Green hydrogen can become a pillar of Nepal’s energy strategy, contributing to economic growth and net-zero commitments
Green hydrogen has emerged as one of the most promising energy carriers for achieving net-zero carbon targets globally in recent years. Green hydrogen can address two immediate challenges in the energy transition: decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors and ensuring energy storage for intermittent renewable sources with its ability to store renewable electricity in chemical form. As a signatory to the Paris Agreement and participant in recent COPs, Nepal has pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2045 and become carbon negative thereafter. The country’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) emphasizes scaling up renewable energy and exploring low-carbon technologies to meet its climate goals.
With abundant hydropower potential, year-round clean water from the Himalayas and seasonal mismatches between electricity supply and demand, Nepal is well-positioned to use excess hydropower for hydrogen production. By 2035, this country intends to produce 28,500 MW of electricity power (15,000 MW to export and 13,500 MW to be used locally), which leaves a possible surplus of up to 20,919 MW. This surplus could produce around 3m tons of green hydrogen annually, meeting up to 1.7–2.2 percent of the projected global demand of 150–195m tons in 2035. This represents a major opportunity to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuel, enhance energy security and establish a new green industry. However, economic viability assessment of the proposed practice is essential in transitioning potential into practice. Thus, this article analyses the economic viability of green hydrogen production in Nepal.
Economic assessment
The economic viability of green hydrogen production in Nepal depends on both the capital investment (CAPEX) required to build the facility and the operational expenditure (OPEX) for its ongoing operation. The total CAPEX of the Green Hydrogen Production Plant is usually divided into several major subsystems. The electrolyzer system represents the most significant portion of the total CAPEX (about 45 percent). The system includes stacks, power electronics and control units. The storage and compression of Hydrogen comprises approximately 20 percent in the form of high-pressure vessels, compressors and safety systems. Balance-of-plant (BoP) requires about 15 percent of the total, which includes piping, valves, instrumentation and electrical interconnections. The water purification system constitutes approximately five percent, which is crucial in producing high-purity deionized water in electrolysis. The remaining 15 percent is land acquisition and infrastructure development, which includes foundation, civil works, access roads and utility connections.
The most significant component of the operation expenditure (OPEX) of such a facility is the electricity cost, comprising 65-70 percent of the annual operating cost, since the electrolysis process is energy-intensive and the cost of electricity is a significant factor affecting the price of hydrogen. Maintenance covers about 10 percent of the total, including regular inspection, component changes and system service. Human resources cost account for about eight percent, including plant operators, engineers and administrative staff. The remaining 12-17 percent will be classified under miscellaneous expenses that will incorporate insurance, safety compliance, spare parts inventory and miscellaneous overheads.
For instance, considering that the Government of Nepal has already waived customs and income tax on hydrogen production equipment for the next five years as per the fiscal budget of FY 2025-26, and that the cost of each plant component (electrolyzer, storage, balance-of-plant, purification systems, land and infrastructure) generally aligns with global benchmarks, a 500-kW green hydrogen plant in Nepal is estimated to require a total CAPEX of about Rs 500m ($3.67m) with an annual OPEX of around Rs 65m ($0.477m). A 1 MW facility would cost approximately Rs 900m ($6.62m) in CAPEX and Rs 135m ($0.99m) in OPEX. In comparison, a 2 MW green hydrogen production plant with an integrated oxygen recovery and bottling facility is estimated to require a total CAPEX of Rs 1.63bn ($11.98m), with an annual OPEX of Rs 255m ($1.87m), where Rs 200m ($1.47m) is solely covered by electricity cost. Thus, the CAPEX–OPEX profile highlights the importance of securing low-cost renewable electricity, optimizing system efficiency and monetizing by-products for Nepal to establish a cost-competitive green hydrogen sector. The relatively high proportion of electrolyzer and storage costs in CAPEX suggests that technological advancements and economies of scale will be critical to cost reductions over the coming decade.
The construction period for green hydrogen projects depends on plant capacity, supply chain lead times and site conditions. In Nepal’s context, a 500-kW plant can typically be completed within 9–12 months, including site preparation, procurement and commissioning. A 1 MW plant may require 14–18 months, while a 2 MW facility, given its greater storage, compression, and civil work requirements, can take 18–24 months. Streamlining regulatory approvals and integrating the hydrogen facility with existing hydropower plants can reduce timelines by up to 20 percent.
Economic viability
Numerous countries and entities are trying to lower the price of green hydrogen. As a new and capital-intensive form of technology, it must be made less expensive to scale up. On a per-kilogram basis, 60–70 percent of the production cost is attributed to electricity, 0.5–1 percent to water, 8–15 percent to CAPEX and 2–4 percent to other operational expenses. Currently, the worldwide price to generate green hydrogen is between $3 and $8 per kg, whereas in 2035 it is estimated to be $1.3-$2.3 per kg. Since Nepal has access to cheap electricity and clean water, it is estimated that the production costs will be between $1.2-$1.8 per kg by 2035, making Nepal’s hydrogen very cost-competitive.
A detailed cost analysis indicates that a 2 MW electrolyzer represents the optimal scale for Nepal’s initial green hydrogen projects, producing hydrogen at approximately Rs 1,812/kg ($13.32/kg) based on current electricity rates (Rs 11/kWh, i.e. $0.08/kWh). This mid-range capacity strikes a critical balance—delivering economies of scale without the prohibitive costs of larger plants, as costs initially decrease from small to medium scales, rise slightly between 2-5 MW due to balance-of-system complexities, and then drop again for 10+MW capacities. With a manageable capital investment of around Rs 1.64bn ($12.05m), the 2 MW model offers commercial viability while remaining scalable for future expansion. Furthermore, if subsidized electricity rates (Rs 3/kWh, i.e. $0.02/kWh) are applied, production costs could fall to ~Rs 1,372/kg (~$10.08/kg) and at an intermediate tariff of
Rs 6/kWh ($0.04/kWh), production costs for a 2MW plant are estimated at Rs 1,537/kg ($11.3/kg), reinforcing Nepal's potential to establish a cost-competitive green hydrogen industry that aligns with domestic energy goals and emerging global market opportunities.
Land requirement and site selection
The establishment of green hydrogen production facilities in Nepal requires careful consideration of land availability, terrain, accessibility and proximity to essential resources. For electrolysis plants, land is primarily allocated to the electrolyzer building and power conditioning units (25 percent of total area), hydrogen storage and compression facilities (20 percent), oxygen recovery and bottling units (15 percent), balance-of-plant (BoP) systems including piping and workshops (15 percent), water treatment and purification systems (10 percent), and access roads, green buffers and safety exclusion zones (15 percent). Based on global benchmarks, a 2 MW green hydrogen production facility typically requires around 1.2 acres (~4,856 m²), which could be arranged as 70 m × 70 m.
In the context of Nepal, site selection should be nearer to the large hydropower plants to cut down on transmission losses and infrastructure costs. Sites around Bagmati, Gandaki and Koshi provinces, which already have or are planning to have large-scale hydropower plants, seem to be the most appropriate. Areas near the transmission substations, accessible roads for transporting heavy equipment and water sources are also critical. The site should not be near dense population areas so that the high-pressure hydrogen storage that would be used would not pose too many safety issues. Integrating the hydrogen plants with other hydropower plants or as extensions to existing ones would make the issues of land acquisition simpler and would ensure a constant supply of electricity, especially during low-demand periods when surplus electricity from hydropower is available.
Oxygen as a by-product
Electrolysis produces oxygen alongside hydrogen (8 kg of oxygen per 1 kg of hydrogen). This by-product can be monetized, improving project economics. For instance, a 2 MW plant operating for 8,000 hours annually equates to over 6,376 kg of oxygen daily. Nepal currently operates around 25 oxygen plants producing 80,000–85,000 kg per day, serving both medical (60 percent) and industrial (40 percent) sectors. The additional supply from green hydrogen projects could strengthen domestic oxygen security, particularly during health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, when oxygen shortages became critical. This oxygen can be compressed and bottled for sale to hospitals, industries such as steel and glass manufacturing and water treatment facilities. A dedicated 2 MW by-product oxygen production facility would require a CAPEX of about Rs 145m, producing 6,376 kg of oxygen per day, equivalent to approximately 744 high-pressure medical-grade cylinders daily, where each cylinder has a volume of 40 liters filled at 150 bar pressure (equivalent to 6,000 liters at atmospheric pressure). At a market price of Rs 600 per 40-liter cylinder, this output could generate annual revenue of around Rs 162m. The oxygen revenue stream can significantly offset hydrogen production costs, potentially reducing the effective cost per kilogram of hydrogen by 5–10 percent depending on market demand and selling prices.
Conclusion
Nepal has significant potential to establish a green hydrogen industry due to its abundant hydropower resources, clean water access and increasing commitment to decarbonization. The economic assessment for Nepal’s green hydrogen production suggests that the country’s first commercial pilot project could be implemented at scales of 500 kW, 750 kW, 1 MW, or 2 MW, out of which the 2 MW facility stands out as the optimum and most economically viable choice so far. The output potential of a 2 MW facility is about 800 kg of green hydrogen daily. If all production is consumed, the project would achieve an internal rate of return (IRR) of 10–11 percent and a payback period (PBP) of 6–8 years under varying electricity tariffs from Rs 3 ($0.02) to Rs 11 ($0.08) per kWh.
The most immediate application of such a pilot project would be establishing a green hydrogen–fueled transportation ecosystem in Nepal. With a daily hydrogen production target of 800 kg, approximately 20 fuel-cell buses could be operated daily. This would replace diesel consumption and avoid around 1,956 tonnes of CO₂ emissions yearly, contributing to roughly 0.041 percent of Nepal’s total annual transport sector CO₂ emissions. While the electricity prices currently render the production prices of small to mid-scale plants to be on the higher side, these can be lowered substantially with the right subsidy policies, scaling up of technology and monetization of by-products. A phased approach, starting with strategically located 2 MW facilities near hydropower plants, can validate technical performance, establish market links and create a skilled workforce. As global costs decline and demand rises, Nepal can scale production to tap into regional export markets, particularly India, Bangladesh and other South Asian nations transitioning to cleaner energy.
Green hydrogen not only offers a pathway to reduce Nepal’s fossil fuel imports and improve energy security but also positions the country as a potential exporter in a rapidly expanding global market. With supportive policies, public–private partnerships and infrastructure investments, green hydrogen could become a pillar of Nepal’s energy strategy, contributing to economic growth and the nation’s commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2045.
When the law gives polygamy a wink
The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA) recently introduced a draft amendment to Section 175 of the National Penal Code Act, 2017 concerning the conditions under which a marriage is deemed void. The proposal drew widespread opposition from Parliament, women’s rights activists, human rights defenders and the public for containing a controversial provision: if a child is born or a woman is pregnant from a second relationship, that relationship would not be voided solely for being polygamous. Critics and rights advocates have termed the clause “regressive,” warning it creates a legal loophole that legitimizes polygamy.
Against this backdrop, this article begins by outlining the core provisions of the proposed amendment to the National Penal Code. It then critically examines the underlying logic driving the proposal, highlighting its internal weaknesses and inconsistencies. The discussion proceeds to interrogate the deeper assumptions embedded in the lawmaking process—particularly the troubling stereotype about men’s nature and behavior that the amendment appears to endorse—and demonstrates why these assumptions are both inaccurate and harmful. Finally, the article explains how the proposed amendment contradicts Nepal’s national legal framework and concludes with recommendations for a constructive way forward.
Explanation of the provision
Nepal banned polygamy more than 60 years ago with the introduction of the Muluki Ain (National Code) in 1963, which made polygamy a punishable offence but did not allow such marriages to be annulled. This changed in 2017 when the National Penal Code Act 2017 introduced a provision in Section 175 that automatically voids a second marriage if the first one is still legally valid. The Criminal Code also set penalties under Section 175, stating that a man who marries another woman while still married can face up to five years in prison and a fine of up to Rs 50,000.
The proposed amendment mentions that if a child has already been born from the marital relationship or if the woman is pregnant, such marriage shall not be annulled solely on the grounds that the person has been punished for the offence of polygamy. This is a significant deviation from the earlier provision, which automatically voided a second marriage if the first marriage was still valid. Critics argue that this proposed clause could make it easier for individuals to commit polygamy by simply serving the punishment while retaining the marriage.
When logic takes a backseat
“If a man no longer shares a heartfelt relationship with his wife and then develops a relationship with another woman—resulting in the birth of a child—yet does not formalize the relationship through marriage, the second woman’s life can be devastated. In many such cases, a large number of women end up abandoned and on the streets”, this quote from the Secretary of the Ministry of Law Parashwor Dhungana summarizes the key logic presented by the amendment proposer to the law. But a thorough examination of the logic behind the proposed amendment exposes deeply flawed assumptions. The proposal starts with the premise that some men engage in extramarital affairs—and assumes these affairs inevitably involve physical intercourse. It then leaps to the conclusion that such intercourse will almost certainly lead to conception and the birth of a child. Based on this shaky foundation, the amendment argues that the mother and child born from such unions will face legal, social and cultural hardships if the second marriage is annulled. The solution? Legalize polygamy to “protect” their rights.
But this so-called protection hides a troubling contradiction. While it claims to protect women and children, it ends up encouraging extramarital affairs, approving relationships outside marriage and even allowing men to father children in such situations. In doing so, it risks making polygamy seem acceptable, all under the cover of safeguarding rights.
Worse still, the provision allows this cycle to continue indefinitely, limited only by a man’s reproductive capacity. It effectively permits men to bypass existing anti-polygamy laws and engage in multiple simultaneous marriages. This undermines the very legal and moral framework that sustains monogamous marriage and family integrity.
Creatures of uncontrollable urges?
The proposed amendment assumes men are driven primarily by uncontrollable sexual urges and biological imperatives, effectively stripping them of their agency, responsibility and dignity. This depiction reduces men to nothing more than violent actors whose actions must be tolerated or legally accommodated, regardless of the moral or social consequences. Such a portrayal is a serious mischaracterization that unjustly paints men as incapable of self-control, fidelity, or respect for the law.
This assumption is not only inaccurate but profoundly unfair. It denies men their capacity for ethical decision-making and holds them to a double standard that excuses illegal behavior under the guise of biological necessity. To portray men as inherently unable to resist extramarital relationships or as individuals whose reproductive acts supersede their legal obligations is to condemn them unjustly and deny their full humanity.
Furthermore, this portrayal entrenches harmful stereotypes that reinforce patriarchal norms, suggesting that men deserve special legal privileges simply because their biology “demands” it. This is not only damaging to men’s social and moral standing but also undermines the principles of justice, equality, and personal accountability that any fair legal system must uphold.
Contradiction with legal framework
The proposed amendment, though intended to protect mothers and children, contradicts Nepal’s constitutional provisions, national laws and international human rights obligations. It undermines the Muluki Civil Code, 2017, and the National Criminal (Penal) Code, 2017, which criminalize polygamy and safeguard marital equality. Constitutionally, it breaches Article 38, which guarantees women’s rights, and Article 18, which ensures equality before the law. Internationally, it violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Article 16), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, Article 16), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Articles 3 and 23), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, Article 10), all of which uphold equality in marriage, protect women’s dignity, and prohibit practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality.
Consequences and the way forward
In the last fiscal year alone, 521 out of 1,198 women, who approached the National Women Commission, were victims of husbands’ extramarital affairs. Many married men involved in these affairs were found to be living in “live-in relationships” with other women—an arrangement unregulated by Nepal’s laws—leaving their wives vulnerable to violence and exploitation. Reports from the Office of the Attorney General reveal that in the first four years after the National Criminal (Penal) Code came into force, district courts registered an average of 850 polygamy cases each year. Nepal Police data show 653 polygamy cases in 2080–81 alone, with the actual number likely far higher due to underreporting driven by family honor, lack of awareness, fear and social stigma.
Given this alarming situation, the proposed amendment—if enacted—would create dangerous legal loopholes for polygamy, fueling a surge in gender-based violence, domestic abuse and sexual exploitation beyond anything Nepal has yet faced. The government cannot claim ignorance of these consequences. Therefore, to address this, the first step must be to scrap this proposed amendment without delay. The second is to strengthen the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that no law in Nepal undermines the rights, dignity and safety of women. The third step is to foster a transparent environment where wider and meaningful consultation takes place before any law is discussed or passed.
The author is a researcher with an interest in the intersection of media and gender
Amendment to Polygamy Law: Legal reform or gendered injustice?
The Council of Ministers, after massive protests from all sides, has decided to form a task force to revise the draft amendment on polygamy law in Nepal. Before this decision, Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Ajay Kumar Chaurasiya, had clarified: the government is not seeking to promote polygamy through the proposed legal amendment, and the aim is to protect the rights of children born out of wedlock. This kind of framing shifts the burden of accountability from the legal system to individual cases of infidelity and dysfunctional marriages, treating them as aberrations rather than manifestations of systemic failure. The narrative exposes the entangled relationship between law, gender and society, while raising broader questions about who bears the consequences, and what voices and lens shape the marriage law in Nepal?
Despite the government’s decision to rethink the amendment, there needs to be a critical uprising until it is reverted. In this article, I argue that the proposed amendment will reinforce the systemic treatment of marriage as a means to establish paternity, and it is acutely detrimental to gender justice in Nepal.
(Ir)relevance of the proposed amendment
The current marriage law requires children to bear their father’s (sur)name to be considered “legitimate”. The Nepali women’s struggle for their identity, their household and economic roles in raising children are undermined. Firstly, the amendment will reaffirm that biological fathers are accountable solely through marriage, while falsely viewing them as well-equipped guardians, always capable of providing and protecting. The widely perceived, dominant masculine role of men as the ultimate provider is legitimized, while it should have been that of a duty-sharer and an equal partner in current times where women’s rights as human rights have been widely-globally ratified. Moreover, the Constitution of Nepal guarantees gender equality as an enforceable right.
Secondly, the amendment will maintain the notion that marriage is primarily a means to legitimize a fathers’ role as a patriarch. There is no alternative legal means for a Nepali woman to demand economic and social responsibilities of fathers for the children born outside marriage. The amendment is further going to perpetuate this systemic malfunction, rather than providing a reasonable recourse for the parties involved.
The minister asserts that the law still stands against polygamy in other circumstances besides those that do not require such “compensation”. Marriage, one or multiple, cannot be an effective reparation in itself. It is a social institution embedded with complex gender power relations.
In heteronormative patriarchal cultures, central to sustainable marriage has been the ideal conduct of wives, not of husbands. Unofficial unions are often secret affairs. Wives are expected to be forgiving and accepting, while the second woman is demonized as the “home breaker”. The husband’s social status is not much affected because the notion related to men as hypersexual “polygamous” beings is widely internalized. The proposed amendment will provide legal cover to men who have unofficially married multiple women or fathered children outside marriage. The affected women and children on both sides will still have to navigate stigma, having to uphold family honor. Thus, polygamy remains a problem and allowing it under specific circumstances does not play a compensatory role, just legitimizes marriage for the purpose of patrilineal recognition.
The paradox of legal reform
Despite the constitutional mandate for gender equality, the marriage law in Nepal is mired in contradictions.
Chapter 1 (Provisions relating to marriage), Section 68 describes marriage as “a permanent, inviolable and holy social and legal bond”, a sacred institution which should not be dissolved, and that the law will try to keep intact. The reality of diverse unintended marital consequences where either party indulges in multiple unofficial sexual/romantic relationships contradicts with this definition.
How many such “inviolable alliances” a man is allowed for his children to be legitimized? Does official marriage guarantee an accountable fatherhood and functional spousal relationship? Also, as polyandry is criminalized too, the amendment creates a systemic gender gap, wherein women are morally obliged to be loyal and men get a pass in garb of patrilineal rights. The law then becomes a tool to regulate women’s sexuality through marriage.
In Nepal, the parliament is mandated to ratify all legal decisions, any legal gap that is addressed by the parliament is based on value judgement. The value judgements should ideally be based on the principles of natural justice, and notion of liberty and equality. This contradicts with the legal framework guided by historically dominant Brahminical Hindu supremacy. Hindu male scholars in the past have portrayed women’s identity in their scriptures as child bearing entities, whose character and conduct should be regulated by “virtuous” men for better procreation. The law defines and regulates the essence of marriage through the very lens. Already problematic, this further puts the inclusion and diversity issue within the parliament as well as the judicial bench under spotlight. Whose voices shape the law in a nation with vastly diverse ethnicities? What power frameworks underpin, and what theories constitute the notion of “liberty” for lawmakers and judicial committees?
Reflecting further, through “compensation” narrative, evidently, the law views women (both in official and unofficial union) in victimhood realm, which warrants recompense, male-protection and dependency.
Alternatively, a legal approach to viewing women as agents opens ways for understanding their choices, needs and gendered predicaments in complex relationships. And, it is also important to assess the patriarchal elements, the ground-level, systemic and dysfunctional situations under which enable such relationships to unfold and majorly affect women. The law should seek to explore what are the regional and global precedents of individuals navigating through such relationships through law? How have the women, men and children been legally supported in those circumstances, without permitting polygamy?
Last but important, in most of the contexts in Nepal, marriage does not involve merely a husband-wife relationship. The power bestowed on the groom as a patriarch extends to his paternal side of the family, multiplying control, surveillance and potential abuse of the bride. Further intersecting issues such as dowry system, obsessive patrilineal claim over children undermine mother’s decisions and rights, intercaste dynamics, etc. There is legal evidence of these factors compounding to affect women disproportionately in Nepal. Legitimizing polygamy under any circumstance will thus fuel violence against women, and lead to proliferated gender conflicts, dysfunctional families and neglected children in the long run.
In conclusion, there needs to be a sincere discourse around the legally mainstreamed patrilineal legitimacy to begin with. It is high time that the lawmakers do not take patriarchy as a given framework to draft laws. For now, the counterproductive, myopic and gender-biased decision for the amendment needs to be reversed immediately.
Changing news consumption behavior
For a long time, Nepali media took its audience for granted. Little to no research was done on reader profiles, content preferences, audience engagement or even on circulation research and readability research which form the backbone of effective print media.
Similarly, there has been a complete lack of audience ratings research for radio and television. In the absence of such insights, audiences were expected to consume and believe whatever content was disseminated. The result of this one-sided dynamic has been disastrous as traditional media are now struggling to retain its audience.
In the 20th century, audiences did not have many ways to consume the news. The relationship between media and audiences was largely one-way traffic, and audience engagement was limited to occasional letters to the editor or phone calls.
Radio, television and print were used to influence and control public opinion, often pushing through specific narratives. Audiences were viewed as passive recipients of information, and media houses operated under the assumptions of the “magic bullet theory” introduced by Harold Laswell in the 20th century. This theory assumed that media messages had a direct, powerful effect on a passive audience.
Although audiences may have had grievances, they either did not have a channel to register their feedback or media houses simply ignored their feedback. In contrast, the digital era introduced the “two-step flow theory” which seeks greater audience participation, engagement and feedback. Still, the remnants of the old bullet theory persist in the Nepali media landscape, albeit in subtler forms.
In Nepal, things began to change with the advent and subsequent expansion of the internet. By early 2000, online news platforms began to emerge. Unlike traditional outlets, these platforms introduced comment sections from the outset, giving readers space to express their opinion and to engage with content.
The internet, and the broader digitization of Nepali society, transformed the country’s media sphere. While audiences in the past had limited access to news, they are now inundated with options. More importantly, they now have direct access to primary sources such as government press releases, official documents and reports. This allows them to compare what media houses report with the original information and identify discrepancies.
Meanwhile, the exponential rise of social media began reshaping how Nepali people consumed news. Traditional media lost its monopoly over the creation and dissemination of information. Ironically, media houses themselves rushed to social platforms to share their contents, often produced with significant investment, without a clear strategy for engagement or monetization.
At the same time, internet access expanded even to remote areas for Nepal, becoming affordable even for low-income communities. Equipped with smartphones and internet access, audiences began spending more time on platforms like Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). Global studies show that between 2008 and 2018, these platforms led to a fundamental shift in new consumption. Today, however, TikTok has overtaken both as a primary source of information for many users.
When media houses began sharing their content on social media, it eliminated the need for audiences to turn to newspapers, radio and television for news. Despite this, Nepali media was doing relatively well in terms of revenue and audience before the COVID-19 pandemic. However, once nationwide lockdowns were enforced to curb the spread, the media landscape changed dramatically. For the first time in the history of Nepali media, many print publications halted operations for days. Radio and television also reduced news production significantly. A few online platforms, despite health risks, continued delivering news.
As people remained confined to their homes, they turned to smartphones and digital platforms for information. At the same time, government agencies, private businesses and NGOs relied heavily on social media to communicate with the public. This combination of traditional media’s limited presence and the active role of digital platforms meant that audiences were able to fulfill their information needs without newspapers or TV. In fact, during the COVID era, a significant portion of the audience shifted to social media for news consumption, especially in Nepal. By the time the pandemic subsided, traditional media had lost a last share of its readership and advertising revenue.
Despite these seismic changes, mainstream media in Nepal largely failed to recognize, or respond, to the shifting dynamics of news production, dissemination and consumption. Meanwhile, other platforms like TikTok, Instagram and YouTube, and short-form video formats gained rapid popularity.
For far too long, media houses in Nepal took their audiences for granted. They failed to evolve with changing news consumption behaviors and technological trends. Now, they are faced with a three-fold challenge: finding ways to retain the audience, researching reader preferences and developing sustainable revenue models. This has become a do-or-die situation for the media.
But no scientific research has been conducted in Nepal to understand changing media consumption patterns. Neither regional nor international research organizations have included Nepal in their studies. However, it is evident even without formal data that audiences are consuming news via TikTok and other platforms rather than by reading newspapers and watching television stations.
The Reuters Institute’s Digital News Report, while not focused on Nepal, offers useful insights. The report points out that an accelerating shift toward consumption via social media and video platforms is further diminishing the influence of institutional journalism and fostering a fragmented media ecosystem dominated by podcasters, YouTubers and TikTokers.
The report also states that populist politicians around the world are bypassing traditional journalism, opting instead for friendly partisan outlets and influences. These personalities often gain privileged access, but rarely ask questions. Many of them are involved in spreading disinformation. In many ways, India’s experience mirrors that of Nepal’s, the report says.
According to the Reuters study, Indian audiences show a strong preference for accessing news via smartphones and social media platforms such as YouTube (55 percent), WhatsApp (46 percent), Instagram (37 percent) and Facebook (36 percent), especially among English-speaking users. This trend likely holds true for Nepal as well.
Another global trend that is increasingly evident in Nepal is news fatigue. With decades of political instability, the media has been dominated by repetitive coverage of political wrangling, corruption and the same political figures. On the international front, conflict-heavy news continues to dominate headlines. Audiences are growing tired of this monotony; they no longer want to read or hear the same narratives year after year.
While mainstream media has played an essential role in strengthening democracy, exposing corruption and holding power accountable, it has lagged behind in offering diverse, engaging content. This has contributed to audience fatigue and disinterest.
In conclusion, media houses must rethink their strategy. They need to increase their presence on platforms where audiences are active, especially video-centric platforms like YouTube and TikTok. As gatekeepers of institutional journalism, they still possess the credibility and capacity to serve public interest, but they must listen more to what their audience wants.
This means developing responsive content strategies, adopting audience research methods and creating sustainable digital revenue models. More importantly, it is time to actively implement Audience Engagement Theory, which emphasizes two-way communication and greater interaction with the public. If mainstream media is to stay relevant, it must stop treating its audience as passive recipients and start seeing them as active participants in the media ecosystem.
