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An abrupt incident that occurred in early September 2025 in Nepal was unprecedented on many levels. A peaceful protest, spearheaded by the country’s Generation Z (Gen-Z), evolved into a nationwide outcry against deep-rooted corruption, systemic nepotism, and the controversial ban on social media. The demonstrations, held on September 8 and 9, resulted in unexpected human casualties and extensive socio-economic damage, sending shockwaves throughout the country’s political landscape.

The gravity of these events prompted the formation of an Interim Government tasked with stabilizing the country, restoring public trust, and conducting elections for members of the House of Representatives on March 5, 2026. However, a clear and sustainable roadmap—particularly one ensuring elections on the stated date—remains elusive. Amidst this uncertainty, a window of opportunity has opened: one where critical reforms may be introduced, institutional weaknesses addressed, and the aspirations of a new generation taken seriously.

Key demands

The protests marked a pivotal moment in Nepal’s modern political history—not only because of their scale, but also due to the clarity of Gen-Z’s demands. This generation, born and raised in the post-monarchical, federal democratic era, is no longer willing to accept outdated practices in governance.

Their demands include the establishment of good governance through investigations of all corruption cases from 1990 to 2025 by a competent and trusted body. They have called for the elimination of nepotism and favoritism, as reflected in social media trends against “nepo kids” and “nepo babies.”

They have also expressed their interest in overhauling the current political system and ending long-lasting political leadership. They favor a directly elected executive model and demand comprehensive reform of the electoral system. Their concerns include ensuring transparent and merit-based appointments to high-level positions such as judges, commissioners, and ambassadors. They have also called for a review of the federal structure—particularly the distribution of powers between the federal and provincial levels—along with administrative reforms.

These demands are both ambitious and constitutionally complex, and responding to them will require careful legal, political, and institutional maneuvering.

Constitutional provisions and legal constraints

The Constitution of Nepal provides a degree of flexibility for reform but also contains clear limitations in addressing Gen-Z’s demands. The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is the designated body to investigate corruption, while adjudication lies with the Special Court. There is currently no constitutional provision for an alternative authority to carry out such wide-ranging corruption investigations.

In terms of structural reforms, the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority to approve any change in the form of government, electoral system, or federal structure. Amendments impacting the provincial structure or exclusive provincial powers (as per Schedule 6) require approval from the respective Provincial Assemblies. The Constitution does allow for referendums, but only with a two-thirds majority approval of Parliament.

These processes, while theoretically feasible, are heavily dependent on the cooperation of established political parties—the very institutions whose legitimacy has been called into question by Gen-Z protesters.

Emerging challenges in a volatile political climate

The September 2025 events have placed Nepal’s political status quo under considerable strain. Established political parties, many of which feel threatened by the scale and popularity of the Gen-Z movement, have shown reluctance to endorse investigations or constitutional amendments that may jeopardize their authority.

Several key challenges lie ahead. First, political resistance: the established leadership is unlikely to support any reforms that could lead to their displacement or reduced influence. Second, while the Interim Government has been mandated to conduct elections on March 5, 2026, this may not be feasible without the full cooperation of political parties. Continued protests and ideological conflicts between Gen-Z activists and political traditionalists could deepen societal divides.

Additionally, differences among Gen-Z groups on various issues have also surfaced, potentially weakening their collective strength. Implementing some of Gen-Z’s demands, such as the direct election of the executive, would require major constitutional overhauls. If the transition falters or fails, it could open the door to authoritarian alternatives—a scenario that would be catastrophic for democratic consolidation. Revisiting issues such as federalism and secularism without national consensus could also ignite deeper communal or regional tensions, potentially recalling the decade-long domestic conflict.

Building a constructive roadmap: Immediate and medium-term steps​​​​​​​

To stabilize the political environment and move toward meaningful reform, Nepal must embrace a carefully coordinated and inclusive strategy. The Interim Government must demonstrate impartiality and competence, ensuring legitimacy across all demographic and political lines.

To address the damage caused during the protests, a transparent and independent body should be formed to investigate the events of September 2025, including loss of life, property damage, and underlying grievances. Financial and technical support from development partners will be crucial for implementing systemic reforms and ensuring a credible electoral process.

Launching an inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue on constitutional amendments—particularly electoral reform, federal competencies, and leadership structures—is essential. There is broad understanding among Gen-Z activists and political thinkers that constitutional reform should follow the elections; therefore, dialogues on reform priorities must begin now within civil society, Gen-Z networks, and political parties.

To ensure good governance, a trusted commission must be established to investigate historic corruption cases, without overlapping with the jurisdiction of the CIAA. Robust dialogue among Gen-Z leaders, political parties, civil society, and government bodies should be institutionalized through town hall meetings, one-on-one dialogues, public interactions through media, working groups, and policy forums.

Clear mechanisms should also be developed to include Gen-Z in political discourse—whether through advisory roles, youth assemblies, or integration into party reform processes.

Question of timely elections: Possibilities, pitfalls, and consequences​​​​​​​

Despite uncertainties, there are several positive indicators regarding the upcoming election. The Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) has committed to the scheduled timeline. The Ministry of Finance has confirmed the availability of necessary resources, and most political parties have expressed interest in participating.

However, significant challenges could derail the process, such as continued agitation from both Gen-Z and traditional parties, unmet youth expectations, leadership disputes within parties, and corruption probes linked to the September events. If these risks are not addressed, the election may either be postponed or produce outcomes unacceptable to large segments of the population, particularly the youth.

Role of Civil Society: The contribution of NLS and GEOC

Civil society organizations such as the Nepal Law Society (NLS) and the General Election Observation Committee (GEOC) have a critical role to play in facilitating this transition. Both organizations have been involved in the observation of several elections in the past.

The NLS, in particular, has supported the constitution-making process by providing independent forums for dialogue on key issues, policy guidance, and capacity development. In the current context, their contributions can include:

• Building coordination mechanisms among Gen-Z, political parties, and the government;

• Supporting electoral preparations through legal advice, technical expertise, and observation;

• Promoting public dialogue through workshops, interactions, and publications;

• Advising on constitutional reforms, including drafting model amendments;

• Monitoring corruption and ensuring transparency and public trust; and

• Mediating conflicts and preventing escalation through peaceful negotiation platforms.

These organizations can serve as neutral venues bridging competing forces, upholding both legal integrity and democratic aspirations.

Conclusion: From crisis to opportunity

Nepal stands at a critical juncture in its democratic evolution. The Gen-Z protests have not only exposed long-standing governance failures but also ignited a national conversation on constitutional and governance reform and the future of leadership.

This moment presents an opportunity to establish a people-centric, democratic, accountable, transparent, and ethical system of governance. The Interim Government, political parties, civil society, and international partners must now seize this moment—not to suppress dissent, but to channel it constructively.

By embracing transparency, accountability, and inclusivity, Nepal can emerge from this period not only with a renewed political mandate but also with stronger democratic foundations for a prosperous future.

(Pradhan is Chief Executive Director of the Nepal Law Society and Secretary General of the General Election Observation Committee.)

The Sushila Karki Cabinet is still incomplete, though she has included ministers in two lots. Perhaps, she is finding it difficult to choose ministers as she has to balance between the nominees of different GenZ groups on the one hand and their efficiency and honesty, on the other. The GenZ movement overthrew the Oli government through mass protests held on Sept 8 and 9 after the government crackdown on social media, which had been giving a people fed up with rampant corruption, bad governance, nepotism, lavish lifestyles of political leaders and their near and dear ones, political instability and an uncertain future, a platform to vent out their anger and frustration. 

The rally, which saw a significant number of students in school uniform, was almost without any leadership. The unleashing of the police force in the massive protest resulted in the death of 19 protesters, which sparked counterviolence that turned government buildings, media, business houses, banks and hotels etc into a cinder throughout the country.

Sadly, the mass, which lacked leadership, was hijacked by those groups who wanted to take revenge against not only the political leaders but also against government institutions and commercial institutions against whom they had some grudges like those who were dissatisfied with the present democratic setup, living standards of the leaders and their relatives and deprived of misusing of the state fund and natural resources. The security agencies were unable to stop the arson and vandalism.

The present condition is not the outcome of the failures of one government or two. It is an accumulative effect of the past, as rulers did not care for the welfare of the commoners. The Nepali state always remained a political project and never became a peoples’ project. Of course, the present predicament hastened the scenario to unfurl. The  country has enough foreign exchange due to increasing remittances, on the one hand and about 5-6m workers working aboard and about two thousand departing daily by air despite a large number of people from the western districts going to India, on the other.

The Nepal valley (the Kathmandu valley) became a Nepal state with the political project of Gorkha King Prithvi Narayan Shah of expanding the boundaries of his tiny principality. It materialized with the capturing of the Kathmandu valley, in 1769. Its boundaries  went on expanding until it was stopped by Kangra (India) and the British East India Company, which was equally expanding its territories. The company squished the border through a (controversial) Treaty of Sugauli in 1816. The Rana regime extended support to the British in both World Wars to keep them in good humour and keep their political project intact.

However, the resentment among the people, dissatisfaction of King Tribhuvan and Nepali Congress’ armed revolution in 1950 needed negotiations in Delhi, which resulted in a ‘Compromise Formula’ that pledged to establish democracy through a constitution promulgated through an elected Constituent Assembly (CA), provide recognition to the King, give continuity to the Rana Prime Minister and form a coalition government with the Nepali Congress. The deal was not fully implemented.

The resurrected Shah dynasty continued its earlier stand on its political project. King  Mahendra ignored the CA issue and proclaimed a constitution to hold parliamentary elections. Within 18 months, he dissolved the elected government and parliament, and introduced a partyless Panchayat system. King Birendra followed suit.

The 1990 people’s movement reintroduced the parliamentary system. But it could not last long due to the internal bickering of the Nepali Congress and the decade-long Maoists insurgency. After the assassination of King Birendra, King Gyanendra, who sought to rule directly, forced the seven political parties to join hands with the Maoists against the monarchy. Consequently, another people’s movement in 2006 overthrew it. The elected CA adopted an all-inclusive constitution with federalism in 2015.

During the last 74 years (1951-2025) there were 59 changes of government. Significantly, the instability continued as the latest government is the 15th since 2006.The frequent changes were necessitated only to satisfy the insatiable greed of leaders to acquire power and continue to hold as long as possible and also to accumulate unlimited wealth by any means that led to corruption and misrule. 

The challenges before the GenZ movement are enormous. It was easy to overthrow a beleaguered government but eradicating deeply-entrenched corruption will be a Herculean task. The strong collusion between politicians, bureaucracy, security agencies and judiciary will not allow any effort to eliminate it, as each of them will defend the rest for its own safety. To ensure that the government does not deviate from their chosen direction, GenZs have to keep a close watch; otherwise their sacrifice will be fruitless.

Views are personal

The recent wave of youth-led activism in Nepal—the GenZ revolt—has rightly torn open the rotten underbelly of political corruption, nepotism and dynastic power. It has been a blistering attack on Singhadurbar, the symbolic heart of governmental misrule.

Yet, if this revolt stops at the political gates, it will fail to uproot the deeper, more insidious culture of unaccountability that suffocates this country. The next frontier lies not only beyond Parliament but across the entire landscape of privileged power—inside the polished offices of NGOs and INGOs, the judiciary, the armed forces, the bureaucracy, the corporations, and, most critically, the compromised media establishment. The revolution must now move from a critique of politicians to a critique of all elites.

A compromised watchdog

A free and independent press is often called the fourth pillar of democracy. But in Nepal, that pillar has been hollowed out—eaten away by political alignment, corporate control and donor dependency. When a watchdog becomes dependent on the hand that feeds it, it no longer barks; it guards the master’s house.

Many so-called “independent” outlets are owned by business families or political investors whose real interest lies not in journalism but in influence. Editorial lines are quietly auctioned off to whoever offers the most—in advertising, contracts or access. Government and corporate advertising now function as veiled bribes, buying silence or favorable coverage. Investigative journalism—the heartbeat of democratic accountability—has been replaced by a toxic blend of propaganda, sensationalism, and self-censorship.

The NGO elite

Corruption does not stop at Singhadurbar or in media newsrooms; it extends deep into the NGO and INGO world that claims to represent the “voice of civil society.” For far too long, the development sector has worn the halo of moral superiority while operating as a parallel elite structure—opaque, unaccountable and self-perpetuating.

Founders of major NGOs often treat their organizations as personal estates, remaining chairpersons or executive directors for decades, drawing high salaries, controlling grants and filling boards with loyalists who block reform. Just as politicians are not meant to rule for life, civil society and NGO leaders must also retire from their high-paid, benefit-laden positions after a few years. Activism is not a career ladder or a lifetime pension; it is a public service.

Nepal’s NGO ecosystem has become a closed circuit of privilege where the same names circulate across boards, consultancies and “capacity-building” projects. Development work is too often reduced to a marketplace of donor contracts, where accountability is measured by paperwork rather than people’s progress. Audit reports verify numbers, not ethics; receipts, not results. If audits were enough, there would be no corruption anywhere in the world.

Donors also bear responsibility. They must not fund the same NGOs and INGOs for decades, especially those whose operating costs and salaries absorb the bulk of development budgets. Instead, international and domestic funding should support smaller NGOs and local civil society groups, empowering genuine grassroots initiatives rather than perpetuating elite monopolies.

Radical transparency

The moral strength of the GenZ movement lies in its uncompromising demand for radical transparency. That demand must extend to every sphere of power—political, bureaucratic, corporate, media, and NGO. Every institution that receives public, corporate or donor funds must be open to citizen scrutiny.

NGOs and INGOs must publicly disclose their total donor funds, salary scales, consultant fees, and operational expenses. Media houses must declare their true ownership and major advertisers, especially those linked to political or corporate entities. Judges, generals, chief editors and NGO directors—anyone wielding public influence—must be required to disclose their assets. Transparency is not a political weapon; it is the foundation of public trust.

The solution: CWGG

To make accountability a living reality, Nepal needs a Citizen Watchdog and Good Governance (CWGG) body—an independent, non-political civic mechanism that bridges people and power. This body would enforce accountability by receiving and tracking complaints of corruption, mismanagement, and nepotism across all sectors. It would verify impact through youth-led, community-based monitoring before forwarding substantiated cases to the appropriate legal authorities. And it would empower citizens by serving as a civic advisory hub—providing reliable, unbiased information about essential public processes: how to seek justice in domestic violence cases, apply for a driving license, follow legal procedures for foreign employment, take loans from banks or cooperatives, file lawsuits, access free legal aid, register to vote, or start a small business, etc.

In short, the CWGG would replace confusion and exploitation with clarity and empowerment—helping ordinary people make informed decisions and reclaim agency over their lives. Nepal’s fight against corruption is no longer a two-front war between the people and politicians. It is a multi-front moral revolution. The same scrutiny that brought Singhadurbar to its knees must now reach the air-conditioned boardrooms of NGOs, the glass offices of corporate media and the donor-funded corridors of “development.”

Universal ethics

GenZ is the only generation bold enough to confront all these elites and rebuild Nepal on the foundation of radical honesty and collective accountability. The revolution has only begun. The next 'obstacle to democracy' is not just inside Singhadurbar—it is also sitting comfortably in the name of “development,” “governance,” and even “press freedom.”

The repeated promulgation of constitutions shows that Nepal has been a constitutional laboratory for experimenting with various democratic models. From the Rana oligarchy to absolute kingship, the partyless Hindu monarchy, multiparty democracy and now a federal republican system, the country has transitioned through diverse political frameworks. After decades under the unitary system, Nepal has embraced federalism since 2015. 

These transitions reveal that Nepal has adopted a new constitution almost every decade in a span of 75 years. Recently, some groups have started advocating for a directly-elected executive form of government—the only model yet untested. The recurring failure of political leadership is often mistaken as the failure of constitutions, prompting public frustration and calls for change. However, no constitutional reform can succeed without honest, visionary and committed leadership. 

In the 1940s, public outrage ended the Rana regime. During the 1950s, King Tribhuvan restored monarchical authority, and later King Mahendra imposed a partyless system that faced strong public resistance. In response, King Birendra promulgated the 1990 constitution, recognizing multiparty democracy. Yet, it was later replaced by the interim constitution of 2007, which in turn gave way to the 2015 constitution—the first drafted by people's elected representatives as mandated by the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord that formally ended the decade long (1996-2006) Maoist insurgency.

Chronicles of change  

Of Nepal’s seven Constitutions, the Government of Nepal Act, 1948 was the first constitutional document. However, it did not vest sovereignty in the people of Nepal. 

Professor Laxmi Prasad Kharel, in Comparative Law and Nepalese Legal System, observed that the 1948 Act was “doomed to die from its inception”—the Ranas opposed sharing power, and the people rejected it for failing to meet their expectations. 

During the Rana era (1846–1951), state power was monopolized by the Rana family. Jung Bahadur (1817–77) seized power in 1846 and made himself permanent prime minister.

In 1951, an Interim Constitution was introduced but King Tribhuvan failed to fulfil his promise of establishing a constituent assembly. The King retained the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and Ministers and the cabinet functioned at his pleasure. The interim constitution lasted eight years, during which King Mahendra ascended the throne and imposed a direct rule on 1 Feb 1958, governing nearly two years without any constitution. 

In 1959, King Mahendra promulgated a new constitution where the Cabinet was accountable not only to the parliament but also to the King. He retained sweeping powers, including the power to dissolve the government and lower house and declare emergency under Article 55—making him politically supreme. In 1962, he replaced it with another constitution establishing the party-less Panchayat system, combining monarchical and parliamentary features. It banned political parties and imposed discriminatory citizenship provisions requiring knowledge of Nepali language. 

The 1962 constitution was replaced by the 1990 constitution, adopted after the people’s movement. The 1990 constitution introduced a multi-party democracy system and an independent judiciary. 

Federal dreams  

The 1990 constitution also failed to survive for long. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007 was crafted through a political understanding following the abolition of the constitutional monarchy. It served as a transitional framework until a new constitution could be promulgated through the Constituent Assembly. 

The interim constitution, 2007 was the first Constitution to be written by Members of Parliament. It mandated the Constituent Assembly to enact a formal Constitution institutionalizing republicanism, federalism and secularism. 

During the period of 2007 to 2015, “The first priority today has to be the creation of a truly federal, democratic, republican political system and to ensure its development rising above the party-political lines and transient priorities. This task cannot be accomplished by limiting oneself to a certain political ism or anti-ism,” observes political scientist and professor Krishna Khanal in his book Federalism in Nepal: Management and Implementation.

Prof Bipin Adhikari in his book, Salient Features of the Constitution of Nepal, 2015, observes that inclusivity and diversity are the core focus of the 2015 constitution. However, Nepal’s journey toward inclusion depends, to a great extent, on the quality of democracy and constitutionalism it will achieve on the foundation of its constitution, argues Prof Adhikari in another book, From Exclusion to Inclusion: Crafting a New Legal Regime in Nepal. 

So, how can one discredit the progressive features of the current constitution? We can find hope in every political movement, but in Nepal’s case, the political transformations have, often, failed to deliver. Frequent repeal or enactment of constitutions cannot be considered a yardstick of a healthy democracy. Rather, the actual implementation of the constitution should serve as the foundation for good governance and a truly healthy democracy.   

Let’s build, not blame 

The problems in politics should not be mistaken for problems in the constitution. Merely testing different constitutional models cannot provide a lasting solution. The enactment of a constitution is not a magic stick to transform the state. What Nepal needs now is collective commitment to effectively implement the constitution. 

Conflicting provisions, if any, can always be amended through due process. Actual transformation can be achieved through constitutional stability, not through frequent changes of constitutions.  Weak governance, a politically influenced administration and public dissatisfaction with political leadership are to blame for the current mess, not the constitution.