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Political debates in Nepal often revolve around constitutions, coalitions, and leadership changes. Yet one fundamental reality receives far less attention: political stability rarely precedes economic stability. In most successful societies, the sequence is reversed. Economic empowerment creates stability, and stability, in turn, reinforces good governance.

When citizens are able to earn, invest, build enterprises, and gradually improve their standard of living, they begin to value predictability, transparency, and the rule of law. A society where people feel economically secure tends to be calmer, more cooperative, and more invested in its institutions. Conversely, when economic opportunity is limited or concentrated among a few actors, politics becomes a contest over access to scarce resources.

This relationship between economic inclusion and political stability has been widely examined. In Capital in the Twenty First Century, Thomas Piketty shows how excessive concentration of wealth can destabilize societies. In Why Nations Fail, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argue that nations prosper when institutions allow broad participation. In Corruption and Government, Susan Rose-Ackerman makes a more uncomfortable point: corruption is often not just a moral failure, but a consequence of limited economic access.

For Nepal, these are not abstract ideas. They reflect structural realities that continue to shape the country’s economic trajectory.

Growth vs participation

A country does not become prosperous simply because its GDP increases. It becomes prosperous when its citizens have the opportunity to participate in that growth. An economy can expand while remaining narrow, concentrated, and exclusionary. In such cases, wealth accumulates, but opportunity does not spread. Over time, this imbalance creates both economic fragility and political tension.

Every resilient economy rests on a broad base of small and medium enterprises. In Nepal, SMEs contribute approximately 22 percent of GDP and employ around 1.8m people (Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2024). These businesses are not peripheral—they are central to inclusive growth.

This idea has long been established. In Small Is Beautiful, EF Schumacher argued that economies built around human-scale enterprises are more balanced and sustainable. In The Mystery of Capital, Hernando de Soto emphasized that the real wealth of developing countries lies in enabling ordinary citizens to convert their assets and ideas into productive capital.

The practical question, therefore, is simple: can an ordinary Nepali realistically build and grow a business?

The structural barriers

For many, the answer remains uncertain. Access to finance continues to be a primary constraint. The banking system, regulated by Nepal Rastra Bank, relies heavily on collateral-based lending. While this ensures financial discipline, it excludes individuals who lack property but possess viable ideas.

Nepal’s import-driven economic structure further concentrates opportunity among those with capital, networks, and scale. Smaller entrepreneurs are often confined to the lower end of the value chain, with limited ability to expand.

Regulatory and compliance requirements add another layer of difficulty. What is routine for established firms can be overwhelming for new entrants. The result is not deliberate exclusion, but a system that consistently favors those already positioned to succeed.

When policy does not broaden opportunity

Governments often attempt to address these gaps through targeted incentives. Nepal has done the same, particularly in promoting industrial activity. Yet outcomes suggest that such measures do not always lead to broader participation.

Nepal has repeatedly attempted to stimulate industrial activity through targeted tax incentives. Yet several cases raise questions about their effectiveness. For example, vehicle assembly plants received over Rs 14bn in tax concessions in five years, but according to the Auditor General, the value added within Nepal did not match the revenue forgone, and consumers saw little meaningful price reduction. The issue is not the intent behind such policies, but their distribution. Firms with scale and capital are better positioned to capture these benefits, while smaller entrepreneurs remain largely excluded. Growth, in such cases, does not necessarily translate into wider economic participation.

Corruption as a structural outcome

This leads to a deeper issue. As Susan Rose-Ackerman argues, corruption often emerges from competition over limited economic access. When licenses, contracts, or economic gateways are scarce, businesses compete not only in markets, but for influence. In such environments, access becomes more valuable than efficiency, relationships begin to outweigh capability, and economic power concentrates. Corruption, in many cases, becomes a rational response to constrained opportunity. Reducing corruption, therefore, requires more than enforcement. It requires expanding the number of people who can participate in the economy.

The risk of concentration

Economic concentration also introduces systemic risks. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis demonstrated how large institutions can become “too big to fail.” The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the rescue of institutions such as American International Group forced governments to deploy massive public resources to prevent wider collapse. For smaller economies like Nepal, such risks are even more significant. Limited fiscal capacity means that the failure of large economic actors can place disproportionate strain on the entire system. A diversified economy, supported by a broad base of enterprises, is inherently more resilient.

An untapped engine: Women entrepreneurs

One of Nepal’s most significant opportunities lies in expanding the role of women in the economy.

Women contribute an estimated 36 percent of Nepal’s GDP, yet only 22.5 percent of working-age women are formally employed (UN Women Nepal, 2023; World Bank Gender Data, 2024). This gap highlights not a lack of capability, but a lack of access and opportunity.

Women’s economic contributions already span agriculture, small enterprises, services, and emerging sectors. Evidence globally shows that women reinvest a significantly higher proportion of their income into families and communities—up to 90 percent compared to around 40 percent for men (World Bank Gender Report, 2022). Studies such as those by EY (2023) also suggest that women-led enterprises often deliver stronger long-term value and sustainability. Countries such as India have recognized this and introduced targeted credit programs and policy frameworks to support women entrepreneurs.

For Nepal, this is not simply a matter of inclusion. It is one of the most immediate and scalable opportunities for economic expansion.

Rethinking the role of the state

A broader shift is required in how the state approaches the economy. Revenue generation cannot rely solely on taxation. In a developing economy like Nepal, excessive reliance on high and often punitive taxes can suppress consumption, discourage investment, and slow economic momentum. The state must evolve from being primarily a tax collector to becoming a strategic economic participant.

Nepal has significant untapped potential in sectors such as hydropower, infrastructure, tourism corridors, cable transport systems, and mineral extraction. These are commercially viable opportunities that, if structured correctly, can generate sustained national income. A more effective approach lies in well-designed Public Private Partnership models.

Under such a framework, the government initiates projects using concessional or soft loans from development partners including governments and other bilateral agencies, projects are structured with clear revenue streams such as electricity exports, toll collections, user charges, or resource royalties, once operational and de-risked, these assets are partially or fully offloaded in the capital markets

This model allows the government to build infrastructure without immediate fiscal strain, repay debt through project-generated income, and recover capital, often at a premium, through market participation. It also enables reinvestment into new projects, creating a continuous cycle of economic expansion. It is a model already proven globally across toll highways, energy infrastructure, ports, and transit systems.

For Nepal, the implications are significant. Hydropower exports, toll-based expressways, ropeways in difficult terrain, tourism infrastructure, and mineral development can all be structured in this manner. This approach reduces dependence on taxation, broadens the capital market, and allows citizens themselves to participate in national assets through equity ownership.

The direction ahead

Nepal stands at a crossroads. Its young population, expanding connectivity, and integration with global markets offer enormous potential. But prosperity cannot remain concentrated. A resilient future lies in empowering thousands of entrepreneurs - farmers, manufacturers, tourism operators, technology startups, and women leaders across every scale of the economy. When opportunity spreads, prosperity becomes inclusive and durable. And when prosperity is widespread, stability follows.

The foundations of a stable Nepal will not be built solely in parliament. They will be built in the countless enterprises where citizens take risks, create value, and transform ideas into opportunity. When people are able to thrive economically, peace and contentment follow. From that foundation, both economic and political stability naturally emerge.

Nepal’s new generation of lawmakers must now act with clarity. Expanding access to credit, dismantling structural barriers, reducing punitive tax regimes, and building an economy that rewards participation over proximity to power are not optional reforms, they are necessary corrections.

Because in the end, stability will not be delivered through politics alone. It will emerge when citizens believe they have a fair chance to succeed.

And that belief is built not through promises, but through opportunity.

In the wake of Nepal’s youth-led political shift, there is a renewed sense of hope across the country, a belief that things can be done differently, that long-standing systems can be re-examined, and that policy can begin to reflect the realities of the people it serves. For educators, this moment feels deeply personal. Between my parents and myself, we have spent close to six decades in education, shaping classrooms, preparing teachers, and building institutions. From this vantage point, of experience, responsibility, and continued investment in Nepal’s future, I often reflect on a crucial need: that the education policy we shape must be truly inclusive, adaptive, and reflective of the needs of a modern Nepali society.

A modern education policy must recognize that private schools are not merely optional institutions but an essential part of a diverse education ecosystem. Free education, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is vital, but so too is the right of communities to access schools that meet the specific needs of their children. These principles are not mutually exclusive. Private schools fill gaps, whether through higher accountability, specialized programs, or approaches that prioritize skills alongside academics. In a diverse society, no single system can serve every child and family equally; providing choice ensures that students have access to environments where they can meaningfully learn and grow.

The policy must also actively encourage international collaboration. Thousands of Nepali students leave the country each year in search of better educational opportunities. This is not only a reflection of aspiration, but also of gaps within our own system. An education policy that allows schools to engage with global resources, pedagogical practices, and academic collaborations creates the possibility of strengthening learning at home. Affiliations, teacher training, access to international content, and the ability to bring in expertise from outside Nepal are not departures from national identity. Rather, they are ways of ensuring that Nepali students are not learning in isolation and remain connected to the advancements shaping education globally. A more open system allows schools to evolve, innovate, and remain relevant and dynamic in a rapidly changing world.

One of the reflections of how inclusion is understood in policy lies in the way language is treated within the curriculum. Nepal’s classrooms are far more diverse than policy often acknowledges. This diversity is not only diverse in terms of returning students or international learners, but also across communities within Nepal whose mother tongue is not Nepali. When proficiency in Nepali language and literature is assumed, and when subjects like Social Studies are taught exclusively in Nepali, the medium itself can become a barrier to learning.

Creating flexibility within this structure, whether through alternative Nepali language learner tracks in 

place of standard language and literature, or more accessible approaches to teaching Social Studies in the language of comfort, allows students to engage with content more meaningfully. This adjustment would not only support Nepali returnees but also ensure that students from diverse linguistic communities within Nepal are not disadvantaged by a one-size-fits-all requirement. At the same time, it creates space for all learners to connect with Nepali language and culture in ways that are accessible and relevant. Inclusion, in this sense, is not about lowering standards, but about ensuring that language enables learning rather than limits it.

Diversity within the teaching community is equally essential. The ability to bring in educators from different backgrounds, including international faculty, strengthens cross-cultural understanding, enriches pedagogical practice, and exposes students to multiple perspectives. These are not peripheral advantages; they are central to preparing students for a global and interconnected world. Yet, practical barriers such as restrictive hiring processes, visa restrictions, and high costs often make this difficult. Addressing these constraints would allow schools to build more dynamic, globally relevant learning environments, aligned with broader national aspirations of openness, collaboration, and growth.

At the same time, inclusion must extend to students whose needs fall outside conventional systems. 

As I explored in my 2025 op-ed titled ‘The Invisible Student’, every child has the right to education and the ability to move through it with dignity. Flexible pathways, curriculum modifications, accommodations, and alternative forms of certification are not exceptions; they are essential to ensuring that education serves every learner it is meant to reach. Only then can the principles of human dignity and equity, central to any modern education policy, be truly upheld.

If Nepal is to foster collaboration, innovation, and growth, its education system must be open enough to evolve and responsive enough to reflect the realities of its learners. This includes students across geographies, languages, abilities, and aspirations. Schools that are able to respond to this diversity are better positioned to nurture not just academic success, but confidence, adaptability, and a sense of belonging.

Such an approach also carries implications beyond the classroom. When students feel that the system reflects their realities and aspirations, the impulse to look outward for opportunity begins to shift. Retention of talent, meaningful engagement with the Nepali diaspora, and the ability to attract learners from beyond our borders all emerge more organically from a system that is innovative, relevant, and inclusive at its core.

The opportunity before this government is significant. An education policy that is open, equitable, and future-ready has the potential to shape not just institutions, but the direction of the country itself. If done well, it can create a system that retains talent, and positions the country as a hub for learning in the region.

The election of March 5 stands as a transformative milestone in Nepal’s democratic evolution, effectively dismantling the long-standing narrative that the Constitution of Nepal 2015 created insurmountable structural barriers to a single-party mandate. For years, the prevailing wisdom among political analysts suggested that the country’s mixed electoral framework, with its heavy emphasis on proportional representation, rendered a decisive majority nearly impossible for any nascent political force. 

However, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) defied these theoretical constraints by securing an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats and over 5m proportional votes. This massive electoral ‘signature’ served as a powerful public referendum on the leadership of Rabi Lamichhane, functioning as a popular exoneration while he remained in legal custody facing allegations of cooperative finance fraud. This outcome suggests that a significant portion of the electorate viewed these judicial proceedings as politically motivated rather than purely legal, signaling a profound shift in the national psyche toward a collective aspiration for prosperity that transcends traditional partisan arithmetic.

By positioning itself as a disruptor of systemic corruption and administrative lethargy, the RSP has demonstrated that a platform centered on institutional integrity can overcome the perceived limitations of a fragmented multiparty system. Yet, this victory brings with it a complex set of challenges, particularly regarding the intersection of judicial process and political will. 

While the RSP successfully harnessed public frustration to secure power, it must now perform the difficult task of translating populist momentum into stable, rule-of-law-based governance. To satisfy the expectations of a diverse citizenry without further polarizing the nation’s legal and political institutions, the party must convert its immense political capital into a coherent and functional fiscal pathway. The mandate is rooted in a fundamental public trust that the RSP can modernize the economy and restore ethical purity to state institutions; a goal that necessitates a radical departure from a status quo-ist fiscal policy.

A central pillar of this reform agenda involves a comprehensive overhaul of Nepal’s Public Financial Management (PFM) to address deep-seated structural imbalances that have long stunted national economic development and growth. According to data from the Nepal Rastra Bank, the national GDP at current prices has reached Rs 6,107.2bn, but the composition of this figure reveals a concerning reality: the service sector dominates at 62.01 percent, while agriculture and industry contribute a mere 25.16 percent and 12.82 percent, respectively. 

This heavy reliance on services has failed to generate sufficient high-quality employment or significant value-added economic growth, placing immense pressure on the incoming RSP government to pivot toward aggressive industrial expansion. Strengthening the industrial sector is not merely a fiscal preference but a structural necessity for fostering meaningful job creation, setting up an export-oriented economy and achieving long-term, sustainable economic stability.

The existing national revenue architecture, though diverse, remains increasingly strained by its reliance on a complex but inefficient portfolio of instruments, including income taxes, VAT, and specialized levies for health and education. Even as the Inland Revenue Department reports a steady upward trajectory in total revenue from Rs 429.3bn in 2020-21 to Rs 583.82bn in 2024-25, these nominal gains mask significant underlying vulnerabilities. 

Most especially, the Department of Customs highlights a precarious imbalance where import-related revenue reached Rs 478bn in the latest fiscal year, dwarfing export-related revenue of only Rs 277bn. This datapoint underscores a disproportionate and risky dependence on trade-based public revenue, which leaves the national budget highly susceptible to global market fluctuations and external shocks.

Despite rising revenue figures, the Ministry of Finance continues to face formidable challenges in meeting its fiscal targets due to systemic weaknesses within its primary institutions. These institutional bottlenecks include a chronic deficit of skilled human capital, substandard technological infrastructure, and the persistent threat of moral hazard within the PFM administration. Such vulnerabilities ensure that the modernization of PFM entities remains a critical but largely unfulfilled mandate. 

Without addressing these fundamental administrative flaws and diversifying the tax base away from volatile import duties, the government will likely continue to struggle with fiscal shortfalls. Consequently, the RSP must lead a comprehensive PFM reform that simplifies tax structures while broadening the base across all levels of the federal polity, ensuring that the modernization of PFM entities move from a theoretical goal to an operational reality.

Furthermore, a decade into the federal transition, the promise of genuine fiscal federalism remains in a state of perilous limbo. At the subnational government level, revenue mobilization is severely hampered by operational hurdles and an inefficient bureaucracy that prevents provincial and local governments from exercising their constitutional fiscal autonomy. Revitalizing subnational governance is a vital priority and without enhancing the efficacy of the subnational polity, the federal system can neither collect nor strategically mobilize the resources required to address the urgent needs of its citizenry. 

Establishing transparency in budgeting, auditing, and fiscal reporting is essential to fostering public trust and enhancing the scientific application of federal transfers. Additionally, the government must adopt strategic debt management, strictly limiting sovereign borrowing to productive, high-yield investments to close the financing gap for high-priority projects without jeopardizing long-term solvency.

The budget (for the fiscal year 2026-27) of the RSP must also prioritize inclusive microeconomic integration to uplift rural and marginalized communities who have placed their faith in the RSP. The objective is to move beyond mere subsistence, fostering an environment where marginalized populations are integrated into national economic value chains by stimulating local entrepreneurship and increasing productive capacity. This requires a dual-track approach to youth engagement and industrialization that balances short-term job creation with long-term structural transformation. Rather than maintaining a narrow focus on traditional microfinance, which often leads to high-interest debt cycles without capital growth, the budget should emphasize comprehensive rural finance programs designed to facilitate capital formation and technical scaling. 

By providing affordable, long-term credit and strengthening SME financing policies, the RSP can ensure that capital is directed toward productive investments rather than just consumption, making the youth stakeholders in a decentralized, inclusive economy.

To catalyze this broader transformation, the RSP must prioritize a strategic pivot toward energy and infrastructure, investing in new generation projects to lower electricity costs and modernizing the grid to support industrial demand. Rather than exporting raw energy at a discount, the goal must be the cultivation of an energy-intensive domestic economy at every river basin level supported by robust logistics hubs. Parallel to this, the ICT sector offers immense potential for economic diversification. By spearheading a digital economy initiative and providing tax incentives for startups, the state can leverage domestic energy to fuel technology services. A national digital training program for youth, coupled with the full digitization of government business, would absorb the trained labor force and reduce administrative costs, mirroring successful models of youth mobilization seen in advanced economies.

Ultimately, the RSP’s success will be measured by its ability to drive agrarian transformation and industrial revitalization. The budget must emphasize ‘smart farming’, integrated agro-processing, and robust rural infrastructure to minimize post-harvest losses. Simultaneously, the strategic revival of distressed or ‘sick’ industries such as jute, rubber, paper, and textiles; offers a ‘triple benefit’ of employment generation, import substitution, and enhanced national competitiveness. 

By modernizing social services through digital classrooms and Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) curricula, the RSP can ensure long-term human development and capability lead to function. Shifting national priorities away from a reliance on remittances and toward high-growth sectors like tourism and sustainable farming will build a truly inclusive macroeconomic framework. These reforms serve as a tangible reward for the mandate granted by the citizenry, translating the political support for leaders like Rabi Lamichhane and Balendra Shah into a resilient, self-sufficient national economy that finally fulfills the public trust. 

There could hardly be a more compelling time to write and reflect on the world order, as nations remain deeply engaged in an ongoing contest of power and influence. Writing this feels more of a relatable environment of world order rather than a distant view and it also shapes the way we comprehend our own outlook of the world and human nature. If there’s one thing that’s unchanging attributes of humans, it’s their consciousness for power that drives them restless and impulsive. For power takes the shape of their desires, molding ambitions, igniting conflicts and competitions. This isn’t the end here, as it rather scales up in a larger frame from individuals to states; and then the urge to gain power grows as a continuum; it manifests. Regardless of whether one believes it or not, there’s a significant reality difference between being in actual power to being in proximity to that power.

In light of this idea comes Jo Inge Bekkevold’s article “No, the World Is Not Multipolar” that provides a striking rebuttal and yet convincing critique to the increasingly popular narrative to one of the widely spread beliefs that the International system is an emerging multipolar. The term ‘multipolar’ has been repeatedly invoked in academic debates, by diplomats, policy analysts and media commentators. Global leaders like Antonio Guterres, Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron, Lula da Silva, and Vladimir Putin present multipolarity as an imminent reality every now and then. Bakkevild argues that the narrative rests falsely on the concept of what an actual multipolarity is all about. In response, Bekkevold presents a carefully assembled series of empirical evidence that unfolds how great-power capabilities are distributed clarifying, what truly constitutes the great-power standing

Bekkevold’s idea of multipolar means having at least three state variables as an imperative element such as enough military capacity, economic weight and global influence to shape international outcomes. In this scenario, according to him, only two countries at present fulfills this criteria: The United States and China. At its baseline, this essay roots with Neorealism theory where the diffusion of power is prominently present. Reviewing the commonly contested countries such as Russia, Brazil and India, he claims that each one of them does not meet the criteria. India, for instance, has been an emerging power in the last few years but possesses only a fraction of its economic budget in comparison to China’s economic budget. Similarly, the European Union too, cannot function as a single unified pole because other European countries have very different national interests and their own approaches to foreign policy. 

Japan and Germany might be wealthy but they still lack the global reach. Russia has nuclear weapons but its economy too, falls short. In that sense, the conclusion he draws in true sense, is that none of these countries can become as close as the United States and China are. His explanations are backed by concrete measurable data as he refers to SIPRI defense statistics, IMF GDP rankings, and naval deployment figures. These data gives an empirical weight to his argument which is based on political aspiration rather than a structural set of realities. The fact that the United States and China together account for half of global military expenditure, and that China’s GDP counters the combined economies of countries in the world marks a significant scale of unmatched domination.

The most interesting part of the essay is when he mentions three reasons that challenge the popular beliefs of the multipolar world. The first reason being the idea of multipolarity as widely accepted because it is a normative concept which invites a fair international system where the fear of one power gaining momentum and outweighing the other do not exist. The second reason being, that the sense of multipolarity serves as a way of intellectual avoidance as it hints on the intention of such people who want to avoid the new form of Cold war. The third reason is that these things used in common, so as not to leave out the space for the USA to place their leverage. 

Part of why these reasons come out is from the influence of political desire rather than an empirical reality. In such a scenario, the author’s explanation showcases a gap between people’s perspective and the functioning of the world order. While the author claims the fact confidently, he bases it around the idea of failed global power distribution and making policies rests around it, which can create serious strategic mistakes. The author’s key point to be noted is around how countries’ failed attempts to understand multipolarity in real sense leads to failed strategic mistakes. 

Strategic systems motivate policymaking and when policies are made according to multipolarity, and it leads to policy failures. For instance, his example of Macron claiming Europe as a “third superpower” demonstrates how simple rhetoric confuses allies and creates unrealistic expectations, including Beijing. Similarly, investors who misread the global system risk making costly strategic errors. 

In that sense, the author’s perspective fits perfectly with a neo-realistic theory offering explanations about material power like military strength and economic size where every other 4 country goes competitive to gain power. And nowhere does the author mention explicitly about soft power which makes it even more clearer as to the significance of struggle for power gain. The treatment of global power therefore, is relatively static, however the arguments put forward are persuasive enough to improvise the misled narratives. Illustrating the position of the USA and China and the world as a Bipolarity, the author’s motivation holds truth about struggle for power. 

The analysis in a nutshell, mirrors the persistent enduring human impulse for power as highlighted earlier, where proximity to power dictates false perceptions, false narratives and false strategic led behavior. Therefore, whether or not the world order is multipolar or bipolar becomes secondary when the desire for power becomes a full fledged influencing factor in the International System. So, in arguing that the world is bipolar is Author’s own conformity that power gravitates towards the strongest–that today’s world order is constantly shaped not by aspirational rhetoric alone but by the hard realities of material capabilities, demanding strategic clarity rather than comforting imaginations.