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The upcoming election is interpreted in conflicting ways: protesters see it as a “phoenix” rising from the graves of 76 GenZ martyrs, symbolising a contest between old and new politics, while UML Suprimo Oli and his party frame it as a battle between nation-builders and destroyers. In reality, it is a vote shaped by recent unrest and the deaths of civilians.

Nepal is once again preparing for a midterm election—an exercise that, by its very nature, is untimely. Unlike a scheduled general election, a midterm poll is triggered before a parliamentary term has run its course, often under conditions of political crisis. Such elections rarely occur in an atmosphere of readiness. Neither the state machinery nor the electorate is usually fully prepared. Yet political compulsion leaves little room for choice.

This will be Nepal’s second midterm election. The first was held in 1994 after then prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala dissolved Parliament. That decision came at a time of deep factional infighting within the Nepali Congress, which had fractured into two rival groups named 74 and 36 on the basis of the number of parliamentarians. The election that followed adhered to a familiar global pattern: the ruling party that initiated the midterm poll was punished by voters, while the main opposition benefited.

The Nepali Congress lost power, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), or UML, came to power for the first time by forming a minority government under its chairperson, Man Mohan Adhikari. That episode remains a defining chapter in Nepal’s post-1990 democratic history.

Three decades later, the country finds itself confronting another midterm election—once again amid political instability, judicial intervention and deep public dissatisfaction with the political class.

The courts, dissolutions and the Oli factor

Following its rise to power in the mid-1990s, UML attempted to dissolve Parliament while leading a minority government. The Supreme Court intervened, ruling that such a move was unconstitutional. The decision triggered widespread political agitation, both inside the House and on the streets. That confrontation between the executive and the judiciary would set a precedent for future constitutional disputes.

In the years that followed, Parliament has twice been dissolved while UML was in power—both times under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. On each occasion, the Supreme Court struck down the dissolutions, declaring them unconstitutional and reinstating the legislature. Those rulings reinforced the judiciary’s role as a key arbiter in Nepal’s fragile constitutional order.

The main reason behind this mid-term election is widely seen as former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. The difference this time is striking: while he once tried and failed to force a mid-term election, he now cannot stop it, despite his efforts. The GenZ movement, which arose in response to Oli’s hardline policies, led to the death of 76 civilians. Following his removal from office, an interim government took shape. Acting on the demands of the GenZ protesters, the interim administration dissolved parliament and announced a mid-term election. Oli, along with his former coalition partner—the establishment faction of the Nepali Congress under Sher Bahadur Deuba—has approached the Supreme Court seeking the restoration of the parliament. Given the current situation, the election scheduled for March 5  is likely to take place before the court issues its verdict on the case, potentially making parliamentary restoration irrelevant.

Views on the GenZ protests and the upcoming election are deeply divided. Different groups are shaping their own narratives to suit their interests. Protesters describe the election as a “phoenix rising from the graves” of GenZ martyrs, framing it as a referendum between old and new political forces. Oli rejects this interpretation. He portrays the GenZ movement as a conspiracy of domestic and foreign actors to corner him and casts the election as a battle between those who would “destroy the country” and those who would “build it,” claiming the role of the nation-builder.

In reality, both these extreme narratives are misleading. The election is neither simply a contest between the old and the new, nor is the GenZ movement solely the result of a domestic-foreign conspiracy, as Oli claims. Rather, it is a vote standing over the graves of 76 innocent civilians, a measure of public opinion shaped by recent political unrest. How the Nepali people interpret and respond to it remains to be seen. The answer will become clear only after the March 5 election results.

Party politics and accountability

While UML has closed ranks around Oli, other parties have experienced internal upheaval. Within the Nepali Congress, youth leaders recently convened a special party convention that sidelined long-time leader Sher Bahadur Deuba. Deuba, a five-time prime minister, has faced sustained criticism for prioritising personal political survival over party renewal and reform.

His removal—though controversial—was widely seen as a symbolic attempt of younger party members to assert accountability within the organisation. Many argue that Deuba’s leadership had come to embody the stagnation and transactional politics that voters increasingly reject.

UML, by contrast, has taken no comparable steps to discipline or sideline Oli. Instead, its party convention reaffirmed his leadership overwhelmingly. For critics, this reinforced the perception of UML as a party centred on a single individual rather than collective leadership.

That perception appears to be resonating in Oli’s home constituency of Jhapa-5, where political dynamics have shifted. Reports suggest that voters there are less concerned with party affiliation than with identifying a candidate capable of defeating Oli. The constituency has become sharply polarised between his remaining loyal supporters and a growing group of voters seeking change.

Into this contest has stepped Balen Shah, who resigned as the mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City to challenge Oli in Jhapa-5. While some view his move as politically risky, others see it as a calculated attempt to capitalise on public frustration with established leaders.

Vote sans issues in a shallow democracy

Beyond individual contests, the broader nature of Nepal’s elections has remained largely unchanged despite repeated political transformations. The country has experienced multiple systems—monarchy, Panchayat rule, constitutional monarchy and now a federal republic. Yet electoral behaviour continues to be shaped less by policy debates and more by personality, identity and patronage.

Multiparty democracy is often regarded as the most advanced political system, with periodic elections serving as its core mechanism of accountability. In theory, parties present clear agendas, voters choose among them, and those who fail to deliver are voted out.

In practice, Nepal’s democratic exercise remains underdeveloped. This will be only the third such election under the current republican framework. Political agendas are weakly articulated, candidates often lack policy clarity, and voters are still adapting to the idea of elections as instruments of accountability rather than ritualistic exercises.

Campaigns continue to be influenced by caste, religion, region and personal networks. Despite the formal abandonment of the Panchayat system, the personalised nature of politics has endured. Many figures who once opposed multiparty democracy have successfully reinvented themselves within it, moving across parties while retaining influence and access to power.

Elections have also become increasingly expensive. While parties now contest elections rather than individuals, the underlying culture has not changed. Campaigns are often likened to financial investments, with candidates expected to recover their costs once elected. As a result, parties tend to favor wealthy contenders over ideologically committed activists, reinforcing corruption and public cynicism

Social media, new faces and an uncertain verdict

This election is unfolding in a dramatically altered information environment. Nearly every voter now carries a smartphone, providing access to social media platforms that amplify messages at unprecedented speed. Algorithms often reward emotionally charged content, enabling misinformation and disinformation to circulate widely.

Populist narratives have gained traction, particularly around figures portrayed as political outsiders. Online discourse suggests growing enthusiasm for newer faces such as Balen Shah and Rabi Lamichhane, as well as other non-traditional political actors. Whether this digital momentum will translate into votes remains uncertain.

Despite the noise, most analysts agree that no single party is likely to secure a clear majority. Nepal’s electoral system, combined with a highly polarised electorate, makes such an outcome improbable. Even alliances between major parties may struggle to cross the threshold needed to form a stable government.

As a result, post-election coalition bargaining appears almost inevitable. While such arrangements are common in parliamentary democracies, Nepal’s experience has been marked by instability and frequent government changes.

Ultimately, while the election may help restore procedural legitimacy and stabilise constitutional processes, few expect it to resolve Nepal’s deeper political challenges. Governance failures, entrenched corruption and weak institutional accountability remain unresolved.

As the country heads toward polling day, many hope the election will serve as a genuine democratic exercise—one in which voters prioritise competence and integrity over loyalty and identity. Whether that hope will be realised will become clear once the ballots are counted.

For now, Nepal waits—once again placing its faith in the ballot box to chart a way forward.

The author is a senior Nepali journalist based in Washington, DC

Nepal adopted federalism to bring the government closer to the people. If there is a deeper decentralization, the government comes closer to its citizens. Through the proximity to its citizens, the government earns trust of the people.  The extent to which the government is close to the people is determined by the effectiveness of public services delivered through its different offices and centers. 

In the past, although central policies were rhetorically anchored in the ideology of decentralization of power, their implementation portrayed a different picture. Despite advocating the dire need for decentralization of power  while in  opposition, the same political party showed an  unwillingness to let go of power and  merely paid lip service to the idea  once in office. Owing to Singhadarbar’s centralized mindset, local authorities were left with partial autonomy, which limited their ability to exercise real power of making prime decisions of their own.  

Against this backdrop, the present federal system has sought to ensure decentralization in practice, enabling the government to reach each and every household across the country under the slogan of Gaun Gaunma Singhadurbar. How far the slogan has been emanated in the actions taken by the government has become a matter of evaluation.

Trust building

Trust is built on the bedrock of effective policy implementation, and when government commitments bring fruitful results, that make  people satisfied. One of the major reasons a government loses trust and confidence of the people is its failure to effectively reach people through efficient and responsive public service delivery. In democracy, a government exists to serve the people and the nation by safeguarding the sovereignty and national unity, keeping law and order in place, driving sustained economic growth for inclusive national development, striking a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy in the national interest, and working tirelessly for the welfare and well-being of its citizens.

It is a part of the national culture of Nepali people to be peace- loving and to believe in maintaining harmonious relations on real ground, not just in principle. They value tolerance and patience. This is the reason we see them happy most of the time, despite being burdened by multiple financial and physical difficulties. Because of their tolerant character, they are generally perceived liberal and positive toward the government and its governance institutions.  As long as their minimum requirements of daily necessities, such as drinking water, reliable electricity, quality education, healthcare services and employment, are easily available, Nepalis do not tend to create public backlash by making high demands with the government.

If they do not get access to these basic services, naturally a certain degree of public discontent inevitably simmers. In this situation, the government loses the trust of the people. If the people's dissatisfaction is not addressed timely, they may lose their patience and tolerance, which ultimately may turn into public unrest, and open resistance against the government. In the past, mass protests and demonstrations launched by the Nepalis, regardless of their intensity, were the result of a deficit of trust in the government. It is a widely known reality that every service-counter is a test of government credibility and efficient service of today generates public trust tomorrow.

For years, people have harbored grudges and complaints about the government's way of dealing with them and delivering public services. It is the bureaucracy that is responsible for implementing the public policies into action through certain tangible plans and procedures. If the bureaucracy shows its ineffectiveness in providing prompt services to needy citizens, it tarnishes the image of the government. Public services are primarily delivered through service counters and centers.  Many service seekers  at service centers are often told by the service providers to come tomorrow (‘Bholi Aaunus’). Instead of satisfying citizens by providing quick services, if they are simply told to come back the next day without any reasonable explanation, how can the ‘citizen-first’ policy of the government be implemented in an effective manner?

This is the crux of the problem in establishing good governance. Unfortunately, when service seeking citizens turn to middlemen and pay under the table, they get services then and there. In many cases, such a situation still prevails within the bureaucratic system, which is capable enough to erode the public trust and undermine institutional integrity. A culture of buck-passing the responsibilities to others is being established gradually. In many cases senior government officials do not dare to take any risk in making decisions due to a latent fear of being summoned by the anti-graft body to give a statement.

Trade unionism within bureaucracy has divided civil servants into rival groups operating under the cloak of political parties, eroding the political neutralism. This type of situation prevailing within the government mechanism is enough to widen the gulf between the government and the citizens.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) highlighted that within the period of 2013-2019, Venezuela’s administration was highly politicized. The bureaucracy was incompetent and mismanaged the economy, public services and petro-currency controls, lacked transparency, and this dire situation triggered hyperinflation and institutional collapse. 

In a similar vein, the OECD’s ‘Italy Public Administration Review-2018’ explicitly portrayed a picture of how political bargaining in senior bureaucratic appointments and weak insulation of administrative institutions from party politics affect negatively over policy implementation, public trust and administrative efficiency.

These eye-opening instances suggest that Nepal must seriously work to build its citizens’ trust in government, for which the political and bureaucratic leaders must deliver exemplary results through their personal and public conduct, guided by transparency, zero tolerance for corruption, citizen-friendly behavior, and strong commitment to policy implementation. 

Nepal is currently steering toward a definitive realignment, characterized by the collapse of traditional partisan fealty and the emergence of a meritocratic mandate. The ‘GenZ Uprising’ and the subsequent dismantling of Sher Bahadur Deuba’s hegemony signify a profound repudiation of a legacy marred by administrative ineptitude and strategic stagnation. Deuba’s political career, alongside the populist rhetoric of KP Sharma Oli and the ideological volatility of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, serves as a cautionary tale of prioritizing personal survival over the foundational democratic and governance values. 

The ascension of Gagan Kumar Thapa signifies a profound generational shift toward results-oriented pragmatism, marking a departure from traditional ideological rigidity. To achieve a similar transformative impact, the communist led by former multiple time prime ministers of Khadka Prasad Sharma Oli and Puspa Kamal Dahal along with others must experience a comparable party avalanche akin to the recent restructuring of the Nepali Congress. However, the March 5 election faces the threat of ‘unholy alliances’ between the entrenched trio of Deuba, Oli, and Dahal, who seek to manipulate the democratic and governance values to preserve their waning influence. 

To counteract this, voters must demand a robust social contract that literalizes ‘Power to the People’ by securing water and energy as the non-negotiable bedrock of national security and economic development. They must critically analyze these recycled agendas and reject any coalition that views vital resources as elective luxuries. This election is a strategic imperative for Nepali citizens to purge the political landscape of institutionalized corruption and to establish a capable governance model of fostering genuine economic dynamism and national sovereignty.

The River Basin Plan 2024

The Water and Energy Commission (WEC) of the Government of Nepal successfully brought to the River Basin Plan 2024 represents a seminal shift in Nepal’s geoeconomic strategy, offering a sophisticated framework for hydrological, terrestrial resource governance and flood control. Rooted principles of  the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), the blueprint advocates for a decentralized, multi-scalar river basin governance model across ten major river basins like the Gandaki, Bagmati, Karnali and Koshi. 

By prioritizing multipurpose projects, the plan seeks to harmonize hydroelectric generation, perennial irrigation, and ecological preservation, positioning water security as the primary catalyst for domestic production and a vital antidote to the chronic ‘brain drain’ of overseas migration. However, a critical disconnect persists between this technocratic roadmap and the prevailing orthodox political landscape. Despite the immense potential of fertile, sequestered river valleys such as the Dordhi and Rapti to foster niche agricultural entrepreneurship, these regions remain marginalized by systemic corruption and populist rhetoric. 

Leadership under figures of Puspa Kamal Dahal, Khadka Prasad Sharma Oli and Sher Bahadur Deuba including other incapable former prime ministers have historically substituted substantive policy with strategic stagnation, leaving the nation burdened by debt and governance ineptitude. Established political entities, including the Nepali Congress and various communist blocs, continue to treat energy and water as peripheral commodities rather than the fundamental pillars of economic sovereignty. Ultimately, the active  river basin plans of the WEC success hinges on whether Nepali voters can compel the political class to move beyond ‘recycled dreams’ and embrace this roadmap as a non-negotiable imperative for national resilience.

Imperative of water and energy

Water and power are the fundamental catalysts required to reanimate Nepal’s stagnant economy. As stakeholders in the democratic process, voters must scrutinize party manifestos for concrete economic agendas regarding the water and energy sector. The River Basin Plan of the WEC 2024 provides a comprehensive blueprint for unlocking natural resource potential to catalyze economic transformation. Therefore, voter support must be directed toward candidates who offer pragmatic, realistic policy commitments prioritizing the needs of the populace who have been neglected for over three decades. To date, neither the Nepali Congress nor the various splintered communist factions have demonstrated a serious commitment to converting these resources into genuine economic endeavors.

Economic Implications of the River Basin Plan 2024

The implementation of multipurpose projects at local, provincial, and national levels across the identified river basins offer profound economic opportunities. These projects serve a strategic function: transferring water to agricultural command areas, enhancing environmental services, revitalizing rural and urban economic partnerships by increasing productivity, advancing industrial and ecological balance. Sufficient water infrastructure supports productivity across all social, economic and environmental sectors. 

The River Basin Plan of 2024  projects a capital requirement of $8.8bn for investment and operations, which is estimated to yield $15.7bn in total benefits. Under the strategic river basin plan framework: the Economic Net Present Value is projected to increase from Rs 1,151bn to Rs 1,221bn. Beyond these metrics, integrated water and power projects act as a multiplier for job creation and ‘real sector’ growth, directly elevating household incomes and human development indices, ultimately expanding GDP over $100bn with over $5000 per capita income.

The institutional failures of the power sector

Nepal’s power sector is currently stifled by the structural inefficiencies and monopolistic stagnation of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA). Despite extensive government support, the NEA’s gross failure to ensure reliable delivery has forced enterprises into costly diesel-reliance, compromising national economic dynamism. This institutional paralysis is exacerbated by a leadership culture that prioritizes the performative optics of energy exportation and populist media narratives over domestic infrastructure and household energy promotion. 

Furthermore, the NEA exerts a ‘feudal’ dominance over independent power developers, frequently defaulting on grid-connection commitments and imposing restrictive Power Purchase Agreements and power generation to existing projects that jeopardize the sustainability of power projects. Such autocratic behavior necessitates an immediate transition toward an unbundled, decentralized market structure. 

To unlock Nepal’s hydroelectric potential, the upcoming  election must prioritize the establishment of a robust, independent regulatory body capable of enforcing accountability and dismantling entrenched political patronage. The professionalization of energy governance replacing administrative lethargy with meritocratic leadership is the only viable pathway to securing economic sovereignty. By curbing the NEA’s absolute market dominance, Nepal can foster a competitive environment that transforms electricity from a neglected luxury into the fundamental bedrock of industrial prosperity.

In Nepal, as the nation prepares for parliamentary elections on March 5, the song has become a recurring soundtrack for a people caught in a cycle of “revolutionary disillusionment.” The parallels between George Orwell’s Manor Farm and the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal are no longer just literary—they are a mirror reflecting a grim political reality.

The song of the golden future

The ‘animals of England’ in George Orwell’s world-famous novel ‘Animal Farm’ promised a world where “the ring will disappear from our noses.” What’s more, ‘fruit fields’ shared by all were also on its agenda. For Nepal, those ‘good tidings’ were sung in the revolutions for change of 1990, 2006, and 2015. Each change promised the end of the ‘tyrant’s man’—whether it was an absolute monarchy or an old-guard regime—and the dawn of ‘prosperous Nepal, happy Nepalis’. But these promises remained unfulfilled.

By 2026, however, the chit chatter in tea shops from Jhapa to Kanchanpur reflects the later, darker chapters of Orwell’s novel. Instead of the promised prosperity, the ‘musical chairs’ of leadership rotating between figures like KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal have created a sense of hopelessness among citizens.

The cast of the 2026 ‘farm’

Nepal’s political theater reflects Orwell’s “farm” in four forms. The supreme strategist uses nationalism to defend the stronghold of the loyalists, while a modernizing visionary fights to build a “reform windmill” with the machinery of the old guard. The architects of the past are fighting as the broken ghosts of a people-led rebellion. Finally, the new guard, born of the youth protests of 2025, bypasses propaganda via social media. The final question remains: once holding the keys to the farmhouse, will these new leaders serve the people or will they eventually learn to walk on two legs?

Squealer and the digital barn

In Orwell’s world, Squealer could turn ‘black into white’. In 2026 Nepal, Squealer isn’t a single pig; it is the digital landscape. TikTok warriors and partisan news portals are working overtime to explain why ‘unnatural’ alliances—like the recent sweep of the National Assembly by the NC-UML coalition—are actually ‘victories for stability’.

When the ‘Seven Commandments’ (the 2015 Constitution) are subtly ignored to suit the ruling elite, the digital Squealers are there to repaint the barn wall, convincing the public that “All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.”

The ‘boxers’ of the Tarai and the Gulf

The saddest figure in ‘Animal Farm’ is Boxer, the hardworking horse. In Nepal, Boxer is a migrant worker in Qatar, a farmer in Tarai, and a daily wage earner in Kathmandu. “I will work even harder,” says the modern Boxer, sending remittances home to build a ‘windmill’ (national economy) that never benefits his family. In 2026, the nation’s muscle—its youth—is still being shipped off to the ‘glue factories’ of foreign labor markets. The janitors inside the farmhouse are reaping the fruits of federalism.

The final scene: A mirror at Baluwatar

The 2025 GenZ protests led to an interim government, yet as the March 5 vote nears, the distinction between the ‘Old Guards’ and the ‘New Reformers’ is blurring. At high-level dinners, the revolutionary features of the newcomers seem to be softening into the satisfied jowls of the establishment.

As Nepal heads to the polls, the voters must ask: are we electing leaders to manage the farm for the benefit of all ‘beasts’, or are we simply choosing a new set of pigs to sit at the table? The song of the ‘golden future’ is still being sung; whether it remains a dream or becomes a reality depends on whether the singers can finally stop looking at the farmhouse and start looking at the fields.

In the high-stakes political theater of 2026, the 2015 Constitution of Nepal—once hailed as the ‘unalterable law’ of the new Republic—is undergoing a transformation that feels less like reform and more like a tactical rewrite. Much like the barn wall in Animal Farm, where the ink was subtly altered under the cover of night, the sacred text of Nepal’s democracy is being ‘refined’ by the ruling elite. To see this narrative in action, one must look at how the fundamental promises of the revolution are being adapted to fit the convenience of those currently in power.

From sovereignty to status quo

The rebellion was against the ‘Tyrant Man’, the absolute monarchy. which vests sovereignty and state authority in the Nepali people. In the early days, this was the first commandment: Whatever goes upon two legs is an enemy. But as we approach the March 2026 elections, critics argue that the political elite have become the very ‘two-legged’ masters they once overthrew. The sovereignty that was supposed to empower the street now seems to reside exclusively within the boardroom meetings of the major party alliances.

Similarly, the promise of equality was the bedrock of the 2015 spirit: Whatever goes upon four legs is a friend. It guaranteed that no citizen would be discriminated against based on caste, religion, or origin. However, the current ‘Great Barn Coalition’ between the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML has created a political environment where some ‘friends’ are clearly more equal than others. Independent voices and GenZ activists find themselves marginalized by a system that prioritizes party loyalty over the inclusive ideals of the Preamble.

The federal bed and the secular cloth

The debate over the structure of the state mirrors the shifting rules in Orwell’s farmhouse. Federalism was the revolution’s hard-won ‘bed’—a place of rest for the diverse ethnic groups of Nepal. Yet, the cost of this bed has become a point of contention. Leaders now argue for centralizing control and reducing the number of provinces, essentially adding ‘sheets’ of bureaucratic convenience to a system that was meant to empower the grassroots.

Even the secular nature of the state is being challenged. Orwell’s animals were forbidden from wearing clothes, symbolizing a break from human vanity. In Nepal, ‘secularism’ was the rejection of the old Hindu Kingdom’s ‘garments’. But in the 2026 campaign, some factions are pushing to return to religious identity, arguing that the "secular cloth" doesn't fit the national character. Like Moses the Raven returning with tales of "Sugarcandy Mountain," these movements offer a nostalgic vision of the past to distract from the economic struggles of the present.

The threshold of equality

In Animal Farm, the rule “No animal shall kill any other animal” was eventually qualified with the words ‘without cause’. In 2026 Nepal, the ‘Right to Live with Dignity’ is being strained by the use of state machinery to stifle dissent. The most subtle edit, however, is the ‘Three percent threshold’ for proportional representation. This is the modern version of the final commandment. While the Preamble still shouts that ‘All animals are equal’, the electoral laws effectively ensure that only the biggest, most established ‘beasts’ can reach the grain silo of parliament. As the 2026 elections draw near, the people are left staring at a barn wall where the original revolutionary paint is fading, replaced by a new set of rules that look remarkably like the ones they fought to erase.