Submit your Article

In Nepal, addiction is still spoken about in hushed tones. A man who drinks too much is said to lack self-control. A teenager glued to a phone is blamed for poor discipline. Someone who uses drugs is often seen as irresponsible, immoral, or beyond help. These explanations feel familiar because they are deeply cultural. But neuroscience tells us they are wrong. Addiction is not a failure of character. It is a disorder of the brain.

This is not a matter of opinion. Over the past several decades, research in neuroscience and public health has shown that addiction changes how the brain functions. It alters neural circuits responsible for reward, motivation, stress, learning, and self-control. When this science is ignored, society responds with shame instead of treatment. People suffer longer. They relapse more often. Many die quietly, without support or care. Nepal is now facing a growing addiction crisis that demands a science-based response.

The scale of addiction in Nepal

Government data show that substance use is not a marginal issue. The Nepal Drug Users Survey conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs estimated more than 130,000 current drug users nationwide, with the number increasing each year. Most users are young, and the vast majority are men. This is not a hidden subculture. It is a public health challenge affecting families, workplaces, and entire communities.

Alcohol use is even more widespread. According to Nepal’s STEP wise Survey on Non-Communicable Disease Risk Factors, conducted with support from the World Health Organization (WHO), nearly one in four adults reported consuming alcohol in the past year. Rates were far higher among men. Tobacco use remains similarly common across the population.

Since alcohol and tobacco are legal and socially accepted, their harm is often underestimated. Yet research conducted within Nepal tells a more troubling story. A large study from central Nepal, published in an international mental health journal, found that nearly one in four male drinkers screened positive for alcohol use disorder. Harmful drinking was closely associated with depression, suicidal thoughts, reduced ability to function at work and home, and intense feelings of shame. The researchers did not describe alcohol misuse as a lifestyle choice. They described it as a condition deeply intertwined with mental health and stigma.

Drug use injections add another layer of risk. Studies published in journals such as PLOS ONE have documented high vulnerability to HIV and hepatitis C among people who inject drugs in Nepal. These studies also highlight how fear, discrimination, and criminalization discourage people from seeking healthcare until serious illness develops. When addiction goes untreated, it becomes a driver of infectious disease, disability, and premature death.

A new and growing addiction among Nepal’s youth

While Nepal continues to debate drugs and alcohol, another form of addiction is growing rapidly, especially among adolescents. Problematic internet and smartphone use is now widely reported among Nepali school and college students. A 2024 study of urban school adolescents found that excessive internet use was strongly associated with poor sleep, depression, and emotional distress. Another study published in PLOS ONE the same year reported that a substantial proportion of adolescents met criteria for internet addiction, and that physical inactivity and disrupted sleep patterns were common.

These findings matter because behavioral addictions are not less real than substance addictions. The brain does not distinguish between dopamine released by alcohol, gambling, or endless social media scrolling. What matters is repetition, intensity, and how powerfully a behavior trains the brain’s reward system.

Nepal’s youth are growing up in a digital environment that rewards constant engagement and rapid stimulation. Their brains are still developing, particularly the regions responsible for impulse control and decision-making. Neuroscience shows that early and excessive exposure to addictive patterns, whether chemical or digital, can shape brain development in ways that persist in adulthood.

What neuroscience tells us about addiction

Modern neuroscience has transformed how addiction is understood. Addictive substances and behaviors repeatedly overstimulate the brain’s reward system. Over time, the brain adapts. Everyday pleasures feel less satisfying. Stress and irritability increase. Cravings become automatic. The systems responsible for self-control struggle to regulate behavior. This is how addiction shifts from choice to compulsion.

WHO has consistently emphasized that addiction is a chronic brain disorder, not a moral failing. This is also why relapses are common. When someone returns to substance use, it does not mean treatment failed or that the person lacked willpower. It means the brain remains vulnerable and requires continued support. WHO’s recognition of gaming disorder in its international disease classification further reinforces this understanding. Compulsive behaviors that disrupt daily functioning are legitimate health conditions, not personal flaws.

A response shaped by stigma

Despite this growing body of evidence, Nepal’s response to addiction remains limited and fragmented. Addiction is often treated as a social nuisance rather than a health condition. Families hide the problem until it becomes severe. Individuals delay seeking help because they fear judgment. When treatment is accessed, it often relies heavily on institutional rehabilitation, with limited long-term follow-up or integration with mental health care.

Research conducted in Nepal shows that stigma itself worsens outcomes. People with alcohol use disorders frequently internalize shame, which is associated with poorer mental health and a lower likelihood of seeking help. Shame does not cure addiction. It fuels it. At the same time, Nepal’s mental health system is overstretched. The country has a limited number of trained addiction specialists, most of them concentrated in urban areas. Community level prevention and early intervention remain rare.

A global warning Nepal should not ignore

Globally, addiction is rising. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that more than 300 million people worldwide used drugs in the past year, the highest number ever recorded. WHO estimates that alcohol alone contributes to more than two million deaths each year.

These are not failures of morality. They are failures of health systems that do not act early or compassionately enough. Countries that have adopted neuroscience informed approaches, including early screening, integrated mental health care, harm reduction, medication assisted treatment, and long-term support, have seen better outcomes. Those that rely on punishment and stigma do not.

What Nepal must do now

Nepal must recognize addiction as a health condition rooted in brain biology. This shift would change how families respond, how clinicians treat patients, and how policymakers allocate resources. Care for people with addiction must be integrated into primary healthcare. Screening for alcohol, tobacco, drugs, and problematic internet use should become routine. Training in addiction medicine and mental health must be expanded. Treatment should address depression, trauma, and anxiety alongside substance use, not as separate problems.

Harm reduction services for people who inject drugs must be strengthened, not stigmatized. Evidence from Nepal itself shows that community-based outreach saves lives and reduces disease transmission. Prevention must begin early. Schools should teach how the brain forms habits and how sleep, stress, substances, and screens affect mental health. Parents cannot fight addictive digital platforms alone.

A choice Nepal can no longer avoid

If addiction could be solved through shame, Nepal would have solved it generations ago. Addiction persists because it is not a moral problem. It is a brain problem shaped by biology, stress, trauma, and the environment. Neuroscience also shows that the brain can recover, but only when treatment replaces judgment, and understanding replaces silence. Nepal has begun to speak more openly about mental health. Addiction must be part of that conversation. Treating addiction as a brain disorder is not an excuse. It is the first step toward effective, compassionate, and evidence-based care. Silence has failed. Stigma has failed. Science has not.

The author is a PhD candidate in the Department of Neurosciences and Neurological Disorders at the University of Toledo College of Medicine and Life Sciences

In a historic political shift, the newly formed Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and its prime ministerial candidate, rapper-turned-politician Balen Shah, swept the elections in Nepal and are set to form the government – dislodging the country’s old political institutions. While the mandate marks a pivotal moment in Nepal's political landscape following the Gen-Z protests that rocked the country last year, it also poses a significant strategic test for India in Kathmandu. 

Nepal occupies a key strategic place in India’s South Asian engagement strategy. India remains Nepal’s largest trading partner. Over the past decade, New Delhi has invested significantly in developmental assistance, strengthening cross-border connectivity projects and hydro and energy cooperation.

Initiatives such as amending the ‘Treaty of Transit’ to enhance trade flows via the Jogbani-Biratnagar rail link – enabling direct rail transport of containerised and bulk cargo to Nepal’s custom yard – and completion of the 34 km Jayanagar-Kutha rail link, similarly, integrated check posts have been operationalized to streamline customs procedures and reduce logistical delays – illustrate India’s effort in institutionalising supply chains that bind two economies closer together.

In the energy sector, India has invested heavily in several hydropower and electricity transmission projects. Multiple cross-border electricity transmission lines are already operational, while agreements have been signed for a new 400 kV transmission line linking Inaruwa to New Purnea and the Lamki-Dododhara corridor with Bareilly. Additionally, under a long-term power-purchase agreement, Nepal plans to export up to 10,000 MW of electricity to India over the next decade – reinforcing New Delhi’s ambition to position itself as the hub of a broader regional energy network. 

However, the smooth operationalization of these initiatives depends significantly on a cooperative and predictable political leadership in Kathmandu. It is precisely at this juncture that the landslide victory of the RSP carries profound significance. 

The RSP’s electoral triumph reflects the aspirations of a new generation shaped by the Gen-Z wave. For many Nepalis, the political mandate represents not merely a change in government but a generational reset in a political system long criticized for stagnation and persistent corruption. The anti-corruption sentiment that fuelled the September protests has now propelled a leadership that emphasises transparency, accountability, and institutional reforms while simultaneously articulating what many describe as a more “vocal sovereignty."

Within this emerging political cohort, relations with India may no longer be viewed through the lens of ‘historical obligation’. Sections of Nepal’s political discourse have historically accused India of excessive involvement in Nepal’s internal affairs and behaving as ‘big brother’ rather than engaging on equal terms. Whether justified or not, such perceptions have periodically strained bilateral ties in the past. The emergence of a political order committed to “strategic autonomy” and a “Nepal First” approach is therefore likely to scrutinize India’s role far more closely, particularly in negotiations concerning trade felicitation, customs procedures, and cross-border administrative arrangements. 

Consistent with this outlook, RSP under Shah’s leadership has pledged to reposition Nepal from a traditional “buffer state” between India and China into a “vibrant bridge” that facilitates trilateral economic partnerships. The RSP argues that Nepal must pragmatically maximize its sovereign interests with both neighbors through technical negotiations. 

China, meanwhile, is keen to steadily expand its economic and infrastructural footprint in Nepal. During K.P. Sharma Oli’s tenure, Kathmandu finalized several projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, deepening Chinese engagement in the country’s infrastructure sector. 

While Shah has expressed equal frustration with both India and China, it is very likely that the new government will seek to diversify Nepal’s external partnerships to reduce long-standing dependence on any single partner. Such balancing is common in South Asian diplomacy; yet, most of the party leadership’s relative lack of prior institutional experience in governing at the national level, coupled with a new political landscape, introduces an element of unpredictability regarding how these ambitions will translate into policy or whether the party’s “Nepal’s First” policy will slip into a “China First” reality – inevitably complicating India’s strategic calculations in the Himalayas.

Another sensitive dimension concerns unresolved territorial disputes. Shah and his party have taken a critical position on revisiting the India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship and have repeatedly called for a stronger Nepali stance on key territorial disputes, including Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, insisting that no foreign activity should take place in these regions without Nepal’s consent. The issue has remained a sensitive flashpoint between the two since Nepal’s controversial map revision in 2020. Now, with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, the new leadership could possess the domestic political capital to pursue a harder line on such issues, considering Balen Shah’s earlier anti-India rhetoric as a mayor of Kathmandu – possibly sharpening bilateral tensions.

New Delhi’s diplomatic outreach towards Nepal was traditionally anchored in the long-established political entities, such as the Nepal Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist–Leninist (CPN-UML). The RSP’s landslide victory signals the erosion of this familiar political landscape and the emergence of a new generation of leaders whose governance approach remains largely untested. In a country witnessing a dramatic shift, its younger generation is more digitally connected than ever before and uncompromisingly aspirational. Nepal’s electoral earthquake has brought the RSP into the corridors of power – one that India’s regional diplomacy has not previously had to navigate in such a form.

Although the new mandate sends some optimism in New Delhi's strategic circles. Analysts view the emergence of RSP, compounded by Shah's technocratic priorities – its emphasis on improving infrastructure, digital connectivity, and boosting GDP – could also open new avenues for cooperation. RSP ambitiously wants to be vehicle of change of a new Nepal and the trajectory of India-Nepal relations will therefore depend on how India adapts to this evolving landscape, making the RSP’s rise not a just a domestic phenomenon but a critical strategic test for New Delhi’s regional diplomacy in Kathmandu. 

Ammu S. Anil is a Senior Research Fellow at the MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, and a Visiting Fellow at NIICE Nepal, Lalitpur.

Mahesh Ganguly, Teaching Assistant and Research Fellow, IIT Bombay. 

When a major neighboring currency weakens, Nepal cannot afford to ignore it. The recent pressure on the Indian rupee is not only India’s problem. Because  Nepali rupee is pegged to the Indian rupee, Nepal inevitably feels the impact. When the rupee weakens against the US dollar, the Nepali currency moves in the same direction. That simple fact ties Nepal’s economic stability closely to developments across the open border.

The rupee’s recent weakness is not the result of a deliberate policy choice by India. It reflects a mix of global shocks and structural realities. Oil prices have surged because of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. Investors have become more cautious and moved toward safer assets such as the US dollar. At the same time, interest rates in the US remain relatively high, making dollar assets attractive.

India’s own economic structure also plays a role. The country imports a large amount of crude oil and many industrial inputs that are priced in dollars. When oil prices rise, India’s import bill increases quickly. This pushes up demand for dollars and puts pressure on the rupee. Even though India has strong growth and a vibrant services sector, its merchandise trade deficit remains large.

There's a growing argument that a weaker currency helps developing economies by making exports cheaper. In theory, that can be true. Countries with strong manufacturing bases can gain competitiveness from mild currency depreciation. But that argument has limits. India imports a lot of fuel, machinery, chemicals, and electronic components. When the rupee weakens too sharply, the cost of these imports rises. That increases production costs and fuels inflation.

In other words, a weak currency is not always a blessing. It can also act like a tax on the economy.

For Nepal, the implications are more complicated because of the currency peg. Nepal Rastra Bank maintains a fixed exchange arrangement where 100 Indian rupees equal 160 Nepali rupees. This peg has long served as a monetary anchor. It simplifies trade with India and provides stability in a small and import-dependent economy. But the peg also means Nepal imports India’s exchange-rate movements. When the rupee weakens against the dollar, the Nepali rupee weakens too. That affects import prices and inflation inside Nepal.

The most obvious impact is on fuel. Nepal imports petroleum products largely through India. If global oil prices rise and the rupee falls, Nepal faces a double shock. Transport costs increase. Electricity backup becomes more expensive. Food distribution costs rise. Construction materials and industrial inputs also become costlier. Inflation can therefore increase even if domestic demand is weak. Nepal’s central bank has long recognized that inflation in India often spills over into Nepal because of the currency peg and the close trade relationship.

This does not mean Nepal is currently in a crisis. In fact, the country’s external position is stronger than it was just a few years ago. Foreign-exchange reserves have recovered significantly since the stress period of 2022. Remittance inflows remain robust, providing a vital cushion for the economy. Inflation has also moderated from earlier peaks.

But comfortable numbers today do not guarantee long-term security. Nepal’s external stability is more comfortable than it is structurally secure. The economy still depends heavily on remittances and imports. A combination of higher oil prices, slower remittance growth, or a surge in imports could again tighten the external account.

Remittances illustrate this paradox well. They are a lifeline for Nepal. Millions of Nepalis working abroad send money home, supporting families and boosting consumption. These inflows help finance imports and stabilize the balance of payments. But they also reinforce an economic model built on migration and consumption rather than production and exports.

For many young Nepalis, the path to economic success still runs through a foreign airport.

This structural dependence means Nepal remains vulnerable to external shocks. When global conditions change, the impact travels quickly through exchange rates, import prices, and financial flows.

What should Nepal do in this situation? First, policymakers should not panic about the currency peg. The peg remains useful because India is Nepal’s dominant trade partner. It provides stability and credibility in monetary policy. Changing the exchange-rate regime abruptly would likely create more uncertainty than relief. Instead, the focus should be on strengthening the defenses around the peg.

Nepal Rastra Bank should continue to maintain strong foreign-exchange reserves. Adequate reserves give the central bank the ability to manage volatility and reassure markets during periods of stress. Careful monitoring of imports and external payments is also essential.

Second, the government should manage imported inflation carefully. Fuel pricing is a good example. Sudden price increases can hurt households and businesses, but delaying adjustments for too long can create fiscal problems. A balanced approach that smooths price changes while protecting vulnerable groups is more sustainable.

Third, Nepal must reduce its structural dependence on imported energy. Hydropower remains the country’s greatest economic advantage. Expanding domestic electricity use and exporting surplus power can reduce fuel imports and strengthen the external balance over time.

Fourth, export diversification is essential. Tourism, hydropower exports, agro-processing, and niche manufacturing sectors all offer potential. Without stronger exports, Nepal will continue to rely on remittances and imports to sustain growth.

Finally, governance and economic management matter. Investors and entrepreneurs need stable policies, efficient infrastructure, and predictable regulations. Without these foundations, economic transformation will remain slow.

Households and businesses should also avoid overreacting to currency movements. A weaker rupee does not mean people should rush to buy dollars or speculate in foreign currency. Panic behavior can create unnecessary instability. Instead, firms should focus on managing costs and adjusting contracts when imported inputs become more expensive.

Some sectors may even benefit modestly. Remittances sent in dollars or other foreign currencies increase in value when converted into Nepali rupees. A weaker currency can also help certain exports in third-country markets. But Nepal’s export base remains limited, so the inflationary impact of currency weakness is likely to dominate. In the end, the lesson is simple: Nepal is not in immediate trouble, but it cannot afford complacency; external conditions remain uncertain; oil prices are volatile; global financial markets can shift quickly; and the Indian rupee may remain under pressure for some time.

Nepal should use this period of relative stability wisely. Strong reserves and remittances have provided breathing space. That space must be used to build a more resilient economy. Because when the rupee trembles, Nepal inevitably feels the shock. The real challenge is ensuring that the country becomes strong enough to withstand those shocks.

Four years ago, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) did not exist. Today, it is forming Nepal’s government. That alone should make every traditional political party stop and ask itself a very uncomfortable question: what went so wrong?

The March 5 election results were not merely a surprise. They were a rebuke, delivered quietly through the ballot box by millions of Nepalese voters who had run out of patience. RSP's landslide victory is historic not because a new party won, but because it signals something deeper: the collapse of public faith in the political establishment that has governed this country since the democratic revolution of 1990.

The weight of 35 years

To understand why RSP won, you have to understand what Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and the Maoist Centre have come to represent in the minds of ordinary voters. These parties have had every opportunity. They have held power repeatedly. They have made promises repeatedly. And repeatedly, voters have watched corruption scandals unfold, unemployment persist, public services stay broken, and governments formed through deals that had nothing to do with governance and everything to do with political survival.

The Sept 2025 GenZ protests tried to force accountability through the streets. Young people came out in tens of thousands, angry and organized, demanding change. The response from the old guard was predictable: consolidate, maneuver, and wait for the storm to pass. Many of those same leaders tightened their grip on their party structures and assumed they would outlast the anger.

They misread the room. When the protest could not dislodge them, voters took matters into their own hands on election day. Quietly, and in massive numbers, they chose someone else.

The Balen factor

RSP’s strategic decision to align with Kathmandu’s popular mayor, Balen Shah, and present him as the incoming Prime Minister just weeks before the election was arguably the most consequential political move of this election cycle. It gave RSP something it badly needed: a face, a story, and a reason to vote.

Balen ran a campaign unlike anything Nepal had seen before. He traveled the country in a caravan-style tour, appearing in constituency after constituency, not as a party boss but as something closer to a movement. His interactions with the media remained minimal. His public statements were carefully measured. Yet none of that seemed to matter. What voters saw was someone different. Someone who had actually done something as Kathmandu’s mayor, and who carried himself with a quiet credibility that felt foreign in a political landscape dominated by familiar faces making familiar promises.

This is important to understand: many voters who cast a ballot for RSP could not name their local RSP candidate. Many had only a vague sense of the party’s actual policy platform. What they knew was Balen, and what Balen represented—the possibility, however uncertain, that things could be done differently. In a country exhausted by broken promises, that possibility was enough.

History has a pattern

Nepal’s political history follows a recognizable rhythm. The party that captures the energy of a major political turning point tends to win the election that follows. Nepali Congress led the government after the 1990 democratic movement. The Maoists swept to power after the peace process ended the decade-long armed conflict. Madhes-based parties rose in 2008 on the back of a powerful identity movement. UML and the Maoists dominated in 2017 after steering the promulgation of the new federal constitution.

RSP has now repeated this pattern. Whatever one thinks of the GenZ protests, RSP absorbed their energy and their symbolism. They carried the sentiment of that movement into the election. And history, as it tends to do, rewarded them for it.

The harder question

But winning is the easy part. Governing is not. RSP now inherits a country with a fractured economy, deeply entrenched patronage networks, a public service in disrepair, and a geopolitical position that requires careful navigation between India, China and the West. The very expectations that swept RSP to power are now its greatest liability. Voters did not just want RSP to win. They wanted someone to actually fix things. The mandate is real, but so is the weight of it.

Several questions will define RSP’s tenure before it even properly begins. Can the party hold together its internal dynamics—particularly the relationship between the party leadership and whoever leads the government—without fracturing under the pressure of real decisions? Will it have the discipline to focus on long-term governance rather than the temptation of short-term popularity through high-profile corruption investigations? And perhaps most critically: will it fall into the same patterns of compromise politics that eroded the credibility of every government before it?

There is also the question of capacity. RSP is a four-year-old party. It does not have the deep bench of experienced administrators and policymakers that comes with decades in politics. This is, in some ways, part of its appeal. But governing a country is not the same as campaigning through one. The distance between the promise of change and the delivery of it has destroyed many political careers in Nepal. RSP is about to find out how wide that distance really is.

A verdict, not a blank cheque

The March 5 result deserves to be read for what it is: a verdict on the past, and a conditional bet on the future. Voters did not give RSP unconditional trust. They gave it a chance and it is a rare, hard-won chance born out of collective frustration and a willingness to try something new. That is not the same as loyalty, and RSP would be wise not to confuse the two.

Nepal’s old parties will not disappear. They will regroup, recalibrate, and wait. If RSP stumbles—if governance fails, if corruption appears, if the internal politics become more visible than the public service—those parties will be ready to remind voters that the alternative they chose was no better than what came before.

The GenZ generation that lit the fuse of this political moment is watching. So is the far larger group of ordinary Nepalis who quietly voted for change without quite knowing what form it would take. They have done their part. The ballot box has spoken.

Now comes the harder work, and the real test of whether this is truly a new chapter in Nepal's politics, or just another turn of the same old wheel.