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Nepal, landlocked between the two giant neighbors—China, the world’s second largest economy, to the north across the Himalayas and India, the fourth largest economy, wrapping around its eastern, western and southern borders—is still struggling with inadequate physical infrastructure, limited connectivity and remains starved of sustained economic prosperity, despite the glorious history and epochs of rich and vibrant civilization of its own.

Since gaining independence from the 104-year autocratic Rana regime in 1951, Nepal has attained almost all the major political achievements it needs to accomplish up to the present day. Although the implementation of these achievements has often remained weak, Nepali citizens have, through constitution, already secured a broad range of rights, freedoms and access to the state. Today, no Nepali citizen, regardless of any race, religion, language, gender or region, has to be marginalized by the state system. In this context, continuing to advocate for various political issues and keeping the nation entangled in a prolonged state of transition even at present no longer appears to be relevant. Instead, the Nepali people are increasingly demanding development and prosperity. They aspire to become prosperous citizens of a prosperous nation and seek a decisive breakthrough in physical infrastructure, internal and external connectivity and economic transformation comparable to that achieved by other developed and emerging economies of the world. They wish to see Nepal moving fast on a development and growth trajectory.

On the same note, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the construction of the Trans-Himalayan Railway, also known as China-Nepal cross border Railway, the planned extension of the very famous 1956 kilometer Qinghai-Tibet Railway, was signed by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, and then Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli in June 2018 under the overarching framework of the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network, a component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As per the underscored plan, the Trans-Himalayan Railway is designed to link Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal, with China’s vast rail network via the 527.2-km Jilong/Keyrung-Xigaze/Shigatse rail corridor, which subsequently connects with the Qinghai-Tibet Railway network, operational since 2006.

The Trans-Himalayan Railway corridor isn’t just a railway, it’s a 600-km engineering marvel designed to pierce straight through the world’s tallest mountain range, connecting Nepal directly with China. Beyond its monumental scale, the railway will confront one of the most geologically volatile and environmentally hostile regions on Earth, where the Indian plate continues its inexorable collision with the Eurasian plate, making the region a hotspot of intense seismic activity. This ongoing tectonic activity causes frequent earthquakes, from minor tremors to catastrophic events capable of reshaping the landscape. Adding to this extraordinary challenge is the railway's dramatic vertical journey, descending from approximately 4,500 meters on the Tibetan Plateau, cutting through the Himalayan massif, and arriving in Kathmandu at around 1,400 meters. This represents an elevation differential of nearly 3,000 meters, an engineering feat of exceptional rarity in the history of railway construction. Reflecting the extreme terrain, the 2018 pre-feasibility study reveals that about 98.8 percent of the 72.2-km Nepal section of the railway would consist of tunnels and bridges.

Although discussion about linking China’s railway network to Nepal first came up in the year 1973 during a meeting between the President of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong, and Nepal’s King Birendra, it failed to gain meaningful momentum for decades until Nepal faced the unofficial Indian Blockade in 2015, which compelled Kathmandu to seek alternative corridors to the outside world. In this context, China’s railway emerged as an economic lifeline, offering Nepal a pathway to reduce its long-standing dependence on India as the sole gateway for trade and transit.

Since ancient times, Kathmandu has been a commercial bridge and logistical base, playing a key role in regional commerce between South Asia and China under the historic Silk Road connectivity, long before the advancement of modern way of road and water transportation. The city’s prosperity during this era was, to some extent, underpinned by its position as an intermediary between South Asian markets and Lhasa. By effectively utilizing the revitalized historic route through the Trans-Himalayan Railway, Nepal once again could position itself as a vital bridge between China, with 1.4bn people, and South Asia including India, the largest population on Earth, emerging as a regional trade hub and accelerating its economic advancement.

Whether in energy or innovation, space science or biology, human cognition or artificial intelligence, China’s trajectory of advancement is nothing short of astonishing. On a global scale, regardless of the benchmark cost at which any product is manufactured, if there is any country capable of producing the same goods at lower cost, with greater speed, on a far larger scale, or across a wide range of varieties, that country today is China alone—and achieving direct connectivity with such a nation, by significantly reducing transport time and trade costs, the Trans-Himalayan Railway would unlock a new horizon of possibilities for Nepal, transforming it from a landlocked into a land-linked one. Enhanced connectivity with China would open access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets, enabling Nepal to expand exports of high value goods such as medicinal herbs, agro products, handicrafts and niche manufactured items.

Beyond trade, the railway could attract substantial foreign direct investment across key sectors like logistics, manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, hydroelectricity and infrastructure, while improved rail connectivity would simultaneously boost tourism by making Nepal more accessible to Chinese and international travelers, thereby strengthening hospitality, transport and service industries. 

Hindus all over the world celebrate Mahashivaratri, a festival dedicated to Shiva or Mahadev (the god of gods), one of the three principal gods or Tridev—the other two being Brahma and Vishnu—in a grand manner. Monday of every week is considered to be  the holy day for worshipping Shiva. Mahashivaratri, which falls mostly on the month of Falgun, marks the day when Shiva saved the world from destruction by holding the deadly Halahala (a deadly poison) in his throat. During this festival, people observe fasting, worship Shiva and stay awake all night. After bathing early in the morning, devotees visit Shiva temples and worship the god with Bel (wood apple) leaves and datura flowers (moonflowers) amid the chants of ‘Om Namah Shivaya’.

There are many interesting myths about the origin of Mahashivaratri. One of them goes: Once gods were trying to extract nectar from the ocean using the Manthara mountain as Madani (a pole with shafts, used for churning milk) and the great serpent Vasuki as a rope. Vasuki got tired and started vomiting Halahal, leaving the deities much panicked as the poison could destroy the entire universe. Shiva drank this poison to avert the calamity while Parvati, his consort, sat down pressing the throat to prevent the poison from going down his throat. Vishnu also closed Shiva’s mouth to prevent the poison from spreading. The gods were worried and fasted all day and stayed awake all night, wishing for Shiva’s good health. Shiva held Halahal in his throat throughout, causing it to turn blue. For this reason, he got the name Neelkanth (blue-throated) and the night dedicated to him is known as Mahashivaratri.

Dolakha is an ancient town with rich Newari culture outside the valley. Here, not a month goes by without some festival or fair. There are various  arrangements not only for food and drink but also for entertainment during every festival. 

There are Mahadev temples in Pingal Tole, Tashicha Tole and Simbhuthan of the upper tole of Dolakha. Among these, locals offer puja during Mahashivaratri at at Mahadev temples of Simbhuthan and Pingal Tole by making a huge fire. Bhimeshwar is considered a manifestation of Mahadev and there’s a temple dedicated to him in Dolakha (the Bhimeshwar temple), but no big celebration takes place at the temple during Mahashivaratri.

The late Balkrishna Joshi, former Chief of Gauri Shankar Campus, had first published an article about the cult of Bhimeswar using the term ‘Ek Shila Teen Avatar’ in the magazine ‘Hamro Sanskriti’ published by the Department of Culture. He wrote that even if there is only one stone idol, it takes three forms—Bhimsen, Bhimeshwar and Bhairav—during different times of worship.  The term ‘Ek Shila Teen Avatar’ that he used for the first time has become very popular now.

The late Joshi had made some revisions in this article before his death, a part of which is presented here: “There is another legend about the origins of Bhimeshwar. During their exile into the woods (they had gone incognito for the sake of their saftety)—after losing all in a gamble (dhyutkrida) with the Kauravs at Hastinapur—the Pandava reached Dolakha through the forests hills. At that time, Draupadi became very tired and sick. She started crying and bemoaned with Bhimsen about her poor condition. Moved by her plight, Bhimsen worshiped and prayed to Mahadev by looking toward Mount Gaurishankar. Thereafter, Draupadi became healthy and was able to walk. After this, Bhimsen, pleased with blessings from Mahadev installed a Shivalinga and worshiped it. This Shivalinga came to be known as Bhimeshwar.

He had used the term ‘Ek Shila Teen Avatar’ as there are three forms of Dolakha Bhimeshwar: Mahadev (at the time of Rudri Puja), Bhimsen (at the time of daily worship) and Bhairav (at the time of buffalo and goat sacrifice). Gods used to take different forms in ancient times and Bhimeshwar of Dolakha was (and is) no exception.

According to Dhanbajra Bajracharya and  Tek Bahadur Shrestha (The Historical Outline of Dolakha), “There is no special statue of Bhimsen like Bhimsensthan in other places. There is only one type of Shivalinga-shaped idol. Here, Bhimsen is also considered an ‘Ishwar’ (Mahadev) and Rudri performed. Along with this, animal sacrifices are also performed here by wrapping the idol of Bhimeshwar in a Khada.”

According to historians, expressions such as Shree 3 Mahadev, glory to Shankar and Shree 3 Bhimeshwar inscribed in old gold and copper plates, mace, pinnacle, etc indicate that Bhimsen had the temple of Bhimeshwar built in Dolakha.

The evidence found in Vanshawali (genealogies) and writings of foreign scholars strongly supports the opinion of the late Joshi. In the course of their research into the history of Nepal, foreign scholars like Mary Slusser and Sylvian Levy have highlighted the glory of Bhimeshwar, but Nepali scholars seem to have ignored it. A book titled ‘Nepal Desh Ko Itihas’ goes: One day, Bhimsen came to Nepal (then Kathmandu valley), where Danasur was blocking the flow of water and enjoying a ride on a boat made of a rock. Upon seeing him, girls got frightened and ran away….. Bhimsen established a Shivalinga (Bhimeshwar Shivalinga) and returned to Dolakha. It is believed that the rock still lies in Bhimdhunga, a settlement in Nagarjun municipality, Kathmandu. 

In Dolakha Bhimeshwar, devotees pray for their welfare, offer puja and perform Rudri Puja round the year. During Rudri, water mixed with milk is continuously poured over the idol from a special vessel  hanging on top of the idol. Tridents, sloping bulls and drums offered at the temple point that many devotees regard Bhimeshwar as a form of Shiva. On the occasion of Bhim Ekadashi, the leaves of Bel tree are put in a palanquin and brought at the temple for offering puja to Shiva amid a musical procession that attracts devotees from far and wide. 

Therefore,  there should be no delay in taking the initiative to celebrate Mahashivratri with great pomp in Dolakha as well.

Countries, businesses, or communities can make money through carbon trade by cutting down on greenhouse gas emissions or by conserving the environment. Things like protecting forests, making clean energy, improving farming methods, and better waste management can all help cut emissions. When a project effectively cuts down on carbon emissions, it can earn carbon credits, which are proof that the emissions have been cut down. Companies or nations who need to cut their emissions to realise climate goals can then acquire these credits. In basic terms, carbon trade lets Nepal make money from other countries while conserving the environment. Nepal has a lot of forests, hydroelectric resources, farmland, and community-based conservation systems. Carbon trade is a big chance for the economy and the environment in this country.

The Government of Nepal created the Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 to handle this chance in a way that is organized and trustworthy. This rule sets up a nationwide framework for selling carbon and explains how carbon projects get approved, measured, reported, and validated. It also defines standards for issuing and keeping track of carbon credits, makes sure that the government is involved and that everything is open and honest, and safeguards national interests while participating in international carbon markets. In brief, Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 gives Nepal the legal right to take part in global carbon markets. This legal clarity is very important since foreign buyers only trust carbon credits that come from countries with clear laws, trustworthy institutions, and systems that work.

Carbon trading is not just good for the environment; it is also a way for countries to do business with each other. Carbon credits are like Nepal’s traditional exports, like tea, cardamom, carpets, or hydropower, in that they can be traded. Like any other export item, carbon credits must meet international standards, follow technical rules, and go through accepted verification and certification procedures. If people in other countries don't trust or accept Nepal’s carbon credits, they can’t be sold, no matter how good they are for the environment. Because of this, carbon trade should be seen as part of Nepal’s export strategy and trade facilitation objective, not just as an environmental policy concern.

Accreditation is a key idea in carbon trading. It basically decides who you can trust. Accreditation determines who may check carbon projects, what methods are acceptable for measuring emissions, whether Nepal’s procedures meet international standards, and whether international buyers would accept approvals given in Nepal. If certification mechanisms aren’t strong, transparent, or consistent, international buyers might not want Nepal’s carbon credits, ask foreign organizations to verify them again at a high expense, provide lower rates, or not buy from Nepal at all. These problems are like Non-Tariff Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade in that they make it harder for businesses to compete and get into the market.

Right now, Nepal can’t fully participate in international carbon markets because of some shortcomings in its accreditation system. There isn’t a strong national certification agency that focuses on carbon verification, and the Measurement, Reporting, and Verification requirements don’t yet match up with how things are done in the global carbon market. There aren’t many ways to verify and audit things in the country, and there aren’t any agreements with significant international carbon standards or registers to recognize each other’s work. Also, project developers and investors are unsure about what to do because procedures and timetables are not clear. These gaps make transactions more expensive, slow down approvals, and lower worldwide trust in Nepal’s carbon credits.

Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 needs to work well with international systems for Nepal to be successful around the world. One important step is to set up or choose a robust National Accreditation Body that can accredit carbon verifiers and validators in line with international standards. The regulation must make it clear that this kind of organization must work independently and openly. This would make Nepal less reliant on foreign verification organizations, lower the costs of domestic projects, and give the country more control over the carbon trading process.

It is also very crucial that Nepal’s Measurement, Reporting and Verification system is in line with worldwide standards. MRV methods must be scientifically valid, transparent, and aligned with international standards, including ISO-based frameworks and prominent voluntary carbon market methodologies. Nepal doesn’t need to come up with new ways to keep track of carbon; instead, it can modify and combine current worldwide methods to fit its own needs. This alignment makes sure that Nepali carbon credits are acknowledged around the world without any problems or extra checks.

Strong quality assurance and quality control methods are also needed to keep carbon trading honest and of high quality. Regular audits, defined standard operating procedures, protections against mistakes or manipulation, and professional certification of verifiers are all very important. These systems help keep Nepal’s good name and create trust over time with international buyers, investors, and registries.

Another important task is to set up mutual recognition agreements with major buyer countries and worldwide carbon standards. Nepal’s accredited verifiers and certified credits can be used internationally without having to be verified twice, thanks to mutual recognition. This lowers costs, speeds up transactions, and makes Nepal’s carbon credits more competitive. These kinds of agreements are common instruments for making international trade easier, and they can be used directly in carbon markets.

The national carbon registry is also very important for developing trust. A trustworthy registry must keep track of the generation, transfer, and retirement of carbon credits in a safe way, stop double counting, and make public information clear. It also has to work with foreign registries so that transactions can happen smoothly across borders. Carbon credits lose their worth and credibility in the market if there isn’t a reliable and interoperable registry.

For effective implementation, both transparency and predictability are crucial. People should be able to easily find out about and understand all of the regulations, procedures, fees, and deadlines that Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 sets. Processes should be digitized whenever possible to cut down on choice, delays, and uncertainty in administration. These concepts are very important for good trade governance and for investors to feel safe.

Finally, for carbon trading to be successful in the long run, there needs to be a lot of investment in increasing capacity. People in the government, verifiers, auditors, project developers, and local communities all need to learn how to do things and get technical training. Building local expertise means that Nepal can run its own carbon market and keep more of its economic value in the country. It also gives communities that safeguard natural resources more influence.

When accreditation and regulatory systems aren’t strong, carbon trading has high verification costs, long approval delays, and low trust from other countries. When these processes are made stronger, approvals happen faster, transaction costs go down, trust in Nepal goes up, and Nepal can charge more for its carbon credits. Fixing accreditation gaps is no longer merely a technical or administrative change; it is now a sort of trade facilitation reform.

Regulation 2082 of the carbon trade is a big step forward for Nepal, but it’s not enough on its own. For carbon trade to work well, accreditation needs to be reliable, standards need to be in line with international norms, systems need to be open, and organizations need to gain the trust of people around the world. If Nepal can create this base, carbon trade can bring in money from other countries, help local populations, protect forests, and make Nepal a stronger player in international commerce. Carbon is traded on confidence in global carbon markets. This trust is generated through strong accreditation, trustworthy processes, and institutional legitimacy, not promises. 

The author is a trade and trade facilitation expert

The upcoming election is interpreted in conflicting ways: protesters see it as a “phoenix” rising from the graves of 76 GenZ martyrs, symbolising a contest between old and new politics, while UML Suprimo Oli and his party frame it as a battle between nation-builders and destroyers. In reality, it is a vote shaped by recent unrest and the deaths of civilians.

Nepal is once again preparing for a midterm election—an exercise that, by its very nature, is untimely. Unlike a scheduled general election, a midterm poll is triggered before a parliamentary term has run its course, often under conditions of political crisis. Such elections rarely occur in an atmosphere of readiness. Neither the state machinery nor the electorate is usually fully prepared. Yet political compulsion leaves little room for choice.

This will be Nepal’s second midterm election. The first was held in 1994 after then prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala dissolved Parliament. That decision came at a time of deep factional infighting within the Nepali Congress, which had fractured into two rival groups named 74 and 36 on the basis of the number of parliamentarians. The election that followed adhered to a familiar global pattern: the ruling party that initiated the midterm poll was punished by voters, while the main opposition benefited.

The Nepali Congress lost power, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), or UML, came to power for the first time by forming a minority government under its chairperson, Man Mohan Adhikari. That episode remains a defining chapter in Nepal’s post-1990 democratic history.

Three decades later, the country finds itself confronting another midterm election—once again amid political instability, judicial intervention and deep public dissatisfaction with the political class.

The courts, dissolutions and the Oli factor

Following its rise to power in the mid-1990s, UML attempted to dissolve Parliament while leading a minority government. The Supreme Court intervened, ruling that such a move was unconstitutional. The decision triggered widespread political agitation, both inside the House and on the streets. That confrontation between the executive and the judiciary would set a precedent for future constitutional disputes.

In the years that followed, Parliament has twice been dissolved while UML was in power—both times under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. On each occasion, the Supreme Court struck down the dissolutions, declaring them unconstitutional and reinstating the legislature. Those rulings reinforced the judiciary’s role as a key arbiter in Nepal’s fragile constitutional order.

The main reason behind this mid-term election is widely seen as former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. The difference this time is striking: while he once tried and failed to force a mid-term election, he now cannot stop it, despite his efforts. The GenZ movement, which arose in response to Oli’s hardline policies, led to the death of 76 civilians. Following his removal from office, an interim government took shape. Acting on the demands of the GenZ protesters, the interim administration dissolved parliament and announced a mid-term election. Oli, along with his former coalition partner—the establishment faction of the Nepali Congress under Sher Bahadur Deuba—has approached the Supreme Court seeking the restoration of the parliament. Given the current situation, the election scheduled for March 5  is likely to take place before the court issues its verdict on the case, potentially making parliamentary restoration irrelevant.

Views on the GenZ protests and the upcoming election are deeply divided. Different groups are shaping their own narratives to suit their interests. Protesters describe the election as a “phoenix rising from the graves” of GenZ martyrs, framing it as a referendum between old and new political forces. Oli rejects this interpretation. He portrays the GenZ movement as a conspiracy of domestic and foreign actors to corner him and casts the election as a battle between those who would “destroy the country” and those who would “build it,” claiming the role of the nation-builder.

In reality, both these extreme narratives are misleading. The election is neither simply a contest between the old and the new, nor is the GenZ movement solely the result of a domestic-foreign conspiracy, as Oli claims. Rather, it is a vote standing over the graves of 76 innocent civilians, a measure of public opinion shaped by recent political unrest. How the Nepali people interpret and respond to it remains to be seen. The answer will become clear only after the March 5 election results.

Party politics and accountability

While UML has closed ranks around Oli, other parties have experienced internal upheaval. Within the Nepali Congress, youth leaders recently convened a special party convention that sidelined long-time leader Sher Bahadur Deuba. Deuba, a five-time prime minister, has faced sustained criticism for prioritising personal political survival over party renewal and reform.

His removal—though controversial—was widely seen as a symbolic attempt of younger party members to assert accountability within the organisation. Many argue that Deuba’s leadership had come to embody the stagnation and transactional politics that voters increasingly reject.

UML, by contrast, has taken no comparable steps to discipline or sideline Oli. Instead, its party convention reaffirmed his leadership overwhelmingly. For critics, this reinforced the perception of UML as a party centred on a single individual rather than collective leadership.

That perception appears to be resonating in Oli’s home constituency of Jhapa-5, where political dynamics have shifted. Reports suggest that voters there are less concerned with party affiliation than with identifying a candidate capable of defeating Oli. The constituency has become sharply polarised between his remaining loyal supporters and a growing group of voters seeking change.

Into this contest has stepped Balen Shah, who resigned as the mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City to challenge Oli in Jhapa-5. While some view his move as politically risky, others see it as a calculated attempt to capitalise on public frustration with established leaders.

Vote sans issues in a shallow democracy

Beyond individual contests, the broader nature of Nepal’s elections has remained largely unchanged despite repeated political transformations. The country has experienced multiple systems—monarchy, Panchayat rule, constitutional monarchy and now a federal republic. Yet electoral behaviour continues to be shaped less by policy debates and more by personality, identity and patronage.

Multiparty democracy is often regarded as the most advanced political system, with periodic elections serving as its core mechanism of accountability. In theory, parties present clear agendas, voters choose among them, and those who fail to deliver are voted out.

In practice, Nepal’s democratic exercise remains underdeveloped. This will be only the third such election under the current republican framework. Political agendas are weakly articulated, candidates often lack policy clarity, and voters are still adapting to the idea of elections as instruments of accountability rather than ritualistic exercises.

Campaigns continue to be influenced by caste, religion, region and personal networks. Despite the formal abandonment of the Panchayat system, the personalised nature of politics has endured. Many figures who once opposed multiparty democracy have successfully reinvented themselves within it, moving across parties while retaining influence and access to power.

Elections have also become increasingly expensive. While parties now contest elections rather than individuals, the underlying culture has not changed. Campaigns are often likened to financial investments, with candidates expected to recover their costs once elected. As a result, parties tend to favor wealthy contenders over ideologically committed activists, reinforcing corruption and public cynicism

Social media, new faces and an uncertain verdict

This election is unfolding in a dramatically altered information environment. Nearly every voter now carries a smartphone, providing access to social media platforms that amplify messages at unprecedented speed. Algorithms often reward emotionally charged content, enabling misinformation and disinformation to circulate widely.

Populist narratives have gained traction, particularly around figures portrayed as political outsiders. Online discourse suggests growing enthusiasm for newer faces such as Balen Shah and Rabi Lamichhane, as well as other non-traditional political actors. Whether this digital momentum will translate into votes remains uncertain.

Despite the noise, most analysts agree that no single party is likely to secure a clear majority. Nepal’s electoral system, combined with a highly polarised electorate, makes such an outcome improbable. Even alliances between major parties may struggle to cross the threshold needed to form a stable government.

As a result, post-election coalition bargaining appears almost inevitable. While such arrangements are common in parliamentary democracies, Nepal’s experience has been marked by instability and frequent government changes.

Ultimately, while the election may help restore procedural legitimacy and stabilise constitutional processes, few expect it to resolve Nepal’s deeper political challenges. Governance failures, entrenched corruption and weak institutional accountability remain unresolved.

As the country heads toward polling day, many hope the election will serve as a genuine democratic exercise—one in which voters prioritise competence and integrity over loyalty and identity. Whether that hope will be realised will become clear once the ballots are counted.

For now, Nepal waits—once again placing its faith in the ballot box to chart a way forward.

The author is a senior Nepali journalist based in Washington, DC