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The Russia-Ukraine war has evolved into a transnational conflict drawing in thousands of foreign nationals. Available data suggest that approximately 18,000 foreign citizens are serving in the Russian Armed Forces, while more than 130 foreign nationals from over 30 countries have been listed as prisoners of war (POWs) in Ukraine. Among them are Nepali citizens, killed, missing, captured, or still engaged in combat.

The participation of Nepalis in a distant European war is not an isolated anomaly. Rather, it reflects the intersection of global labor migration, economic precarity, militarized recruitment networks, and geopolitical strategy. This article examines the structural drivers behind Nepali enlistment, Russia’s motivations for foreign recruitment, and Nepal’s diplomatic and policy responses.

Foreign recruitment in the Russian war effort

Foreign recruitment into the Russian military must be understood within the broader context of manpower shortages and political constraints. As battlefield losses mounted, Moscow sought to replenish forces without triggering widespread domestic discontent through additional waves of mobilization.

Foreign nationals serve several strategic purposes for Russia in the context of the ongoing war. First, their deployment provides a degree of political insulation, as casualties among foreign fighters are less likely to trigger domestic backlash compared to losses among Russian citizens. Second, recruiting foreigners can be more cost-efficient, often involving fewer long-term welfare obligations, pensions, or social benefits. Third, amid sustained battlefield attrition, foreign enlistment enables rapid operational replenishment of forces without resorting to politically sensitive large-scale mobilization at home. Fourth, the presence of foreign fighters carries propaganda value, allowing Moscow to portray its war effort as enjoying international backing rather than being isolated. Finally, foreign recruits who return to their home countries may function as informal transnational networks of influence, potentially advancing Russian strategic interests beyond the immediate battlefield.

Entities associated with the Wagner Group, a Russian state-aligned private military company (PMC), reportedly played a role in foreign recruitment efforts. Following the failed mutiny led by its commander in 2023, the group was formally dismantled. In the aftermath, the Russian government moved to consolidate control by integrating PMCs into the regular armed forces. As a result, individuals recruited thereafter have been enlisted directly into the military, signing formal contracts with the Ministry of Defense rather than with private entities. Additionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a series of decrees expediting Russian citizenship for foreign nationals who enlist, thereby institutionalizing recruitment incentives within the state framework.

Motivations of foreign recruits

The motivations of foreign nationals joining the Russian Armed Forces can broadly be categorized into three interrelated drivers: financial incentives, coercion and deception, and ideological affinity. Economic necessity appears to be the most significant factor, as many recruits originate from lower-income countries where domestic wages are far below the compensation packages advertised by Russian recruiters. 

Reported monthly salaries of $2,000–$3,000, along with promises of insurance coverage, medical benefits, and pathways to citizenship, create powerful pull factors for economically vulnerable individuals. At the same time, evidence from captured foreign fighters indicates that not all enlistments are entirely voluntary. In certain cases, individuals were allegedly misled with promises of civilian employment, threatened with deportation, or pressured into signing military contracts. There have also been claims that recruitment extended to detainees, with authorities reportedly approaching individuals while they were under arrest, prior to any court sentencing. In such instances, coercive tactics, including intimidation, physical pressure, or blackmail, were allegedly used to secure enlistment. 

Additionally, the contracts are typically drafted in Russian, a language many recruits do not fully understand, raising concerns that they may sign binding military agreements without clear comprehension of their terms and obligations. These accounts complicate the narrative of free and informed consent in the recruitment process. A smaller segment may be driven by ideological affinity, particularly individuals from regions historically connected to Soviet or socialist political traditions. Many of these regions remain significantly exposed to Russian influence in their political systems, economic networks, and informational space, which can increase susceptibility to pro-Russian narratives and propaganda, thereby shaping perceptions and motivations. However, in the Nepali context, ideological motivations appear to be secondary to economic considerations.

Nepal’s structural vulnerabilities

The recruitment of Nepalis into the Russian military cannot be divorced from Nepal’s domestic political economy. Nepal’s economy remains heavily dependent on remittances. Youth unemployment hovers near 20 percent, and approximately one in five citizens lives below the poverty line. Per capita income remains under $1,500. Labor migration is deeply embedded in Nepal’s development model; an estimated 1,500–2,000 Nepalis leave the country daily for foreign employment. In 2022–23 alone, roughly 71,000 Nepalis opted for permanent migration. Within this context, Russia emerged as an alternative labor destination, albeit one embedded in a war economy.

Beyond structural poverty lies aspirational transformation. Social media exposure has amplified desires for global mobility, consumer goods, and upward socioeconomic mobility. Russian recruitment advertisements reportedly emphasized high salaries, advanced weaponry, insurance coverage, and immediate citizenship pathways for families. For individuals earning less than $200 per month domestically, the promise of $3,000 represented not only income but social mobility.

Similarly, Nepal’s historical experience with foreign military service, particularly Gurkha service in British and Indian armies, has normalized overseas enlistment as honorable employment. However, unlike treaty-based Gurkha recruitment, current enlistment into Russian forces lacks formal intergovernmental safeguards, transparency, and institutional oversight.

Recruitment mechanisms and trafficking networks

Reports indicate that many Nepalis traveled to Russia on tourist visas, often transiting through the United Arab Emirates. Informal agents and alleged trafficking networks reportedly charged substantial fees, ranging from $1,500 to $9,000 per recruit. In Dec 2023, Nepalese authorities arrested multiple individuals accused of facilitating recruitment into the Russian military. Despite Nepal’s suspension of labor approvals for Russia, anecdotal evidence suggests that recruitment continued, albeit at reduced rates. Russian officials have maintained that foreign nationals joined independently and voluntarily, complicating data verification efforts.

Battlefield realities and human costs

Testimonies from returnees and families describe short training periods, sometimes as brief as 10–14 days, before deployment. Language barriers, extreme climatic conditions, and unfamiliar terrain compounded operational risks. Some accounts allege that foreign recruits were deployed in frontline positions with limited protection. Casualty figures remain contested. Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges dozens of deaths and over one hundred missing persons, while Ukrainian intelligence sources have cited higher involvement numbers. 

In March 2024, Ukraine publicly disclosed that it was holding five Nepali prisoners of war (POWs). However, no visible initiatives were taken by the Russian side in response. The families of the POWs have continued to report delays in the dissemination of information and in compensation procedures from the Russians. The lack of clarity surrounding official figures has further contributed to growing public distrust.

Nepal’s diplomatic position

Nepal formally condemned Russia’s invasion and voted in favor of resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly demanding respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. This marked a departure from Nepal’s abstention during the 2014 Crimea vote, reflecting a shift toward a more explicit normative stance aligned with the UN Charter. Simultaneously, Nepal has pursued diplomatic channels to repatriate POWs, recover remains, and seek compensation. However, the state faces structural limitations in monitoring and regulating informal migration routes.

The phenomenon of Nepali participation in Russia’s war highlights several urgent policy challenges for the state. First, it exposes weaknesses in migration governance, underscoring the need for stronger oversight of outbound labor migration and tighter regulation of informal and unauthorized recruitment channels. Second, it calls for more robust anti-trafficking enforcement, including enhanced cross-border cooperation to dismantle networks that exploit vulnerable job seekers. Third, the crisis reflects deeper structural issues within Nepal’s domestic employment strategy, particularly persistent unemployment and heavy dependence on remittance-driven growth, which push youth to seek risky opportunities abroad. Finally, it reveals limitations in consular protection capacity, emphasizing the need to expand diplomatic resources and crisis-response mechanisms to better safeguard Nepali migrant workers caught in conflict zones.

Conclusion

Nepali involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war is neither purely voluntary adventurism nor solely geopolitical manipulation. It is a product of structural economic vulnerability, aspirational pressures, recruitment networks, and wartime labor demand. For Russia, foreign recruitment mitigates domestic political risk and manpower shortages. For Nepali youth, enlistment represents a high-risk strategy for socioeconomic mobility. For Nepal, it exposes systemic weaknesses in migration governance and economic planning. Absent structural reform, similar patterns may re-emerge in future conflicts. 

The author is the Research Director at the Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE), Nepal’s leading think tank

Nepal has been passing through a volatile political phase following the violent protests of Sept 9, during which key state installations—including the Parliament building, Singha Durbar, and the President’s Office—were set on fire. The unrest created a serious political and constitutional vacuum, raising concerns about state stability and security. In the aftermath, the role of the Nepali Army (NA) came under intense public scrutiny.

Many members of the public and political leaders questioned why the NA failed to protect vital government institutions such as Singhadurbar. The Army, however, defended its actions, arguing that its top priority was to prevent human casualties rather than protect physical infrastructure. According to senior NA officials, opening fire on protesters on September 9 could have triggered even more severe violence the following day. They maintain that if more lives had been lost, the situation might have spiraled beyond control of NA. This debate is likely to continue in the days ahead.

Despite the criticism, the Army’s conduct during and after the protests has been widely regarded as measured and responsible. Most notably, in the political vacuum that emerged after the unrest, the NA did not attempt to assume power. Instead, it facilitated the restoration of civilian rule. Following initial engagement with protest groups to help restore normalcy, the Army worked closely with President Ramchandra Paudel and major political parties to expedite the formation of a new government.

Between Sept 9 and 12, the NA coordinated with the President and senior leaders from major parties to accelerate the government formation process. The Army reportedly urged political actors to quickly establish a new administration, given the sensitive and volatile environment. By doing so, it sent a clear message that it had no political ambitions and remained committed to its professional and apolitical role.

A military takeover—even a temporary one until elections could be held—might have further complicated the crisis and jeopardized Nepal’s 2015 Constitution. Senior leaders such as Madhav Kumar Nepal and Pushpa Kamal Dahal publicly acknowledged the Army’s constructive role in restoring stability. The US Embassy in Nepal also praised President Paudel and Chief of the Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel for ensuring a smooth transition back to civilian governance.

Following the formation of the Karki-led government and the announcement of elections, the Army continued to emphasize that elections were the only viable path out of the crisis. On this issue, the NA, President Paudel, and Prime Minister Sushila Karki appeared aligned. The Army maintained that any postponement of elections could trigger another round of political instability and constitutional uncertainty. This firm position helped bring political parties together in support of the electoral process.

In preparation for the March 5 elections, the Nepal Army played a proactive role in strengthening security arrangements. Although constitutional questions sometimes arise regarding the mobilization of the Army for election security, the NA fully cooperated with the government. Given concerns about declining morale within the Nepal Police, there had been doubts about whether adequate security could be ensured. In response, the Army expedited logistical and operational preparations within a limited timeframe.

To date, no major incidents of election-related violence have been reported. The Army has continued patrol operations to maintain a secure environment. Just weeks ago, top political leaders had expressed concerns about their ability to campaign safely. However, most candidates are now actively engaged in electioneering without significant security complaints, aside from a few minor incidents.

The NA has provided security for elections since the restoration of democracy. For the March 5 polls, it deployed over 80,000 personnel. Traditionally, the Army is stationed in the outer security ring of polling centers, while police and local security forces manage the inner perimeter. However, in coordination with local authorities, the NA can assume responsibility for inner-circle security when threat levels are high.

Compared to previous elections, the Army’s role in this process has been more extensive and intensive, largely due to the extraordinary political circumstances. These elections are not taking place under normal conditions; they are viewed as a crucial step toward restoring constitutional order and political stability. By committing itself to ensuring free, fair, and timely elections, the Nepal Army has positioned the electoral process as central to resolving the ongoing crisis and putting the constitution back on track.

Free drinking water supply may win votes, but a sustainable water supply system wins the future.

Access to water is a global human rights agenda; however, this global consensus is sometimes misinterpreted as a mandate for ‘free water for all’. The real challenge in the WASH sector is to ensure that no citizen is denied water due to poverty, while also maintaining financially viable systems. Political parties sometimes pick this as an agenda and try to implement it, and the result is that the system becomes more paralyzed. The blanket free water policies ultimately degrade the service quality and disproportionately benefit high volume users rather than the poor, per a study.

Drinking water supply has not been treated as a tradable commodity so far in human history. So that instinct still shapes the public perception today, making tariffs politically sensitive.

But providing water supply is not just to lay pipeline or construction of reservoirs, it’s rather a continuous public service which seeks continuous operation, maintenance, manpower, energy and institutions. Additionally, our WASH sector today does not suffer only from the lack of proper and sufficient infrastructures but from poor utilization of existing infrastructure. Systems constructed with huge public and donor investment remain underused or poorly operated due to inadequate management and lack of institutional support. So, the problem is not the pipe and tanks alone, it is governance. 

My field experience evaluating the performance of urban water utilities shows how poorly-designed pricing policies can backfire. In Katahariya municipality, where the municipality itself used to bear the household drinking water cost, the Water and Sanitation User’s Committee admitted that households use drinking water even for the bathing of domestic animals. So the utilities are under constant pressure to meet demand and operate the system.  In Darchula district headquarters, a flat tariff system—households pay fixed amounts regardless of the consumption—has led to excessive per capita water use. During my visit, treated water was visibly flowing along roads not due to abundance, but because there was no incentive to conserve.

If we look at the result of the Free Water Promise in Rajasthan or New Delhi, the poorer section of society who suffered from the non-availability of water cannot avail the benefits of such schemes. Usually, subsidies end up benefitting mainly those outside the target group.

Among the eight newly-constructed urban water supply systems, one is performing at an ‘improved’ level, according to a recent study of the Town Development Fund. Most remain in the ‘improving’ category, while some are already under the ‘poor’ category. Even the newly-constructed water supply systems are seeking urgent support for operations, management and institutional strengthening. The scenarios in rural areas are even worse.

At the same time, rapid urban growth, change in living standards, haphazard construction and climate-induced stress are reducing the quality and quantity of available water. So, innovation for the adaptation of climate-induced stress, integration of new and sophisticated technologies, system strengthening, alternative operation modalities, etc should be the state priorities.

Promising ‘free water’ is not a solution; it is a distraction. Political parties should focus on providing quality service rather than free.

Every year brings hopeful news about brain disease. Scientists discover drugs that remove toxic proteins. Experimental treatments rescue neurons in animals. Brain scans now reveal damage to extraordinary precision. From the outside, it feels as if cures for Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease must already exist somewhere, waiting only to reach patients. Yet inside clinics, the conversation sounds very different.

Doctors can help reduce tremors, improve mobility, and temporarily slow memory decline. But stopping the disease itself remains rare. Families struggle to understand this contradiction. If science is advancing so rapidly, why does the illness continue to progress? This question has quietly become one of the central challenges of modern medicine.

Across all areas of drug development, treatments for brain disorders fail more often than therapies for heart disease, infections, or cancer. Large analyses of pharmaceutical pipelines published in Nature Biotechnology, Biostatistics, and BIO industry reports show that only about 6 to 8 percent of neurological drugs entering clinical trials eventually reach approval. Most fail during Phase II clinical trials; the stage designed to prove that treatment improves human life rather than laboratory biology. In the laboratory, disease looks solvable. In real people, it behaves differently.

When the brain looks better, but the person does not

For decades, Alzheimer’s research focused on amyloid plaques and sticky protein deposits in the brain. The logic seemed simple: remove the plaques and the disease should slow. After many failures, medicine finally succeeded biologically.

Antibody therapies now visibly clear amyloid on brain scans. The EMERGE and ENGAGE trials of Aducanumab showed plaque removal but inconsistent clinical benefit, leading to controversial approval based on biomarker change rather than functional improvement. The CLARITY-AD trial of Lecanemab, published in The New England Journal of Medicine in 2022, showed a statistically significant slowing of decline by about 27 percent, yet the difference in daily life remained modest. The TRAILBLAZER-ALZ 2 trial of Donanemab, published in JAMA in 2023, reported similar results. For families, the outcome felt confusing. The scans improved clearly. Life improved only slightly.

Researchers eventually understood why. Long-term biomarker studies summarized in Lancet Neurology show Alzheimer’s disease begins 15 to 20 years before forgetfulness appears. By the time treatment starts, large parts of the brain network are already lost. Removing plaques changes biology, but it cannot restore neurons that have already died. The treatment works. It simply arrives too late.

Parkinson’s disease, which involves degeneration of dopamine neurons, taught the same lesson. Scientists hoped that protecting these cells would slow progression. In animals, the strategy repeatedly succeeded. In patients, it did not work.

The PRECEPT trial testing CEP-1347 showed no disease-modifying benefit. The STEADY-PD III trial of Isradipine, published in The New England Journal of Medicine in 2020, confirmed that a drug protective in laboratory models did not prevent disability in humans. More recently, anti-alpha-synuclein antibody trials such as PASADENA and PADOVA demonstrated target engagement but failed to produce meaningful clinical improvement.

Pathology studies had already hinted at the explanation. By the time tremor appears, roughly half of substantia nigra dopamine neurons and most striatal dopamine are already lost. A drug cannot protect cells that no longer exist.

The disease begins long before diagnosis

In laboratory models, disease is fast and clear. Toxin damages neurons within days. A mutation produces symptoms within months. Cause and effect are visible. Human neurodegeneration behaves differently. It resembles slow aging under a microscope. Sleep disruption, inflammation, metabolism, environmental exposure, and genetics interact quietly for decades before symptoms appear. By the time someone notices tremor or memory loss, the brain has been compensating for injury for years. Many drugs were designed for early disease but tested in late disease. The medicine did not necessarily fail. The timing did.

One name, many diseases

Another discovery of a further complicated treatment. Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease are not single, uniform disorders. Research in Nature Reviews Neurology and Neuron shows multiple biological subtypes involving inflammation, mitochondrial dysfunction, vascular injury, and immune signaling. Parkinson’s may even begin in the gut in some patients and in the brain in others.

Two patients may look identical in clinics but have different underlying biology. When placed in the same clinical trial, a drug helping one subgroup can appear ineffective overall. Cancer treatment improved only after medical science accepted that one diagnosis could contain many diseases. Neurology is now learning the same lesson.

Why this matters even more in Nepal

The gap between discovery and benefit becomes wider in countries like Nepal. As life expectancy rises, dementia and Parkinson’s disease are increasing. Early symptoms such as loss of smell, constipation, sleep disturbance, or slowed movement are often dismissed as normal aging. Medical care is usually sought only after tremors, falls, or major memory problems appear, indicating that the disease has already advanced. At such a stage, treatments designed to slow early degeneration can do little. Scientific progress exists globally, but its impact depends on timing. The challenge is not only access to medicine, but access early enough for medicine to matter.

Why failed trials still move science forward

A failed clinical trial sounds discouraging, but it rarely means the idea was wrong. Often, it means the treatment was given too late, to the wrong subgroup, or measured over too short a period. Because of these lessons, neuroscience is changing direction. Blood biomarkers, imaging, and genetic screening are being developed to detect disease years before symptoms appear. Prevention trials such as AHEAD 3-45 and DIAN-TU now test therapies in people who are biologically positive but still healthy. The central question is shifting from "Does the drug work? To whom should it be administered, and when?”

The real meaning of progress

For families living with brain disease, progress feels painfully slow. Yet decades of disappointing trials revealed something profound: these illnesses begin long before diagnosis. Many treatments did not fail because hope was misplaced. They failed because they met the disease at the wrong moment. The future of brain medicine may depend less on discovering a miracle cure and more on matching the right therapy to the right person at the right stage. When early detection, precise diagnosis, and timely treatment finally align, scientific breakthroughs will stop fading after headlines and begin changing everyday life both around the world and in Nepal.

The author is a PhD candidate in the Department of Neurosciences and Neurological Disorders at the University of Toledo