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It is all set, but both sides have yet to officially announce the upcoming visit of Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to India. Reports indicate that the visit is scheduled for 16–17 September 2025. In this connection, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri is arriving in Kathmandu on Aug 17 for a two-day visit.

High-level diplomatic visits are held at mutually agreed times through diplomatic channels. When it is realized that high-level engagements are necessary, such sojourns are arranged in mutual consultation. It is worth noting that there are frequent high-level visits between the two countries. Since May 2014, there have been 17 exchanges at the level of Head of State or Head of Government. These visits occur as per requirements, and there has been no gap in the highest political communication between the two countries.

Political relations 

Nepal-India relations are underpinned by shared cultural and societal cohesion. Looking back over the seven decades of friendship between the two countries, political relations have always been maintained, even though some hitches and glitches have appeared. Even in the hardest times, there has been no disruption of the highest level of communication, which stands as a symbol of deep relations.

High-level meetings between the heads of government also take place on the sidelines of different multilateral and regional forums. On April 4, Prime Minister Oli and Indian Prime Minister Modi met during the sixth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Bangkok. Prime Minister Oli described the discussions as meaningful and constructive.

PM Oli and PM Modi also met on the sidelines of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly on 22 Sept 2024. The two leaders reviewed the bilateral relationship between India and Nepal and expressed satisfaction at the progress made in diverse sectors, including development partnership, hydropower cooperation, and people-to-people ties.

In Nepal, visits of the head of government to India have often been overstated, over-judged and over-concerned. This is unnecessary. Frequent communication at the highest level means that visits alone are not always the sole indicator of a smooth relationship.

Nepal requires India’s cooperation to realize the national aspiration of “Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepali” set by Prime Minister Oli. Encouragingly, Prime Minister Modi has praised this aspiration and pledged India’s support to help make it a reality.

Pending issues

Pending issues between Nepal and India should be addressed amicably through diplomatic negotiations—a sentiment reiterated by both Prime Minister Oli and Prime Minister Modi.

The bilateral mechanisms have been consistently active in addressing these issues. Some matters, such as boundaries and water resources, require time to resolve. Certain issues have persisted for decades, inherited from history. Nonetheless, both leaderships should ensure that bilateral relations move forward progressively.

In the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) Report, the Indian side has maintained that it will be accepted at an appropriate time. If Nepal continues to receive this response, it should avoid raising the issue unilaterally too frequently. Established in January 2016 at the highest political level, the EPG was tasked with reviewing agreements and treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Friendship Treaty. It had finalized its report in 2018.

On issues like border management, both governments remain engaged and committed to resolution through diplomatic dialogue. Political leaders should provide strategic direction, but implementation should be carried out efficiently by technical and bureaucratic levels. Currently, India and Nepal operate more than 40 bilateral institutional mechanisms covering the full spectrum of relations, and these should meet regularly to resolve pending matters.

In recent years, India’s economic support to Nepal has increased. Physical and digital connectivity has expanded through the construction of border roads, integrated checkposts, transmission lines and petroleum pipelines. Major power sector milestones include the finalization of the Long-Term Power Trade Agreement, the trilateral power trade agreement between India, Nepal and Bangladesh, and agreements for the development of hydropower projects in Nepal by Indian developers, such as the 480 MW Phukot Karnali and the 669 MW Lower Arun. Key connectivity projects now facilitate Nepal’s access to sea lanes of transport and commerce.

Neighbors first

Nepal is a priority partner of India under its “Neighborhood First” Policy. In every form of support extended to Nepal and in every high-level meeting, the Indian side invokes Prime Minister Modi’s Neighborhood First policy, which also applies to India’s other neighboring states.

In this spirit, PM Modi visited the Maldives on 25–26 July 2025 as the Guest of Honour at the celebrations of the Maldives’ 60th Independence Day. During the visit, he reiterated that India has supported and will continue to support infrastructure development projects aligned with the priorities of the Maldivian people. Similarly, Sri Lankan President Anura Kumara Dissanayaka visited India on 15–17 Dec 2024. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that Sri Lanka is India’s closest maritime neighbour in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and holds a central place in the Prime Minister’s vision of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and the Neighborhood First policy.

In Kathmandu, Indian Ambassador Naveen Srivastava and his team have maintained warm diplomatic relations with the Government of Nepal and all major political parties. Ambassador Srivastava’s tenure has been marked by constructive diplomacy and mutual respect, helping to address and set aside earlier perceptions regarding external involvement in Nepal’s internal matters.

It appears that India has, of late, renewed its understanding with the Oli-led government in Nepal, reflecting a recognition of its shared responsibility toward a close and valued neighbour. Consequently, Prime Minister Oli’s visit to India has been scheduled, with several important agreements expected to be signed during the visit. 

Reportedly, Prime Minister Modi will visit Nepal thereafter. There is hope that this much-anticipated exchange of visits will mark a fresh chapter in bilateral relations, paving the way for a “new normal” of constructive engagement and mutual trust.

The 70th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relationships between Nepal and China is an important milestone for both nations but it is obvious to say that Nepal has been benefitting the most from this relationship.

Over the years, Nepal proved to be a reliable and trusted partner for Beijing and it is worthy to observe that Kathmandu was able to forge a strong relationship with China without putting its own strategic interests in jeopardy. Co-habiting a space hemmed between India and China, while it can bring multiple advantages, can also be a tricky endeavor.

Balancing off different interests and trade-offs between New Delhi and Beijing requires high skills in navigating foreign diplomacy without forgetting in the equation, the role of the United States that, with the exception of the incumbent administration in Washington, has also been a strong and important partner for Kathmandu.

Thanks also to the presence of different communist parties in the country, Beijing has been able to assert its influence and it is remarkable how swiftly China has been capable of boosting not only its development assistance but also its soft power in Nepal.

I often read mesmerizing reports from reporters invited to China to observe firsthand and then report and explain back home the huge improvements in the lives of Chinese citizens over the last 30 years, enhancements that have been accompanied by a turbo state-led capitalism that supported China’s rise. I have a huge admiration for China’s history and ancient civilization while as someone who grew up in the West, I have also a critical view of certain policies and positions taken by Beijing.

I never expected China to turn itself into a democracy but at the same time, I do not have an uncritical view of some of its approaches related to human rights and freedom of expression. Yet I always had a strong desire to try to understand the nuances of certain policies because in politics as well as in governance, we cannot simplify everything through “white and black” lenses and this is particularly true for a complex country like China.

Because understanding the ways the Chinese Communist Party works and the multilayered governance structure of its political and administrative systems are complex endeavors that require a lot of expertise.

In short, observing and trying to make sense of what is happening in China is indeed a fascinating thing and I do believe that the West should make a much bigger effort at grasping the nuances of China’s political system.

Nepal, despite its links with India, has managed, quite successfully, at building important bridges with China. At the same time, even in relation to the Road and Belt Initiative, Beijing’s flagship global program, Nepal has been able to push back with due respect and smartness. At the same time, the civil society of Nepal has been able to forge stronger relationships with peers in China and slowly a stronger knowledge of the country is emerging and this is a good thing.

Yet, I do feel that members of the press corps and activists should also develop a more holistic understanding of China. I never believed that a paradise on Earth exists, a nation capable of embodying perfection in all its spheres of life where no problems exist. This not only applies to China but also Europe, Australia or the United States of America or any other nation.

As a European, I can be proud of our democratic credentials and freedom of speech I can enjoy back home. I can also certainly assert that the EU has also been struggling with double standards and I wish the Europeans could always walk the talk in matters of upholding human rights domestically but also in their foreign policies. So, I do not take it easily to criticize the second biggest power on Earth, especially when China has been doing a lot for the nation that has been hosting me for many years.

Yet, as Nepal’s consciousness of India has matured over the years because the citizens of the former know very well the mindset, culture, politics and foreign policies of the latter, I do believe that slowly a more “complete” view of China will emerge.

From Beijing’s perspective, this inevitable evolution of views is not necessarily a negative thing because real partnerships require the space also to vent some criticisms or simply different perspectives. As China might sometimes vent its frustrations toward Kathmandu, it is normal that Nepal can be in a position to question certain policies and positions taken by Beijing, not out of disrespect, but simply out of sincere and trustworthy commitment to make the bilateral relationship stronger. This would happen because the rapport between the two will be enhanced when the interests of the smaller partner are better addressed and the latter becomes more assertive.

Nepal learned how to navigate its relationships with its south neighbor, developing a sense of self-confidence in also pushing back whenever needed. At the end of the day, such a level of candid approach might annoy New Delhi but at the end of the day, India knows that the relationships are stronger when both parties feel comfortable at expressing each other even if the positions are different.

Eventually, the same would happen with the northern neighbor. This would represent a new level of relationships between China and Nepal that, rather than being one-sided, are more mutually beneficial because they are more balanced.

Finally, I want to take an appreciative view of what China has been doing for Nepal. With the exception of the Ring Road work that I believe has been poorly designed (see the number of lethal accidents that have occurred so far since the revamped partial motorway has opened from Koteshwar to Kalanki), China has been playing a huge and very generous role in supporting Nepal.

I recently read of plans that China will build a bone marrow transplantation facility at the BP Koirala Memorial Cancer Hospital in Bharatpur, Chitwan.

There are also discussions on important expansions at Civil Service Hospital in Kathmandu, a hospital entirely built by China that, since its start of operations, has already seen important upgrades. These are key infrastructure projects for Nepal, very tangible initiatives at direct benefit of local peoples. At the same time as Nepal is proceeding to graduate from the category of least developed nations, would it not also be essential for Kathmandu to start doing something to help China? I do understand that this might look like a ridiculous proposition but instead I do believe that Nepal is about to reach the point where it can also show gratitude to its northern neighbor.

As Kathmandu tries to learn more about the almost unimaginable improvements in the lives of Chinese people and how Beijing has been prioritizing the right to development, Nepal can also show its templates and success stories. For example, how the nation halved its poverty and levels of social exclusions and how its political system, despite its own issues like instability and corruption, proved to be indispensable for such progress. Nepal could also do much more in promoting its culture and way of dealing with internal problems and differences and why not establish an exchange program where hundreds of Chinese students come here to learn about the country?

If millions of Chinese students have flocked to the USA, why not have some of them also learn Nepal’s way to development and prosperity? Frankly speaking, the university system in Nepal, while having its own share of challenges, also counts with some best practices. Higher education is just one area where Nepal could do something to reciprocate China’s generosity.  Without a doubt, there are many other areas where Nepal can do its bits to show that it is not taking China’s generosity for granted.

The rapid expansion of digital technology is reshaping the media landscape in deep and profound ways. This shift has already compelled the media industry to transform—not only their newsrooms but entire media organizations. It also demands an overhaul of journalism education, if not a complete transformation.

In Nepal, journalism education has remained alarmingly disconnected from the media industry. It is heavily focused on theoretical aspects, paying little to attention to practical skills. There is already a huge gap between classrooms and newsrooms. Universities are often hesitant to engage with media houses, and media houses, in turn, are not particularly welcoming to journalism students.  

As both a media educator and journalist, I have closely observed the dynamics of both environments. The transformation of newsrooms is well underway, albeit often without clear direction. However, there has been little meaningful discussion about transforming journalism education. Any reform must involve a broad range of stakeholders, including the media fraternity. Given the radical changes in the media and digital landscape, it is high time universities offering journalism programs began revising their curricula. Otherwise, classrooms will turn redundant and irrelevant.

Already, multiple factors have put journalism on a downward trajectory. Gone are the days when classrooms were packed with enthusiastic students eager for a future in the media. Today, many colleges have closed media departments, and those still offering media programs are struggling to survive. When I began my career, classrooms were full of students and newsrooms bustling with journalists. Now, my dual profession, teaching journalism in the mornings and practicing it during the day, is at risk .. For the past decade and a half, these two roles have been my main sources of income. 

University curricula must be updated to reflect the realities of a media landscape shaped by information technology. Otherwise, they risk becoming irrelevant. On paper, Nepal’s mass communication and journalism curricula rank among the best in South Asia. From Bachelor’s to MPhil level, they cover a broad range of issues including new media, law, development, history, media studies, political communication, public relations, communications, culture and society, among others. Theoretically, these courses are up to date and relevant. Tribhuvan University’s journalism program, for example, is comprehensive and comparable to top universities of the world. Yet the real problem lies in human resources and practical training.

A lack of quality faculty is one of the most pressing issues. Without specialized teachers, students are receiving only a superficial, or sometimes even inaccurate, understanding of complex subjects. There is a shortage of teachers for core areas such as mass communication theories, intercultural communication, political communication and media research. This is not to say that current teachers are incapable; many are brilliant minds. However, they cannot dedicate time to teaching across multiple institutions. Generation Z students deserve deeper, more relevant media knowledge. While there are competent professionals outside academia, they rarely get opportunities to take classes because universities, which are highly politicized, often prioritize political affiliation over merit.

Another inherent problem is the lack of emphasis on practical training. There are fundamental errors in teaching methods.

Teachers still dominate classrooms with traditional notebooks; at best, some use digital tools like PowerPoint. Although the syllabus includes numerous practical assignments, their actual implementation is minimal. For example, students rarely receive mentorship to develop news stories on current issues, which is an essential skill for immediate employability. While practical assignments exist across courses, they are mostly left unexecuted or are treated as mere formalities.

Universities offer specializations such as radio, television and new media, yet many lack the infrastructure to produce news for these platforms. It was a serious oversight for universities to permit colleges to teach these courses without ensuring the availability of proper technology or requiring them to secure necessary facilities. While university teachers excel at theoretical aspects, they tend to be less engaged with practical training.

Meanwhile, student dissatisfaction with colleges and teachers is growing, though their voices are being suppressed. I have heard from many students that artificial intelligence (AI) tools provide deeper theoretical insights than their classes. Without interactive discussions and practical work, they see little reason to attend classes. They feel attendance, which is linked to final grades, is the only motivation keeping them in class. Such complaints deserve serious consideration, not outright dismissal. 

If colleges and universities lack resources to support practical training, they should collaborate with the media industry to provide students with hands-on experience. However, academia-industry collaboration is confined to signing Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with little real cooperation. Neither media houses nor universities engage each other. Despite this, some students independently secure internships and perform well in newsrooms. This is beneficial for media houses facing a shortage of human resources. However, there are issues on the students’ side too. Many university students of journalism show little interest in news reporting and writing. This is not to say Nepal’s media education solely produces journalists, it also opens career paths in advertising, public relation and media research, among others. My point is that the young generation’s enthusiasm for journalism itself is waning.

The purpose of this article is not merely to highlight the existing problems but to spark debate on revamping the media and journalism education in light of the rapidly changing media landscape. Over the past two decades, media courses have focused largely on print, radio and television, covering reporting, writing, editing and publishing. These core skills, but are no longer sufficient. 

The priority now should be on a comprehensive overhaul of journalism curricula to suit today’s media environment. Traditionally, journalism education has centered on news reporting, writing, editing and publishing. These skills are essential, but now must be supplemented. The current media landscape demands new journalistic skills which existing courses fail to address adequately.

The media industry now needs human resources in diverse roles such as social media officers, AI coordinators, video storytellers, revenue strategists, audience engagement specialists and more. Therefore, journalism programs, historically focused on producing reporters and editors, must expand to include these emerging fields created by digital technology. The future of journalism education demands greater innovation, creativity and student-driven learning models instead of the current theory-heavy syllabus. Additionally, AI is poised to revolutionize both newsrooms and classrooms. Given all these challenges, there is an urgent need to revisit and update the existing curriculum. At the same time, there should be debate and discussions on how best to teach journalism in this age of AI which has taken virtually every sector by storm. 

Contemporary global discourse is saturated with calls for multipolarity. Leaders from Beijing to Brasília, from Moscow to New Delhi invoke a new world order—one where power is shared more equitably among diverse states and regions, and the dominance of any single power is curbed. Yet, despite these slogans and shifting alliances, the reality remains more concentrated than advertised. The United States continues to act—and be treated—as the primary actor on the global stage, wielding unmatched capabilities across military, economic, technological, and institutional domains. In effect, the world is staging a multipolar play, but the US remains its lead performer—a solo show on a multipolar stage.

Consider military power. As of 2024, the United States accounted for roughly 37 percent of global military expenditures, with a defense budget exceeding $1trn (SIPRI estimate)—more than the next nine countries combined, including China and Russia. Its global military footprint includes over 750 bases across more than 80 countries, reinforcing rapid deployment capabilities and sustained influence in every major region. In contrast, China, the oft-touted peer competitor, has only one overseas military base and far less capacity for power projection.

The United States continues to dominate global affairs through unilateral decisions that often override international consensus. In Ukraine, Washington has led the global response to Russia’s action with over $75bn in aid and a sweeping sanctions regime that even neutral powers like India and Turkey have had to navigate under pressure. In the Middle East, the US carried out the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 and continues to conduct airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—frequently without international consultation. The pattern holds in Gaza, where the US has repeatedly vetoed UN ceasefire resolutions during the 2023–24 conflict, even as civilian casualties mounted and allies grew uneasy. In these arenas, global powers like China and Russia have issued condemnations, but lack the influence or institutional weight to meaningfully counterbalance American actions.

Latest examples include the US Air Force and Navy attacks on three nuclear facilities in Iran on June 22 as part of the Iran–Israel war, the US support to the Israeli war in Gaza, against Hamas who no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel, even by the standards of some 600 retired Israeli security officials, including former heads of intelligence agencies. Prior to it in December last year, amidst the Russian warnings, the US helped bring down Syria’s Assad regime—the closest Russian ally in the Middle East. Forget the eastward expansion of NATO disregarding its own assurance to Russia that it would not do so.

This solo performance extends to East Asia, where the US continues to maneuver around its “one-China” policy by deepening ties with Taiwan through arms deals, diplomatic visits, and strategic signaling—all while China, despite its rise, remains unable to prevent these moves. In Syria, the US maintains troops and control over resource-rich regions in defiance of Damascus, as Russia looks the other way and China stays diplomatically detached. India, often seen as a rising multipolar player, has largely opted for strategic silence or hedging in each of these conflicts. Across these cases, the US not only acts without deference to global opinion—it also forces others to adjust to its decisions. The result is a world that may appear multipolar in discourse, but in practice still revolves around a single actor exercising disproportionate power with little external constraint.

In economic terms, US financial primacy remains foundational. The US dollar still constitutes around 60 percent of global foreign exchange reserves and is involved in 88 percent of all currency transactions. US capital markets continue to serve as the world’s main liquidity pool, and American technology firms lead in innovation and digital infrastructure. Even US domestic legislation—such as the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act—has reshaped global industrial policy by incentivizing foreign firms to align with American interests and supply chains, frequently overriding WTO norms or multilateral negotiation channels. See how the US has threatened India with additional tariffs should the latter continue buying Russian oil.

Moreover, the United States retains unmatched normative and institutional leverage. It plays a leading role in NATO, the G7, the Bretton Woods institutions, and dominates voting power in the IMF and World Bank. Even when institutions falter, the US increasingly relies on ad hoc or bilateral mechanisms to maintain influence, such as AUKUS, the Quad, and security pacts in the Indo-Pacific—sidestepping multilateral gridlock with flexible but US-centered architectures.

During his second term, President Trump has intensified the use of economic sanctions and tariffs as central pillars of his foreign policy, particularly targeting Iran and China. A “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has been reactivated, with a primary goal of driving the country’s oil exports to zero. This has involved a significant increase in sanctions, with roughly three-quarters of new designations since January 2025 aimed at disrupting Iran's revenue streams. For instance, the Treasury Department has targeted over 115 individuals, vessels, and companies across 17 countries, including a “vast shipping empire” led by Iranian oil tycoon Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. These sanctions have also been extended to third-party entities in China, India, and the UAE for their role in facilitating the trade of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, such as the sanctioning of six Indian companies for engaging in over $220m in trade with Iran.

In addition to targeted sanctions, the administration has employed broad tariffs to isolate and pressure nations. The average applied US tariff rate rose from 2.5 percent to an estimated 27 percent in the first few months of the second term, the highest level in over a century. A universal 10 percent tariff was imposed on all imports, while country-specific tariffs were also used to escalate trade disputes. For example, tariffs on Chinese goods peaked at 145 percent, leading to retaliatory tariffs of 125 percent from China. The administration has also leveraged weapons supply as a foreign policy tool. While not directly providing vast amounts of military aid to Ukraine, the US has authorized weapons sales through its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, committing approximately $960m and pressuring NATO allies to increase their defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035. This strategy of combining economic pressure, isolation, and arms sales to allies underscores a transactional and unilateral approach to international relations.

What seems strange is the extreme selfish behaviour of the competitors, a phenomenon reflected in the Nepali expression hul ma jyan jogaaoo (stay safe in the crowd), an attitude that lets a rooster fight the jackal alone! It is not hard to see how the US woos one opponent when it is attacking the other, successfully bringing down the regime in question. Only the US knows the wheel rotates.

Thus, the international system is characterized less by balanced multipolar governance than by fragmented resistance surrounding a persistent unipolar core. The United States continues to act, and be perceived, as the system's indispensable actor, even as rhetorical coalitions challenge its dominance. The world may speak the language of multipolarity, but until that rhetoric is translated into shared institutions, joint rule-making, and collaborative enforcement, the global order remains a solo performance by the United States—backed by unmatched capability and strategic depth—on a stage filled with understudies.