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The absence of the United States, China and Russia from recent G20 leaders’ meetings has often been treated as a sign that the forum has outlived its usefulness. That reading misses what is actually changing. The G20 has not disappeared from global economic diplomacy, nor has it been formally sidelined. What has shifted is the kind of work it is expected to do. Where it once functioned as a space for high-level coordination among the largest economies, it now operates more clearly as a forum sustained by those states that continue to depend on institutional stability.

This change reflects the erosion of the conditions that made the G20 indispensable in the first place. The forum took shape at a moment when financial instability moved quickly across borders and reduced the effectiveness of national responses. During that period, coordination was not a matter of preference, it was imposed by circumstance. That sense of mutual exposure no longer carries the same force. Economic policy is now shaped far more openly by strategic rivalry, domestic politics and security concerns. Subsidies, sanctions and trade restrictions are increasingly deployed without serious expectation of collective restraint. Under these conditions, broad consensus-based settings offer limited influence while imposing visible constraints.

The consequences of this shift were visible well before Johannesburg. The New Delhi summit showed that agreement was still possible, but only by narrowing the range of issues treated as appropriate for collective engagement. Disruptions linked to geopolitical conflict were acknowledged indirectly, if at all. This allowed the meeting to remain orderly, but it also reduced the forum’s capacity to engage with the sources of economic instability rather than its symptoms. Once this approach became routine, leader-level participation lost some of its urgency. Johannesburg made that clear.

The effects of selective disengagement have not been evenly distributed. For countries such as India, the European Union and Brazil, participation in multilateral institutions remains closely tied to economic and political strategy. Their economies are deeply embedded in global markets, and their policy objectives rely on predictable regulatory and financial environments. Institutional credibility matters more to these states than unilateral leverage. Unlike the great powers, they cannot easily replace multilateral engagement with bilateral or bloc-based arrangements without incurring costs.

This dependence has also increased their visibility within the G20. India, the EU and Brazil have become central to maintaining continuity in the forum not because they exercise coercive power, but because they retain a material interest in its operation. Their economic weight gives substance to this role. India’s expanding domestic market and manufacturing ambitions place it at the center of debates on development and technology. The European Union brings regulatory capacity and financial depth that influence global standards regardless of geopolitical fragmentation. Brazil’s position in commodity, energy and agricultural markets connects development concerns with climate and food security in ways few other actors can.

India’s recent engagement illustrates how an emerging great-power leadership now tends to function. Its emphasis on digital public infrastructure and development finance draws directly on policies already deployed domestically. Rather than relying exclusively on aspirational commitments, India has used practical experience to structure discussion. This does not compensate for the absence of great-power coordination, but it keeps multilateral engagement connected to implementation rather than rhetoric alone. The European Union operates through a different channel. Its influence rests less on mediation and more on scale. Through trade regimes, climate regulation, and digital standards, the EU shapes economic behavior well beyond its immediate membership. Within the G20, it provides a degree of policy continuity at a time when economic governance is increasingly shaped by short-term strategic considerations. Brazil’s contribution lies largely in its diplomatic positioning. Its engagement with institutional negotiation, the size of its economy, and South–South cooperation allows it to frame issues such as debt relief, food security and climate adaptation as shared economic challenges. In a polarized environment, this ability to keep discussions from sliding into distributive conflict has practical value.

Together, these states help prevent strategic rivalry from overwhelming multilateral settings altogether. They cannot resolve competition between the largest powers, nor can they substitute for the resources those powers control. Major initiatives in areas such as debt restructuring or climate finance still depend on actors with greater influence over capital and markets. Middle powers can align positions and sustain discussion, but compulsion remains beyond their reach.

What has happened to the G20 cannot be separated from what has happened to the political order that made it possible. The United States has already moved away from the model of leadership that sustained this forum in its early years. It still participates selectively, but its priorities now lie elsewhere: domestic industrial policy, security-driven trade decisions and tightly-managed alliances. The assumption that global economic stability requires sustained engagement in universal forums no longer shapes American behaviour in any consistent way.

China’s trajectory is different, but no less consequential. Beijing has not withdrawn from multilateralism. Instead, it has become increasingly selective about the kinds of institutions it is willing to invest in. Where rules, agendas and hierarchies are inherited from an earlier order, China engages cautiously. Where institutions can be designed, expanded or reshaped, its commitment is far more visible. This does not amount to abandonment, but it does reflect an effort to reconfigure the institutional landscape around Chinese preferences rather than adapt to existing constraints. Russia’s position is shaped by yet another set of pressures. Prolonged sanctions and political isolation have reduced any incentive to preserve institutions associated with Western economic dominance. Its alignment with China is less about shared economic vision than about mutual dissatisfaction with the current system. For Moscow, weakening the authority of existing frameworks has become a strategy in itself, particularly where those frameworks are seen as enforcing exclusion.

Taken together, these trajectories point to an uncomfortable reality. There is no major power waiting in the wings to restore the conditions under which the G20 once functioned. The idea that a hegemonic actor will step in to stabilize multilateral economic governance now belongs to an earlier period. That world has already passed. This is why the role of countries and entities such as India, the European Union, Brazil, and others matters more than is often acknowledged. These actors continue to benefit directly from stable, predictable economic frameworks. Their growth strategies, regulatory environments and external engagements depend on institutions that manage friction rather than amplify it. For them, the erosion of multilateral forums is not an abstract concern but a practical problem.

Sustaining the G20, then, is not about nostalgia for an earlier order or faith in institutional idealism. It is about interest. In the absence of great-power custodianship, responsibility shifts to those who still gain from continuity. Whether this responsibility can be translated into real influence remains uncertain. What seems clear is that multilateralism will no longer be upheld by those with the greatest power, but by those with the greatest stake in keeping the system from fragmenting further.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of Delhi based International Centre for Peace Studies

A right that lives only in writing is not a right at all. Without sincere enforcement, even the finest laws become empty promises. As the world marks Human Rights Day on December 10—commemorating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948—it is worth asking: are we genuinely upholding these rights, or merely celebrating them in speeches and documents?

The UDHR, with its 30 articles, protects basic freedoms such as the right to life, liberty, equality, speech and expression. These rights are also guaranteed by Nepal’s 2015 Constitution. However, guaranteeing rights and ensuring people enjoy them,in true and material sense, are two different things.

Rights on Paper

Human rights violations continue around the world. Children, women, and workers still face mistreatment. Even basic rights like clean air and safe public spaces are not fully protected. In Nepal, the Constitution promises dignity for all, but dignity requires respect, equality, and real opportunities.

Developing countries like Nepal often struggle to implement fundamental rights, which increasingly appear dependent on economic capacity. As a result, their enforcement begins to resemble the fate of Directive Principles—lofty aspirations constrained by limited resources.

When states, in practice, start placing fundamental rights and directive principles on the same footing solely because of economic inadequacy, it leads to undemocratic governance and systematic human rights violations. Every individual is entitled to enjoy these rights fully by virtue of being human. It is high time for the states to assume collective responsibility in combating discrimination and safeguarding human rights. After all, the mere enactment of laws carries little value without meaningful enforcement.

Governance Matters

Good governance is essential for protecting rights. Nepal’s Constitution emphasizes rule of law, transparency, inclusion, and welfare. Global thinkers—from Locke to Gandhi—have long linked justice and governance. Nepal’s own history, including Prithvi Narayan Shah’s Dibya Upadesh, stresses fairness and preventing injustice.

The Good Governance (Management and Operation) Act of 2008 is a specific law aimed at promoting good governance by ensuring public administration accountable, transparent, inclusive, and participatory. This Act emphasizes values like the rule of law, corruption-free administration, financial discipline, and efficient public service. Section 17 mandates for the basis and reason to be mentioned in decision. 

Other relevant statutory measures, such as the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority Act (1991), Prevention of Corruption Act (2002), the Public Procurement Act (2007), and the Right to Information Act (2007), further reinforce Nepal’s commitment to ensuring good governance.

The Supreme Court in the case of Gopal Guragain on behalf of Communication Corner Pvt. Ltd. v. Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, Singhdurbar, Kathmandu (N.K.P., 2067, Vol.1, Decision Number. 8299) held that transparent governance helps reduce corruption, delays, and red tape.

The UN lists eight pillars of good governance, including accountability, participation, and equity. Without these, rights cannot flourish.

Poor Economy 

Many fundamental rights remain unfulfilled because of weak economic conditions. Pollution violates environmental rights. Unemployment pushes thousands of youths abroad for survival. Social inequality, political favoritism, and digital gaps deepen discrimination.

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar famously argued that political democracy cannot survive without economic democracy. Rights become empty promises when the state lacks the resources to enforce them. Perhaps the world needs a new global commitment to support poorer nations in fulfilling human rights obligations.

Way forward 

Education should promote peace, equality, justice, and respect. Legal knowledge alone is not enough; people must learn empathy, fairness, and non-violence.

Human rights should not depend on a country’s wealth. Nor should they remain limited to paper or be treated merely as a topic for university curricula. Instead, they must be taken seriously as a matter that demands genuine, practical implementation. 

It is time for nations to work together to uphold human rights in practice—not just in speeches and documents. Laws have value only when they are implemented, and every person deserves to enjoy their rights fully, simply by being human.

“To deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity,” rightly said Nelson Mandela. It’s high time we acknowledged his words and implemented our human rights-friendly laws in true and material sense.  

Authors are faculty members in Law at Manmohan Technical University (MTU), Biratnagar, Nepal

Forty years ago, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Charter was signed. Despite its initial successes, South Asia today is politically and strategically fractured, economically least integrated and stuck when it comes to connectivity and diplomacy. With widening internal divisions and growing external demands, how should we look back to the four decades of SAARC and its future? 

Paradigm in peril: “After experiencing twice in their own lifetimes” the tragedies of the two World Wars, that generation of thinkers and leaders came together to create the United Nations to lead the world in transforming human behavior for “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and other threats. After the deaths, devastation, and despair, the UN, standing on its three pillars, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the Human Rights Council (initially named Commission), was to be the global repository of a new hope of collective human security, prosperity and dignity.

With the UN at the core, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the ill-fated International Trade Organization (ITO), GATT—now the World Trade Organization (WTO)—were to assist in managing global financial, monetary and trading systems. Aimed at intellectually guiding this global transformation, a new academic discipline, International Affairs, Studies or Relations (IR), bringing together knowledge of history, geography, politics, economics, law, diplomacy and national security etc, also started in Western universities, which has now spread to all parts of the world. 

In both these new developments, there was an assumption that the inadequacies in understanding, codifying and guiding human relations individually, but more importantly relations among the highest and most powerful of the human institutions, the nation-states, were primarily responsible for the death and devastation. Now, of course, technology has fundamentally altered the understanding and application of sovereignty, power and interest, further amplifying the need for some form of convergence between national sovereignty and global governance with transformative IR and effective UN. Sadly, the Global Paradigm was in Peril for a long time. With the crisis in IR and post-Cold-War unilateralism the UN is totally marginalized in global affairs.

Regionalism, the next best hope: With the UN unable to come out of the Cold-War chasm, but regional cooperation in post-War Europe doing much better, some scholars and policy makers thought, perhaps, that cooperation for peace-security, prosperity and human dignity among countries within the same geographic region, with similar culture, stages of development, threat perceptions and security needs would have better prospects. Regionalism thus emerged as the next best hope in IR, a better approach to resolve disputes, avoid wars and promote peace and security, development, and human rights.

With European integration, it was assumed that regional organizations, their leaders and officials could better catalyze national interest harmonization, protecting and promoting individual national interests within the collective regional good. This in turn could act as the building block for future global transformation.

Establishment of SAARC: Aware of the power of the idea of regionalism and their region’s common problems of poverty and political violence, like in other parts of the world, seven heads of state and government of South Asia signed the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 8th December 1985. “Promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in South Asia” for the welfare of the peoples of the region was the main goal. 

Right at the start, South Asian leaders identified two main areas for regional cooperation: Collective prosperity and regional security. With Afghanistan as the eighth member in 2007, the relevance of SAARC  in addressing the twin tragedies increased significantly. 

Early successes: From a modest start areas of cooperation multiplied, encompassing poverty alleviation to trade and finance, culture to environment, social development to security, science and technology to tourism. Eight agreements, including the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), six conventions including on Suppression of Terrorism and its additional protocol were signed. The Food Bank and Development Fund was meant to promote greater regional integration. SAARC Seed Bank, Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment, Rapid Response to Natural Disaster and Implementation of Regional Standards were also signed.

The Social Charter and Charter of Democracy were steps toward common political and social order. The South Asian University could still spur greater intellectual interaction and innovation for greater regional consciousness, identity and cooperation. Sadly, performance hugely lags compared to potential. 

Intellectual traffic jam: Three decades after its establishment, Nepal was hosting the 18th SAARC Summit from 23-27 Nov 2014. As the host, the political leadership of the organization came to Nepal. For the second time, the secretariat was also headed by a Nepali and the third time the summit was being held in Kathmandu, where the secretariat is located.

All major global and regional actors (the US, China, Russia, Japan, Myanmar, Iran and South Korea) as observers of SAARC, reflected the pivotal position of South Asia in the post-Cold War world. With national leadership of vision and strong SG, this summit could have been a transformative moment for SAARC. 

As a member of the Summit Preparatory Committee, at the first meeting, I began my remarks by quoting a former SG—“SAARC has hardly progressed beyond signs and symbols”—and reminding the participants of the widespread criticism of SAARC for being ineffective. With Nepal assuming multiple leadership roles, I asked, “what kind of agenda should we propose, business as usual, incremental reforms or transformative?” 

Initially there was an all-round support for a transformative agenda. But from the second meeting the “intellectual traffic jam, political timidity and bureaucratic rigidity” started clogging the highway responsible for making SAARC unable to move forward.

After prolonged discussion, ‘Deeper Integration (Better Connectivity) for Peace and Prosperity’ was agreed as the summit theme. But support for deeper integration for peace and prosperity started diminishing and eventually the summit ended up being what SAARC summits have always been, rich in fanfare and declaratory rhetoric but little progress in addressing the real problems of the people of the region or a more unified position on external demands. “Neighborhood first or last?” dilemma and “beggar thy neighbor” policies keep South Asia divided and SAARC in “coma” today. 

Essentials remedies: This takes me back to the third SAARC Summit in 1987, the first in Nepal. In preparation for it, the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS) of the Tribhuvan University (TU), with which I was then associated, organized a seminar titled ‘SAARC: Retrospect and Prospect’. I started my paper “Nepal in SAARC, a Long-Term Perspective” with a question: What kind of regional cooperation are we talking about without Trade? Trade became one of the areas of cooperation later. 

The next issue I raised was the provision of the charter excluding bilateral and contentious (political and security) issues. The role of the secretariat only as an administrative unit and the level of the secretary-general (SG), a mid-level career official, was the third issue I identified for discussion. Finally, the overly state-centric nature of the organization was, in my view, problematic. With this diagnosis, I proposed three remedies:

1. Strengthening the Secretariat and upgrading the level of the SG, enabling and empowering him/her to more effectively implement the decisions of the inter-governmental bodies and promote regionalism by harmonizing national interests of individual member-states within the larger regional good

2. Greater role for civil society to take up issues that may seem politically contentious for the inter-governmental process to take up immediately but too important to be left out completely

3. A confidence building process by establishing a Council for Dispute Settlement composed of elder statesmen and intellectuals to discuss issues excluded from the inter-governmental process until the charter can be reviewed and amended to strengthen SAARC as a mature institution able to discuss more substantive bilateral political and security issues, which are the main impediments to real regional cooperation

My conclusions then were, without addressing these issues, SAARC will be busy only in marginal issues and diplomatic fanfare but unable to really move regional cooperation forward in any significant way. Since then, I have moved from academia to public service, diplomacy to conflict resolution and peacemaking. In my academic-professional-diplomatic roles, I have spoken and written on the need to ‘Transform SAARC to Prepare South Asia for a New Age’, with emphasis on the issues identified in that short paper.

Almost three decades later, the 18th summit came and went. Not just the 19th summit remains in limbo, but SAARC and South Asia continue at the same crossroads of time and space, history and geography, only in many ways moving backward in regional cooperation. The only difference is, with the new Asian Century, China in the north and India at its center, the Indo-Pacific, South Asia  and the Central Himalayas have emerged as one of the global political, economic and strategic epicenters, significantly increasing opportunities and risks for the region. 

As a student, teacher and practitioner, I have advocated rethinking IR and regional cooperation for long. Today, I am both happy and sad that the discourse on SAARC, its marginalization or BIMSTEC and its revitalization, revolve around the same issues I have raised for four decades. 

The author deals extensively with these issues in his new book “SAARC to BIMSTEC:Breakdown or Breakthrough in Regional Cooperation in South Asia”, being published by a leading Indian publisher in early 2026

Nepal’s political landscape has been shaped repeatedly by acts of betrayal, and today’s GenZ movement finds itself encircled by similar breaches of trust—both from state institutions and non-state forces. This pattern is not new. Twenty years after the 2006 Second People’s Movement, that abolished the monarchy and established a federal republic, Nepal witnessed another youth-led uprising in Sept 2025, commonly referred to as the “GenZ” movement. The protesters’ core demands centered on ending systemic corruption, addressing mass unemployment, lifting restrictions on social media, holding the state accountable and dismantling entrenched old power structures. While some voices within the movement called for constitutional amendments or a directly-elected prime minister, the demand for immediate elections was not the primary focus.

Nevertheless, in response President Ramchandra Paudel dissolved the House of Representatives, appointed former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister and announced fresh elections within six months. Many observers see this rapid dissolution and election announcement as the latest instance of the state deflecting, rather than addressing, popular demands for systemic change.

Whether this abrupt move constitutes a deliberate strategy to defuse and ultimately neutralize the GenZ youth rebellion remains a critical question that warrants serious national debate.

Whither constitutional legitimacy?

After the government collapsed and Parliament was dissolved, the nation was left without leadership. Holding fresh elections and seeking a new public mandate appeared to be the most legitimate and constitutional way forward. It would have ensured that the interim government remained only a temporary arrangement, functioning strictly within constitutional limits. However, this path was never pursued.

The President should have first explored the possibility of forming a new government from within the existing Parliament, safeguarding constitutional integrity and institutional dignity. The more democratic alternative would have been to respond to the aspirations of the youth, bring their concerns to the floor of Parliament, and open meaningful avenues for their representation and participation in state governance. Nepal has taken such steps before—it is not a distant chapter of history.

Yet, the interpretation of the symbolic burning of ‘parliament’ during the movement as an attack on the institution itself has now become a contentious matter, one that may shape political debates and institutional behaviour far into the future.

Some argue that calling for fresh elections in the midst of a power vacuum is merely an effort to preserve the existing power structure. Others claim that this step does not resolve constitutional deadlocks but stands in direct violation of the constitution. Meanwhile, even as the demand for parliamentary restoration remains under judicial review, the very parties advocating for it are preparing to contest elections scheduled for March 5 next year. This, in effect, suggests that they have dismissed the spirit of the GenZ movement.

For some, elections were presented as a way to absorb the movement’s energy—redirecting youthful activism from the streets into parliamentary politics. Yet this logic contradicts the core of the youth uprising, which never demanded immediate elections. The protests exerted intense pressure on those in power, but following the election declaration, criticism has grown that the President’s decision—taken in the belief that street anger could be channeled into ballot papers—constitutes a profound betrayal of the movement’s purpose. In response, a segment of the youth now questions whether another uprising is needed to secure the goals for which they first took to the streets.

A bid to signal stability

By announcing the election date, the President appears to be projecting a message—both domestically and internationally—that Nepal is moving from instability toward procedural normalcy. Despite the scheduled elections creating an impression of institutional restoration, the conditions for a fair and credible vote are still far from secure. If the elections were to be cancelled under such circumstances, the country could face another crisis, reminiscent of events like prison breakouts and the burning of government buildings during previous unrest.

A limited mandate

The interim administration has been granted only one primary task: to conduct elections. This narrow mandate risks entrenching the same old power structures riddled with corruption. In such an environment, the possibility of the GenZ movement returning to the streets remains high. The interim government itself has repeatedly clarified that its role is not to engineer systemic change, but merely to steer the country back to the constitutional path through elections.

Yet, elections within six months are no cure-all. The challenges ahead are immense. The youth-led uprising has demanded deeper structural reforms—reforms that are currently not being addressed. The President’s decision to withhold authority from the interim government to amend the constitution or initiate institutional restructuring stands in stark contradiction to the spirit of transition. This raises a real risk that elections may simply reopen the door for the old parties to regain power.

There is also constitutional ambiguity regarding the appointment of a prime minister from outside Parliament following its dissolution. Fears persist that those powers granted in the present could be misused in the future.

Trust, reform and inclusion

Nepal is navigating a turbulent period. Institutions are weakened, and public trust in the state is steadily eroding. In such a context, six months is a short window. Rushed elections may favor established political forces rather than fairness or reform. If grievances over unemployment, corruption, exclusion and limited opportunity remain unaddressed, dissatisfaction could resurface even more strongly.

Simply announcing elections and releasing attractive party manifestos cannot restore people’s faith in the existing order. Trust must be rebuilt through visible action. The interim government must prioritise transparency and accountability from day one. Public disclosure of assets—from ministers and top officials to senior policymakers—is essential to reinforce integrity in state leadership.

Sensitive corruption cases must be pursued without delay, and the law must be allowed to act decisively. Only then will citizens feel the beginning of change. Equally crucial is the meaningful inclusion of youth, experts, women, indigenous communities and civil society in candidate selection and electoral rule-making—because inclusive participation is the foundation of genuine democracy.

Before the election day arrives, Nepal needs a broad national dialogue on long-overdue reforms and on the review of vague or disputed constitutional provisions. Such deliberation can set the groundwork for stability, improve governance and gradually rebuild public confidence in the system.