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As the so-called wave of revolutions has swept across South Asia, it is now set to culminate in elections in Bangladesh and Nepal. In Nepal, the interim government led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki has proceeded without delay in conducting elections. The country’s politics have remained in flux since the last polls, marked by shifting coalitions and Gen Z–led anti-corruption protests that culminated in the dissolution of Parliament in September 2025. As Nepal’s 30 million citizens prepare to vote amid a fragmented field of 125 parties and more than 2,500 candidates, neighbouring India is watching closely. The outcome carries significant implications for India’s interests—from the reliability of governance and Kathmandu’s foreign policy orientation to regional stability and the future of bilateral cooperation.

While Nepal’s traditional parties retain strong cadre bases, a powerful youth wave has emerged, one that every party is now trying to capture. This churn has produced internal upheavals across the three major parties: the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). Within the Nepali Congress, General Secretaries Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma led a high-profile revolt against the ageing leadership of Sher Bahadur Deuba. This culminated in a January 2026 “Special General Convention,” where Thapa was elected party president, effectively ending Deuba’s decades-long tenure after the Election Commission recognized Thapa’s reformist faction as the legitimate party leadership.

In the CPN-UML, Senior Vice-Chair Ishwar Pokharel, backed significantly by former President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, mounted a direct challenge to KP Sharma Oli during the party’s December 2025 general convention. Pokharel and his supporters criticized Oli’s handling of the GenZ protests and his refusal to step down as prime minister until forced by the uprising. Despite this, Oli retained the party chairmanship by a wide margin.

Meanwhile, the CPN (Maoist Centre) faced a similar crisis. Deputy General Secretary Janardan Sharma openly demanded that Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ resign and take responsibility for the party’s declining credibility and its growing disconnect from youth aspirations. Although Sharma eventually quit to launch his own Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, his dissent accelerated the Maoists’ merger into the broader Nepali Communist Party (NCP) in November 2025. Formally established on 5 Nov 2025, the NCP is a broad alliance of ten leftist factions seeking to consolidate influence ahead of the March 2026 elections. Its core comprises the Maoist Centre and the CPN (Unified Socialist), with Prachanda remaining a dominant—though increasingly scrutinized—figure.

The youth-led movement itself is now split between high-stakes party politics and independent activism. The most prominent “alternative” force has emerged in the alliance between Balen Shah and the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP). In a bold attempt to break with the old political order, Shah resigned as mayor of Kathmandu to contest a parliamentary seat in Jhapa-5, directly challenging UML’s Oli on his home turf. The alliance has positioned Shah as its prime ministerial candidate, betting that the momentum of the protests can unseat the country’s most entrenched leaders.

At the same time, many original GenZ organizers, such as Rakshya Bam, have chosen to stay away from large party structures altogether. Running as independents or under smaller banners like the “GenZ Front,” they argue that joining any major party, even newer ones, inevitably leads to the same compromises. Their focus remains accountability: demanding justice for those killed during the September protests and acting as a “moral watchdog” to ensure the movement’s anti-corruption message is not diluted by electoral politics.

From India’s perspective, New Delhi has historically supported a democratic and stable Nepal, a position reaffirmed after the GenZ protests, when the Indian establishment swiftly recognized the interim government and began working with it. That said, no state welcomes unpredictability in its foreign relations, and predictability is built through continuity, trust, and sustained engagement. From this standpoint, India would prefer that the current political churn ultimately leads to a measure of stability.

India would first and foremost hope that these elections serve as a stabilising force in Nepal’s fractured politics, preventing a relapse into chaos that could raise security concerns along the open border. Elections are also moments when populist and nationalist rhetoric tends to peak, sometimes straining bilateral ties. While such rhetoric deserves attention, it is ultimately the post-election government that matters. Given the current geopolitical climate, a reset grounded in pragmatism and mutual interest will be essential. For now, it is time to let democracy, and the people of Nepal, do their work, while others watch and wait.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life member of Delhi Based the Delhi-based International Centre for Peace Studies

In the aftermath of America’s “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela on 3 Jan 2026, countries across the world publicly articulated their respective positions. A majority of states protested the operation, describing it as an attempt to topple the executive head of a sovereign country elected by its people. Some nations, however, supported the US action, arguing that President Nicolás Maduro had undermined democracy and governed Venezuela in an authoritarian manner. China and Russia, often aligned on major international issues, strongly condemned the US intervention, portraying it as part of a broader pattern of hegemonic behavior by Washington. 

Amid this global polarization, India adopted a distinct and carefully balanced position. Rather than aligning fully with any camp, India pursued a foreign policy course that reflects a third path in contemporary international relations, an alignment based on India's interest or a policy of multialignment with national interest at its core. As President Donald Trump continued to challenge multilateral institutions originally shaped by the United States and initiated multiple trade and tariff disputes even with close partners such as India, New Delhi refrained from rhetorical escalation and instead quietly recalibrated its diplomatic posture. India’s response to these developments illustrates a foreign policy approach that privileges strategic autonomy over ideological alignment. Rather than reacting impulsively to global pressures, India has consistently emphasized decision-making based on national priorities, domestic needs, and long-term strategic considerations.

Additional tariff on Indian exports 

One of the most visible manifestations of US-India tensions was President Trump’s decision in Aug 2025 to impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports. The stated justification was India’s continued purchase of Russian crude oil despite US sanctions and pressure. Washington suggested that these tariffs could be reconsidered if India reduced or halted its energy imports from Russia.

India, however, did not change its policy. Instead of responding through public confrontation, New Delhi sent a quiet but firm diplomatic signal. Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi during his official visit last September. In a rare personal gesture, Prime Minister Modi received President Putin at Palam Airport, underscoring the importance India attaches to its relationship with Russia.

Beyond symbolism, substance followed. India and Russia concluded agreements aimed at ensuring uninterrupted oil supplies to India, reinforcing energy cooperation at a time of global volatility. These decisions were driven by India’s domestic energy needs and economic considerations rather than external pressure.

India’s position was straightforward: Indian leaders are accountable to Indian citizens and must protect Indian interests. India requires reliable and affordable energy supplies, and Russia remains a major and dependable source. While India and Russia have maintained cordial relations for decades, particularly in defense cooperation, recent developments have elevated this partnership to a strategic level. India continues to be one of the largest buyers of Russian defense equipment, further reinforcing mutual dependence. Despite sustained pressure from Washington, Prime Minister Modi chose to follow a course aligned with India’s own strategic roadmap. This episode clearly demonstrated that India’s foreign policy decisions are not dictated by alliance politics but by national necessity.

The Tianjin posture 

India’s multialignment was also evident in its engagement with multilateral platforms. A key example was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin, China, in late August 2025. As an active SCO member, Prime Minister Modi participated in the high-level summit and held sideline meetings with major leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. India’s presence at the SCO summit reflected its willingness to engage with Eurasian powers even at a time when relations with the United States were experiencing strain.

However, India also demonstrated diplomatic sensitivity and balance. Prime Minister Modi chose not to attend a separate Chinese victory parade commemorating Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. While President Putin and several other SCO leaders participated in the event, Modi returned to India after the summit concluded.

This decision was deliberate. From India’s perspective, the commemorative event is related to a bilateral historical issue between China and Japan. India maintains strong and friendly relations with Japan and saw no strategic benefit in participating in an event that could complicate those ties. By separating multilateral engagement from bilateral historical narratives, India reinforced its issue-based diplomacy and avoided unnecessary diplomatic signaling.

Another example of India’s balanced approach was its response to the Venezuela crisis. Following the American intervention in Jan 2026, India’s Ministry of External Affairs issued a carefully-worded statement. India neither endorsed the US military action nor defended President Maduro. Instead, it expressed concern over developments in Venezuela and emphasized the safety and welfare of Indian citizens residing there.

For India, the protection of its citizens abroad remains a fundamental responsibility of the state. The MEA’s response reflected India’s long-standing principles of non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and preference for peaceful dialogue. At a time when many countries adopted sharply polarized positions, India chose restraint and balance.

Strategic autonomy

At the heart of these policy choices lies strategic autonomy, a concept deeply embedded in India’s foreign policy tradition. In today’s realist international system, national interest remains the primary driver of state behavior. In this context, Prime Minister Modi and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar represent a realistic approach to diplomacy-one that places India and Indian citizens above all external considerations.

India maintains issue-based relations with all major powers. It is a strategic partner of the United States and a member of the QUAD, engaging actively in the Indo-Pacific framework. At the same time, India has preserved its deep strategic partnership with Russia, particularly in defense and energy cooperation. Simultaneously, India engages China through platforms such as BRICS and the SCO, even while managing complex bilateral challenges.

India and China also position themselves as prominent voices of the Global South, frequently questioning the dominance and hegemonic tendencies of the Global North. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar has emerged as a leading diplomatic voice articulating the concerns of developing countries on issues ranging from global inequality to institutional reform. Through BRICS, India and China, along with other emerging economies, seek to reduce over-dependence on the US dollar and challenge the weaponization of global financial systems.

Crucially, India does not pursue its relationship with one power at the cost of another. It neither sacrifices ties with China to please the United States nor undermines relations with Washington to accommodate Beijing. This balanced posture defines India’s multialignment policy. Far from compromising sovereignty, India has strengthened it by independently pursuing its foreign policy objectives.

Good neighbourly ties

This approach also shapes India’s neighborhood policy. India has clearly stated that it seeks cooperative relations with neighbors who reciprocate goodwill. If a neighbor adopts an unfriendly posture, India reserves the right to respond appropriately—a position reiterated by External Affairs Minister Jaishankar in recent statements.

In the context of Nepal-India relations, India’s multialignment and non-interference principles were evident. Despite significant political changes within Nepal, India refrained from intervening in domestic affairs. When Nepal experienced a political transition and an interim government was formed to conduct elections, India accepted the change and worked with the government in place. New Delhi supported Nepal’s general election scheduled for 5 March 2026, without showing preference for any political party or ideological orientation.

India’s multialignment foreign policy represents a pragmatic response to a fragmented and uncertain global order. By engaging all major powers while avoiding rigid alliances, India has positioned itself as an independent actor capable of navigating global crises without compromising national interests. Whether in trade disputes, energy security, multilateral diplomacy, or neighborhood relations, India’s actions consistently reflect strategic autonomy, realism, and national priority.

Nepal’s democratic journey over the past seven decades has been neither linear nor easy. From autocracy to democracy, from monarchy to constitutional monarchy, from civil conflict to republican federalism—and four constitutions between them—the country has continuously reinvented its political system in search of legitimacy, inclusion, and stability. Though all the constitutions marked their own milestone, the 2015 constitution was a historic milestone by institutionalizing inclusion, secularism, federalism, and republicanism, forethought to be correcting centuries of political exclusion and autocracy. Yet two decades later, a hard truth confronts us: Nepal has achieved representation, but not governance stability; inclusion, but not delivery.

The frustration is most visible among Nepal’s youth especially after the Sept 8 uprising. Their demand is not ideological. It is practical and the voices of the people. The Nepali people seek a state that governs competently, delivers services, and plans beyond electoral cycles. The message is unmistakable: representation alone is no longer enough.

Democracy isn’t the problem

Nepal’s political instability is not a failure of democracy itself, but of its institutional design. Since Nepal became a federal republic in 2008, it has seen significant political instability, revealing around 13 to 14 different governments formed by shifting coalitions, none completing a full five-year term, highlighting frequent leadership changes, alliance breakdowns, coalition fragility, and executive paralysis. Prime Ministers rise and fall not due to electoral verdicts, but due to internal party bargaining, shifting alliances determined more on expanding autocratic behaviour for power rather than people’s need and national priorities. Ministers are often selected for loyalty rather than competence. Parliament is crowded yet weak, while oversight institutions are politicized.

This instability has damaged Nepal’s credibility—both domestically and internationally. Policy continuity is weak, capital expenditure remains chronically low, and administrative morale has eroded. In such an environment, inclusion risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

The answer, however, is not authoritarian nostalgia nor democratic rollback. Nepal does not need less democracy; it needs better-designed democracy.

A hybrid governance model

Nepal must now transition from a transitional constitution to a performance-oriented democratic state. This requires a hybrid governance model—one that preserves parliamentary accountability while ensuring executive stability and professional administration.

First, Nepal should consider a fixed-term Prime Minister, elected by Parliament for a full five years and insulated from premature no-confidence motions except under extraordinary constitutional circumstances. Such a provision would allow governments to govern, not merely survive. To reinforce neutrality, the Prime Minister should relinquish party office upon election, separating state leadership from factional control.

Second, executive professionalism must be restored through a professional cabinet. Ministers should be appointed from outside Parliament—drawn from academia, civil service, business, public policy, and national security. This is neither radical nor undemocratic; it is practiced in many parliamentary democracies. By breaking patronage networks, Nepal can replace political loyalty with performance accountability.

Third, Nepal’s legislature must be leaner and more effective. A unicameral Parliament of 165 representatives comprising the current First Past the Post members would be better suited for lawmaking and oversight than today’s bloated bicameral structure. Fewer legislators, properly resourced committees, and stronger oversight would enhance both efficiency and public trust.

Fourth, the Head of State should remain ceremonial but constitutional—a neutral guardian of constitutional balance, elected through an electoral college, not a political competitor.

Finally, Nepal should revisit its federal design. A Union model of administration—preserving strong local governments while eliminating redundant provincial layers—could deliver services more efficiently. Countries like Japan and France demonstrate that decentralization does not require multiple political tiers; it requires empowered local administration and fiscal clarity. 

It would install institutional reinforcement by, first, strengthening Parliamentary Committees—particularly the Public Accounts Committee, the National Security Committee, and an independent Ethics Committee. Second, it would uphold judicial independence through transparent, merit-based appointments to constitutional bodies. Finally, it would introduce clear performance metrics and enforceable ethics codes across the civil service to ensure professionalism, accountability, and public trust.

The PR debate

As Nepal’s interim government, Election Commission, and political parties move toward finalizing a modality for proportional representation (PR), it is time to pause and ask a difficult but necessary question and confront another uncomfortable reality: Has PR, in its current form, strengthened Nepali democracy—or weakened it?

PR was introduced to correct exclusion—and it succeeded in the purpose. Women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis and minorities—limited in state power—gained more visibility in Parliament.

But today, PR increasingly produces representation without accountability, legitimacy without competition, and inclusion without voter consent.

Without internal party democracy, PR becomes a tool of patronage, Members of Parliament (MP) enter the Parliament not through public trust, but through party lists—rewarding loyalty over leadership, not downward to voters, proximity over performance. Inclusion turns symbolic, and democracy thins out. The result is a Legislature where presence is inclusive, but power remains centralized and insulated. This is not an argument against inclusion. It is an argument against unaccountable inclusion.

Comparative democracies offer a clear lesson. In countries such as Germany and New Zealand, PR functions because political parties are internally democratic, transparent, and institutionally disciplined. Party lists are regulated, leadership is accountable, and institutions enforce standards. The result is legitimacy without competition, inclusion without voter choice. Nepal adopted the mechanism—but not the safeguards.

A smarter path forward is not abandoning inclusion, but embedding it directly into the electoral contest. Instead of allocating representation through party lists, Nepal should require political parties to meet mandatory, percentage-based inclusion thresholds within the 165 First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) seats. Let women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest, campaign, and win elections through political party’s nominations. This approach would ensure that inclusion is not a nomination—but a mandate.

It would move our democracy: From nomination to election; from protection to participation; from symbolism to legitimacy. Such a reform would also justify reducing Parliament from 275 members to 165—making it leaner, more accountable, and directly answerable to the people.

Inclusion must mature as a Parliament that represents Nepal’s future must be chosen by its people—especially its youth. Democracy deepens when every MP knows they owe their seat to voters, not party headquarters. Inclusion is not a favor granted by elites. It is a right—earned through votes.

Nepal can no longer postpone this debate. A smarter Parliament begins when every MP is directly accountable to the people.

A safer path: Inclusion thru polls

The solution is not abandoning inclusion. That would be both unjust and politically destabilizing. The solution is to embed inclusion directly within the 165 First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) seats.

Political parties should be legally required to allocate candidates in percentage terms—ensuring women, Dalits, Indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest elections across constituencies. Let inclusion be achieved through ballots, not appointments.

This approach preserves diversity while restoring accountability. Candidates must campaign, engage voters, and win mandates. MPs gain legitimacy not from party lists, but from public trust.

Inclusion must evolve: from nomination to election, from protection to participation, from symbolism to legitimacy.

A Parliament that claims to represent Nepal’s future—especially its youth—must be chosen by the people.

Why this moment matters

Nepal stands at a strategic crossroads. Economic vulnerability, demographic change, geopolitical pressure, and public disillusionment converge at a moment when incremental tinkering is no longer enough. Governance reform is not a technical exercise; it is a national necessity.

Reducing Parliament from 275 to 165 members, streamlining administration, professionalizing the executive, and reforming PR together form a coherent strategy: stability with inclusion, authority with accountability, and democracy with delivery.

Conclusion: From transition to coherence

Nepal’s credibility will ultimately be measured not by who governs, but by how the state performs. A democracy locked in perpetual transition cannot fulfill the aspirations of a young, ambitious nation.

The task ahead is to refine Nepal’s democratic architecture—without abandoning its inclusive spirit. A hybrid model that is stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit offers a pathway out of political survival and toward strategic coherence.

This is not a debate Nepal can afford to postpone. Inclusion is not a favor. It is a right—earned through votes.

The expected outcomes arrive for a structural stability that enables long-term policy continuity. Second is professionalism over patronage in executive decision-making. Third is the fiscal efficiency through reduced bureaucracy and institutional duplication. Finally, to renewed public trust and strengthened diplomatic confidence in Nepal’s governance integrity.

The concept ca be implemented through a roadmap. Firstly, by convening a National Governance Reform Dialogue for Constitutional reforms to build consensus and draft reform principles. Secondly by establishing a Constitutional Review Taskforce to recommend structural and procedural reforms. Lastly by adopting a Governance Compact 2040—a multi-party and civic commitment prioritizing stability, merit, and accountability as national objectives.

Nepal’s future credibility rests not on who rules, but on how it governs. By embracing a hybrid model—stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit—the country can move decisively from perpetual transition to coherent, credible democracy.

The author is Major General (Retd) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability

Soil erosion and slope instability have long been major challenges in Nepal. The country’s steep topography, intense rainfall, and fragile geological conditions contribute to frequent landslides, erosion, debris flows, rockfalls, riverbank cutting, and slope failures. Human activities within the natural environment have further aggravated these problems, often triggering mass movements that lead to slope instability. As a result, Nepal has suffered significant losses of life, property, and infrastructure, particularly roads and bridges.

The natural ground gradually loses its initial strength and becomes unstable due to both natural and human-induced activities. Natural processes include landslides, mass movement, soil erosion, and the slow weathering of rocks. Human-induced activities include blasting in surrounding areas; construction of roads, dams, and high-rise structures that generate ground vibrations; haphazard cut-and-fill operations on otherwise stable ground; and the addition of excessive loads on soil masses. From a soil protection perspective, civil engineering structures are often constructed to protect unstable soil from weathering. However, building such structures is not always feasible or cost-effective.

As an alternative or complementary approach, living plants are systematically planted using standard methods to gradually improve soil strength over time—either alongside or independent of civil engineering structures. This approach is known as bio-engineering. Large-scale civil engineering solutions are often expensive and sometimes socially unacceptable. Bio-engineering, as a low-cost slope stabilization technique, offers an efficient alternative for controlling shallow-seated slope failures. In Nepal, which has active geomorphology, steep mountain slopes, intense rainfall, and limited economic resources, bio-engineering plays a particularly important role and should be more widely adopted.

Bio-engineering refers to the partial or complete use of living vegetation, with or without civil engineering structures, to stabilize soil in its natural setting. The proportion of vegetation to civil structures depends on site-specific conditions and engineering requirements. The core principle of bio-engineering is to provide initial support through civil structures, where necessary, while allowing vegetation to progressively strengthen the soil mass. Over time, as vegetation matures, the contribution of civil engineering structures becomes minimal, with the overall stability largely maintained by plant root systems.

It must be emphasized that bio-engineering cannot entirely replace civil engineering structures in terms of strength, economy, or durability. Instead, bio-engineering requires appropriate support from civil structures depending on site conditions. However, bio-engineering is more flexible, environmentally adaptable, and resilient to variable loads than rigid civil structures. It is therefore particularly effective for small-scale sediment control on steep slopes, habitat restoration projects, and landslide mitigation in seismic regions. Studies have shown that vetiver grass is one of the most effective bio-engineering plants when compared to other vegetation types. This article focuses on the valuable bio-engineering plant known as vetiver grass.

Nepal’s first application of bio-engineering dates back to 1980 during the Dharan–Dhankuta road project, where it was used to protect roadside slopes.

Typical bio-engineering applications in Nepal include soil bio-engineering at Krishna Bhir, bio-terracing along roadsides, bio-engineering measures along the Dipayal–Mellekh road, roadside bio-engineering on the Muglin–Narayanghat road, the Dhangadi–Dadeldhura section, and slopes in Dhankuta, among others.

Vetiver grass is an inexpensive, fast-growing, and highly versatile plant capable of withstanding a wide range of environmental conditions. Since the 1980s, the World Bank has promoted vetiver grass for preventing landslides and soil erosion through slope stabilization. As a vegetation-based system, vetiver is environmentally beneficial from the outset. Its exceptionally long and dense root system reinforces soil and makes it highly resistant to erosion caused by high-velocity water flow. The deep and rapidly developing roots also provide excellent drought tolerance, making vetiver suitable for stabilizing steep slopes.

Vetiver can withstand extreme weather conditions, including prolonged droughts, flooding, submergence, and temperature variations ranging from –14°C to 55°C. It also shows high tolerance to soil acidity, salinity, and acid sulfate conditions, outperforming many conventional vegetation types. Moreover, vetiver can regenerate once adverse conditions are removed.

Vetiver is widely used to consolidate cut slopes, primarily by reducing erosion caused by surface runoff that would otherwise damage downslope areas. It effectively prevents shallow surface failures, thereby reducing the likelihood of deeper slope failures. Even in rare cases where deep failures occur, vetiver helps reduce the volume and velocity of sliding material. Additionally, it preserves the natural and aesthetic character of road corridors.

In Nepal, bio-engineering has long been practiced for erosion control along riverbanks, unstable retaining structures, sloping terrain, road batters, and agricultural land protection. Native species such as bamboo, kans (wild sugarcane), kush (halfa grass), amriso (broom grass), and khayar (black catechu), often combined with non-living materials like wood and stone, have traditionally been used. However, due to limited scientific understanding of bio-engineering principles and applications, its use in infrastructure development remained limited until conventional civil engineering structures proved inadequate.

Vetiver systems can also be effectively combined with conventional structural measures such as retaining walls, rock protection, and concrete riprap. For example, vetiver hedgerows may protect the upper portion of a slope while civil engineering structures reinforce the lower section. Key characteristics—such as tolerance to temperature extremes, rapid root growth, deep anchorage, low cost, longevity, high survival rate, and minimal maintenance—make vetiver one of the most successful bio-engineering plants in comparative assessments.

Comparative studies consistently show vetiver to be superior to many other bio-engineered vegetation types. Its suitability for steep slopes highlights its strong potential for application along hill roads in Nepal. In conclusion, multiple studies demonstrate that the use of vetiver grass on slopes has significantly enhanced bio-engineering practices in Nepal and holds great promise for future slope stabilization efforts.