Submit your Article

The Annapurna Express’s recent coverage (June 11 & 15, 2025) outlines Nepal Rastra Bank’s (NRB) paradigm shift toward inclusive policy making alongside pointed critiques of financial sector oligopolies under Governor Biswo Poudel’s stewardship. While these dual initiatives ostensibly represent a break from traditional monetary governance paradigms, their transformative potential remains circumscribed by institutional implementation constraints. The Governor’s grassroots consultations with entrepreneurs signal a welcome democratization of policy formulation, particularly regarding climate-adaptive financing and (small and medium-sized enterprise) SME sector needs. Parallel criticisms of credit concentration among privileged business houses and individuals during parliamentary debates on financial sector reform legislation reveal acute awareness of systemic inequities. However, mere articulation of these concerns proves insufficient. There is a need for technically sophisticated policy instruments, rigorous monitoring mechanisms and enforceable regulatory safeguards. The fundamental challenge confronting NRB transcends rhetorical commitments, residing instead in its institutional capacity to convert participatory inputs and diagnostic critiques into measurable policy outcomes. Without such operational competence, these ostensibly progressive measures risk remaining performative gestures rather than effecting substantive financial sector transformation. The central bank’s ability to institutionalize technical implementation frameworks will ultimately determine whether this reorientation represents genuine reform or merely cosmetic governance adjustments.

Advisory mechanism and institutional redundancy

Governor Poudel’s recruitment of a three-member advisory committee underscores structural inefficiencies within NRB governance. Despite NRB’s existing cadre of internationally trained professionals, reliance on this external back door entrants raises concerns about internal confidence and the potential for political patronage. Advisory bodies often serve symbolic rather than substantive roles, diluting accountability and diverting attention from rigorous and data-driven analysis. The sidelining of internal technical expertise in favor of ceremonial consultations undermines efforts to implement advanced financial modeling and scientific risk assessments. To move forward, NRB must strengthen in-house analytical capacity and deploy modern surveillance technologies, transitioning from a bureaucratic institution to a knowledge-driven central bank.

 Implementation vs. preparation

Governor Poudel’s technocratic background and field engagement are commendable, yet policy effectiveness hinges on implementation. With inflation at 6.05 percent in mid-December 2024 and productive sector lending stagnant at 15.2 percent of total credit, Nepal faces the challenge of balancing price stability with growth imperatives. The NRB's inflation target of 6.5 percent needs to be harmonized with the pressing requirement for funding climate-smart infrastructure and support for SMEs. However, the central bank’s autonomy remains fragile, persistently challenged by fiscal dominance and political interference. Cross-country evidence underscores that monetary policy effectiveness depends on institutional independence, a standard NRB struggles to consistently meet.

 Monetary policy’s developmental role

Monetary policy in Nepal serves a critical dual function: stabilizing the macroeconomy and enabling structural transformation through resource allocation. Yet, its impact is limited by an underdeveloped financial sector and the predominance of informal credit markets and remittance inflows, which distort price signals. Contractual savings institutions such as the Employment Fund, Social Security Fund, and Citizen Investment Trust, including police and army funds, manage significant public savings. But they operate with minimal regulatory oversight. This gap fosters risky lending practices and threatens financial stability. NRB must integrate these entities into a comprehensive regulatory framework, aligning their operations with macroeconomic objectives. Furthermore, NRB should enhance oversight of primary and secondary capital markets, where rooted rent seeking interest groups undermine market integrity. Transparent regulation can bolster SME financing and investor confidence. Public-private credit risk-sharing models, SME financing and fintech platforms offer promising avenues to expand investment opportunities and financial inclusion.

Risks in financial innovation

While securitization offers liquidity and risk diversification, in weak financial systems it can amplify systemic vulnerabilities. Instruments like collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) often misallocate risk and encourage moral hazard. In Nepal’s nascent capital markets, such products risk heightening financial instability rather than mitigating it. The NRB should enforce risk-retention mandates, strengthen disclosure protocols, and develop sector-specific risk models to ensure financial innovation reinforces rather than undermines systemic resilience.

 Structural deficiencies in financial architecture

Three critical deficiencies weaken Nepal’s financial system. First, inflation measurement relies on outdated commodity baskets, failing to capture actual household expenditures in key sectors. Updating consumption weightings is vital for credible policymaking. Second, credit allocation failures, especially in state-owned banks, lead to mispriced risk and inefficient capital flow, evident in speculative hydropower lending and trade finance manipulation. Implementing risk-based lending and strengthening governance are urgent. Third, financial exclusion persists due to legacy banking practices that marginalize SMEs, pushing them toward informal credit markets. Hybrid credit models and dedicated SME facilities could help bridge this financing gap.

 Curbing NPLs and strengthening risk oversight

Nepal’s escalating non-performing loans (NPLs) underscore systemic vulnerabilities in credit underwriting and risk management. According to the NRB’s Financial Stability Report (2024), the aggregate NPL-to-total-loan ratio surged to 3.86 percent, marking a 3.4 percent year-on-year increase, with total distressed assets reaching Rs 199.66bn. Alarmingly, over 56 percent of these NPLs are classified as “loss” assets, reflecting severe deterioration in asset quality. Sectoral analysis reveals acute stress in construction (7.28 percent), followed by fisheries (6.65 percent), agriculture (6.22 percent), and metal production (6.09 percent). The banking sector’s NPL composition has worsened, with loss-category loans now dominating at 56.66 percent. Despite their limited GDP contribution, loan portfolios remain disproportionately concentrated in consumption and retail sectors, exposing financial institutions to unproductive risk. The absence of granular, sector-specific risk assessments particularly in high-exposure sectors like hydropower heightens systemic fragility. To preempt further instability, the NRB must transition from reactive oversight to predictive risk analytics, implementing rigorous stress-testing frameworks and Likert-scale credit scoring models tailored to individual BFIs and each sector. Current reliance on narrative-based advisory mechanisms, devoid of empirical validation, perpetuates cyclical vulnerabilities. Without institutionalizing data-driven risk analysis and surveillance, Nepal’s financial sector risks replicating crises, necessitating urgent reforms in supervisory methodologies to align credit allocation with sustainable economic priorities.

 Takeaway

The NRB’s recent policy shift toward inclusivity and evidence-based decision-making reflects a theoretically progressive stance, recognizing the need for broader economic and investment equity. However, rooted structural weaknesses such as institutional inefficiencies, outdated metrics, and governance gaps undermine substantive reform, risking purely symbolic change. The disproportionate focus on price stability over equitable growth highlights a misalignment with Nepal’s developmental needs, necessitating integrated strategies prioritizing investment in micro, small, and medium enterprises, rural finance, financial inclusion, and sectoral productivity. Effective implementation hinges on preserving technocratic autonomy, as NRB independence is foundational to credible governance. The upcoming monetary policy will test the NRB’s capacity to convert rhetoric into data-driven action, balancing investment expansion with regulatory rigor against politically connected elite businesses capture. As the NRB transitions from macroeconomic stabilizer to proactive architect of Nepal’s economic future, Governor Poudel’s leadership must be judged by tangible outcomes, policy coherence, execution efficacy, and measurable progress across socioeconomic strata. This demands both analytical sophistication and institutional resilience.

A fully stable relationship has been elusive to India and China. Since the birth of the modern nation states, the unresolved border has continued to put an ominous shadow on the relationship. The lack of understanding toward each other has also resulted in major mistrust which has only grown with time. The Galwan clash of June 2020, which pushed the relationship into a total freeze for 4.5 years, has added to the existing mistrust. However, some positive momentum and thaw was finally achieved in October 2024 after multiple rounds of talks and has been pushing the relationship in a positive direction. But, given the history of the relationship, it will not be wrong to assume that a lot needs to be reformed for this relationship to be truly functional.

In a first after Galwan, the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh visited Qingdao China from June 25 to June 26 to attend the defence ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting and met his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun. It was during this meeting that the Indian side proposed a four-point plan to achieve a ‘permanent solution’ to the border problem. The four-point agenda includes: “adherence to the 2024 disengagement plan, continued efforts to de-escalate, accelerated efforts to achieve the goal of demarcation and delimitation at the borders, and the usage of the existing special representative level mechanism to prepare new processes to manage differences and improve relations”. Singh also reiterated the need to build and establish mutual trust, which has been adversely impacted after the 2020 Galwan clash.

The points clearly highlight the multiple level of challenges and issues which India-China relations face even after 75 years of diplomatic relationship. India was one of the first countries to recognize the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since then, the relationship has faced major hurdles and what makes it ever more problematic is the existing unresolved border.

Singh has rightly asserted that there is a need to look for a permanent solution to the border as it has time and again proved to be a major obstacle in the improvement of the relationship. The idea promoted by China, which led to the thaw in 1988, was that borders can be resolved at a future date, while economic and other relationships improved, has been proven quite fragile. The India-China trade relations have boomed in the last four decades and today the bilateral trade stands at $118bn dollars, however, it has not proved to be a factor in actually bridging the trust deficit or strengthening the relationship. The fragility of diplomatic mechanisms has been witnessed time and again.

Both sides had realized the need for regular communication and they tried to look for ways to improve this. The lack of communication was quite apparent during the 73-day military standoff at Doklam. In order to address this lacunae, the two countries did engage in unofficial talks in the form of the Wuhan Summit of 2018 and the Mamallapuram Summit of 2019. These summits were supposed to help the leaders communicate better and help any future challenge like the standoff at Doklam. However, the Galwan clash of 2020 underscored the fact that the mistrust and miscommunication ran too deep.

However, India and China are two of the largest economies and nuclear power states and de-escalation is a crucial and necessary step toward improving the relationship. The Indian side’s reiteration is understood as a peaceful border is essential for overall growth of the country. But it appears that India and China need to genuinely understand each other’s concerns. Both have been working toward achieving their own respective goals and are trying to resolve the border issue as per their understanding. The unresolved border has time and time again pushed this relationship into uncertainty and the fact that the Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) which were achieved and implemented by mutual understanding could be shattered by one incident underscores the need for better communication and peaceful resolution of the border. 

For the last 75 years, the two countries have also built a domestic narrative on the border and this is today closely linked to the sovereignty and identity of the countries. For a resolution, the border will have to be negotiated, and as negotiations go, it will call for a compromise. The question this raises is: Which country or government will be comfortable accepting any such outcome? No government can be seen as giving up on territory and thus appear weaker. The mistrust is too deeply ingrained and the repeated border skirmishes initiated by Beijing time and again has not helped the case. Nationalism soars too high and too strong when it comes to resolving the border.

Even today, it appears that the two sides are talking parallel to each other. The Chinese have continued to stress the need to restart and establish people-to-people contact, which had completely broken after Galwan and also impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Beijing has shown its proactiveness here by restarting the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and also issuing visas to a large number of Indians. It is also asserting that direct flights should be restarted soon. Meanwhile, New Delhi has continued to push for a resolution of the border and push for de-escalation, which is clear from the Indian defence minister’s agenda too. The fact that no joint statement was made during the SCO defence ministers’ meeting further shows the gap in perception. India has been firm on asserting the role of Pakistan as a terrorist state while China continues to push a parallel narrative.

A stable and cooperative India-China relationship will be beneficial to them as well as the South Asian region but it can be achieved only when the two sides genuinely start to understand and trust each other.

The author is an associate professor at OP Jindal Global University

People’s trust in the media is fast declining, if not hitting the rock bottom, already. As a professional journalist with no political affiliation, I have spent two decades in this field, witnessing both highs and lows of Nepali media industry. In the early years of my career, the media was all flourishing: newspaper circulation was rising, radio and television were booming, and college classrooms were filled with enthusiastic media students. Now, the trend has sharply reversed. 

The current state of Nepali media bears some superficial resemblance to American media from 1900 to the 1940s. During that period, US newspapers were characterized by partisan, sensationalism, public criticisms over media performances, abuse of media power and growing concerns about the media’s negative impact on democracy. In response to these issues, American educator Robert Hutchins was appointed to lead a blue-ribbon panel to study the challenges facing US media. 

This piece broadly explores the current crisis of credibility in the media, the government’s attempt to control the press and what a wise and transparent approach to media regulation should look like. We must openly acknowledge that public trust in us is eroding due to a multitude of factors.

Only by first admitting this can we begin to rebuild the trust. At the heart of the media’s current crisis lies a widespread violation of journalistic ethics. Financial struggles are already a serious concern. But if journalists commit to upholding ethical standards, public criticism can at least be reduced, if not entirely silenced. 

It is not only digital platforms which are flouting journalistic codes of conduct. Traditional media, which pride themselves on being part of the mainstream, are also flagrantly violating ethical norms, further fueling public distrust. The erosion of confidence in media is not unique to Nepal; it is a global trend that began in the early 2000s and it continues to deepen. A recent report by the Reuters Institute revealed that only 40 percent of people trust the media. The silver lining, however, is that this figure has not declined over the past few years.

 In fact, trust in news has remained stable for the third consecutive year, even though it is still four percentage points lower than it was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, public trust in the media continues to erode gradually. For instance, in recent years, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority(CIAA) has filed cases against more than half a dozen journalists, alongside government officials, for their alleged involvement in corruption and irregularities. Meanwhile, people are struggling to distinguish between news, views and advertisement and paid content.   

Another problem is the structural weakness of Nepali media houses. The ongoing economic crisis is forcing many media outlets to carry out mass layoffs, severely weakening newsrooms. This has not only affected field-based reporting but also undermined the gate-keeping—selecting, filtering and refining the news before it reaches the public. As a result, ordinary citizens are increasingly questioning the accuracy, balance and credibility of the news they consume.

One of the most corrosive issues in Nepali journalism today is the political affiliation of journalists. Many spend more time on social media than in the newsroom, either defending their preferred political parties or attacking their rivals. The level of political alignment among journalists has reached an alarming level. People no longer trust content produced by those who openly align with political parties and shape their social media presence accordingly. Journalism is being misused as a stepping stone for political appointments or personal financial gains. 

Professional journalists are facing pressure not just from political actors but from their own colleagues affiliated with political parties or power centers. If a journalist publishes critical news about these parties or centers, affiliated colleagues often retaliate by undermining or attacking the former. Journalists who maintain independence are finding it increasingly difficult to survive in such a hostile environment.

Another growing problem is the media’s overreliance on social media content, due in large part to the decline in field reporting. This has led to a troubling trend: journalists often use unverified social media posts as the basis for news stories. Recently, a prominent journalist published a report based on rumors circulating online. 

Although filing a cybercrime case against him was unjustified, the video content he produced was clearly problematic and damaged the credibility of the media outlet involved. Those in power are now using such incidents as a pretext to clamp down on the media. Several news stories based on unchecked social media information have sparked controversy. Even worse, there is a growing reluctance among media houses to acknowledge mistakes or issue timely corrections.  

Due to these ethical lapses, all three branches of the state—the executive, legislature and the judiciary—believe that the media should be tightly regulated. The problem is further complicated by the inability of the politicians to distinguish between professional news content and personal social media posts. On that basis, they are attempting to suppress independent journalism, especially as it continues to expose corruption and irregularities. With corruption at an all-time high and politicians and government officials implicated, the media has effectively become their enemy.

Every draft of media-related laws introduced by successive governments directly contravenes the international treaties and convention to which Nepal is a party, and also violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression. There is now rhetoric within the parliament in favor of restricting the media, while the executive branch is employing various means to jail journalists. The judiciary, once considered a last resort for journalists seeking justice, is letting journalists down, more often than not.

The judiciary plays a vital role in safeguarding freedom of speech, expression and the press by checking the executive’s attempts to impose suppressive laws. Historically, Nepal’s judiciary upheld these principles, from the Panchayat era to King Gyanendra’s direct rule. Unfortunately, the current reality is quite the opposite. 

The judiciary has become more restrictive toward press freedom, emboldening those who wish to curtail it. Courts are now misusing the contempt of court provision to harass journalists and even issuing orders to remove published news content in a clear violation of constitutional norms. 

The media fraternity itself is partly to blame for this situation, having failed to support the enactment of a clear and fair contempt of court law. It is ironic that during times of autocracy, Nepali media stood firmly in defense of press freedom, but in the republican era, that commitment appears to be wavering. A close examination of recent bills related to the media, social media and information technology reveals that the government’s aim is control, not regulation. These efforts undermine the principles of responsible journalism and the social responsibilities of the media. 

As I conclude this piece, I return to the Hutchins Commission report of 1947. To address media shortcomings, the US did not control the press, doing so would have violated the First Amendment, which explicitly states, “Congress shall make no law, abridging the freedom of the press.” Instead, the focus was placed on promoting ethical standards and media accountability. In our context, any attempts to control the media would violate the 2015 constitution and international treaties and conventions to which Nepal is a party. 

Those in power must understand that ethical reform is a far more effective tool than legal coercion for addressing shortcomings of the media. At the same time, collaboration between private media, academic institutions and the government can help find solutions. If necessary, a powerful commission similar to Hutchins Commission can be formed. The state can take a range of non-intrusive measures to promote ethical standards without interfering in press freedom.

The executive, the judiciary and the legislature must urgently abandon their current restrictive mindset. Attempts to control the media will not resolve its shortcomings; it will make the matter worse. We in the media must also recognize that public criticism of our work is both real and justified, and we must act responsibly.

In a turbulent world where a polycrisis looms—from Ukraine to Iran—hot conflicts remain unresolved through diplomacy, and the developed world shows fractures, as seen in the recent G7 summit in Canada, multilateral efforts are withering. A rare exception is European unity in the Ukraine conflict. Against this backdrop, cooperation in South Asia becomes especially noteworthy, particularly given that nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan were on the brink of war after the terror attacks in Kashmir’s Pahalgam.

Amid these tensions, a positive development emerges. Nepal has begun supplying 40 megawatts (MW) of electricity to Bangladesh via India. This is a significant step for one of the world’s least interconnected regions. But why is this a crucial milestone in South Asia’s energy landscape?

South Asia is undergoing an energy transition. India, the world’s third-largest power consumer, saw peak demand reach 250 GW this year, with projections suggesting 458 GW by 2032. Bangladesh’s peak demand is nearing 16,000 MW and is expected to exceed 34,000 MW by 2030. As India expands its renewable energy capacity and Bangladesh shifts from gas and coal, both countries are increasingly turning to cross-border power exchanges to supplement domestic supply.

Nepal and Bhutan represent untapped potential. The Himalayan nations possess hydropower capacities of 40,000 MW and 30,000 MW, respectively, yet less than 10 percent has been harnessed. With proper infrastructure, they could become the region’s clean energy reservoirs.

The feasibility of power trading hinges on infrastructure, where quiet but meaningful progress has been made. Since 2016, the Nepal–India Dhalkebar–Muzaffarpur 400 kV line has enabled Nepal to export electricity to India. The recent Nepal-Bangladesh power transfer utilized this line, routing through India’s eastern grid via the HVDC Baharampur–Bheramara link.

BIMSTEC has sought to capitalize on this momentum. Its Grid Interconnection Master Plan, developed with ADB support and approved in 2018, outlines technical strategies for an integrated electricity market. The Energy Centre in Bengaluru, envisioned as a BIMSTEC knowledge hub, is expected to foster policy alignment and trade facilitation.

Yet BIMSTEC remains institutionally weak. While the recent trilateral power exchange occurred within its territory, it was not coordinated by BIMSTEC itself,  which is a critical distinction. Unlike the EU’s energy union or Africa’s Power Pools, BIMSTEC lacks a formal regulatory framework for energy trade. There is no central market operator, no unified dispute mechanism, and no standardized tariff system. Without a dedicated trading platform, transactions rely on bilateral deals, contingent on India’s willingness to facilitate them.

This model has worked so far, but its scalability is uncertain. As new projects like Bhutan’s Sunkosh and Nepal’s Arun-IV come online, challenges around pricing, grid stability, and regional capacity planning will grow. A regional market cannot thrive indefinitely on ad-hoc bilateral agreements.

Political commitment within BIMSTEC is also uneven. While India, Nepal, and Bangladesh have made progress, members like Myanmar and Sri Lanka remain peripheral to energy discussions, and Thailand’s involvement has been largely rhetorical.

A multilateral institutional framework is needed—not just for regulation but also to develop infrastructure, from unlocking Himalayan hydropower to building a shared grid. It could also create an integrated market for surplus power. However, this requires sustained engagement. BIMSTEC could learn from ASEAN, where economic cooperation persists despite territorial disputes.

India and Bangladesh aim for net-zero emissions by 2070. With rising energy demand and a push for cleaner solutions, investments in hydropower and other renewables are critical. As a neighbor to most BIMSTEC members, India should not only facilitate power exchanges but also actively help build the necessary infrastructure. This is also a strategic imperative for Indian and Bangladeshi exports, particularly to the EU, which will soon impose a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) tax.

The Nepal-Bangladesh power deal, enabled by India, is more than a regional energy milestone. It underscores a geopolitical and developmental opportunity South Asia cannot ignore. Amid climate crises, energy insecurity, and volatile bilateral ties, cross-border power trade offers a path to redefine cooperation through economic interdependence.

Yet without a multilateral framework, such exchanges remain fragile, dependent on India’s strategic calculus. The absence of standardized rules, dispute resolution, and long-term planning leaves the region vulnerable to political shifts and technical failures. For India, formalizing a BIMSTEC energy community is not just goodwill—it aligns with its climate diplomacy and trade competitiveness in a CBAM-regulated world.

The real challenge is not technical feasibility but political vision. South Asia’s energy future hinges on its ability to institutionalize trust, integrate equity, and depoliticize infrastructure.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is also associated as a Life Member of the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi