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On a long flight to Kathmandu, the man next to me said, “So, you are a professor—what do you teach?” I smiled. If only academic life were that simple. Teaching is only one part of what I do. Many imagine professors spending most of their time in classrooms. The truth is far broader: we supervise students, review research papers, write proposals, organize conferences, design new courses, serve on committees and sometimes travel across continents to share ideas. Being an academic is not just a job. It is a way of living and learning. Teaching, research and service are woven together, each influencing the others. A student’s question might spark a research idea. Writing a paper might change how I teach. Organizing a conference might lead to collaborations that last years. The philosopher Martin Heidegger called this “worldhood.” 

Our actions don’t exist as isolated tasks, but as parts of a larger, meaningful whole. Reviewing a paper, mentoring a student, preparing a lecture or attending a conference are all connected threads in the same fabric of academic life. Each gains significance from its connection to the others. Our work flows together in a daily rhythm that shapes our identity as academics. Some days are smooth; others are a blur of deadlines, meetings and rejections. But the rewards are real: a student finally grasping a difficult idea, a paper being accepted, a collaboration taking root. Guiding students is among the most satisfying parts of my job.

Watching them grow, thinking critically and discovering new things is deeply rewarding. Every discussion, assignment and piece of feedback is an investment in the next generation—not just in their knowledge, but in their ability to question, explore and contribute to the world. Research is another core pillar. Writing papers, reading others’ work and debating ideas with colleagues all feed into a global conversation. When I attend a conference—whether in Asia, Europe or Africa—I’m not just presenting my work; I’m listening, exchanging perspectives and finding new questions to explore. 

Often, the most important moments happen outside formal sessions: a conversation over coffee, a hallway debate, a chance meeting that sparks an unexpected project. Travel is not just about sightseeing, but also about connecting ideas and people. Each trip adds new threads to the academic fabric—perspectives from different cultures, insights from other disciplines and friendships that outlast any single project.

Academic life is always forward-looking: the next paper to write, the next course to design, the next student to mentor. Our work builds on the knowledge of those before us, and future scholars will build on ours. A lecture is never just a lecture; it’s part of a long chain of learning. A research paper is part of an ongoing conversation. Mentoring a student helps shape the future of our academic community.

Yes, there are challenges—funding struggles, heavy workloads, administrative tangles—but the rewards outweigh them. The freedom to explore ideas, the joy of learning continuously and the chance to inspire others make this life fulfilling. Back in Norway, I still think about my recent guest lecture at Madan Bhandari University of Science and Technology (MBUST) in Nepal.

I noticed how eager students were to explore ways to relate their research to their own community’s challenges. Seeing them connect academic concepts to real-world problems reminded me of the true purpose of teaching: helping students think critically, apply knowledge, and make a difference in the communities they care about. So, when people ask what I do, I find it hard to give a short answer. Being a professor is not a list of duties. 

It is curiosity, dedication and connection. It is the privilege of being part of a community of thinkers and learners. Each lecture, paper, and conversation add to a larger journey. Academia is not just a career. It is a calling—one that shapes how we live, think and relate to the world. For those of us who have chosen it, the journey is filled with challenges, discoveries and every so often, moments that make it all worthwhile.

As a democracy, Nepal has state apparatuses to address the concerns of its people. Hospitals exist to treat ills and courts are there to provide remedy with judicial pills. However, neither courts nor hospitals can cure all ills with perfect judicial or medical pills. 

Of late, people seem to place great trust either in hospitals for health and long life, or in courts for accessing justice. The rising number of public interest litigations (PILs) and writs show that public faith in the judiciary has grown over the years. This is a positive sign as the judiciary is counted as the resort for availing justice. 

However, this also tells us something interesting that people often turn to courts with litigation because of failure of other branches of the state—the legislature and the executive—to meet the expectations of the people or for their gross failure in upholding the constitutional values. 

PIL 

The PIL refers to a legal proceeding initiated in a court poor to protect or enforce the rights or interests of the public or a particular segment of society. Unlike typical lawsuits, a PIL is filed not for personal gain but to seek justice on behalf of the public. 

The petitioner is not dominus litis in PIL cases. The Supreme Court of Nepal has passed a plethora of judgments while considering PIL suits. It’s generally the relaxation of locus standi. 

Articles 133 and 144 of the Constitution of Nepal empower the Supreme Court (SC) and the High Courts with extraordinary jurisdiction to issue necessary orders and writs. The decisions passed under PILs have played a dynamic role in advancing significant social and legal reforms over the years.

The case of Advocate Radhey Shyam Adhikari v the Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers and Others (NKP 2048 BS, Vol 12, Decision Number 4430) is considered as the first PIL case in Nepal where the SC held that petitioners need to have meaningful relations and substantial interest in the subject matter to file a PIL.

In the landmark case of Surendra Raj Pandey v Speaker of Gandaki Province and Others (080-WO-1175), the SC invalidated the Speaker’s decision to uphold the confidence vote secured by Chief Minister Khag Raj Adhikari, who had claimed support from 30 MLAs in a 60-member House.

The petitioner contended that a majority requires the backing of more than half the total strength of the House—ie, at least 31 members in a 60-member assembly. The respondents argued that the Chief Minister had obtained a majority of the members present and voting, specifically 30 out of 59 MLAs. The court, however, held that a vote of confidence must command the support of the majority of the total membership of the House, not just those present and voting. As a result, the confidence motion was deemed invalid and was set aside through certiorari. 

In Hikmat Kumar Karki v Chief of the Province, Koshi Province, Biratnagar and Others (NKP 2081, Issue 10, Decision Number 11356), the SC held that a person holding the position of the Speaker cannot claim an additional or dual role as a Provincial Assembly member. The Speaker must remain limited to the role of Speaker. 

In Sher Bahadur Deuba and Others v the Office of the President and Others (077-WC-0071), the SC reinstated the House the President had dissolved on the recommendation of then KP Sharma Oli-led government.  

These are just a few representative cases where the apex court had to step in to uphold the constitutional values. These types of incidents have not occurred only in Nepal. India, too, has a long list of Supreme Court decisions correcting the injustices from the governments at the helm.

India’s case

The Supreme Court of India, by overruling its own decision in the State of Rajasthan v the Union of India (1977), held in the case of SR Bommai v Union of India (1994) that the presidential proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review and that it is not an absolute but a conditional power and that no assembly can be dissolved before both the Houses of the Parliament ratify the proclamation. The imposition of Presidential rule and dissolution of the State Assembly cannot be done together, the SC further held.

The apex court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad v the State of Bihar (2006) held that the Governor has no power to decide the majority of the state legislative assembly. He is supposed to play a role in forming a government of a party or parties enjoying majority or confidence in the House and the deciding place for the matter is only the floor of the House, not the Raj Bhawan (Governor’s House).

Sabotaging constitutional values 

Against this backdrop, there appears an important question: Why can’t we build a culture that respects and upholds constitutional values? 

When government departments chase short-term benefits, and people are forced to challenge those decisions on constitutional grounds, it creates a climate where cases are filed against almost every governmental move. This leads to growing public distrust and a loss of faith in the government. 

Yet, the PIL should not turn into a tool to earn publicity; it should not become something like “Publicity/Private-Interest Litigation.” In essence, it should be a virtuous weapon in the hands of the weak.

The way forward

The PIL is an effective tool to lower the barriers and augment trust between judiciary and people. Its sole purpose is to uphold the rule of law and constitutional values. 

In a constitutional democracy, government actions should reflect moral values, constitutional rights and well-established principles. Introducing bills that promote bigamy or seek pardons for serious criminals will only lead to more PILs in the future—just like we have seen in the past. 

The authors are judicial officers at Morang district court, Biratnagar

Green hydrogen has emerged as one of the most promising energy carriers for achieving net-zero carbon targets globally in recent years. Green hydrogen can address two immediate challenges in the energy transition: decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors and ensuring energy storage for intermittent renewable sources with its ability to store renewable electricity in chemical form. As a signatory to the Paris Agreement and participant in recent COPs, Nepal has pledged to achieve net-zero emissions by 2045 and become carbon negative thereafter. The country’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) emphasizes scaling up renewable energy and exploring low-carbon technologies to meet its climate goals.

With abundant hydropower potential, year-round clean water from the Himalayas and seasonal mismatches between electricity supply and demand, Nepal is well-positioned to use excess hydropower for hydrogen production. By 2035, this country intends to produce 28,500 MW of electricity power (15,000 MW to export and 13,500 MW to be used locally), which leaves a possible surplus of up to 20,919 MW. This surplus could produce around 3m tons of green hydrogen annually, meeting up to 1.7–2.2 percent of the projected global demand of 150–195m tons in 2035. This represents a major opportunity to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuel, enhance energy security and establish a new green industry. However, economic viability assessment of the proposed practice is essential in transitioning potential into practice. Thus, this article analyses the economic viability of green hydrogen production in Nepal.

Economic assessment

The economic viability of green hydrogen production in Nepal depends on both the capital investment (CAPEX) required to build the facility and the operational expenditure (OPEX) for its ongoing operation. The total CAPEX of the Green Hydrogen Production Plant is usually divided into several major subsystems. The electrolyzer system represents the most significant portion of the total CAPEX (about 45 percent). The system includes stacks, power electronics and control units. The storage and compression of Hydrogen comprises approximately 20 percent in the form of high-pressure vessels, compressors and safety systems. Balance-of-plant (BoP) requires about 15 percent of the total, which includes piping, valves, instrumentation and electrical interconnections. The water purification system constitutes approximately five percent, which is crucial in producing high-purity deionized water in electrolysis. The remaining 15 percent is land acquisition and infrastructure development, which includes foundation, civil works, access roads and utility connections.

The most significant component of the operation expenditure (OPEX) of such a facility is the electricity cost, comprising 65-70 percent of the annual operating cost, since the electrolysis process is energy-intensive and the cost of electricity is a significant factor affecting the price of hydrogen. Maintenance covers about 10 percent of the total, including regular inspection, component changes and system service. Human resources cost account for about eight percent, including plant operators, engineers and administrative staff. The remaining 12-17 percent will be classified under miscellaneous expenses that will incorporate insurance, safety compliance, spare parts inventory and miscellaneous overheads.

For instance, considering that the Government of Nepal has already waived customs and income tax on hydrogen production equipment for the next five years as per the fiscal budget of FY 2025-26, and that the cost of each plant component (electrolyzer, storage, balance-of-plant, purification systems, land and infrastructure) generally aligns with global benchmarks, a 500-kW green hydrogen plant in Nepal is estimated to require a total CAPEX of about Rs 500m ($3.67m) with an annual OPEX of around Rs 65m ($0.477m). A 1 MW facility would cost approximately Rs 900m ($6.62m) in CAPEX and Rs 135m ($0.99m) in OPEX. In comparison, a 2 MW green hydrogen production plant with an integrated oxygen recovery and bottling facility is estimated to require a total CAPEX of Rs 1.63bn ($11.98m), with an annual OPEX of Rs 255m ($1.87m), where Rs 200m ($1.47m) is solely covered by electricity cost. Thus, the CAPEX–OPEX profile highlights the importance of securing low-cost renewable electricity, optimizing system efficiency and monetizing by-products for Nepal to establish a cost-competitive green hydrogen sector. The relatively high proportion of electrolyzer and storage costs in CAPEX suggests that technological advancements and economies of scale will be critical to cost reductions over the coming decade.

The construction period for green hydrogen projects depends on plant capacity, supply chain lead times and site conditions. In Nepal’s context, a 500-kW plant can typically be completed within 9–12 months, including site preparation, procurement and commissioning. A 1 MW plant may require 14–18 months, while a 2 MW facility, given its greater storage, compression, and civil work requirements, can take 18–24 months. Streamlining regulatory approvals and integrating the hydrogen facility with existing hydropower plants can reduce timelines by up to 20 percent.

Economic viability

Numerous countries and entities are trying to lower the price of green hydrogen. As a new and capital-intensive form of technology, it must be made less expensive to scale up. On a per-kilogram basis, 60–70 percent of the production cost is attributed to electricity, 0.5–1 percent to water, 8–15 percent to CAPEX and 2–4 percent to other operational expenses. Currently, the worldwide price to generate green hydrogen is between $3 and $8 per kg, whereas in 2035 it is estimated to be $1.3-$2.3 per kg. Since Nepal has access to cheap electricity and clean water, it is estimated that the production costs will be between $1.2-$1.8 per kg by 2035, making Nepal’s hydrogen very cost-competitive.

A detailed cost analysis indicates that a 2 MW electrolyzer represents the optimal scale for Nepal’s initial green hydrogen projects, producing hydrogen at approximately Rs 1,812/kg ($13.32/kg) based on current electricity rates (Rs 11/kWh, i.e. $0.08/kWh). This mid-range capacity strikes a critical balance—delivering economies of scale without the prohibitive costs of larger plants, as costs initially decrease from small to medium scales, rise slightly between 2-5 MW due to balance-of-system complexities, and then drop again for 10+MW capacities. With a manageable capital investment of around Rs 1.64bn ($12.05m), the 2 MW model offers commercial viability while remaining scalable for future expansion. Furthermore, if subsidized electricity rates (Rs 3/kWh, i.e. $0.02/kWh) are applied, production costs could fall to ~Rs 1,372/kg (~$10.08/kg) and at an intermediate tariff of
Rs 6/kWh ($0.04/kWh), production costs for a 2MW plant are estimated at Rs 1,537/kg ($11.3/kg), reinforcing Nepal's potential to establish a cost-competitive green hydrogen industry that aligns with domestic energy goals and emerging global market opportunities.

Land requirement and site selection

The establishment of green hydrogen production facilities in Nepal requires careful consideration of land availability, terrain, accessibility and proximity to essential resources. For electrolysis plants, land is primarily allocated to the electrolyzer building and power conditioning units (25 percent of total area), hydrogen storage and compression facilities (20 percent), oxygen recovery and bottling units (15 percent), balance-of-plant (BoP) systems including piping and workshops (15 percent), water treatment and purification systems (10 percent), and access roads, green buffers and safety exclusion zones (15 percent). Based on global benchmarks, a 2 MW green hydrogen production facility typically requires around 1.2 acres (~4,856 m²), which could be arranged as 70 m × 70 m.

In the context of Nepal, site selection should be nearer to the large hydropower plants to cut down on transmission losses and infrastructure costs. Sites around Bagmati, Gandaki and Koshi provinces, which already have or are planning to have large-scale hydropower plants, seem to be the most appropriate. Areas near the transmission substations, accessible roads for transporting heavy equipment and water sources are also critical. The site should not be near dense population areas so that the high-pressure hydrogen storage that would be used would not pose too many safety issues. Integrating the hydrogen plants with other hydropower plants or as extensions to existing ones would make the issues of land acquisition simpler and would ensure a constant supply of electricity, especially during low-demand periods when surplus electricity from hydropower is available.

Oxygen as a by-product

Electrolysis produces oxygen alongside hydrogen (8 kg of oxygen per 1 kg of hydrogen). This by-product can be monetized, improving project economics. For instance, a 2 MW plant operating for 8,000 hours annually equates to over 6,376 kg of oxygen daily. Nepal currently operates around 25 oxygen plants producing 80,000–85,000 kg per day, serving both medical (60 percent) and industrial (40 percent) sectors. The additional supply from green hydrogen projects could strengthen domestic oxygen security, particularly during health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, when oxygen shortages became critical. This oxygen can be compressed and bottled for sale to hospitals, industries such as steel and glass manufacturing and water treatment facilities. A dedicated 2 MW by-product oxygen production facility would require a CAPEX of about Rs 145m, producing 6,376 kg of oxygen per day, equivalent to approximately 744 high-pressure medical-grade cylinders daily, where each cylinder has a volume of 40 liters filled at 150 bar pressure (equivalent to 6,000 liters at atmospheric pressure). At a market price of Rs 600 per 40-liter cylinder, this output could generate annual revenue of around Rs 162m. The oxygen revenue stream can significantly offset hydrogen production costs, potentially reducing the effective cost per kilogram of hydrogen by 5–10 percent depending on market demand and selling prices.

Conclusion

Nepal has significant potential to establish a green hydrogen industry due to its abundant hydropower resources, clean water access and increasing commitment to decarbonization. The economic assessment for Nepal’s green hydrogen production suggests that the country’s first commercial pilot project could be implemented at scales of 500 kW, 750 kW, 1 MW, or 2 MW, out of which the 2 MW facility stands out as the optimum and most economically viable choice so far. The output potential of a 2 MW facility is about 800 kg of green hydrogen daily. If all production is consumed, the project would achieve an internal rate of return (IRR) of 10–11 percent and a payback period (PBP) of 6–8 years under varying electricity tariffs from Rs 3 ($0.02) to Rs 11 ($0.08) per kWh.

The most immediate application of such a pilot project would be establishing a green hydrogen–fueled transportation ecosystem in Nepal. With a daily hydrogen production target of 800 kg, approximately 20 fuel-cell buses could be operated daily. This would replace diesel consumption and avoid around 1,956 tonnes of CO₂ emissions yearly, contributing to roughly 0.041 percent of Nepal’s total annual transport sector CO₂ emissions. While the electricity prices currently render the production prices of small to mid-scale plants to be on the higher side, these can be lowered substantially with the right subsidy policies, scaling up of technology and monetization of by-products. A phased approach, starting with strategically located 2 MW facilities near hydropower plants, can validate technical performance, establish market links and create a skilled workforce. As global costs decline and demand rises, Nepal can scale production to tap into regional export markets, particularly India, Bangladesh and other South Asian nations transitioning to cleaner energy.

Green hydrogen not only offers a pathway to reduce Nepal’s fossil fuel imports and improve energy security but also positions the country as a potential exporter in a rapidly expanding global market. With supportive policies, public–private partnerships and infrastructure investments, green hydrogen could become a pillar of Nepal’s energy strategy, contributing to economic growth and the nation’s commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2045.

The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA) recently introduced a draft amendment to Section 175 of the National Penal Code Act, 2017 concerning the conditions under which a marriage is deemed void. The proposal drew widespread opposition from Parliament, women’s rights activists, human rights defenders and the public for containing a controversial provision: if a child is born or a woman is pregnant from a second relationship, that relationship would not be voided solely for being polygamous. Critics and rights advocates have termed the clause “regressive,” warning it creates a legal loophole that legitimizes polygamy.

Against this backdrop, this article begins by outlining the core provisions of the proposed amendment to the National Penal Code. It then critically examines the underlying logic driving the proposal, highlighting its internal weaknesses and inconsistencies. The discussion proceeds to interrogate the deeper assumptions embedded in the lawmaking process—particularly the troubling stereotype about men’s nature and behavior that the amendment appears to endorse—and demonstrates why these assumptions are both inaccurate and harmful. Finally, the article explains how the proposed amendment contradicts Nepal’s national legal framework and concludes with recommendations for a constructive way forward.

Explanation of the provision

Nepal banned polygamy more than 60 years ago with the introduction of the Muluki Ain (National Code) in 1963, which made polygamy a punishable offence but did not allow such marriages to be annulled. This changed in 2017 when the National Penal  Code Act 2017  introduced a provision in Section 175 that automatically voids a second marriage if the first one is still legally valid. The Criminal Code also set penalties under Section 175, stating that a man who marries another woman while still married can face up to five years in prison and a fine of up to Rs 50,000.

The proposed amendment mentions that if a child has already been born from the marital relationship or if the woman is pregnant, such marriage shall not be annulled solely on the grounds that the person has been punished for the offence of polygamy. This is a significant deviation from the earlier provision, which automatically voided a second marriage if the first marriage was still valid. Critics argue that this proposed clause could make it easier for individuals to commit polygamy by simply serving the punishment while retaining the marriage.

When logic takes a backseat

“If a man no longer shares a heartfelt relationship with his wife and then develops a relationship with another woman—resulting in the birth of a child—yet does not formalize the relationship through marriage, the second woman’s life can be devastated. In many such cases, a large number of women end up abandoned and on the streets”, this quote from the Secretary of the Ministry of Law Parashwor Dhungana summarizes the key logic presented by the amendment proposer to the law.  But a thorough examination of the logic behind the proposed amendment exposes deeply flawed assumptions. The proposal starts with the premise that some men engage in extramarital affairs—and assumes these affairs inevitably involve physical intercourse. It then leaps to the conclusion that such intercourse will almost certainly lead to conception and the birth of a child. Based on this shaky foundation, the amendment argues that the mother and child born from such unions will face legal, social and cultural hardships if the second marriage is annulled. The solution? Legalize polygamy to “protect” their rights.

But this so-called protection hides a troubling contradiction. While it claims to protect women and children, it ends up encouraging extramarital affairs, approving relationships outside marriage and even allowing men to father children in such situations. In doing so, it risks making polygamy seem acceptable, all under the cover of safeguarding rights.

Worse still, the provision allows this cycle to continue indefinitely, limited only by a man’s reproductive capacity. It effectively permits men to bypass existing anti-polygamy laws and engage in multiple simultaneous marriages. This undermines the very legal and moral framework that sustains monogamous marriage and family integrity.

Creatures of uncontrollable urges?

The proposed amendment assumes men are driven primarily by uncontrollable sexual urges and biological imperatives, effectively stripping them of their agency, responsibility and dignity. This depiction reduces men to nothing more than violent actors whose actions must be tolerated or legally accommodated, regardless of the moral or social consequences. Such a portrayal is a serious mischaracterization that unjustly paints men as incapable of self-control, fidelity, or respect for the law.

This assumption is not only inaccurate but profoundly unfair. It denies men their capacity for ethical decision-making and holds them to a double standard that excuses illegal behavior under the guise of biological necessity. To portray men as inherently unable to resist extramarital relationships or as individuals whose reproductive acts supersede their legal obligations is to condemn them unjustly and deny their full humanity.

Furthermore, this portrayal entrenches harmful stereotypes that reinforce patriarchal norms, suggesting that men deserve special legal privileges simply because their biology “demands” it. This is not only damaging to men’s social and moral standing but also undermines the principles of justice, equality, and personal accountability that any fair legal system must uphold.

Contradiction with legal framework

The proposed amendment, though intended to protect mothers and children, contradicts Nepal’s constitutional provisions, national laws and international human rights obligations. It undermines the Muluki Civil Code, 2017, and the National Criminal (Penal) Code, 2017, which criminalize polygamy and safeguard marital equality. Constitutionally, it breaches Article 38, which guarantees women’s rights, and Article 18, which ensures equality before the law. Internationally, it violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Article 16), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, Article 16), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Articles 3 and 23), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, Article 10), all of which uphold equality in marriage, protect women’s dignity, and prohibit practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality.

Consequences and the way forward

In the last fiscal year alone, 521 out of 1,198 women, who approached the National Women Commission, were victims of husbands’ extramarital affairs. Many married men involved in these affairs were found to be living in “live-in relationships” with other women—an arrangement unregulated by Nepal’s laws—leaving their wives vulnerable to violence and exploitation. Reports from the Office of the Attorney General reveal that in the first four years after the National Criminal (Penal) Code came into force, district courts registered an average of 850 polygamy cases each year. Nepal Police data show 653 polygamy cases in 2080–81 alone, with the actual number likely far higher due to underreporting driven by family honor, lack of awareness, fear and social stigma.

Given this alarming situation, the proposed amendment—if enacted—would create dangerous legal loopholes for polygamy, fueling a surge in gender-based violence, domestic abuse and sexual exploitation beyond anything Nepal has yet faced. The government cannot claim ignorance of these consequences. Therefore, to address this, the first step must be to scrap this proposed amendment without delay. The second is to strengthen the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms to ensure that no law in Nepal undermines the rights, dignity and safety of women. The third step is to foster a transparent environment where wider and meaningful consultation takes place before any law is discussed or passed.

The author is a researcher with an interest in the intersection of media and gender

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