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In the wake of Nepal’s youth-led political shift, there is a renewed sense of hope across the country, a belief that things can be done differently, that long-standing systems can be re-examined, and that policy can begin to reflect the realities of the people it serves. For educators, this moment feels deeply personal. Between my parents and myself, we have spent close to six decades in education, shaping classrooms, preparing teachers, and building institutions. From this vantage point, of experience, responsibility, and continued investment in Nepal’s future, I often reflect on a crucial need: that the education policy we shape must be truly inclusive, adaptive, and reflective of the needs of a modern Nepali society.

A modern education policy must recognize that private schools are not merely optional institutions but an essential part of a diverse education ecosystem. Free education, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is vital, but so too is the right of communities to access schools that meet the specific needs of their children. These principles are not mutually exclusive. Private schools fill gaps, whether through higher accountability, specialized programs, or approaches that prioritize skills alongside academics. In a diverse society, no single system can serve every child and family equally; providing choice ensures that students have access to environments where they can meaningfully learn and grow.

The policy must also actively encourage international collaboration. Thousands of Nepali students leave the country each year in search of better educational opportunities. This is not only a reflection of aspiration, but also of gaps within our own system. An education policy that allows schools to engage with global resources, pedagogical practices, and academic collaborations creates the possibility of strengthening learning at home. Affiliations, teacher training, access to international content, and the ability to bring in expertise from outside Nepal are not departures from national identity. Rather, they are ways of ensuring that Nepali students are not learning in isolation and remain connected to the advancements shaping education globally. A more open system allows schools to evolve, innovate, and remain relevant and dynamic in a rapidly changing world.

One of the reflections of how inclusion is understood in policy lies in the way language is treated within the curriculum. Nepal’s classrooms are far more diverse than policy often acknowledges. This diversity is not only diverse in terms of returning students or international learners, but also across communities within Nepal whose mother tongue is not Nepali. When proficiency in Nepali language and literature is assumed, and when subjects like Social Studies are taught exclusively in Nepali, the medium itself can become a barrier to learning.

Creating flexibility within this structure, whether through alternative Nepali language learner tracks in 

place of standard language and literature, or more accessible approaches to teaching Social Studies in the language of comfort, allows students to engage with content more meaningfully. This adjustment would not only support Nepali returnees but also ensure that students from diverse linguistic communities within Nepal are not disadvantaged by a one-size-fits-all requirement. At the same time, it creates space for all learners to connect with Nepali language and culture in ways that are accessible and relevant. Inclusion, in this sense, is not about lowering standards, but about ensuring that language enables learning rather than limits it.

Diversity within the teaching community is equally essential. The ability to bring in educators from different backgrounds, including international faculty, strengthens cross-cultural understanding, enriches pedagogical practice, and exposes students to multiple perspectives. These are not peripheral advantages; they are central to preparing students for a global and interconnected world. Yet, practical barriers such as restrictive hiring processes, visa restrictions, and high costs often make this difficult. Addressing these constraints would allow schools to build more dynamic, globally relevant learning environments, aligned with broader national aspirations of openness, collaboration, and growth.

At the same time, inclusion must extend to students whose needs fall outside conventional systems. 

As I explored in my 2025 op-ed titled ‘The Invisible Student’, every child has the right to education and the ability to move through it with dignity. Flexible pathways, curriculum modifications, accommodations, and alternative forms of certification are not exceptions; they are essential to ensuring that education serves every learner it is meant to reach. Only then can the principles of human dignity and equity, central to any modern education policy, be truly upheld.

If Nepal is to foster collaboration, innovation, and growth, its education system must be open enough to evolve and responsive enough to reflect the realities of its learners. This includes students across geographies, languages, abilities, and aspirations. Schools that are able to respond to this diversity are better positioned to nurture not just academic success, but confidence, adaptability, and a sense of belonging.

Such an approach also carries implications beyond the classroom. When students feel that the system reflects their realities and aspirations, the impulse to look outward for opportunity begins to shift. Retention of talent, meaningful engagement with the Nepali diaspora, and the ability to attract learners from beyond our borders all emerge more organically from a system that is innovative, relevant, and inclusive at its core.

The opportunity before this government is significant. An education policy that is open, equitable, and future-ready has the potential to shape not just institutions, but the direction of the country itself. If done well, it can create a system that retains talent, and positions the country as a hub for learning in the region.

The election of March 5 stands as a transformative milestone in Nepal’s democratic evolution, effectively dismantling the long-standing narrative that the Constitution of Nepal 2015 created insurmountable structural barriers to a single-party mandate. For years, the prevailing wisdom among political analysts suggested that the country’s mixed electoral framework, with its heavy emphasis on proportional representation, rendered a decisive majority nearly impossible for any nascent political force. 

However, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) defied these theoretical constraints by securing an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats and over 5m proportional votes. This massive electoral ‘signature’ served as a powerful public referendum on the leadership of Rabi Lamichhane, functioning as a popular exoneration while he remained in legal custody facing allegations of cooperative finance fraud. This outcome suggests that a significant portion of the electorate viewed these judicial proceedings as politically motivated rather than purely legal, signaling a profound shift in the national psyche toward a collective aspiration for prosperity that transcends traditional partisan arithmetic.

By positioning itself as a disruptor of systemic corruption and administrative lethargy, the RSP has demonstrated that a platform centered on institutional integrity can overcome the perceived limitations of a fragmented multiparty system. Yet, this victory brings with it a complex set of challenges, particularly regarding the intersection of judicial process and political will. 

While the RSP successfully harnessed public frustration to secure power, it must now perform the difficult task of translating populist momentum into stable, rule-of-law-based governance. To satisfy the expectations of a diverse citizenry without further polarizing the nation’s legal and political institutions, the party must convert its immense political capital into a coherent and functional fiscal pathway. The mandate is rooted in a fundamental public trust that the RSP can modernize the economy and restore ethical purity to state institutions; a goal that necessitates a radical departure from a status quo-ist fiscal policy.

A central pillar of this reform agenda involves a comprehensive overhaul of Nepal’s Public Financial Management (PFM) to address deep-seated structural imbalances that have long stunted national economic development and growth. According to data from the Nepal Rastra Bank, the national GDP at current prices has reached Rs 6,107.2bn, but the composition of this figure reveals a concerning reality: the service sector dominates at 62.01 percent, while agriculture and industry contribute a mere 25.16 percent and 12.82 percent, respectively. 

This heavy reliance on services has failed to generate sufficient high-quality employment or significant value-added economic growth, placing immense pressure on the incoming RSP government to pivot toward aggressive industrial expansion. Strengthening the industrial sector is not merely a fiscal preference but a structural necessity for fostering meaningful job creation, setting up an export-oriented economy and achieving long-term, sustainable economic stability.

The existing national revenue architecture, though diverse, remains increasingly strained by its reliance on a complex but inefficient portfolio of instruments, including income taxes, VAT, and specialized levies for health and education. Even as the Inland Revenue Department reports a steady upward trajectory in total revenue from Rs 429.3bn in 2020-21 to Rs 583.82bn in 2024-25, these nominal gains mask significant underlying vulnerabilities. 

Most especially, the Department of Customs highlights a precarious imbalance where import-related revenue reached Rs 478bn in the latest fiscal year, dwarfing export-related revenue of only Rs 277bn. This datapoint underscores a disproportionate and risky dependence on trade-based public revenue, which leaves the national budget highly susceptible to global market fluctuations and external shocks.

Despite rising revenue figures, the Ministry of Finance continues to face formidable challenges in meeting its fiscal targets due to systemic weaknesses within its primary institutions. These institutional bottlenecks include a chronic deficit of skilled human capital, substandard technological infrastructure, and the persistent threat of moral hazard within the PFM administration. Such vulnerabilities ensure that the modernization of PFM entities remains a critical but largely unfulfilled mandate. 

Without addressing these fundamental administrative flaws and diversifying the tax base away from volatile import duties, the government will likely continue to struggle with fiscal shortfalls. Consequently, the RSP must lead a comprehensive PFM reform that simplifies tax structures while broadening the base across all levels of the federal polity, ensuring that the modernization of PFM entities move from a theoretical goal to an operational reality.

Furthermore, a decade into the federal transition, the promise of genuine fiscal federalism remains in a state of perilous limbo. At the subnational government level, revenue mobilization is severely hampered by operational hurdles and an inefficient bureaucracy that prevents provincial and local governments from exercising their constitutional fiscal autonomy. Revitalizing subnational governance is a vital priority and without enhancing the efficacy of the subnational polity, the federal system can neither collect nor strategically mobilize the resources required to address the urgent needs of its citizenry. 

Establishing transparency in budgeting, auditing, and fiscal reporting is essential to fostering public trust and enhancing the scientific application of federal transfers. Additionally, the government must adopt strategic debt management, strictly limiting sovereign borrowing to productive, high-yield investments to close the financing gap for high-priority projects without jeopardizing long-term solvency.

The budget (for the fiscal year 2026-27) of the RSP must also prioritize inclusive microeconomic integration to uplift rural and marginalized communities who have placed their faith in the RSP. The objective is to move beyond mere subsistence, fostering an environment where marginalized populations are integrated into national economic value chains by stimulating local entrepreneurship and increasing productive capacity. This requires a dual-track approach to youth engagement and industrialization that balances short-term job creation with long-term structural transformation. Rather than maintaining a narrow focus on traditional microfinance, which often leads to high-interest debt cycles without capital growth, the budget should emphasize comprehensive rural finance programs designed to facilitate capital formation and technical scaling. 

By providing affordable, long-term credit and strengthening SME financing policies, the RSP can ensure that capital is directed toward productive investments rather than just consumption, making the youth stakeholders in a decentralized, inclusive economy.

To catalyze this broader transformation, the RSP must prioritize a strategic pivot toward energy and infrastructure, investing in new generation projects to lower electricity costs and modernizing the grid to support industrial demand. Rather than exporting raw energy at a discount, the goal must be the cultivation of an energy-intensive domestic economy at every river basin level supported by robust logistics hubs. Parallel to this, the ICT sector offers immense potential for economic diversification. By spearheading a digital economy initiative and providing tax incentives for startups, the state can leverage domestic energy to fuel technology services. A national digital training program for youth, coupled with the full digitization of government business, would absorb the trained labor force and reduce administrative costs, mirroring successful models of youth mobilization seen in advanced economies.

Ultimately, the RSP’s success will be measured by its ability to drive agrarian transformation and industrial revitalization. The budget must emphasize ‘smart farming’, integrated agro-processing, and robust rural infrastructure to minimize post-harvest losses. Simultaneously, the strategic revival of distressed or ‘sick’ industries such as jute, rubber, paper, and textiles; offers a ‘triple benefit’ of employment generation, import substitution, and enhanced national competitiveness. 

By modernizing social services through digital classrooms and Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) curricula, the RSP can ensure long-term human development and capability lead to function. Shifting national priorities away from a reliance on remittances and toward high-growth sectors like tourism and sustainable farming will build a truly inclusive macroeconomic framework. These reforms serve as a tangible reward for the mandate granted by the citizenry, translating the political support for leaders like Rabi Lamichhane and Balendra Shah into a resilient, self-sufficient national economy that finally fulfills the public trust. 

There could hardly be a more compelling time to write and reflect on the world order, as nations remain deeply engaged in an ongoing contest of power and influence. Writing this feels more of a relatable environment of world order rather than a distant view and it also shapes the way we comprehend our own outlook of the world and human nature. If there’s one thing that’s unchanging attributes of humans, it’s their consciousness for power that drives them restless and impulsive. For power takes the shape of their desires, molding ambitions, igniting conflicts and competitions. This isn’t the end here, as it rather scales up in a larger frame from individuals to states; and then the urge to gain power grows as a continuum; it manifests. Regardless of whether one believes it or not, there’s a significant reality difference between being in actual power to being in proximity to that power.

In light of this idea comes Jo Inge Bekkevold’s article “No, the World Is Not Multipolar” that provides a striking rebuttal and yet convincing critique to the increasingly popular narrative to one of the widely spread beliefs that the International system is an emerging multipolar. The term ‘multipolar’ has been repeatedly invoked in academic debates, by diplomats, policy analysts and media commentators. Global leaders like Antonio Guterres, Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron, Lula da Silva, and Vladimir Putin present multipolarity as an imminent reality every now and then. Bakkevild argues that the narrative rests falsely on the concept of what an actual multipolarity is all about. In response, Bekkevold presents a carefully assembled series of empirical evidence that unfolds how great-power capabilities are distributed clarifying, what truly constitutes the great-power standing

Bekkevold’s idea of multipolar means having at least three state variables as an imperative element such as enough military capacity, economic weight and global influence to shape international outcomes. In this scenario, according to him, only two countries at present fulfills this criteria: The United States and China. At its baseline, this essay roots with Neorealism theory where the diffusion of power is prominently present. Reviewing the commonly contested countries such as Russia, Brazil and India, he claims that each one of them does not meet the criteria. India, for instance, has been an emerging power in the last few years but possesses only a fraction of its economic budget in comparison to China’s economic budget. Similarly, the European Union too, cannot function as a single unified pole because other European countries have very different national interests and their own approaches to foreign policy. 

Japan and Germany might be wealthy but they still lack the global reach. Russia has nuclear weapons but its economy too, falls short. In that sense, the conclusion he draws in true sense, is that none of these countries can become as close as the United States and China are. His explanations are backed by concrete measurable data as he refers to SIPRI defense statistics, IMF GDP rankings, and naval deployment figures. These data gives an empirical weight to his argument which is based on political aspiration rather than a structural set of realities. The fact that the United States and China together account for half of global military expenditure, and that China’s GDP counters the combined economies of countries in the world marks a significant scale of unmatched domination.

The most interesting part of the essay is when he mentions three reasons that challenge the popular beliefs of the multipolar world. The first reason being the idea of multipolarity as widely accepted because it is a normative concept which invites a fair international system where the fear of one power gaining momentum and outweighing the other do not exist. The second reason being, that the sense of multipolarity serves as a way of intellectual avoidance as it hints on the intention of such people who want to avoid the new form of Cold war. The third reason is that these things used in common, so as not to leave out the space for the USA to place their leverage. 

Part of why these reasons come out is from the influence of political desire rather than an empirical reality. In such a scenario, the author’s explanation showcases a gap between people’s perspective and the functioning of the world order. While the author claims the fact confidently, he bases it around the idea of failed global power distribution and making policies rests around it, which can create serious strategic mistakes. The author’s key point to be noted is around how countries’ failed attempts to understand multipolarity in real sense leads to failed strategic mistakes. 

Strategic systems motivate policymaking and when policies are made according to multipolarity, and it leads to policy failures. For instance, his example of Macron claiming Europe as a “third superpower” demonstrates how simple rhetoric confuses allies and creates unrealistic expectations, including Beijing. Similarly, investors who misread the global system risk making costly strategic errors. 

In that sense, the author’s perspective fits perfectly with a neo-realistic theory offering explanations about material power like military strength and economic size where every other 4 country goes competitive to gain power. And nowhere does the author mention explicitly about soft power which makes it even more clearer as to the significance of struggle for power gain. The treatment of global power therefore, is relatively static, however the arguments put forward are persuasive enough to improvise the misled narratives. Illustrating the position of the USA and China and the world as a Bipolarity, the author’s motivation holds truth about struggle for power. 

The analysis in a nutshell, mirrors the persistent enduring human impulse for power as highlighted earlier, where proximity to power dictates false perceptions, false narratives and false strategic led behavior. Therefore, whether or not the world order is multipolar or bipolar becomes secondary when the desire for power becomes a full fledged influencing factor in the International System. So, in arguing that the world is bipolar is Author’s own conformity that power gravitates towards the strongest–that today’s world order is constantly shaped not by aspirational rhetoric alone but by the hard realities of material capabilities, demanding strategic clarity rather than comforting imaginations.

Chaite Dashain is celebrated every year on Chaitra Shukla Ashtami, the eighth day of the bright fortnight in the month of Chaitra. The Navratri that falls in this month is commonly known as Chaite Dashain. The festival is observed on Ashtami because that day is traditionally dedicated to the sacrifice of animals to Lord Bhagwati, drawing large crowds of devotees to her temples.

Chaite Dashain is, in essence, a smaller form of Bada Dashain, which is celebrated in the month of Asoj/Kartik. According to legend, Bada Dashain was originally celebrated in Chaitra, but due to the dry weather and drought typical of that month, it was shifted to Asoj/Kartik. Chaite Dashain has since continued to be observed in Chaitra in its place.

Since Chaite Dashain is primarily a festival of non-Newars, the Newars of Dolakha do not celebrate it in a significant way. People from outside Dolakha town, however, celebrate it with great enthusiasm, and so it is largely outside devotees, rather than locals, who come to worship Lord Bhimeshwar during this period. Although it shares the name ‘Dashain’, there is no custom in Dolakha of marking the occasion with feasts or special meals as there is during Bada Dashain. As a child, I was always puzzled: it’s called Dashain, so why don’t parents buy meat or prepare a feast? At the Bhimeshwar shrine, however, a large crowd of non-Dolakhali devotees would gather to worship and offer animal sacrifices. This brought a lively and entertaining fair to Dolakha town. Beyond Dolakha, I also witnessed a grand Chaite Dashain fair in Baglung Bazaar in the west, in 2031 BS.

In 2021 BS, the Cottage Industry Office in Dolakha had set up product stalls around the pond in the lower tole. Around that time (2020/21 BS) Dolakha would see a large influx of devotees coming to worship Bhimeshwar and sacrifice buffaloes, goats, ducks, roosters, and sheep at the fair. Pilgrims came especially from Bhojpur, Okhaldhunga, Khotang, Sindhuli, Ramechhap, and Sindhupalchowk districts, filling the homes of Dolakha town. Those who had no guests arriving for Bhakal puja felt somewhat left out, and so some residents would wait at the town's entrance and invite travelers in. Since our father had worked in Khotang and Okhaldhunga, our home always received guests during Chaite Dashain without fail. Brahmin and Chhetri devotees who sacrificed buffaloes would not eat the meat themselves, and since there were no means to transport it home, they would leave it all with their hosts.

Some devotees stayed with old acquaintances, while others requested lodging from local families. The houses in the upper tole, closest to the Bhimeshwar temple and the main market, were especially full of pilgrims. There was much to enjoy. Through the night, the Bahun/Chhetri community sang Juhari songs in the market area, while Tamang people sang Juhari in their own language. The whole city of Dolakha reverberated with singing until dawn. Juhari is a form of competitive singing between groups of boys and girls. One of its more intriguing rules: if a boy wins the Juhari contest against a girl, he may take her home as his bride.

Though Chaite Dashain is not celebrated at a community-wide level in Dolakha, the Guthiyars do observe it in a simple, traditional way through the Guthi system. As in Bada Dashain, Phulpati is carried from Rajkuleshwar to the Bhimeshwar Temple on the day of Maha Ashtami. Sacrifices are offered and Durga Puja is performed. There is a tradition of sacrificing buffaloes at both the Bhimeshwar Temple and Tripurasundari. The rituals begin at the Ganesh temple, where the Guthiyars perform the invocation puja according to traditional custom. Afterward, the group proceeds to Rajkuleshwar and then to the Bhimeshwar temple with all the puja materials, before returning to Rajkuleshwar. As with Bada Dashain, Chaite Dashain puja is performed in rotation by four Guthiyars of Dolakha each year.

The day of Navami is Ram Navami, the birth anniversary of Lord Rama, on which animal slaughter is forbidden. In keeping with this tradition, worship continues at the Bhimeshwar temple on that day, but without sacrifice. According to scripture, Lord Ramachandra of the Treta Yuga was born on the ninth day of the bright fortnight, and so Navami is observed in his honor. In Dolakha, devotees fast on this day and light lamps at the Bhimeshwar temple in the evening.