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Nepal government, acting through the Department of Foreign Employment in the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, has decided to resume the issuance of labor approval for several major destination countries within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other West Asian states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman.

In terms of Human Resource Management (HRM) and international labor migration dynamics, this represents an important restoration of the international labor pipeline between Nepal, as a labor-exporting nation, and the GCC, as a labor-importing region. This decision signifies a resumption of normalcy in the overseas labor recruitment process.

The suspension of labor permits disrupted not only the labor migration process to other countries but also the overall ecosystem of foreign employment services. The pause in the issuance of such documents stopped the chain of recruitment processes, from verifying the demand, recruiting the candidates, selecting suitable individuals, sending them to host countries, and processing onboarding in their countries.

This disruption has had two-fold consequences for employment:

• Internationally speaking, many Nepalis looking forward to becoming migrant labor have been deprived of their chances, and thus the opportunity to improve their income status.
• Domestically speaking, the suspension of issuing such documents has practically paralysed the business operations of the country’s recruitment agencies. There are over 1,000 recruitment agencies functioning as intermediaries for international labor hiring; hence, such measures affected their business activities and incomes. This meant that the people working for these organisations (such as HR specialists and others) could not perform their regular duties.

As such, the suspension not only affected foreign employment but also caused a reduction in domestic employment associated with the migration industry, thereby demonstrating its multiplier effect on Nepal’s labor force.

The approval of labor flows will enable Nepal to resume its place in the global workforce supply chain. From the perspective of Nepali nationals, this means an ability to gain entry into the global market and benefit from regulated international employment, especially in labor-intensive industries like construction, hospitality, manufacturing, facilities management, and domestic service.

On the part of the host economy, the availability of manpower will enable the employer in GCC to plan his operations according to manpower needs and production schedules, which will help in avoiding labor shortage and maintaining efficiency in business operations.

As far as Human Resource Management is concerned, this step would ensure a balance between supply and demand for labor in Nepal and GCC economies.

Foreign employment is an important aspect of Nepal’s macroeconomic policy regime. Remittances are a major component of the nation’s GDP and are one of the largest sources of foreign currency earnings. The suspension of the system created disruptions in the economic cycle, since migration and remittances have been delayed. This had impacts at the household level in terms of lowering disposable incomes, restricting consumption, and increasing the level of economic vulnerability for families residing in rural and remittance-oriented areas.

Now that the labor permits have resumed, the remittance flow should start returning to normal levels, thus stabilising household incomes and fostering domestic consumption. Furthermore, the resumption of activities of the recruitment agencies creates economic activity through various commissions and taxes as well as job creation.

With regard to the resumption of mobility, there is a need for governance of the overseas recruitment process. A regulated system of migration is needed to address the issue of unregulated recruitment that poses threats such as overpricing, contract switching, and informal recruitment.

Since recruitment agencies are key intermediaries in human resource management, there is a need to observe ethical standards such as transparency in pricing, employment contracts, and bilateral labor agreements. There is also a need to strengthen pre-departure orientation and skills assessment programs.

Nepal’s GCC economies have always relied on expatriate workers to ensure development and economic diversification. Nepali nationals, with their flexibility and dedication, continue to be a popular choice in various industries. With the relaxation of the ban, GCC-based companies can again have access to a steady supply of talent, allowing them to fulfil their manpower needs with ease. This move will further strengthen the established labor ties between Nepal and GCC economies.

Role of institutions and coordination among stakeholders

The activation of the sector of foreign employment involves the following:

• The government institutions should work toward providing stability, efficiency, and supervision of policies.
• The recruitment agencies should be responsible for their actions, ensuring professionalism and financial soundness.
• The training institutions should focus their programs on meeting international labor market needs.
• The employers in the destination countries should respect workers’ rights and provide a safe working environment.
• Coordination among the above stakeholders will help in developing a strong migration regime.

Toward a sustainable and skill-based approach for migration

In addition, there is another positive move toward shifting away from a quantitative approach to migration toward a more sustainable skill-based approach to migration. This will enable Nepali workers to develop their skills through technical and language learning programs in order to improve their competitiveness at work. From an HRM standpoint, it is important to note that this strategy reflects the changing world trend in which talent mobility becomes a priority. The cancellation of the suspension on labor permits is a fresh start for the international recruitment sector in Nepal. It restores the functioning of the international recruitment market, opens up opportunities for migrant workers and recruitment firms who had their activities hampered due to the suspension.

Most significantly, this policy decision recognises that foreign employment is not a standalone activity but a complete economic system involving the workers, their family members, recruitment agencies, and employers globally. The previous suspension had affected various components of the economic system involving labor migration and employment in the recruitment industry. It is essential to pay attention to the improvement of the management, increase ethical recruitment policies, and train Nepali workers to be more successful in the foreign job market. Taking an all-round perspective will allow Nepal to optimise the benefits associated with migration and support its population. Overall, this policy decision marks a new chapter in foreign labor migration and the operation of the Nepali recruitment industry.

Have the people of South Asia ever been asked about their feelings on regional cooperation and integration? Every time the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS), one of the most prominent Asian think tanks focused on international relations, releases its annual State of Southeast Asia Survey Report—the latest edition of which was issued just weeks ago—this is the question I inevitably find myself asking.

As a European who strongly believes in the process of regional integration as demonstrated by the EU, I cannot stop thinking about how much better off South Asia as a whole would be if a stronger regional integration process existed. The fact that India and Pakistan do not get along, and the persistent state of tension between the two nations, has long been seen as a structural impediment to deeper regional cooperation. 

Realistically speaking, it is undeniable that the nature of this semi-permanent hostility between Islamabad and New Delhi is genuinely problematic for fostering what remains an unfinished and very incomplete process of bringing the nations of South Asia and their people closer together.

Yet at the same time, it has also become something of a convenient excuse to stop thinking about regional cooperation altogether.

Acknowledging the improbability of a political reset—one that might resuscitate the near-moribund South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—should not foreclose a pan-South Asian conversation about it.

The interests of the people of the region, especially its youth, may at this moment be overtaken by more pressing daily concerns such as the fight against corruption or the pursuit of a more equitable economy. But they could, once again, become galvanized around the tangible gains of a stronger, more united South Asia. The current impasse, caused by the fraught India-Pakistan relationship, should not be a barrier to imagining what deeper cooperation—and perhaps, one day, even integration—might look like across the region.

So is there anything the current chair of SAARC—which, owing to the dysfunction of the regional cooperation process, remains Nepal—could do? It is true that the Balen Shah administration is wholly focused on internal reforms. But from a practical standpoint, not merely a symbolic one, Kathmandu could and should invest in reactivating a conversation about a more cooperative and potentially more united South Asia.

At this juncture, symbolism matters enormously, and this is where Shishir Khanal, Nepal’s new Foreign Affairs Minister, could make his mark. Imagine the following scenario. It is early morning, and preparations at the central campus of Tribhuvan University are underway to host the inaugural Future of South Asia Lecture, organized by the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy (DIRD). The keynote speaker is not the Secretary General of SAARC but Minister Khanal himself, who uses the occasion to lay out the government’s vision for reactivating the regional cooperation process.

Rather than confining the discussion to SAARC, it might make more sense to think beyond traditional frameworks and focus on what could be achieved if the nations of the region worked more—and more effectively—together.

To be clear: I am a supporter of SAARC. I am, in fact, more enthusiastic about a holistic regional process than about placing too much weight on minilateral mechanisms among select member states. Trilateral arrangements such as those between India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, or quadrilateral initiatives like the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) framework to boost sub-regional transportation, are practical and worthwhile. But can these formats truly substitute for the more structural, overarching, and ambitious process that encompasses all SAARC nations?

There is considerable evidence that when nations work together, their economies grow substantially—and the benefits extend well beyond trade to encompass the many dimensions of cooperation that deepen people-to-people ties.

Yet reactivating the public imagination around regional cooperation solely through the lens of SAARC may not be effective, given the objections many would raise—chief among them, the lack of political will in New Delhi to even utter the word ‘SAARC’.

Focusing on the vision rather than the vehicle to achieve it can be a smart way to navigate, for now, what is perceived in New Delhi as a taboo subject. Minister Khanal could use his address to articulate a long-term dream for the region—one in which people’s mobility is greatly enhanced, doing business across South Asian borders is seamless, and a new generation of young people can participate in a pan-regional student exchange program.

In the second part of his speech, Minister Khanal could sketch out practical confidence-building measures to restart the dialogue on regional cooperation. As I have argued before, Nepal could convene a regional summit outside the purview of SAARC, inviting all South Asian leaders to Kathmandu for a frank conversation on concrete ways to work together. Even if India or Pakistan declined, others might still attend.

This requires audacity, but that is precisely why Prime Minister Shah chose to seek national office.

In this imagined lecture, Minister Khanal could announce that Kathmandu will prioritize both a national and a regional conversation on cooperation—branded as the “Nepal for South Asia” Initiative: the most ambitious foreign affairs undertaking Kathmandu has ever conceived.

Beyond the bold announcement of a regional summit, the initiative could encompass a range of complementary activities: an annual South Asia Essay Competition for students; a fellowship program for young scholars from across the region to spend a year in Kathmandu, hosted by local think tanks, working on South Asian issues; a master's and PhD program in South Asian Studies run by DIRD; a People-to-People South Asian Summit bringing together civil society voices from across the region; and, perhaps most significantly, the first-ever State of South Asia Survey Report—gauging what the people of the region actually think and feel about their shared future.

Minister Khanal should also encourage SAARC’s current leadership to do more to highlight the bloc's ongoing activities. SAARC is on life support, but it is not dead. Its institutions—regional research centers and thematic initiatives—are not entirely paralyzed, but they need support, even moral support. Reactivating a conversation about South Asia could also help build incremental trust between India and Pakistan, one step at a time.

Nepal can take the lead in restarting the project of regional cooperation. SAARC as an institution may eventually be rebooted, rebranded, or superseded by an entirely new pan-South Asian mechanism. What matters now is beginning the conversation.

The stakes are too high, the potential too vast, and the benefits of a cooperative South Asia too significant to let timidity prevail.

Will Minister Khanal and the Balen administration play bold, or will they retreat into a focus on purely national priorities? Perhaps the new government in Kathmandu should not forget that Nepal’s national interests are inextricably rooted in a prosperous and more united South Asia.

I would like to imagine the closing words of Minister Khanal’s address: “Nepal can pursue its national goals of prosperity, inclusivity, and wellbeing by freeing our politics from corruption and bringing people closer to decision-making through a new compact of good governance. Yet our future—our destiny—is also inextricably tied to our sisters and brothers across South Asia. Engaging our regional partners is not only an economic imperative. It is a moral duty to build a stronger, more connected, and more united South Asia.”

In a historic election, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has decimated the established and traditional parties in the country, including the Nepali Congress (NC) led by Gagan Thapa and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) led by former prime minister KP Sharma Oli. The landslide victory is significant because it is the first time any party has achieved a majority since the enactment of the 2015 constitution. This represents a major change in Nepali politics, as the country has not experienced a stable government in the past two decades. No government in Nepal has completed a full five-year term. 

For the first time, Nepal may witness a majority government with a full term. The Nepal election for 275 parliamentary seats is a mix of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems, which makes it more difficult to form a stable majority government, especially when thousands of candidates are in the fray. However, the RSP’s historic win is set to change that perception.

RSP’s victory: The fall of the old guard

The RSP had a meteoric rise after the popular former Kathmandu mayor Balendra (Balen) Shah became its prime ministerial candidate. However, the rise of Balen Shah and RSP is owed to the traditional politics of old leaders, most of whom served their interests. The March election became necessary after the GenZ protests toppled the government in September last year. These protests were a result of years of corruption, misgovernance, unemployment and instability in the country. 

However, the social media ban by the government acted as an immediate trigger for the protests, which were fuelled by widespread discontent among the youth regarding the government’s failure to address their concerns. The uprising was so intense that over 70 people lost their lives, and infrastructure worth Rs 84.45bn was damaged. Later, the uprising came to symbolize the clash between the old generation and the new.

The RSP promises a new and a better future for the Nepali people. It promises expansion of the economy to $100bn, per capita income of around $3000, creation of 1.2m jobs, a growth rate of seven percent, and universal healthcare insurance in five years. These are ambitious targets for a landlocked country like Nepal. Though promises like these are great for attracting the attention of voters, it remains to be seen how the RSP plans to deliver once it forms the government.

Analysts say the RSP is experiencing a groundswell, particularly because Nepali politics offers few alternatives due to repeated failures after each election, which makes the emergence of new parties like the RSP and candidates like Balen particularly significant in providing fresh perspectives and potential solutions to longstanding issues. Expectations are high that the emergence of a new legitimate government in Nepal will instill some stability in the country.

However, the stability of Nepal will depend on how well the new government implements the reforms without alienating the general people. This entails addressing the needs and concerns of various communities and promoting inclusive participation in the political process, which includes actively engaging with marginalized groups and fostering dialogue to build trust and cooperation among different sectors of society. Inclusive government is the key to a stable government. The new government will need to tackle the problems of corruption and unemployment (currently above 20 percent) and work toward effective governance.

Though the rise of RSP and Balen Shah is interlinked with the GenZ revolution and their demands for accountability in governance, there is no clear roadmap yet for how the RSP will fulfil the demands of GenZ raised in the 10-point agreement. The agreement itself was marred with controversy because not everyone supported it, and there may be significant opposition from various political factions and civil society groups that question its validity. 

Moreover, the legitimacy of the interim government and its authority to sign the agreement may come under scrutiny. There could be significant pressure on the RSP, considering it rode to the election victory on the back of the GenZ movement.

Commanding a majority government has its pitfalls. Since the March election has provided an extraordinary mandate to the RSP, the opposition does not have enough numbers to restrain or hold the new government accountable. Moreover, the latest election was fought more on individual popularity than the party ideology, which raises the possibility of high-handedness by Balen Shah, whose celebrity more or less carried the election for the RSP.

Balen has no clear political ideology or affiliations, and he joined the RSP recently. He has some administrative experience as mayor, but he got criticism for driving out vendors by using strong police tactics in Kathmandu. During his tenure, he used bulldozers to demolish illegal structures and also stopped collecting garbage from Singha Durbar to enforce cleanliness in the city of Kathmandu. Though the mandate has made it easier for Nepal to reset its traditional fractional and unstable politics, it does not provide a magic wand to its troubles. The new government not only has to work toward the aspirations of people, especially GenZ, but it will also have to bring to justice those who engaged in mindless violence, rioting and vandalism during the September protests. 

However, after the 10-point agreement legitimized the GenZ protests, it raised questions about how proactively the government would prosecute those who perpetrated the arson and violence. There are also chances of retribution against officials who fired at unarmed protesters. The general election mandate will not only have an impact on the domestic politics but may also impact Nepal’s foreign policy and geopolitics.

Nepal’s role in South Asian geopolitics: From ‘buffer state’ to ‘vibrant bridge’

The outcome of the election could reshape Nepal’s diplomacy. It is expected that new actors in power would bring new energy and ideas to advance Nepal’s foreign policy objectives. However, the advent of new political forces in power could bring unpredictability and could be cause for concern for India and China. During the September protests, Nepal’s economy took a hit, and infrastructure worth billions was damaged, which has made it expedient for the new government to receive foreign aid and development grants from its partners. 

Therefore, the RSP government will need to chart out a workable diplomatic plan to balance its relationship with India and China.

Political stability in Nepal will foster economic development, usher in social stability, and maintain law and order, which will directly impact India’s open border. India has long been Nepal’s development partner. Recognizing this, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has welcomed the victories of RSP leaders Shah and Lamichhane. Modi spoke with them over the phone and underlined India’s willingness to work with the new government. It is expected that the RSP will not lose the balancing diplomacy of Nepal in favor of one partner over another. Its election manifesto provides some insights into its foreign policy objectives. 

In its election manifesto, RSP stated that it wants to reposition Nepal from a “buffer state” to a “vibrant bridge” between India and China. However, this is not a new objective. Earlier KP Sharma Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal had the same objective of repositioning Nepal’s role, albeit without any success.  

Moreover, the old irritants between the India-Nepal relationship are likely to continue. The RSP has consistently demanded a firm Nepali stance on Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, citing historical treaties and rejecting foreign activities without consent. Their victory, which emphasizes sovereignty and anti-corruption, could intensify pressure on India for border talks amid the RSP’s push for strategic autonomy. The nationalistic posture of Balen Shah on issues such as “Greater Nepal” could be another irritant in the relationship. 

In 2023, after India installed a mural of “Akhand Bharat” (a Greater India)—encompassing many of its neighbors—Shah hung a “Greater Nepal” map in his office, including territories that once belonged to Nepal but now lie within India’s borders. His supporters hailed the move as an assertive counter to foreign dominance. 

However, as a prime minister, he will need to be more flexible while dealing with a bigger power. The confrontationist attitude might do more harm than good, as it could jeopardize crucial trade agreements and diplomatic relations that are essential for Nepal's development. Since Nepal needs India for its development and trade, the RSP government will need to reach an understanding with India without compromising Nepal’s sovereignty.

At the same time, it is hoped that the incoming government will prioritize Nepal’s relationship with India, as it remains a major source of Nepal’s imports and facilitates Nepal’s exports to other countries through its ports, airports and waterways. Unlike the 2015 blockade that raised the price of energy in Nepal, India has already built a petroleum pipeline that will provide an uninterrupted supply to its neighbors. Amid uncertainty in the oil market, India would remain the main supplier with an agreement to supply 1,000 metric tonnes of LNG in the next five years. 

Nepal-India ties will not be limited to the ‘Roti-Beti’ relationship but will be multidimensional, encompassing trade, transit, energy and investment, which will generate jobs for Nepalis. India contributes one-third of Nepal’s investment, and a stable policy would boost investor confidence. Issues like the unresolved border issue would be a major challenge, as the pressure to resolve the dispute would be high.

Unlike India, Nepal’s relationship with its northern neighbor, China, faces distinctive challenges directly linked to the recent GenZ uprising. The corruption issues surrounding Pokhara International Airport could create minor disturbances in Nepal-China relations, especially since GenZ protested against rampant corruption in the country, making this a sensitive issue for any government. 

The perception of the RSP government shielding corrupt officials raises concerns about transparency and accountability in governance. This might also bring scrutiny to other Chinese projects and the rising debt for not going ahead with the stalled projects, as Nepal needs investment to create more jobs. Balen Shah removed a Chinese infrastructure project, Damak Industrial Park in Jhapa, which was closer to India’s Siliguri corridor, from the manifesto—a cautious move, one could say, due to corruption issues and India’s concerns. China’s interest in Nepal is also shaped by concerns over Tibetan activism, Western security penetration, and Indian influence. It remains to be seen how the RSP will address these concerns.

Nonetheless, China is an important development partner of Nepal. Earlier, It  had exhibited its interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower sector, even though it had to withdraw from the West Seti Hydropower Project due to cost escalations. 

While political turnover in Kathmandu may alter individual relationships, Beijing’s diversified channels allow it to adapt. Therefore, this does not necessarily weaken China’s influence on Nepal’s politics—it redistributes it.

Recently, the United States has emerged as another major player in Nepal. Nepal has again become strategically sensitive for Washington, DC, as the US has committed nearly $550m to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for spending on a power transmission network and highway projects. The US views Nepal through the lens of democratic resilience and Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

US officials have emphasized electoral integrity and institutional support while warning against predatory financing models that compromise sovereignty. The MCC commitment signals sustained US engagement even amid competing global priorities. The US offers Nepal a partnership model that reinforces rather than constrains its autonomy, giving Nepal the opportunity to continue diversifying its external partnerships. However, India and China would not want the presence of the US in Nepal. 

China has already raised concerns over the MCC funding. The RSP government in Nepal would need to do careful balancing so as not to irk its neighbors, yet it would receive meaningful aid from the US. China views the US’s investment in the MCC Project, which funds connectivity and energy projects, as a challenge to China’s BRI.

Thus, the Balen Shah-led RSP government in Nepal has got the mandate to make meaningful changes and put Nepal on the development path. It also has the chance to relook at its foreign policy, seek new development partners, and strengthen its existing partnerships. However, it has to tread cautiously and balance the relations between competing powers, such as India and China, without inviting any ire from them. 

It will be a major challenge for the incoming government to balance the interests of its neighbors and ensure that Nepal’s own developmental aspirations are not caught up in geopolitics. India needs to acknowledge the political transformation in Nepal, which promises reforms through youth participation in politics. Both India and China need a fresh approach to deal with a government that represents a new political class and a leadership that represents the youth.

One year after Donald Trump assumed office for his second term as American President, his administration’s South Asia policy is beginning to take shape.

Over the past year, the Trump administration paid very little attention to the smaller countries of South Asia, as Trump was focused on preventing or stopping major wars occurring in different parts of the world. The Trump administration has recalled several ambassadors from South Asian countries, including Nepal, and has not yet appointed their replacements.

Meanwhile, the administration’s relationship with India witnessed a tumultuous phase due to tariff war. Now, the relationship between India and the United States is returning to normalcy following the settlement of trade disputes. 

This week, at least three senior American officials spoke about their approach to South Asia. S. Paul Kapur, Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. State Department, appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to outline Washington’s South Asia policy.

According to Kapur’s statement, the principal agenda of the Trump administration is to expand trade relationships with South Asian countries, as it is doing elsewhere. In his second term, Trump has employed tariffs as a tool to pressure governments to make trade more favorable to the United States.

Kapur further added: “Just last week, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi reached agreement on a historic trade framework. And two days ago, the Trump Administration signed a trade deal with Bangladesh, providing American exporters with access to Bangladesh’s market of 175 million people.” But, U.S has a very minimal trade with Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

Beyond trade, he outlined three broad approaches to strategic capacity-building that the Trump administration is deploying in South Asia: defense cooperation, targeted investment, and diplomacy.

Defense cooperation includes military sales and transfers, co-development of systems and platforms, and bilateral and multilateral exercises.  Targeted investment combines U.S. seed funding, American technology and expertise, and private industry participation.

Diplomacy involves institutionalized engagement between senior leaders, as well as ad hoc interactions to address emerging opportunities or challenges, along with strategic messaging to support U.S. initiatives.

Regarding the smaller countries of South Asia, the Trump administration’s first priority appears to be countering growing Chinese influence. Kapur said: “Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bhutan’s strategic locations afford them outsized importance, but also can make them targets for coercion.”

He added that defense cooperation with the United States helps these countries protect their borders and waterways against encroaching powers, while carefully targeted investment can provide high-quality, transparent, and non-coercive support for critical infrastructure such as ports, telecommunications networks, and energy facilities—helping them avoid the dangers of debt-trap diplomacy. This indicates that the U.S. intends to limit Chinese investment in those countries.

Similarly, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga said that strengthening ties with New Delhi through defense cooperation, trade, and technology partnerships advances shared interests.

He stated: “I look forward to increasing cooperation, co-production, and investment, especially under the new framework negotiated by the President. Bordering India, Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing political transformations.”

He noted that Bangladesh will hold free elections tomorrow following its July 2024 revolution, which ousted an authoritarian government in September 2025.

 In Nepal, youth-led protests overthrew the government, and the country will hold democratic elections next month. According to him, both instances offer new chapters for engagement in South Asia, shaping U.S. relations with these new governments.

He further added that South and Central Asia is a dynamic region, where young and growing populations are more often drawn to Western cultures and values than to China’s authoritarian alternative.

“Strategic U.S.-led diplomacy will make a difference in building alliances and achieving our mutually beneficial goals throughout the region,” he said.

“Our strategy in South Asia must be comprehensive, anchored in strong partnerships, economic engagement, and a commitment to democratic values. Our engagement in the region must advance American interests, while also contributing to a more secure, prosperous, and free Indian Ocean,” he added.

Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), has said his visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. He visited Nepal ahead of the March 5 elections to the House of Representatives (HoR), which are taking place against the backdrop of the September 8–9 Gen Z protest.

The visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. U.S.-Nepal cooperation in these areas benefits Nepali and American citizens throughout the region and supports global peacekeeping efforts, says a press statement issued by INDOPACOM after the two-day visit.