Beyond tiger and rhino: The other side of conservation

Nepal’s wildlife conservation success story is typically told through its most celebrated achievements: the remarkable recovery of the tiger population, the steadfast protection of the one-horned rhinoceros, and the country’s sustained efforts to safeguard its large mammals.

But government records tell a different, more complicated story. Data and reports from Nepal Police, Nepali Army, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC), National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC) and wildlife-related organizations and research papers reveal that wildlife crime extends far beyond these iconic species.

Pangolin, red panda, turtle, deer, bird, wild boar, monitor lizard, monkey, kalij pheasant, himalayan monal (danphe), himalayan goral, fish, gharials, and other lesser-known creatures regularly appear in seizure and crime records. Wildlife products have been recovered not only in protected areas and border districts but also in major cities and Kathmandu itself.

The threats are equally diverse, ranging from organized trafficking and deliberate poaching to opportunistic hunting, live-bird markets, accidental capture, and poisoning.

Between fiscal years 2019/20 and 2024/25, the Nepali Army recorded 14, 27, 22, 31, 44, and 26 wildlife-crime incidents respectively. The number more than tripled over five years before declining slightly in the most recent period covered.

These figures, however, cannot be read as a direct measure of the actual scale of wildlife crime. They represent cases detected and recorded by authorities, and an increase can reflect greater enforcement capacity and detection rates just as easily as it can signal rising criminal activity.

In fiscal year 2023/24, the records include the killing of a red panda in Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve, alongside hunting of frogs, kalij, and ratuwa deer. The following year, authorities recorded incidents involving frogs, turtles, danphe, jackals, musk deer, and goral, among others. The most recent data contain further cases involving chittal, wild boar, golden monitor lizard, fish, peacock, and naur.

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The pangolin: A warning sign on the illegal trade network

Among lesser-known species, the pangolin offers perhaps the strongest evidence of a continuing illegal trade. Nepal is home to both the Chinese pangolin and the Indian pangolin. The Chinese pangolin is classified as Critically Endangered by the IUCN, and all pangolins are protected under wildlife legislation and listed in CITES Appendix I. Yet pangolin products repeatedly appear in enforcement records.

Police’s five-year data contain seizures of pangolin scales and pangolins in several provinces. In Bagmati, records include 25 kilograms of pangolin scales, dead pangolins, and additional seizures of hundreds of grams and one kilogram of scales. Police records also show a much larger seizure in Koshi involving 209.199 kilograms of pangolin scales.

Protected area records tell a similar story. In fiscal year 2023/24, authorities seized 208 kilograms and 76 grams of pangolin scales at Makalu-Barun National Park. In fiscal year 2025/26, Chitwan National Park recorded the seizure of a live pangolin.

These are not isolated incidents. A 2021 study, ‘Illegal Trade in Pangolins in Nepal: Extent and Network’, which examined pangolin seizures from 2015 to 2020, recorded 56 seizures involving 154.12 kilograms of pangolin scales, along with live and dead pangolins and whole hides. The researchers estimated that at least 209 pangolins may have been killed and traded during the period. Kathmandu accounted for 29 of the 56 recorded seizures, while districts adjoining the capital and those bordering India and China emerged as critical nodes in the trade network. The research also found people from 26 districts involved in pangolin poaching, underscoring the importance of local actors at the beginning of the trafficking chain.

Conservationist Kumar Paudel, founder of Greenhood Nepal, says pangolins are now among the most frequently seized species in Nepal. But he cautions against automatically interpreting the increase in seizures as an increase in trafficking. “Either law enforcement agencies have become more aware about pangolins, resulting in an increased detection rate, or the demand in the trade itself is increasing,” he said. “So, it is not very conclusive, but what is certain is that pangolin seizure reports have been increasing in recent years.”

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Kathmandu at the center

Kathmandu repeatedly appears in wildlife-crime records. Police data include pangolin scales, red panda skins, turtles, musk deer bina, rhino horn, and other wildlife products seized within the Kathmandu Valley.

Paudel notes that districts connected to Nepal-India and Nepal-China border routes tend to record more seizures, while Kathmandu acts as a major transit and collection hub.

Tulshi Laxmi Suwal, founder of the Small Mammals Conservation and Research Foundation, says Kathmandu Valley has also appeared in records involving snow leopards, red pandas, musk deer, pangolins, and turtles.

The NTNC describes Nepal as both a source and transit country for species including tigers, rhinos, snow leopards, red pandas, and pangolins. It identifies remoteness of trading routes, limited coordination, inadequate skilled human resources, and insufficient technology as key challenges to wildlife-crime enforcement. NTNC says its wildlife-crime work includes strengthening frontline capacity among the Army, Police, Armed Police Force, customs officials, and protected area authorities, as well as supporting community-based anti-poaching units and transboundary cooperation.

Paudel says commercial pangolin trafficking is ultimately driven by external demand, while local people are often involved in capturing the animals. “Poaching is not something that outside people come and do,” he said. “Poaching happens with the help of local people, but the trade is not progressing due to the locals; it is completely driven by external demand.”

Suwal says many cases involving small mammals are opportunistic. A person may encounter an animal and kill or capture it for a small amount of money without being part of an organized trafficking network. Pangolins are particularly vulnerable during the monsoon, when water entering their burrows can force them to emerge, Suwal explained. Some people may kill them out of fear. Others may consume them. Still others may collect their scales after hearing exaggerated claims about their value.

Suwal says misinformation is an important part of the problem. People may carry even small quantities of pangolin scales toward Kathmandu because they believe the scales can fetch enormous sums of money. At the same time, many may not understand that pangolins are protected or that wildlife offences carry serious penalties.

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Red pandas: Protected on paper, vulnerable in practice

Unlike many lesser-known species, the red panda has attracted substantial research and conservation attention. Yet it continues to appear in crime records.

Police records include five red panda skins in Lumbini, four in Karnali, and five in Kathmandu Valley in 2021/22. The volume of seizures dropped sharply in 2022/23, with only one red panda skin recorded in Koshi. In the subsequent fiscal year 2023/24, the downward trend continued with just one red panda skin seized in Bagmati. In 2025, the red panda made headlines after one died from stress and trauma following an attempted theft from the Central Zoo.

WWF Nepal identifies the red panda as one of its six focal threatened species, alongside the tiger, greater one-horned rhino, elephant, pangolin, and snow leopard. WWF says red panda habitat in Nepal extends beyond protected areas and faces threats including habitat loss, fragmentation, human dependence on forest resources, roads and hydropower development, forest fires, climate-related hazards, and poaching.

Research published in 2020, ‘Landscape Variables Affecting the Himalayan Red Panda Ailurus fulgens Occupancy in Wet Season Along the Mountains in Nepal’, examined red panda occupancy across Nepal’s mountains. The study found that landscape variables influenced occupancy, and, significantly, the researchers noted that the government’s spatial data were restricted because releasing precise locations could create poaching risks.

Another study on red panda trade in Nepal, ‘What is Driving the Increased Demand for Red Panda Pelts?’, found that recent seizures suggested increased trade in pelts, while the reasons behind demand remained unclear. Researchers identified poverty-induced easy-money motives, inadequate knowledge of red-panda-related crime, and communication problems around awareness campaigns as possible factors contributing to supply.

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The live market

Bird Conservation Nepal (BCN)’s 2024 survey of wild bird trade in 49 urban centers found 41 bird species being kept for sale. Thirty-one were species found in Nepal, while 10 were imported from elsewhere. Nineteen of the species recorded were listed in CITES Appendix II.

Kiran Gosai, senior research officer at BCN, said the most frequently observed birds included budgerigars, scaly-breasted munias, tricolored munias, rose-ringed parakeets, and cockatiels. Kathmandu and Pokhara were identified as major hubs, while Birgunj, Dewangunj, Mahendranagar, and Dhangadhi were identified as collection points serving surrounding areas, including India.

The Army data show similar activity. Koshi Tappu Wildlife Reserve recorded unauthorized transportation of birds in 2021/22, while 2022/23 data showed the transportation of 135 parrots. The 2023/24 record also includes live kalij being transported from Shivapuri-Nagarjun National Park.

According to vulture expert Ankit Joshi, there is no significant pattern of deliberate vulture hunting, trafficking, or poaching in Nepal. But vultures are dying from unintentional poisoning.

Turtles present another example. Suwal says turtles can be caught accidentally while people are fishing. Rather than releasing them, some may sell them in markets. In such cases, the person handling the animal may not even know which species it is or whether it is protected.

The Army records also show the scale of the task facing protected area authorities. Hundreds of people are recorded as having been arrested in national parks, wildlife reserves and hunting reserves, in individual years.

In 2020/21, for example, Shivapuri-Nagarjun National Park recorded 1,488 people controlled, while Rara recorded 198, Banke 172, Chitwan 127, and Bardiya 105. But these figures should not be interpreted as hundreds of wildlife traffickers. They include people involved in different types of violations, including illegal collection of forest products, wildlife hunting, and transportation.

While Nepal celebrates the recovery of its iconic mammals, government and police records reveal a sprawling, diverse trade in pangolins, red pandas, birds, and other overlooked species. From Kathmandu’s transit hubs to remote mountain reserves, data shows illegal wildlife crime extends far beyond tigers and rhinos

Personnel deployed for conservation duties work in difficult terrain and weather, and face operational challenges ranging from logistics and communications to conflict with communities and dangerous wildlife. The Army data show that 120 personnel deployed in conservation duties have died, with many others injured. Shortages of accommodation, transport, communications, and medical infrastructure persist, while floods, landslides, and snow can disrupt operations. The Army notes that changing techniques and technologies used in wildlife crime create additional challenges.

The Army also identifies specific areas of concern across the protected area network. Chitwan’s identified risk areas include parts of the buffer zone and Nawalparasi. Banke’s include parts of the Chure and buffer zone. Parsa has identified risk locations in both core and surrounding areas. Shuklaphanta, Bardiya, Makalu-Barun, Sagarmatha, Koshi Tappu, and Dhorpatan also have locations identified as vulnerable to wildlife crime.

Shifting from awareness to livelihoods

The experiences of two community forests around Kathmandu provide a different picture.

Dipendra Thapa of Taudolchhap Community Forest in Suryabinayak-8, Bhaktapur, said the community has not seen pangolin hunting or trafficking. There have been some cases of kalij being hunted and sold to restaurants, he said, but pangolin-conservation programs have improved awareness and involved young people.

Sushila Ale Magar of Laglagepakha Community Forest in Chandragiri-3, Kathmandu, similarly said residents had previously lacked awareness about pangolins but are now involved in conservation and rescue efforts. She said the community has not seen pangolin hunting and trafficking cases.

Suwal argues that communities living close to wildlife need more than awareness campaigns. They need education, livelihood opportunities, and tangible benefits from conservation. “If we can do things that provide them some benefit from it,” she said, conservation efforts are more likely to reduce poaching and trade.

That approach is consistent with NTNC and WWF-like agencies’ wildlife-crime strategy, which emphasizes community engagement and support alongside institutional capacity, technology, and transboundary cooperation.

The NTNC’s 2025 annual report, for example, described community-based pangolin research in 16 community forests across Chitwan, Gorkha, and Makwanpur, noting that much pangolin habitat lies outside protected areas and therefore requires work with community forests.

Among lesser-known species, the pangolin offers perhaps the strongest evidence of a continuing illegal trade

The next phase of conservation

Nepal’s tiger and rhino successes should not be dismissed. They show that sustained investment, political commitment, scientific monitoring, law enforcement, and community participation can produce measurable conservation results.

The evidence gathered for this reporting suggests that pangolins, red pandas, birds, turtles, and other species are not absent from the conservation system. They are present in the laws. They are present in government records. They are present in research. They are present in community programs. And, increasingly, they are present in seizure records. But their threats are different. Treating all the problems as the same wildlife-crime issue would be as ineffective as ignoring them.

The question Nepal now faces is whether it can build a conservation system that is sufficiently species-specific, data-driven, and community-centered to respond to different threats. The country’s own records show that wildlife crime already extends well beyond the tiger and rhino. The challenge is to make sure conservation policy does the same. Because the true test of Nepal’s conservation success is not only whether its most famous animals survive. It is whether the animals that receive less attention can survive, too.

Trapped underground: Rs 80bn in preliminary losses, 900+ missing

Flooding in the Bhotekoshi-Trishuli river systems has caused catastrophic damage to hydropower projects in Rasuwa and Nuwakot, with the government’s preliminary assessment putting losses to the hydropower sector alone at more than Rs 80bn.

The assessment, carried out by the Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation, covers 12 hydropower projects that were either operational or under construction. It does not include damage to transmission and distribution infrastructure, for which assessment is still underway.

The flooding on Aug 26 also affected irrigation systems, solar power and alternative energy infrastructure in the two districts. The government has yet to determine the final extent of the damage.

The human toll remains equally alarming. Hundreds of workers and technical staff remain missing or out of contact after being trapped by floodwaters and debris, particularly inside underground powerhouses, headworks and access tunnels.

The Ministry’s preliminary assessment puts the number of workers, technical staff and local people missing or trapped at 983 across the affected sites. A separate update issued by the Independent Power Producers’ Association, Nepal (IPPAN), however, puts the number of people out of contact at 947 across 11 projects. The figures are preliminary and have continued to change as rescue and communication efforts progress.

Of the 12 projects, eight were operational, with a combined capacity of 281 MW, while four projects with a combined capacity of 388 MW were under construction. Together, the projects represent 669 MW of installed or planned capacity.

The immediate challenge for the hydropower sector is not only the physical destruction of infrastructure but also the ongoing rescue operation. Many of the affected facilities are located in steep mountain terrain and rely on underground tunnels and powerhouses. Floodwaters have filled these structures with mud, rocks and debris, while continuing rainfall and swollen rivers have made it difficult for rescue teams and heavy machinery to reach them.

Rasuwa bears the brunt

Rasuwa has suffered the heaviest impact, with six major hydropower facilities affected, including some of the country’s largest projects.

The affected projects in the district have a combined capacity of 494 MW, according to the preliminary assessment. They include Upper Trishuli-1, Rasuwagadhi, Rasuwa-Bhotekoshi, Langtang Khola, Chilime and Mailung Khola.

The 216-MW Upper Trishuli-1, which is under construction, has recorded the largest number of people missing. According to IPPAN, 557 people associated with the project remain missing or out of contact. The project had 1,433 people at the site, of whom 876 have been rescued. Around 115 people are suspected to be trapped in the headworks and main tunnel. Those reported out of contact include 15 people from NWEDC, seven from JH Consult, 56 from Doosan, 385 from PowerChina and 94 from Andritz Hydro. A 44-member South Korean rescue team has also arrived to assist in the search. Nine Korean nationals are among those reported missing.

The 111-MW Rasuwagadhi Hydropower Project, which is operational, has reported 93 people out of contact. It remains uncertain how many of them may be trapped inside the underground powerhouse. Three people managed to reach a safe location, while four others reportedly rescued themselves from underground two days after the disaster. Rescue operations at Rasuwagadhi have been complicated by the rising river. An excavator could not be deployed because of rising water levels and erosion, while a protection wall was damaged. A helicopter also could not land at the site.

The 120-MW Rasuwa-Bhotekoshi project, which is under construction, has reported four people missing. The IPPAN update also records the rescue of three Chinese and two Nepali workers by helicopter. The figures do not fully correspond, however, with the reported number of missing people.

At the 20-MW Langtang Khola project, which was in testing and commissioning, 41 people were reported missing or out of contact, while 19 were rescued. Search teams had advanced around 150 metres into the tunnel. The Ministry’s preliminary account says workers may have been trapped in an access tunnel while concreting work was being carried out around the penstock.

The 22-MW Chilime Hydropower Project has also been hit hard. IPPAN reported six people trapped inside the underground powerhouse, while 71 people were at the site and others had reached safety. The Ministry’s preliminary account, however, puts the number of missing people at eight, indicating that the human toll remains subject to verification.

Rescue operations have been particularly difficult because of continued rainfall and rising river levels. Nepali Army personnel and an expert team from the Indian Army have been deployed, but rescuers have so far been unable to reach those trapped underground. Machinery is being prepared for the operation, although an excavator had not yet reached the site at the time of the IPPAN update.

At the 5-MW Mailung Khola Hydropower Project, seven people remain out of contact, with some having been unreachable for as long as a week.

Nuwakot projects severely affected

Six hydropower and energy facilities in Nuwakot have been affected, with a combined capacity of 175.7 MW. The preliminary assessment puts the number of people missing from these sites at 237.

The 37-MW Upper Trishuli-3B, which is under construction, accounts for the largest number of missing people in Nuwakot. According to IPPAN, 191 people are out of contact. They include 141 workers from Fewa Construction, 21 from Trishuli Hydropower, seven family members of employees, 12 workers from Cheska Engineering, one security guard and three Kathmandu University interns. Twenty-three tunnel workers managed to escape, but heavy mud and debris blocked safe access to other workers. Two excavators had been sent to the site, with preparations underway to deploy three. The Ministry’s preliminary account says five bodies have been recovered from the Upper Trishuli-3B site. This figure was not included in the corresponding IPPAN project update.

The 60-MW Upper Trishuli-3A, which is operational, has 42 people believed to be trapped inside its underground powerhouse. The workers were carrying out maintenance work when the flood struck. The tunnel leading to the powerhouse has been blocked by rocks, sand and mud, while the Trishuli River has remained dangerously high. The Nepal Electricity Authority has been working to create an alternative access route, including blasting large rocks and pumping out water, to reach the workers trapped underground.

At the 24-MW Trishuli Hydropower Center, three people are missing—two security guards and one employee. IPPAN says 70 of the 73 people at the site are safe. At the 14.1-MW Devighat Hydropower Project, one security guard is reported missing. The 15.6-MW Middle Trishuli Ganga Hydropower Project, which is under construction, has reported two people missing, while one injured person has been rescued.

Solar plant among damaged energy infrastructure

The flooding also damaged the Nuwakot Solar Power Project. The preliminary assessment describes the project as a 25-MW solar facility, with no casualties reported. The IPPAN update, however, provides a more detailed assessment, saying a 19.6-MW plant was completely damaged, with four of its seven sites swept away. Office and control buildings were also destroyed, although all personnel were reported safe. The project was built by a Chinese company and was scheduled to be handed over to the Nepal Electricity Authority after five years. The flood damaged the facility before the handover could take place.

Local governments win global climate funding. Do they know how to use it?

Nine municipalities in Nepal have been selected for a global youth climate fund that will provide $50,000 to each local government. But the municipalities are at different stages of planning how to use the money, with some still waiting for the funds and a climate policy expert warning that the grants should not become another round of generic plantation or awareness programs.

The municipalities selected under the 2026 expansion of the Bloomberg Philanthropies Youth Climate Action Fund are Bedkot, Belauri, Biratnagar, Garuda, Ilam, Kageshwori Manohara, Lahan, Parshuram and Tulsipur.

The fund is intended to support climate and environmental projects led by young people aged 15 to 24. Each municipality receives $50,000, which can be distributed as microgrants of between $1,000 and $5,000 to eligible youth-led projects. Up to $10,000 can be used for administrative costs.

In Bedkot Municipality, Mayor Bhoj Raj Bohara said the local government has already identified seven or eight activities, with each planned to receive about $5,000. “We have created seven or eight activities to carry out youth and climate activities,” Bohara said.

The proposed activities range from environmental promotion and biological embankments to a ‘Nakshatra Vatika’, a space intended to familiarise young people with different plant species and environmental issues. The municipality also plans to mobilise a natural underground water spring at Bhankeshwar. Bohara said the focus would be particularly on school and college students, providing them with information about the environment and opportunities to participate in climate-related activities.

But Bedkot has not yet received the money. “We are currently just in the initial phase,” Bohara said, adding that the municipality has signed an agreement with an NGO called NEEDS, which works on climate and climate action. The funds will come through the organisation rather than directly into the municipality.

According to Bohara, the arrangement was made because receiving the money directly through the municipal system could have created administrative complications. Bedkot’s proposed activities reflect the flexibility built into the fund, which allows municipalities to support projects ranging from climate education and environmental campaigns to green infrastructure, resilience, waste management and youth-led governance initiatives.

A cross-learning mechanism could allow municipalities to share successful approaches, technical knowledge and ways of involving young people. A successful project in one municipality could then potentially be adapted elsewhere

But climate policy expert Abhishek Shrestha says municipalities should begin with a different question: what climate problems are actually affecting their communities? “First of all, the main thing is what are the climate-related problems or disasters of the local municipalities? Have they made a plan on how they should respond to those? If not, they should work on that first,” Shrestha said.

Projects would be more effective if they were developed around existing local climate risks and municipal plans, rather than being designed simply because funding has become available, he said.

The differences between the nine municipalities are significant, Shrestha said, and climate action should reflect those differences. “In the case of Ilam, maybe landslides could be a major problem,” he said. He also pointed to Ilam’s dependence on agricultural cash crops, saying climate-related stresses affecting agriculture could provide an entry point for youth engagement and entrepreneurship.

Biratnagar faces a different set of risks, he said. “Currently there are many problems with heat stress, followed by cold waves and heat waves,” Shrestha said. He also identified inundation as a major concern for Biratnagar, with potential consequences for agriculture. Heat waves and urban heat islands could likewise provide the basis for adaptation projects. “For that, it should be context-specific,” he said.

The same principle could apply to Lahan in Madhesh, where flooding and other climate stresses could shape the projects selected under the fund. Shrestha said municipalities should examine their historical climate stresses, understand how those risks have been addressed institutionally and then determine how young people can contribute.

That does not mean awareness programs should be excluded. But Shrestha cautioned against treating familiar environmental activities as climate solutions without connecting them to specific local problems. “Definitely, a level of capacity building and awareness for these issues needs to be done,” he said. “But not just ‘as usual,’ like saying ‘plantation.’ Plantation programs can come under many environmental programs.”

In some municipalities, he said, the priority could instead be water sources or other physical interventions needed to address specific climate risks. “Such hardware projects should be made,” Shrestha said, stressing that the starting point should be the municipality's understanding of its climate risks and whether it has a plan or documentation to address them.

The fund is significant not only because of the money involved but also because of the opportunity it provides to local governments to access resources for climate action. “Even if many resources come, they arrive at the federal government level,” Shrestha said, noting that local governments often have limited technical capacity to access and manage climate resources. “However, the way this money is coming is a good opportunity,” he said.

Climate change affects all 753 local levels to varying degrees, he said, making locally specific climate planning increasingly important. The program’s stated purpose is to give young people the resources, guidance and platform to design and implement solutions to climate and environmental problems at the local level. The program’s earlier participating cities have supported activities including green spaces, composting stations, tree planting, community gardens and waste collection.

For Nepal, however, Shrestha argues that the bigger opportunity lies in using the grants to establish a model for locally led climate action. The municipalities could also learn from one another, he said. “If there were a platform for cross-learning among them, perhaps everyone wouldn’t have the same level of understanding,” Shrestha said.

The municipalities may differ in their understanding of how the resources can be accessed and mobilised, while their technical capacity is also likely to vary. “They can move forward by creating such a structure,” he said.

Climate change affects all 753 local levels to varying degrees making locally specific climate planning increasingly important

A cross-learning mechanism could allow municipalities to share successful approaches, technical knowledge and ways of involving young people. A successful project in one municipality could then potentially be adapted elsewhere.

The nine selected municipalities are not moving at the same pace.

Parshuram Municipality Mayor Bharat Badayar Joshi said his municipality had opened a call for proposals targeting youth clubs, schools and colleges, initially envisaging eight groups receiving $5,000 each. The municipality is considering climate, waste management, disaster preparedness, renewable energy and green-cover projects, but plans to extend the call after the first round failed to produce proposals considered strong enough.

Lahan Municipality Mayor Mahesh Chaudhary has linked the program to the municipality’s previous work on ponds and fruit-tree plantations. He said around 10,000 saplings had been planted and that the municipality wanted to involve young people in planting and protecting trees and conducting awareness activities, while also creating employment opportunities.

In Garuda Municipality, Mayor Kanthamani Jaisawal said he needed to check municipal records before providing details about the fund. Meanwhile, Tulsipur Municipality Mayor Tikaram Khadka said the money had not reached the municipality and that he had no information about it so far.

The mayors of Belauri, Biratnagar, Ilam and Kageshwori Manohara did not respond to multiple calls seeking information about their plans for the fund.

The program also provides participating cities with coaching, training and templates for project selection, communication, co-design and project support.

The program provides participating cities with coaching, training and templates for project selection and support

For Shrestha, Nepal should use that support to build more than individual projects. “If they do even better work, then more such resources can be brought in,” he said. He believes successful projects could help municipalities attract additional matching funds from organisations seeking to work on climate issues at the local level. “In that sense, if they do good work, they can bring in other matching funds in the coming days, because climate doesn't fall under the priorities of many local levels,” he said.

The grants could therefore become a starting point rather than an endpoint. The immediate challenge, however, is to ensure that the money does not simply reproduce familiar environmental activities under a new funding label.

If local governments can use the money to identify their specific climate risks, build youth capacity and demonstrate workable local solutions, the program could provide a model for attracting and managing additional climate finance at the municipal level.

Bhotekoshi floods: What we know so far?

At least 469 bodies have been recovered following the devastating Bhotekoshi floods, with the death toll feared to be much higher as at least 1,000 people remain missing, according to Nepal Police and authorities. Bodies have been recovered from eight districts stretching from Rasuwa to Nawalparasi West. Authorities say a large number of people remain unaccounted for in flood-affected areas, making the final death toll difficult to estimate.

The worst-affected areas include Timure, Syafrubesi, Mailung, Betrawati, Trisuli Bazaar, Galchi, Gajuri, Malekhu, Ruwakot, Majhimtar and Mugling.

The Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Development said around 40 kilometres of the Betrawati–Mailung–Syafrubesi–Rasuwagadhi road section had been completely destroyed. An additional 10-kilometer stretch between Galchi and Trisuli has also been blocked. At least 41 bridges have been damaged by the floods. Twenty pieces of equipment from the government and private sectors have been mobilized to clear roads, while preparations are underway to install Bailey bridges to restore the Prithvi Highway and reconnect Rasuwa with the national road network.

Hundreds of foreign nationals missing

The Nepal Tourism Board said 540 foreign nationals from 31 countries were reported missing in the affected areas. Indian nationals account for the largest group, with 178 reported missing. However, India’s Ministry of External Affairs has put the number of missing Indian nationals in Nepal and Tibet at 288.

Other large groups reported missing include 65 Americans, 53 Ukrainians, 51 Malaysians, 35 Australians and 33 British nationals. Another 127 Nepali nationals who had traveled to the affected areas as tourists are also reported missing. 

Following reports of foreign nationals being missing in the Bhotekoshi flood, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has formed an Emergency Response Team (ERT) to coordinate search, rescue and consular assistance. The ministry said the ERT would serve as the central coordinating mechanism for verifying information, locating and rescuing foreign nationals affected by the floods, and providing consular support. It will also coordinate with relevant agencies and provide information to families and diplomatic missions.

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40 Mansarovar-bound vehicles missing

According to the Federation of Nepalese National Transport Entrepreneurs (FNNTE), the flood has caused massive damage to the public transport sector, leaving numerous passenger and cargo vehicles destroyed and transport workers missing. It said that a complete, detailed assessment of the vehicle damage is still underway. In response to the crisis, the federation has formed a five-member committee to collect and verify details of the damaged and missing vehicles.

According to FNNTE, 25 buses belonging to the Nepal Araniko Transport Service Pvt Ltd, which were carrying pilgrims on the Kailash Mansarovar, are currently unaccounted for. Along with the buses, the pilgrims and 50 staff members are out of contact. Additionally, 15 vehicles operated by the Namaste Pasang Lhamu Transport Company Pvt Ltd, along with their passengers, remain missing with no status updates available. 

In total, the federation confirmed that 40 vehicles carrying Mansarovar-bound pilgrims are currently out of contact as search and verification efforts continue.

Telecommunications disrupted

The floods have also disrupted telephone and internet services in Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading.

A total of 87 telecommunications towers operated by Nepal Telecom and Ncell have been affected. Nepal Telecom has reported 60 non-functioning towers, while 27 Ncell towers have been affected.

Nepal Telecom has extended free voice calls, mobile data and SMS services for customers in and around the affected areas for an additional three days. The services will now remain free through Aug 30, following an earlier decision to provide two days of free voice calls along with 2 GB of data and 50 SMS per day.

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Major damage to hydropower projects

The floods have caused extensive damage to hydropower projects along the Trishuli river corridor in Rasuwa and Nuwakot. The flood swept away the substation at Pairebesi in Kispang-5, which carries electricity generated in Nuwakot to Kathmandu, as well as the Trishuli and Devighat hydropower centres. Technical studies are being launched to assess how electricity supply through the national grid can be maintained.

In Rasuwa, the damaged projects include the 111-MW Rasuwagadhi Hydropower Project, 20-MW Langtang Khola, 120-MW Langtang-Bhotekoshi, 22-MW Chilime and the 216-MW under-construction Upper Trishuli-1 project.

In Nuwakot, the Upper Trishuli 3A (60 MW), under-construction Upper Trishuli 3B (37 MW), Trishuli Hydropower Centre (21 MW), Devighat (14 MW) and a 25-MW solar plant built by the Nepal Electricity Authority have also suffered damage.

The Independent Power Producers’ Association, Nepal (IPPAN) said 13 hydropower projects—seven in Rasuwa and six in Nuwakot—have been damaged by the flood originating from the Tibet side and flowing into the Bhotekoshi.

The Nepal Electricity Authority has restored electricity supply to Battar and Trisuli Bazaar in Nuwakot through an alternative arrangement after the flood damaged the regular power supply system. The Balaju–Trisuli and Chapali–Devighat 66-kV transmission lines have been charged at 11 kV to resume supply.

Repair and restoration of damaged infrastructure are also being accelerated.

More than 7,400 security personnel mobilized

Prime Minister Balen Shah, through a Facebook post, said 13,295 security personnel have been mobilized for search, rescue and relief operations in the flood-affected areas.

A total of 239 helicopter flights have so far been conducted for search and rescue operations, including 211 flights by the Nepali Army and 28 by private operators.

Medical teams from the Nepali Army, Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, National Trauma Center, Bir Hospital and Tribhuvan University Teaching Hospital have been deployed at Nuwakot District Hospital to treat the injured.

Temporary accommodation, food, drinking water and medicines have also been arranged at Nepali Army barracks for displaced residents.

As of 9 am on Friday, a total of 1,545 people have been rescued. According to Nepal Police, 644 were rescued from Rasuwa, 898 from Nuwakot, and 3 from Dhading. The number of injured individuals receiving treatment at various hospitals in Kathmandu or who have already been discharged stands at 84.

The Nepali Army said it rescued 700 people by air and another 200 by land on Thursday. The aerial rescue operations included 100 foreign nationals and covered areas including Timure, Syafrubesi, Dhunche and Mailung. More than 4,200 Nepali Army personnel have been mobilised for the rescue operation, with drones and military dogs also being used to search for missing people.

Also, a team of the Nepali Army has successfully rescued 350 workers and locals trapped inside a hydropower tunnel. The army is actively working to safely rescue over 100 people who are still trapped in the same tunnel.

Authorities continue to search for survivors and missing people as access to several of the worst-hit settlements remains difficult because of destroyed roads, bridges and communication infrastructure.

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Flood risk persists along Bhotekoshi-Trishuli

The Flood Forecasting Division has warned that the risk of flooding remains in the Bhotekoshi-Trishuli river system after a lake formed upstream in China continues to grow. According to the latest information received from China through Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a river blockage at the site where the flood occurred on Wednesday has formed a lake, which is continuing to expand and could potentially breach. 

The division said the assessment is based on the latest information from the Chinese side, satellite imagery and preliminary analysis. It has urged residents in downstream areas of the Bhotekoshi River, travellers, rescue personnel and others in the area to remain highly alert until further notice. People have also been advised to stay away from riverbanks and other vulnerable areas. 

China’s Ministry of Water Resources has attributed the formation of the lake to an avalanche in the Lhende River area. A Chinese report said around 2m cubic metres of water had accumulated in the upstream lake by Thursday morning, with water beginning to flow out of the lake. It added that the lake could accumulate an additional three million cubic metres of water over the next three days.

Citing the Chinese ministry, the Global Times reported that the lake has formed at the confluence of the Chocen River on the Chinese side and the Purepu Tyangkpo River on the Nepali side. The report warned that the lake poses an additional flood risk to downstream areas. Chinese authorities are monitoring the lake and have also carried out modelling to assess the potential flood threat arising from a possible breach.

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PMs visit affected sites

Prime Minister Balendra Shah inspected areas of Bidur and surrounding parts of Nuwakot affected by the Bhotekoshi-Trishuli floods, his secretariat said. Shah travelled to Nuwakot by road at around 9:30 am on Thursday, accompanied by Infrastructure Development Minister Sunil Lamsal. During the visit, he inspected flood damage and held discussions with local administrators, security officials and elected representatives. The prime minister directed authorities to provide immediate relief to displaced families, restore blocked roads and damaged infrastructure as soon as possible, and accelerate long-term rehabilitation efforts, according to his secretariat. 

Meanwhile, Chinese Premier Li Qiang arrived in Kerung, China, to inspect flood-affected areas, according to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency and the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu. Li led a team of senior officials to oversee rescue and relief operations. The team will also meet personnel involved in the rescue and relief efforts, Xinhua reported.

What caused the Bhotekoshi flood?

A day after a massive flood in the Bhotekoshi River caused widespread destruction in Rasuwa and affected downstream areas of Nuwakot, Dhading and Gorkha, questions remain over what triggered the disaster.

While some Nepali experts have raised the possibility of a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) or a combination of cascading events in Tibet, the Chinese side has attributed the disaster to an earthquake on the Nepali side that allegedly triggered an ice avalanche and subsequent mudslides.

Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal, speaking in Parliament on Wednesday, said that initial information has been received about an earthquake in Tibet and that it may be related to the flooding in the Bhotekoshi.

Climate change expert Ujjwal Upadhyaya said the nature and scale of the flood suggested that a GLOF could be one possible explanation, although he stressed that this was only an initial assessment. “Looking at the nature of the flood, it appears like a glacial lake outburst flood,” Upadhyaya said, adding that rising global temperatures and increased atmospheric temperatures in the region could be increasing the risk of such events.

He also identified another possibility: heavy rainfall in the Tibetan region of China may have triggered a massive landslide, forming a temporary natural dam that subsequently collapsed. Such an event, known as a landslide dam outburst flood, could have produced a sudden surge of water, mud and debris.

Upadhyaya said satellite imagery and further analysis would be needed to determine what actually happened. He noted that at least one of three glacial lakes located around 26 kilometers north of the Nepal-China border in the Tibetan region could potentially have contributed to the disaster. Another possibility, he said, was that an ice or landslide temporarily blocked the river before the accumulated water suddenly broke through.

A combination of events could also have produced the scale of destruction witnessed downstream, he said. A glacial lake outburst or landslide could have triggered a flood that swept away water and debris accumulated behind a lower temporary dam, creating a cascading disaster.

Upadhyaya warned that the risk may not yet be over if a landslide-created dam remains partially intact and a large volume of water and debris is still trapped upstream.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority and geologist Dan Shugar have presented preliminary evidence suggesting that a major landslide occurred in the Tibetan region and may have triggered the flood. However, Upadhyaya said an important question remained: where did the enormous volume of water, mud and rock that entered the river actually originate?

He called for a detailed scientific investigation into the possibility that the landslide and a GLOF may have occurred together. “The scale of destruction seen in this disaster would generally be difficult to explain through a single event,” he said, suggesting that a sequence involving an ice avalanche, glacial lake outburst, river blockage and sudden release of water could have occurred.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Embassy in Nepal has offered a different preliminary explanation.

Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zhang Maoming said initial information indicated that an earthquake had occurred on the Nepali side on Wednesday morning, triggering an ice avalanche and subsequent mudslides. According to Zhang, the mudslides caused significant casualties and left people missing on both sides of the Gyirong-Rasuwagadhi border.

Talking to Nepal government national broadcast NTV, he said, “Following the disaster, the Chinese Embassy activated its emergency response mechanism, assessed the situation of Chinese citizens and businesses in the affected areas of Nepal, and requested the Nepali government and relevant authorities to intensify rescue operations. The embassy also dispatched a working team to the affected area to coordinate rescue efforts.” Despite casualties and losses on the Chinese side, China has also begun coordinating emergency supplies and cash assistance for Nepal, Zhang said.

He stressed the need for greater Nepal-China cooperation in disaster preparedness and response, including cross-border information sharing, monitoring and early-warning systems for meteorological, hydrological and geological hazards. He also called for stronger institutional coordination in emergency rescue, as well as greater cooperation in personnel training, technical exchanges and emergency supplies.

“Accusations help nothing; cooperation saves lives,” the Chinese Embassy said in a social media post.

The exact cause and sequence of events behind the Bhotekoshi flood, however, remain unclear. Experts say satellite imagery, hydrological data, geological assessments and information from both Nepal and China will be needed to establish what triggered the disaster.

PM Balen invited to COP31

Prime Minister Balendra Shah has received an invitation to participate in the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP31), extended by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The invitation was officially disclosed on Wednesday by Krishna Prasad Dhakal, joint secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during a meeting of the National Assembly’s Development, Economic Affairs and Good Governance Committee at Singha Durbar.

Dhakal said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already forwarded the invitation to the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. However, a final decision on the level of Nepal’s representation at the summit is yet to be made.

COP31 is scheduled to take place from November 9 to 20 in Antalya, Turkey.

Prime Minister Shah has not visited any foreign country since assuming office. He has also recently received an invitation to visit India.

At COP30 in Brazil, then Minister for Agriculture and Livestock Development Madan Prasad Pariyar led Nepal’s delegation. Speaking on behalf of Nepal, Pariyar said that although the country contributes minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions, it is disproportionately affected by climate change.

He highlighted the rapid retreat of glaciers, worsening water and food insecurity, and a series of climate-induced disasters that claimed more than 300 lives in Nepal in 2025 alone. “Our agriculture, the backbone of our economy, is reeling,” he said.

Pariyar reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to ambitious climate action, noting that the country has submitted its action-oriented NDC 3.0 and National Adaptation Plan, with a target of achieving net-zero emissions by 2045. He also highlighted Nepal’s conservation record, noting that forest cover now exceeds 46 percent.

Calling climate finance received by Nepal “negligible,” Pariyar urged developed countries to fulfill their past commitments and provide simplified, predictable and grant-based support to vulnerable countries. He welcomed the launch of the Barbados Implementation Modality (BIM) and called for the full operationalization of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD).

Nepal sent a significantly smaller delegation to COP30, following a Cabinet decision under then-interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki to curb non-essential overseas travel and limit the size of official delegations. To reduce government expenditure, the government capped state- or government-led delegations at 10 members and limited other government-sponsored teams to three members.

When Nepal first began participating in UN climate negotiations in 1995, it sent only two delegates, compared with 19 from the United Kingdom and 27 from the United States. The size of Nepal’s delegations gradually increased over the years. Sixty-nine Nepali delegates attended COP26 in Glasgow, while Nepal was reprimanded at COP20 in Lima for sending a “jumbo delegation” despite its limited resources.

A 2024 report by ApEx revealed that Nepal’s delegation missed 68 of the 392 sessions at COP29 because its negotiators were overworked.

Despite organizational shortcomings, Nepal has used the COP process to advance issues related to mountains and climate justice. At COP29 in Baku, Nepal sent a high-level delegation led by President Ramchandra Paudel, with Nepal emphasizing the need to mobilize climate finance, protect mountain ecosystems and operationalize the Loss and Damage Fund.

100 days of honeymoon power

The first 100 days of a government rarely determine its ultimate legacy. But they often reveal how a government intends to use power. Does it spend its opening months managing political survival? Responding to a crisis? Passing legislation? Or attempting to change the institutions it has inherited?

Nepal’s four most recent governments began their first 100 days under markedly different circumstances. Sher Bahadur Deuba took office amid a constitutional crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Pushpa Kamal Dahal inherited a fragmented Parliament and a fragile coalition. KP Sharma Oli returned to power with a broad parliamentary majority and a promise of political stability. Balendra Shah entered office with an overwhelming mandate for change and expectations of rapid institutional reform with almost two-third majority.

Their opening months therefore offer a useful comparison. It’s not of their entire legacies, but of how each government converted its political circumstances into governing action.

The comparison suggests a clear distinction. Deuba’s government was primarily defined by crisis management, Dahal’s by coalition politics and targeted reforms, and Oli’s by institutional continuity and legislative achievements. Shah’s government, by contrast, attempted to pursue a broad program of simultaneous institutional change.

That does not make every Shah government initiative successful. Some reforms remained incomplete. Others faced legal challenges, human rights concerns and criticism over executive overreach. But measured by the breadth of its agenda, the number of institutions it sought to change and the speed with which it moved from political mandate to administrative action, Shah’s government had the most ambitious first 100 days of the four administrations examined here.

The comparison suggests a clear distinction. Deuba’s government was primarily defined by crisis management, Dahal’s by coalition politics and targeted reforms, and Oli’s by institutional continuity and legislative achievements. Shah’s government, by contrast, attempted to pursue a broad program of simultaneous institutional change

The comparison assesses nine areas of governance: political stability, legislative performance, administrative reform, public service delivery, economic management, anti-corruption efforts, foreign policy, crisis response and democratic governance. It draws on official government reports, parliamentary records, budget documents, court decisions, independent monitoring reports and publicly available data.

The question is therefore not simply which prime minister was the most popular or which government made the biggest promises. It is this: Which government did the most with its first 100 days?

Four governments, four opening priorities

The four governments entered office with different political circumstances and therefore different priorities.

Deuba’s first 100 days were dominated by the pandemic and the task of restoring constitutional continuity after a political crisis. Dahal’s government was defined by coalition management, although it also introduced targeted economic and administrative reforms. Oli’s government benefited from a stronger parliamentary foundation and achieved a major legislative breakthrough in transitional justice. Shah’s administration used its political mandate to pursue a much broader program of administrative, institutional and anti-corruption reforms.

This does not mean Shah performed best in every individual category. Deuba’s vaccination campaign was arguably the strongest crisis response. Oli’s transitional justice legislation was a major legislative achievement. Dahal’s microfinance reforms produced tangible benefits for vulnerable borrowers.

Shah’s distinction lies elsewhere: His government attempted to act across the greatest number of governance areas simultaneously.

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Balendra Shah (2026): Reform at speed

When Shah entered Singha Durbar in 2026, he did so under circumstances unlike those of his recent predecessors. An anti-establishment electoral wave had given his government an overwhelming parliamentary mandate and created unusually high expectations for rapid change.

The administration responded by unveiling a 100-point reform agenda. Unlike previous governments that spent much of their opening months negotiating coalition arrangements or responding to crises, Shah’s government began almost immediately to restructure parts of the state.

The government later reported that it had completed 70 commitments and partially implemented another 17, claiming an 87.2 percent completion rate. Independent monitor Digital Pratikpashya, however, estimated that only around 17 percent had been fully implemented. The disagreement over the numbers illustrates a broader feature of Shah’s first 100 days: the administration moved quickly, but the scale of its claims was frequently contested.

The most significant interventions came in administrative reform. The government reduced the number of federal ministries from 22 to 18, arguing that a leaner structure would reduce duplication and improve efficiency. It also annulled around 1,500 political appointments made under previous governments and opened vacancies on the basis of meritocracy.

A proposed Civil Service Act sought to lower the retirement age of civil servants to 55, with the government arguing that the bureaucracy needed generational renewal. Supporters viewed the measures as an attempt to professionalise institutions long shaped by political patronage. Critics questioned whether such sweeping changes had been introduced with sufficient consultation and institutional safeguards.

The administration’s anti-corruption campaign was equally aggressive. Investigative agencies launched high-profile investigations into senior politicians and business figures. Former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak were arrested over their alleged roles in the GenZ protest crackdown, while former Finance Minister Bishnu Paudel faced money laundering investigations. Business figures including Deepak Bhatta, Shekhar Golchha and Shanker Agrawal were also arrested over alleged financial irregularities.

The government established an Asset Investigation Commission that collected more than 11,000 asset declarations from public officials. The Supreme Court ordered a halt to the work of the newly formed commission. The Department of Money Laundering Investigation filed seven major cases seeking to recover approximately Rs 118bn.

The scale of the campaign attracted public attention, but also accusations from opposition parties that the government was selectively pursuing political opponents. Whether the investigations ultimately establish a new standard of accountability or become associated with political prosecution remains an open question.

Shah’s government also sought to demonstrate improvements in everyday public services. The Department of Transport Management printed approximately 2.4m driving licences, reducing a backlog of nearly 2.9m applications. The Free Health Portal enabled citizens to check hospital bed availability across 213 hospitals in real time. According to the government, more than 2,200 marginalised patients benefited from the platform during the review period.

Other digital initiatives expanded online access to education, labour and consular services. These measures were less politically dramatic than arrests or administrative restructuring, but they demonstrated the government’s attempt to combine structural reform with visible improvements in service delivery.

The four governments entered office with different political circumstances and therefore different priorities

The economic agenda was similarly ambitious. The government presented a Rs 2.1trn budget focused on infrastructure, technology and fiscal stability. It also approved approximately $185m in concessional loans from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for digital transformation and small and medium enterprises.

The borrowing generated criticism because Shah had previously criticised foreign borrowing. Supporters argued that concessional loans for productive sectors were different from borrowing for consumption, while critics saw a gap between the government’s rhetoric and its governing practice.

Foreign policy also reflected Shah’s preference for a less conventional style. Rather than holding one-on-one meetings with foreign ambassadors, he organised collective meetings with representatives from more than a dozen countries, including India, the United States, China and the European Union.

Yet the speed and breadth of the government’s reform agenda also generated some of its most serious controversies.

Nationwide eviction campaigns targeting informal settlements along riverbanks displaced an estimated 15,000 people from around 2,600 families without a comprehensive resettlement plan. Human rights organisations argued that the operations raised concerns over housing rights and due process.

Public criticism intensified after the death of 25-year-old ride-sharing driver Ganesh Nepali, who self-immolated following a confrontation with municipal police over parking enforcement. His death became a focal point for wider concerns about the government’s enforcement-driven approach.

Questions also emerged over democratic governance. Critics accused the administration of relying heavily on executive ordinances rather than parliamentary debate. Shah’s repeated absence from mandatory parliamentary sessions prompted opposition protests, while several executive decisions were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court.

Press freedom became another point of contention after individuals associated with the government staged ‘car-park’ outside major media houses in response to critical reporting.

The government’s foreign policy also generated controversy. Shah’s remarks in Parliament regarding Nepal-India border encroachment drew criticism from opposition parties, while allegations surrounding the unofficial detention of officials from the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority and provocative statements by some ministers further fuelled concerns about the administration’s political style.

The picture that emerges is therefore mixed but distinct. Shah’s government did not simply announce reforms; it attempted to alter the structure of government, challenge established patronage networks, pursue major corruption investigations and expand digital services and all within its first 100 days.

No other government in this comparison attempted institutional change on a comparable breadth during the same period.

KP Sharma Oli (2024): A rare coalition

When KP Sharma Oli returned as prime minister in 2024, he led an unprecedented coalition between the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress, two largest parties in the Parliament. The government entered office promising stability, constitutional amendments and economic recovery.

Its most significant achievement during the first 100 days was parliamentary approval of amendments to the transitional justice law. After years of political deadlock, the legislation established a revised legal framework for addressing conflict-era human rights violations and represented one of the most important legislative achievements of the period.

The government also introduced performance agreements for ministers and pursued digital governance initiatives. Nepal signed a trilateral agreement with India and Bangladesh to export 40 megawatts of hydropower to Bangladesh through India’s transmission network.

Balen administration’s anti-corruption campaign was equally aggressive as attempted administrative reforms

Macroeconomic indicators showed gradual improvement. GDP growth rose to around 3.9 percent from 1.95 percent the previous year, while inflation eased to approximately 4.1 percent.

However, the government’s opening months were dominated by devastating floods and landslides that killed nearly 300 people and displaced thousands. The federal response drew widespread criticism for being slow and poorly coordinated.

Political controversies, including the donation of land for a CPN-UML headquarters by BhatBhateni Supermarket Min Bahadur Gurung and the arrest of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane, further overshadowed the administration’s early achievements.

Oli’s first 100 days produced an important legislative breakthrough. But compared with the Shah’s government, its reform agenda was narrower and more focused on institutional continuity than broad structural transformation.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal (2022): Fragile coalition

Pushpa Kamal Dahal returned as prime minister in Dec 2022 after an election that produced no clear parliamentary majority as obvious. His government initially included the CPN-UML and several smaller parties. But the Nepali Congress too dramatically gave a confidence vote to the prime minister having the support of 268 out of 275 MPs. The coalition then collapsed within days over disagreements surrounding the presidential election with the UML.

Dahal then formed a new eight-party coalition with Nepali Congress as a major backer and secured a second vote of confidence. Political realignment therefore consumed much of his opening period.

Despite that instability, the government introduced several targeted reforms. Its most significant intervention was in the microfinance sector. Institutions were ordered to refund around Rs 1.6bn collected through unauthorised service fees, while a monthly interest ceiling of 1.5 percent and a single-lender policy were introduced.

The government also lowered the minimum threshold for foreign direct investment from Rs 50m to Rs 20m and expanded public services, including national identity card printing, passport distribution and the Hello Sarkar grievance platform.

Dahal’s government also advanced transitional justice legislation and sought to balance relations with India and China through hydropower and infrastructure cooperation.

Its first 100 days showed that targeted reform was possible even under coalition pressure. But the government’s political instability limited the scale of its broader agenda.

Sher Bahadur Deuba (2021): Crisis management

Sher Bahadur Deuba assumed office in July 2021 after the Supreme Court overturned KP Sharma Oli’s dissolution of the House of Representatives. He inherited a constitutional crisis, a fragile five-party coalition and the devastating second wave of Covid-19.

His defining achievement was the acceleration of Nepal’s vaccination campaign. By the end of the first 100 days, around 15m vaccine doses had either been administered or secured, allowing nearly one-third of the adult population to receive at least partial or full vaccination.

But political instability severely constrained the government. Coalition negotiations delayed the formation of a full Cabinet for 88 days. Parliament also failed to endorse the government’s budget replacement bill, resulting in Nepal’s first budget holiday.

The government faced criticism over an ordinance that lowered the threshold for splitting political parties and over the appointment of Gajendra Hamal, the brother-in-law of then-Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana, as a minister.

Deuba’s government therefore performed its most important work in crisis management rather than structural reform. Its first 100 days were shaped by circumstances that left little room for a broader governing agenda.

What the first 100 days reveal

The comparison does not produce a simple ranking of four prime ministers.

Deuba’s government was tested by a public health emergency and made its most significant contribution through the acceleration of Covid-19 vaccination. Dahal demonstrated political adaptability and introduced targeted reforms, particularly in microfinance, but spent much of his opening period managing coalition realignments. Oli benefited from a stronger parliamentary base and achieved a major breakthrough in transitional justice, even as disaster response and political controversies weakened his early record.

Shah’s government stands apart for a different reason.

It attempted to use its opening 100 days not primarily to manage a coalition or respond to a single national crisis, but to pursue change across multiple parts of the state at once. It reduced the number of ministries, challenged political appointments, moved against party-affiliated unions, proposed changes to the civil service, launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign, expanded digital public services and pursued administrative restructuring.

The scale of that agenda makes Shah’s first 100 days the most ambitious of the four governments examined here.

That conclusion does not mean the government was without serious shortcomings. The pace of reform generated questions about consultation, due process and executive power. Evictions of informal settlements drew human rights criticism. Several decisions faced judicial scrutiny, while the administration’s relationship with Parliament, the media and opposition parties remained contentious.

These limitations are part of the assessment. A government that attempts more also creates more opportunities for overreach, legal challenge and failure.

The relevant question is therefore not whether Shah’s government completed every promise or avoided every controversy. It did neither. The question is what it attempted to do with its political mandate.

On that measure, the comparison is clear. Among Nepal’s four most recent governments, Balendra Shah’s administration demonstrated the broadest governing ambition and the most extensive attempt at simultaneous institutional change during its first 100 days.

Whether that makes the reforms successful will be determined by what happens next—whether they survive judicial scrutiny, institutional checks, political opposition and the test of time.

The first 100 days are not a final verdict. But they can establish a benchmark. Shah’s government appears to have set one.

RSP’s first national convention ends in controversy

The first national convention of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), expected to institutionalize the party’s promise of “new politics,” ended in controversy after six days of administrative chaos, disputed election results, factional tensions, and growing criticism that the party has begun replicating the very political culture it once vowed to dismantle.

Held in Bharatpur from June 21 to 26, the convention was widely seen as the party’s biggest institutional test since its formation in 2022. For a party that rose rapidly by promising transparency, internal democracy, meritocracy, accountability, and an alternative to Nepal’s traditional political establishment, the gathering was expected to demonstrate whether RSP could practice internally the values it has consistently championed in public.

Instead, six turbulent days exposed deep organizational weaknesses, procedural controversies, and internal contradictions that now threaten the credibility of the very political project on which the party built its rise.

Trouble began even before formal proceedings started. Originally planned as a three-day event, the convention stretched nearly a week as the party struggled to complete basic organizational preparations. Delegates arriving from across the country encountered confusion over accreditation, identity card distribution, registration procedures, and repeated delays in scheduled sessions.

The party leadership reportedly failed to finalize the delegate list until the final hours before the convention began. Confusion over representative verification immediately disrupted proceedings, forcing postponement of the closed session that was originally scheduled for the second day. The delegate count also mysteriously rose from an initial 3,000 to over 4,100 without any transparent audit trail.

The situation was particularly striking in Madhes, the party’s strongest electoral base where it secured 57.33 percent of proportional representation votes. RSP failed to hold district conventions in seven of the province’s eight districts, meaning delegates were selected through ad hoc committees rather than any democratic process.

Party leaders repeatedly claimed that over 4,000 delegates had attended the convention. Yet only around 2,900 delegates participated in voting for central committee positions. By the time elections for key office bearers were held, turnout had reportedly collapsed to nearly 1,300 votes. In effect, nearly 70 percent of convention delegates abstained from deciding the party’s new leadership

For a party that has repeatedly criticized older political forces for bureaucratic inefficiency and weak organizational culture, the early administrative collapse proved politically embarrassing.

Thousands of delegates, many of whom traveled from remote districts at their own expense, found themselves stranded in Chitwan for days amid uncertainty over constantly shifting schedules. Several publicly complained about spending significant personal funds on accommodation and food while the party leadership failed to communicate clearly about the delays.

Weather conditions further deepened frustration. The convention took place in nearly 40-degree pre-monsoon heat, while delegates struggled with mounting accommodation costs due to repeated extensions. The opening session, scheduled for 1 pm, began only at 3:30 pm. Party leaders including Rabi Lamichhane and Balen Shah arrived hours late, mirroring the same political culture of delays the party had once criticized. Delegates reportedly slept in nomination halls while waiting, and many from distant districts returned home before proceedings concluded.

The convention’s biggest controversy emerged during internal elections for central committee positions, where disputes over electoral outcomes quickly escalated into one of the gathering’s most serious flashpoints.

The dispute involving candidate Puja Banstola became the most visible controversy. According to internal election results, Banstola secured more votes than several competing candidates. However, disagreements emerged over how the party interpreted inclusion provisions while finalizing winners, ultimately leaving her unelected despite receiving a stronger vote count.

The outcome immediately triggered criticism from party members and supporters, with accusations that the party had inconsistently applied its own constitutional provisions and denied representation to a candidate who had secured greater electoral support.

The controversy quickly spread across social media, with many supporters openly questioning whether the party’s commitment to fairness and meritocracy exists only as political rhetoric. Although the party’s election commission later corrected the error, the damage had already been done.

Equally troubling was the complete absence of meaningful democratic deliberation during endorsement of the party’s key political and organizational documents.

President Rabi Lamichhane presented major policy proposals intended to shape the party’s long-term political direction. Yet delegates were reportedly given virtually no opportunity to debate, question, amend, or challenge the documents before being asked to endorse them.

A process that should have involved serious deliberation among thousands of representatives was reduced to little more than procedural formality. One party leader sarcastically remarked that the “intensive discussion conducted by 4,200 delegates lasted just seven seconds.”

The electronic ballot system itself created confusion after candidate names reportedly appeared in random order

The irony was striking.

RSP built much of its political identity by criticizing traditional parties for bulldozing major decisions through centralized leadership structures while suppressing internal debate. Yet during its own most important organizational gathering, the party appeared to repeat precisely the same practice.

The policies themselves were deeply controversial: abolishing provincial assemblies, introducing a directly elected executive, making the National Assembly non-partisan, and implementing non-partisan local elections. If implemented, these proposals would fundamentally alter the federal framework established by Nepal’s 2015 Constitution. Yet none were subjected to genuine internal debate. Delegates were simply asked to endorse them—and they did.

The party’s much-publicized digital voting system became another source of controversy. Delegates reportedly stood in long queues for hours merely to complete nomination and registration procedures.

The electronic ballot system itself created confusion after candidate names reportedly appeared in random rather than alphabetical order. Several candidates later raised concerns over inconsistencies in published results after names initially appearing in one result sheet reportedly shifted positions following revisions.

Perhaps the most legally troubling revelation from the convention was the discovery that 35,257 registered party members—representing 6.73 percent of the party’s membership base—were minors under the age of 18.

The revelation potentially violates multiple legal provisions, including Article 39 of Nepal’s Constitution, which prohibits the political exploitation of children; Section 14 of the Political Parties Act, 2073, which requires party members to be eligible voters aged 18 or above; and Section 66 of the Act Relating to Children, 2075, which criminalizes the recruitment of minors into political organizations.

The leadership attempted to dismiss the revelation as a technical glitch in the party’s online registration system. But critics argue the explanation is legally and morally insufficient, particularly given that the party has repeatedly advocated for depoliticizing educational spaces and restricting student unions in the name of protecting young people from partisan influence.

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The convention also exposed visible factional divisions despite repeated public claims that RSP rejects faction-based politics.

While President Rabi Lamichhane faced no competition, several contested positions reportedly reflected growing internal alignments among competing leadership groups. Candidates and insiders privately accused powerful figures within the leadership of quietly promoting preferred candidates through informal channels despite the party’s public opposition to factional politics.

Perhaps the most politically damaging statistic emerging from the convention was the dramatic collapse in delegate participation.

Party leaders repeatedly claimed that more than 4,000 delegates attended the convention. Yet only around 2,900 participated in voting for central committee positions. By the time elections for key office-bearer positions were held, turnout had reportedly fallen to nearly 1,300 votes.

In effect, nearly 70 percent of delegates abstained from deciding the party’s new leadership. This included Lamichhane himself, who was present in Chitwan but did not vote, while Balen Shah had already returned to Kathmandu.

The sharp decline reflected more than logistical inconvenience. It exposed growing frustration among delegates exhausted by repeated delays, financial burden, organizational confusion, and dissatisfaction with how the convention was being conducted.

The convention exposed visible factional divisions inside the party despite repeated public claims that RSP rejects faction-based politics

In many ways, delegates had already delivered their verdict.

For many young voters, urban professionals, first-time voters, and politically frustrated citizens, RSP’s rise symbolized hope that Nepal could finally build a credible alternative to the country’s old political establishment. That symbolic value made this convention particularly important.

But the party’s first major organizational exercise instead exposed a troubling contradiction.

Nepal’s traditional political parties have long faced criticism for factional bargaining, procedural manipulation, centralized decision-making, weak internal democracy, and lack of transparency. RSP entered politics promising to break that cycle.

Yet during its own first major institutional test, the party found itself accused of replicating many of the same practices it once built its political identity opposing.

The convention that was supposed to institutionalize Nepal’s most ambitious experiment in alternative politics instead exposed an uncomfortable possibility: RSP may already be evolving into the very political culture it promised to replace.