What to do with excess liquidity?
The term liquidity trap was coined by economist John Maynard Keynes in 1936. A liquidity trap is when there is excess liquidity in the market but the banking sector is unable to invest and there is no demand for credit. This is why the banking sector is forced to further reduce interest rates. When investment is weak, the price of goods and services also increases.
Banks have large sums of money in their deposits and are not borrowing. This is a problem because banks have to pay interest on the money they have. The state of cash availability in banks and financial institutions is called liquidity apart from the quality or ability of any asset to be converted into immediate expenditure or payable amount.
In the banking and financial sector, liquidity is also understood as immediately investable capital. Even with low interest rates, there is no demand for credit from the business sector, but rather consumption and investment are reduced, cash hoarding is encouraged and capital is transferred abroad, that is, capital flight. When liquidity in such a market increases, investors are worried that they will not get a return. In such a situation, monetary policy is powerless because it cannot be implemented effectively.
Nepal Rastra Bank is the regulator of managing bank liquidity in Nepal, so it has a large number of tools to control bank liquidity. Some of the methods are increasing the CRR and SLR ratios, increasing reverse repo, issuing government securities, increasing bank rates, etc. For some time now, there has been a significant decrease in excess liquidity and credit flow.
Deposits kept by the general public in banks, amounts kept by banks in the central bank, financial instruments that are bought and sold in the market, and precious metals such as gold and silver have high liquidity.
There are some reasons for this which include: Lack of clear explanation of currency liberalization, financial chaos, non-viability of the economy, sluggishness in the capital market, post-covid economic situation etc., unpreparedness of business, trade and industry friendly environment.
In short, unless some security is given to the bank officials, they are less likely to lend. This excess liquidity, which could have driven economic growth under ideal circumstances of the country and monetary situation, is being underutilized mainly due to declining credit activity and increasing burden of non-banking assets, which is currently seen in Nepal.
Liquidity problem
Despite the country having sufficient cash reserves, banks are struggling to mobilize funds profitably. Economic uncertainty and declining public confidence have brought about and are overshadowing a dramatic slowdown in credit distribution in the country. Borrowers worried over financial instability are reluctant to borrow more, while banks, burdened by a growing default burden, are tightening lending standards. Adding to these problems is the growth of non-banking assets—assets that banks have acquired due to loan defaults, usually real estate, which is also a problem, and the current budget. Even in the past, the idea of opening an asset management company did not work.
Service vs manufacturing
Nepal currently has a huge service industry. This is a bright spot. The problem is that lending to the service industry is a struggle fraught with great risks. There is almost always zero physical assets and service industries are always valued by their equity value and their overall brand name and demand. Banks are uncomfortable lending to the service industry as well as the manufacturing industry. One because the assets are always intangible and the other because of the existing NPAs.
Liquidity management in Nepal in a difficult situation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that economic stability is the main macroeconomic goal of any country, developed or developing. Fiscal policy and monetary policy ensure this, which is not possible without the availability of liquidity and its proper mobilization. The main source of liquidity is deposits received from various agencies and individuals, external remittances and loan recovery. Looking at the current context of Nepal, on the one hand, there is a predominance of consumer credit, and on the other, due to the slowdown in industry and trade, the disposable income of businesspeople and the general public has decreased, which is making it difficult to pay the principal and interest on loans taken from banks.
The bitter but real question has begun to arise whether the banking sector will find it difficult to manage liquidity due to the country’s excess liquidity and will fall into a liquidity trap. The budget for the fiscal 2025-26 has arrived, there is a liquidity mechanism, monetary policy will come, how will it be addressed?
In this context, businesspeople had to run their businesses to repay bank loans. Consumers had to increase consumption. At the same time, banks should be aware that they should not delay in formulating short-term, medium-term and long-term strategies to solve the problem of liquidity management.
The country’s banking sector is experiencing a terrible paradox.
Despite having sufficient cash reserves, banks are struggling to mobilize funds profitably. Economic uncertainty and declining public confidence have led to a dramatic slowdown in credit distribution. Borrowers worried about financial instability are hesitant to take on more loans, while banks burdened by the burden of increasing defaults are tightening lending standards.
Despite having adequate cash reserves, banks are struggling to mobilize funds profitably. Economic uncertainty and declining public confidence have led to a dramatic slowdown in credit distribution. Borrowers concerned about financial instability are reluctant to borrow more, while banks, burdened by growing defaults, are tightening lending standards. The Daily Liquidity Facility (DCF) Procedures of the Nepal Rastra Bank (Second Amendment) Provides detailed information on the procedures and processes to be followed for the DCF and the Overnight Liquidity Facility under the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system operated by Nepal Rastra Bank.
It clarifies how participating financial institutions can utilize the liquidity facility, the management of collateral, calculation of interest, and the additional charges and actions to be taken in case of default.
It also covers the use of collateral management accounts and settlement accounts, the format of monthly reports and the rules on recovery. In the country, the Nepal Rastra Bank is the bank that sends the required liquidity to the banking system and absorbs it when there is excess.
The procedure was prepared by the central bank with the aim of providing immediate liquidity to banks and financial institutions in case of liquidity shortage while transacting in the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system. This has been made by exercising the authority granted by Section 110(3) of the Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2058. In Nepal, credit has not been able to expand because there is currently pressure on businesses to repay loans rather than demand for loans. Central banks manage liquidity in the economy to ensure financial stability and control inflation.
A detailed overview of why and how they collect excess liquidity, the benefits of this practice, and the costs associated with it shows that: Why do central banks collect excess liquidity?
Control of inflation
Excess liquidity can lead to high inflation because more money can buy the same amount of goods and services. By collecting liquidity, central banks can help stabilize prices.
Financial markets are stable: Too much liquidity can result in rising asset prices and increased risk-taking. Reducing liquidity can help maintain market discipline. Promoting sustainable economic growth: By ensuring that liquidity levels are appropriate, central banks can help the economy grow sustainably rather than overly dynamic.
Managing currency value: Excess liquidity can also weaken a country’s currency. By controlling liquidity, central banks can help maintain or strengthen the value of a currency.
How do central banks raise excess liquidity?
Open market operations (OMOs): The central bank sells government securities in the open market to absorb excess cash. When financial institutions buy these securities, they pay for them from their reserves, which reduces the amount of money in circulation.
Interest rate adjustments: By lowering interest rates, central banks can make borrowing cheaper and saving more unattractive, which can lead to lower spending and investment, which in turn reduces liquidity.
Reserve requirements: Increasing the reserve requirement ratio forces banks to hold a larger portion of their deposits in reserves, which reduces the amount available for lending. This can directly reduce liquidity in the economy.
Fixed deposits and reverse repos: Central banks can also use instruments such as fixed deposits or reverse repurchase agreements to temporarily absorb liquidity. Banks deposit funds with the central bank for a specified period, reducing the money supply.
Benefits of liquidity deposits
Inflation control: Helps maintain price stability, which is important for economic confidence and planning.
Financial stability: Reduces the risk of asset overvaluations, which can lead to a financial crisis if they become too extreme.
Promotes responsible lending: By controlling excess liquidity, banks can be encouraged to lend more responsibly, reducing the risk of default.
Strong currency: A strong national currency can benefit importers and reduce the cost of foreign borrowing.
Long-term economic growth: By creating a more stable economic environment, central banks can foster conditions that support sustainable growth. As for the costs of liquidity management, they can vary depending on the methods used
Interest costs: If a central bank raises interest rates, it can increase the cost of borrowing for governments and consumers, which can have a liquidity effect on the economy.
Opportunity costs: Selling securities or raising reserve requirements can limit the amount of money available for banks to lend, potentially slowing economic growth.
Administrative costs: Implementing and managing liquidity management operations incurs administrative costs for the central bank.
Market effects: Aggressive liquidity management can cause market instability or disruptions, which can have broader economic effects. In short, despite the costs of managing excess liquidity, it can also contribute to economic stability, inflation control and sustainable growth.
In short, while there are costs to managing excess liquidity, the benefits in terms of economic stability, inflation control and sustainable growth often outweigh these costs. Therefore, central banks must carefully balance their liquidity management strategies to effectively achieve their monetary policy goals. Collaboration with the business community is essential in resolving the issues raised, including the questions raised regarding the current capital and credit guidelines for liquidity management, 2079.
It seems that a comprehensive roundtable conference should be held immediately between bankers, businesspeople and the government to arrive at a conclusion on why the banking sector is not enthusiastic about credit investment and why there is no demand for credit despite the significant increase in deposits. The economy is weakening due to increasing dependence on consumption, government revenue and imports. Therefore, for proper management of liquidity, emphasis should be placed on manufacturing and agricultural-oriented investment, and the development of import-substituting industries and exports should be increased.
Inclusive digital transformation: What does it look like for females?
Nepal stands at a pivotal moment in its digital journey. With 132 percent of cellular mobile phones proliferating and with 55.8 percent of online penetration expanding even into remote corners the question is no longer if the country will transform, but how that transformation can be guided toward equity and inclusion. Central to this is the role of girls and young women: from coders and entrepreneurs to engineers and digital-diplomacy leaders, they represent an enormous reservoir of talent that remains largely untapped. In a country where digital strategies have been drafted to accelerate progress on health, education and economic development, Nepal cannot afford to leave half its population on the sidelines.
As we marked the International Girls in ICT Day 2025 last month under the theme “Girls in ICT for Inclusive Digital Transformation,” this article explores what that transformation could and should look like for Nepal. We examine the current landscape, shed light on both barriers and opportunities and chart a possible roadmap to ensure every girl in Nepal can confidently claim her place at the digital table.
Every year on April 24, the global community unites to celebrate Girls in ICT Day, shining a spotlight on the critical role that girls and young women play not just as technology users, but as innovators, creators and leaders of our digital future.
The celebration is rooted in a powerful historical parallel. Thirty-six years ago, the Hubble Space Telescope was launched, an achievement made possible in no small part by Nancy Roman, often called the “mother” of Hubble. Roman faced early resistance: she was told astronomy and the vastness of space was no place for a woman. Undeterred, she persevered, securing legislative approval and funding that transformed human understanding of the universe. Her story is a testament to the fact that when women are given the opportunity to lead, the boundaries of possibility expand exponentially.
In Nepal, the year’s celebration featured hackathons, ideathons, AI exposure workshops and digital safety training. These events witness the enthusiastic response from the young participants but their urban-centric nature definitely leaves countless curious girls in rural and marginalized communities disconnected from the celebration.
The big picture
Nepal’s digital transformation journey, as outlined in the 16th Periodic Plan, is focused on modernizing governance, enhancing service delivery and integrating technology across key sectors. The government has prioritized faceless service delivery through tools like the Nagarik App, supporting Digital Nepal Framework 2.0, which seeks to expand digital infrastructure, broadband connectivity and cybersecurity measures. Education and healthcare systems are also undergoing digitization, with plans to implement digital learning platforms and an integrated health information system to improve accessibility.
Gender inclusivity is embedded in the transformation efforts, with targeted programs aimed at expanding digital literacy among women and marginalized communities. Policies emphasize increasing technology access and affordability for women, children, gender minorities and individuals with disabilities, ensuring equitable participation in Nepal’s evolving digital economy. Employment initiatives like IT-based job programs for youth further aim to bridge gaps and provide digital employment opportunities. Fintech solutions such as IME Pay, Khalti and eSewa have empowered women-led businesses, offering financial inclusion and digital banking services to underserved communities. These structural changes indicate that Nepal’s digital transformation, if effectively implemented, has the potential to bridge the gender divide and economic disparities for a more inclusive future.
But challenges still persist.
Women in ICT in Nepal
Nhasala Joshi, the co-founder of Women Leaders in Technology (WLiT), recalls how, in professional settings, people often assumed she was an assistant when she attended meetings alongside her male employees. This seemingly small but deeply rooted assumption speaks volumes about the gender disparity in Nepal’s ICT sector, where women still struggle for recognition in leadership and technical roles. It reflects a larger societal pattern, one shaped by entrenched biases, systemic exclusion and a biological deterministic attitude that diminishes women’s professional agency.
According to a Women in Information Technology (WIIT) study, women constitute only 7.88 percent of the workforce in Nepal’s ICT companies, particularly in core technical roles, and an even lower 0.51 percent in ICT-enabled firms. These figures stand in stark contrast to 42 percent female tech representation in the Philippines, 34 percent in India and 22 percent in Indonesia, underscoring Nepal’s lag in gender-inclusive digital employment. The UN Women’s Gender Snapshot Report (2022) warns that this exclusion could cost Nepal Rs 15bn by 2025, reinforcing the economic urgency of closing the digital gender gap.
Women in Nepal’s digital landscape face systemic barriers that limit their full participation in ICT. Deep-seated biases in hiring, restricted access to digital literacy programs and weak cybersecurity protections perpetuate gender disparities. Key challenges also include limited mentorship opportunities, financial barriers to accessing education and training, and inadequate support for work-life balance, making it difficult for women to return to the workforce after career breaks.
Despite increasing internet accessibility (with women making up 43.6 percent of Nepal’s total social media users) this connectivity does not equate to equal opportunities in the digital economy. Many women continue to face online harassment, cyber threats and limited exposure to tech-driven employment, reinforcing their marginalization in Nepal’s digital transformation. Furthermore, Nepal’s policy framework lacks explicit mandates for gender equity in ICT, offering insufficient legal protections for digital safety and empowerment. Without deliberate action, these gaps will widen, leaving women on the periphery of Nepal’s digital progress rather than at its center.
The way forward
Despite the stark differences, the same study shows that the ICT sector is gradually becoming more inclusive for women, offering signs of progress toward equality. Encouragingly, wage disparity appears less pronounced in Nepal’s ICT sector, with 87.9 percent of surveyed women reporting no compensation differences compared to male counterparts. Women are also recognized for their strong ethical professionalism, effective customer relations and innovative thinking, underscoring their potential to shape the industry. Much remains to be done to ensure meaningful participation for women in digital transformation.
For Nepal’s digital transformation to be truly inclusive, efforts must begin with investing in girls in ICT from an early stage. Strengthening digital literacy programs in schools, communities and workplaces is essential to ensuring that young girls not only understand technological tools but can also envision career opportunities in ICT. Nepal must also push for stronger cybersecurity laws and workplace inclusivity policies to safeguard women’s participation in the sector without fear of harassment or discrimination. Investment in women-led tech initiatives can accelerate progress by providing funding, mentorship and incubation opportunities for female entrepreneurs in technology. Additionally, shifting cultural narratives is crucial—society must actively encourage young girls to pursue digital careers and showcase female tech leaders as role models.
Digital transformation in Nepal is more than a technological shift—it is a structural reimagining of economic, infrastructural and social development. As Nepal embraces digital tools to modernize public service delivery, governance and economic opportunities, ICT emerges as the essential enabler of this transition. However, for this transformation to be truly impactful, it must be inclusive, ensuring that women, who make up nearly half of the nation's population, are active contributors rather than passive beneficiaries.
Messages from ex-Prez Bhandari’s China visit
Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s nine-day visit to China has been interpreted differently by various sections of the society. Much of the commentary and analysis was based on reports in the Nepali media often lacking objectivity or verification. This tendency, with a few exceptions, remains a characteristic of Nepal’s media landscape.
Before delving into her high-level visit to Beijing and Gansu province accompanied by leaders of the CPN-UML and a Minister of the Government of Nepal, it is worth recalling who Bidya Devi Bhandari is. She served two terms as the president of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, becoming both the country’s first female president and a founding president of the republican era. During her tenure, she faithfully upheld the Constitution and acted as a guardian of national interest, always prioritizing sovereignty and integrity without compromise.
In Nepal’s political history, Bhandari has made lasting contributions that are widely recognized. She championed the women’s movement, significantly advancing women’s participation in policymaking, especially in politics. Before becoming the head of state, she was the vice-president of the CPN-UML—the party’s second-highest position. Although she entered the presidential office carrying her party’s legacy, she fulfilled the responsibilities of her high office with dignity and neutrality.
Now, let us return to the core issue: the nature of her visit to China. She visited the northern neighbor in the capacity of a former head of state, not as a CPN-UML leader. Contrary to reports in Kathmandu, she was not invited by the International Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC), but rather by an organization named the Chinese Association for International Understanding. However, it is true that the IDCPC facilitated the visit. During her stay in Beijing, she addressed a gathering of political parties from China’s neighboring countries as a guest speaker. She understandably presented herself as both a former head of state and a former vice-president of the CPN-UML, which is appropriate and does not harm anyone. After all, political leaders carry their legacies.
In Gansu, she delivered a statement on China’s Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), announced by President Xi Jinping in 2023, at a high-level political party meeting. China is a civilizational state with a recorded history of more than five thousand years. The revival of such a legacy is a proud moment for any nation. During her visit, Bhandari met with Chinese Vice-president Han Zheng in Gansu and held a meeting with Liu Jianchao, Minister of the IDCPC, in Beijing. In both meetings, she presented herself as a leader of Nepal’s communist movement and a former president. She also met Ji Bingxuan, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress and president of the Chinese Association for International Understanding. Their exchanges focused on goodwill and matters of mutual interest.
While she was participating in programs in Beijing, a wave of speculations and conspiracy theories flooded the media in Kathmandu. Much of the reporting misrepresented the nature of her engagements, fueling unnecessary political tensions. Upon the delegation’s return, Minister Damodar Bhandari held a press briefing to clarify the purpose and outcomes of the visit. He explained that the visit focused on strengthening bilateral ties and covered various issues, including trade, culture, civilizational linkages and people-to-people relations. Understandably, discussions also included party-to-party relations between the CPN-UML and the CPC.
These were the key diplomatic engagements of former President Bhandari during her visit to China. Everyone has the right to interpret the underlying messages, but interpretations must be based on facts and coherence with the agendas of the visit.
Let’s fairly evaluate the visit.
First, no Chinese leader said that Nepal’s communist parties must unite before the 2027 elections, as some Nepali media outlets inaccurately reported. Chinese officials are careful not to interfere in domestic political matters. They consistently emphasize political stability as a prerequisite for development and prosperity. When engaging with Nepali leaders, they often share their own historical experiences of national humiliation and urge Nepali counterparts to maintain stability and pursue development with patience and vision.
Second, Chinese leaders generally welcome guests with honor and respect—more so for someone like Madam Bhandari, who is both a former head of state and a figure with a strong communist legacy. The respect she received should be interpreted as respect for the people of Nepal and its leadership. There is no evidence to support the claim that China is projecting her as the next president of the CPN-UML or facilitating her return to active politics.
Third, some reports suggested that Minister Liu said Madam Bhandari was the only leader capable of uniting Nepal’s communist parties. This was another misrepresentation. While Minister Liu did praise Bhandari, he did not suggest that she was uniquely trusted by China to reunite the leftist forces. This claim is part of a deliberate effort to circulate misleading narratives.
Fourth, Madam Bhandari is not only a former president but also the spouse of Madan Bhandari, the architect of People’s Multiparty Democracy (PMD)—the guiding principle of the CPN-UML. Chinese leaders hold great respect for the late Madan Bhandari and are closely familiar with the PMD framework. Their respect for Madam Bhandari is naturally linked to her late husband’s ideology, which sought to creatively reorient Nepal’s communist movement.
Fifth, the issue of who will be the next president of the CPN-UML is entirely an internal matter of the party. It is neither dictated by Beijing nor influenced externally. KP Sharma Oli is the current president of the party and the Prime Minister of Nepal. He leads both roles with strength and stability. Oli has never faced a leadership challenge within the party. He is seen as the leader who protected and revived the party during difficult times. If and when he decides to step down, he will identify a suitable successor. Should Madam Bhandari re-enter active politics, it will only be with Oli’s endorsement.
Therefore, let us refrain from circulating fabricated plots. Let us respect our neighbors and avoid unnecessarily dragging them into our internal affairs. Let us show our leaders some respect and avoid fueling divisions.
Building trust in state institutions
The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) has filed a corruption case against former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and 91 others in connection with the Patanjali land scandal. The move has ignited a debate over whether the CIAA has the constitutional authority to investigate cabinet decisions, with legal experts and political analysts sharply divided.
Nepal’s party, the CPN (Unified Socialist), along with several opposition groups, has denounced the case as politically motivated. Many suspect that Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli may have influenced CIAA Chief Prem Kumar Rai to target Nepal, one of Oli’s most vocal critics, under the pretense of a corruption probe. The rift between the two leaders has been widening since the party’s split in 2021
Public reaction has been swift and skeptical. From social media to teashop gossip, many see this as an attempt to weaken the Unified Socialist and lure away its lawmakers. If successful, such a maneuver could boost the CPN-UML’s numbers in the House of Representatives, potentially pushing the Nepali Congress into second place.
But the greater concern is the deepening erosion of public trust in state institutions. This growing distrust poses a more serious threat to Nepal’s democratic order than the revival of monarchist sentiment.
Like many state institutions, the CIAA is losing legitimacy due to a flawed appointment process, selective investigations, and a deferential attitude toward the political elite—all of which compromise its constitutional autonomy. At the heart of the problem lies the method of appointing the CIAA’s leadership.
Chiefs and commissioners are often chosen based on political allegiance or their willingness to offer bribes for the position. Such practices fatally compromise the agency’s independence.
As a result, the CIAA is frequently accused of targeting “small fish” while ignoring large-scale corruption involving high-profile figures. Its track record in major cases is dismal, with many prosecutions falling apart due to poorly prepared charges at the Special Court.
Had the CIAA built a reputation for fair and rigorous investigations, the current case against Nepal might not have provoked such intense skepticism.
This isn’t just about one institution. Across the board, Nepal’s key democratic institutions are rapidly losing public confidence. The recent delay in appointing the Governor of Nepal Rastra Bank is a case in point, which was marked by indecision and political bargaining at the highest level.
Meanwhile, the judiciary’s credibility continues to decline. One controversial verdict after another has led many to question the impartiality of the courts. Just two weeks ago, the Janakpur high court acquitted former Nepali Congress lawmaker Mohammad Aftab Alam in connection with the 2008 Rautahat blast and subsequent killing of those injured.
Despite strong testimony from legal experts, witnesses, and journalists implicating Alam, the court found him not guilty. Such rulings fuel public despair and reinforce the perception that justice in Nepal is hostage to politics and impunity.
The executive branch fares no better. Public trust in the government is at an all-time low, driven by repeated accusations of corruption, opacity, and indifference to citizens’ concerns. One glaring example is the unwillingness of the Prime Minister and ministers to disclose their property details more than a year after the current NC–UML coalition took power.
If Nepal’s political parties are serious about defending the current system against royalist and other anti-democratic forces, they must begin by restoring faith in public institutions. That starts with overhauling the deeply flawed appointment process. Too often, constitutional bodies are staffed not by competent, independent professionals but by political loyalists and former bureaucrats with party affiliations.
These appointees remain beholden to the leaders who installed them, rendering institutions ineffective and subservient. Far from being autonomous, many constitutional bodies now operate as extensions of the executive. The judiciary is no exception.
Over the past two decades, political interference in the justice system has become so normalized that ordinary citizens can identify the political leanings of Supreme Court justices based on their past affiliations. This perceived bias has severely undermined the legitimacy of court rulings.
Both the judiciary and legislature operate in the shadow of partisan influence. Other institutions, including the Nepal Police, Nepal Army, and various regulatory agencies, are also viewed as corrupt and politicized
Because political parties remain at the center of power, the impetus for reform must come from them. Yet history shows a troubling pattern: when prominent political figures are implicated in corruption, their parties work to weaken or discredit oversight bodies. This has been the case since the early 1990s, when the CPN-UML resisted unfavorable court rulings, followed by the Nepali Congress in the 2000s.
After 2006, the Maoists and Madhes-based parties attacked the credibility of state institutions, and now, newer parties like the Rastriya Swatantra Party publicly challenge investigations and court decisions. This persistent trend has done lasting damage to the credibility of Nepal’s democratic institutions.
Political parties often proclaim their commitment to democracy, but that commitment must be judged by actions—not words. True dedication to democratic values requires strengthening institutional integrity, not undermining it for short-term political gain. On this front, Nepal’s political leadership has repeatedly failed.
Public faith in the current political class is near collapse. To address this deepening crisis, Nepal urgently needs principled, accountable leadership at all levels—federal, provincial, and local. These leaders must ensure that public institutions function independently, deliver on their mandates, and operate without political interference.
Today, state institutions are widely seen as corrupt, politicized, inefficient, and disconnected from the public. If political parties genuinely wish to safeguard the political system, they must embrace a long-term, systemic reform agenda rooted in the spirit of the 2015 Constitution.
Although the Constitution enshrines the separation of powers, genuine institutional reform has yet to follow. Nepal does not need a constitutional amendment, but it does need a comprehensive review aimed at strengthening the architecture of democracy. Only then can the country’s political system hope to survive and thrive.
