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In a turbulent world where a polycrisis looms—from Ukraine to Iran—hot conflicts remain unresolved through diplomacy, and the developed world shows fractures, as seen in the recent G7 summit in Canada, multilateral efforts are withering. A rare exception is European unity in the Ukraine conflict. Against this backdrop, cooperation in South Asia becomes especially noteworthy, particularly given that nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan were on the brink of war after the terror attacks in Kashmir’s Pahalgam.

Amid these tensions, a positive development emerges. Nepal has begun supplying 40 megawatts (MW) of electricity to Bangladesh via India. This is a significant step for one of the world’s least interconnected regions. But why is this a crucial milestone in South Asia’s energy landscape?

South Asia is undergoing an energy transition. India, the world’s third-largest power consumer, saw peak demand reach 250 GW this year, with projections suggesting 458 GW by 2032. Bangladesh’s peak demand is nearing 16,000 MW and is expected to exceed 34,000 MW by 2030. As India expands its renewable energy capacity and Bangladesh shifts from gas and coal, both countries are increasingly turning to cross-border power exchanges to supplement domestic supply.

Nepal and Bhutan represent untapped potential. The Himalayan nations possess hydropower capacities of 40,000 MW and 30,000 MW, respectively, yet less than 10 percent has been harnessed. With proper infrastructure, they could become the region’s clean energy reservoirs.

The feasibility of power trading hinges on infrastructure, where quiet but meaningful progress has been made. Since 2016, the Nepal–India Dhalkebar–Muzaffarpur 400 kV line has enabled Nepal to export electricity to India. The recent Nepal-Bangladesh power transfer utilized this line, routing through India’s eastern grid via the HVDC Baharampur–Bheramara link.

BIMSTEC has sought to capitalize on this momentum. Its Grid Interconnection Master Plan, developed with ADB support and approved in 2018, outlines technical strategies for an integrated electricity market. The Energy Centre in Bengaluru, envisioned as a BIMSTEC knowledge hub, is expected to foster policy alignment and trade facilitation.

Yet BIMSTEC remains institutionally weak. While the recent trilateral power exchange occurred within its territory, it was not coordinated by BIMSTEC itself,  which is a critical distinction. Unlike the EU’s energy union or Africa’s Power Pools, BIMSTEC lacks a formal regulatory framework for energy trade. There is no central market operator, no unified dispute mechanism, and no standardized tariff system. Without a dedicated trading platform, transactions rely on bilateral deals, contingent on India’s willingness to facilitate them.

This model has worked so far, but its scalability is uncertain. As new projects like Bhutan’s Sunkosh and Nepal’s Arun-IV come online, challenges around pricing, grid stability, and regional capacity planning will grow. A regional market cannot thrive indefinitely on ad-hoc bilateral agreements.

Political commitment within BIMSTEC is also uneven. While India, Nepal, and Bangladesh have made progress, members like Myanmar and Sri Lanka remain peripheral to energy discussions, and Thailand’s involvement has been largely rhetorical.

A multilateral institutional framework is needed—not just for regulation but also to develop infrastructure, from unlocking Himalayan hydropower to building a shared grid. It could also create an integrated market for surplus power. However, this requires sustained engagement. BIMSTEC could learn from ASEAN, where economic cooperation persists despite territorial disputes.

India and Bangladesh aim for net-zero emissions by 2070. With rising energy demand and a push for cleaner solutions, investments in hydropower and other renewables are critical. As a neighbor to most BIMSTEC members, India should not only facilitate power exchanges but also actively help build the necessary infrastructure. This is also a strategic imperative for Indian and Bangladeshi exports, particularly to the EU, which will soon impose a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) tax.

The Nepal-Bangladesh power deal, enabled by India, is more than a regional energy milestone. It underscores a geopolitical and developmental opportunity South Asia cannot ignore. Amid climate crises, energy insecurity, and volatile bilateral ties, cross-border power trade offers a path to redefine cooperation through economic interdependence.

Yet without a multilateral framework, such exchanges remain fragile, dependent on India’s strategic calculus. The absence of standardized rules, dispute resolution, and long-term planning leaves the region vulnerable to political shifts and technical failures. For India, formalizing a BIMSTEC energy community is not just goodwill—it aligns with its climate diplomacy and trade competitiveness in a CBAM-regulated world.

The real challenge is not technical feasibility but political vision. South Asia’s energy future hinges on its ability to institutionalize trust, integrate equity, and depoliticize infrastructure.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is also associated as a Life Member of the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi 

Nepal’s capital market, represented by the Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE), is undergoing a pivotal moment. Once seen as a promising platform for investment and economic mobilization, it now stands marred by widespread manipulation and unethical practices that compromise its credibility. While the trading volume has increased and the number of retail investors has multiplied over the years, the surge in activity has also invited a disturbing trend: systematic market malpractices designed to mislead, exploit and ultimately strip small investors of their capital.

Among the most pervasive of these practices is the manipulation of share prices through coordinated trading, a tactic that exploits small-cap companies with low floating shares. Groups of traders often conspire to corner such stocks—accumulating large quantities and controlling the float. By executing a series of synchronized buy and sell orders through different accounts they control, they create the illusion of heightened market activity and demand. This simulated momentum attracts unsuspecting retail investors who, seeing the surge, interpret it as a sign of growth or news-based rally. In reality, they are walking into a trap. Once these orchestrators have driven up prices and lured in enough buyers, they quickly offload their shares at inflated rates, leaving latecomers saddled with overvalued assets.

This behavior is enabled and obscured by the use of multiple dematerialized (demat) and Trading Management System (TMS) accounts, often opened under the names of family members or associates. These accounts, though legally distinct, are in practice controlled by a single orchestrator, allowing them to shuffle shares around and simulate market demand. By exploiting NEPSE’s lenient policy on multiple accounts per individual, manipulators hide their tracks with relative ease. The lack of comprehensive Know Your Customer (KYC) implementation adds another layer of opacity, making it exceedingly difficult for regulators to identify patterns of abuse or hold culprits accountable.

Price manipulation often intersects with insider trading, which continues to thrive in the absence of robust regulatory deterrence. Those with early access to corporate decisions or financial information use it to strategically time their trades. In some cases, prices are deliberately inflated through internal transfers before being pushed onto the public with aggressive promotion tactics. Retail investors are then exposed to these stocks at their artificial peaks, unaware that the fundamentals of the companies in question do not justify such valuations. By the time the truth unfolds, the orchestrators have exited, and the average investor is left with significant losses.

An alarming dimension of this scheme is the misuse of social media platforms. Sites like Facebook, YouTube and emerging voice platforms such as Clubhouse are increasingly being used to spread misinformation, generate artificial hype, and create momentum for otherwise illiquid or fundamentally weak stocks. Traders pose as analysts or experts and recommend stocks with confident predictions of sharp price increases. These discussions are timed with manipulative trades in the market, creating a feedback loop that convinces the public of the stock’s potential. When the bubble bursts, it is often too late for the retail investor to escape.

Adding to the opacity is the practice of fund transfers between related accounts to obscure the money trail. Manipulators move capital across multiple bank accounts under family names or proxy ownership to fund share purchases or mask the source of the investment. This kind of financial obfuscation makes regulatory tracing cumbersome and dilutes the possibility of legal intervention. In some cases, these same actors even default on broker payments, taking advantage of the trust-based relationships between clients and their brokerage firms. By settling trades but withholding payments, they place brokers in financial jeopardy and erode trust within the trading ecosystem.

The use of netting—where trades are balanced across multiple controlled accounts to avoid generating a net position—is another technique used to manipulate prices while maintaining an appearance of normalcy. This tactic helps manipulators push and pull prices during the day, all while ensuring their overall exposure remains neutral by the end of the session. The end result is a market that appears healthy on the surface but is deeply flawed beneath.

The implications of these activities are far-reaching. First and foremost, they create a hostile environment for the average investor. Many enter the market with the hopes of earning modest returns, only to find themselves caught in traps laid by sophisticated manipulators. As losses mount, trust in the market diminishes, driving potential investors away. This is particularly harmful in a developing economy like Nepal, where capital markets should ideally be a channel for democratized wealth creation and economic participation. Instead, the current environment fosters inequality, where those with the knowledge and resources to manipulate the system grow richer at the expense of the uninformed.

From a macroeconomic perspective, this kind of manipulation distorts the price discovery mechanism of the stock market. In an ideal system, stock prices reflect the underlying fundamentals of a company—its profitability, governance, market potential and operational integrity. But when prices are artificially inflated or deflated through manipulative trades, capital is misallocated. Poor-performing companies may receive undue attention and investment, while fundamentally sound firms may be ignored. This harms the broader economy by diverting resources from productive to speculative uses.

Addressing these issues requires a coordinated, multi-pronged reform strategy that targets both the structural loopholes and behavioral incentives that currently enable market abuse. Regulatory oversight must be significantly strengthened. SEBON, as the primary market regulator, needs to enhance its surveillance capabilities, adopting real-time monitoring systems that can detect patterns of matching trades, coordinated activity, and unusual volume surges. The technology exists—it is a matter of political and institutional will to deploy it effectively. Alongside this, NEPSE must overhaul its trading platform to plug known loopholes. Transfers of shares between brokers or across accounts without scrutiny should be restricted or tightly monitored.

There is a compelling need to impose stricter controls on account creation. Limiting each individual to a single demat and TMS account, along with robust biometric KYC processes, will curb the use of multiple accounts for manipulation. SEBON should also require the declaration of beneficial ownership in all trades. Without full transparency on who is ultimately controlling a transaction, regulators cannot effectively enforce accountability.

The penal framework must evolve to reflect the severity of market manipulation. Financial penalties alone may not be sufficient deterrents; trading bans and even criminal prosecution must be part of the regulatory toolkit. Enforcement actions should also be made public, not just to set examples but to build investor confidence that the system protects their interests.

Regulating the influence of social media is another urgent frontier. Financial discussions on public platforms should be brought under the purview of regulatory oversight. Collaborations between SEBON and social media companies can help in tracking, flagging, and penalizing accounts that promote stocks for manipulative purposes. A regulatory framework could also be created to license or verify credible financial commentators, ensuring that their analyses meet ethical and factual standards.

Protecting brokers and incentivizing their role in fraud prevention is equally important. Brokers are often the first to sense suspicious behavior but may hesitate to act due to fear of losing clients or facing legal repercussions. Regulatory bodies must establish clear reporting mechanisms and ensure that brokers are legally protected and encouraged to report red flags. A compensation fund for retail investors, supported by penalties collected from offenders, could provide a safety net for those affected by fraudulent activity.

Education remains the long-term solution. Without empowering investors to think critically, avoid herd behavior and analyze fundamentals, reforms can only go so far. Awareness campaigns, seminars and digital content aimed at educating the public about common manipulation tactics can create a more resilient investor base. Retail investors must be taught how to interpret company filings, understand earnings reports and spot red flags in stock behavior.

Nepal’s stock market is at a crossroads. On one side lies the path of reform, transparency and long-term stability, on the other a continuation of short-termism, manipulation and systemic erosion. The market cannot flourish in an environment where deception outweighs disclosure, and exploitation overshadows equity. A functioning capital market is not just a feature of a modern economy—it is its lifeline. Nepal must choose to protect this vital institution by acting now, decisively and with unwavering commitment to integrity.

As we mark the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on June 26 this year, it is the right time to reflect on our efforts to control drug abuse in Nepal. Even though Nepal has strict laws against drug abuse, the number of drug users in the country is increasing by more than five percent every year. This worrying trend continues even under the federal system where public health falls under the shared responsibility of the central, provincial and local governments.

At present, the Narcotic Drugs (Control) Act, 1976 is a special law governing the use of narcotic and psychotropic substances. Nepal has also been a member of the International Narcotics Control Board since 1987. This law replaced the earlier Intoxicating Substance Act, 2017 (1961) and the Intoxicating Substance Rules, 2019 (1962), meaning drug control was legally recognized even before the 1976 Act.

Despite provisions for heavy fines and even life imprisonment, drug abuse continues to rise. This clearly shows that tougher punishments alone are not enough to solve the abuse problems. There must also be other efforts such as public awareness, counseling, rehabilitation programs, and community support to reduce and prevent drug abuse effectively.

Speaking through data

The data released by the Home Ministry last year suggests that the number of illicit drug abusers in Nepal is increasing by 5.06 percent every year taking the total users to an estimated 156,821 as of mid-April, 2024. As per Nepal Drug Users’ Survey-2020, published by Home Ministry, the number of drug users in the country stood at 130,424 in 2020, which is the increment rate of 5.06 percent annually. If the survey report is something to stand by, the majority of drug abusers (69.5 percent) in Nepal are aged 20-29 years. The proportion of drug users was reported in Bagmati province (35.6 per cent) and lowest portion in Karnali (1.4 percent). 

Rigorous penal regime 

The Narcotic Drugs (Control) Act of 1976 prohibits the cultivation, production, purchase, sale, distribution, export, import, consumption or storage of cannabis/marijuana. The law also bans the cultivation of opium, the manufacture of narcotic drugs and the sale, purchase, possession, trafficking, import or export of such substances.

Section 14 of the 1976 Act outlines the penalties. It stipulates that if any individual found consuming cannabis/marijuana shall be punished with imprisonment for up to one month or fine of up to
Rs 2,000. A person found in consuming opium, coca or other drugs prepared out of them would be sentenced for a jail term of up to one year or up to Rs 10,000 fine. The Act also provides for 2-10 years of jail sentence and fine of Rs 100,000 to Rs 2m on a person found convicted in consuming prohibited drugs other than that of natural or artificial drugs and psychotropic substances. 

Also, if a person is found with marijuana of more than 10 kilograms, the law prescribes a prison term of 2-10 years along with a fine ranging from Rs 15,000 to Rs 100,000.

If a person is found cultivating up to 25 opium or coca plants, he may be sentenced to imprisonment for one to three years and fined between Rs 5,000 and Rs 25,000. But, in case of cultivating more than 25 plants of opium, the stipulated jail term for the said offence stands at three to 10 years of jail term, and fine of Rs 25000 to Rs 200,000. 

In case of trafficking of prohibited drugs, except that of cultivation and consumption of opium, coca or other drugs made out of them, of up to 25 grams, the prison term stipulated is five to up to 10 years and Five to Twenty-Five thousand rupees of fine. But, the jail term of 15 years to life imprisonment and fine of Rs 500,000 to Rs 2,500,000 has been prescribed for causing trafficking of prohibited drugs, except that of cultivation and consumption of opium, coca or other drugs made out of them, of more than 100 grams.  

The way forward 

The researches show that the controlled drugs, which are comparatively less expensive, are mostly used by drug abusers. The misuse of pharmaceutical drugs such as Tramadol (Opidol) tablets/capsules, Nitrazepam (Nitrosun) tablets, Pheniramine maleate (Avil) injections and Promethazine (Phenargan) injections is on the rise.

Importantly, the deployment of digital technologies such as scanners and detection systems could help identify drugs being smuggled either on individuals or within their belongings as they enter or exit Nepal. It’s imperative to have a balanced mechanism/strategy that combines legal enforcement with preventive, rehabilitative and awareness-driven interventions. There could be a new drug justice regime, where health professionals, legal experts, psychiatrists, drug experts, pharmacists and among others collaborate and cooperate, to evolve mechanisms to fight against drug abuse.  

There could be no one-size-fits-all solution to tackle drug abuse. A balanced approach is needed—combining strict laws, public awareness about legal and health risks, and understanding the financial and career impacts of drug use. Observing the International Day against Drug Abuse holds real meaning only if we can reduce drug abuse and its harmful effects in everyday life.

The authors are officers serving in the judiciary

Non-banking assets are a rising risk in Nepal’s banking system, despite not receiving as much attention as inflation or interest rates. They are a sign of more serious issues with credit risk, loan recovery, and regulatory supervision. 

What are Non-banking assets? When a borrower defaults to pay the loan, the loan becomes a non-performing loan (NPL), and the bank can take legal action to recover the debt. When collateral, such as real estate, cars, or machinery, has been pledged as security for a secured loan, the bank has the authority to seize the assets. In order to recover the outstanding loan, the bank may then put these assets for auction. If the auction of seized collateral is successfully completed, the loan is settled.

During settlement if the auctioned amount exceeds the outstanding loan, the bank returns the surplus to the borrower but if the amount is insufficient to cover the debt, the bank may take further legal action to recover the remaining amount. These seized assets acquired by the financial institution after an unsuccessful auction are referred to as non-banking assets (NBAs).

They are no longer utilized in the bank’s main lending activities and hence do not generate income for financial institutes so banks attempt to recover default loans via sale of these NBAs as soon as possible or convert them to banking assets as per the law. 

How do assets become non-banking assets? In Nepal's banking sector generally, loans are disbursed against collateral after accurate valuation with repayment terms and mutual agreement between the mortgagee and mortgagor. According to Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) Directives 2081, loans are classified based on the duration of repayment delays ranging from performing loans (pass and watch list) to non-performing loans (sub-standard, doubtful and loss).

When a loan provided to the borrower is classified as a non-performing loan, the bank offers the borrower an opportunity to repay the loan before initiating legal recovery procedures. The collateral pledged for loans, including real estate, stocks, automobiles, machines, etc. may be seized by the bank in the case that a borrower fails to pay the loan, and the financial institution attempts to recover the loan through public auction. If these seized assets are not purchased by the public through auction, the lender (the bank) self, accepts the assets and it is referred to as non-banking assets. These non-banking assets should be sold as soon as possible however, with the Board decision and approval from Nepal Rastra Bank, such assets may be converted into banking assets if necessary. 

A mid-May 2024 report by the NRB shows that NBAs of banks and financial institutes (of “A”, “B” and “C” categories) is Rs 27.6bn till mid May 2024. Now the value has reached to Rs 45.11bn till mid-May 2025 which has been increased by Rs 17.51bn since last year. A significant portion of these assets are held by commercial banks. 

The NRB reports that 20 Class “A” financial institutions have non-banking assets valued at Rs 38.48bn as of mid-May 2025, which is an increase by Rs 14.78bn from mid-July 2024. Similarly, development banks have Rs 3.9bn worth of non-banking assets as of mid-May 2025. Likewise, finance companies have Rs 2.72bn worth of non-banking assets as of mid-May 2025. Financial sector’s continuous battle to get rid of mortgaged properties in a slow real estate market post-pandemic are the causes of this spike. 

NBAs burdens both sides of the balance sheet. First, they do not generate income, unlike performing loans that yield interest. Second, they come with a significant regulatory burden, as the central bank mandates that banks and financial institutions set aside a 100 percent loss provision once a loan remains overdue for more than a year. Third, NBA represents tie-up capital limiting the bank's liquidity and ability to generate future income. In other words, the longer the NBA stays unsold, the more it strains the bank’s liquidity and profitability. In today’s context, despite frequently publishing notices for an auction, they have been unable to sell these assets.

To prevent the accumulation of NBAs, financial institutions must adopt steps like analysis of assets or projects requiring accurate valuation for asset-backed loans and a comprehensive SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis for project base loans. However, it is important to give high priority on repayment capacity rather than just collateral valuation. For example, an individual taking the loan of Rs 3m for 10 year’s period at 8.5 percent interest rate, backed by Rs 5m collateral may seem low risk but with a monthly income of Rs 60,000 and existing family and living expenses, paying EMI of over Rs 37,000 could be difficult and unmanageable.

Such cases highlight the chances of increasing default risk and hence lead to non-banking assets so, banks must enhance their credit risk assessment processes using advanced analytics, predictive models, and periodic reviews. Leading financial institutions such as JP Morgan Chase (USA), ICICI Bank (India), Standard Chartered Bank (Global) have successfully implemented these models to manage credit risk. In addition to repayment capacity, credit rating systems for borrowers should be established in Nepal. Countries like India and the US use credit scores to assess borrowers risk that helps to improve transparency, reduce risky lending and encourage responsible financial behavior which ultimately helps to prevent loan defaults. Moreover, regulatory bodies must strictly enforce their acts, directives, and circulars.

In Nepal, ineffective regulation is evident as several banks have high NPL rates. While NRB is mandated to intervene if the NPL exceeds five percent, Karnali Development Bank reached an alarming 40.85 percent NPL before NRB took action. It has raised a huge question about delays and inefficiencies in regulatory oversight. A regulatory body in collaboration with financial institutions must conduct a financial awareness program about financial responsibilities, repayment obligations, and the consequences of defaulting to prevent the accumulation of non-banking assets. 

Furthermore, NRB should constantly assess the impact of NBAs on key performance indicators such as profitability and capital adequacy so that it can strengthen Nepal’s financial system.The rise in NBAs reflects deeper weakness in Nepal’s financial sector. Without stronger and efficient regulation and constant monitoring, NBAs will continue to threaten stability and it will gradually destroy trust in the banking system.