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In a historic election, the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has decimated the established and traditional parties in the country, including the Nepali Congress (NC) led by Gagan Thapa and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) led by former prime minister KP Sharma Oli. The landslide victory is significant because it is the first time any party has achieved a majority since the enactment of the 2015 constitution. This represents a major change in Nepali politics, as the country has not experienced a stable government in the past two decades. No government in Nepal has completed a full five-year term. 

For the first time, Nepal may witness a majority government with a full term. The Nepal election for 275 parliamentary seats is a mix of first-past-the-post (FPTP) and proportional representation (PR) systems, which makes it more difficult to form a stable majority government, especially when thousands of candidates are in the fray. However, the RSP’s historic win is set to change that perception.

RSP’s victory: The fall of the old guard

The RSP had a meteoric rise after the popular former Kathmandu mayor Balendra (Balen) Shah became its prime ministerial candidate. However, the rise of Balen Shah and RSP is owed to the traditional politics of old leaders, most of whom served their interests. The March election became necessary after the GenZ protests toppled the government in September last year. These protests were a result of years of corruption, misgovernance, unemployment and instability in the country. 

However, the social media ban by the government acted as an immediate trigger for the protests, which were fuelled by widespread discontent among the youth regarding the government’s failure to address their concerns. The uprising was so intense that over 70 people lost their lives, and infrastructure worth Rs 84.45bn was damaged. Later, the uprising came to symbolize the clash between the old generation and the new.

The RSP promises a new and a better future for the Nepali people. It promises expansion of the economy to $100bn, per capita income of around $3000, creation of 1.2m jobs, a growth rate of seven percent, and universal healthcare insurance in five years. These are ambitious targets for a landlocked country like Nepal. Though promises like these are great for attracting the attention of voters, it remains to be seen how the RSP plans to deliver once it forms the government.

Analysts say the RSP is experiencing a groundswell, particularly because Nepali politics offers few alternatives due to repeated failures after each election, which makes the emergence of new parties like the RSP and candidates like Balen particularly significant in providing fresh perspectives and potential solutions to longstanding issues. Expectations are high that the emergence of a new legitimate government in Nepal will instill some stability in the country.

However, the stability of Nepal will depend on how well the new government implements the reforms without alienating the general people. This entails addressing the needs and concerns of various communities and promoting inclusive participation in the political process, which includes actively engaging with marginalized groups and fostering dialogue to build trust and cooperation among different sectors of society. Inclusive government is the key to a stable government. The new government will need to tackle the problems of corruption and unemployment (currently above 20 percent) and work toward effective governance.

Though the rise of RSP and Balen Shah is interlinked with the GenZ revolution and their demands for accountability in governance, there is no clear roadmap yet for how the RSP will fulfil the demands of GenZ raised in the 10-point agreement. The agreement itself was marred with controversy because not everyone supported it, and there may be significant opposition from various political factions and civil society groups that question its validity. 

Moreover, the legitimacy of the interim government and its authority to sign the agreement may come under scrutiny. There could be significant pressure on the RSP, considering it rode to the election victory on the back of the GenZ movement.

Commanding a majority government has its pitfalls. Since the March election has provided an extraordinary mandate to the RSP, the opposition does not have enough numbers to restrain or hold the new government accountable. Moreover, the latest election was fought more on individual popularity than the party ideology, which raises the possibility of high-handedness by Balen Shah, whose celebrity more or less carried the election for the RSP.

Balen has no clear political ideology or affiliations, and he joined the RSP recently. He has some administrative experience as mayor, but he got criticism for driving out vendors by using strong police tactics in Kathmandu. During his tenure, he used bulldozers to demolish illegal structures and also stopped collecting garbage from Singha Durbar to enforce cleanliness in the city of Kathmandu. Though the mandate has made it easier for Nepal to reset its traditional fractional and unstable politics, it does not provide a magic wand to its troubles. The new government not only has to work toward the aspirations of people, especially GenZ, but it will also have to bring to justice those who engaged in mindless violence, rioting and vandalism during the September protests. 

However, after the 10-point agreement legitimized the GenZ protests, it raised questions about how proactively the government would prosecute those who perpetrated the arson and violence. There are also chances of retribution against officials who fired at unarmed protesters. The general election mandate will not only have an impact on the domestic politics but may also impact Nepal’s foreign policy and geopolitics.

Nepal’s role in South Asian geopolitics: From ‘buffer state’ to ‘vibrant bridge’

The outcome of the election could reshape Nepal’s diplomacy. It is expected that new actors in power would bring new energy and ideas to advance Nepal’s foreign policy objectives. However, the advent of new political forces in power could bring unpredictability and could be cause for concern for India and China. During the September protests, Nepal’s economy took a hit, and infrastructure worth billions was damaged, which has made it expedient for the new government to receive foreign aid and development grants from its partners. 

Therefore, the RSP government will need to chart out a workable diplomatic plan to balance its relationship with India and China.

Political stability in Nepal will foster economic development, usher in social stability, and maintain law and order, which will directly impact India’s open border. India has long been Nepal’s development partner. Recognizing this, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has welcomed the victories of RSP leaders Shah and Lamichhane. Modi spoke with them over the phone and underlined India’s willingness to work with the new government. It is expected that the RSP will not lose the balancing diplomacy of Nepal in favor of one partner over another. Its election manifesto provides some insights into its foreign policy objectives. 

In its election manifesto, RSP stated that it wants to reposition Nepal from a “buffer state” to a “vibrant bridge” between India and China. However, this is not a new objective. Earlier KP Sharma Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal had the same objective of repositioning Nepal’s role, albeit without any success.  

Moreover, the old irritants between the India-Nepal relationship are likely to continue. The RSP has consistently demanded a firm Nepali stance on Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura, citing historical treaties and rejecting foreign activities without consent. Their victory, which emphasizes sovereignty and anti-corruption, could intensify pressure on India for border talks amid the RSP’s push for strategic autonomy. The nationalistic posture of Balen Shah on issues such as “Greater Nepal” could be another irritant in the relationship. 

In 2023, after India installed a mural of “Akhand Bharat” (a Greater India)—encompassing many of its neighbors—Shah hung a “Greater Nepal” map in his office, including territories that once belonged to Nepal but now lie within India’s borders. His supporters hailed the move as an assertive counter to foreign dominance. 

However, as a prime minister, he will need to be more flexible while dealing with a bigger power. The confrontationist attitude might do more harm than good, as it could jeopardize crucial trade agreements and diplomatic relations that are essential for Nepal's development. Since Nepal needs India for its development and trade, the RSP government will need to reach an understanding with India without compromising Nepal’s sovereignty.

At the same time, it is hoped that the incoming government will prioritize Nepal’s relationship with India, as it remains a major source of Nepal’s imports and facilitates Nepal’s exports to other countries through its ports, airports and waterways. Unlike the 2015 blockade that raised the price of energy in Nepal, India has already built a petroleum pipeline that will provide an uninterrupted supply to its neighbors. Amid uncertainty in the oil market, India would remain the main supplier with an agreement to supply 1,000 metric tonnes of LNG in the next five years. 

Nepal-India ties will not be limited to the ‘Roti-Beti’ relationship but will be multidimensional, encompassing trade, transit, energy and investment, which will generate jobs for Nepalis. India contributes one-third of Nepal’s investment, and a stable policy would boost investor confidence. Issues like the unresolved border issue would be a major challenge, as the pressure to resolve the dispute would be high.

Unlike India, Nepal’s relationship with its northern neighbor, China, faces distinctive challenges directly linked to the recent GenZ uprising. The corruption issues surrounding Pokhara International Airport could create minor disturbances in Nepal-China relations, especially since GenZ protested against rampant corruption in the country, making this a sensitive issue for any government. 

The perception of the RSP government shielding corrupt officials raises concerns about transparency and accountability in governance. This might also bring scrutiny to other Chinese projects and the rising debt for not going ahead with the stalled projects, as Nepal needs investment to create more jobs. Balen Shah removed a Chinese infrastructure project, Damak Industrial Park in Jhapa, which was closer to India’s Siliguri corridor, from the manifesto—a cautious move, one could say, due to corruption issues and India’s concerns. China’s interest in Nepal is also shaped by concerns over Tibetan activism, Western security penetration, and Indian influence. It remains to be seen how the RSP will address these concerns.

Nonetheless, China is an important development partner of Nepal. Earlier, It  had exhibited its interest in investing in Nepal’s hydropower sector, even though it had to withdraw from the West Seti Hydropower Project due to cost escalations. 

While political turnover in Kathmandu may alter individual relationships, Beijing’s diversified channels allow it to adapt. Therefore, this does not necessarily weaken China’s influence on Nepal’s politics—it redistributes it.

Recently, the United States has emerged as another major player in Nepal. Nepal has again become strategically sensitive for Washington, DC, as the US has committed nearly $550m to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for spending on a power transmission network and highway projects. The US views Nepal through the lens of democratic resilience and Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

US officials have emphasized electoral integrity and institutional support while warning against predatory financing models that compromise sovereignty. The MCC commitment signals sustained US engagement even amid competing global priorities. The US offers Nepal a partnership model that reinforces rather than constrains its autonomy, giving Nepal the opportunity to continue diversifying its external partnerships. However, India and China would not want the presence of the US in Nepal. 

China has already raised concerns over the MCC funding. The RSP government in Nepal would need to do careful balancing so as not to irk its neighbors, yet it would receive meaningful aid from the US. China views the US’s investment in the MCC Project, which funds connectivity and energy projects, as a challenge to China’s BRI.

Thus, the Balen Shah-led RSP government in Nepal has got the mandate to make meaningful changes and put Nepal on the development path. It also has the chance to relook at its foreign policy, seek new development partners, and strengthen its existing partnerships. However, it has to tread cautiously and balance the relations between competing powers, such as India and China, without inviting any ire from them. 

It will be a major challenge for the incoming government to balance the interests of its neighbors and ensure that Nepal’s own developmental aspirations are not caught up in geopolitics. India needs to acknowledge the political transformation in Nepal, which promises reforms through youth participation in politics. Both India and China need a fresh approach to deal with a government that represents a new political class and a leadership that represents the youth.

India is providing political, diplomatic, and logistical support for Nepal’s March 5 elections, viewing the polls as the most viable path out of the country’s ongoing political crisis. Drawing lessons from recent developments in Bangladesh and following Nepal’s GenZ–led movement, New Delhi conveyed a clear message to both the government and major political parties: elections are the only way forward.

India was the first country to welcome the inauguration of Sushila Karki as interim head of the government. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi subsequently held talks with her, signaling strong diplomatic backing. Much of the Western political establishments also aligned with India’s position of holding elections on schedule. While Western partners emphasized the need for reforms prior to the polls, India argued that restoring law and order and conducting timely elections should be the immediate priority.

Initially, the leadership of both the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML appeared hesitant about proceeding with the elections. According to political sources, Indian officials urged the NC leadership to take a firm decision in favor of elections, a move that also pressured the UML to follow suit. India further encouraged NC leaders to resolve internal disputes related to the special general convention and focus their attention on the electoral process.

The Karki-led interim government also sought India’s support in conducting the elections. This reportedly influenced its decision not to recall Nepal’s Ambassador to New Delhi, Shankar Sharma, who was appointed under the Nepali Congress quota.

India has since provided all logistical assistance requested by Nepal. The first and second tranches of election-related support have already been delivered. Under the first tranche, India supplied 60 vehicles, while the second tranche included 250 vehicles. A third tranche of assistance is currently in the pipeline. According to diplomatic sources, India believes that the March 5 elections will help ensure the formation of a democratic government and contribute to political stability in Nepal.

New Delhi assessed that postponing the elections could open the door for external and internal forces to destabilize Nepal, with direct implications for India’s security interests.India and Western countries broadly share concerns over China’s expanding influence in Nepal.

My research as a scholar seeks to theorize Nepal’s foreign policy. While conducted from geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives, geo-economics is defined as a tool to achieve geopolitical goals, making the geopolitical discourse dominant in this study.

Although the term “geopolitics” was first coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899, Nepal had practiced geopolitics actively since the Lichchhavi Kingdom. The first Lichchhavi king, Manadev-1, exercised political power to safeguard and strengthen the state, engaged in military competition with neighboring states, and introduced the Manka currency, marking the beginning of Nepal’s geopolitical and geo-economic discourses. So, Nepal is one of the oldest states to practice the geopolitical and geoeconomic affairs in the world.

Nepal’s unique geopolitical context can be defined in terms of bilateral and trilateral frameworks. From the Lichchhavi period to 1950, bilateral geopolitics predominated.After the US began providing development aid to Nepal in 1951, Nepal’s geopolitics began shifting toward trilateralism. 

During the Cold War, Nepal’s geopolitics remained largely bilateral, but trilateral geopolitics began to develop slowly. The 1990–2010 period marked a rapid transition period (RTP) toward trilateral geopolitics, fully emerging after U.S. involvement through the MCC project’s feasibility study around 2012. This trilateral geopolitics is projected to persist at least until 2150. Its basis includes: the historical rise and fall of global powers, the declining influence of the USA, and China’s goals until 2049.

At the first level of analysis, this research takes into account the periods of five major powers in world history. This study considers the Achaemenid Persian Empire as the first powerful superpower in world history, which is regarded as having begun in 550 BCE and lasted for approximately 220 years. The Roman Empire is taken as the second superpower. It began in 27 BCE and lasted for about 500 years. This was the superpower that endured for the longest period in world history. 

The Mongol Empire was the third superpower, which is also recognized as the superpower that conquered the largest geographical area. This superpower existed from 1206 to 1368 CE. Similarly, the British Empire is identified as the fourth superpower in world history, and it is noted to have lasted for nearly 400 years. The most recent and current superpower to date is the United States of America, which has remained in that position for the past 80 years.

The second basis is the declining influence of the United States in the world. In terms of purchasing power parity, China surpassed the United States in economic power as early as 2014. Although the United States remains a superpower in the military sphere, its global dominance and role have been weakening. Under the current circumstances, the United States is not in a position to carry out direct military attacks against countries such as China, Russia, and North Korea. Even though there has been an informal form of strategic cooperation among Russia, China, and North Korea, an official strategic partnership was established between Russia and North Korea in June 2024. There are also differences of opinion between Europe and the United States on many issues. Institutions led by China have been increasingly challenging those led by the United States. As emerging powers grow stronger, the superpower has been becoming weaker.”

The third basis is China’s national commitment. On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution in 2049, China has already declared its determination to become a superpower in all fields by that time. If China establishes itself as a superpower by 2049, the basis for projecting how long it will remain in that position lies in examining the lifespans of past superpowers in world history, as mentioned above. The superpower with the shortest lifespan was the Mongol Empire, which maintained its influence for only 162 years. If China becomes a superpower by 2049, the duration of the United States’ status as a superpower would amount to only about 105 years, making it the shortest superpower to date.

Now, following historical trends of superpowers, the newly emerging superpower China appears likely to retain its superpower status for at least another 100 years, that is, until around 2150. On the other hand, India is also moving forward to become a superpower. Nepal lies between two emerging superpowers, and projections indicate that not only China as an emerging power, but also another global superpower will remain concentrated in this same geographical region for as long as China retains its superpower status. In such a situation, the theoretical foundation of Nepal’s politics and foreign policy is trilateral geopolitics, and the research projects that this will continue at least until 2150.

Among the mainstreaming theories of international relations, realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism are primarily taken into consideration. It is not possible here to include a debate on how these theories emerged; however, judging from where and by whom these theories were propounded, it becomes evident that they are not, and cannot be, comprehensive theories of international relations. In the course of the research, the biographies of a total of 28 theorists associated with these theories were examined. Those 28 theorists were affiliated with only six countries in total, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Greece, France, and Switzerland etc. At present, there are 195 countries in the world. The theories proposed and developed by theorists from just six countries are being studied by the remaining 189 countries. International relations are not the concern of only five or six countries. Whether or not the issues of the remaining 189 countries are included in these theories is a matter that requires serious research.

The same applies in the case of Nepal. Whether the issues, agendas, and the fundamental nature of Nepal’s geopolitics were included or not in the research of those theorists determines whether Nepal can claim ownership of those theories and whether those theories have been able to address Nepal’s core issues and agendas in international relations. Nepal does not appear to be in a position to adopt a realist approach within the current world structure, although military power remains indispensable as a component of national security. However, at present, it does not seem possible for Nepal to alter the trajectory of its relations with other countries through the use of military power. Similarly, liberal practices have also not strengthened Nepal’s dignity and international prestige. Therefore, by adopting realist and liberal policies, Nepal is not in a position to absolutely achieve its national interests, which is the experience of the past 150 years for Nepal.

In place of these theories, it has already been mentioned above that a trilateral geopolitical discourse is emerging as Nepal’s theory of international relations. There are numerous countries, like Nepal, in the world that cannot strengthen their national interests by adopting realist and liberal theories. Only militarily and economically powerful states are in a position to successfully apply these theories. Therefore, a series of events around the world have been confirming that these theories—studied and taught worldwide as theories of international relations, are, in reality, theories only for powerful states.

A new model for foreign policy decision-making

Graham Allison has proposed five models for analyzing and making foreign policy decisions. These are: the Rational Actor Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the Organizational Process Model, the Inter-Branch Politics Model, and the Political Process Model. These models, developed by an American scholar, are based on the practices of powerful countries like the USA. He does not appear to have studied how foreign policy decisions are made in countries like Nepal, which have highly sensitive geopolitical conditions and are subject to the influence and pressure of external actors.

In Nepal’s special context, a new model has emerged, namely the “Role of Dominant External Actor Model.” This model has massively dominated Nepal’s external affairs, particularly during the period from 1950 to 1960, and at various times after 1990. Under this model, influential external great powers emerge as strong actors in Nepal’s geopolitics, and due to the influence and pressure of multiple actors, Nepal and similar countries are unable to make foreign policy decisions independently.

Geopolitics and geo-economics are inseparable in foreign policy

The research shows that geopolitics and geo-economics have developed together ever since the concept of the state emerged. Both play an equally important role in the emergence of the state, its further consolidation, and the expansion of its international influence. Scholars of international relations and political science have noted that geo-economics functions as a means to achieve geopolitical objectives. Foreign policy plays a crucial role in achieving and promoting national interests.

There are two types of National Interest. First, the primary national interest, which is related to geopolitics, and second, the secondary national interest, which is related to geo-economics. If the geo-economic issues are separated from geopolitics, half of the national interest, namely, the secondary national interest, falls into crisis. Similarly, if geopolitics is separated from geo-economic analysis, the primary national interests are overlooked. To achieve both, foreign policy must encompass both dimensions.

Therefore, another theoretical aspect of this research is that geopolitics and geo-economics cannot remain separate in the proper interpretation, analysis, and implementation of foreign policy for the sake of national interest. The research concludes that any study of foreign policy that separates one of these two from the other cannot be a comprehensive study.

The research concludes that trilateral geopolitics will henceforth become the main theoretical discourse of Nepal’s international relations, and that Nepal’s foreign policy doctrine articulated by Prithvi Narayan Shah as “a Yam between two Boulders” has already changed, although the nation has not yet perceived this change. The research also specifies what kind of doctrine has emerged as a result of this transformation.

Nepal’s future foreign policy doctrine has emerged in the form of “A Cat and Three Lions.” From around 2010, when the country’s geopolitics began to take on a trilateral character, the foreign policy doctrine also started to change from that time onward. A doctrine does not guide foreign policy for a few years or decades; rather, it guides an entire era. The research projects that this new doctrine will guide Nepal’s foreign policy at least until the year 2150. The term “Three Lions” symbolically refers to the major state actors that are intensely active in Nepal’s geopolitics. Nepal, in terms of military power, economic strength, and diplomatic influence, is symbolically described as a “cat.”

Empirical/policy-oriented aspect

Along with the conclusions related to the theoretical/philosophical aspects mentioned above, the research also brings forward practical and policy-related dimensions connected to them. The conclusions related to the practical and policy aspects are presented here.

False narrative that Nepal’s foreign policy began with Prithvi Narayan Shah

International relations experts who have published research-based articles and books on Nepal and Nepal’s foreign policy have stated that Nepal’s foreign policy began with King Prithvi Narayan Shah. We have also continued to study it in the same manner. However, this research rejects that narrative. The works of Yadu Nath Khanal, SD Muni, and Leo E Rose show that they studied Nepal’s foreign policy starting from King Prithvi Narayan Shah. Yet, during the Malla and Lichchhavi periods as well, there was extensive practice of cooperation and conflict among many small states that existed at that time within the geography of present-day Nepal.

Historical documents mention that the states of the Kathmandu Valley maintained strong trade relations with Tibet to the north and with the southern empire, and that through the Kathmandu Valley, there was movement of diplomatic envoys in both directions from the northern neighbor to the south and from the southern neighbor to the north. The notion of Nepal as “a yam between two boulders,” attributed to King Prithvi Narayan Shah, appears not to have been originally propounded by him, but rather theorized based on practices that existed in the states of the Malla and Lichchhavi periods preceding him. He himself is also seen to have learned from his father, Nar Bhupal Shah, about how to govern a state and what policies could be adopted after the unification of Nepal.

Therefore, the research concludes that the foreign policy adopted by Nepal after the unification initiated by Prithvi Narayan Shah was not a novel beginning but a continuation of the history of Nepal. Consequently, the foundation of modern Nepal’s foreign policy lies not with Prithvi Narayan Shah, but with the external affairs practices of King Manadeva-1, regarded as the first king of the Lichchhavi dynasty. The political system adopted by Manadeva-1, his economic policy (the introduction of Mananka currency), the strengthening of military power, and diplomatic skill constitute the point of departure for Nepal’s geopolitics and geo-economics.

Viewed in this way, although the terms geopolitics and geo-economics began to be used globally from 1899 and 1990, respectively, their practice in Nepal dates back as early as the fifth century. Since foreign policy is inherently linked with these practices, the claim and narrative that Nepal’s foreign policy began with King Prithvi Narayan Shah therefore seemed incorrect.

Weak theoretical basis of the principle of balance in Nepal’s foreign policy

Generally, the concept of balance is theoretically associated with military affairs. In English, it is referred to as the Balance of Power System. This concept is directly related to military engagement and strategic equations. There are two other related terms as well: first, external balancing, which is directly linked to military alignments; and second, internal balancing, which is related to economic strengthening. However, the so-called balance doctrine that Nepal refers to is not related to either of these. On the other hand, it has not been theoretically articulated in Nepal either. Merely calling something a balance doctrine does not make it a theory; a theory requires a much longer, scholarly, and practical foundation, which has not been developed in Nepal.

The core meaning of the balance doctrine, as used in Nepal, refers to balancing the interests of other countries, which appears to be contrary to the theories of international relations. This is because, in international relations, time is not spent on balancing the interests of others; rather, all efforts are devoted to promoting one’s own national interests. Therefore, the theoretical foundation of the balance doctrine, as articulated in Nepal, is inherently weak. Hence, the research concludes that it lacks relevance altogether.

Equal relations, not special relations

A state has only permanent interests; it has no heart or emotions. If one follows emotions, relations with a particular state may be termed special or normal, but in relations between states, national interest is paramount, and therefore, relations between states cannot be categorized as special or normal. In international relations, relations with all countries are and should be equal. This is even more essential for a geopolitically highly sensitive country like Nepal.

The dimensions and priorities of our relations, of course, vary according to the context, but that does not mean that our international relations are divided into “normal” and “special.” Conveying such a message diplomatically weakens international affairs. Therefore, the narrative of “special relations” also appears to be irrelevant.

Matrix model: New era policy

Based on the philosophical and empirical conclusions above, the research has proposed a new model outlining what Nepal’s foreign policy should be like. Although the research focuses on geopolitics, geo-economics, and foreign policy, the above conclusions have been drawn through an examination of the philosophical, empirical, and historical facts associated with these three areas. On the basis of these conclusions, the proposed foreign policy of Nepal has been named the “7×7 Matrix Model.”

In this matrix, seven geopolitics-related policies are placed along the topmost horizontal row, and seven geo-economics-related policies (referred to as elements in mathematics) are placed along the leftmost vertical column. The policies on the geopolitical axis are denoted by A, and those on the geo-economic axis are denoted by B.

In the overall structure of the 7×7 Matrix Model, there are 49 dependent elements. The research proposes seven foreign policy components placed along the horizontal axis that are related to, and deal with, issues arising in Nepal’s geopolitical sphere. Similarly, the seven policies placed along the vertical axis are related to geo-economics and deal with issues in that domain. The research concludes that Nepal should formulate a total of 14 foreign policies (seven related to geopolitics and seven related to geo-economics) to conduct its foreign affairs in the new era. All of these 14 policies are interrelated; hence, they have been structured in the form of a matrix. This also means that when formulating one policy, issues related to the remaining 13 policies must not be overlooked, as any one policy has direct and indirect effects on all others.

The seven policies more closely related to geopolitics and Nepal’s primary national interests are as follows:

• Nepal’s sovereign, equal, and independent India policy;
• Nepal’s century-long China policy;
• Nepal’s Super-Power policy;
• Nepal’s neutral policy toward global security-related organizations;
• Nepal’s deep-engagement policy toward East and West Asian countries;
• Nepal’s deeper cooperation policy toward other South Asian countries; and
• Nepal’s cordial policy toward UNSC P5 member states and other major powers.

These seven policies are more closely aligned with geopolitics and Nepal’s primary national interests.

Similarly, the seven policies closely related to geo-economics and Nepal’s secondary national interests are as follows:

• Nepal’s shared future policy toward least developed and developing countries (the Global South);
• Nepal’s multilateral economic engagement policy toward countries providing foreign direct investment (FDI) and global financial institutions (such as AIIB, WB, IMF, WTO, BRI, MCC, etc.);
• Nepal’s policy of Peace and Cooperation toward global institutions (such as the United Nations, SAARC, BIMSTEC, etc.);
• Nepal’s continental and diplomatically dynamic policy with all friendly countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations;
• Nepal’s policy on soft power, major global issues, and cultural engagement;
• Nepal’s friendship policy toward Afro–Asian–Western regions (Europe and North/South American countries); and
• Nepal’s policy on the protection and mobilization of the Nepali diaspora.

These 14 policies guide how Nepal should present itself to the world, enhance its prestige, and maintain friendly relations with countries worldwide. Through them, Nepal’s influence can spread globally, enabling its issues to shape and influence the international community. The policies under this model are projected to be capable of effectively managing the political crises and opportunities arising from Nepal’s trilateral geopolitics at least until 2150. Therefore, the research projects that this policy framework will remain effective for at least the next one and a half centuries.

An excerpt from Chanda’s PhD thesis. He is currently associated with the Policy Research Institute

Minister for Foreign Affairs Bala Nanda Sharma is returning back to Kathmandu from Dhaka Thursday afternoon. He is on an official visit to Bangladesh from Tuesday to attend the state funeral of Begum Khaleda Zia, former Prime Minister of Bangladesh and Chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

Minister Sharma attended the state funeral in Dhaka on Wednesday afternoon, where a floral wreath was laid at the burial site of the late leader on behalf of the Government of Nepal.

During the visit, Foreign Minister Sharma met Tarique Rahman, son of the late Begum Zia and Acting Chairperson of the BNP, and conveyed condolences on behalf of the Government and people of Nepal. Sharma noted Begum Zia’s role in Bangladesh’s political and democratic journey. Rahman thanked the foreign minister for attending the funeral and expressed hope for continued cooperation between Nepal and Bangladesh.

On Wednesday afternoon, Sharma also called on the Chief Adviser of the Interim Government of Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, and handed over a message of condolence from Prime Minister Sushila Karki. In the message, the prime minister acknowledged Begum Zia’s contributions to strengthening Nepal-Bangladesh relations during her three terms as prime minister.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, discussions during the meeting covered bilateral relations and explored ways to enhance cooperation in areas such as trade, energy, connectivity, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges.

Foreign Minister Sharma also met Bangladesh’s Adviser for Foreign Affairs Md Touhid Hossain and delivered a personal letter of condolence. Hossain thanked Nepal for its continued support and for the foreign minister’s presence at the funeral.