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2016 was celebrated as the bicentenary of diplomatic ties between Nepal and the United Kingdom. Officially, diplomatic relations between the two countries are said to have begun in 1816, the year Nepal signed the Sugauli Treaty with  East India Company. 

The nine-article treaty was not signed between two sovereign states; rather, it was between the sovereign nation of Nepal and an economic entity, the East India Company. Article One of the treaty states: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable East India Company and the King of Nepal.”

The East India Company formally relinquished control over India in 1858, when its rule was replaced by the British Crown. The first official treaty between Nepal and Great Britain was signed only in 1923. Known as the Treaty Between the United Kingdom and Nepal, it was signed in Kathmandu on 21 Dec 1923. The first article of the seven-article treaty states: “There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Governments of Great Britain and Nepal, and the two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect each other’s independence, both internal and external.”

In this sense, the 1923 treaty is the only agreement signed between two sovereign nations. Yet, the Sugauli Treaty continues to be regarded as the benchmark of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Interestingly, the narrative is different when it comes to China. The treaty signed on 2 Oct 1791, known as the Treaty of Betrawati, presents notable parallels with the Sugauli Treaty. First, both treaties were signed in the aftermath of war. The Betrawati Treaty was concluded 24 years before the Sugauli Treaty, the former following China’s victory over Nepal, and the latter resulting from British victory. Second, neither treaty was signed directly between official state actors, though state authority was clearly referenced in both. In Article One of the Betrawati Treaty, China is explicitly mentioned: “That China should henceforth be considered as father to both Nepal and Tibet, who should regard each other as brothers.”

Similarly, the British government is referenced in Article Seven of the Sugauli Treaty, which states: “The Rajah of Nipal engages never to molest or disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in the possession of his territories; but agrees, if any difference shall arise between the State of Nipal and the Rajah of Sikkim, or the subjects of either, that such differences shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government, by which award the Rajah of Nipal engages to abide.”

From Nepali perspective, both treaties represent subjugation—one in terms of political hierarchy and the other through the loss of nearly one-third of its territory. Yet, this remains the reality of history, and there is no alternative but to acknowledge it.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of Nepal-China diplomatic ties, formally established on 1 Aug 1955 in Kathmandu. Unlike its relations with the United Kingdom, Nepal and China do not recognize 1792 as the beginning of formal diplomatic relations. This discrepancy calls for deeper debate and clearer interpretation. If Nepal-UK diplomatic ties are considered to have begun in 1816, why should Nepal–China relations not be acknowledged as starting in 1792? Conversely, if 1955 is accepted as the official starting point of Nepal-China ties, why is 1923 not similarly recognized as the true beginning of Nepal–UK diplomatic relations?

Historically, Nepal-China relations date back to the seventh century during the reign of Narendradev. However, no formal written documents from that period exist. The earliest documented diplomatic agreement dates to 1792. Therefore, this should be considered the formal beginning of Nepal-China diplomatic ties.

If diplomatic agreements concluded during China’s monarchical era are deemed inapplicable to the People’s Republic of China, then why should Nepal accept the same logic, given that the 1955 Nepal-China treaty was signed under Nepal’s own monarchy, led by King Mahendra? It would serve the interests of both countries to recognize 1792 as the first documented instance of formal diplomatic engagement.

India has been closely engaging with the Sushila Karki-led interim government since its formation. New Delhi was the first to welcome her leadership. On Sept 18, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Karki, expressing India’s readiness to “work closely to further strengthen the special ties between the two countries” and reaffirming India’s support for Nepal’s efforts to restore peace and stability.

Although the Karki government is interim and time-bound, New Delhi is working with it as a full partner: signing key agreements, convening bilateral mechanisms, and facilitating high-level exchanges. Ministers have been traveling to New Delhi, and diplomatic activity in Kathmandu has intensified. 

This week, Munu Mahawar, additional Secretary at India’s Ministry of External Affairs, visited Kathmandu, the first high-level foreign official to do so after the Sept 8–9 GenZ protests.  He met Prime Minister Karki and all cabinet ministers, pledging India’s logistical support for the March 5 elections. Notably, Mahawar did not meet leaders of the major political parties, even though the Indian Embassy continues to quietly engage with the broader political spectrum. 

Many members of the international community in Kathmandu remain hesitant to meet political leaders publicly. According to leaders, New Delhi has been encouraging them to view the March 5 elections as the only credible path to ending the current political deadlock. 

The Karki government has also signaled goodwill toward India by not recalling Nepal’s Ambassador to New Delhi, Shankar Sharma, despite recalling ambassadors to 11 other countries, including China, the US, and the UK. 

Oli’s exit from power may also have been welcomed in strategic circles in New Delhi, where he had long been perceived as leaning toward Beijing. As Kathmandu’s engagement with Beijing has slowed and the US has taken a low-key approach to Nepal’s internal political developments, Nepal–India ties have grown significantly stronger.

Since the formation of the Sushila Karki–led government following  Sept 8–9 protests, there has been minimal engagement between Kathmandu and Beijing. In the aftermath of the GenZ protests, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song met Prime Minister Sushila Karki and other government ministers to convey Beijing’s concerns, but there have been no high-level visits between Kathmandu and Beijing. 

Typically, October, November and December see a high number of visits as part of preparations for the coming year. This time, however, not only have the visits from China declined, but overall Chinese activities have also slowed. A China watcher noted, “Beijing may be in a wait-and-see position as the political developments unfold in Nepal.”

Similarly, Beijing’s viewpoint may be that since the current government cannot take major policy decisions, it is better to wait for the new government to be formed after the elections. According to people familiar with the matter, Beijing has conveyed two messages to Nepal following the GenZ protests. First, what happened on Sept 8–9 and the political course that followed is Nepal’s internal affair. Second, China has strongly raised its security concerns due to the open involvement of some Tibetan groups in those protests.

Over the past decade, China’s political, economic and security influence in Nepal has grown, increasing Beijing’s confidence that any government in power will refrain from jeopardizing its security interests related to Tibetan activities. However, the events of September have renewed Beijing’s worries.

Thus, after the GenZ movement, Beijing is experiencing both confidence and insecurity regarding its security interests. China is now closely monitoring the activities of the Tibetan community as well as broader political developments, including cabinet formation. Beijing believes that there can be no substantial progress on the Belt and Road Initiative under the current government. For this reason, China has adopted a policy of maintaining only a working relationship with the new government, with a special emphasis on security concerns. During this period, several Chinese delegations visited Nepal to study the Genz movement and assess potential challenges to bilateral relations. 

Nepal concluded its participation at the 30th Conference of Parties (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with a very small team of around 20 negotiating officials. 

From securing global recognition for mountain ecosystems to amplifying the voice of vulnerable nations, Nepal’s delegation—though small—played a strategic and coordinated role throughout the two-week summit in Belém, Brazil.

According to Maheshwar Dhakal, joint-secretary at the Ministry of Forests and Environment and Nepal’s national focal point for the UNFCCC, the country’s presence at COP30 was marked by “strong leadership, intensive engagement, and historic outcomes” for its long-pursued mountain agenda.

COP30 opened with a series of preparatory sessions starting Nov 4—LDC Group meetings on Nov 4–5, Leaders’ Summit on Nov 6–7, and G77 and China consultations on Nov 8–9. The main negotiations ran from Nov 10–21, with discussions extending unofficially until Nov 22.

Nepal’s delegation, led by Agriculture and Livestock Development Minister Madan Prasad Pariyar participated in a number of engagements. Supported by senior officials including MOFE Secretary Rajendra Prasad Mishra, OPMCM Secretary Govinda Karki, MoALD Secretary Deepak Kharal, and Nepal’s Ambassador to Brazil Nirmal Kafley, the team included representatives from government, civil society, academia, and the media.

The highlight of Nepal’s COP30 engagement was the successful global recognition of the mountain agenda, an advocacy effort pursued jointly with Bhutan and Kyrgyzstan.

Nepal held two rounds of consultations with the COP30 Presidency, resulting in three major achievements. First on agreement to hold an Annual Dialogue on Mountains and Climate Change, beginning at SB64 in June 2026. The second one on inclusion of mountain ecosystems in the Global Mutirão (Mutirão) decision text, the main outcome document of COP30.

And the third on recognition of the mountain agenda in the preamble of the COP30 cover decision, as well as in the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) text.

Dhakal noted that this was “the strongest visibility that mountain issues have ever received at the UNFCCC,” indicating that years of persistent diplomacy had finally begun to pay off.

Nepal backed three key declarations proposed by the COP30 Presidency. Tropical Forest Facility Forever, Integrated Fire Management Declaration, Sustainable Fossil Fuel Management Declaration are on the list. Officials said these positions align with Nepal’s commitments to forest conservation and climate-resilient development.

Minister Pariyar delivered Nepal’s national statement at the high-level plenary, emphasizing the urgent need to protect vulnerable communities in the Himalayas. He also participated in 11 high-level events, including Nepal’s flagship program, “Sagarmatha to Belém”.

MOFE Secretary Mishra spoke at the Leader Summit and presented a joint statement on behalf of Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan at the opening plenary, highlighting the shared vulnerabilities of Himalayan and South Asian nations.

OPMCM Secretary Govinda Karki addressed climate finance during a ministerial dialogue, calling for stronger global support to implement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).

Nepal’s non-governmental actors and media delegates also remained active throughout, engaging in pavilion events and side discussions with development partners.

In its closing remarks, Nepal underscored the existential threat posed by global warming to Himalayan ecosystems: “For Nepal, keeping global temperature rise below 1.5°C is not just a number in an agreement—it is a matter of survival.”

Nepal welcomed the Mutirão decision, commitments to adaptation and loss and damage funding, and the new annual mountain dialogue. It also expressed gratitude to Brazil for its hospitality and congratulated Turkey and Australia for being selected to co-host COP31, and Ethiopia, the first LDC to host COP32.

Nepal expressed appreciation for the COP30 Presidency’s leadership in negotiating the mountain text. “As climate impacts intensify, the urgency to respond to the unique challenges faced by mountain regions is greater than ever,” Nepal said, while expressing hope that a formal agenda item on mountains could be secured in the future.

Despite limited numbers, Nepal maintained high internal coordination through regular meetings and media briefings. Dhakal said the quality of Nepal’s interventions, the unity among delegates, and strong collaboration with other mountainous nations were widely appreciated.

He added that Nepal’s mountain agenda is now “close to the establishment phase,” with further efforts needed in the lead-up to COP31 and SB64.

As COP30 concluded, Nepal’s delegation returned home preparing for a formal debrief. With COP31 set to be hosted jointly by Turkey and Australia, and COP32 by Ethiopia, Nepal aims to continue building momentum toward securing formal recognition and sustained support for mountain regions, one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable ecosystems.

In Dec 2023, COP28 held in Dubai passed an ambitious plan to dramatically cut the use of petrol, gas, and coal by 2050, expand the use of renewable energy, and bring fossil-fuel emissions down to net zero. A total of 198 countries signed the agreement.

However, shortly after signing, countries including Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, and India backtracked on their commitments, arguing that the continued use of fossil fuels was necessary to meet global energy needs.

The United States, which had played a crucial role in securing signatures during COP28, has shown little interest in the issue after Donald Trump returned to the presidency. Trump has labeled climate change “the biggest hoax in the world.”

This time, he did not send any official federal delegation to Belém. At Belém, more than 80 countries from Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa expressed the need for a clear roadmap to implement the COP28 commitments. But under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, countries like China, India, and Russia blocked progress on the agenda. As a result, the final agreement made no mention of fossil fuels at all.

International media also reported COP30 as a flop. “This year’s UN climate conference in Brazil had many unique aspects that could have been part of an historic outcome,” AP wrote adding, “The final decision announced Saturday, which included some tangible things like an increase in money to help developing nations adapt to climate change, was overall watered-down compared to many conferences in the past decade and fell far short of many delegates’ expectations. It didn’t mention the words ‘fossil fuels’, much less include a timeline to reduce their use.” 

Instead of being remembered as historic, the conference will likely further erode confidence in a process that many environmentalists and even some world leaders have argued isn’t up to the challenge of confronting global temperature rise, which is leading to more frequent and intense extreme weather events like floods, storms and heat waves, it said.

Reuters said that Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had launched the summit calling for countries to agree on a ‘roadmap’ for advancing a COP28 pledge to shift away from fossil fuels.

“But it was a road to nowhere at this summit, as oil-rich Arab nations and others dependent on fossil fuels blocked any mention of the issue. Instead, the COP30 presidency created a voluntary plan that countries could sign on to—or not,” it wrote. “The result was similar to Egypt's COP27 and Azerbaijan’s COP29, where countries agreed to spend more money to address climate dangers while ignoring their primary cause.”