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As in his first tenure (2017–2021), US President Donald Trump has signaled his intention to adopt an aggressive Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) to counter China's growing influence in the region. While his administration’s exact approach remains to be seen, Trump’s actions thus far suggest a more unilateral and hardline strategy compared to his predecessor, Joe Biden, who focused on fostering partnerships and multilateral cooperation in the region.

A key question is whether Trump will continue Biden’s approach of strengthening ties with allies and regional partners or pivot to a more isolated stance, prioritizing direct US action. Another point of uncertainty is whether his administration will focus on a military-centric strategy or emphasize economic engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific. But one thing appears certain: the Trump administration's IPS strategy is likely to adopt a more confrontational tone. This approach could aggravate not only Beijing but also some US partners in the region.

Shortly after taking office, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a high-profile meeting with foreign ministers from Australia, India and Japan—the member nations of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or "Quad." A statement from the US State Department emphasized the group's shared commitment to a “"Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” where democratic values, rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are upheld.

The statement underscored the Quad's collective stance against unilateral actions that attempt to alter the regional status quo through coercion or force. “Our four nations maintain our conviction that international law, economic opportunity, peace, stability, and security—especially in the maritime domain—are essential for the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region," the statement declared. It also highlighted commitments to strengthening regional maritime, economic, and technological security in response to rising threats, while promoting reliable and resilient supply chains. India, as the next host of the Quad Leaders' Summit, is set to play a pivotal role in steering the group's agenda.

China has criticized the Quad, labeling it as an attempt to encircle Beijing and undermine its strategic interests. China's opposition to the Quad's initiatives could escalate tensions in the region, especially as the Trump administration doubles down on its Indo-Pacific focus.

The Indo-Pacific Strategy introduced by the Biden administration in 2022 emphasized collaboration with India and other regional groupings to promote stability in South Asia. During Biden's tenure, India-US relations saw a significant deepening of their strategic partnership. However, Trump's return to power could strain this partnership, particularly due to his hardline stance on tariffs and trade. Trump has already suggested the possibility of imposing a 100 percent tariff on imports from BRICS nations, including India—a move that could severely impact the trade relationship between Washington and New Delhi.

Trump's approach to China is also likely to exacerbate existing tensions. Having already initiated a trade war with Beijing during his first term, Trump has signaled his intent to escalate economic pressure on China. In a recent press conference, he hinted at imposing a 10 percent across-the-board tariff on all Chinese goods as early as Feb 1. Such a move would likely lead to further deterioration in US-China relations, with significant ramifications for the global economy.

Beyond trade, Trump’s previous decisions—such as withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord and the World Health Organization—have raised concerns about the US’ role in addressing global challenges. These moves could undermine US credibility and influence in the Indo-Pacific, where collaborative efforts on climate change, public health, and sustainable development are crucial.

Despite these challenges, Trump is expected to continue working with India to counter China's influence in the region. Reviving talks with North Korea, a hallmark of his first term, may also resurface as a diplomatic priority. However, Trump’s stance on Taiwan, a critical flashpoint in US-China relations, remains uncertain.

Nepal, a strategically located country in South Asia, is unlikely to remain unaffected by these geopolitical shifts. Nepal’s relations with both India and China are integral to its foreign policy, and any significant changes in US strategy toward these powers will have a ripple effect on Kathmandu's diplomatic calculus. For instance, further deterioration in US-China relations could constrain Nepal's ability to navigate its relationships with both nations.

Additionally, Trump's policies on global issues such as climate change, health and minority rights are likely to impact Nepal directly. The country, which is already grappling with the challenges of climate change, relies on international cooperation and funding to implement mitigation and adaptation strategies. A more isolationist US approach could hinder Nepal’s efforts in these areas. Changes in US funding or support for health services and rights related to sexual and gender minorities could also have social and economic repercussions.

As Trump’s administration takes shape, it will be crucial to monitor how his Indo-Pacific Strategy evolves and its implications for the region and beyond.

Donald J Trump was sworn in on Monday as the 47th President of the United States, marking a remarkable political comeback. On Sunday, Trump pledged to issue nearly 100 executive orders aimed at reversing or eliminating policies enacted by the Biden administration. These orders primarily target immigration, energy policy, and a range of other issues.

Foreign policy experts suggest that Trump’s return to office warrants close attention to his trade war with China, his approach toward Asian allies like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and his “America First” foreign policy. These stances could bring significant shifts to multilateralism and global diplomacy, with considerable effects on the Indo-Pacific region. Trump's transactional approach to diplomacy is expected to heighten tensions in critical areas such as the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan.

Regarding Nepal, shifting US global priorities could impact American assistance in climate change and health sectors. Political analyst Chandra Dev Bhatta notes that while American foreign policy has shown consistency over time, recent years have highlighted ideological differences between Republicans and Democrats. If Trump 2.0 adopts a more aggressive foreign policy, Bhatta predicts it will manifest through economic measures, particularly tariffs. “If Trump becomes a ‘tariff man,’ it will have a ripple effect globally due to the interconnected nature of the world economy,” Bhatta said.

For smaller countries like Nepal, where economic stakes are lower, the focus will remain on geopolitics over geo-economics. However, navigating this geopolitical landscape will become more challenging, Bhatta adds, as geopolitics and geo-economics are increasingly intertwined. He also highlights potential domestic implications for Nepal stemming from Trump’s policies, especially his declared funding cuts through the Department of Government Efficiency and Governance (DOGE) and the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) agenda. If these cuts are implemented, they could significantly affect funding both domestically and internationally.

Trump’s immigration stance could also impact Nepalis in the US, particularly if he enforces stricter policies on undocumented immigrants. Bhatta speculates that such policies might be part of a bargaining strategy, commonly referred to as the ‘madman theory,’ or a genuine intent, the outcome of which remains uncertain. Additionally, Trump’s efforts to consolidate power in Asia under the MAGA banner will likely exert geopolitical pressure on countries like Nepal.

Strategic thinker Binoj Basnyat believes that Trump’s second term is likely to continue Biden’s legacy in Asia due to the region’s growing importance in global trade, security and geopolitics. He emphasizes that managing rising challenges, fostering alliances and ensuring stability will shape US strategies. India’s role as a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific region will be central to these efforts. The US will likely continue leveraging frameworks such as the 2017 “South Asia Policy”, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy and the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Basnyat highlights that these strategies align with containing China’s rise while strengthening ties with India, designated as a major defense partner in 2016. Initiatives like the India-US 2+2 ministerial dialogue, established in 2018, will continue to influence smaller South Asian nations, including Nepal. He notes that global competition and great power influence are shaping national politics in South Asia, with Nepal’s political parties also reflecting these dynamics.

Basnyat asserts that Nepal’s strategic stability is shaped by global geostrategic factors, including the Post-Cold War syndrome in Europe, the New Cold War in the Indo-Pacific and proxy wars in the Middle East. He suggests that under any potential geopolitical scenario, Nepal’s strategic trajectory will largely depend on its relationships with New Delhi and Beijing. However, Nepal should also prioritize its ties with Washington as a third neighbor, balancing national interests without falling into strategic traps.

During the Joe Biden administration, US engagement with Nepal increased significantly, with over $700m in foreign aid provided since 2019 through the US Department of State and USAID. These initiatives focused on health, economic growth, democracy, governance and food security. One of the primary US priorities in Nepal is the smooth implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) project. Recently, American private companies have also expressed interest in investing in Nepal’s tourism, medical and other sectors. Meanwhile, the US push for the State Partnership Program (SPP), pending since 2022, remains a contentious issue.

During Trump’s previous tenure, the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy report sparked controversy over its implications for MCC and other bilateral initiatives. The Biden administration carefully avoided conflating these issues in bilateral discussions. Observers suggest Nepal should closely monitor Trump’s policies toward India and China, as they could indirectly affect Nepal.

In an interview with ApEx, Katie Donohoe, USAID’s mission director in Nepal, highlighted the agency’s enduring mission despite changes in US administrations. She remarked, “Since USAID was established in 1961, there have been 12 presidential administrations, and this will be my fifth transition working with USAID. While new administrations bring different policy priorities, USAID’s core mission has remained consistent.” Donohoe expressed confidence that USAID will adapt to align with the new administration’s priorities while continuing to collaborate with the government of Nepal and its people.

The KP Sharma Oli-led administration is striving to improve its ties with New Delhi but has yet to achieve substantive results. Despite repeated attempts to mend relations, ruling party leaders and foreign policy experts suggest that bilateral relations between Nepal and India may be deteriorating rather than improving. A series of unresolved issues and missteps on both sides seem to have created a widening gulf.

During his earlier tenure and as an aspiring prime minister, Oli believed that the so-called ‘Delhi Durbar’—referring to India's political establishment—was obstructing his political aspirations. However, in a strategic political maneuver, Oli secured the premiership with the support of the Nepali Congress, a traditional ally of India.

Once in office, Oli took a series of initiatives aimed at establishing a cordial relationship with New Delhi. Like many of his predecessors, Oli hoped to receive an immediate invitation for an official visit to India as a gesture of goodwill. However, this invitation never materialized. Reports from Indian media suggest that New Delhi was initially open to welcoming Oli in August or September. However, India later withdrew the invitation, allegedly due to Oli’s insistence on preconditions—specifically, his demand that India announce steps to resolve the ongoing border dispute.

The border dispute, commonly referred to as the “map row,” stems from competing territorial claims over areas such as Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh. While Oli has consistently advocated for progress on this issue, New Delhi appears reluctant to prioritize it, viewing it as a sensitive topic better deferred. Diplomats note that this impasse has fueled mistrust and contributed to the stagnation of bilateral relations.

A meeting between Prime Minister Oli and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York was seen as an opportunity to break the ice. However, according to diplomatic insiders, the meeting failed to yield any significant breakthrough. Analysts suggest that this outcome is emblematic of deeper issues in the relationship.

The unresolved border dispute is not the only factor straining ties. Another contentious issue is the fate of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, finalized in 2018. The report, a collaborative effort by experts from both countries, was intended to recommend ways to enhance Nepal-India relations. However, India has shown little interest in accepting or even acknowledging the report, a stance that has frustrated Nepal.

Since becoming prime minister, Oli has repeatedly highlighted the importance of the EPG report in his speeches and public appearances. He has even used public platforms, such as the launch of former Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa’s book on the Indian blockade, to criticize India’s handling of the issue. During the event, Oli remarked, in a satirical tone, that Indian leaders seem too busy to formally receive the report.

This persistence, according to analysts such as Chandra Dev Bhatta, may have further irritated New Delhi. India, for its part, appears to view the EPG report as an unwelcome complication, and this view is shared by several Nepali political parties, including the Nepali Congress, the CPN (Maoist Centre), and Madhes-based parties. Despite this, Oli’s UML continues to push the issue, creating additional friction in bilateral ties.

Adding to the tensions is Nepal’s decision to align with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy. The agreement, signed under Oli’s leadership, has been a point of contention since its inception. India has long opposed the BRI, citing sovereignty concerns, particularly because certain projects under the initiative traverse disputed territories.

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba’s recent visit to India seemed aimed at clarifying Nepal’s stance on the BRI. However, her trip failed to achieve its objectives. Indian leaders declined to meet her, reportedly due to either scheduling conflicts or dissatisfaction with her role in supporting the BRI framework agreement. This chilly reception was in stark contrast to her earlier visit in August, during which she was warmly received and even handed over an invitation from Oli to Modi for a visit to Nepal. Modi accepted the invitation but deferred setting a date, suggesting it would be decided through diplomatic channels.

The cooling of ties is not limited to Oli’s government. A senior Nepali Congress leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that even the relationship between the NC and India has soured. According to the leader, India was displeased with the NC for forming a coalition government with the UML. Additionally, India reportedly disapproved of the NC-led government’s decision to sign the BRI agreement with China.

Despite these challenges, certain aspects of Nepal-India relations remain functional. Bilateral mechanisms continue to operate, with regular meetings and consultations taking place. Nepali ministers frequently visit India, and there has been a noticeable strengthening of military ties between the Nepal Army and the Indian Army.

However, a senior Indian academic who closely follows bilateral relations noted that while India remains committed to engaging with the Nepali public, it has grown wary of working with Oli. “Oli’s strategic agreements with China could have implications for India’s security. I don’t foresee a cordial relationship between him and New Delhi in the near future.”

This situation bears similarities to the events of 2020 when the map row first escalated. After a prolonged communication breakdown, India sent Samant Kumar Goel, the chief of its intelligence agency RAW, as a special envoy to meet Oli. The visit facilitated a wide-ranging discussion of bilateral issues and temporarily eased tensions. However, subsequent political instability in Nepal, including Oli’s dissolution of Parliament, derailed progress.

Diplomats and political leaders now suggest that both governments should consider employing a combination of official and back-channel diplomacy to rebuild trust. Despite Oli’s recent efforts to use track two channels to resolve disputes, these initiatives have so far failed to deliver results.

For Nepal and India, the path to repairing relations will require addressing both long-standing disputes and emerging challenges. Progress will depend on a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue and a mutual commitment to preserving and strengthening a historically close relationship that remains vital for both nations.

Nepal participated in 324 out of the 392 negotiation meetings it was expected to attend during the 29th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP29) held in Baku, Azerbaijan, from Nov 11 to 22. At an event titled ‘Reflection on Nepal’s Participation in COP29 and the International Court of Justice’, organized by the Ministry of Forests and Environment (MoFE) in Kathmandu on Thursday, Ministry Secretary Deepak Kumar Kharal explained that COP29 featured negotiations on 14 agenda items and 96 sub-agendas, totaling 392 meetings, of which Nepal missed 68.

Each of these 14 thematic agendas was attended by Nepali negotiation teams, led by joint-secretaries specializing in the respective topics. Despite criticism at home over the size of the Nepali delegation sent to COP29, Secretary Kharal attributed the missed meetings to an insufficient number of negotiators. He emphasized that the ministry had learned valuable lessons and would aim for better preparation at COP30 and beyond. “We need to establish a dedicated and permanent negotiation team with clear standards and procedures for inclusive participation, involving national delegates, technical experts, and relevant stakeholders,” Kharal said. He also stressed the importance of capacity building for national delegates and technical experts to enhance negotiating skills.

Manjeet Dhakal, a Nepali negotiator and Advisor to the Chair of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) for the multilateral process under the UNFCCC, highlighted the significant improvement in Nepal’s participation in COP over the years, both in terms of quantity and quality. “In the past, Nepal was represented at COP by a very small team from MoFE. However, these days, representatives from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, as well as private sector actors and civil society organizations, also join the discussions, contributing their expertise as needed.” 

Dhakal added that Nepal’s focus has expanded from a limited set of priorities, such as climate finance and adaptation, to a broader range of thematic areas. “For instance, this year alone, we actively participated in discussions across 14 thematic groups, including carbon emissions reduction, loss and damage, and mitigation. This demonstrates that both the quantity and quality of our participation have improved significantly.”

Nepali officials’ inclusion in various global committees also reflects the country’s growing negotiating power. Dhakal pointed out that Maheshwar Dhakal, joint-secretary at MoFE, serves on the Loss and Damage Fund, while Naresh Sharma, under-secretary at MoFE, is a member of the Adaptation Fund. “Through these committees, Nepal is making meaningful interventions.” 

In addition to thematic meetings, COP29 included sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). These also included 48 coordination meetings of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Group and ‘G77 and China’, seven plenary sessions, 10 head-of-delegates meetings, and 115 daily thematic coordination meetings, bringing the total to over 500 meetings in which Nepal needed representation.

Buddi Sagar Poudel, the joint-secretary heading the Forest and Watershed Division at the MoFE, also serves as a negotiator representing Nepal at climate conferences. Leading Nepal’s efforts on the ‘Enhanced Transparency Framework’ and ‘Global Stocktake’ themes, he noted that while Nepal has actively engaged in significant negotiations, missing less-priority meetings is inevitable due to the simultaneous nature of numerous sessions. “However, the fact is that we have weak negotiating power. The meetings are multilateral, not bilateral, and sometimes, we feel intimidated in front of hundreds of representatives from powerful countries. There’s a fear of appearing uninformed if we make a mistake. If we fail to communicate our stance clearly and convincingly, we risk offending others or being misunderstood.”

Before COP29, Nepal undertook extensive preparations, including forming thematic groups, conducting consultations and council meetings, training negotiators, organizing a National Climate Summit, and drafting Nepal’s position paper. During COP29, Nepal not only participated in official meetings but also organized side events in pavilions and held bilateral discussions. However, Nepal did not have its own pavilion this time and relied on borrowing space from other countries. This limitation underscored the need for greater logistical and strategic investment in Nepal’s future participation.

To address multilateral challenges, Poudel stressed the importance of building a robust pool of negotiators. “We need individuals with strong research and expertise on the topics being negotiated, but Nepal has very few such resources.” He proposed several measures to strengthen Nepal’s negotiation capacity, including institutional memory and the development of a consistently trained negotiation team. “For instance, if a meeting involves cross-cutting issues related to climate change and energy, we need informed representatives from the Ministry of Energy, Water Resources, and Irrigation, or experts from the relevant field. The same applies to other sectors, like finance.” 

To enhance both the quantity and quality of negotiators, Poudel recommended early training and practical exposure. “Institutions must invest in their negotiators by organizing model COPs and offering practical sessions. Negotiation is a continuous learning process—after attending two or three COPs, a negotiator becomes experienced and can engage more effectively,” Poudel said. Practical exposure would also help build confidence among negotiators when dealing with representatives of more powerful nations.

At COP29, Nepal coordinated thematic presentations and advocated for its position at the LDC meetings. In the G77 and China meetings, Nepal presented the LDC position while also lobbying for its own priorities. According to government officials, Nepal was successful in doing so.

Nepal also participated in other key events, including the Hindu Kush Himalaya Environmental Ministers’ Meeting organized by Bhutan and the High Ambition Coalition Meeting hosted by the Marshall Islands. There too, Nepal got a chance to press its Mountain agenda. Such participation helped Nepal raise awareness about the unique challenges faced by mountain regions, bringing attention to the importance of including mountain-specific strategies in global climate policies.

On the sidelines of COP29, Nepal held numerous bilateral meetings with key stakeholders, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), the President of the World Green Economy Organization (WEGO), the President of the Maldives, the UN Assistant Secretary-General, and the Executive Director of the Loss and Damage Fund, among others. These discussions provided Nepal with a platform to build alliances and secure commitments for support in addressing climate vulnerabilities. Secretary Kharal noted that UN Assistant Secretary-General Elliott Harris expressed strong support for Nepal’s climate efforts, pledging to provide remarks on behalf of the UN Secretary-General at any event organized by Nepal, provided adequate notice is given. “He was very pleased with Nepal’s commitment to combating the climate crisis, and this is a result of our extensive meetings, negotiations, and efforts on achieving national and global goals.” 

Nepal made significant strides at COP29 by successfully advocating for the mountain agenda and addressing critical climate issues, according to Kharal. “Mountain is not a formal agenda in COP, but Nepal emphasized the inclusion of mountain-based actions and a mountain-to-marine approach to tackle climate change impacts.” Nepal also played a leading role in coordinating and raising awareness about the common mountain agenda, drawing international attention to the unique challenges faced by mountain regions.

In climate finance, Nepal and other climate-vulnerable countries successfully lobbied to increase annual funding from $100bn to $300bn. The country supported the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, which includes a $1.3trn roadmap from Baku to Belém (Brazil), set to begin in 2025. “We strongly said that we won’t take loans for climate finance,” Kharal said. This firm stance highlighted Nepal’s demand for equity and fairness in accessing climate finance.

Additionally, Nepal highlighted the importance of implementing the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and operationalizing Article 6 of the Paris Agreement for carbon trading. A bilateral agreement with Sweden for carbon trading marked a key milestone in advancing Nepal’s mitigation efforts. This agreement demonstrated Nepal’s growing capability to engage in meaningful international collaborations.

Nepal also demonstrated progress in transparency and gender inclusion, supporting the launch of the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform and the ‘Building National Capacities of Nepal to Meet Requirements of the Enhanced Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement’ (CBIT) Project. The country committed to extending the Enhanced Lima Work Plan for Gender and Inclusion until 2035. High-level political engagement ensured Nepal’s active participation in international dialogues, resulting in Nepal’s election as a member of the Adaptation Fund Board and accreditation for the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC). These achievements underscored Nepal’s commitment to inclusivity and accountability in climate action.

Besides these achievements, Dhakal noted other milestones in Nepal’s climate diplomacy. In May 2024, Nepal hosted the International Expert Dialogue on Mountains, People, and Climate Change, which was attended by a representative from Azerbaijan, the host of COP29. Additionally, Nepal was invited to the pre-COP29 ministerial meeting for the first time in 12 years. “These achievements indicate that Nepal’s voice is being heard on the global stage,” Dhakal said. Such recognition marks a shift in Nepal’s global standing, opening doors for more significant collaborations.

While acknowledging the progress, Dhakal stressed that more work needs to be done. “We are never fully satisfied, but looking back at where we started, we have made significant progress.” However, this progress must be supplemented with more strategic planning and capacity-building initiatives to maximize Nepal’s impact in global forums.

Joint-secretary Poudel proposed hiring international trainers to provide specialized training. “Such training is not only crucial for COPs but also for other multilateral meetings and negotiations,” Poudel pointed out. “Moreover, these training shouldn’t be limited to one or two officials but should involve at least 15–20 officers to build a permanent negotiation team.” 

At Thursday’s event, Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba said that through effective negotiations, Nepal should aim to secure at least $10bn annually in climate finance from the designated $300bn global climate fund. She emphasized the need for Nepal to raise its voice more assertively on the global stage for climate justice, climate finance, and compensation. She highlighted the paradoxical situation where Nepal, despite contributing negligibly to carbon emissions, suffers disproportionately from their adverse effects. This underscores the necessity for Nepal to play a more active role internationally to tackle these challenges and advocate for equitable solutions.

Minister Rana also shared that on Dec 9, her delegation, representing Nepal, made its first oral submission on ‘State Responsibilities on Climate Change’ at an international hearing at the International Court of Justice. During the hearing, she forcefully raised the issue of Nepal enduring consequences for mistakes it never made and stressed the need for responsible developed nations to take equal responsibility in addressing the climate crisis and establishing the principle of climate justice. Such advocacy is critical for amplifying Nepal’s voice on the international stage.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli also vowed that the government would take the lead in managing climate finance to cope with the climate crisis. He emphasized that climate change issues in mountains are not just the concerns of mountainous countries. “Our efforts should be for protecting the mountains to seas,” he stressed. He urged stakeholders to prepare for COP30 through bold negotiations and a thorough evaluation of COP29. 

Key achievements

• Nepal played a pivotal role in highlighting mountain dialogues and drawing international attention to the mountain agenda.
• Successfully coordinated the collective mountain agenda and ensured high-level political engagement.
• Signed an agreement with the Swedish government for carbon trading.
• Nepal was elected as a member of the Adaptation Fund Board and secured accreditation for the National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC).
• Launched two climate-related projects in the presence of a Global Environment Facility (GEF) representative.
• Enhanced the capacity of Nepali delegates in climate negotiations and technical discussions.