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This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nepal and China. Over these seven decades, the two neighbors have forged a relationship grounded in mutual respect, non-interference, and shared aspirations for development, peace, and prosperity. This is a unique model of partnership rooted in trust and mutual respect

On 1 Aug 1955, Nepal and  China formally established diplomatic relations. Seventy years later, this historic milestone provides a timely moment to reflect on a multifaceted partnership that has evolved from ancient civilizational exchanges into a dynamic 21st-century cooperation model. Built on the core principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and non-interference, Nepal-China relations continue to hold significant relevance for Nepal’s foreign policy trajectory and development ambitions.

A relationship rooted in geography, shaped by history

Nepal and China are more than just neighbors; they share more than seventeen centuries-old ties through trade, religion, culture, and kinship across the Himalayas. The exchanges between Lumbini and Lhasa, between artists and monks, are testimonies to a relationship that predates formal diplomacy. The 1956 Nepal-China Boundary Agreement and subsequent treaties not only delineated borders but also laid the foundation for long-term cooperation.

In modern diplomatic history, China has consistently respected Nepal’s territorial integrity and political independence, while Nepal has firmly adhered to the One-China Policy. This diplomatic symmetry has helped both countries build a resilient and trust-based relationship, despite changing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia and beyond.

Development, connectivity, and the promise of the BRI

China has played a critical role in Nepal’s development efforts through grants, soft loans, and infrastructure projects. From the construction of the Araniko Highway in the 1960s to ongoing efforts in energy, hydropower, airport expansion, and digital connectivity, Chinese cooperation has left visible footprints in Nepal’s development landscape. 

The signing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement in 2017 marked a new phase in economic diplomacy. While its implementation has been slow and requires better clarity and transparency, the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network—envisioned under the BRI—holds transformative potential for Nepal, particularly in trade facilitation, energy transit, and cross-border infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Nepal must approach such initiatives with strategic foresight—ensuring debt sustainability, environmental safeguards, and equitable benefits for local communities.

Beyond infrastructure: People, culture, and soft power

Nepal-China relations are increasingly shaped by people-to-people engagement. Thousands of Nepali students pursue higher education in China, supported by scholarships. Cultural exchange programs, tourism, and media collaboration have helped build a more nuanced understanding between the two societies.

China established the Confucius Institute in Nepal to promote Chinese language and culture. Regular cultural delegations, exhibitions and performances are organized to strengthen people-to-people relations. There is a growing dissemination of Chinese narratives in Nepali media, especially around regional geopolitics and BRI. Chinese media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and China Radio international have partnership with Nepali media.

China promotes Nepal as a tourism destination among Chinese citizens and has included Nepal in approved travel destinations. Joint branding of heritage sites such as  Lumbini is  part of soft tourism diplomacy. In times of crisis, such as the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake and the Covid-19 pandemic, China provided critical humanitarian support to Nepal, reinforcing a spirit of solidarity. Such gestures are not merely symbolic but serve as catalysts for strengthening trust among the general public.

The strategic imperative for Nepal

As Nepal seeks to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), strategic partnerships with neighbors like China become indispensable. However, Nepal must adopt a clear, consistent, and country-owned foreign policy, grounded in national interest and inclusive development priorities.

The trade imbalance between Nepal and China remains a persistent challenge. Addressing it requires improved access to the Chinese market, support for Nepali agricultural and handmade exports, and the upgrading of border infrastructure at key points like Rasuwagadhi, Tatopani and Mustang. Furthermore, as climate change disproportionately affects the fragile Himalayan ecosystem, Nepal and China should deepen cooperation on climate resilience, biodiversity conservation, and green technology transfer.

Looking ahead: Rethinking the next chapter

As Nepal and China commemorate 70 years of friendship, both countries must reimagine their cooperation in light of emerging global challenges—climate change, poverty, digital transformation, and regional security. Future collaboration must focus not only on infrastructure, but also on green development, youth exchange, public health, and social inclusion.

Diplomatic anniversaries are more than ceremonial milestones—they are opportunities to reflect, renew, and re-energize relationships as well as to reimagine the future. The 70th anniversary offers both Kathmandu and Beijing the chance to reaffirm their strategic trust, expand areas of cooperation, and ensure that their partnership contributes meaningfully to regional harmony and Nepal’s long-term national interest. Nepal must seek cooperation for changing from landlocked to land linked.

The 70th anniversary of Nepal-China relations should catalyze a broader conversation among policymakers, academics, and civil society about what an equitable, future-oriented partnership looks like in a rapidly changing global order.

In this next phase, cooperation must move beyond state-to-state interactions and become more inclusive of youth, local governments, academic institutions, and marginalized communities—ensuring that the benefits of diplomacy and development reach the grassroots.

As a small but strategically located nation, Nepal must continue to walk a balanced diplomatic path—maintaining friendly ties with both its neighbors while protecting its autonomy and advancing a just, inclusive development agenda.

The Nepal-China partnership, built over seven decades, can continue to be a model of asymmetric yet respectful diplomacy—one that champions sovereignty, mutual benefit, and the shared dreams of two peoples.

As we look ahead, the friendship between Nepal and China must continue to be guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. A true celebration of this historic milestone would be not only in looking back with pride—but also looking forward with purpose.

The author is former Nepali ambassador to China

It has been exactly 109 years since the world’s first press council was established in Sweden in 1916. Its goal was to create an independent media self-regulatory body facilitated by the state, but guided by the broader media fraternity and the public. Since then, dozens of countries have formed, revised, dissolved, or renamed their press councils. In democratic nations, some councils have retained their autonomy; in autocratic regimes and much of the Global South, however, they often remain under government control.

Despite these variations, the core idea behind press councils has remained consistent: to serve as an intermediary between the press and the public, promoting professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards, while offering policy input to the government. Crucially, press councils are meant to operate on the principle of self-regulation, based on the strict implementation of a code of ethics, rather than through legal regulation enforced by other government bodies. A press council should be a collective effort involving the state, the media industry, and the public. While the government may support its effective functioning, it must not seek to control it.

Nepal adopted the idea of a press council earlier than many other countries. The Press Council Nepal (PCN) was established in 1971 based on the recommendations of a new communication plan. During the Panchayat era, it operated largely under government control. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, new legislation promised an independent council. However, successive chairpersons failed to uphold that promise, often becoming submissive to the government and their affiliated political parties.

There is a persistent tendency in Nepal to create overlapping institutions aimed at controlling the media, without clearly understanding or respecting their distinct mandates. The Media Council Bill, for instance, seeks to grant expanded powers to a new Media Council, many of which overlap with functions already assigned to existing government agencies. This has led to a widespread perception within the bureaucracy that PCN is merely another department under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, damaging its credibility and undermining its intended independence. Successive PCN leaderships have done little to challenge this perception.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a growing consensus among bureaucrats, politicians, and lawmakers in favor of tighter media control, often under the pretext of curbing misinformation and disinformation. The proposed Media Council Bill must be examined in this broader context. While it does not explicitly propose the formation of a media control body, it does aim to expand the council’s jurisdiction from print to digital platforms. The name of the institution is secondary; what matters is whether its independence, both structural and operational, is safeguarded.

The most serious flaw in the Bill is the excessive power it grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, particularly in appointing and removing council members. To protect the council’s autonomy, an independent commission, possibly involving a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, should be tasked with recommending the council’s leadership and members.

However, implementing such reforms may face resistance. Organizations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), politically affiliated journalist associations, and senior journalist groups may oppose changes that reduce their influence over appointments. Political parties and the bureaucracy may also seek to preserve their control through informal arrangements. In the last three decades, very few truly independent journalists or academics have been appointed to the council or similar bodies.

Parliament must seriously consider creating a transparent, independent appointment mechanism. Yet, many lawmakers lack a clear understanding of the press council’s core mission and values. Another concerning provision in the Bill is the transfer of authority to issue press accreditation certificates to the Media Council. This is not the council’s appropriate role. Even more troubling is the proposed provision allowing the council to revoke a journalist’s press pass for up to a year for violating the code of ethics. This directly contradicts the fundamental purpose of a press pass, which is to enable public information access, not serve as a tool for punishment.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting already imposes unnecessarily restrictive requirements for issuing press passes. Shifting that authority to the Media Council will only increase confusion and bureaucratic friction. Other provisions in the Bill also raise concerns, suggesting that the drafters may have drawn inspiration from press council models in more authoritarian regimes.

One welcome aspect of the Bill is the proposed removal of the council’s authority to classify newspapers. However, this change may also face resistance from journalist organizations, as classification has traditionally been used to control or reward media outlets. A separate entity, such as an Audit Bureau of Circulation, should be created to handle classifications for both print and digital platforms.

Overall, the Bill lacks a clear, forward-looking vision for the role and structure of the Media Council. It also fails to reflect on past institutional lessons. For the council to function effectively, it must have a strong, cooperative relationship with media organizations. At present, a significant trust deficit exists between the council and the Nepali media industry. The law should ensure not only participation from the media and public, but also their meaningful contribution to the council’s work. As drafted, the Bill envisions the Media Council more as a government department than an independent regulatory body. A complete overhaul is, therefore, necessary.

If parliament is truly committed to forming an independent media council, it should return the Bill to the Ministry with clear instructions to redraft it in consultation with all stakeholders, including international experts.

This debate is not about targeting the current government or any individual minister. The Bill was originally introduced by the previous government, but it now falls on the current one to refine and pass it. Political parties must rise above narrow interests and prioritize the long-term public good.

A strong, independent institution serves democracy and society, regardless of whether it aligns with a party’s immediate interests. When it comes to media accountability, as Denis McQuail puts it, two models exist: answerability and liability. Answerability is moral and social; it’s voluntary, cooperative, and involves non-material penalties. Liability, by contrast, is legal, imposed, and often punitive.

Press councils should operate on the answerability model. They should function as watchdogs that bark but do not bite, empowered to raise concerns, issue warnings, and alert stakeholders to ethical lapses, but not to take legal action against journalists. Evaluated through this lens, many of the Bill’s flaws become more evident, and more easily correctable.

So a humble appeal to parliament: step back from narrow debates and redraft the Bill from first principles. This is a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a free, accountable, and ethical press in Nepal.

On July 23, the International Court of Justice issued a groundbreaking Advisory Opinion clarifying that states have an obligation to tackle climate warming. The ruling, while not binding, also affirmed, in an unequivocal way, the duties and responsibilities of nations who have been historically responsible for the emission of carbon fossils. The AO is certainly charting a new phase both in the field of climate negotiation and in the realm of climate litigation, with the latter set to expand and scale in ways that are difficult to imagine.

At the same time, it might be useful to reflect about the trajectory, the pathway that led to the Hague where the ICJ is located. We should not forget that it all started with a group of law students at the University of South Pacific in Suva, Fiji. They were the ones, emboldened with sheer confidence and ambition, who had started working on the rationale, the legal case for which the ICJ should step in. It was because of their irreverence and perhaps recklessness that we have reached this turning point in the fight to uphold the Paris Agreement. Their stories have been celebrated worldwide and rightly so and by now, there have been many articles, videos about them.

However, let us not forget that, it is also worth remembering another part of the story. It was because of the Government of Vanuatu that the case for an AO could be brought to the General Assembly of the United Nations, an indispensable step to reach the ICJ. A small island nation of approximately 320.000 people was able to gather the required support from other member-states and convince them of the urgency of approaching the ICJ. It was a long and complex journey that started in 2019.

When I first heard this story, I could not stop thinking about the following question: if the students that had dared to start this process were from Nepal, a nation much bigger and powerful than Vanuatu, would they have received the same level of support from their own government? Well, this is an inescapable question.

While it is true that the federal government in Kathmandu embraced the case during the hearings at the Hague, I have been wondering if Nepal would have been able to garner the 105 co-sponsor nations at the General Assembly without whom the resolution would have never passed. Perhaps the key question is not really about the diplomatic capacities of Nepal at the UN. Probably it would not have been unimaginable for Kathmandu to bring together enough co-sponsors like Vanuatu did, ensuring that the resolution paving the way for ICJ’s intervention would pass through consensus at the General Assembly.

The real question to ask ourselves is another one: would, at first, the government have listened and backed a group of its own law students? This is a fundamental aspect to discuss. It is also important to remember that Nepali youths were also very active in supporting the cause globally. Some of them have been taking the lead at national and regional level through the World’s Youth For Climate Justice, the global movement that was initially spearheaded by the students at the University of South Pacific.

The same group of youths played an important leadership role in ensuring that the Government of Nepal could have a strong representation when the country defended the need for an AO during the official hearings at the ICJ in December last year. It is probably safe to say that without their involvement, Arzu Rana Deuba, the Foreign Minister of Nepal, would not have given a strong and convincing statement at the Hague.

Therefore, it is appropriate now to think about the future months when the AO’s principles will start reverberating in the international community and yes in the court of justice around the world. While it is impossible to summarize here through a few lines some of the legal principles and substantive statements from the ICJ, it is worthy to remember that the justices also expressed their opinion on the states’ responsibilities to prepare the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These are the commitments that all the parties to the Paris Agreement have pledged to implement in order to reduce (in jargon, “mitigate”) their carbon emissions.

According to the AO, the preparation and implementation of NDCs are not entirely discretionary for the governments. In practice, it means that these documents must be ambitious and each respective country must have concrete plans to effectively implement them so that they can scale back their emissions. Only in this way, the entire international community can collectively be able to limit global warming to 1.5°C as per the Paris Agreement.

Even more far bridging is the fact that parties to the Paris Agreement not drafting or not doing enough to implement the NDCs, can be found in breach of international law and their action or omission can be considered an internationally wrongful act. This is a very important aspect of the AO that perhaps has not received adequate attention as most of the commentary has been on the duties and responsibilities of industrialized nations’ responsible for anthropogenically-induced climate change.

For developing and emerging nations, the part of the AO on the NDCs requires utmost attention. Preparing an ambitious NDC is a complex task and Nepal has been showing leadership when it recently finalized its latest version, the third overall since the approval of the Paris Agreement. It also means that the country needs to introspect and reflect on the tools and policies at disposal to ensure that it can do whatever it can to implement the NDC. While many of its components will depend on foreign assistance on the part of the polluting industrialized nations, a lot of its implementation will rely on effective and transparent governance at both national and local levels.

And here another question: does Nepal have in place effective mechanisms to ensure that those parts of the NDCs under its direct control, the ones implementable without any form of foreign aid including funding for loss and damage or even possible future compensation, can be achieved? Even in the case of Nepal being able to receive the much-needed climate finance from outside, will the country be able to use these resources effectively and transparently? That’s why it is appropriate for the nation to brainstorm on the most effective tools and mechanisms to ensure that Nepal does whatever is possible to implement the NDCs parts where it has a direct control on the outcomes.

One way to start rethinking the national climate governance is to have solid mechanisms to engage members of the civil society. We could imagine a National Climate and Biodiversity Council consisting of members of civil society, including representatives of academia. It is important to also include the area of biodiversity because, as we know, we are talking about two sides of the same coin even if then, at the international level, nations have the burdensome duty of dealing with two completely different negotiation mechanisms.

Half of the seats available in the Council should be assigned to local youths who would represent the whole diversity of the nation, therefore also ensuring the participation of youths from historically marginalized communities that, so far, have been less involved and engaged on climate work. The Council should not be just a sounding board for the government but a platform that can, on one hand, propose ideas and solutions, while, on the other, keep a check on the government’s implementation of the NDC.

The central level body at the federal level could work in partnership with similar mechanisms at provincial levels with some sort of loose and light coordination between the two levels. Memberships could come through consensus and ensure that certain criteria are met in order for someone to be able to claim a seat. I am talking about a voluntary role that, if obtained, will only be for a limited amount of time, perhaps one year or maximum two years with the possibility to renew it for another year.

Another option would be to have a body that is exclusively composed of youths, a Youth Climate and Biodiversity Council but I am afraid such an approach would only invite tokenistic results and its work might not be taken seriously. Remembering how the international community got this trailblazing AO is paramount. A small group of law students were able to initiate a global movement and, with the right support, they made history. Then, why not entrust more policymaking responsibilities, including some forms of decision making to them in implementing the Paris Agreement at the national level? After all, who can better ensure that AO will be literally upheld and put into practice?

When former President Bidya Devi Bhandari attempted to re-enter active politics through the CPN-UML—the very party she helped build—she was blocked by a decision that hides behind constitutional dignity while exposing a deeper problem in Nepal’s political culture. The move to sideline her isn’t just a power play—it is an act of political exclusion steeped in patriarchy, internal insecurity and disregard for constitutional freedoms.

The CPN-UML’s Central Committee, led by KP Sharma Oli, denied Bhandari’s return, arguing that a former president must remain above party politics to preserve the sanctity of the office. Yet this rationale collapses under scrutiny—legally, politically and morally. This is not simply about Bhandari’s personal ambitions. This is about how we define democracy in Nepal. Are we a system that allows experienced leaders—regardless of gender—to remain engaged in shaping the country’s future? Or do we selectively retire people when their political presence becomes inconvenient?

Both Dev Gurung of the CPN (Maoist Center) and Tank Karki of the UML itself have forcefully challenged the party’s decision, calling it unconstitutional and unjustified. Gurung points out that the move violates Article 17 of Nepal’s Constitution, which guarantees political freedom and fundamental rights to all citizens, including former officeholders. Once a president steps down, they are no longer bound by the symbolic or ceremonial obligations of that office. The Constitution does not categorize former presidents as non-citizens. Any restriction on their political participation would require strong legal justification—such as actions threatening national sovereignty—which clearly does not apply in Bhandari’s case.

What is more surprising is Gurung warns that political parties registered under the constitution cannot make internal rules or take decisions that override or undermine constitutionally-protected individual rights. In this case, the UML’s action amounts to a political overreach with no constitutional basis.

Tank Karki echoes these concerns from within the party. He questions how any political organization can assume the authority to limit a citizen’s right to participate in politics, especially when no such restriction is mandated by the Constitution. Karki invokes multiple precedents to dismantle the UML leadership’s justification: Ramchandra Paudel returned to Nepali Congress after serving as Speaker, Subash Nembang resumed active roles within UML post-speakership, Khilaraj Regmi became Prime Minister while serving as Chief Justice and Nanda Bahadur Pun held a senior Maoist position while serving as Vice-president. These examples make it abundantly clear that returning to politics after holding high office is not new, nor is it constitutionally inappropriate. Karki rightly asks: “Are we truly democratic if we restrict political participation for someone who is no longer in office?” His question reveals the core contradiction of the UML’s decision—it is less about constitutional dignity and more about political control.

Indeed, Bhandari’s assertiveness and her public hint at contesting leadership within the party were likely perceived as a direct threat by Oli, who has ruled UML unchallenged for years. But attempting to eliminate opposition through procedural justifications is not leadership—it’s suppression. And suppressing a leader like Bhandari, especially after her decades-long contribution to Nepal’s democratic movement, is not just unfair—it’s self-defeating for a party that claims to represent democratic ideals.

What’s more troubling is the gendered nature of this exclusion. When men return to active politics after high office, they are often hailed for their experience. When a woman does the same, she is told it undermines her dignity. This is a classic patriarchal double standard. It elevates women only when they are silent, symbolic and submissive—but excludes them when they seek actual power.

The logic used to bar Bhandari, wrapped in notions of “respect,” “republican values,” and “national unity,” is in fact a tool of silencing. It offers ceremonial honor in exchange for political irrelevance. But true dignity for women in politics lies in allowing them to lead, compete and challenge—just as their male counterparts do.

This sends a deeply discouraging message to Nepal’s women: that the presidency is not a platform for further leadership but a dead-end. That political achievements are valid only until they challenge existing male authority. That even after reaching the highest office, women must gracefully disappear from the political stage.

Nepal’s democracy cannot afford to send such a message.

Bhandari is not asking for favors. She is asserting a right she has earned through decades of political struggle—from student activism in the late 1970s to her contributions in constitutional processes and women’s representation. She remains one of the few women in Nepal with both national recognition and grassroots political experience. Silencing her does not protect democracy—it weakens it.

At a time when Nepal’s political environment is marked by fragmentation, volatility and declining public trust, the exclusion of a credible and experienced leader like Bhandari is a strategic blunder. Her return could help stabilize internal party conflicts, promote left unity and offer a counterbalance to male-dominated power blocs. Her leadership represents continuity, not disruption. Moreover, allowing her back into politics could rejuvenate faith among Nepal’s younger generation—especially women—that political space is open to all, not just a privileged male few.

Let’s also set the legal record straight: there is no constitutional clause that prevents a former president from joining a political party. The arguments being made in UML’s decision—the so-called “spirit” of Article 61—are interpretive at best. The same “spirit” was never invoked for male figures returning from constitutional positions. Why now?

Some claim that Bhandari’s political re-entry might damage the symbolic sanctity of the presidential office. But symbols don’t build nations—leaders do. And leaders must be allowed to evolve, contribute and contest. The presidency was a chapter in Bhandari’s political journey—not the conclusion. Letting her rejoin politics is not an attack on the republic—it is a celebration of its openness. Her participation will not break the system. In fact, excluding her weakens the very democratic spirit the UML claims to be protecting.

Democracies do not function by freezing capable leaders into statues of respect. They thrive when voices—especially those of women—are free to speak, challenge and lead. Nepal cannot claim to support women's empowerment while pushing its most experienced female politician into a corner. Ultimately, this is not just about Bidya Devi Bhandari. This is about what kind of republic we want to be. One that fears women’s power or one that embraces it?

Let her lead again—not as a symbol, but as a politician, a woman, and a citizen. Because the strength of Nepal’s democracy will be measured not by how well it confines women, but by how freely it lets them rise.

The author is a political observer and advocate for inclusive democratic processes