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Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari returned home on Monday after completing a 10-day China visit, during which she held talks with senior leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and government officials.

Her visit came amid her recent, unannounced but increasingly active involvement in party politics, drawing significant attention from both political and strategic circles. In the weeks leading up to the trip, Bhandari toured various provinces, engaging with local leaders and cadres, and has become more vocal about her ambition to lead the CPN-UML. She has ignored public concerns that former heads of state should stay away from active politics to preserve the dignity of the presidency. Bhandari was accompanied by Raghubir Mahaseth, head of the UML’s international department, Minister Damodar Bhandari and other senior leaders, who have distanced themselves from Prime Minister and party chairperson KP Sharma Oli. In Beijing, she was accorded a moderate level of respect.

Although Chinese President Xi Jinping did not meet her, Bhandari held talks with Chinese Vice-President Ji Bingxuan and Liu Jianchao, Minister of the CPC’s International Department and a prominent Chinese leader known for his close engagement with Nepali political figures.

Bhandari’s main event in Beijing was her participation in a conference of political parties from China’s neighboring countries, themed “Building a Community with a Shared Future with Neighboring Countries: Political Parties in Action,” held on May 25–26.

The reception Bhandari received as a senior UML figure must be viewed in the light of her past role and potential political future. As President from 2015 to 2022, she played a crucial part in enhancing Nepal’s engagement with China. She frequently encouraged successive governments to advance the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). During her tenure, she attended the second BRI summit in 2019 and helped finalize the protocol on the Transit and Transport Agreement signed in 2016.

In 2017, Bhandari launched Chinese President Xi Jinping’s book, “The Governance of China,” at a special ceremony held in Shital Niwas. She also endorsed China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) by attending a high-level video conference, despite opposition from Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The year 2019 saw Xi’s historic visit to Nepal, during which several strategic agreements were signed, significantly deepening bilateral cooperation. These developments have shaped the Chinese perception of Bhandari as a dependable figure in Nepal's political landscape.

For Beijing, the return of a China-friendly leader like Bhandari to active politics could be welcome news. Members of her delegation have publicly claimed that China encouraged her to initiate efforts to unify Nepal’s communist parties—a long-held preference of the Chinese leadership. However, such claims should be taken with caution, as Chinese officials rarely make such direct statements.

Within the UML, some leaders believe that if Bhandari becomes party chair, the long-elusive unification with the CPN (Maoist Centre) could be revived—something hindered by personal rivalries between Oli and Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal. While Bhandari is certain to return to UML politics, it remains unclear whether she will take a confrontational path against Oli or whether Oli will voluntarily step aside. Oli has recently stated that his health permits him to remain politically active for the next 15–20 years, suggesting he is unlikely to support a unification narrative that credits Bhandari over himself.

Bhandari’s visit is unlikely to have any immediate or direct impact on UML’s internal dynamics, despite some sidelined party leaders hoping it will accelerate her rise to the helm. Her supporters are trying to portray the visit as an indication that China backs her leadership, suggesting she is capable of uniting Nepal’s fragmented communist forces. However, there are ample reasons to remain cautious. Open Chinese support for Bhandari could antagonize both Oli and the Nepali Congress (NC). A senior UML leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, noted that China prioritizes political stability in Nepal and may support left unity only if it contributes to that goal—but without backing one leader at the expense of alienating others.

Nevertheless, the perception of Bhandari’s close ties with Beijing may cause ripples within the UML. Ironically, this perception could even bring Oli and New Delhi closer. China, meanwhile, appears to have realized that its earlier emphasis on communist unification risked alienating other key actors in Nepal, including the NC. Given the current state of relations, observers say China is unlikely to openly push for left unity at the cost of broader political balance.

In Beijing, Liu Jianchao met Bhandari and, according to the Chinese readout, acknowledged her longstanding contributions to China-Nepal relations. “Inter-party exchanges play an important role in China–Nepal relations,” the readout stated. The CPC expressed its willingness to strengthen engagement with all Nepali political parties and deepen exchanges in governance and administration through the “political party +” channel. Bhandari, for her part, emphasized Nepal’s commitment to finding a development path suited to its own conditions and expressed interest in learning from China’s experience in party-building and governance. 

During her address at the CPC dialogue, Bhandari praised the CPC’s governance model, stating: “The historical experience and contemporary practice of the CPC are of great reference to Nepal’s economic and social transformation and also provide important reference for developing countries around the world to explore the path of modernization.” She further stated that China’s vision of building a “community with a shared future” offers a powerful example for regional cooperation and solidarity. By amplifying China’s development model in her speeches, Bhandari is aligning herself closely with Beijing’s strategic messaging.

In Nepal, the journey of women in politics can symbolically be presented as a tug-of-war between progress and resistance. The deeply entrenched patriarchal norms limit the roles of women in political and public life. The Constitution of Nepal promulgated in 1990 brought about a glimmer of hope as Article 114 of the constitution mandated political parties to file five percent women candidates to contest in elections . But this did not guarantee that women would actually make it to parliament. As a result, between 1990-1999 elections, the percentage of women in parliament could not exceed six percent.

Nepal witnessed a surge in the number of female candidates in 2008 elections due to the provision in the 2007 Interim-Constitution ensuring a minimum of 33.33 percent reservations for women in parliament. This demographic representation celebrated an outcome of years of fight for equality, propelled by the decade long civil war 1995-2006. While it brought an increase in the demographic representation of female candidates, did it actually signify effective participation and empowerment, or did it simply mask the underlying systemic barriers that hinder the rise of women’s political power and decision-making?

Today, with the House of Representatives having a base requirement of 92 women (33.45 percent) out of the 275 total parliamentarians, we see how beneath Nepal’s democratic framework lies a troubling gap between promise and practice. The 33.33 percent representation quota for women was meant to be a minimum threshold, a starting point for inclusion. Unfortunately, many political parties treat it as a ceiling, not a base. This representation becomes even scarcer as we ascend the hierarchy ladder. In 2025, out of 22 ministries of the federal government of Nepal only one female is appointed a minister.

The quota system designed with the aim of democratizing opportunities were treated by the political parties as checkboxes they needed to tick. Political parties were responsible for exploiting the country’s constitutional provisions to empower women for their vested interests. By manipulating the loopholes parties are allowing the avoidance of the crucial measures mentioned in the regulations. The issue doesn’t end here women are placed in unelectable constituencies, sidelined from key decision making processes and reduced to symbolic placeholders. This challenge does not end once they enter the parliament. The complex interplay of socio-economic and institutional factors shape these women’s experiences and overall effectiveness in their work in politics.

Women continue to pass through various stages of scrutiny and criticism because patriarchal societal norms question their legitimacy as leaders. These factors not only discourage the women in the field but also the potential women candidates who wish to enter the political arena. Unaddressed challenges have consequences that extend outwards. On the grounds of tokenistic representation, without significance in participation, women may be continually excluded from significant policy formulation and lobbying processes—an antithesis to democratic governance. It also impairs the responsiveness of policies to address the needs of the diverse population. Additionally, gender imbalance representation in hierarchy further solidifies structural inequality and thus inhibits progress toward social justice and equality.

Overcoming these barriers requires systematic reforms and beyond-the-surface solutions. There is a need to wipe out the root sources of social-cultural, economic, and institutional conditions that make gender inequality by implementing such reforms and changing societal mindsets in a way that they eradicate such norms and values that perceive women as more subordinate than men. Only in that way can the future of this nation be remolded with the voices of women shaping its political destiny.

Nepal needs more than women in seats, it needs women in power. 

The new fiscal budget presented on Thursday has effectively halted the progress of around 17,117 MW of run-of-river (RoR) hydropower projects in Nepal by introducing a major policy shift in the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) model.

Until now, RoR projects operated under a ‘Take or Pay’ PPA model, where the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) had to pay private developers regardless of whether it used the electricity or not. The latest budget, however, proposes a shift to a ‘Take and Pay’ model, meaning the NEA will only pay for the electricity it actually purchases.

Ganesh Karki, President of the Independent Power Producers’ Association of Nepal (IPPAN), warned that this policy change could render investments already made by private developers in RoR projects unviable. He said banks are unlikely to finance projects under the new PPA model, pushing many developments to the brink of cancellation.

According to IPPAN, 17,117 MW worth of RoR projects currently hold licenses from the Department of Electricity Development, with approximately Rs 66bn already invested. These projects are in various stages of development, awaiting PPAs and financial closure. Once fully implemented, total investment could reach Rs 3.4trn. The breakdown includes 2,078 MW of projects already under construction, 6,436 MW awaiting construction permits, 5,079 MW with survey licenses, and 3,521 MW awaiting survey permits.

This shift has frustrated private developers who had expected the budget to align with the government’s recently unveiled Energy Development Roadmap, which aims to generate 28,500 MW of electricity—15,000 MW for export to India and 13,500 MW for domestic consumption.

IPPAN claims the new provision makes it nearly impossible for the private sector to move forward, despite other budget promises like streamlining forest clearance, transmission line construction, and support for reservoir-based projects. Karki argued that unless developers can build the projects, these other incentives become meaningless.

“The government’s move has placed private developers in a position where their investment could drop to zero,” Karki said. “The state should not have issued licenses in the first place if it planned to later change the agreement terms. The Department of Electricity Development continues to issue licenses, but developers are now left in limbo.”

NEA sources said the switch to ‘Take and Pay’ is necessary for the financial sustainability of the authority. The previous model, where payments had to be made even without actual power usage, posed significant financial risks—especially during the monsoon when RoR production exceeds domestic demand and guaranteed exports to India remain uncertain.

IPPAN has strongly opposed the shift and announced plans to launch protests if the decision is not reversed. In a statement released Friday, IPPAN described the new policy as hostile to private investment and a setback for Nepal’s power sector. The group also criticized the government for failing to support the ongoing development of RoR projects, which they claim still constitute a majority of the private sector’s hydropower activity.

IPPAN called for an immediate revision of the policy and demanded a return to the ‘Take or Pay’ model. Failure to do so, they said, would prompt a “strong and decisive” protest campaign.

Currently, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity is about 3,600 MW, with over 80 percent contributed by the private sector. Of the 17,117 MW of RoR projects awaiting PPAs, the NEA or the government is developing only 190 MW.

IPPAN argues that the new provision contradicts the Energy Development Roadmap and the goals set out in the 16th Five-Year Plan of the National Planning Commission. The association also claims the decision violates existing policies and legislation, including the Electricity Act 1992, the Hydropower Policy 2001, and the National Water Resources Policy.

The organization fears that this policy change will derail over Rs 1.5trn already invested by the private sector, and jeopardize an additional Rs 3trn planned for future investment, pushing the entire sector into uncertainty.

Most recently, top bureaucrats have pushed to remove the cooling-off clause from a bill passed by the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee of the House of Representatives. This clause provides that civil servants become eligible for political appointments only after two years of retirement. The objection from senior officials has triggered widespread debate about the importance of cooling-off periods and the broader implications of the revolving door phenomenon.

When public officials move quickly into private or political roles after their tenure, it raises serious concerns about conflicts of interest, fair governance and the credibility of public institutions. To reduce these risks, many countries have introduced “cooling-off periods” or “revolving door laws” to restrict such movements for a certain time. In Nepal’s case, this issue calls not just for clause-based reforms but for a full legal framework that addresses all aspects of post-retirement appointments.

Global approaches and legal foundations

The concept of a cooling-off period took root in the United States with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, introduced after the Watergate scandal. This law prohibited former public officials from lobbying the departments where they previously worked for a certain period. Later, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 reinforced these efforts by setting clear one- or two-year bans for high-ranking officials entering lobbying roles. The objective was to prevent future private benefits from influencing decisions made during public service.

India also recognized this issue. The All India Services (Conduct) Rules prevent retired civil servants from taking up commercial jobs without prior government approval. In Center for Public Interest Litigation v Union of India (2011), the Supreme Court of India emphasized the need for ethics in public life, particularly when it comes to awarding contracts or appointing regulators. The Court pointed out the dangers of private companies using insider information gained during government service. However, enforcement and political commitment remain inconsistent.

The United Kingdom has implemented a more structured system. It established the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA), which reviews post-service job proposals by ministers and senior officials. While ACOBA's advice is not legally binding, public and media scrutiny help discourage questionable transitions. In the case of Porter v Magill, 2001, UKHL 67, the House of Lords stressed administrative fairness. The Court ruled that any decision could be struck down if a “fair-minded and informed observer” believed there was a real chance of bias. The case involved a council trying to manipulate housing policies for political benefit, highlighting the importance of impartial governance.

Nepal’s framework and challenges

Nepal has recognized the importance of cooling-off periods in various sectors, though its application remains fragmented and inconsistent. For example, the Nepal Rastra Bank Act prohibits employees of the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) from joining banks and financial institutions (BFIs) for up to three years after leaving their positions. This provision reflects an awareness of potential conflicts of interest in the financial sector and seeks to safeguard public trust. In the judiciary, the Constitution imposes restrictions on judges, allowing them to take on only certain specialized roles as explicitly permitted. Judges also regularly recuse themselves from cases where there is a potential conflict of interest or a reasonable perception of bias.

One of Nepal’s key issues is the absence of an independent institution to review post-retirement appointments. Unlike the UK’s ACOBA, Nepal has no formal mechanism to assess whether a new role for a former official might pose risks of undue influence. Appointments to important bodies, commissions and advisory groups often lack transparency and are based more on political links than merit. The proposed Federal Civil Service Bill 2023 introduces a two-year cooling-off period requiring government approval before any constitutional, political, and diplomatic appointment. Yet, recent opposition from senior officials illustrates the challenge of implementing these rules when personal interests are at stake.

High-ranking civil servants frequently take on politically sensitive roles soon after retiring, undermining the independence and credibility of the institutions they join. The law also lacks a clear definition of “political appointment,” allowing for vague interpretations and selective enforcement. This legal gap makes it easier for influential individuals to bypass accountability.

To improve governance, Nepal should move toward passing a comprehensive revolving door law. Such a law should provide clear definitions of post-retirement roles, specify which types of appointments are restricted, and create an independent ethics body with authority to investigate and enforce the law. This would help ensure that decisions made in public service are not influenced by future personal benefits.

Nepal can also learn from global experiences. Requiring public disclosure of post-retirement roles and decisions made by a reviewing authority would increase transparency. Similarly, issuing a “cooling-off certificate” before an official takes a new job could create a system that is both fair and regulated.

Conclusion
For Nepal to build stronger democratic institutions and maintain public confidence, it must develop a unified, binding legal framework to manage post-retirement roles for public officials. A clearly-defined cooling-off period, backed by an independent review mechanism and precise legal definitions, will help prevent conflicts of interest and promote ethical governance.

The ongoing parliamentary discussions offer a timely opportunity to address this issue. Although there is resistance from vested interests, lawmakers must prioritize reforms that reflect the public interest. Transparency, impartiality and integrity should guide Nepal’s governance. By adapting successful global practices to the national context, Nepal can ensure that public service remains a commitment to the nation—not a shortcut to personal advantage.