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During the ongoing Central Working Committee meeting of the Nepali Congress (NC), leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of both the party and the government.

They criticized the government and NC ministers for failing to fulfill their duties, weakening the party’s presence in the coalition. Leaders also pointed out that key commitments from the seven-point agreement between the NC and UML—signed during the government’s formation—remain unfulfilled. One major example is the lack of progress on the constitution amendment, a key pledge made by both parties.

Senior leader Shekhar Koirala demanded an explanation from party President Sher Bahadur Deuba: “Why has there been no progress on the constitution amendment?” So far, the ruling parties have taken no steps toward this goal. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli has even stated that an amendment may not be possible before the 2027 elections, as the NC and UML lack the necessary numbers. Other leaders echoed these concerns, arguing that the failure to deliver on promises has damaged the credibility of both the government and the party.

Regarding governance, leaders said the government has failed to meet public expectations or align with the party’s aspirations. However, there was no clear consensus on whether the NC should seek an alternative to the current coalition. NC leader Prakash Sharan Mahat noted that while no one explicitly called for a change in the alliance, leaders urged improvements in the government’s performance.

Another key discussion centered on the party’s stance regarding electoral alliances and coalition governments. Senior leader Koirala questioned Deuba’s decision to form an electoral alliance with the Maoist Center but then align with UML to create the government. “I supported an NC-UML coalition for stability, but NC should have led the government,” he said.

There is growing pressure within the NC to rule out future electoral alliances with the Maoist Center. However, some top leaders argue that without such an alliance, the party cannot defeat the UML. It remains uncertain whether the NC will partner with the Maoists if the current government lasts until the next elections. Leaders also raised doubts about the party’s commitment to holding its general convention on time. Some suspect President Deuba may delay it until after the 2027 elections, a move that would allow him to lead the election government if the current coalition holds. Leaders demanded an immediate convention schedule.

Under the party’s statute, Deuba is ineligible to run for president a third time. It remains unclear whom he will endorse as his successor from his faction, though Koirala and Gagan Thapa have already announced their candidacies. The meeting also addressed dysfunction in the party’s sister organizations, many of which have failed to hold timely conventions. Discussions also touched on intra-party democracy and other organizational challenges.

Koirala further criticized the party’s decision to appoint a leader as a central committee member despite their active membership being less than 10 years old. He also condemned the party for sidelining loyal leaders in past elections while now taking action against them. He proposed granting amnesty to rebel candidates with a warning against repeating such actions. Additionally, he urged the party president to resolve delays in sister organizations’ conventions, where leadership tenures are being repeatedly extended without elections.

As Nepal faces escalating climate uncertainty, the need for robust data systems and transparent frameworks has never been more urgent. Climate change is no longer a distant threat—it is a present-day challenge that affects every sector, from agriculture and water resources to energy, health and infrastructure. Rising temperatures, erratic weather, and more frequent climate-related disasters are already disrupting livelihoods, increasing social vulnerability, and hindering national development. 

 To respond effectively, Nepal must strengthen its capacity for evidence-based planning, transparent governance, and adaptive management. Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems are critical in this process. They enable the systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of climate data, allowing stakeholders to track the effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation actions and refine strategies over time. MRV systems also foster accountability and build trust among government bodies, development partners, the private sector, and local communities by providing credible, transparent information on climate progress. A well-functioning MRV framework is increasingly required to access international climate finance, including from mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which demand verifiable proof of impact. Strengthening MRV is not just a technical necessity but a strategic investment in Nepal’s climate-resilient, low-carbon future. By grounding policy in reliable data and continuous learning, Nepal can enhance the credibility of its climate actions, attract sustainable investment, and protect both its people and ecosystems for the long term. 

 What is MRV and why does it Matter?

At its core, Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) is a fundamental process that underpins effective climate governance. It encompasses three interrelated functions: systematically collecting data on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-related activities; reporting that information in a consistent, transparent, and standardized format; and verifying its accuracy through independent assessment or third-party review. These processes.

ensure the integrity and credibility of climate data, which is essential for informed decision-making and adaptive management. A well-designed and operational MRV system empowers countries to track progress toward their climate targets, assess the effectiveness of mitigation and adaptation policies, and maintain accountability in the deployment of climate finance. It also provides a basis for aligning national actions with international commitments, including the goals outlined in the Paris Agreement. 

For Nepal, MRV is far more than a bureaucratic requirement—it serves as a strategic instrument for advancing national climate priorities. A credible MRV system builds confidence among development partners and international donors, making it possible to mobilize and scale up climate investments from global mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund. It also strengthens the capacity of domestic institutions to coordinate across sectors, evaluate climate risks, and refine policies based on measurable outcomes. Without a reliable and transparent MRV framework, Nepal risks not only falling short of its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) but also missing critical opportunities to demonstrate leadership, attract financing, and protect vulnerable communities from the accelerating impacts of climate change. Investing in MRV is, therefore, an investment in trust, resilience, and long-term development. 

The current landscape: progress and gaps

Nepal has taken commendable early steps toward institutionalizing its MRV system. The Ministry of Forests and Environment (MoFE) has been officially designated as the Single National Entity (SNE) responsible for coordinating all MRV-related activities. Within MoFE, a dedicated MRV Unit has been established under the Climate Change Management Division (CCMD), reflecting a clear intent to build a structured, functional, and responsive climate data architecture. Key roles have been outlined for unit heads, data analysts, and sectoral focal points, signaling a foundational move toward operational coherence and inter-agency collaboration. While the vision is ambitious, implementation remains a work in progress. MRV coverage across sectors—energy, agriculture, forestry, waste, and industry—is currently fragmented and uneven. In some sectors, such as forestry and agriculture, data systems are improving, but still lack harmonized methodologies or standardized emission factors. Others, particularly waste and industry, suffer from outdated or incomplete inventories and weak institutional linkages.

Several persistent challenges impede the full realization of an integrated MRV system. A critical gap is the lack of standardized baseline data for both emissions and adaptation indicators, which hampers the ability to measure real progress or assess effectiveness. Data fragmentation is common, with different agencies collecting information in silos without common reporting formats or interoperable databases. Overlapping mandates among ministries, unclear delineation of responsibilities, and limited coordination further exacerbate inefficiencies.

At the subnational level, capacity constraints are even more pronounced. Provincial and local governments often lack trained personnel, adequate funding, and technological tools to collect, process, and report climate data reliably. The flow of information between national and subnational levels remains inconsistent, undermining efforts to build a bottom-up MRV structure that reflects local realities. The absence of a strong legal and policy mandate for MRV weakens the authority of the system as a whole. Without binding legal provisions, enforcing reporting obligations or ensuring data quality becomes difficult. This limits the country’s ability to produce credible, verifiable data necessary to access climate finance, influence policy development, and track NDC implementation. To close these gaps, Nepal must prioritize the development of a comprehensive legal framework that mandates MRV obligations across sectors and levels of government. Standard operating procedures, capacity-building programs, and interoperable digital platforms will also be essential. With sustained political commitment and strategic investment, Nepal can transform its MRV system from a foundational concept into a powerful engine for climate accountability, transparency, and ambition. 

Integrating MRV with the Biennial Transparency Report

To comply with its international obligations under the Paris Agreement, Nepal is required to submit a Biennial Transparency Report (BTR). This reporting framework is central to the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) of the Paris Agreement and includes several critical components:

● A national inventory of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, covering all major sectors such as energy, agriculture, land use, waste, and industry; 

● Progress tracking toward achieving the country’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets, including sectoral mitigation actions; 

● Adaptation communication, which outlines how the country is responding to climate risks and building resilience across vulnerable communities and ecosystems; 

● Reporting on support received, particularly in the form of climate finance, capacity-building initiatives, and technology transfers from international partners. 

Delivering on these requirements demands more than just emissions accounting—it requires integrated, multi-dimensional MRV systems capable of capturing, analyzing, and communicating diverse types of climate-related data. For example, Mitigation MRV tracks greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions across key sectors using internationally accepted methods. It shows how policies like renewable energy expansion, energy efficiency, and sustainable land use contribute to emission cuts.

Adaptation MRV focuses on resilience, monitoring indicators such as reduced climate-related losses, improved food and water security, and better disaster preparedness. Support MRV ensures transparency in climate finance, capacity-building, and technology transfer. It tracks how resources are used, evaluates their impact, and builds trust with donors and stakeholders. Integrating these three strands—mitigation, adaptation, and support of MRV—into a cohesive system will strengthen Nepal’s credibility on the global stage, improve access to international climate finance, and help guide strategic decision-making at home. A robust MRV architecture not only fulfills reporting obligations but also becomes a critical tool for steering climate-compatible development in Nepal.

What Needs to Be Done?

1. Legal and institutional reform: Nepal must legally recognize the MRV framework and clearly assign roles across central, provincial, and local governments. Embedding these responsibilities in climate policies and regulations will strengthen enforcement, coordination, and long-term sustainability. 

2. Capacity building: Sustained training is essential for government staff, technical experts, and non-state actors. Skills must extend beyond data collection to areas like GHG inventories, statistical modeling, climate risk assessment, and gender-responsive reporting. 

3. Digital infrastructure and data sharing: A centralized, interoperable digital MRV platform is needed to collect, validate, and analyze real-time data across sectors. Standardized formats, open-access dashboards, and strong data protection will enhance transparency and efficiency. 

 4. Stakeholder coordination: Clear roles, reporting timelines, and performance indicators must be defined for all institutions. Strengthening collaboration among national, provincial, and local actors—along with civil society and the private sector—will improve data quality and inclusiveness.

5. Donor alignment and trust: A robust MRV system demonstrates Nepal’s commitment and builds confidence with international partners. Meeting global reporting standards, like the Biennial Transparency Report (BTR), will improve access to climate finance and technical support.

 The Way Forward

Climate change poses one of the greatest challenges in Nepal’s development journey—but it also presents a unique opportunity to build more transparent, data-driven, and resilient institutions. A well-functioning MRV system is not just a reporting tool—it is a strategic asset that enables the country to measure progress, guide investments, and deliver real results for communities and ecosystems.

To translate commitments into outcomes, Nepal must treat MRV as a national development priority. Strengthening MRV systems is a prerequisite for unlocking climate finance, meeting Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets, and achieving a just and inclusive transition to a low-carbon economy. By institutionalizing MRV with legal backing, investing in digital tools, and fostering a culture of collaboration and accountability, Nepal can move from aspirational promises to measurable climate action—demonstrating both to its citizens and to the international community that it is serious about building a sustainable future.

(Budhathoki is a development professional based in Kathmandu, focused on climate change, climate finance, and governance.)

A fully stable relationship has been elusive to India and China. Since the birth of the modern nation states, the unresolved border has continued to put an ominous shadow on the relationship. The lack of understanding toward each other has also resulted in major mistrust which has only grown with time. The Galwan clash of June 2020, which pushed the relationship into a total freeze for 4.5 years, has added to the existing mistrust. However, some positive momentum and thaw was finally achieved in October 2024 after multiple rounds of talks and has been pushing the relationship in a positive direction. But, given the history of the relationship, it will not be wrong to assume that a lot needs to be reformed for this relationship to be truly functional.

In a first after Galwan, the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh visited Qingdao China from June 25 to June 26 to attend the defence ministers meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting and met his Chinese counterpart, Admiral Dong Jun. It was during this meeting that the Indian side proposed a four-point plan to achieve a ‘permanent solution’ to the border problem. The four-point agenda includes: “adherence to the 2024 disengagement plan, continued efforts to de-escalate, accelerated efforts to achieve the goal of demarcation and delimitation at the borders, and the usage of the existing special representative level mechanism to prepare new processes to manage differences and improve relations”. Singh also reiterated the need to build and establish mutual trust, which has been adversely impacted after the 2020 Galwan clash.

The points clearly highlight the multiple level of challenges and issues which India-China relations face even after 75 years of diplomatic relationship. India was one of the first countries to recognize the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since then, the relationship has faced major hurdles and what makes it ever more problematic is the existing unresolved border.

Singh has rightly asserted that there is a need to look for a permanent solution to the border as it has time and again proved to be a major obstacle in the improvement of the relationship. The idea promoted by China, which led to the thaw in 1988, was that borders can be resolved at a future date, while economic and other relationships improved, has been proven quite fragile. The India-China trade relations have boomed in the last four decades and today the bilateral trade stands at $118bn dollars, however, it has not proved to be a factor in actually bridging the trust deficit or strengthening the relationship. The fragility of diplomatic mechanisms has been witnessed time and again.

Both sides had realized the need for regular communication and they tried to look for ways to improve this. The lack of communication was quite apparent during the 73-day military standoff at Doklam. In order to address this lacunae, the two countries did engage in unofficial talks in the form of the Wuhan Summit of 2018 and the Mamallapuram Summit of 2019. These summits were supposed to help the leaders communicate better and help any future challenge like the standoff at Doklam. However, the Galwan clash of 2020 underscored the fact that the mistrust and miscommunication ran too deep.

However, India and China are two of the largest economies and nuclear power states and de-escalation is a crucial and necessary step toward improving the relationship. The Indian side’s reiteration is understood as a peaceful border is essential for overall growth of the country. But it appears that India and China need to genuinely understand each other’s concerns. Both have been working toward achieving their own respective goals and are trying to resolve the border issue as per their understanding. The unresolved border has time and time again pushed this relationship into uncertainty and the fact that the Confidence Building Mechanisms (CBMs) which were achieved and implemented by mutual understanding could be shattered by one incident underscores the need for better communication and peaceful resolution of the border. 

For the last 75 years, the two countries have also built a domestic narrative on the border and this is today closely linked to the sovereignty and identity of the countries. For a resolution, the border will have to be negotiated, and as negotiations go, it will call for a compromise. The question this raises is: Which country or government will be comfortable accepting any such outcome? No government can be seen as giving up on territory and thus appear weaker. The mistrust is too deeply ingrained and the repeated border skirmishes initiated by Beijing time and again has not helped the case. Nationalism soars too high and too strong when it comes to resolving the border.

Even today, it appears that the two sides are talking parallel to each other. The Chinese have continued to stress the need to restart and establish people-to-people contact, which had completely broken after Galwan and also impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Beijing has shown its proactiveness here by restarting the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and also issuing visas to a large number of Indians. It is also asserting that direct flights should be restarted soon. Meanwhile, New Delhi has continued to push for a resolution of the border and push for de-escalation, which is clear from the Indian defence minister’s agenda too. The fact that no joint statement was made during the SCO defence ministers’ meeting further shows the gap in perception. India has been firm on asserting the role of Pakistan as a terrorist state while China continues to push a parallel narrative.

A stable and cooperative India-China relationship will be beneficial to them as well as the South Asian region but it can be achieved only when the two sides genuinely start to understand and trust each other.

The author is an associate professor at OP Jindal Global University

Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari has rejoined the CPN-UML, marking a significant development in Nepal’s political landscape. She confirmed that she had renewed her party membership, which she had relinquished after assuming the presidency following the promulgation of the 2015 constitution. For a long time, there had been confusing and contradictory messages regarding her membership status.

Speaking at an event organized by the Madan Bhandari Foundation, she declared: “Now I am reunited with the UML as a member of this family, and I feel proud of this.” Her announcement comes close on the heels of a high-profile visit to China and a series of nationwide tours aimed at reconnecting with party cadres.

Bhandari’s political resurgence has stirred unease within the UML, particularly among Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and his close allies, including senior leaders Pradeep Gyawali and Shankar Pokhrel, who have openly expressed their opposition to her return. The situation mirrors an earlier controversy when former Vice-president Nanda Kishor Pun rejoined the CPN (Maoist Center) amid similar internal criticism.

Her return raises pressing questions about the party’s future leadership. Will Oli willingly transfer power to Bhandari or will the two compete for control in the upcoming party elections? Reports suggest Bhandari is positioning herself as a unifying figure, citing Oli’s health concerns and deepening party divisions, while also portraying herself as someone capable of bringing Nepal’s fractured communist factions together.

Oli had reportedly urged Bhandari to delay her public announcement to avoid stoking internal conflict. However, she insisted on clarifying her position ahead of the UML’s upcoming statute convention, arguing that transparency was necessary. Over recent months, Oli has publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Bhandari’s intent to return to party politics. Meanwhile, there is also a growing public debate over whether it is appropriate for a former head of state to re-enter active politics.

The immediate challenge before the UML leadership is to assign Bhandari a role—similar to what the Maoist Center did for Nanda Kishor Pun, who returned to politics despite internal resistance. While Bhandari’s comeback may not pose a direct challenge to Oli’s leadership in the short term, it could undermine the ambitions of second-rung leaders vying to lead the party.

Key contenders to succeed Oli include Ishwar Pokhrel, Shankar Pokhrel, Bishnu Poudel and Pradeep Gyawali. Given her stature as a former president, her late husband's legacy and her recent outreach, analysts suggest Bhandari could dominate the UML’s direction for the next decade if she secures the party leadership.

Bhandari’s re-entry has already triggered polarization within the party. Many leaders previously distanced from Oli have now aligned with her. Since the departure of senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal, the UML had largely avoided public factionalism, with Oli maintaining a tight grip on internal power. In the party's 10th convention, Oli’s attempt to be elected unanimously was challenged by Bhim Rawal, leading to a formal election process. Rawal later left the party.

Bhandari has vowed to strengthen the UML into a decisive political force ahead of the 2027 elections, emphasizing that internal unity could lead the party to a majority, an idea that resonates with many party leaders and cadres. Her return could also accelerate the defection of CPN (Unified Socialist) members to the UML, as many disillusioned leaders see no future in the party, especially after the CIAA filed a corruption case against Madhav Kumar Nepal.

Her re-entry comes at a crucial time, as the party prepares for its statute convention and a leadership convention in the years ahead. Oli, who became party chairman in 2015 and was re-elected in 2021 with 1,840 votes against Bhim Rawal’s 223, has not confirmed whether he will seek a third term. Bhandari has expressed optimism about Oli continuing as the party leader. The UML has scheduled its statute convention for August, and the leadership convention is planned within the next five years.

General Secretary Shankar Pokhrel has openly opposed Bhandari’s comeback. Speaking at a party event in Pokhara, he stated that the former president cannot overstep the UML’s vision of development and prosperity. He warned that opportunist forces were attempting to weaken the party from within.

Speaking at a separate event the same day, Oli echoed similar concerns, warning party members against encouraging factions working to influence the upcoming general convention. “The party is on a mission for 2084 (2027),” he said, referencing the next national election. Pokhrel had earlier proposed barring Bhandari’s return to party politics by effecting changes in the party statute. 

Bhandari, however, remains firm in her political vision. She has pledged to further advance people’s multiparty democracy, an ideology propagated by her late husband, Madan Bhandari. The core of this ideology is the belief that communist parties in Nepal must embrace parliamentary democracy instead of adhering to orthodox communist principles. 

Her reentry also carries geopolitical implications, as both India and China closely monitor her political trajectory. While Beijing welcomed her during her recent visit, where she met senior Chinese Communist Party officials.  Striking a diplomatic tone, “India and China’s socio-economic progress inspires us. We must strengthen ties with both to build mutually beneficial partnerships,” said Bhandari.