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It has been exactly 109 years since the world’s first press council was established in Sweden in 1916. Its goal was to create an independent media self-regulatory body facilitated by the state, but guided by the broader media fraternity and the public. Since then, dozens of countries have formed, revised, dissolved, or renamed their press councils. In democratic nations, some councils have retained their autonomy; in autocratic regimes and much of the Global South, however, they often remain under government control.

Despite these variations, the core idea behind press councils has remained consistent: to serve as an intermediary between the press and the public, promoting professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards, while offering policy input to the government. Crucially, press councils are meant to operate on the principle of self-regulation, based on the strict implementation of a code of ethics, rather than through legal regulation enforced by other government bodies. A press council should be a collective effort involving the state, the media industry, and the public. While the government may support its effective functioning, it must not seek to control it.

Nepal adopted the idea of a press council earlier than many other countries. The Press Council Nepal (PCN) was established in 1971 based on the recommendations of a new communication plan. During the Panchayat era, it operated largely under government control. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, new legislation promised an independent council. However, successive chairpersons failed to uphold that promise, often becoming submissive to the government and their affiliated political parties.

There is a persistent tendency in Nepal to create overlapping institutions aimed at controlling the media, without clearly understanding or respecting their distinct mandates. The Media Council Bill, for instance, seeks to grant expanded powers to a new Media Council, many of which overlap with functions already assigned to existing government agencies. This has led to a widespread perception within the bureaucracy that PCN is merely another department under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, damaging its credibility and undermining its intended independence. Successive PCN leaderships have done little to challenge this perception.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a growing consensus among bureaucrats, politicians, and lawmakers in favor of tighter media control, often under the pretext of curbing misinformation and disinformation. The proposed Media Council Bill must be examined in this broader context. While it does not explicitly propose the formation of a media control body, it does aim to expand the council’s jurisdiction from print to digital platforms. The name of the institution is secondary; what matters is whether its independence, both structural and operational, is safeguarded.

The most serious flaw in the Bill is the excessive power it grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, particularly in appointing and removing council members. To protect the council’s autonomy, an independent commission, possibly involving a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, should be tasked with recommending the council’s leadership and members.

However, implementing such reforms may face resistance. Organizations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), politically affiliated journalist associations, and senior journalist groups may oppose changes that reduce their influence over appointments. Political parties and the bureaucracy may also seek to preserve their control through informal arrangements. In the last three decades, very few truly independent journalists or academics have been appointed to the council or similar bodies.

Parliament must seriously consider creating a transparent, independent appointment mechanism. Yet, many lawmakers lack a clear understanding of the press council’s core mission and values. Another concerning provision in the Bill is the transfer of authority to issue press accreditation certificates to the Media Council. This is not the council’s appropriate role. Even more troubling is the proposed provision allowing the council to revoke a journalist’s press pass for up to a year for violating the code of ethics. This directly contradicts the fundamental purpose of a press pass, which is to enable public information access, not serve as a tool for punishment.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting already imposes unnecessarily restrictive requirements for issuing press passes. Shifting that authority to the Media Council will only increase confusion and bureaucratic friction. Other provisions in the Bill also raise concerns, suggesting that the drafters may have drawn inspiration from press council models in more authoritarian regimes.

One welcome aspect of the Bill is the proposed removal of the council’s authority to classify newspapers. However, this change may also face resistance from journalist organizations, as classification has traditionally been used to control or reward media outlets. A separate entity, such as an Audit Bureau of Circulation, should be created to handle classifications for both print and digital platforms.

Overall, the Bill lacks a clear, forward-looking vision for the role and structure of the Media Council. It also fails to reflect on past institutional lessons. For the council to function effectively, it must have a strong, cooperative relationship with media organizations. At present, a significant trust deficit exists between the council and the Nepali media industry. The law should ensure not only participation from the media and public, but also their meaningful contribution to the council’s work. As drafted, the Bill envisions the Media Council more as a government department than an independent regulatory body. A complete overhaul is, therefore, necessary.

If parliament is truly committed to forming an independent media council, it should return the Bill to the Ministry with clear instructions to redraft it in consultation with all stakeholders, including international experts.

This debate is not about targeting the current government or any individual minister. The Bill was originally introduced by the previous government, but it now falls on the current one to refine and pass it. Political parties must rise above narrow interests and prioritize the long-term public good.

A strong, independent institution serves democracy and society, regardless of whether it aligns with a party’s immediate interests. When it comes to media accountability, as Denis McQuail puts it, two models exist: answerability and liability. Answerability is moral and social; it’s voluntary, cooperative, and involves non-material penalties. Liability, by contrast, is legal, imposed, and often punitive.

Press councils should operate on the answerability model. They should function as watchdogs that bark but do not bite, empowered to raise concerns, issue warnings, and alert stakeholders to ethical lapses, but not to take legal action against journalists. Evaluated through this lens, many of the Bill’s flaws become more evident, and more easily correctable.

So a humble appeal to parliament: step back from narrow debates and redraft the Bill from first principles. This is a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a free, accountable, and ethical press in Nepal.

On July 23, the International Court of Justice issued a groundbreaking Advisory Opinion clarifying that states have an obligation to tackle climate warming. The ruling, while not binding, also affirmed, in an unequivocal way, the duties and responsibilities of nations who have been historically responsible for the emission of carbon fossils. The AO is certainly charting a new phase both in the field of climate negotiation and in the realm of climate litigation, with the latter set to expand and scale in ways that are difficult to imagine.

At the same time, it might be useful to reflect about the trajectory, the pathway that led to the Hague where the ICJ is located. We should not forget that it all started with a group of law students at the University of South Pacific in Suva, Fiji. They were the ones, emboldened with sheer confidence and ambition, who had started working on the rationale, the legal case for which the ICJ should step in. It was because of their irreverence and perhaps recklessness that we have reached this turning point in the fight to uphold the Paris Agreement. Their stories have been celebrated worldwide and rightly so and by now, there have been many articles, videos about them.

However, let us not forget that, it is also worth remembering another part of the story. It was because of the Government of Vanuatu that the case for an AO could be brought to the General Assembly of the United Nations, an indispensable step to reach the ICJ. A small island nation of approximately 320.000 people was able to gather the required support from other member-states and convince them of the urgency of approaching the ICJ. It was a long and complex journey that started in 2019.

When I first heard this story, I could not stop thinking about the following question: if the students that had dared to start this process were from Nepal, a nation much bigger and powerful than Vanuatu, would they have received the same level of support from their own government? Well, this is an inescapable question.

While it is true that the federal government in Kathmandu embraced the case during the hearings at the Hague, I have been wondering if Nepal would have been able to garner the 105 co-sponsor nations at the General Assembly without whom the resolution would have never passed. Perhaps the key question is not really about the diplomatic capacities of Nepal at the UN. Probably it would not have been unimaginable for Kathmandu to bring together enough co-sponsors like Vanuatu did, ensuring that the resolution paving the way for ICJ’s intervention would pass through consensus at the General Assembly.

The real question to ask ourselves is another one: would, at first, the government have listened and backed a group of its own law students? This is a fundamental aspect to discuss. It is also important to remember that Nepali youths were also very active in supporting the cause globally. Some of them have been taking the lead at national and regional level through the World’s Youth For Climate Justice, the global movement that was initially spearheaded by the students at the University of South Pacific.

The same group of youths played an important leadership role in ensuring that the Government of Nepal could have a strong representation when the country defended the need for an AO during the official hearings at the ICJ in December last year. It is probably safe to say that without their involvement, Arzu Rana Deuba, the Foreign Minister of Nepal, would not have given a strong and convincing statement at the Hague.

Therefore, it is appropriate now to think about the future months when the AO’s principles will start reverberating in the international community and yes in the court of justice around the world. While it is impossible to summarize here through a few lines some of the legal principles and substantive statements from the ICJ, it is worthy to remember that the justices also expressed their opinion on the states’ responsibilities to prepare the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These are the commitments that all the parties to the Paris Agreement have pledged to implement in order to reduce (in jargon, “mitigate”) their carbon emissions.

According to the AO, the preparation and implementation of NDCs are not entirely discretionary for the governments. In practice, it means that these documents must be ambitious and each respective country must have concrete plans to effectively implement them so that they can scale back their emissions. Only in this way, the entire international community can collectively be able to limit global warming to 1.5°C as per the Paris Agreement.

Even more far bridging is the fact that parties to the Paris Agreement not drafting or not doing enough to implement the NDCs, can be found in breach of international law and their action or omission can be considered an internationally wrongful act. This is a very important aspect of the AO that perhaps has not received adequate attention as most of the commentary has been on the duties and responsibilities of industrialized nations’ responsible for anthropogenically-induced climate change.

For developing and emerging nations, the part of the AO on the NDCs requires utmost attention. Preparing an ambitious NDC is a complex task and Nepal has been showing leadership when it recently finalized its latest version, the third overall since the approval of the Paris Agreement. It also means that the country needs to introspect and reflect on the tools and policies at disposal to ensure that it can do whatever it can to implement the NDC. While many of its components will depend on foreign assistance on the part of the polluting industrialized nations, a lot of its implementation will rely on effective and transparent governance at both national and local levels.

And here another question: does Nepal have in place effective mechanisms to ensure that those parts of the NDCs under its direct control, the ones implementable without any form of foreign aid including funding for loss and damage or even possible future compensation, can be achieved? Even in the case of Nepal being able to receive the much-needed climate finance from outside, will the country be able to use these resources effectively and transparently? That’s why it is appropriate for the nation to brainstorm on the most effective tools and mechanisms to ensure that Nepal does whatever is possible to implement the NDCs parts where it has a direct control on the outcomes.

One way to start rethinking the national climate governance is to have solid mechanisms to engage members of the civil society. We could imagine a National Climate and Biodiversity Council consisting of members of civil society, including representatives of academia. It is important to also include the area of biodiversity because, as we know, we are talking about two sides of the same coin even if then, at the international level, nations have the burdensome duty of dealing with two completely different negotiation mechanisms.

Half of the seats available in the Council should be assigned to local youths who would represent the whole diversity of the nation, therefore also ensuring the participation of youths from historically marginalized communities that, so far, have been less involved and engaged on climate work. The Council should not be just a sounding board for the government but a platform that can, on one hand, propose ideas and solutions, while, on the other, keep a check on the government’s implementation of the NDC.

The central level body at the federal level could work in partnership with similar mechanisms at provincial levels with some sort of loose and light coordination between the two levels. Memberships could come through consensus and ensure that certain criteria are met in order for someone to be able to claim a seat. I am talking about a voluntary role that, if obtained, will only be for a limited amount of time, perhaps one year or maximum two years with the possibility to renew it for another year.

Another option would be to have a body that is exclusively composed of youths, a Youth Climate and Biodiversity Council but I am afraid such an approach would only invite tokenistic results and its work might not be taken seriously. Remembering how the international community got this trailblazing AO is paramount. A small group of law students were able to initiate a global movement and, with the right support, they made history. Then, why not entrust more policymaking responsibilities, including some forms of decision making to them in implementing the Paris Agreement at the national level? After all, who can better ensure that AO will be literally upheld and put into practice?

In the life of an individual, graduation is a moment to cherish—forever. This holds true for a nation as well.

Come 2026 and Nepal is set to graduate from the club of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a grouping of 44 countries from Africa (32), Asia (8), Caribbean (1) and Pacific (3), leaving behind its 54-year association with the club, as the club chair on her last legs.

Of the three criteria for graduation—gross national income (GNI) per capita, human assets index (HAI) and economic vulnerability index—Nepal has fallen a bit short of the first criteria but met the other two, becoming the first country to graduate without meeting the GNI criterion.

Let’s revisit Nepal’s scores against the three indices over the past decade.

In 2015, also the year of a massive Gorkha earthquake that left behind a trail of deaths and destruction, followed by a blockade, Nepal’s GDI per capita stood at a paltry $659 against the minimum threshold of $1248. In 2018, 2021 and 2024, its GDI stood at $745, $1027 and $1300 against the minimum thresholds of $1230, $1222 and $1306.

On the two other parameters, Nepal has consistently performed alright.

But, as they say, a miss is as good as a mile and this rings true on the GDI front, from 2015 to 2019 (the year of the Covid pandemic) and beyond.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, while addressing the National Assembly recently, when the ‘hallowed’ hall was fully awake (most probably), read the upcoming graduation in an albeit different light. According to the chief executive, this shows that the implementation of (his vision) ‘Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepali’  has begun yielding results.

What does this graduation mean for the country and the people? Per the PM, the improvement in the parameters in question and the upcoming graduation is an indication of Nepal heading toward self-reliance and a rising global profile of the country.

While the graduation indicates that Nepal has grown richer, how much of the riches have trickled down to the bottom rung over the years is an open question.

Analyses suggest that graduation means Nepal will no longer have easy access to cheaper international loans, that it will impact international support and assistance that Nepal has been enjoying, the number of scholarships for Nepali students will go down and that the country will have to strive harder for bringing in foreign investment, so on and so forth.

Here’s hoping that our government will be able to make the best of the opportunities that come with the graduation as well as some shocks that come with it.

Experts say that diplomacy comes handy in such situations.   

Indeed, as Eleanor Roosevelt says, the future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams. 

Two major coalition partners, the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML, are reviewing the performance of government ministers, with plans to dismiss those deemed ineffective. Ministers were informed at the time of their appointment that they would face evaluation after one year and could be removed based on their performance. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and NC President Sher Bahadur Deub have begun consultations for a cabinet reshuffle. However, the move is likely to stir discord within both the NC and UML.

Overall, ministerial performance has been unsatisfactory. While ministers made lofty promises and generated noise, tangible results have been lacking. Meanwhile, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal is once again pursuing the unification of fringe communist parties to bolster his political position. With his attempts to spark friction between the NC and UML proving ineffective, he has shifted focus to party unification.

Dahal has reached out to CPN (Unified Socialist) Chairperson Madhav Kumar Nepal for immediate unification. However, many CPN (US) leaders and cadres prefer to return to the UML rather than merge with the Maoist Center. Should Nepal decide to unify with Dahal’s party, it could trigger a split in the CPN (US). Meanwhile, the UML has taken stricter measures to curb former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s activities within the party.

The UML has issued a circular instructing party units not to engage in any debate over Bhandari's potential return to active party politics. Intra-party tensions are also mounting in the Maoist Center, with Chairperson Dahal and senior leader Janardan Sharma exchanging public barbs. Dahal has accused internal forces of spreading false rumors that he is planning to split the party.

While Dahal shows no intention of relinquishing party leadership, a power struggle is underway. Senior leaders Sharma and Barshaman Pun are positioning themselves as his successors. In the Dahal-Sharma tussle, Pun appears to be aligning with Dahal to gain favor. All three major parties—NC, UML, and Maoist Center—face looming leadership crises as Deuba, Oli, and Dahal approach retirement.

The UML’s circular may hinder Bhandari’s ability to organize political events, as party leaders now fear disciplinary action. Since the party revoked her membership, many of her vocal supporters have stopped attending her programs. Though Bhandari has expressed her intent to stay active in politics, recent party decisions are likely to restrict her activities significantly.

Amid rumors of a challenge to Deuba’s leadership, Shekhar Koirala has admitted that his faction lacks the numbers to replace him as parliamentary party leader. Speaking publicly, Koirala said even Deuba is aware of this reality. Still, Koirala continues to ride the wave of anti-incumbency sentiment within the party to strengthen his own position, criticizing both the party and government leadership.

Deuba remains in a relatively secure position as Koirala and General Secretary Gagan Thapa, despite both wanting to prevent Deuba from returning as prime minister, remain rivals and are not working together. Their push to hold the party’s general convention before the 2027 election seems unlikely to succeed, as unresolved issues over active membership persist. Within the NC, realignments and the formation of new factions are expected in the coming days, as Deuba has announced he won’t contest the presidency again.

Meanwhile, the Nagarik Unmukti Party has expelled Chairperson Ranjita Shrestha over her alleged involvement in a corruption scandal. Once an emerging force in the 2022 parliamentary elections, the party had recently withdrawn its support to the government and now finds itself mired in internal conflict. In Nepal, intra-party power struggles have become a political norm, often resulting in splits.

The controversy surrounding the land-related bill remains unresolved. The ruling NC has proposed a five-point amendment to address differences, particularly with UML. Madhes-based parties have expressed dissent on several provisions. Upendra Yadav, chairman of the Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal, has said the bill violates the constitution and plans to challenge it in court. The Rastriya Swatantra Party has called for the bill to be returned to the Agriculture Ministry.

Parties are also preparing for the by-election in Rupandehi-3. It is still unclear whether the NC and UML will form an electoral alliance. Candidate selection is underway, and the by-poll is expected to serve as a barometer for current public support for political parties.

In Bagmati Province, the government faces renewed instability due to internal party rifts. Indra Baniya has been elected the party’s parliamentary leader, defeating incumbent Chief Minister Bahadur Singh Lama. Lama is under pressure to resign after losing control over his own party. Though the province had seen stability for the past year due to the NC-UML coalition, tensions are now resurfacing.

On a different front, the US government has officially confirmed that Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects will continue in Nepal, ending months of uncertainty. Both the Biden and Trump administrations have viewed MCC in Nepal as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Nepal’s decision to sign the BRI framework agreement with China earlier this year increased pressure on Washington to retain MCC support. A bipartisan consensus exists in the US on countering China’s growing influence, and the continuation of MCC underscores Nepal’s strategic importance, despite broader aid cuts.

Finally, Prime Minister Oli is scheduled to visit Turkmenistan from Aug 5–8 to participate in the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries. Preparations are also underway for his likely visit to India in September, though the date has not been confirmed.