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One year after Donald Trump assumed office for his second term as American President, his administration’s South Asia policy is beginning to take shape.

Over the past year, the Trump administration paid very little attention to the smaller countries of South Asia, as Trump was focused on preventing or stopping major wars occurring in different parts of the world. The Trump administration has recalled several ambassadors from South Asian countries, including Nepal, and has not yet appointed their replacements.

Meanwhile, the administration’s relationship with India witnessed a tumultuous phase due to tariff war. Now, the relationship between India and the United States is returning to normalcy following the settlement of trade disputes. 

This week, at least three senior American officials spoke about their approach to South Asia. S. Paul Kapur, Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. State Department, appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to outline Washington’s South Asia policy.

According to Kapur’s statement, the principal agenda of the Trump administration is to expand trade relationships with South Asian countries, as it is doing elsewhere. In his second term, Trump has employed tariffs as a tool to pressure governments to make trade more favorable to the United States.

Kapur further added: “Just last week, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi reached agreement on a historic trade framework. And two days ago, the Trump Administration signed a trade deal with Bangladesh, providing American exporters with access to Bangladesh’s market of 175 million people.” But, U.S has a very minimal trade with Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

Beyond trade, he outlined three broad approaches to strategic capacity-building that the Trump administration is deploying in South Asia: defense cooperation, targeted investment, and diplomacy.

Defense cooperation includes military sales and transfers, co-development of systems and platforms, and bilateral and multilateral exercises.  Targeted investment combines U.S. seed funding, American technology and expertise, and private industry participation.

Diplomacy involves institutionalized engagement between senior leaders, as well as ad hoc interactions to address emerging opportunities or challenges, along with strategic messaging to support U.S. initiatives.

Regarding the smaller countries of South Asia, the Trump administration’s first priority appears to be countering growing Chinese influence. Kapur said: “Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bhutan’s strategic locations afford them outsized importance, but also can make them targets for coercion.”

He added that defense cooperation with the United States helps these countries protect their borders and waterways against encroaching powers, while carefully targeted investment can provide high-quality, transparent, and non-coercive support for critical infrastructure such as ports, telecommunications networks, and energy facilities—helping them avoid the dangers of debt-trap diplomacy. This indicates that the U.S. intends to limit Chinese investment in those countries.

Similarly, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga said that strengthening ties with New Delhi through defense cooperation, trade, and technology partnerships advances shared interests.

He stated: “I look forward to increasing cooperation, co-production, and investment, especially under the new framework negotiated by the President. Bordering India, Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing political transformations.”

He noted that Bangladesh will hold free elections tomorrow following its July 2024 revolution, which ousted an authoritarian government in September 2025.

 In Nepal, youth-led protests overthrew the government, and the country will hold democratic elections next month. According to him, both instances offer new chapters for engagement in South Asia, shaping U.S. relations with these new governments.

He further added that South and Central Asia is a dynamic region, where young and growing populations are more often drawn to Western cultures and values than to China’s authoritarian alternative.

“Strategic U.S.-led diplomacy will make a difference in building alliances and achieving our mutually beneficial goals throughout the region,” he said.

“Our strategy in South Asia must be comprehensive, anchored in strong partnerships, economic engagement, and a commitment to democratic values. Our engagement in the region must advance American interests, while also contributing to a more secure, prosperous, and free Indian Ocean,” he added.

Adm. Samuel J. Paparo, commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), has said his visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. He visited Nepal ahead of the March 5 elections to the House of Representatives (HoR), which are taking place against the backdrop of the September 8–9 Gen Z protest.

The visit highlighted Nepal’s leadership in promoting regional stability, disaster preparedness, and peacekeeping. U.S.-Nepal cooperation in these areas benefits Nepali and American citizens throughout the region and supports global peacekeeping efforts, says a press statement issued by INDOPACOM after the two-day visit. 

The latest electoral data from Nepal reveals a profound demographic shift that is reshaping the nation’s political landscape. While the country has historically been governed by a ‘senior guard’, a new wave of political representation is emerging, characterized by a sharp divide between the voting and candidacy patterns of the youth and the elderly. This generational disconnect suggests that while established parties like the Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML, and Nepali Communist Party (NCP) maintain institutional loyalty among seniors, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has effectively monopolized the aspirations of the younger generation.

For the first time in recent history, the ‘under 30’ demographic has found a singular political home. The RSP has positioned itself as the primary vehicle for youth participation, fielding 17 individuals. In a surprising show of grassroots youth engagement, the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party follows with 14 individuals under 30. 

This stands in stark contrast to the UML, which has managed to field only three, and the Nepali Congress, which remarkably has zero representation in this youngest category. Other parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (seven individuals), CPN (Maoist) (four individuals) and NCP (one individual) show minor engagement. Smaller entities like the Shram Sanskriti Party (seven), Ujyalo Nepal Party (nine) round out the group, but the data suggests that for the GenZ demographic, the RSP is the primary attraction.

As we move into the 31 to 40-year-old demographic, the RSP reaches its peak influence with a massive 53 individuals. This is the highest concentration of talent for the party and signals a strong grip on the young-adult workforce. This age group also sees a significant surge from the Ujyalo Nepal Party with 33 individuals, the CPN (Maoist) with 36, and the Shram Sanskriti Party with 31. Interestingly, even in this energetic age bracket, the traditional ‘big two’ remain largely absent, with the UML fielding only 10 and the NC only nine. The NCP shows a slightly higher involvement here with 18 candidates, while the RPP fields 26 and the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party maintains 19.

The 41 to 50 age bracket serves as the ultimate competitive melting pot, where almost all parties show their most balanced numbers. The NCP holds the highest number here with 61 candidates, followed closely by the RSP with 51 individuals. They are joined at the top by the CPN (Maoist) and the Shram Sanskriti Party, both of which have exactly 50 individuals. The RPP also shows its strength here with 44 individuals. It is only at this stage—the mid-40s—that the NC (39) and UML (36) begin to see their numbers rise, suggesting that their recruitment pipelines favor those who have ‘paid their dues’ over several decades. Other notable presences in this middle bracket include the Ujyalo Nepal (29), and Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party (38).

The power dynamic shifts entirely once we cross the 50-year threshold. In the 51 to 60 age group, the CPN-UML records the single highest number in the entire dataset with 71 individuals, followed closely by the Nepali Congress with 67 and the RPP with 51. The NCP remains a significant force with 47 candidates. Meanwhile, the RSP begins to dip with 41 individuals, and the CPN (Maoist) drops to 28. In this bracket, the Ujyalo Nepal (25) and Nepal Majdur Kishan Party (38) maintain steady numbers, but this group clearly represents the ‘power center’ of the established parties, where organizational experience is most highly valued.

Finally, the 61 and above category cements the divide. The Nepali Congress leads the seniors with 50 individuals, followed by the CPN-UML with 44, NCP with 37, and the RPP with 35. In a sharp reversal of the youth trend, the newer parties are almost non-existent among the elderly. The CPN (Maoist) has 12, the Ujyalo Nepal has eight, and the Shram Sanskriti Party has six. Most notably, the RSP has a mere two individuals in this senior group. 

This data paints a final picture of a nation split by time: a youth-led movement is rising from the bottom, while the traditional guard continues to hold the fort from the top.

The political parties and the candidates of the House of Representatives (HoR) elections scheduled for March 5 are beginning their formal election campaigns from today as per the election code of conduct. 

According to the Election Commission (EC), the candidates and political parties are allowed to organize rallies, mass meetings, corner assemblies and publish their election-related materials in the media outlets only from 15 days of the elections.

As per the same provision of the election code of conduct, the political parties and candidates could continue the publicity campaigns until March 1 midnight.

The EC has urged all stakeholders to conduct the election campaigns by fully upholding the integrity of elections.  

Likewise, the EC has also mobilized different mechanisms for the implementation and monitoring of the election code of conduct.  

In case of violation of the election code of conduct, the EC would seek clarification from the political parties and candidates, and would advance further legal actions. However, the EC has made it clear that such a situation for action would not come since the code of conduct was formulated after a massive interaction with the political parties and stakeholders.

Similarly, Acting Chief Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari said that the EC has taken the zero tolerance policy against the violation of the election code of conduct.

On 8 Sept 2025, thousands of youths descended onto the streets of Kathmandu to protest years of systemic corruption, widening inequality between the political class and ordinary citizens, limited opportunities, and the growing distance between young people and state authority. The controversial decision by the KP Oli-led coalition government to ban 26 social media platforms served as the immediate trigger, but the protests reflected much deeper and long-standing dissatisfaction with the state.

Shortly after the ban, hashtags such as #NepoKids and #NepoBaby began trending on TikTok and called for street protests. The movement had no single leader, no party flag, no formal guidelines, and was expected to remain peaceful and non-violent, as most protesters were teenagers and many of them in school uniforms. However, the demonstration did not unfold as anticipated. Protesters breached the first police barricades near Everest Hotel in New Baneshwor and advanced toward the main gate of the Federal Parliament, where some attempted to climb the gate. The government failed to control the protest and responded with extreme brutality, killing 19 individuals that day.

In the evening, Oli convened a cabinet meeting. Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak resigned, and the government announced the withdrawal of the social media ban, but it failed to anticipate or manage the consequences for the following day.

Despite the curfew, the situation worsened dramatically the next day. From early morning, angry protesters moved with a different intensity than the previous day. Government buildings and state institutions were vandalized and set on fire. Politicians and their properties were targeted, and amid the chaos, thousands of prisoners escaped from prisons. By the afternoon, Oli submitted his resignation to the President, but by then the situation was already out of control, with massive national losses. Following his resignation, Oli was evacuated by the Nepal Army to a safe location amid ongoing attacks and threats against political figures.

From that night onward, the Army took control of security across Kathmandu and other areas to restore law and order, enforce the curfew, and stabilize the country during the power vacuum. This continued until an interim government was formed under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki on Sept 12, with the mandate to hold elections on March 5.

The movement ended with a heavy human toll, massive economic losses, and several days of national crisis. Despite these costs, it opened space for intense intra-party debate, especially among younger members of major traditional parties who began demanding immediate leadership change and grassroots-level reform.

Nepali Congress: Revolt to reform

Nepali Congress (NC), the country’s oldest democratic party and a key player in the pre-protest coalition government with CPN-UML, faced immediate backlash. Its headquarters and leaders were attacked, and internal conflicts between the establishment faction led by Sher Bahadur Deuba and the reformist faction led by Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma intensified.

Soon after the uprising, Thapa and Sharma issued a joint statement and video message acknowledging the GenZ movement, admitting their party’s repeated failures to understand citizens’ demands despite being in power multiple times. Reformist leaders feared not only for the party’s future but also for their own political relevance. They strongly demanded party reform, generational handover, and serious reflection on past mistakes to build a “New Congress.”

The party faced two main options: proceed to elections under the existing leadership, as favored by the establishment faction, or pursue reform through a regular or special convention, the core demand of the reformists.

As internal tussles continued, the reformist faction began collecting petitions from party representatives nationwide under Article 17(2) of the party statute, which mandates a Special General Convention if at least 40 percent of delegates submit a written request citing specific reasons. Meanwhile, the establishment faction pushed for the restoration of the dissolved House of Representatives. Deep disagreements gradually pushed the party into prolonged internal turmoil.

On Oct 14, Sher Bahadur Deuba appeared at a Central Committee meeting after recovering from injuries sustained during a mob attack on the second day of the protests. He called for party unity amid national unrest, condemned organized violence, and acknowledged GenZ demands for good governance. He pledged to hand over party leadership after the 15th General Convention and temporarily stepped aside as party president, appointing Vice-president Purna Bahadur Khadka as acting president.

Despite expectations that Deuba’s move would ease tensions, divisions only deepened. The establishment faction opposed holding a convention before the March 5 elections, arguing it would disrupt preparations, while reformists insisted that pre-election change was essential to address youth demands. The Thapa–Sharma faction strengthened its position by securing support from more than 50 percent of convention delegates for a special convention, while establishment leaders focused on restoring the dissolved House.

On Dec 1, after two months of heated debate, the Central Working Committee announced the 15th General Convention for Jan 10–12 in Kathmandu, a move widely seen as an attempt to sideline the demand for a special convention. Reformists warned that if the regular convention failed to proceed, a special convention would be unavoidable. On Jan 2, the convention was postponed until after the elections, citing logistical challenges and campaign priorities. In response, the reformist faction rejected the delay and began preparations for a special convention.

On Jan 8, the Thapa-Sharma faction officially announced a Special Convention for Jan 11-12 at Bhrikutimandap, despite strong opposition from the establishment. The convention opened with enthusiasm and hopes for a “New Congress.” Thapa and Sharma presented political and organizational proposals outlining their vision for party transformation. Meanwhile, fears of a party split grew as candidate selection, which was scheduled for Jan 20, remained stalled. Organizers claimed 56 percent delegate participation, though the official list was never released.

The establishment faction dismissed the convention as illegitimate and unconstitutional. On Jan 14, the Deuba faction expelled Thapa, Sharma, and Farmullah Mansoor for five years, removing their general membership. This marked the third major split in Nepali Congress’s history since 1950. In response, representatives at Bhrikutimandap formed a new Central Working Committee under Thapa’s leadership until the next regular convention.

Both factions approached the Election Commission (EC) seeking official recognition. The Thapa-Sharma faction argued that their convention followed party statutes and enjoyed majority support, while the Deuba faction insisted it was illegitimate and threatened nationwide protests if rejected. The EC later recognized Thapa’s faction as the legitimate Nepali Congress based on majority delegate support. The Deuba faction rejected the decision, alleging external interference. The matter is now before the Supreme Court, and NC is heading into the elections under Thapa’s leadership, while the establishment faction remains largely silent.

UML’s radical stance

CPN-UML adopted an antagonistic stance toward the GenZ uprising from the outset, choosing confrontation over introspection. Amid widespread turmoil and party leaders under the army protection, Shankar Pokharel called for dialogue to safeguard constitutional democracy while strongly condemning the Sept 9 vandalism.

The party appeared divided. Leaders such as Ishwar Pokhrel, Surendra Pandey, and Yogesh Bhattarai acknowledged past mistakes and called for reform, while Shankar Pokharel and Mahesh Basnet remained firm supporters of Oli. Unlike Nepali Congress, these divisions were not strictly generational.

Following Oli’s return from army protection, reformist voices gradually faded. The Oli camp’s framing of the movement as anarchic and disastrous became the official party line, accompanied by conspiracy narratives and harsh criticism of the Karki-led interim government. UML strongly pushed for parliamentary restoration.

At the Oct 15–18 Central Committee meeting, reformists urged Oli to step down. When he refused, they shifted focus to demanding a general convention to restore legitimacy. The party’s 11th General Convention was held Dec 14–16 in Bhaktapur. Despite public expectations for leadership change, Oli was re-elected for a third term, effectively closing the chapter on internal reform.

Maoist’s cosmetic adjustment

As an opposition party, CPN (Maoist Center) expressed solidarity with the Sept 8 protests and demanded the prime minister’s resignation. Despite suffering losses during the unrest, Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal acknowledged the youth movement and sought to position himself as adaptable and open to generational change. He accepted the interim government and focused on the upcoming elections.

On Sept 26, Dahal dissolved the party’s central and standing committees, forming a convention organizing committee with himself as coordinator. While framed as reform, internal tensions persisted. Leaders like Janardan Sharma openly criticized Dahal’s top-down approach but failed to generate substantive change. Sharma later joined Baburam Bhattarai’s Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party. Unlike in NC, there was no strong generational push for leadership change.

On Nov 5, Dahal initiated a unification of nine leftist parties, forming the Nepali Communist Party with himself as coordinator. While framed as consolidation, the move appeared more like rebranding, retaining the same leadership and political culture under a new name.

RSP: From early blunder to alternative force

The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), founded in 2022 with anti-establishment rhetoric, emerged as the fourth-largest parliamentary force. While it initially supported the GenZ movement and demanded the prime minister’s resignation, its political immaturity became evident. On the second day of unrest, senior leaders focused on mobilizing pressure for Rabi Lamichhane’s release from prison, even as the country burned. That same day, more than 13,000 prisoners, including Lamichhane, escaped, triggering a national security crisis.

RSP faced widespread criticism, and leaders such as Sumana Shrestha left the party citing internal democracy concerns. Nevertheless, RSP continued to support the interim government and opposed parliamentary restoration.

Seeking to position itself as a credible alternative, RSP unified with Bibekshil Sajha on Nov 30. After Lamichhane’s release on bail on Dec 19, the party endorsed Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah as a prime ministerial candidate, despite controversies surrounding his role during the unrest. An agreement with the Ujjyalo Nepali Party briefly followed but later collapsed.

As elections approach, parties are contesting independently, without coalitions. While many claim to be “new” or “reformed,” the fundamental nature of Nepali politics remains largely unchanged.