Submit your Article

The absence of the United States, China and Russia from recent G20 leaders’ meetings has often been treated as a sign that the forum has outlived its usefulness. That reading misses what is actually changing. The G20 has not disappeared from global economic diplomacy, nor has it been formally sidelined. What has shifted is the kind of work it is expected to do. Where it once functioned as a space for high-level coordination among the largest economies, it now operates more clearly as a forum sustained by those states that continue to depend on institutional stability.

This change reflects the erosion of the conditions that made the G20 indispensable in the first place. The forum took shape at a moment when financial instability moved quickly across borders and reduced the effectiveness of national responses. During that period, coordination was not a matter of preference, it was imposed by circumstance. That sense of mutual exposure no longer carries the same force. Economic policy is now shaped far more openly by strategic rivalry, domestic politics and security concerns. Subsidies, sanctions and trade restrictions are increasingly deployed without serious expectation of collective restraint. Under these conditions, broad consensus-based settings offer limited influence while imposing visible constraints.

The consequences of this shift were visible well before Johannesburg. The New Delhi summit showed that agreement was still possible, but only by narrowing the range of issues treated as appropriate for collective engagement. Disruptions linked to geopolitical conflict were acknowledged indirectly, if at all. This allowed the meeting to remain orderly, but it also reduced the forum’s capacity to engage with the sources of economic instability rather than its symptoms. Once this approach became routine, leader-level participation lost some of its urgency. Johannesburg made that clear.

The effects of selective disengagement have not been evenly distributed. For countries such as India, the European Union and Brazil, participation in multilateral institutions remains closely tied to economic and political strategy. Their economies are deeply embedded in global markets, and their policy objectives rely on predictable regulatory and financial environments. Institutional credibility matters more to these states than unilateral leverage. Unlike the great powers, they cannot easily replace multilateral engagement with bilateral or bloc-based arrangements without incurring costs.

This dependence has also increased their visibility within the G20. India, the EU and Brazil have become central to maintaining continuity in the forum not because they exercise coercive power, but because they retain a material interest in its operation. Their economic weight gives substance to this role. India’s expanding domestic market and manufacturing ambitions place it at the center of debates on development and technology. The European Union brings regulatory capacity and financial depth that influence global standards regardless of geopolitical fragmentation. Brazil’s position in commodity, energy and agricultural markets connects development concerns with climate and food security in ways few other actors can.

India’s recent engagement illustrates how an emerging great-power leadership now tends to function. Its emphasis on digital public infrastructure and development finance draws directly on policies already deployed domestically. Rather than relying exclusively on aspirational commitments, India has used practical experience to structure discussion. This does not compensate for the absence of great-power coordination, but it keeps multilateral engagement connected to implementation rather than rhetoric alone. The European Union operates through a different channel. Its influence rests less on mediation and more on scale. Through trade regimes, climate regulation, and digital standards, the EU shapes economic behavior well beyond its immediate membership. Within the G20, it provides a degree of policy continuity at a time when economic governance is increasingly shaped by short-term strategic considerations. Brazil’s contribution lies largely in its diplomatic positioning. Its engagement with institutional negotiation, the size of its economy, and South–South cooperation allows it to frame issues such as debt relief, food security and climate adaptation as shared economic challenges. In a polarized environment, this ability to keep discussions from sliding into distributive conflict has practical value.

Together, these states help prevent strategic rivalry from overwhelming multilateral settings altogether. They cannot resolve competition between the largest powers, nor can they substitute for the resources those powers control. Major initiatives in areas such as debt restructuring or climate finance still depend on actors with greater influence over capital and markets. Middle powers can align positions and sustain discussion, but compulsion remains beyond their reach.

What has happened to the G20 cannot be separated from what has happened to the political order that made it possible. The United States has already moved away from the model of leadership that sustained this forum in its early years. It still participates selectively, but its priorities now lie elsewhere: domestic industrial policy, security-driven trade decisions and tightly-managed alliances. The assumption that global economic stability requires sustained engagement in universal forums no longer shapes American behaviour in any consistent way.

China’s trajectory is different, but no less consequential. Beijing has not withdrawn from multilateralism. Instead, it has become increasingly selective about the kinds of institutions it is willing to invest in. Where rules, agendas and hierarchies are inherited from an earlier order, China engages cautiously. Where institutions can be designed, expanded or reshaped, its commitment is far more visible. This does not amount to abandonment, but it does reflect an effort to reconfigure the institutional landscape around Chinese preferences rather than adapt to existing constraints. Russia’s position is shaped by yet another set of pressures. Prolonged sanctions and political isolation have reduced any incentive to preserve institutions associated with Western economic dominance. Its alignment with China is less about shared economic vision than about mutual dissatisfaction with the current system. For Moscow, weakening the authority of existing frameworks has become a strategy in itself, particularly where those frameworks are seen as enforcing exclusion.

Taken together, these trajectories point to an uncomfortable reality. There is no major power waiting in the wings to restore the conditions under which the G20 once functioned. The idea that a hegemonic actor will step in to stabilize multilateral economic governance now belongs to an earlier period. That world has already passed. This is why the role of countries and entities such as India, the European Union, Brazil, and others matters more than is often acknowledged. These actors continue to benefit directly from stable, predictable economic frameworks. Their growth strategies, regulatory environments and external engagements depend on institutions that manage friction rather than amplify it. For them, the erosion of multilateral forums is not an abstract concern but a practical problem.

Sustaining the G20, then, is not about nostalgia for an earlier order or faith in institutional idealism. It is about interest. In the absence of great-power custodianship, responsibility shifts to those who still gain from continuity. Whether this responsibility can be translated into real influence remains uncertain. What seems clear is that multilateralism will no longer be upheld by those with the greatest power, but by those with the greatest stake in keeping the system from fragmenting further.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of Delhi based International Centre for Peace Studies

The government and Gen Z representatives late this evening signed a 10-point agreement at the Office of the Prime Minister, Singha Durbar.

Prime Minister Sushila Karki and Bhoj Bikram Thapa, on behalf of those who attained martyrdom and were injured during the Gen Z movement, signed the pact. 

Following the agreement signing ceremony, PM Karki said the consensus would prove to be a milestone in bringing transformations to the country.

 "The agreement will guide tomorrow's wave for change," she said, adding that it will help strengthen the constitution, contributing to the prevention of bloodshed and disasters in the future. 

"We are the same group. Gen Zs are my children, and we all aspire for the youth force to reach state power. Their ideas and thoughts should be the guiding principles of the State. We wish to see a bright future for our children."

The pact incorporates provisions on issues of good governance, constitutional amendment, and the electoral system, in line with the spirit of the Gen Z movement held on September 8-9.

Government ministers, chief secretary, and senior government officials were present on the occasion.

Lumbini Lions have entered the Qualifier 2 of the Nepal Premier League (NPL) 2025, defeating Kathmandu Gorkhas by four wickets.

In the eliminator match held at TU International Cricket Ground earlier today, Lumbini surpassed the victory target of 112 runs set by Kathmandu in 17.4 overs at the loss of six wickets.

For Lumbini's victory D'Arcy Short scored 33 runs off 34 balls, followed by Sundeep Jora who scored 23 runs off 23 balls. Likewise, Captain Rohit Paudel and Niroshan Dickwella scored 18 and 14 runs respectively.

For the bowling side, Santosh Yadav took two wickets, while Karan KC, Sunny Patel, Shahab Alam and Rashid Khan claimed one wicket each.

Earlier, batting first after winning the toss, Kathmandu Gorkhas were able to score only 111 runs in 19.1 overs, losing all their wickets.

Santosh Yadav top-scored with 23 runs off 17 balls while John Simpson and Mohammad Aadil Alam scored 18 runs each. Bhim Sharki contributed 14 runs off 16 balls.

In restricting Kathmandu to a meagre total, Sher Malla took three wickets in his full quota of four overs, giving away 22 runs. This feat also earned him the player-of-the-match award. 

Captain Rohit Paudel also took three wickets while Ruben Trumpelmann took two wickets.

With the win today, Lumbini Lions will face Biratnagar Kings in the second qualifier to be held at the same ground tomorrow. 

Biratnagar lost to Sudurpaschim Kings by 77 runs in the Qualifier 1 held on Tuesday.

After defeating Biratnagar in Qualifier 1, Sudurpaschim have booked a place in the final, and will play the winner of tomorrow's match. 

The final is scheduled to take place at the same venue on Saturday.

Non-life insurance companies have so far paid out only 18.7% of the total claims filed for losses arising from the Gen Z protests of September 8 and 9, according to updated figures from the Nepal Insurance Authority (NIA). 

The two days of violent unrest, marked by arson, vandalism and clashes between security forces and protesters, resulted in extensive damage to public property, business establishments, vehicles and private homes.

Of around 3,300 claims amounting to approximately Rs 23.44 billion received by insurers, companies have made advance and parietal payments totaling Rs 4.38 billion to policyholders, the NIA said.

Property insurance has accounted for the largest share of losses. Out of 710 property claims worth Rs 19.88 billion, insurers have so far settled about Rs 3.21 billion. Similarly, out of 2,308 motor insurance claims valued at Rs 3.47 billion, payments totaling Rs 1.08 billion have been made as of December 3..

Engineering and contractor’s risk policies have seen 225 claims worth Rs 555.5 million, of which insurers have settled Rs 68.1 million. Transport insurance accounts for 12 claims valued at Rs 16.8 million, with payouts of Rs 6.6 million. Under the “other” category, insurers have paid Rs 4.9 million against 45 claims totaling Rs 384 million.

According to the NIA, 1,984 of the total claims are linked directly to arson and vandalism in Kathmandu and several districts. Seventy-four people were killed in the protests, which escalated after police used excessive force to disperse crowds. Hotel Hilton Kathmandu alone reported damages of around Rs 8 billion, making it one of the largest individual losses.

All fourteen non-life insurance companies and four microinsurers have reported exposure to losses from the protests. Seven companies have liabilities exceeding Rs 1 billion each.

Oriental Insurance has received the highest claim totaling Rs 5.14 billion from 40 policies, followed by Siddhartha Premier Insurance with Rs 4.93 billion across 258 claims. Shikhar Insurance ranks third in terms of claim value, with 366 cases totaling Rs 2.39 billion. IME Prudential Insurance has 24 claims worth Rs 1.59 billion, while Sagarmatha Lumbini Insurance has reported 233 claims amounting to Rs 1.47 billion.