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Hundreds of GenZ youths filled the busiest streets of Nepal’s capital city—Maitighar and New Baneshwor on Sept 8. It was the burst of frustration with the government’s malpractice—corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, ban on social media resulting in encroachment of the freedom of speech and the rising “nepo-baby” trend on social media that showcased contrasting images of the lavish lifestyles of political leaders’ children comparing to the daily struggles of ordinary Nepalis who shed their skin and bones in foreign lands just to sustain their families. 

What began as a peaceful protest quickly turned violent after the police forces opened fire claiming 76 innocent lives. The aftermath of the massacre left the nation in shock. 

The following day, government and private properties were destroyed, set ablaze and ultimately forced the then Prime Minister KP Oli to step down. For a country already mired from political instability, it felt like watching a tower of Jenga collapse. 

Just a year before Nepal’s September revolution, a similar GenZ youths uprising, called the July Revolution took place in Bangladesh. Thousands of students and youth activists took to the streets, demanding an end to decades of “political corruption” and “authoritarian regime”. The movement grew rapidly throughout the country after violent clashes between protesters and security forces, leading to a nationwide wave of demonstrations that eventually forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country, marking a major turning point in Bangladesh’s political history. 

As a matter of fact, these two movements, led primarily by GenZ youths, marked a historic turning point for both nations shaping their modern political landscapes. Nepal saw the rise of its first woman Prime Minister, while Bangladesh’s long-serving female leader was forced into exile. The July Revolution in Bangladesh is now more than a year-old story, while Nepal’s September Revolution is still only two- or three-months in. Bangladesh is still struggling to rebuild its governance and restore public trust, and Nepal now stands at a similar crossroads. 

So, what kind of future lies for Nepal?

Constitutional crisis in Bangladesh 

In Bangladesh, following the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, Chief of Army Staff General Waker- uz-Zaman and President Mohammed Shahabuddin announced the formation of an interim government to stabilize the political situation. 

Invoking the emergency provision under Article 72(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Professor Muhammad Yunus, sworn in as the chief advisor to the Interim Government. However, the formation of the Interim Government led to a constitutional crisis. However, this triggered a constitutional crisis. 

Many critics argued that the appointment of a non-elected prime minister violated Article 56(1), which states that the prime minister must be a Member of Parliament. Several writs were filed, but the Supreme Court of Bangladesh quashed the writs, citing an Interim Government could be formed in accordance with Article 106 of the Constitution.  

Despite this, opposition groups have continued to resist the government adding on to the nation’s political instability. While Professor Yunus has promised national elections by July 2026, the fragile political environment and widespread distrust make that path challenging. 

Along with the political instability, Bangladesh has been facing challenges with a deteriorating law and order situation with increasing mob violence, violence against women and girls, and even religion-based clashes. Religious minorities, including Hindus and Ahmadiyyas, remain vulnerable as opportunistic groups exploit the power vacuum to spread hatred and violence. The new government’s struggle to control sectarianism shows how revolutions can awaken deep-rooted tensions that are hard to contain.

Politico-constitutional crisis in Nepal

In Nepal, following the resignation of KP Oli, led to a similar sequence of events like in Bangladesh. With the formation of a power vacuum, Army Chief Ashok Raj Sigdel and President Ram Chandra Paudel stepped in. 

After talks with the leading GenZ protest groups, former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed as Nepal’s first woman Prime Minister under Article 61, which confers power on the President to protect the constitution. However, her appointment immediately became controversial as a section of lawyers and learned class argued that “none of the constitutional provision explicitly recognizes” Karki’s elevation to PM office.   

As of Sept 29, sixteen writs have been registered at the Supreme Court’s constitutional bench challenging the legality of her government.

State facilities burned and vandalized 

Adding to the crisis, Nepal’s law and order situation has deteriorated. Key government buildings, including the Supreme Court, Revenue offices in Kathmandu, Biratnagar and others, Morang District Court, Biratnagar High Court, Rajbiraj High Court, Saptari District Court, Kathmandu District Court and other courts, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Federal Parliament were burned down during the protests. Resultantly, the offices so damaged are yet to stand functional in full-fledged mode.  

The Supreme Court continued operating its benches from temporary tents.

Drop in security personnel morale 

The morale of security forces has also plummeted. Nearly 1,000 personnel from the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force have resigned following the protests. With the interim government planning elections on 5 March 2026 the weakened security apparatus poses a major threat. 

The criminal gangs, political opportunists, and even external actors could exploit the instability. For ordinary citizens, this means growing insecurity, political uncertainty, and potential lawlessness on the streets. 

Economic dimension 

In the aspect of economy, both Nepal and Bangladesh are facing economic challenges following their revolutions. In Bangladesh many industries have been shut down leading to massive job losses, with many industries still not in operation, banks have been reluctant to issue letters of credit, dealing a severe blow to international trade and business confidence. 

On a more positive note, the interim government has introduced several economic reforms aimed at recovering laundered money and attracting fresh investments. 

Nepal can take inspiration from these efforts and adopt similar strategies to stabilize its own struggling economy. Nepal, too, is suffering economically in the aftermath of the September Revolution. The repercussions have been evident in the sharp decline of the tourism industry, which is one of the country’s main sources of revenue. 

Furthermore, Nepal Rastra Bank Governor, has acknowledged that investor confidence has significantly weakened since the GenZ movement, creating additional pressure on the already fragile economic environment. The World Bank has also lowered Nepal’s economic growth forecast to 2.1 percent for 2025/26 from 5.2 percent which is an alarming rate.

If political instability continues Nepal could face severe consequences like a slowdown in foreign investment, rising unemployment, and many more.

Way forward

Given the political instability and the challenges, the future remains uncertain, but it will be interesting to see how it unfolds, hopefully in an optimistic light for both Nepal and Bangladesh. 

History offers examples of nations like Germany and Japan, which managed to rebuild themselves into major economic powers after experiencing total devastation and political overhauls. With perseverance, accountability, and reform, there is hope that both countries can follow a similar path toward recovery and progress.

Nepal should reconsider its long-standing practice of appointing ministers from sitting MPs. Such changes are not just desirable—they are inevitable—given the mounting evidence of political instability if the country is to preserve the integrity of its parliamentary system and respond to growing public discontent. The Constitution of Nepal also allows for the selection of ministers from among MPs, and requires those appointed from outside parliament to secure membership within six months.

Corruption, patronage politics and weak legislative scrutiny have also increased as the country grapples with an alarming increase in election spending. Once MPs become ministers, they become entangled in the executive branch, reducing their ability and willingness to hold the government accountable. Moreover, since political positions are viewed as investments rather than responsibilities, the lure of ministerial appointments encourages excessive spending on parliamentary election campaigns.

In light of these anomalies, it is time to rethink this constitutional arrangement. Barring members of the House of Representatives from assuming ministerial positions would create a clear separation of powers, reduce political conflicts of interest and discourage the monetization of elections. Appointing ministers from outside parliament based on expertise and merit is the need of the hour. Doing so can help strengthen governance and restore citizens’ trust in Nepal’s democratic institutions.

A vicious cycle

Nepal’s elections are so expensive that only those with the support of wealthy or powerful donors can compete effectively. According to reports, despite our low GDP and per capita income, Nepal’s elections are estimated to be 147 times more expensive than those in neighboring India. Candidates for the 2022 general election have been reported to have taken on large amounts of personal debt or relied on opaque funding sources.

This financial burden does not end with victory. Elected members of the House of Representatives, who are deeply in debt from campaigns funded by private donations, often view ministerial appointments as a way to make up for the shortfall. Ministerial positions come with significant perks—salaries, allowances, and influence over budgets and contracts—that can be used for personal gains. When donors, often businesses or contractors, expect policy favors or government tenders, the stage is set for institutionalized corruption.

Corruption would be reduced if members of the House of Representatives were barred from becoming ministers. The parliamentary role alone reduces the opportunities for recovering the financial investments made in elections. Instead, candidates can focus on policy and public service, potentially reducing overall election costs through greater transparency and public financing reforms advocated by experts.

Erosion of accountability

Corruption in Nepal is not just an aberration but a systemic scourge that permeates every level of government. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index gave Nepal a dismal score of 34 out of 100, ranking it 100th out of 180 countries globally.

Political scandals abound. Senior politicians have been implicated in scams such as the fake Bhutanese refugee scam. In 2025 alone, more than a dozen high-profile cases involving former prime ministers and ministers in corruption came to light. These cases were at the center of the GenZ protests earlier this year. They exposed decades of systemic decay.

Appointing members of the House of Representatives as ministers exacerbates this by blurring the lines between the legislature and the executive, weakening the separation of powers necessary for checks and balances. This leads to incomplete separation, legislative flip-flopping and democratic unaccountability.

Parliament’s oversight and monitoring role is weakened when MPs play a dual role as ministers. Who checks on this when members of the executive are also legislators? This creates fertile ground for corruption. Ministers can influence resource allocations, agreements and policies without strong parliamentary oversight.

The legislature could reclaim its role as a watchdog by reserving ministerial positions for technocrats or experts from outside parliament.

In Nepal, this could disrupt the “vicious cycle” where high election costs push politicians into ministerial positions for corrupt gains, as noted in the analysis of campaign finance.

A path forward

The recent youth protests that forced a change of government in less than 28 hours on charges of corruption signal a public mandate for systemic change.

The political upheaval reflects a powerful public demand for deep, structural reforms. This uprising has exposed a critical truth that Nepal’s democratic institutions can no longer function effectively under the old structures that reward money, favoritism and power-brokers in public service.

In this context, the proposal to bar members of the House of Representatives (HoR) from appointing ministers is not an attack on the parliamentary system but a step toward strengthening it. Such a reform would encourage political parties to elect parliamentarians who are truly committed to their legislative duties, while also enabling the formation of an executive.

Implementing this reform may ultimately require constitutional amendments to formalize the separation of legislative and executive responsibilities. Prioritizing non-parliamentarians in cabinet formation and making appointments based on merit could initiate positive change through political practice.

Nepal can no longer sustain a system where skyrocketing election costs and widespread corruption reinforce each other. By clearly separating membership in the House of Representatives from ministerial ambitions, the country must remove financial incentives that distort democratic competition. This can strengthen accountability and rebuild trust in public institutions. The Election Commission and the interim government must recognize the urgency of reform. They must act decisively for the nation’s democratic future. Otherwise, another wave of citizen-led opposition may begin.

China is recalibrating its Nepal policy in the aftermath of the GenZ protests that caught Beijing off guard. The demonstrations and widespread arson—unprecedented in scale—forced several countries, including China, to urgently evacuate their officials and citizens from Nepal.

Since the protests, Nepal-China relations have noticeably slowed. While other major countries such as India, the US, Japan, and members of the European Union have already resumed full engagement with the new government at multiple levels, interaction between Nepal and China has remained limited.

In the early days of the unrest, Beijing was particularly concerned about its security interests in Nepal. The fall of the KP Sharma Oli-led government was a troubling development for China. Until the Sept 8–9 protests, bilateral ties were progressing steadily. Just beforehand, China had invited Oli to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting, where Nepal is a dialogue partner. Oli met President Xi Jinping on the sidelines, took part in China’s Victory Day parade, and earlier had signed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement during an official visit, an outcome that had energized Beijing’s engagement with Kathmandu. China was also preparing a five-year cooperation plan with Nepal and expanding support in agriculture, health, and other sectors. Its engagement with Nepali political parties, including the Nepali Congress, was also deepening.

The GenZ movement, however, appears to have triggered new anxieties in Beijing. Media reports alleging the involvement of Tibetan Original Blood (TOB) raised concerns about external influence. Some left-leaning political leaders further fueled this by suggesting geopolitical motives behind the protests. Additional reports that the government was considering appointing youth leaders allegedly close to the Dalai Lama heightened Beijing’s unease.

Compounding these tensions, the Sushila Karki-led transitional government decided to recall Nepal’s Ambassador to China, Krishna Prasad Oli, who is close to the dismissed prime minister Oli. It did not, however, recall the Ambassador to India, Shankar Sharma. China’s displeasure was evident: notably, the Chinese premier did not send a congratulatory message to Prime Minister Karki, an unprecedented break from diplomatic tradition.

Amid this uncertainty, China moved quickly to protect what it views as its security interests. Ambassador Chen Song raised concerns with top Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Karki and senior officials at the Foreign Ministry. They assured Beijing that the new government remains fully committed to the One-China policy, as previous governments had been.

Chinese officials were encouraged by support from Nepali political leaders, the public, and sections of the media who echoed China’s concerns. In a recent meeting with journalists, Ambassador Chen Song said: “The current government’s commitment to the One-China principle is not less than that of the previous government.”

With these assurances, Beijing’s immediate worries appear to have eased, though several Chinese delegations have since arrived in Nepal to assess the situation firsthand.

Regarding the GenZ movement and upcoming elections, Ambassador Chen has conveyed to Nepali leaders that China will not interfere in domestic political affairs and respects decisions made by the Nepali people. At the same time, Beijing has pledged support for Nepal’s reconstruction and electoral processes.

However, China does not appear optimistic about achieving tangible progress under the interim government, particularly on BRI-related initiatives. Although China continues to work on BRI projects from its side, meaningful progress remains unlikely. Many of the 10 selected projects are seen as unproductive, shaped largely by the political interests of major parties. Still, China’s growing engagement in Nepal’s health and education sectors is expected to continue.

The GenZ protests have also affected tourism cooperation. China had declared 2025 as Nepal Visit Year, but Chinese tourist numbers have sharply declined. Before the protests, the two countries were deepening collaboration on tourism promotion, but the political upheaval has significantly disrupted momentum, and officials expect a further drop in Chinese arrivals in the coming months.

For now, China’s approach appears to be maintaining a working relationship with the Karki administration, prioritising the protection of its core interests while keeping expectations low on broader bilateral progress.

The Election Commission (EC) has notified that it will register voters till Nov 21. The date has been extended in response to a request from Prime Minister Sushila Karki in view of the heavy turnout of voters for registration. Despite the two-shift registration of voters, long queues for registration may be due to the apathy of the EC at the time of annual updating of voter list by including eligible voters seriously on the one hand and the apathy among the voters toward registration, on the other. 

It is worth mentioning here that previously for a citizen to get his name registered in the voter list he had to submit only his citizenship certificate, which was provided by the District Administration Office and that was done at the village level itself. The introduction of the new system of giving biometric data at the District Election Office (DEO) for registration has discouraged many eligible voters. A majority of the voters, who are out of their native places for jobs, education and other purposes, do not prefer to visit the DEO to register themselves by visiting the DEO, which means a certain disruption in their daily schedule.  

Sadly, a citizen has to visit the district headquarters three times, first, for obtaining citizenship certificate, then for voter registration and lastly for getting the National Identity Card. Interestingly, if biometric data are obtained at the time of issuing the citizenship certificate, a citizen has no need to visit the district headquarters time and again.  

If the government introduces a law to address this issue, it will reduce the government expenses by at least 66 percent by curtailing unnecessary staff engaged in this task. At the time, the citizens will get some relief as they won’t have to undertake a strenuous journey to the district headquarters, especially in the hilly and high mountain religions. 

Like many other countries, there are two types of migrant voters in Nepal. First, those who are migrant workers working outside the country. Their number is anticipated to be 5-6m leaving apart about 2m voters living in India. The second type of voters are internal migrants whose number is also believed to be about 1-1.5m. 

A significant number of such voters include those who are registered but are unable to vote at the fixed place, date and time. The data show that out of a 30m population only 18.2m voters are registered and with the latest addition it will reach 18.5m. Interestingly, out of 18.2m voters, hardly 12.5m voters cast their votes and about 0.6m of these votes become invalid. Most of the internal migrant voters do not  cast their votes, explaining, in part, the poor turnout of voters. Since the EC has agreed to use biometric data from the National Certificate issuing office for registering the names, there is heavy rush of voters for registration.

Given this context, I humbly suggest some changes for increasing voting participation of GenZ and migrant workers abroad.

The EC has been authorized to hold polling in several phases (as per Clause 6.3 of the HoR  Election Act, 2017). It entails that it can advance partial voting as well, as per practice of several countries. It is called ‘advance voting’, ‘absent voting’and  ‘external voting, etc. If the EC decides, it can keep voting days open from the date symbols are distributed to the candidates, at least two days ahead of voting day (March 5) for those migrant workers who happen to be in the country during these 15 days, i.e, during the campaign period. The migrant workers won’t have to wait for March 5 to cast their votes. Even if it facilitates a few, that will create history for a democratic Nepal.

More significantly, it will facilitate those GenZ, who are in Kathmandu and other places inside the country in thousands, for their studies and all other purposes, together with the general voters who cannot vote in their home constituency being far away for different purposes. They can also cast their votes for their home constituencies. 

Those allowed to vote for the proportional representation (PR) segment have really been reduced to a status of 40 percent voters. If they can vote for their home constituency also, they will be 100 percent voters, as PR is meant for choosing a party and not the individual candidate. 

The PR segment is for ensuring 33 percent representation of women in the House of Representatives. Thus, it has become a women’s representation segment. This will also help those officials and staff engaged in voting management far away from their home constituencies.

This may revolutionize the voting pattern of the country. Of course, the EC has to get the ballot papers printed within a week by not depending solely on the Janak Educational Material Centre but also on other governmental and private printing presses by adhering to usual security measures.

The author is former election commissioner