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Every parent wants their child to be happy. For many, it is the deepest hope they carry, not just for today, but for a future they may not always be present to shape. Yet beneath this shared wish lies a harder question. What does happiness truly mean, and how do we raise children, who can hold on to it long after we are gone?

Happiness is often mistaken for comfort, success or constant affirmation. It is not found in stars on worksheets, top grades or the latest gadget. Nor does it come from shielding children from every frustration or failure. Deep and lasting happiness grows from something quieter and far more enduring. It comes from a sense of peace with oneself, from feeling secure in who you are, even when life becomes difficult or unpredictable. This kind of happiness cannot be given to a child. It must be built slowly through experience, setbacks and a steady inner belief that is not shaken by comparison or external approval.

Yet somewhere along the way, often out of love and concern, many parents begin protecting children from life rather than preparing them for it. In trying to smooth every path, we may unintentionally weaken the very qualities we hope to nurture. Some children, who appear highly successful, struggle deeply when faced with disappointment. Others, with fewer visible achievements, meet the same challenges with calm determination. The difference is rarely intelligence or talent. It is resilience. And resilience grows not in comfort, but through struggle.

Many of us, who grew up in the Generation X or millennial era, remember childhood as a time of trust and autonomy. Walking to a friend’s house, riding bicycles through the neighborhood or spending hours outdoors without close supervision often began at a young age. The world felt big, but children were trusted to navigate it. Of course, not all of that early independence was safe or wise, but those unsupervised moments demanded problem solving, conflict resolution and independent decision making. Confidence developed quietly through lived experience.

Parents today are understandably more cautious. The world feels more complex and more threatening. But in our efforts to protect children, it is easy to overdo it. Many members of GenZ were not granted similar independence until much later. Safety matters, but so does autonomy, because confidence does not come from praise alone. It comes from doing, from failing, and from trying again. It comes from stepping beyond comfort and discovering a steady sense of self that is not defined by others.

When children are constantly monitored and directed, they miss the small, everyday risks that teach judgment, decision-making and confidence in their ability to recover from failure. Instead of growing more capable, they may grow more dependent. In shielding them from discomfort, we can unintentionally leave them anxious, unsure and constantly seeking reassurance.

This reflection is not only about physical independence. It is also about emotional freedom. Children need space to feel joy, sadness, anger, frustration and disappointment without fear or shame. Emotional maturity is not a personality trait. It is a skill. And like any skill, it develops through practice.

When adults rush to fix every problem or respond with strong emotions of their own such as anger, fear or sadness, children learn that emotions are something to avoid. The intention may be care, but the message received is often one of doubt. You cannot handle this. Over time, this message becomes internalized and forms the child’s inner voice.

One of the hardest tasks of parenting is sitting with a child’s pain without trying to fix the problem. Yet this is often where growth begins. Children learn to regulate their emotions not by avoiding difficult feelings, but by experiencing them in an environment of love, trust and calm. When parents acknowledge emotions with simple acceptance, children learn that discomfort is part of being human. They also learn that they are strong enough to face difficult feelings and that they are not alone while doing so.

This becomes especially important during adolescence. Teenagers are naturally present-focused. Developmentally, they struggle to understand that emotional pain is temporary. This is one reason adolescence is such a vulnerable period. When adults attempt to remove every discomfort, or react with overwhelming emotion themselves, young people may come to believe that negative feelings are dangerous and must be solved by someone else. Without intending to, we risk raising children, who feel emotionally unprepared for life’s realities. If the goal is protection, the answer is not to eliminate pain, but to equip young people to face it with empathy, support, and trust in themselves.

One of the simplest and most overlooked ways to build self worth is through taking responsibility at home. When children contribute by setting the table, folding laundry or helping in the kitchen, they learn that they are useful and capable. These are not small acts. They quietly reinforce a sense of purpose and belonging, reminding children that they matter, that they are needed, and that they can make a meaningful contribution.

Above all, children need to feel loved unconditionally. They need to know their worth is not tied to grades, trophies or praise. Even when parents believe this wholeheartedly, subtle messages can suggest otherwise. Extra excitement when a child receives an A on a report card or heightened warmth upon winning a trophy, can quietly teach that approval is linked to perfection. Over time, this belief shapes how children see themselves and what they believe they must do to be valued.

Every experience a child has is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Adults may focus on the incident, the poor grade, the missed goal or the emotional outburst. What matters more is what the child learns from the experience and how they remember being treated in that moment. The adult’s voice, tone and presence become the child’s inner voice. This inner voice forms the foundation of self-image, values and emotional strength long after childhood ends.

So what will that voice sound like for your child? Will it reassure them that they can face difficulty and remain whole? Or will it echo doubt, shaped by moments when understanding was needed but judgment arrived instead?

As we search for ways to support children, perhaps we can look inward to our own roots. In Nepal, the birthplace of the Buddha, emotional balance and inner awareness have been valued for centuries. Practices such as reflection and mindfulness are not trends. They are timeless tools. Teaching children to pause, breathe and observe their emotions gives them an internal compass, one that guides them through uncertainty with calm.

Raising happy children does not mean removing struggle from their lives. It means walking beside them as they face challenges, stepping back when needed while remaining emotionally present, and trusting them to navigate discomfort, frustration, and pain, knowing they always have a secure base to return to. Real happiness is not about avoiding difficulty, but learning to move through it with courage and self-trust.

Because one day, we will not be there to catch them. If they are truly prepared, they will not need us to.

The Current Macroeconomic Situation Report for the first four months of 2025/26, published by the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) earlier this week, presents a mixed picture of the country’s economy. While inflation has cooled sharply and external sector indicators remain robust, domestic demand, credit growth and capital spending have continued to lag. This has raised concerns about the sustainability of the recovery. While macroeconomic stability has strengthened, momentum in the real economy is uneven.

Inflation drops to multi-year low

Consumer price inflation eased significantly in mid-November 2025, falling to 1.11 percent year-on-year from 5.6 percent a year earlier. Average inflation during the first four months stood at 1.53 percent, well below 4.59 percent in the same period of the previous fiscal year. This reflects a sharp correction in food prices and subdued domestic demand.

The central bank has set a target of containing inflation below five percent in the current fiscal year.

While food and beverage prices declined by 3.32 percent, mainly due to a steep fall in vegetable prices, non-food and services inflation remained moderate at 3.69 percent. The data suggest that price stability has returned across both rural and urban areas, with inflation staying below two percent in most provinces. However, persistent price increases in services such as education, clothing and miscellaneous goods indicate that inflation risks have not disappeared entirely.

Trade gap widens despite export surge

Nepal trade gap widened further during the review period despite impressive export growth. Merchandise exports surged by 77.5 percent to Rs 93.5bn in the first four months of 2025/26, largely driven by shipments of edible oils, cardamom, jute goods and footwear to India. Exports to India more than doubled, while exports to China fell sharply during the period. 

Imports, meanwhile, rose by 18.7 percent to Rs 609.45bn as consumption gradually picks up. This caused the trade deficit to expand by 12 percent to Rs 515.96bn, reversing last year’s modest contraction. Although the export-import ratio improved to 15.3 percent, imports continue to vastly outpace exports.

Remittances anchor external stability

Remittances remain the single most important pillar of Nepal’s external sector. According to the report, inflows jumped by 31.4 percent to Rs 687.13bn during the review period. A strong growth in remittances has been providing strong support to household consumption as well as foreign exchange reserves and the balance of payments.

The current account recorded a surplus of Rs 279.65bn, nearly double the level of a year earlier, while the overall balance of payments surplus widened to Rs 318.4bn. However, the net services deficit widened to Rs 32.91bn, largely due to a significant 11.8 percent increase in travel payments. Education-related travel payments accounted for over half of this outlay, signaling continued foreign currency outflows for overseas studies.

Likewise, foreign exchange reserves expanded by 14.1 percent to Rs 3055.52bn (or $21.52bn). According to the central bank, the reserves are sufficient to cover more than 20.8 months of merchandise imports.

Weak capital spending

On the fiscal front, government finances show rising expenditure pressures but slow revenue growth. Total government spending reached Rs 468.88bn in the first four months, while revenue mobilization stood at Rs 326.55bn. This resulted in a fiscal deficit of Rs 142bn in the four-month period. 

Capital expenditure declined by more than 26 percent year-on-year to just Rs 25.31bn. This massive decline in development spending, coupled with a minimal revenue, speaks volumes about administrative bottlenecks and a failure to effectively deploy capital for development.

Subdued credit growth

Despite ample liquidity in the financial system, credit expansion remained subdued at 1.2 percent due to low demand from the market. While private sector credit from both commercial banks and finance companies increased 1.3 percent each, credit disbursed by development banks decreased by 0.1 percent.

According to the central bank, total private sector credit remained at Rs 5,562.75 in mid-December. Credit flow toward agriculture and some service sectors has come down, while credit growth has been concentrated in real estate, margin lending and construction-related activities.

Three months after the GenZ movement, at least 49 GenZ-affiliated groups have been registered at the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. These groups are largely led by prominent faces of the protest, including those involved in negotiations and the formation of the interim government.

Following the appointment of Sushila Karki as prime minister, the House of Representatives was dissolved, and fresh elections were announced for 5 March 2026. With electoral politics now firmly on the horizon, the question dominating public discourse is simple: Where are the faces of the GenZ movement headed?

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah was a central figure during the movement, openly calling for the dissolution of Parliament and backing an interim government under Karki—both of which ultimately materialized.

Despite widespread expectations that Shah would take a frontline role in post-protest politics, he has so far remained publicly restrained. However, sources close to ApEx say Shah is quietly working to bring together the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Ujyalo Nepal Party backed by Kulman Ghising, and leaders such as Sudan Gurung under a broader electoral alliance.

If plans proceed as expected, Shah, on Martyrs’ Day (30 Jan 2026), is likely to announce his affiliation with the Desh Bikash Party. Previously the Hamro Nepali Party registered at the Election Commission with the election symbol ‘Stick’ has changed its name to Desh Bikash Party as per Shah’s direction, sources say. Ghising recently fuelled speculation by posting a photograph of his meeting with Shah.

Sudan Gurung, another breakout figure of the movement, has registered Nepal Janasewa Party as a contingency option for the upcoming polls, sources say. The party is chaired by Prakash Khadka and carries the election symbol ‘black-and-white shoe’.

Several GenZ leaders—including Ojas Thapa, James Karki, Pradeep Pandey, and Bhawana Raut—are aligned with this camp. Still, Gurung is believed to be closely coordinating with Shah and remains keen on contesting the elections together rather than separately.

Meanwhile, Rakshya Bam has taken a different route. Her group, Nepal GenZ Front, is currently running a nationwide political awareness campaign called ‘Janajagaran’. The core team includes Yatish Ojha, Yujan Rajbhandari, Manish Khanal, Pradeep Gyawali, Amy Amrutha, and Ritu Khadka.

Sources say the group is also exploring the possibility of reviving Nepal Bibeksheel Dal, given many members’ previous association with the party.

Similarly, Tanuja Pandey, known for her strong advocacy of democratic values and the 2015 Constitution, is focusing on public political education rather than direct party politics.

Within the GenZ Movement Alliance, Ojaswee Bhattarai has already taken a formal political step, becoming chair of the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, associated with leaders such as Baburam Bhattarai, Janardan Sharma, Sudan Kirati, and Santosh Pariyar. Alliance members Rijan Rana and Manzil Rana are also inclined towards the party, though they have yet to formally join.

In contrast, Miraj Dhungana and Prabesh Dahal are pursuing a markedly different agenda. According to ApEx sources, they are lobbying for the revival of the 1990 Constitution and advocating for Prime Minister Karki’s resignation in favour of an all-party government led by former Chief Justice Kalyan Shrestha.

The Council of GenZ, which has coordinators across all seven provinces, illustrates the ideological diversity and political fluidity within the broader GenZ movement. In Koshi Province, coordinator Uparjan Chamling, a former Bibeksheel Party associate with leftist leanings, is now involved in Rakshya Bam’s Janajagaran campaign. Shiva Yadav of Madhes Province, who serves as a secretariat member to Youth and Sports Minister Bablu Gupta, has announced his intention to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections but has yet to declare a party affiliation; sources say he is in talks with both the Ujyalo Nepal Party and the RSP. Another GenZ face, Purushottam Yadav, maintaining close ties with Gupta, is in the preliminary proportional list of RSP.

In Bagmati Province, coordinator Afsana Banu is closely associated with Sudan Gurung and the Nepal Janasewa Party, while Pradeep Pandey, the Gandaki coordinator, remains aligned with Gurung but is also exploring a possible move to the Ujyalo Nepal Party. In Lumbini, Aaditya Acharya, 21, is legally ineligible to contest elections due to the age requirement; after unsuccessful attempts to amend the rule, he is now lobbying for a position in RSP’s central committee, drawing on his close relationship with party leader Ganesh Paudel. 

Meanwhile, in Karnali Province, coordinator Anil Shahi is close to newly appointed minister Madhav Chaulagain and is widely seen as sympathetic to RSP, whereas Khemraj Saud, the coordinator for Sudurpaschim Province, is aligned with the Ujyalo Nepal Party.

Some GenZ figures remain unaffiliated. Aakriti Ghimire, initiator of ‘howtodesh-bikas’—a platform simplifying politics for youths—and former Personal Branch Officer to PM Karki’s secretariat, has not aligned with any party. She previously served as chief of staff to Sumana Shrestha’s secretariat. Monika Niraula and Saken Rai, who work closely with Ghimire, are inclined towards the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party but have not formally joined.

On the other end of the spectrum, JB Chand, Madan Buda, and Hemraj Thapa—who also identify as GenZ leaders—are aligned with controversial businessperson Durga Prasai and support the monarchy. Prasai’s group is registered as Nagarik Bachau Dal, Nepal.

Meanwhile, Jasmine Ojha and Biplabi Neupane have officially joined Janadesh Party Nepal, backed by media personality Rishi Dhamala, while Pawan Thapa has joined Gatisheel Loktantrik Party led by Birendra Basnet, owner of Buddha Air.

What began as a youth uprising demanding systemic change has now evolved into a fragmented political landscape, with GenZ leaders spreading across new parties, old ideologies, and competing power centers.

As Nepal heads towards the March 2026 elections, the GenZ movement’s greatest test may no longer be mobilization—but whether its leaders can translate protest energy into coherent political influence.

The Nepali Congress (NC) occupies a singular and enduring position in Nepal’s political history. It is not merely one political party among others but the principal institutional carrier of Nepal’s democratic imagination. From its origins in anti-Rana resistance and exile politics, through the short-lived democratic experiment of the 1950s, the democratic restoration of 1990 and the post-conflict reconstruction after 2006, the NC has repeatedly stood at the center of regime change, constitutionalism and state-building. 

Unlike revolutionary or purely oppositional parties, the NC has combined resistance with responsibility, protest with governance, and idealism with compromise.

Yet historical centrality does not automatically translate into contemporary relevance or organizational vitality. Like many legacy democratic parties worldwide, the NC now confronts a complex crisis marked by ideological ambiguity, leadership inertia, organizational strain and growing distance from a rapidly changing society. This article offers a brief but integrated institutional analysis of the NC, examining its organizational evolution, internal democracy, leadership culture, governance record and reform dilemmas. It argues that the NC’s greatest strengths—moral legitimacy, adaptability and democratic restraint—have also produced structural fragilities that continue to undermine institutional consolidation. Understanding this paradox is essential not only for evaluating the party’s future but also for assessing the prospects of Nepal’s democratic project itself.

Conceptual framework: Parties, institutions and democratic mediation

In democratic theory, political parties are understood as mediating institutions between society and the state. They aggregate interests, articulate political alternatives, recruit leadership and structure political competition. Classical and contemporary scholarship emphasizes three interrelated dimensions of effective party institutionalization: organizational routinization, leadership legitimacy and internal democracy. Parties that fail to balance these dimensions risk either authoritarian capture, organizational decay or social irrelevance.

In post-authoritarian and resource-constrained societies, these tensions are magnified. Parties often emerge from resistance movements, privileging moral authority and personal loyalty over bureaucratic rules. While such traits enhance mobilization during struggle, they complicate later transitions to programmatic, rule-bound party organization. The NC exemplifies this dilemma. Born as a movement rather than a conventional electoral party, it carried movement logics—charisma, sacrifice, flexibility and informality—into periods that increasingly demanded institutional discipline, policy expertise and routinized leadership succession.

Origins and organizational culture: From resistance to electoral politics

The NC emerged through exile politics, underground networks, diaspora activism and cross-border coordination in India. Its early organizational life was shaped by repression and uncertainty. Survival depended on secrecy, trust and personal commitment rather than formal procedures. Leadership authority was earned through sacrifice and credibility, not electoral mandate. These formative experiences created a political culture in which loyalty and moral standing were valued above codified rules.

When democratic openings emerged—particularly after 1951 and later after 1990—the NC faced the challenge of transforming a resistance movement into a competitive electoral party. Formal organizational structures were gradually introduced, but movement culture persisted. Informal decision-making, personalized leadership and flexible norms remained dominant. This hybrid organizational form proved both resilient and unstable—capable of adaptation across regimes, yet resistant to full institutionalization.

Organizational architecture and leadership culture

Over time, the NC constructed a multi-tiered organizational architecture consisting of a central committee, district committees, local and ward units, and a range of sister as well as well-wisher organizations representing students, women, youth, labor, and identity- and profession-based groups. This structure enabled nationwide penetration and electoral reach, distinguishing the NC from regionally confined or ideologically narrow parties. Organizational breadth allowed the party to function as a national integrator in a socially and geographically diverse country.

Despite this formal decentralization, real authority often remained centralized, particularly in leadership selection, coalition bargaining and strategic decision-making. Leadership culture further shaped organizational life.

Foundational leaders commanded authority through moral legitimacy, intellectual stature, and personal sacrifice. Their leadership emphasized ethical restraint and democratic norms over procedural dominance or coercive control. As electoral politics normalized, leadership criteria shifted. Authority increasingly derived from electoral success, factional strength, and control over party machinery. This transition altered internal expectations, intensified competition, and reduced the unifying moral authority that had once moderated conflict. The absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms amplified leadership struggles and factional reproduction.

Factionalism and intra-party democracy

Factionalism has been a persistent and defining feature of the NC. While often portrayed as a pathology, factionalism within democratic parties can perform integrative functions: It can prevent authoritarian consolidation, provide channels for dissent and facilitate elite circulation. In the NC, factions historically emerged around charismatic leaders, generational divides and strategic disagreements rather than deep ideological schisms.

However, the costs of factionalism have been substantial. Persistent internal competition weakened organizational discipline, undermined public credibility and reduced policy coherence. Formal mechanisms of intra-party democracy—general conventions, internal elections and representative committees—coexist uneasily with informal power structures rooted in patronage, negotiation and loyalty networks. The gap between formal rules and actual practice defines the NC’s internal democracy: procedurally pluralistic yet substantively fragile.

Cadre development, resources, organizational capacity

Unlike cadre-based parties with systematic ideological training, the NC has relied largely on informal mentoring, experiential learning and movement socialization. This approach fostered commitment but limited programmatic coherence and policy capacity. Youth and student wings functioned as recruitment pipelines, yet they were frequently politicized and factionalized, reproducing internal divisions rather than cultivating new leadership.

Financial organization has remained a chronic challenge. Limited public funding, reliance on donor networks and opaque financial practices constrained organizational professionalism and accountability. Resource scarcity affected policy research, cadre training and organizational modernization, reinforcing dependence on informal networks and personalized leadership.

Governance record: Democratic stewardship and state-building

The NC is fundamentally a party of governance. Across Nepal’s modern political history, it has repeatedly assumed responsibility during periods of institutional transition, constitutional experimentation and post-conflict reconstruction. Its governing philosophy has emphasized democratic stewardship—procedure, consent and accountability—over coercion or revolutionary rupture.

Congress-led governments played foundational roles in constitutional development, including the 1959 and 1990 constitutions and the post-2006 constitutional process culminating in the promulgation of the new constitution in 2016 with sufficient consensus of a directly-elected constituent assembly. In each instance, the party advocated separation of powers, fundamental rights, judicial independence and parliamentary supremacy. Even when implementation was uneven, these normative commitments shaped the architecture of the Nepali state.

In parliamentary practice, the NC promoted legislative debate, committee systems and opposition rights, reinforcing democratic accountability. In social sectors, Congress governments expanded education, healthcare and early social protection, framing these investments as democratic foundations rather than populist concessions. Infrastructure development, regulatory institutions and fiscal governance advanced incrementally, constrained by limited state capacity and political fragmentation.

Governance limitations and democratic trade-offs

Despite these contributions, the NC’s governance record is marked by significant limitations. Slow policy implementation, uneven administrative capacity, weak monitoring mechanisms and pervasive patronage undermined effectiveness.

Corruption and clientelism eroded public trust, while governance during the Maoist insurgency strained democratic norms. Emergency measures, though often justified as crisis management, left institutional scars. Coalition politics, especially after 2017, diluted accountability, shortened government lifespans and encouraged policy incrementalism rather than structural reform. Federal restructuring after 2015 further complicated governance, overburdening institutions and exposing coordination failures between central, provincial and local governments. These shortcomings reflect not ideological incoherence but the structural difficulties of democratic governance under constraint.

Comparative perspective: Legacy democratic parties in South Asia

Comparatively, the NC occupies a middle ground among South Asian parties. Like several other South Asian parties, it shares a legacy-based leadership culture and factional pluralism. Unlike disciplined left parties, it tolerates internal contestation but struggles with coherence and policy discipline. In contrast to personality-driven regional parties, it retains nationwide presence and constitutional legitimacy.

Internationally, the NC’s trajectory mirrors that of many legacy democratic parties confronting populist challengers, social fragmentation and declining organizational loyalty. Its experience underscores the broader challenge of sustaining democratic parties in an era of electoral volatility and declining ideological attachment.

Recent challenges and the GenZ uprising

Post-2015, the NC navigated a landscape of political fragmentation and external influences. Elections in 2017 and 2022 saw the party alternate in power, often through unstable coalitions. Tenures focused on Covid-19 recovery, infrastructure and foreign relations, but they were marred by allegations of corruption and inefficiency. The 2022 elections positioned the NC as a key player, yet alliances shifted amid geopolitical tensions between India, China and the US.

The year 2025 marked a watershed crisis. In September, youth-led protests erupted across urban centers, demanding anti-corruption measures, accountability for past violence and systemic reforms. These demonstrations—triggered by the government ban on social media and further fueled by disillusionment with entrenched elites, economic woes and unacceptably high youth unemployment—resulted in clashes and casualties, leading to political upheaval, including government resignation, parliamentary dissolution and snap general elections scheduled for March 2026.

Critiques and the challenge of renewal

Contemporary critiques of the NC focus on ideological dilution, leadership inertia, organizational risk aversion and social disconnect. The democratic socialism and humanist ethics that once anchored Congress identity now appear programmatically vague. Leadership succession remains uneven and constrained, and youth engagement limited. Formal inclusion of women and marginalized groups has not consistently translated into substantive empowerment.

Yet decline should not be conflated with irrelevance. The NC retains nationwide organization, constitutional legitimacy and residual moral authority. Its crisis is one of renewal rather than existential collapse. Renewal requires institutionalizing internal democracy, professionalizing organization, strengthening policy capacity and reconnecting with emerging social constituencies.

Conclusion: An incomplete but indispensable democratic institution

The NC represents an incomplete yet indispensable democratic institution. Its historical legitimacy, adaptive capacity and commitment to democratic restraint have sustained Nepal’s democratic state through repeated crises. At the same time, personalized leadership, weak institutionalization and unresolved movement–party tensions continue to undermine organizational coherence and governance performance.

The future of the NC depends on its ability to transform moral authority into institutional strength, reconcile pluralism with discipline and align democratic ideals with governance delivery. Whether it succeeds will shape not only the party’s trajectory but the resilience of Nepal’s democratic project itself.