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The government has decided to implement the 10-point agreement signed with Gen Z representatives on Wednesday. 

The agreement was signed on December 10 at the Office of the Prime Minister, Singha Durbar.

A Cabinet meeting held on Thursday decided to publish the agreement in the Nepal Gazette, Minister for Communications and Information Technology Jagadish Kharel confirmed.

Prime Minister Sushila Karki and Bhoj Bikram Thapa, on behalf of those who attained martyrdom and were injured during the Gen Z movement, signed the pact. 

Likewise, Minister Kharel said that the Council of Ministers decided to expand the scope of the Investigation Commission formed by the Government to probe the incidents of the Gen-Z Movement of September 8 and 9. 

Asked about the presence of then Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to record his statement in the Probe Commission, Minister Kharel said the jurisdiction of the Commission was expanded and the Commission will perform its job in accordance with the laws.

President Vladimir Putin’s ninth visit to India starting from 2000—his first after 2021—has arrived at a moment of extraordinary strategic recalibration. Only two days before the visit began (Dec 4), Washington released its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), a document that signals the United States’ shift from expansive values-based foreign policy to a sharper, interest-driven approach rooted in economic security and technological primacy.

The simultaneity is not accidental; it symbolizes a transforming global order in which India, Russia, and the US are pursuing overlapping but divergent strategic goals, and South Asia sits at the fulcrum of this new geopolitical geometry.

The Putin-Modi meeting carries implications not only for Eurasian stability but also for how the US interprets India’s strategic autonomy and recalibrates its own Indo-Pacific playbook.

India at the center

The NSS 2025 acknowledges bluntly that the US cannot “secure every geography nor stabilize every region”; instead, it will prioritize critical partners capable of shaping the global economy, technology ecosystems and regional balance. India stands at the top of this list, described as a “system-shaping middle power” whose partnership is essential for US economic resilience, defence innovation and Indo-Pacific balancing.

Yet Putin’s visit demonstrates that India’s ascent is anchored in multi-alignment, not alignment. India has neither abandoned Russian defense ties nor restricted Eurasian dialogue despite Western pressure. Instead, New Delhi has widened all channels—deepening defense co-production with the US, sustaining energy ties with Moscow, and managing a complex relationship with China across competition, deterrence and cooperation. This can be accounted precisely for the behavior Washington anticipated, but perhaps underestimated in intensity.

Why Putin’s visit matters 

To the US, the optics of a confident, sanctions-resistant Russian leader receiving a warm Delhi welcome carry three strategic messages: one, that Russia retains influence where the West expected decline. India continues to leverage Russian defense support—particularly spare parts, legacy system maintenance and co-development initiatives that Washington cannot fully replace in the short term. Energy cooperation remains robust, and discounted Russian oil has been crucial to India’s inflation management.

Two, India will pursue autonomy even when US pressure peaks. Despite the growing US–India defense technology partnership—jet engine co-production, UAV collaboration, semiconductor cooperation—New Delhi refuses to limit strategic options. Putin’s visit reinforces India’s unwillingness to become a pillar of a US-led bloc.

Third, Eurasian consolidation remains a live possibility. Moscow’s outreach to India is not merely bilateral. It connects to broader projects—International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) dialogue, Arctic shipping and Asian energy integration—areas Washington must now monitor with renewed seriousness. India and Russia interact through UN and G20 in the global forums, regional groups such as Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), East Asian Summit (EAS), financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and extensive bilateral mechanisms (annual summits, Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC), 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue  and Strategic Economic Dialogue. In addition, in the sector-specific cooperation platforms like the Nuclear Energy, Defense Working Group, Space cooperation, energy and Education and cultural exchanges. 

These messages have direct consequences for how the US implements the NSS 2025. The US will respond by deepening India’s economic incentives. While NSS 2025 downplays ideological diplomacy, it elevates economic security and supply-chain diversification as central pillars. Putin’s visit will accelerate US efforts to firstly to expand critical mineral cooperation with India, secondly to attract Indian companies into US industrial ecosystems, thirdly to increase joint research platforms under QUAD and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for prosperity (IPEF), and lastly to fast-track bilateral trade negotiations previously stalled.

Washington will double down on offering India economic and technological leverage that Russia cannot match.

 Stricter defense technology protocols 

The US understands that India operates Russian-origin systems and engages in sensitive defense exchanges with Moscow. To prevent potential technology leakage, Washington is likely to introduce a more robust end-use monitoring, tighter controls on dual-use technology, and clearer segregation between US-led and Russia-linked Indian projects. 

This will not stall US–India defence cooperation, but it will make technology firewalls more prominent.

Acceptance of India’s strategic autonomy 

The NSS 2025 subtly accepts that India will not become a formal ally. Putin’s visit reinforces that assumption. Washington’s emerging approach is pragmatic: work with India where interests converge, avoid friction where they don’t. This opens space for a more mature, less expectation-heavy partnership.

A more fluid strategic landscape 

Putin’s India outreach reshapes the region in ways Washington will study closely.

Pakistan’s strategic relevance to Washington continues to decline. With India strengthening ties with both the US and Russia, there is little incentive for the US to return to older patterns of Pakistan-centric engagement. Islamabad’s utility becomes more functional—counter-terrorism, nuclear risk management—not geopolitical. 

A more competitive Eurasian environment gives these states greater bargaining power. The US, following its new NSS, will adopt: project-based engagement, maritime capacity-building, debt sustainability support, and supply-chain diversification with Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

These states will increasingly play China, India, Russia and the US against one another to secure economic benefits.

Quiet leverage in a multipolar moment

Nepal stands to gain more subtly than other South Asian states. 

A triangular pattern—India maintaining Russian ties, strengthening US partnership and managing China rivalry—creates strategic breathing room for Kathmandu. For the US, Nepal becomes valuable not as a geopolitical frontline but as a functional partner in sectors aligned with American priorities under NSS 2025: green energy and cross-border power trade, digital governance, cyber security, critical mineral mapping, private-sector investment in hydropower, and disaster response and counter-crime cooperation. 

Engagement will neither surge nor decline—but it will deepen sectoral, with fewer political expectations and more performance-based cooperation. This aligns with Washington’s new doctrine: selective, focused, outcome-oriented. 

For Nepal, the key is to maintain balanced diplomacy while leveraging its position within the India-US-China triangle and the emerging India–Russia connectivity frameworks.

A triangular future

Putin’s visit does not derail US-India cooperation. Instead, it forces Washington to adjust expectations, respect India’s independence and compete more intelligently. The NSS 2025 already anticipates this; the visit accelerates it. 

India emerges not as a camp follower but as a sovereign pole—the only major power capable of engaging Washington, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously without aligning with any. 

For South Asia, this means greater flexibility. For Russia, it preserves Eurasian influence. For the US, it demands strategic patience and economic creativity. 

And for the emerging world order, it signals a future defined less by blocs and more by fluid alignment, selective partnerships and overlapping spheres of cooperation.

The author, a Maj Gen (Retd) and strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu, writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy and stability

The absence of the United States, China and Russia from recent G20 leaders’ meetings has often been treated as a sign that the forum has outlived its usefulness. That reading misses what is actually changing. The G20 has not disappeared from global economic diplomacy, nor has it been formally sidelined. What has shifted is the kind of work it is expected to do. Where it once functioned as a space for high-level coordination among the largest economies, it now operates more clearly as a forum sustained by those states that continue to depend on institutional stability.

This change reflects the erosion of the conditions that made the G20 indispensable in the first place. The forum took shape at a moment when financial instability moved quickly across borders and reduced the effectiveness of national responses. During that period, coordination was not a matter of preference, it was imposed by circumstance. That sense of mutual exposure no longer carries the same force. Economic policy is now shaped far more openly by strategic rivalry, domestic politics and security concerns. Subsidies, sanctions and trade restrictions are increasingly deployed without serious expectation of collective restraint. Under these conditions, broad consensus-based settings offer limited influence while imposing visible constraints.

The consequences of this shift were visible well before Johannesburg. The New Delhi summit showed that agreement was still possible, but only by narrowing the range of issues treated as appropriate for collective engagement. Disruptions linked to geopolitical conflict were acknowledged indirectly, if at all. This allowed the meeting to remain orderly, but it also reduced the forum’s capacity to engage with the sources of economic instability rather than its symptoms. Once this approach became routine, leader-level participation lost some of its urgency. Johannesburg made that clear.

The effects of selective disengagement have not been evenly distributed. For countries such as India, the European Union and Brazil, participation in multilateral institutions remains closely tied to economic and political strategy. Their economies are deeply embedded in global markets, and their policy objectives rely on predictable regulatory and financial environments. Institutional credibility matters more to these states than unilateral leverage. Unlike the great powers, they cannot easily replace multilateral engagement with bilateral or bloc-based arrangements without incurring costs.

This dependence has also increased their visibility within the G20. India, the EU and Brazil have become central to maintaining continuity in the forum not because they exercise coercive power, but because they retain a material interest in its operation. Their economic weight gives substance to this role. India’s expanding domestic market and manufacturing ambitions place it at the center of debates on development and technology. The European Union brings regulatory capacity and financial depth that influence global standards regardless of geopolitical fragmentation. Brazil’s position in commodity, energy and agricultural markets connects development concerns with climate and food security in ways few other actors can.

India’s recent engagement illustrates how an emerging great-power leadership now tends to function. Its emphasis on digital public infrastructure and development finance draws directly on policies already deployed domestically. Rather than relying exclusively on aspirational commitments, India has used practical experience to structure discussion. This does not compensate for the absence of great-power coordination, but it keeps multilateral engagement connected to implementation rather than rhetoric alone. The European Union operates through a different channel. Its influence rests less on mediation and more on scale. Through trade regimes, climate regulation, and digital standards, the EU shapes economic behavior well beyond its immediate membership. Within the G20, it provides a degree of policy continuity at a time when economic governance is increasingly shaped by short-term strategic considerations. Brazil’s contribution lies largely in its diplomatic positioning. Its engagement with institutional negotiation, the size of its economy, and South–South cooperation allows it to frame issues such as debt relief, food security and climate adaptation as shared economic challenges. In a polarized environment, this ability to keep discussions from sliding into distributive conflict has practical value.

Together, these states help prevent strategic rivalry from overwhelming multilateral settings altogether. They cannot resolve competition between the largest powers, nor can they substitute for the resources those powers control. Major initiatives in areas such as debt restructuring or climate finance still depend on actors with greater influence over capital and markets. Middle powers can align positions and sustain discussion, but compulsion remains beyond their reach.

What has happened to the G20 cannot be separated from what has happened to the political order that made it possible. The United States has already moved away from the model of leadership that sustained this forum in its early years. It still participates selectively, but its priorities now lie elsewhere: domestic industrial policy, security-driven trade decisions and tightly-managed alliances. The assumption that global economic stability requires sustained engagement in universal forums no longer shapes American behaviour in any consistent way.

China’s trajectory is different, but no less consequential. Beijing has not withdrawn from multilateralism. Instead, it has become increasingly selective about the kinds of institutions it is willing to invest in. Where rules, agendas and hierarchies are inherited from an earlier order, China engages cautiously. Where institutions can be designed, expanded or reshaped, its commitment is far more visible. This does not amount to abandonment, but it does reflect an effort to reconfigure the institutional landscape around Chinese preferences rather than adapt to existing constraints. Russia’s position is shaped by yet another set of pressures. Prolonged sanctions and political isolation have reduced any incentive to preserve institutions associated with Western economic dominance. Its alignment with China is less about shared economic vision than about mutual dissatisfaction with the current system. For Moscow, weakening the authority of existing frameworks has become a strategy in itself, particularly where those frameworks are seen as enforcing exclusion.

Taken together, these trajectories point to an uncomfortable reality. There is no major power waiting in the wings to restore the conditions under which the G20 once functioned. The idea that a hegemonic actor will step in to stabilize multilateral economic governance now belongs to an earlier period. That world has already passed. This is why the role of countries and entities such as India, the European Union, Brazil, and others matters more than is often acknowledged. These actors continue to benefit directly from stable, predictable economic frameworks. Their growth strategies, regulatory environments and external engagements depend on institutions that manage friction rather than amplify it. For them, the erosion of multilateral forums is not an abstract concern but a practical problem.

Sustaining the G20, then, is not about nostalgia for an earlier order or faith in institutional idealism. It is about interest. In the absence of great-power custodianship, responsibility shifts to those who still gain from continuity. Whether this responsibility can be translated into real influence remains uncertain. What seems clear is that multilateralism will no longer be upheld by those with the greatest power, but by those with the greatest stake in keeping the system from fragmenting further.

The author is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also a Life Member of Delhi based International Centre for Peace Studies

The government and Gen Z representatives late this evening signed a 10-point agreement at the Office of the Prime Minister, Singha Durbar.

Prime Minister Sushila Karki and Bhoj Bikram Thapa, on behalf of those who attained martyrdom and were injured during the Gen Z movement, signed the pact. 

Following the agreement signing ceremony, PM Karki said the consensus would prove to be a milestone in bringing transformations to the country.

 "The agreement will guide tomorrow's wave for change," she said, adding that it will help strengthen the constitution, contributing to the prevention of bloodshed and disasters in the future. 

"We are the same group. Gen Zs are my children, and we all aspire for the youth force to reach state power. Their ideas and thoughts should be the guiding principles of the State. We wish to see a bright future for our children."

The pact incorporates provisions on issues of good governance, constitutional amendment, and the electoral system, in line with the spirit of the Gen Z movement held on September 8-9.

Government ministers, chief secretary, and senior government officials were present on the occasion.