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Three months after the GenZ movement, at least 49 GenZ-affiliated groups have been registered at the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. These groups are largely led by prominent faces of the protest, including those involved in negotiations and the formation of the interim government.

Following the appointment of Sushila Karki as prime minister, the House of Representatives was dissolved, and fresh elections were announced for 5 March 2026. With electoral politics now firmly on the horizon, the question dominating public discourse is simple: Where are the faces of the GenZ movement headed?

Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah was a central figure during the movement, openly calling for the dissolution of Parliament and backing an interim government under Karki—both of which ultimately materialized.

Despite widespread expectations that Shah would take a frontline role in post-protest politics, he has so far remained publicly restrained. However, sources close to ApEx say Shah is quietly working to bring together the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Ujyalo Nepal Party backed by Kulman Ghising, and leaders such as Sudan Gurung under a broader electoral alliance.

If plans proceed as expected, Shah, on Martyrs’ Day (30 Jan 2026), is likely to announce his affiliation with the Desh Bikash Party. Previously the Hamro Nepali Party registered at the Election Commission with the election symbol ‘Stick’ has changed its name to Desh Bikash Party as per Shah’s direction, sources say. Ghising recently fuelled speculation by posting a photograph of his meeting with Shah.

Sudan Gurung, another breakout figure of the movement, has registered Nepal Janasewa Party as a contingency option for the upcoming polls, sources say. The party is chaired by Prakash Khadka and carries the election symbol ‘black-and-white shoe’.

Several GenZ leaders—including Ojas Thapa, James Karki, Pradeep Pandey, and Bhawana Raut—are aligned with this camp. Still, Gurung is believed to be closely coordinating with Shah and remains keen on contesting the elections together rather than separately.

Meanwhile, Rakshya Bam has taken a different route. Her group, Nepal GenZ Front, is currently running a nationwide political awareness campaign called ‘Janajagaran’. The core team includes Yatish Ojha, Yujan Rajbhandari, Manish Khanal, Pradeep Gyawali, Amy Amrutha, and Ritu Khadka.

Sources say the group is also exploring the possibility of reviving Nepal Bibeksheel Dal, given many members’ previous association with the party.

Similarly, Tanuja Pandey, known for her strong advocacy of democratic values and the 2015 Constitution, is focusing on public political education rather than direct party politics.

Within the GenZ Movement Alliance, Ojaswee Bhattarai has already taken a formal political step, becoming chair of the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party, associated with leaders such as Baburam Bhattarai, Janardan Sharma, Sudan Kirati, and Santosh Pariyar. Alliance members Rijan Rana and Manzil Rana are also inclined towards the party, though they have yet to formally join.

In contrast, Miraj Dhungana and Prabesh Dahal are pursuing a markedly different agenda. According to ApEx sources, they are lobbying for the revival of the 1990 Constitution and advocating for Prime Minister Karki’s resignation in favour of an all-party government led by former Chief Justice Kalyan Shrestha.

The Council of GenZ, which has coordinators across all seven provinces, illustrates the ideological diversity and political fluidity within the broader GenZ movement. In Koshi Province, coordinator Uparjan Chamling, a former Bibeksheel Party associate with leftist leanings, is now involved in Rakshya Bam’s Janajagaran campaign. Shiva Yadav of Madhes Province, who serves as a secretariat member to Youth and Sports Minister Bablu Gupta, has announced his intention to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections but has yet to declare a party affiliation; sources say he is in talks with both the Ujyalo Nepal Party and the RSP. Another GenZ face, Purushottam Yadav, maintaining close ties with Gupta, is in the preliminary proportional list of RSP.

In Bagmati Province, coordinator Afsana Banu is closely associated with Sudan Gurung and the Nepal Janasewa Party, while Pradeep Pandey, the Gandaki coordinator, remains aligned with Gurung but is also exploring a possible move to the Ujyalo Nepal Party. In Lumbini, Aaditya Acharya, 21, is legally ineligible to contest elections due to the age requirement; after unsuccessful attempts to amend the rule, he is now lobbying for a position in RSP’s central committee, drawing on his close relationship with party leader Ganesh Paudel. 

Meanwhile, in Karnali Province, coordinator Anil Shahi is close to newly appointed minister Madhav Chaulagain and is widely seen as sympathetic to RSP, whereas Khemraj Saud, the coordinator for Sudurpaschim Province, is aligned with the Ujyalo Nepal Party.

Some GenZ figures remain unaffiliated. Aakriti Ghimire, initiator of ‘howtodesh-bikas’—a platform simplifying politics for youths—and former Personal Branch Officer to PM Karki’s secretariat, has not aligned with any party. She previously served as chief of staff to Sumana Shrestha’s secretariat. Monika Niraula and Saken Rai, who work closely with Ghimire, are inclined towards the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party but have not formally joined.

On the other end of the spectrum, JB Chand, Madan Buda, and Hemraj Thapa—who also identify as GenZ leaders—are aligned with controversial businessperson Durga Prasai and support the monarchy. Prasai’s group is registered as Nagarik Bachau Dal, Nepal.

Meanwhile, Jasmine Ojha and Biplabi Neupane have officially joined Janadesh Party Nepal, backed by media personality Rishi Dhamala, while Pawan Thapa has joined Gatisheel Loktantrik Party led by Birendra Basnet, owner of Buddha Air.

What began as a youth uprising demanding systemic change has now evolved into a fragmented political landscape, with GenZ leaders spreading across new parties, old ideologies, and competing power centers.

As Nepal heads towards the March 2026 elections, the GenZ movement’s greatest test may no longer be mobilization—but whether its leaders can translate protest energy into coherent political influence.

The Nepali Congress (NC) occupies a singular and enduring position in Nepal’s political history. It is not merely one political party among others but the principal institutional carrier of Nepal’s democratic imagination. From its origins in anti-Rana resistance and exile politics, through the short-lived democratic experiment of the 1950s, the democratic restoration of 1990 and the post-conflict reconstruction after 2006, the NC has repeatedly stood at the center of regime change, constitutionalism and state-building. 

Unlike revolutionary or purely oppositional parties, the NC has combined resistance with responsibility, protest with governance, and idealism with compromise.

Yet historical centrality does not automatically translate into contemporary relevance or organizational vitality. Like many legacy democratic parties worldwide, the NC now confronts a complex crisis marked by ideological ambiguity, leadership inertia, organizational strain and growing distance from a rapidly changing society. This article offers a brief but integrated institutional analysis of the NC, examining its organizational evolution, internal democracy, leadership culture, governance record and reform dilemmas. It argues that the NC’s greatest strengths—moral legitimacy, adaptability and democratic restraint—have also produced structural fragilities that continue to undermine institutional consolidation. Understanding this paradox is essential not only for evaluating the party’s future but also for assessing the prospects of Nepal’s democratic project itself.

Conceptual framework: Parties, institutions and democratic mediation

In democratic theory, political parties are understood as mediating institutions between society and the state. They aggregate interests, articulate political alternatives, recruit leadership and structure political competition. Classical and contemporary scholarship emphasizes three interrelated dimensions of effective party institutionalization: organizational routinization, leadership legitimacy and internal democracy. Parties that fail to balance these dimensions risk either authoritarian capture, organizational decay or social irrelevance.

In post-authoritarian and resource-constrained societies, these tensions are magnified. Parties often emerge from resistance movements, privileging moral authority and personal loyalty over bureaucratic rules. While such traits enhance mobilization during struggle, they complicate later transitions to programmatic, rule-bound party organization. The NC exemplifies this dilemma. Born as a movement rather than a conventional electoral party, it carried movement logics—charisma, sacrifice, flexibility and informality—into periods that increasingly demanded institutional discipline, policy expertise and routinized leadership succession.

Origins and organizational culture: From resistance to electoral politics

The NC emerged through exile politics, underground networks, diaspora activism and cross-border coordination in India. Its early organizational life was shaped by repression and uncertainty. Survival depended on secrecy, trust and personal commitment rather than formal procedures. Leadership authority was earned through sacrifice and credibility, not electoral mandate. These formative experiences created a political culture in which loyalty and moral standing were valued above codified rules.

When democratic openings emerged—particularly after 1951 and later after 1990—the NC faced the challenge of transforming a resistance movement into a competitive electoral party. Formal organizational structures were gradually introduced, but movement culture persisted. Informal decision-making, personalized leadership and flexible norms remained dominant. This hybrid organizational form proved both resilient and unstable—capable of adaptation across regimes, yet resistant to full institutionalization.

Organizational architecture and leadership culture

Over time, the NC constructed a multi-tiered organizational architecture consisting of a central committee, district committees, local and ward units, and a range of sister as well as well-wisher organizations representing students, women, youth, labor, and identity- and profession-based groups. This structure enabled nationwide penetration and electoral reach, distinguishing the NC from regionally confined or ideologically narrow parties. Organizational breadth allowed the party to function as a national integrator in a socially and geographically diverse country.

Despite this formal decentralization, real authority often remained centralized, particularly in leadership selection, coalition bargaining and strategic decision-making. Leadership culture further shaped organizational life.

Foundational leaders commanded authority through moral legitimacy, intellectual stature, and personal sacrifice. Their leadership emphasized ethical restraint and democratic norms over procedural dominance or coercive control. As electoral politics normalized, leadership criteria shifted. Authority increasingly derived from electoral success, factional strength, and control over party machinery. This transition altered internal expectations, intensified competition, and reduced the unifying moral authority that had once moderated conflict. The absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms amplified leadership struggles and factional reproduction.

Factionalism and intra-party democracy

Factionalism has been a persistent and defining feature of the NC. While often portrayed as a pathology, factionalism within democratic parties can perform integrative functions: It can prevent authoritarian consolidation, provide channels for dissent and facilitate elite circulation. In the NC, factions historically emerged around charismatic leaders, generational divides and strategic disagreements rather than deep ideological schisms.

However, the costs of factionalism have been substantial. Persistent internal competition weakened organizational discipline, undermined public credibility and reduced policy coherence. Formal mechanisms of intra-party democracy—general conventions, internal elections and representative committees—coexist uneasily with informal power structures rooted in patronage, negotiation and loyalty networks. The gap between formal rules and actual practice defines the NC’s internal democracy: procedurally pluralistic yet substantively fragile.

Cadre development, resources, organizational capacity

Unlike cadre-based parties with systematic ideological training, the NC has relied largely on informal mentoring, experiential learning and movement socialization. This approach fostered commitment but limited programmatic coherence and policy capacity. Youth and student wings functioned as recruitment pipelines, yet they were frequently politicized and factionalized, reproducing internal divisions rather than cultivating new leadership.

Financial organization has remained a chronic challenge. Limited public funding, reliance on donor networks and opaque financial practices constrained organizational professionalism and accountability. Resource scarcity affected policy research, cadre training and organizational modernization, reinforcing dependence on informal networks and personalized leadership.

Governance record: Democratic stewardship and state-building

The NC is fundamentally a party of governance. Across Nepal’s modern political history, it has repeatedly assumed responsibility during periods of institutional transition, constitutional experimentation and post-conflict reconstruction. Its governing philosophy has emphasized democratic stewardship—procedure, consent and accountability—over coercion or revolutionary rupture.

Congress-led governments played foundational roles in constitutional development, including the 1959 and 1990 constitutions and the post-2006 constitutional process culminating in the promulgation of the new constitution in 2016 with sufficient consensus of a directly-elected constituent assembly. In each instance, the party advocated separation of powers, fundamental rights, judicial independence and parliamentary supremacy. Even when implementation was uneven, these normative commitments shaped the architecture of the Nepali state.

In parliamentary practice, the NC promoted legislative debate, committee systems and opposition rights, reinforcing democratic accountability. In social sectors, Congress governments expanded education, healthcare and early social protection, framing these investments as democratic foundations rather than populist concessions. Infrastructure development, regulatory institutions and fiscal governance advanced incrementally, constrained by limited state capacity and political fragmentation.

Governance limitations and democratic trade-offs

Despite these contributions, the NC’s governance record is marked by significant limitations. Slow policy implementation, uneven administrative capacity, weak monitoring mechanisms and pervasive patronage undermined effectiveness.

Corruption and clientelism eroded public trust, while governance during the Maoist insurgency strained democratic norms. Emergency measures, though often justified as crisis management, left institutional scars. Coalition politics, especially after 2017, diluted accountability, shortened government lifespans and encouraged policy incrementalism rather than structural reform. Federal restructuring after 2015 further complicated governance, overburdening institutions and exposing coordination failures between central, provincial and local governments. These shortcomings reflect not ideological incoherence but the structural difficulties of democratic governance under constraint.

Comparative perspective: Legacy democratic parties in South Asia

Comparatively, the NC occupies a middle ground among South Asian parties. Like several other South Asian parties, it shares a legacy-based leadership culture and factional pluralism. Unlike disciplined left parties, it tolerates internal contestation but struggles with coherence and policy discipline. In contrast to personality-driven regional parties, it retains nationwide presence and constitutional legitimacy.

Internationally, the NC’s trajectory mirrors that of many legacy democratic parties confronting populist challengers, social fragmentation and declining organizational loyalty. Its experience underscores the broader challenge of sustaining democratic parties in an era of electoral volatility and declining ideological attachment.

Recent challenges and the GenZ uprising

Post-2015, the NC navigated a landscape of political fragmentation and external influences. Elections in 2017 and 2022 saw the party alternate in power, often through unstable coalitions. Tenures focused on Covid-19 recovery, infrastructure and foreign relations, but they were marred by allegations of corruption and inefficiency. The 2022 elections positioned the NC as a key player, yet alliances shifted amid geopolitical tensions between India, China and the US.

The year 2025 marked a watershed crisis. In September, youth-led protests erupted across urban centers, demanding anti-corruption measures, accountability for past violence and systemic reforms. These demonstrations—triggered by the government ban on social media and further fueled by disillusionment with entrenched elites, economic woes and unacceptably high youth unemployment—resulted in clashes and casualties, leading to political upheaval, including government resignation, parliamentary dissolution and snap general elections scheduled for March 2026.

Critiques and the challenge of renewal

Contemporary critiques of the NC focus on ideological dilution, leadership inertia, organizational risk aversion and social disconnect. The democratic socialism and humanist ethics that once anchored Congress identity now appear programmatically vague. Leadership succession remains uneven and constrained, and youth engagement limited. Formal inclusion of women and marginalized groups has not consistently translated into substantive empowerment.

Yet decline should not be conflated with irrelevance. The NC retains nationwide organization, constitutional legitimacy and residual moral authority. Its crisis is one of renewal rather than existential collapse. Renewal requires institutionalizing internal democracy, professionalizing organization, strengthening policy capacity and reconnecting with emerging social constituencies.

Conclusion: An incomplete but indispensable democratic institution

The NC represents an incomplete yet indispensable democratic institution. Its historical legitimacy, adaptive capacity and commitment to democratic restraint have sustained Nepal’s democratic state through repeated crises. At the same time, personalized leadership, weak institutionalization and unresolved movement–party tensions continue to undermine organizational coherence and governance performance.

The future of the NC depends on its ability to transform moral authority into institutional strength, reconcile pluralism with discipline and align democratic ideals with governance delivery. Whether it succeeds will shape not only the party’s trajectory but the resilience of Nepal’s democratic project itself.

KP Sharma Oli has won the intra-party election for a third consecutive term. The party’s 11th General Convention, held this week in Kathmandu, is widely seen as a test of Oli’s popularity within the party following the GenZ protests of September 8–9, which had ousted him from power.

His re-election with a two-thirds majority signals that Oli continues to wield strong influence and remains popular among party cadres, if not in public. Party leaders say Oli’s resounding victory also serves as an endorsement of the political position he took against the GenZ movement.

Over the past 100 days since the September protests, Oli has consistently argued that the protests were directed against the party itself and that the party must resist forces conspiring to weaken it. His re-election suggests that a significant majority of party members have subscribed to this view.

Oli believes his victory is a response to claims—widely circulated after the September protests—that the era of traditional political parties and veteran leaders is over. During this period, both inside and outside major political parties, there was intense debate suggesting that current leaders should retire in recognition of the GenZ protests. Addressing the convention, Oli said, “Some forces are engaged in deceitful conspiracies against us; now such reactionaries have been crushed.”

A clear indication of this sentiment is the success of leaders who were vocal critics of the GenZ protests. For instance, General Secretary Shankar Pokharel, who strongly criticized the protests in their early days, was re-elected after defeating former Finance Minister Surendra Pandey. Similarly, Mahesh Basnet, who had publicly confronted GenZ leaders, was elected party secretary.

Soon after the GenZ protests, senior leaders including Ishwar Pokharel, Surendra Pandey, Gokarna Bista, Astha Laxmi Shakya, and Yubaraj Gyawali and others had urged Oli to step down as party chair, arguing that the killing of 19 students on September 8 had triggered a public backlash. Oli, however, remained defiant and chose to seek internal legitimacy through the party’s general convention.

Convention representatives ultimately re-elected him with nearly a two-thirds majority. Of the 2,277 delegates who voted, Oli secured 1,663 votes—almost 75 percent—while his challenger, Ishwar Pokharel, received only 564 votes. Only a handful of leaders who favored leadership change and were sympathetic to the GenZ protests succeeded in the elections.

For example, Gokarna Bista was elected vice-chairperson and Yogesh Bhattarai deputy general secretary. Both leaders had earlier advocated for age and term limits for the party president—two terms and a maximum age of 70. Both leaders have taken softer stance towards the demands of GenZ protestors. Bista and Bhattarai have expressed a relatively conciliatory approach toward the demands raised by the GenZ protestors. 

Since the beginning, Oli has framed the September 8–9 protests as a conspiracy by “foreign powers” aimed at dislodging him and his party from power. He has maintained that while he would accept the student-led protest held on the morning of September 8, he rejects the events of September 8–9 as a people’s movement, as characterized by the Sushila Karki-led government.

Without elaborating, Oli said after his re-election that his party was “betrayed” on September 9, the second day of the protests, and vowed not to allow a repeat. He instructed party organizations to ensure security at the community level, citing a lack of trust in the current government.

“We could be deceived again, so we must take responsibility for our own security. Form security teams in society,” Oli said, dismissing the current government as unconstitutional.

While Oli has not directly opposed the March 5 elections, he has expressed skepticism that the current government will be able to conduct them. He has warned the government to either make credible preparations for the polls or step down.

The CPN-UML has already filed a writ at the Supreme Court demanding the restoration of Parliament, and the largest party, Nepali Congress, has followed suit. Lawmakers from both parties are now preparing to jointly approach the Supreme Court seeking parliamentary restoration.

Following his re-election, Oli has adopted an even more aggressive posture toward both the government and the GenZ movement. Last week, the Sushila Karki-led government and GenZ representatives signed an agreement recognizing the GenZ movement as a people’s movement. Oli rejected the agreement, calling it “mere drama” and saying he would not accept it.

As a probe commission formed to investigate the September 8–9 events prepares to summon Oli, he has declined to appear. The document endorsed by the party convention has declared the commission invalid and demanded the formation of an independent investigation commission led by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court.

After consolidating his position as party chair, Oli’s immediate priority appears to be dislodging the current government and exerting pressure on the judiciary to revive Parliament. However, if the government proceeds with the planned March 5 elections, the UML is likely to participate in the polls.

The United States has maintained a notably low-key profile in Kathmandu amid policy uncertainty under the Donald Trump administration and shifting political dynamics in Nepal.

Washington’s decision to rebuke or roll back several longstanding policies, including the dismantling of USAID and the absence of clear strategic guidance, left US embassies abroad uncertain about their priorities. As a result, US engagement in Nepal declined sharply, accompanied by a noticeable drop in high-level visits between Kathmandu and Washington.

It was only in Aug 2025 that President Trump appointed Sergio Gor as the next US ambassador to India and special envoy for South and Central Asian affairs. During this interim period, the US Embassy in Kathmandu worked largely behind the scenes to persuade the new administration to continue the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.

Shortly after State Department officials began re-engaging on South and Central Asia, Nepal experienced major political upheaval that led to the fall of the KP Sharma Oli-led government. Unverified reports and rumors alleging the involvement of US-backed non-governmental organizations in Sept 8–9 GenZ protests further reinforced Washington’s cautious approach and contributed to its subdued public posture.

Following the formation of a new government under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, the US formally welcomed it. Since then, however, there have been no public US statements on elections or Nepal’s internal political developments. While the ambassador and senior embassy officials continue to attend public events, they have largely refrained from commenting on domestic politics or the broader trajectory of bilateral relations.

This restraint has fueled concerns in Kathmandu about the Trump administration’s priorities toward Nepal. Addressing these concerns this week, senior State Department officials said the US is recalibrating—not withdrawing—its assistance. They indicated that future support will be narrower and more selective, focused on areas that serve US national interests and align with President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Allison Hooker, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The US is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, emphasizing that Washington’s commitment to the region remains firm.

As senior US officials step up visits to other South Asian countries, diplomatic sources suggest Kathmandu could see similar engagements in the coming days, potentially offering clearer signals of Washington’s evolving approach to Nepal.