The interminable wait of conflict victims
If there was ever a case of travesty of justice in Nepal, it has to apply to the victims of the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Fully 12 years after the signing of the landmark Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on Nov 21, 2006, they continue on what increasingly appears like a futile quest for justice. On Nov 21 this year they came together to demand radical reforms in the two transitional justice bodies so that the actual victims, and not political leaders, are at the center of the transitional justice process. They were against extending the mandates of the two bodies: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), both of whose extended tenures expire after three months. Again, their argument is that the laws governing these commissions were formed without their consent. If the government still refuses to heed their call, they have threatned to pursue an ‘alternative course of justice’. Having exhausted their legal options at home, they could seek justice at international forums. That will undoubtedly besmirch Nepal’s image abroad. It will also greatly complicate foreign travels of those linked to conflict-era rights abuses, including of some top political leaders.
Transitional justice is by no means easy, but nor were the two earlier legs
The conflict victims have a point. And some of their demands are reasonable and very implementable too. For instance they want formal apology for conflict-time rights violations from the side of the state, the Maoist leadership at the time of war as well as the leaders of major parties. Another demand is that the state take care of the children orphaned due to the war. It is clear that after years of fighting an uphill battle, the conflict victims are tiring, and they are desperately in search of some kind of closure, even if they have to make some unpalatable concessions in the process.
It is a tragedy that after showing the world how to successfully end a bloody conflict, and after promulgating the new constitution that institutionalizes the gains of the 2006 political movement, the political actors are dragging their feet on the third vital leg of the peace process: transitional justice. It is by no means easy, but nor were the two earlier legs. Tired they may be, but the hope of the political class that the conflict victims will in due course forget the injustice done to them is misplaced. So long as their voices are ignored another such conflict cannot be ruled out.
Madhesi parties set to mount a stiff challenge
Nepali politics tends to heat up after over a month-long festive season that starts with Dashain and ends with Chhath. This year it is the two largest Madhes-based parties that could cause the biggest ruction, and mount perhaps the first serious challenge to the mighty government of KP Sharma Oli. Numerically weak, they may not as yet be able to unseat Oli but they could make things rather dicey for him.PM Oli has time and again assured the Federal Socialist Forum Nepal (FSFN)—a part of the federal government Oli leads—and the Rastriya Janashakti Party Nepal (RJPN)—that supports the federal government but is not a part of it—that the constitution ‘should and will’ be amended as per their demands. He better do so, the two parties say, as only reason they supported his government was because of a credible assurance on amendment.
But seven-and-a-half months into Oli’s prime ministership there has been no headway on that front. Chief among the Madhesi parties’ demands are revision of provincial borders, amendment in citizenship clauses, proportional representation of Madhesis in state organs, and release of Madhesi cadres arrested during various protests. They also want RJPN’s Resham Chaudhary—who was elected to the federal lower house from Kailali district, but was barred from taking office after being accused of masterminding the killings of eight police officers during protests in 2015—sworn-in as a lawmaker.
None of these demands will be easy to meet. The constitution makes redrawing provincial boundaries a herculean endeavor; most in the ruling NCP party deem even current citizenship provisions for Madhesis lax; on proportional representation, NCP is under tremendous pressure not to ‘dilute’ the rights of the Pahades in the name of empowering Madhesis; and the entire police apparatus will resist swearing-in Chaudhary.
With the growing appeal of secessionist forces in Madhes, especially among its youth, token concessions from the NCP-led government will not cut ice. The two mainstream Madhesi parties fear irrelevance if they cannot wring out substantive constitutional changes from the federal government. But if the stalemate persists even after Chhath, it is not farfetched to imagine the two parties making common cause with extremists like CK Raut. In fact, there have been plenty of hints that they are contemplating this course.
As Oli strives to keep his own wrangling party in order he will have his task cut out managing the growing challenge from Tarai-Madhesh as well.
Challengers smell blood as Deuba looks to hang on
Electoral outcome and party leadership are closely tied in mature parliamentary democracies. If the party does well, the credit goes largely to the leader. If it does not, the leader assumes full responsibility and resigns. Perhaps there could be no better example of this than the case of the otherwise powerful British Prime Minister David Cameron resigning as the leader of the ruling Conservative Party after the Britons voted to leave the European Union (Cameron had made a strong pitch for staying.) In fact tradition dictates that among the two main British parties, the leader of the one that fares poorly in vital elections resigns. Not so in Nepal. It is hard to think of a single instance whereby the leader of Nepali Congress or the erstwhile CPN-UML, the country’s two main parties until recently, resigned after an electoral debacle. Most recently, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba refused to accept responsibility for his party’s poor showing in the three tiers of elections in 2017, and sought to hang on through means fair and foul. This, coupled with the party’s failure as the main opposition and Deuba’s rule-by-fiat, has bolstered those in the party clamoring for change.
Those in the party calling on Deuba to make amends have gained a new voice ahead of the crucial meeting of NC Mahasamiti—the party’s second-most important decision-making body after the national convention—slated for the end of November. President Deuba is said to have repeatedly postponed the meeting as he feared his rivals would use the body to ‘gang up’ against him. He seems to have relented only after immense pressure from the party rank and file.
Deuba does not want to relinquish the top post. But at the next national convention in 2020 he is likely to get a tough competition from one of the scions of the powerful Koirala family, which has controlled the party for most of past 70 years. Also in the fray for party leadership will be veteran leaders like Ram Chandra Poudel and Krishna Prasad Sitaula. As much as Deuba hates having to step down—ever—the day of reckoning seems to be getting closer. In the meantime, at the upcoming Mahasamiti meet, he will try to tweak the party statute to further centralize decision-making. The goal is to amass enough pork to pass around for his future bid for another term as party president o
Onus for regional cooperation rests with India
Speaking at the opening of the fourth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Kathmandu, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli said SAARC and BIMSTEC are complementary and there is no reason they cannot simultaneously succeed. He was clearly trying to assuage fear among smaller SAARC states like Nepal and Bhutan that India is promoting BIMSTEC in lieu of SAARC. As these smaller countries see it, the reason SAARC has not succeeded is two-fold: one, India and Pakistan’s failure to agree on anything substantial and two, India’s traditional apprehension that other SAARC countries were somehow ‘ganging up’ against it.
The feeling is that India, as by far the biggest country in SAARC, both militarily and economically, and as a fulcrum around which most other SAARC countries operate, could have done more to promote regional trade and connectivity, for instance by unconditionally backing the idea of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Even if Pakistan was obstructing regional integration, why was India then not keen on sub-regional initiatives? For instance it could have earned itself a lot of goodwill in Nepal by agreeing to let the landlocked country trade directly with Bangladesh, which is just 27 km from the eastern Nepali border?
India’s apparent reluctance to do even bare minimum to boost regional trade and connectivity in turn fueled skepticism about whether it was really committed to a more integrated, interdependent South Asia. And this is the same skepticism other countries have when it is now promoting BIMSTEC, comprised of five countries on the Bay of Bengal plus the landlocked Bhutan and Nepal. After ignoring BIMSTEC for over two decades, why the sudden change of heart? Perhaps there is a broader geostrategic component to BIMSTEC as well.
BIMSTEC, in this reckoning, is being promoted to isolate the ‘terror sponsoring’ Pakistan and to check China’s growing inroads in South Asia. At the last SAARC Summit in Kathmandu in 2014, Nepal and Pakistan had even proposed that China be included as a full SAARC member, raising predictable hackles in New Delhi. India has also looked at China’s catchall Belt and Road Initiative doubtfully, not the least because one of its core components passes through disputed Kashmir territories. To add to these suspicions, following the fourth BIMSTEC Summit, India is playing host to BIMSTEC military exercises. The onus is on Indian leadership to show that it has abandoned its security-centric approach and is now committed to common growth and development of this crucial part of Asia
