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Despite being in the midst of the monsoon season, Madhes Province continues to face severe drought, leaving farmers in deep distress. With irrigation facilities available on only 49 percent of the province’s total cultivable land, the impact on agriculture is becoming increasingly dire.

The provincial and federal governments have declared Madhes a drought-affected and crisis-hit area, respectively. However, farmers and local officials report that no substantial action has yet been taken to address the crisis.

According to the Madhes Province Dry Zone Study Report—submitted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development to Singha Durbar on July 28—poor management and a lack of maintenance of irrigation infrastructure lie at the heart of the problem. Of more than 1,000 deep tubewells installed since the Panchayat era by both the government and the private sector, over 50 percent are no longer operational.

The Kamala Irrigation Project under the Samruddha Tarai Madhes Irrigation Special Program has also faced major setbacks. In Saptari, Siraha, and Mahottari districts, only 98 out of 236 installed deep tubewells are functional. The remaining 138 are idle due to incomplete infrastructure, such as pump houses and electrification. Additionally, 68 deep tubewells constructed in fiscal year 2024/25 remain nonfunctional because their supporting structures have yet to be built.

Adding to the challenges, 13 deep tubewells in four districts have been rendered unusable due to the theft of key components like transformers and panel board wires. Others are blocked by debris—stones, bricks, and sand—or remain idle due to disputes between local water user committees and farming groups.

Older irrigation systems have also broken down. Under the now-defunct Janakpur Agricultural Development Plan, only 85 of 242 deep tubewells remain functional. Many of the rest—installed between 1984 and 1994—have failed due to issues such as clogged filters, outdated diesel engines, or overall technological obsolescence.

In rural areas, the need for shallow tubewells has become urgent, as surface irrigation systems like canals and dams remain insufficient or unevenly distributed.

Out of Madhes’s total 542,580 hectares of cultivable land, only 52,224 hectares are currently under cultivation this season. Rainfed rice, which relies entirely on monsoon rainfall, has been planted across 362,344 hectares, while Chaite rice covers 20,839 hectares.

Although rivers, canals, and lakes provide some irrigation, the main sources remain underground—primarily shallow and deep tubewells. The Ministry of Land Management, Agriculture and Cooperatives has warned that without urgent upgrades and investments, these systems will continue to fail farmers.

Districts like Saptari, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Bara, and Parsa are served by major canals such as the Koshi Chandra, Bagmati, and Gandak. However, large parts of Siraha and Dhanusha remain dependent on increasingly unreliable underground systems.

As the drought worsens and food insecurity looms, farmers are calling for immediate government intervention—repairs, subsidies, and the construction of new infrastructure. Without such action, Madhes could face a severe agricultural collapse in the coming months.

When former President Bidya Devi Bhandari attempted to re-enter active politics through the CPN-UML—the very party she helped build—she was blocked by a decision that hides behind constitutional dignity while exposing a deeper problem in Nepal’s political culture. The move to sideline her isn’t just a power play—it is an act of political exclusion steeped in patriarchy, internal insecurity and disregard for constitutional freedoms.

The CPN-UML’s Central Committee, led by KP Sharma Oli, denied Bhandari’s return, arguing that a former president must remain above party politics to preserve the sanctity of the office. Yet this rationale collapses under scrutiny—legally, politically and morally. This is not simply about Bhandari’s personal ambitions. This is about how we define democracy in Nepal. Are we a system that allows experienced leaders—regardless of gender—to remain engaged in shaping the country’s future? Or do we selectively retire people when their political presence becomes inconvenient?

Both Dev Gurung of the CPN (Maoist Center) and Tank Karki of the UML itself have forcefully challenged the party’s decision, calling it unconstitutional and unjustified. Gurung points out that the move violates Article 17 of Nepal’s Constitution, which guarantees political freedom and fundamental rights to all citizens, including former officeholders. Once a president steps down, they are no longer bound by the symbolic or ceremonial obligations of that office. The Constitution does not categorize former presidents as non-citizens. Any restriction on their political participation would require strong legal justification—such as actions threatening national sovereignty—which clearly does not apply in Bhandari’s case.

What is more surprising is Gurung warns that political parties registered under the constitution cannot make internal rules or take decisions that override or undermine constitutionally-protected individual rights. In this case, the UML’s action amounts to a political overreach with no constitutional basis.

Tank Karki echoes these concerns from within the party. He questions how any political organization can assume the authority to limit a citizen’s right to participate in politics, especially when no such restriction is mandated by the Constitution. Karki invokes multiple precedents to dismantle the UML leadership’s justification: Ramchandra Paudel returned to Nepali Congress after serving as Speaker, Subash Nembang resumed active roles within UML post-speakership, Khilaraj Regmi became Prime Minister while serving as Chief Justice and Nanda Bahadur Pun held a senior Maoist position while serving as Vice-president. These examples make it abundantly clear that returning to politics after holding high office is not new, nor is it constitutionally inappropriate. Karki rightly asks: “Are we truly democratic if we restrict political participation for someone who is no longer in office?” His question reveals the core contradiction of the UML’s decision—it is less about constitutional dignity and more about political control.

Indeed, Bhandari’s assertiveness and her public hint at contesting leadership within the party were likely perceived as a direct threat by Oli, who has ruled UML unchallenged for years. But attempting to eliminate opposition through procedural justifications is not leadership—it’s suppression. And suppressing a leader like Bhandari, especially after her decades-long contribution to Nepal’s democratic movement, is not just unfair—it’s self-defeating for a party that claims to represent democratic ideals.

What’s more troubling is the gendered nature of this exclusion. When men return to active politics after high office, they are often hailed for their experience. When a woman does the same, she is told it undermines her dignity. This is a classic patriarchal double standard. It elevates women only when they are silent, symbolic and submissive—but excludes them when they seek actual power.

The logic used to bar Bhandari, wrapped in notions of “respect,” “republican values,” and “national unity,” is in fact a tool of silencing. It offers ceremonial honor in exchange for political irrelevance. But true dignity for women in politics lies in allowing them to lead, compete and challenge—just as their male counterparts do.

This sends a deeply discouraging message to Nepal’s women: that the presidency is not a platform for further leadership but a dead-end. That political achievements are valid only until they challenge existing male authority. That even after reaching the highest office, women must gracefully disappear from the political stage.

Nepal’s democracy cannot afford to send such a message.

Bhandari is not asking for favors. She is asserting a right she has earned through decades of political struggle—from student activism in the late 1970s to her contributions in constitutional processes and women’s representation. She remains one of the few women in Nepal with both national recognition and grassroots political experience. Silencing her does not protect democracy—it weakens it.

At a time when Nepal’s political environment is marked by fragmentation, volatility and declining public trust, the exclusion of a credible and experienced leader like Bhandari is a strategic blunder. Her return could help stabilize internal party conflicts, promote left unity and offer a counterbalance to male-dominated power blocs. Her leadership represents continuity, not disruption. Moreover, allowing her back into politics could rejuvenate faith among Nepal’s younger generation—especially women—that political space is open to all, not just a privileged male few.

Let’s also set the legal record straight: there is no constitutional clause that prevents a former president from joining a political party. The arguments being made in UML’s decision—the so-called “spirit” of Article 61—are interpretive at best. The same “spirit” was never invoked for male figures returning from constitutional positions. Why now?

Some claim that Bhandari’s political re-entry might damage the symbolic sanctity of the presidential office. But symbols don’t build nations—leaders do. And leaders must be allowed to evolve, contribute and contest. The presidency was a chapter in Bhandari’s political journey—not the conclusion. Letting her rejoin politics is not an attack on the republic—it is a celebration of its openness. Her participation will not break the system. In fact, excluding her weakens the very democratic spirit the UML claims to be protecting.

Democracies do not function by freezing capable leaders into statues of respect. They thrive when voices—especially those of women—are free to speak, challenge and lead. Nepal cannot claim to support women's empowerment while pushing its most experienced female politician into a corner. Ultimately, this is not just about Bidya Devi Bhandari. This is about what kind of republic we want to be. One that fears women’s power or one that embraces it?

Let her lead again—not as a symbol, but as a politician, a woman, and a citizen. Because the strength of Nepal’s democracy will be measured not by how well it confines women, but by how freely it lets them rise.

The author is a political observer and advocate for inclusive democratic processes

The Ministry of Finance has begun the preparations for the transition strategy to be adopted when Nepal is upgraded from the Least Developed Country Group to a Developing Country status.

How does the World Bank determine interest rates?

If we think that the World Bank is a global central bank that determines interest rates for the world, that would be wrong. There is no global currency, so there is no global central bank to manage it and determine interest rates for it. The Washington, DC-based World Bank is a global financial assistance institution with membership of about 200 countries, whose objective is to carry out various activities, including poverty alleviation, by providing funds for capital investment.

Loan from the World Bank

The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans to countries around the world for capital projects. It consists of two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Development Association (IDA). The World Bank is a component of the World Bank Group. The IBRD provides assistance to middle-income and poor but creditworthy countries, and it also acts as an umbrella for more specialized agencies under the World Bank.

The IBRD was the original arm of the World Bank responsible for the reconstruction of post-war Europe. Before becoming a member of its affiliated institutions (the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes), a country must be a member of the IBRD. As a least developed country, Nepal has long been receiving large amounts of official development assistance (ODA) and grants. This aid used to be free or at very low interest rates (concessional loans). Now, with the upgrade, the form of this assistance is likely to change dramatically.

This simply means that as a poor country, the money that is available at free or very low interest rates will now decrease. The interest rate on loans is likely to increase, meaning that the money needed for development may have to be paid at higher interest rates than before. Nepal’s public debt increased by Rs 231.8bn in the last fiscal year. Nepal’s public debt is now Rs 264.9bn. Of this, Rs 138.2bn is foreign debt. According to public data, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank contribute 80 percent to Nepal’s development assistance.

As of June 2024, the government’s outstanding public debt was Rs 243.8bn. During this period, the appreciation of the US dollar against the Nepalese currency has been adding additional burden to public debt. There is also concern that this may increase Nepal's external debt burden. Similarly, Nepal will lose its access to special funds such as the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF). These funds have been playing an important role in climate change adaptation and various development projects. Now, the reduced availability of these funds is likely to make it more difficult for Nepal to raise financial resources for climate risk reduction and other development programs.

The reduction in the availability of grants and concessional loans will also put Nepal under increasing pressure to finance projects in key social sectors such as infrastructure development, education and health. As development partners are changing their development assistance policies, Nepal needs to find new sources of finance for its development. The International Development Association provides loans to the world’s poorest countries.

In Nepal, the World Bank has been providing loans to Nepal at an interest rate of 0.75 percent, but the Ministry of Finance recently has announced that it has now increased it to 1.5 percent. As the day of Nepal’s graduation from LDC is approaching, the possibility that the World Bank may have increased the interest rate on loans it provides cannot be ruled out. It is worth noting that Nepal is scheduled to formally graduate from LDC status in 2026. This is an initial indication that its impact is starting to be seen in the interest rate that Nepal has to pay on its foreign debt.

In this context, it seems that the World Bank has increased the interest rate on loans it has been providing to Nepal with effect from this July. The Asian Development Bank has also been charging 1.5 percent interest. However, this is considered a concessional loan. The World Bank has been charging the lowest interest rate on loans among development partners.

After the upgrade, loans will be available from donors only at a relatively high interest rate and this may put Nepal in the grip of additional debt, and it has come to light that the World Bank has increased the interest rate.

In addition, it has been made public that the World Bank has not only increased the interest rate but also reduced the loan repayment period. Nepal used to take loans to repay within 40 years. Now, it is said that the maturity period of the loan has also been reduced from 24 to 30 years by adding six more years.

Earlier, such periods were of two types, 40 and 38 years. Now, the Ministry of Finance has stated that it has been made for 30 years. It is also necessary to move forward in coordination with all parties, making the transitional strategy relevant to the time. Although it is estimated that the upgrade will have positive effects on Nepal's development and commercial investment, contribute to the development of new trade and economic partnerships, build a sustainable development, build a national image, and increase credibility, it is not that easy.

It is also expected to have an impact on sectors such as commodity exports, prices, and employment. Nepal is scheduled to graduate from LDC to developing country status in November 2026.

Key challenges and measures

After the upgrade, Nepal will lose some of the special benefits of LDC status, such as preferential market access for goods and services, flexibility in implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, international development measures, and special financing. Nepal has embarked on a new journey after meeting the per capita Gross National Income (GNI) criteria and qualifying for development from a LDC. The United Nations Committee for Development Policy (UN CDP) had previously recommended the Himalayan nation for upgrade in its final assessment.

Graduation for Nepal is an important step towards realizing the national aspiration of a prosperous and developed Nepal. Nepal will continue to access all LDCs-specific assistance measures by 2026. Apart from Nepal, Bangladesh and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic have also been recommended for graduation by the CDP, which has been good for the country. ‘Developing’ is a relative term, a stage like a work in progress—a stage before something reaches its final state. Nepal in 2025  is certainly more developed than Nepal in 2010, which was more developed than Nepal in 2000. But looking at the global average trend, Nepal has not been able to keep pace with the development happening around the world.

So can Nepal be considered developing? No, not when compared to other countries, but when compared to Nepal in previous years. The majority of Nepalis are only concerned with survival, development is a long way off. It is necessary to dispel the illusion that the Nepali people as a society are still very uneducated, very deeply ‘superstitious’, rarely know the meaning of ‘human rights’ and have not yet reached the complexity and sophistication in thinking required to compete with other developing countries of the world.

Nepal must make proper use of the available resources. Peace and security must be maintained in the country. Since Nepal can commercially produce up to 43 thousand megawatts of hydropower, it should try to produce as much hydropower as possible from fast-flowing rivers. There is a risk of reversal at every graduation, mainly due to outflow shocks such as the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, climate-induced disasters, and trade shocks, which are also major threats to the Nepalese economy.

Similarly, Nepal presents a unique case as it is the first country to be upgraded from the LDC category without meeting the Gross National Income (GNI) criteria. Due to the persistence of many problems, including low standards, it faces the difficult task of achieving sustainable economic growth to progress from the current low-middle income country to a high-income country. There are several economic implications of the upgrade. After upgrade, Nepal will lose some of the special benefits that come with LDC status, such as preferential market access for goods and services, flexibility in implementing WTO rules, international development measures, and special financing.

Although Nepal will be eligible for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) available to developing countries, it is much less generous than the duty-free, quota-free market access that many advanced economies offer to LDCs. Raising the necessary financial resources for the investments needed to put LDCs on a rapid growth path has been a major challenge in implementing the Doha Development Agenda, adopted by the United Nations to provide differential treatment that is closely aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals.

In addition, Nepal will lose access to Aid for Trade (AfT) under the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) five years after upgrade.

Additionally, once a country graduates from the Least Developed Country (LDC) category, the minimum grant element of Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans decreases until it is classified as a Low Income Country (LIC); however, Nepal has also become a ‘Low-Middle Income Country’ (LMIC), due to which the lending conditions have become relatively tighter. That being so, the coming years will be a period of both opportunities and challenges for Nepal to navigate its way from a LDC to a developing middle-income country. Consequently, a smooth, irreversible, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable transition is critical for an upgrade.

The country needs to make serious efforts towards poverty alleviation to develop its productive capacity, expand its export base, diversify its economy, and sustain its tertiary education levels in the long term.   Engaging the private sector, civil society, and the international community is equally important as it pursues the Sustainable Graduates agenda. To foster innovation, job creation and economic diversification, it is important to provide incentives and technical support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).

This support could include e-commerce platforms, digitally enabled green innovations, and tools for digital and financial literacy. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP): Encouraging public-private partnerships, especially in infrastructure development, will leverage the capabilities of the private sector to deliver large projects.

Many of us have a problem saying no to people. It makes us uncomfortable. Sometimes we have to explain ourselves or make elaborate excuses. So, we end up saying yes to things we would rather not be a part of. I guess it’s one of the most common human conditions—one that we would like to correct but find ourselves unable to most of the time. 

I’m horrible at saying no to people. My default response is always a ‘sure’ or an ‘okay’ even as my mind is screaming otherwise. I don’t want to disappoint people or come across as someone who is difficult. But saying yes doesn’t always guarantee I will follow through on my promises. I will often skip lunches and invites despite having said yes to them. I’ll find ways to back out last minute and feel relieved when someone cancels engagements I’ve agreed to be a part of. I realize if I could only say no to things I don’t feel like doing, I don’t have to be unnecessarily stressed out or eventually do things half heartedly. 

I always vow to do better—to speak my mind and turn down offers I’m not interested in. I’m envious of people who can say no. Every year, it’s one of my top five resolutions. I’m trying to learn how to say no without offending people. But it’s not an easy thing. Whenever I say no (or try to say no) I can clearly see the hurt on the other person’s face and I start to explain myself, sometimes even making up stories as I go. I hate myself for it. But I fall into the trap every single time. 

I have a few friends, colleagues, and mentors who can say no politely and with ease. One thing they all seem to have in common is clearly sorted priorities. They know they won’t be able to give time to certain things and have no qualms about rejecting those offers. I have spoken to a few of them and they have all maintained that how the other person feels isn’t in their control. The best they can do is be direct and clearly state where they stand. It prevents future misunderstandings and complications, they say. 

I have said yes to things that I’ve had to cancel at the last minute and this is even worse than not being able to say no in the first place. I realize it makes me lose face and people aren’t likely to take my words seriously in the future. I can’t remember the number of times I’ve said yes to invitations and engagements knowing full well that I might not be able to make it and then regretted it later. 

I’ve also had people say yes to me only to disappear at the last minute. Once a senior female journalist agreed to participate in a roundtable event I was organizing for research purposes. She even confirmed a week before the discussion. Then she wouldn’t pick up her phone or respond to texts a day prior to the event. I know she wasn’t ill or had had no emergencies and could have responded to the calls and texts as she was out and about town. Some people I knew had even caught up with her for coffee and chitchat. 

Needless to say, I hated being on the receiving end of this kind of unprofessional behavior and I wondered how many times I might have disappointed people in a similar fashion. I would like to say that I’ve always made it a point to cancel if I wouldn’t be able to do something I had said yes to but I must have pulled the disappearing act too a few times when it has been too awkward to cancel. 

This one incident has made me think deeply and seriously about the importance and perhaps kindness of saying no rather than saying yes to seem amicable and nice and then later backing out. Though initially alarming, it gives the other person clarity on where things stand. It’s a nicer thing to do for the sake of the other person and also a kind thing to do for yourself. You will feel better about yourself and won’t be stressed. 

Saying no takes practice and it’s not something I hope to achieve overnight or through resolutions but to start with I’m definitely going to force myself to speak my mind instead of saying yes to everything that comes my way. 

One of my colleagues told me a great way to start saying no is to tell people you will think it through when they ask you something and not give an immediate answer. This allows you space to gather your thoughts and give a dignified answer without offending anyone or without having to compromise.