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The Aug 26 floods in Rasuwa, Nuwakot and Dhading have demonstrated Nepal’s capacity to respond to the crisis. The harder test now is whether the country can convert emergency solidarity into disciplined recovery, resilient reconstruction and lasting national preparedness.

Disaster management is often understood through four broad phases: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. Yet recovery itself contains two distinct challenges: rehabilitation, which restores lives, livelihoods and essential services, and reconstruction, which rebuilds infrastructure while reducing vulnerability to future disasters. The flash floods therefore represent a much larger test for Nepal than an emergency-response operation alone. The rescue phase may save lives, but what follows will determine the quality of the state. The real question is no longer simply whether Nepal can respond when disaster strikes. It is whether Nepal can recover effectively, reconstruct intelligently and prepare differently for the next crisis.

From saving lives to restoring lives

The response phase asks a fundamental question: Can the state save lives when disaster strikes? The mobilization of the security forces, civil administration and local authorities, supported by Chinese, Indian and other expertise, has demonstrated Nepal’s ability to mobilize rapidly when confronted by an immediate threat. But recovery asks a more difficult question: Can the state restore lives?

Recovery means far more than clearing debris and reopening roads. It means restoring communications, providing temporary and permanent shelter, reopening schools and health facilities, restoring livelihoods, supporting displaced families and helping communities recover from the psychological and economic consequences of disaster. This is where the character of governance becomes more visible. Emergency response tends to generate solidarity because the national objective is clear: save lives. Recovery is different. It involves decisions about money, priorities, beneficiaries, compensation, contracts, timelines and political responsibility. The politics of recovery can therefore be more difficult than the politics of rescue.

When recovery becomes political

Nepal is itself going through a period of political rehabilitation. The political system is adjusting to new forces, new public expectations and demands for institutions that deliver differently. In such an environment, disaster recovery can easily become another arena for political competition.

Opposition parties have every right—and indeed a democratic responsibility—to scrutinise government decisions. Accountability is particularly important when substantial public resources and international assistance are involved.

But there is a difference between opposing a government and opposing the recovery process. If every government initiative is automatically interpreted through the lens of political competition, rehabilitation can become slower, more fragmented and more expensive. Communities that have lost homes, businesses, roads and livelihoods cannot afford to become collateral damage in a contest over political credit.

The government, however, also has a responsibility. It must not equate criticism with obstruction. It should establish transparent criteria for compensation and resource allocation, publish recovery priorities, ensure transparent procurement, involve local governments and affected communities, and allow independent scrutiny.

The principle should be straightforward: The government should lead recovery without politicising it; the opposition should scrutinise recovery without politicalizing it. The objective is not to remove politics from a democratic recovery process—something neither possible nor desirable—but to institutionalise the process so that political competition does not determine who receives assistance, which communities are prioritised or how reconstruction is implemented.

From recovery to reconstruction

Once immediate needs are addressed, Nepal faces a more strategic question: Can we rebuild better than we were before? Reconstruction cannot mean simply replacing what the floods destroyed. If a bridge is rebuilt in the same vulnerable location, to the same standards and without accounting for changing rainfall patterns, river behaviour, hydrology, slope instability and settlement patterns, Nepal may simply be rebuilding the conditions for the next disaster.

Reconstruction must therefore become an opportunity to build resilience into infrastructure and development planning.

Roads, bridges, telecommunications networks, schools, hospitals and other critical infrastructure should be designed for a more unpredictable Himalayan environment. Risk mapping, river management, slope stabilisation, resilient communications, safer settlement planning and climate-informed infrastructure standards should become integral components of reconstruction. This makes reconstruction more than an engineering exercise. It becomes a development strategy—and increasingly, a national security imperative. And increasingly, it is also a national security issue.

The Himalayas are becoming a shared risk environment where climate change, extreme rainfall, glacial instability, fragile infrastructure, water systems and human security intersect. A disaster that destroys a bridge on a strategic corridor can affect not only a local community but also trade, connectivity, border access and national resilience.

The Himalayas as a shared security environment

The strategic significance of disaster resilience becomes clearer when viewed through the changing Himalayan environment. Climate change, extreme rainfall, glacial instability, landslides, fragile infrastructure, expanding settlements and water-related risks increasingly intersect. A disaster that destroys a bridge or road in a remote district may appear local, but its consequences can extend to trade, connectivity, border access, tourism, energy infrastructure and national resilience.

Disaster preparedness can therefore no longer be treated solely as a humanitarian or administrative responsibility. It is increasingly a matter of human security, economic security and national resilience. For Nepal, this also creates an opportunity to move from being primarily a recipient of disaster assistance to becoming a regional centre of Himalayan resilience and disaster-risk cooperation.

Assistance without dependency

Nepal will inevitably require external assistance. There is nothing unusual or undesirable about this. International partners can provide financing, specialised equipment, technology, technical expertise and humanitarian support that Nepal may not immediately possess.

But assistance should strengthen national resilience rather than create new dependencies. International assistance is rarely completely detached from institutional, economic or strategic interests. States, international organizations, donors and other actors may have humanitarian objectives while simultaneously pursuing institutional, economic or strategic interests. Nepal should therefore remain open to assistance while retaining ownership of its recovery priorities. The distinction is important: Nepal should coordinate assistance; it should not be coordinated by assistance.

This requires a transparent national framework for international support. External projects should be aligned with Nepal’s priorities, implemented through national and local institutions wherever possible, and subject to common standards of accountability.

External partners should build Nepal’s capacity, not substitute for it. This is particularly important in the Himalayan context. The same principle should guide cooperation with India, China and other international partners. Nepal can benefit from collaboration in early-warning systems, hydrological and meteorological information, glacial monitoring, emergency communications, search and rescue, disaster medicine and humanitarian assistance. But such cooperation should be driven by Nepal’s vulnerabilities and national interests—not by the strategic competition of others.

Coordination ts the real test of state capacity

The rescue operation also highlights another lesson: Nepal possesses considerable institutional capacity when the mission is clear and immediate. The Nepali Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police, civil administration, provincial and local governments, communities and private sector each have different roles to play. The challenge is to convert these capabilities into a coherent national system.

Disaster resilience cannot depend on extraordinary mobilization after every catastrophe. It requires a standing architecture of coordination. That means clearly defined institutional responsibilities, interoperable communication systems, common operating procedures, regular exercises and reliable channels between federal, provincial and local governments.

The objective should be to ensure that institutional competition never becomes an obstacle to operational cooperation.

The forgotten phases: Mitigation and preparedness

Perhaps the most important lesson from the floods is that Nepal cannot remain trapped in a recurring cycle of: disaster to rescue to relief to reconstruction and back to disaster.

The ultimate purpose of disaster management is not simply to respond effectively to the last disaster. It is to reduce the consequences of the next one.

That brings us back to the first two phases: mitigation and preparedness. Nepal cannot prevent extreme rainfall, earthquakes, landslides or glacial hazards. But it can reduce vulnerability. That requires investment in risk mapping, early-warning systems, pre-positioned emergency supplies, trained local responders, resilient infrastructure, evacuation planning and regular disaster exercises. Preparedness must also move beyond Kathmandu.

Local governments and communities are often the first responders. Their capacity to communicate warnings, evacuate vulnerable populations, provide first aid and coordinate with security agencies can determine whether a natural hazard becomes a humanitarian catastrophe. The strongest disaster-response system is therefore not one that waits for Kathmandu to arrive. Or not simply to strengthen the response mechanism. It is one in which communities are already prepared before Kathmandu is needed or build a national resilience architecture.

From disaster management to national resilience

Nepal now faces four interconnected tests. Response: Can the state save lives? Recovery: Can the state restore livelihoods, dignity and confidence? Reconstruction: Can the state rebuild better and reduce future vulnerability? Mitigation and preparedness: Can the state reduce the impact of the next disaster?

Each requires a different form of state capacity. Response requires operational capability. Recovery requires political maturity. Reconstruction requires institutional discipline and long-term planning. Preparedness requires strategic foresight. Nepal has demonstrated considerable capacity in the first. The coming months and years will reveal whether it can demonstrate the other three.

Nepal now needs to make a conceptual shift. The objective should not be to create a better emergency response system alone. It should be to establish a National Resilience Architecture capable of anticipating risk, reducing vulnerability, responding rapidly, recovering efficiently and learning institutionally. This should be a permanent national framework rather than an ad hoc mechanism activated after each disaster. The National Resilience Architecture could be built around ten institutional reforms.

Establish a National Resilience Council

Nepal needs a high-level mechanism capable of looking across ministries and levels of government. A National Resilience Council, chaired at the highest political level and supported by a permanent professional secretariat, could integrate disaster risk, climate adaptation, critical infrastructure, food and water security, public health, emergency preparedness and national security.

Its purpose would not be to create another bureaucracy. It would be to overcome the fragmentation that prevents existing institutions from seeing resilience as a whole-of-state responsibility. The Council should maintain a National Risk Register identifying Nepal's most consequential natural, infrastructural, technological and human-security risks.

Create a national risk intelligence system

Nepal cannot manage risks that it cannot see. Risk information is currently too often dispersed among institutions and treated as a technical matter rather than a strategic national asset. Nepal should establish an integrated risk-intelligence platform bringing together meteorological, hydrological, geological, glacial, environmental, demographic and infrastructure information. The objective should be simple: Move from responding to events to anticipating risk.Risk maps should become mandatory inputs into infrastructure planning, settlement decisions and development budgets.

Establish an early-warning-to-early-action system

An early warning that does not produce early action has limited value. Nepal needs to connect forecasting with clearly defined operational triggers. When a credible warning reaches a specified threshold, predefined actions should automatically follow: evacuation, mobilization of responders, movement of emergency supplies, closure of vulnerable infrastructure and activation of local emergency centres. This requires reliable communications extending into remote communities. The system should be designed around the principle that the warning must reach the last kilometre and the response must begin before the disaster arrives.

Build local resilience as the first line of defence

Kathmandu cannot be the centre of every disaster response. Local governments and communities are frequently the first responders. Their ability to evacuate vulnerable people, provide first aid, maintain communications and coordinate with security agencies can determine whether a hazard becomes a catastrophe. Every vulnerable municipality should therefore have a basic resilience package: trained local emergency teams; emergency communication systems; evacuation maps; designated shelters; emergency stocks; community-level drills; and direct coordination mechanisms with security agencies. National resilience begins locally.

Create a resilient critical infrastructure standard

Nepal should establish a national resilience standard for critical infrastructure. Every major road, bridge, hydropower project, airport, telecommunications system, hospital and government facility should undergo disaster-risk assessment before construction and periodic resilience assessment thereafter. Reconstruction should not simply restore previous standards. Where necessary, the government should use the disaster as an opportunity to relocate, redesign or upgrade vulnerable infrastructure. The principle should be: Build once, build resiliently.

Establish a permanent joint disaster response capability

The recent response demonstrated the value of coordination among the Nepali Army, Armed Police Force, Nepal Police and civilian authorities. That coordination should not depend on the circumstances of an individual crisis.

Nepal should institutionalise joint planning, interoperable communications, common operating procedures, logistics arrangements and regular exercises among security agencies, civil administration and local governments. Specialised capabilities—including engineering, aviation, communications, medical support, search and rescue and logistics—should be maintained as national assets. The objective is not to militarise disaster management. It is to ensure that every institution can contribute its specialised capability without duplicating another institution's role.

Create a national recovery and reconstruction facility

Recovery should not begin from scratch after every disaster. Nepal should establish a permanent recovery and reconstruction facility with pre-approved procedures for damage assessment, compensation, procurement, financing and project prioritisation.

This would reduce bureaucratic delay at precisely the moment when speed matters. It should also create a standardised post-disaster damage and needs assessment system, allowing the government to quickly determine what has been lost and what must be restored first.

Introduce a transparent national reconstruction compact

Large-scale recovery inevitably creates opportunities for political patronage and corruption. Nepal should therefore adopt a reconstruction compact based on five principles: transparent procurement, equitable compensation, public reporting, independent monitoring and community participation.

Major reconstruction projects should have publicly accessible information on cost, contractor, timeline, progress and responsible agency. This would allow Parliament, opposition parties, media, civil society and citizens to scrutinise the process without obstructing it. Accountability and efficiency should reinforce one another.

Create a national framework for international disaster assistance

Nepal will need international assistance, including finance, technology, equipment, specialised expertise and humanitarian support.

But Nepal should establish a clear national framework before assistance arrives. International support should be aligned with nationally identified priorities, coordinated through a common mechanism and implemented in ways that strengthen Nepali institutions. Cooperation with India, China and other partners could be particularly valuable in early warning, hydrology, glacial monitoring, emergency communications, search and rescue, disaster medicine and humanitarian assistance. But Nepal must distinguish between accepting assistance and accepting agendas.

The principle should remain: Nepal should coordinate assistance; it should not be coordinated by assistance. External partners should strengthen Nepal's capacity rather than create parallel systems that disappear when projects end.

Make disaster resilience a national budget and planning priority

Perhaps the most important reform is to connect resilience with money. Preparedness cannot remain a declaration without budgetary consequences. Every annual budget and major development programme should include a resilience assessment. Investments that increase exposure to disaster risk should be reconsidered; investments that reduce risk should receive priority. A percentage of national and subnational development expenditure could be progressively linked to risk reduction, resilient infrastructure, preparedness and climate adaptation. This would shift disaster management from an emergency expenditure category to a national investment in future stability.

The efficiency principle

The National Resilience Architecture should ultimately be judged by one question: Does it produce better outcomes with the resources Nepal already possesses?

Nepal does not necessarily lack institutions. It often lacks coordination among them. It does not necessarily lack plans. It lacks implementation discipline. It does not necessarily lack international partners. It lacks a sufficiently integrated mechanism for aligning external support with national priorities. And it does not necessarily lack money. It loses effectiveness when resources are fragmented, delayed or poorly targeted. The challenge, therefore, is not simply capacity. It is institutional efficiency.

Every reform should be measured against four criteria: Speed: How quickly can the state act?

Coordination: Can institutions act together? Accountability: Can citizens see how decisions and resources are being used? Learning: Does every disaster make the next response better? This provides a practical measure of state capacity.

Turning crisis into institutional learning

The present disaster should therefore not be viewed simply as an episode of flooding in three districts. They should be treated as a test of Nepal’s ability to turn crisis into institutional learning. The government must resist the temptation to claim political ownership of recovery. The opposition must resist the temptation to turn every recovery decision into political confrontation. Civil society and the media must scrutinise without sensationalising. Communities must have a meaningful voice in decisions that affect their future. International partners must assist without allowing assistance to become dependency.

Most importantly, reconstruction must survive political cycles. Nepal needs recovery without patronage, reconstruction without politicisation, assistance without dependency, and preparedness without complacency.The flood waters will eventually recede. Roads and bridges will eventually be rebuilt. Emergency camps will eventually close. But that is not the real measure of success. The real measure is whether affected communities become safer, whether infrastructure becomes more resilient, whether institutions become more capable, whether public trust is strengthened and whether Nepal is better prepared for the next crisis.

The rescue saved lives. The recovery will test our politics. The reconstruction will test our institutions. And preparedness for the next disaster will test whether we have truly learned. Emergency response tends to unify. Rehabilitation and reconstruction test political maturity.

Nepal’s challenge is therefore not merely to recover from disaster, but to emerge from it stronger, safer and more resilient than before with state capacity.

The rescue saved lives. Recovery will test Nepal's political maturity. Reconstruction will test its institutional discipline. Preparedness will test its strategic foresight. And learning will determine whether Nepal becomes genuinely resilient. The strategic objective should therefore be unmistakable: Rescue without delay. Recovery without patronage. Reconstruction without vulnerability. Assistance without dependency. Preparedness without complacency. And resilience as a permanent responsibility of the state.

The author is a Maj Gen (Retd) of the Nepali Army and writes on international affairs and geopolitical strategy. He is also a researcher affiliated with Rangsit University in Thailand

While the conclusion of a ‘highly productive’ visit of Sergio Gor, US President Donald Trump’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, on May 4 might seem like routine diplomacy, it takes on a sharper significance when paired with Assistant Secretary Samir Paul Kapur’s April engagement with the Balendra Shah government. Together, these back-to-back engagements signal a deliberate recalibration of US policy toward Nepal. At a time of intensifying regional rivalry, Washington is moving beyond traditional rapport, while Kathmandu appears increasingly determined to navigate this geopolitical competition on its own terms. 

The visits reflect a broader shift in the diplomatic grammar of South Asia, where smaller states such as Nepal are no longer treated merely as passive recipients of geopolitical attention, but as increasingly important strategic actors capable of managing external engagement on their own terms. The standalone nature of Kapur’s visit was itself diplomatically significant. Unlike previous senior US officials who often combined Nepal with wider regional tours, his direct visit to Kathmandu signaled that Nepal is gaining independent strategic relevance within Washington’s South Asia policy. Increasingly, the United States views smaller South Asian states—including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—as geopolitically consequential because of their strategic location bordering Xinjiang, Tibet, and the Malacca Strait connectivity potential, and growing importance within the wider regional competition involving China, India, and the United States.

During the Feb hearing, the US House subcommittee emphasized bipartisan recognition that Nepal—strategically located between India and China—occupies a sensitive geopolitical position. Kapur had stated that preventing domination by any single power in South Asia is a core US objective.

“A hostile power dominating South Asia could exert coercive leverage over the world economy,” he said, adding the US must prevent this from happening and keep the region free and open.

Two visits, one pattern

The visit by S Paul Kapur—centered on political engagement, governance reform and institutional dialogue—effectively set the stage for Washington’s renewed outreach to Nepal. It reflected a traditional yet evolving US diplomatic approach: engage early with emerging political leadership, assess the direction of political transition and identify potential partners for long-term strategic and institutional cooperation. But the significance of Kapur’s visit extended far beyond routine diplomacy. It signaled Washington’s recognition that Nepal is no longer viewed merely as a peripheral bilateral partner, but increasingly as a strategically important state situated between India and China within the broader geopolitical competition shaping South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

Kapur’s earlier congressional remarks underscored that preventing the domination of the region by any single power remains a core US strategic objective. The standalone nature of his Kathmandu visit was therefore diplomatically significant. Unlike previous senior US officials who often folded Nepal into wider regional tours, Kapur’s direct engagement suggested that Nepal is gaining independent strategic attention within Washington’s South Asia policy. Increasingly, the US views smaller South Asian states—including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives—as geopolitically consequential because of their location, connectivity potential and exposure to external strategic competition. In that context, the Kapur visit also highlighted a broader reality: Nepal’s domestic political transitions are increasingly being interpreted internationally through a geopolitical and strategic lens rather than purely as internal democratic developments.

Gor’s visit builds on that foundation but shifts the emphasis. His engagements with Rabi Lamichhane, Shisir Khanal, and Swarnim Wagle were not just courtesy calls. They were targeted interactions with the nodes of political authority, economic policymaking including new US business opportunities in the dynamic tech sector, expanding commercial ties and reform momentum within the new government.

The messaging was consistent across both visits: Nepal’s current political moment—defined by a reform-oriented mandate—is an opportunity the United States does not intend to miss.

Washington’s playbook: Early engagement, economic anchoring

Taken together, these visits reflect a familiar but refined US playbook, which appears to pursue three interconnected objectives.

First, the United States sought to establish early political communication in political transition with the new administration and better understand its governing priorities and strategic orientation. By reaching out soon after the formation of a new government, Washington seeks to shape perceptions, build trust and secure a seat at the table as policies evolve.

Second, Washington aimed to anchor continuity in economic and strategic engagement, particularly regarding implementation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact, expansion of US investment, trade cooperation, digital connectivity and broader economic partnerships rather than security. The prominence of discussions around investment climate reform, private sector growth and technology partnerships—alongside continued emphasis on the MCC compact—signals a deliberate choice. In a region sensitive to geopolitical signaling, economic cooperation offers a lower-friction entry point.

Third, and more strategically, the visit reflected growing US concern regarding the expansion of Chinese influence across South Asia by diversifying engagement beyond the immediate neighbors.

Both visits included interactions with business leaders and non-governmental actors, reflecting an understanding that influence in Nepal is not monopolized by formal political institutions.

This is not containment. It is not coercion. It is competitive engagement through opportunity.

The prime minister’s doctrine: Assertion of sovereign protocol

Yet, the most striking feature of Kapur and Gor’s visit was not what happened—but what did not. The Prime Minister and the President did not meet the US envoys, maintaining a position that he would not engage with officials below a certain rank and would prioritize domestic governance over diplomatic interactions.

This is more than a scheduling decision. It is a doctrinal signal.

Nepal, under its current leadership, appears to be experimenting with a new diplomatic posture—one that emphasizes hierarchy, selectivity and sovereign confidence. The intent is understandable. For decades, Nepal’s foreign policy has often been reactive, shaped by external pressures and internal fragility. A more assertive approach seeks to correct that imbalance.

In principle, this reflects a maturing state: one that chooses when and how to engage, rather than responding to every overture.

But diplomacy is as much about timing and signaling as it is about principle.

Between principle and pragmatism

Neither the Head of the State nor the Head of the Government had a talk with the two US officials, pointing out a stiffness between protocol and pragmatism.

On one hand, it reinforces: a message of dignity and self-respect; a departure from aid-dependent optics and a focus on internal governance as the primary national priority.

But on the other hand, it raises questions: does rigid adherence to hierarchy risk missing strategic opportunities? Could it create perceptions of inaccessibility among key partners? Does it limit Nepal’s ability to shape external narratives at critical moments?

In practice, even major powers exercise flexibility when strategic engagement demands it. For a country like Nepal—situated between competing global and regional interests—the cost of missed conversations can outweigh the benefits of strict protocol.

The economic battleground: Where influence will be decided

Both visits converge on a central theme: Nepal’s future partnerships will be decided in the economic domain. Discussions on investment climate reforms, technology collaboration, infrastructure development and private sector expansion are not peripheral—they are the core of modern geopolitical competition.

The focus on Nepal’s tech sector and the demonstration of drone technology in Sagarmatha operations highlight a subtle but important shift. The US is not merely offering aid; it is positioning itself as a partner in innovation ecosystems.

This approach has two advantages. One, it aligns with Nepal’s aspirations for economic transformation and it avoids triggering geopolitical anxieties associated with overt strategic or military engagement. In effect, the US is saying: partnership without pressure, opportunity without overt alignment.

Cultural diplomacy: The quiet reinforcer

Amid the strategic and economic discussions, the return of the Akshobhya Buddha statue stands out as a quieter but deeply significant gesture. Cultural restitution is not transactional; it is relational.

Such actions build long-term goodwill, reinforce trust beyond policy cycles and position the US as a respectful partner in heritage and identity. In a country like Nepal, where culture and sovereignty are closely intertwined, these gestures carry weight that often exceeds their immediate visibility.

The regional context: A crowded strategic space

These developments cannot be viewed in isolation. Nepal today sits at the intersection of intensifying multiple strategic currents—US-China competition, India’s enduring strategic centrality and the broader recalibration of South Asian geopolitics.

What distinguishes the current moment is not the presence of external interest—but its diversification.

Unlike previous eras, where geopolitical engagement often came with clear alignments, today’s environment is more fluid. Economic projects, technological partnerships, and institutional reforms have become the primary instruments of influence.

For Nepal, this presents both an opportunity and a challenge.

The strategic imperative for Nepal

The convergence of visits by Samir Paul and Sergio Gor underscores a simple reality: Nepal always matters more today than it did a decade ago—not as a battleground, but as a partner space.

The question is not whether Nepal will be engaged. It is how Nepal will manage that engagement.

Three strategic imperatives stand out. One is calibrated engagement when Nepal must engage all partners—India, China, the US, and others—through structured and transparent frameworks. Selectivity is useful, but it must not become exclusion.

Second is flexible diplomacy. Protocol should guide diplomacy, not constrain it. Strategic flexibility allows Nepal to extract maximum benefit without compromising dignity.

Third is issue-based alignment. Rather than aligning with powers, Nepal should align with issues: infrastructure, energy, technology, governance reform. This reduces geopolitical risk while maximizing developmental gains.

Conclusion: Convergence or drift?

The back-to-back engagements by US officials signal intent: Washington is ready to invest—politically, economically and symbolically—in Nepal’s transition.

Kathmandu, meanwhile, is signaling something equally important—a desire to redefine how it is engaged.

Whether these two trajectories converge will determine the future of the relationship.

If managed well, Nepal can transform external interest into internal strength—leveraging partnerships without becoming dependent on them. If mismanaged, the gap between engagement and assertion could widen into quiet misalignment.

In the end, diplomacy is not about who visits or who declines to meet. It is about whether those interactions—taken together—advance national interest.

Nepal stands at a moment where it can do precisely that. The question is whether it will choose adaptation over rigidity, and strategy over symbolism.

The author is a Major General (retired) of the Nepali Army and a strategic affairs analyst. He is also a researcher and is affiliated with Rangsit University in Thailand

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Samir Paul Kapur, concluded a three-day visit to Nepal on April 22, marking the highest-level US visit since the new government took office. Ahead of Nepal’s March 5 election, Kapur had expressed confidence that the vote would be peaceful and said the US was prepared to work with the incoming government. Briefing the US House Foreign Affairs Committee in February, he stated: “With Nepal, we trust there will be a secure and peaceful electoral process, and we are prepared to work with whoever wins.”

In his testimony, Kapur placed Nepal within a broader US strategic outlook for South Asia, alongside developments in countries such as Bangladesh, where political transitions have recently drawn international attention. His subsequent visit to Dhaka in early March reflects continued US engagement across the region during periods of political transition.

A key underlying theme in his remarks was the strategic importance of Nepal’s geographic position between India and China. US lawmakers have increasingly emphasized that South Asia’s balance of power matters for global economic stability. Kapur explicitly noted that preventing dominance by any single power in the region remains a central US objective.

He warned that the emergence of a “hostile power dominating South Asia” could translate into broader coercive leverage over the global economy—underscoring how regional geopolitics is now directly tied to global economic security. Kapur also highlighted that smaller South Asian states—including Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Sri Lanka—are strategically significant but structurally vulnerable to external pressures, particularly through what he described as debt-driven influence mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, he outlined US priorities in the region: expanding trade and economic connectivity, strengthening defence and security cooperation, and supporting partners through diplomacy, investment, and institutional engagement.

The underlying message is clear: the US is increasingly framing South Asia not just as a development region, but as a strategic balance zone—where economic tools, connectivity, and institutional partnerships are deployed alongside traditional diplomacy.

This presents an opportunity for Nepal. The pattern of engagements matters, and this visit reflects a shift in how external actors—particularly the US—are approaching the country. Kapur’s visit appeared mission-driven rather than ceremonial, suggesting a targeted effort rather than symbolic diplomacy. His engagement with Rabi Lamichhane, chairperson of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, signals attention to Nepal’s evolving political landscape and the rise of non-traditional actors. It reflects an interest in governance narratives centered on anti-corruption, technocratic leadership, and service delivery.

Equally notable was the absence of meetings with top state leadership such as the president, prime minister, or army chief. This suggests a deliberate shift from conventional protocol—an exploratory approach that keeps distance from established power structures while focusing more on political economy than security.

The emphasis on engagements with foreign and finance ministries indicates that economic diplomacy is at the core of US priorities. This aligns with a broader approach that competes through capital, regulatory standards, and governance frameworks rather than solely through security partnerships. Key areas of focus include the investment climate, regulatory predictability, infrastructure, energy, and governance-linked economic systems.

Outreach to business leaders further signals that engagement is increasingly being built through markets, not just ministries. It reflects recognition of Nepal’s underutilized private sector and an interest in identifying credible local partners for international capital. Kapur also visited Patan Durbar Square and Boudhanath Stupa, highlighting Nepal’s Newari and Tibetan cultural heritage. He noted that US support for preserving such sites contributes to economic growth while safeguarding shared cultural values. His interaction with the Tibetan community in Kathmandu—and his call for attention to their concerns—signals continued US engagement on Tibet-related issues, a sensitive area given Nepal’s adherence to the One-China policy.

Unlike traditional diplomatic visits, this one appeared less ceremonial and more strategic—politically exploratory, economically focused, selective in protocol, and multi-channel in outreach. The visit can be interpreted as a calibration mission rather than a courtesy call. Its likely objectives include mapping Nepal’s evolving political landscape, re-anchoring US influence in the economic domain, diversifying engagement beyond state actors, and testing Nepal’s strategic flexibility amid intensifying regional competition.

At its core, the approach reflects economic statecraft as a substitute for overt political alignment—shaping the environment in which outcomes emerge rather than attempting to directly control them. The visit also unfolds against intensifying geopolitical competition in South Asia, where India has traditionally held significant influence. New Delhi appears to view increased US engagement with a mix of strategic alignment and cautious watchfulness.

On one hand, there is convergence with Washington on balancing China’s expanding regional role. On the other, India remains sensitive to any external presence that could dilute its influence in what it has long considered its immediate sphere. This reflects both opportunity and concern.

Indian analysts have also pointed to internal political developments in Nepal—particularly the consolidation of major communist parties—as a factor that could expand China’s leverage. This has prompted some within India’s strategic circles to call for closer coordination with the US, even as there is growing recognition that India’s traditional influence is evolving and requires a more deliberate, strategy-driven approach.

At the same time, China has signaled concern over the intensifying US presence. In the lead-up to the visit, Beijing’s representatives in Kathmandu cautioned against activities linked to Tibet and Taiwan, underscoring China’s priority that Nepal not become a platform for anti-China political or security agendas.

China continues to advance its economic footprint through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, framing development cooperation as the central pillar of its engagement. The broader picture is one of intensifying strategic signaling, with both Washington and Beijing testing the boundaries of influence.

For Kathmandu, the message is clear: the opportunity is significant. External actors are engaging despite political fluidity, not waiting for stability. Nepal is seen as strategically relevant even in transition. Future partnerships will depend less on ideology and more on governance quality, regulatory credibility, and economic openness.

The bottom line is that this was not a routine visit—it was a quiet strategic probe. The absence of top-level meetings is not a gap; it is the signal. The US appears to be looking beyond the current state structure—toward the next phase of Nepal’s political economy.

As Prime Minister Balendra Shah convenes all foreign missions’ ambassadors together, it is rarely a routine diplomatic courtesy. It is a calibrated signal—one that communicates intent, direction, and, often, a subtle shift in strategy. Nepal’s recent decision to bring the diplomatic corps under one roof reflects precisely such a moment: a potential inflection point in how Kathmandu sees itself in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

At one level, there were indications of a desire to project coherence. For a country whose foreign policy has often appeared reactive and fragmented, this is an attempt to align messaging, centralize authority, and move toward a more structured engagement with the world. But beyond signaling, the deeper question remains: what kind of foreign policy should Nepal pursue in an era of intensifying great power competition?

The answer lies not in traditional balancing alone, but in a strategic shift toward interest-driven economic diplomacy, anchored in sovereignty, stability, and long-term prosperity.

Beyond optics: Meaning of a diplomatic reset

The collective engagement with ambassadors reflects multiple layers of intent. It is, first, an assertion of political control over foreign policy—an area that has historically suffered from competing institutional voices and inconsistent signaling. Centralizing diplomatic messaging is not merely administrative; it is strategic. It reduces ambiguity and enhances credibility.

Second, the format itself carries geopolitical meaning. In a region defined by rivalry between India and China, alongside growing engagement from the US and the West, convening all ambassadors together sends a deliberate message: Nepal seeks engagement with all, alignment with none.

This is not non-alignment in its Cold War form, but rather “multi-vector autonomy”—a pragmatic approach that allows Nepal to engage multiple partners simultaneously while preserving strategic space.

Third, such a meeting is also about narrative control. By communicating directly with the diplomatic corps, the government aims to shape how Nepal is perceived externally: as stable, open for investment, and politically directed. In an era where perception influences capital flows as much as policy, this is no small consideration.

Structural challenge: Geography meets geopolitics

Nepal’s foreign policy cannot be understood without acknowledging its geography. Located between two rising powers, Nepal has long practiced a delicate balancing act. However, the strategic environment is changing.

China is no longer merely an economic partner; it is increasingly projecting systemic influence through infrastructure, connectivity, and institutional frameworks. India, meanwhile, is transitioning from a regional power to a global actor with heightened sensitivity to its neighborhood. The US and other external actors are also deepening engagement in South Asia, often through the lens of broader Indo-Pacific strategies.

In such a context, passive balancing is no longer sufficient. Nepal cannot afford to be a reactive player, adjusting its posture in response to external pressures. Instead, it must define its own priorities and align external engagements accordingly.

Reframing national interest: From survival to prosperity

Historically, Nepal’s foreign policy has been driven by a narrow definition of national interest—focused on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime stability. While these remain essential, they are no longer sufficient.

Today, national interest must be reframed to include: economic transformation; infrastructure development; energy security and export; employment generation; and technological integration. 

This requires a shift from political-security diplomacy to economic diplomacy as the central pillar of foreign policy.

Economic diplomacy as a strategic doctrine

Economic diplomacy is often discussed in Nepal but rarely operationalized. To move from rhetoric to reality, three structural shifts are necessary.

•  From aid dependence to investment partnership: Nepal must transition from being an aid-recipient mindset to an investment destination. This requires policy predictability, legal and regulatory stability, and transparent project pipelines. Rather than negotiating fragmented bilateral projects, Nepal should present integrated national development portfolios—hydropower, tourism, digital infrastructure—aligned with investor interests.

• Leveraging geography as an economic asset: Nepal’s location between India and China is often seen as a vulnerability. It should instead be leveraged as a connectivity advantage. This means developing cross-border infrastructure, positioning Nepal as a transit and logistics hub, and facilitating trilateral or multi-country economic initiatives where feasible. However, this must be pursued with caution and clarity, ensuring that connectivity does not translate into strategic dependency.

• Energy diplomacy as a game changer: Nepal’s hydropower potential remains its most underutilized strategic asset. A coherent foreign policy should prioritize long-term power trade agreements, regional grid integration, and investment frameworks for large-scale projects. Energy exports can transform Nepal’s economic trajectory—but only if backed by consistent diplomacy and domestic reform.

• Managing great power competition: In navigating external pressures, Nepal should adopt a set of clear principles: strategic equivalence, not strategic ambiguity. The country should engage all major powers transparently, without hidden alignments.

• Issue-based alignment: Nepal should cooperate with different partners on different sectors—security, infrastructure, climate—without allowing any single relationship to dominate.

• Institutional coherence: Foreign policy must be driven by institutions, not personalities. This requires strengthening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ensuring inter-agency coordination.

• Red lines on sovereignty: Economic engagement must not compromise political independence. All agreements should be evaluated through a long-term strategic lens.

Domestic imperative: Foreign policy begins at home

No foreign policy can succeed without domestic alignment. Nepal’s greatest diplomatic weakness has often been internal inconsistency. Frequent government changes, policy reversals, and bureaucratic inefficiencies undermine credibility.

To address this, Nepal must: build cross-party consensus on key foreign policy priorities; strengthen diplomatic capacity and expertise; and ensure policy continuity across political cycles.

Economic diplomacy, in particular, requires sustained engagement over the years, if not decades.

From symbolism to strategy

The convening of ambassadors is, in essence, a symbolic act—but symbolism matters in diplomacy. It signals intent, shapes perceptions, and sets expectations. However, symbolism without follow-through risks reinforcing skepticism.

For Nepal, the real challenge lies in translating this moment into a sustained strategic shift: From reactive to proactive diplomacy; from political signaling to economic outcomes; and from balancing pressures to shaping opportunities.

A window of opportunity

Nepal stands at a crossroads. The evolving geopolitical landscape presents both risks and opportunities. Managed poorly, it could lead to increased dependency and strategic vulnerability. Managed wisely, it could unlock unprecedented avenues for economic growth and global engagement.

The recent diplomatic outreach suggests an awareness of this moment. But awareness must be matched by action.

Nepal does not need to choose between India, China, or the US. It needs to choose itself—its interests, its priorities, and its future. It needs to be based on the realism of geography. 

In doing so, foreign policy must evolve from a strategy of survival to a strategy of prosperity.

Only then will Nepal truly move from being a space between powers to becoming a state that shapes its own strategic destiny.

The author is a retired Major General of Nepali Army and a strategic affairs analyst. He is also a researcher and is affiliated with Rangsit University in Thailand

Nepal’s democratic journey over the past seven decades has been neither linear nor easy. From autocracy to democracy, from monarchy to constitutional monarchy, from civil conflict to republican federalism—and four constitutions between them—the country has continuously reinvented its political system in search of legitimacy, inclusion, and stability. Though all the constitutions marked their own milestone, the 2015 constitution was a historic milestone by institutionalizing inclusion, secularism, federalism, and republicanism, forethought to be correcting centuries of political exclusion and autocracy. Yet two decades later, a hard truth confronts us: Nepal has achieved representation, but not governance stability; inclusion, but not delivery.

The frustration is most visible among Nepal’s youth especially after the Sept 8 uprising. Their demand is not ideological. It is practical and the voices of the people. The Nepali people seek a state that governs competently, delivers services, and plans beyond electoral cycles. The message is unmistakable: representation alone is no longer enough.

Democracy isn’t the problem

Nepal’s political instability is not a failure of democracy itself, but of its institutional design. Since Nepal became a federal republic in 2008, it has seen significant political instability, revealing around 13 to 14 different governments formed by shifting coalitions, none completing a full five-year term, highlighting frequent leadership changes, alliance breakdowns, coalition fragility, and executive paralysis. Prime Ministers rise and fall not due to electoral verdicts, but due to internal party bargaining, shifting alliances determined more on expanding autocratic behaviour for power rather than people’s need and national priorities. Ministers are often selected for loyalty rather than competence. Parliament is crowded yet weak, while oversight institutions are politicized.

This instability has damaged Nepal’s credibility—both domestically and internationally. Policy continuity is weak, capital expenditure remains chronically low, and administrative morale has eroded. In such an environment, inclusion risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

The answer, however, is not authoritarian nostalgia nor democratic rollback. Nepal does not need less democracy; it needs better-designed democracy.

A hybrid governance model

Nepal must now transition from a transitional constitution to a performance-oriented democratic state. This requires a hybrid governance model—one that preserves parliamentary accountability while ensuring executive stability and professional administration.

First, Nepal should consider a fixed-term Prime Minister, elected by Parliament for a full five years and insulated from premature no-confidence motions except under extraordinary constitutional circumstances. Such a provision would allow governments to govern, not merely survive. To reinforce neutrality, the Prime Minister should relinquish party office upon election, separating state leadership from factional control.

Second, executive professionalism must be restored through a professional cabinet. Ministers should be appointed from outside Parliament—drawn from academia, civil service, business, public policy, and national security. This is neither radical nor undemocratic; it is practiced in many parliamentary democracies. By breaking patronage networks, Nepal can replace political loyalty with performance accountability.

Third, Nepal’s legislature must be leaner and more effective. A unicameral Parliament of 165 representatives comprising the current First Past the Post members would be better suited for lawmaking and oversight than today’s bloated bicameral structure. Fewer legislators, properly resourced committees, and stronger oversight would enhance both efficiency and public trust.

Fourth, the Head of State should remain ceremonial but constitutional—a neutral guardian of constitutional balance, elected through an electoral college, not a political competitor.

Finally, Nepal should revisit its federal design. A Union model of administration—preserving strong local governments while eliminating redundant provincial layers—could deliver services more efficiently. Countries like Japan and France demonstrate that decentralization does not require multiple political tiers; it requires empowered local administration and fiscal clarity. 

It would install institutional reinforcement by, first, strengthening Parliamentary Committees—particularly the Public Accounts Committee, the National Security Committee, and an independent Ethics Committee. Second, it would uphold judicial independence through transparent, merit-based appointments to constitutional bodies. Finally, it would introduce clear performance metrics and enforceable ethics codes across the civil service to ensure professionalism, accountability, and public trust.

The PR debate

As Nepal’s interim government, Election Commission, and political parties move toward finalizing a modality for proportional representation (PR), it is time to pause and ask a difficult but necessary question and confront another uncomfortable reality: Has PR, in its current form, strengthened Nepali democracy—or weakened it?

PR was introduced to correct exclusion—and it succeeded in the purpose. Women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis and minorities—limited in state power—gained more visibility in Parliament.

But today, PR increasingly produces representation without accountability, legitimacy without competition, and inclusion without voter consent.

Without internal party democracy, PR becomes a tool of patronage, Members of Parliament (MP) enter the Parliament not through public trust, but through party lists—rewarding loyalty over leadership, not downward to voters, proximity over performance. Inclusion turns symbolic, and democracy thins out. The result is a Legislature where presence is inclusive, but power remains centralized and insulated. This is not an argument against inclusion. It is an argument against unaccountable inclusion.

Comparative democracies offer a clear lesson. In countries such as Germany and New Zealand, PR functions because political parties are internally democratic, transparent, and institutionally disciplined. Party lists are regulated, leadership is accountable, and institutions enforce standards. The result is legitimacy without competition, inclusion without voter choice. Nepal adopted the mechanism—but not the safeguards.

A smarter path forward is not abandoning inclusion, but embedding it directly into the electoral contest. Instead of allocating representation through party lists, Nepal should require political parties to meet mandatory, percentage-based inclusion thresholds within the 165 First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) seats. Let women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest, campaign, and win elections through political party’s nominations. This approach would ensure that inclusion is not a nomination—but a mandate.

It would move our democracy: From nomination to election; from protection to participation; from symbolism to legitimacy. Such a reform would also justify reducing Parliament from 275 members to 165—making it leaner, more accountable, and directly answerable to the people.

Inclusion must mature as a Parliament that represents Nepal’s future must be chosen by its people—especially its youth. Democracy deepens when every MP knows they owe their seat to voters, not party headquarters. Inclusion is not a favor granted by elites. It is a right—earned through votes.

Nepal can no longer postpone this debate. A smarter Parliament begins when every MP is directly accountable to the people.

A safer path: Inclusion thru polls

The solution is not abandoning inclusion. That would be both unjust and politically destabilizing. The solution is to embed inclusion directly within the 165 First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) seats.

Political parties should be legally required to allocate candidates in percentage terms—ensuring women, Dalits, Indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, and minorities contest elections across constituencies. Let inclusion be achieved through ballots, not appointments.

This approach preserves diversity while restoring accountability. Candidates must campaign, engage voters, and win mandates. MPs gain legitimacy not from party lists, but from public trust.

Inclusion must evolve: from nomination to election, from protection to participation, from symbolism to legitimacy.

A Parliament that claims to represent Nepal’s future—especially its youth—must be chosen by the people.

Why this moment matters

Nepal stands at a strategic crossroads. Economic vulnerability, demographic change, geopolitical pressure, and public disillusionment converge at a moment when incremental tinkering is no longer enough. Governance reform is not a technical exercise; it is a national necessity.

Reducing Parliament from 275 to 165 members, streamlining administration, professionalizing the executive, and reforming PR together form a coherent strategy: stability with inclusion, authority with accountability, and democracy with delivery.

Conclusion: From transition to coherence

Nepal’s credibility will ultimately be measured not by who governs, but by how the state performs. A democracy locked in perpetual transition cannot fulfill the aspirations of a young, ambitious nation.

The task ahead is to refine Nepal’s democratic architecture—without abandoning its inclusive spirit. A hybrid model that is stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit offers a pathway out of political survival and toward strategic coherence.

This is not a debate Nepal can afford to postpone. Inclusion is not a favor. It is a right—earned through votes.

The expected outcomes arrive for a structural stability that enables long-term policy continuity. Second is professionalism over patronage in executive decision-making. Third is the fiscal efficiency through reduced bureaucracy and institutional duplication. Finally, to renewed public trust and strengthened diplomatic confidence in Nepal’s governance integrity.

The concept ca be implemented through a roadmap. Firstly, by convening a National Governance Reform Dialogue for Constitutional reforms to build consensus and draft reform principles. Secondly by establishing a Constitutional Review Taskforce to recommend structural and procedural reforms. Lastly by adopting a Governance Compact 2040—a multi-party and civic commitment prioritizing stability, merit, and accountability as national objectives.

Nepal’s future credibility rests not on who rules, but on how it governs. By embracing a hybrid model—stable in structure, professional in operation, and accountable in spirit—the country can move decisively from perpetual transition to coherent, credible democracy.

The author is Major General (Retd) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability

President Vladimir Putin’s ninth visit to India starting from 2000—his first after 2021—has arrived at a moment of extraordinary strategic recalibration. Only two days before the visit began (Dec 4), Washington released its National Security Strategy 2025 (NSS 2025), a document that signals the United States’ shift from expansive values-based foreign policy to a sharper, interest-driven approach rooted in economic security and technological primacy.

The simultaneity is not accidental; it symbolizes a transforming global order in which India, Russia, and the US are pursuing overlapping but divergent strategic goals, and South Asia sits at the fulcrum of this new geopolitical geometry.

The Putin-Modi meeting carries implications not only for Eurasian stability but also for how the US interprets India’s strategic autonomy and recalibrates its own Indo-Pacific playbook.

India at the center

The NSS 2025 acknowledges bluntly that the US cannot “secure every geography nor stabilize every region”; instead, it will prioritize critical partners capable of shaping the global economy, technology ecosystems and regional balance. India stands at the top of this list, described as a “system-shaping middle power” whose partnership is essential for US economic resilience, defence innovation and Indo-Pacific balancing.

Yet Putin’s visit demonstrates that India’s ascent is anchored in multi-alignment, not alignment. India has neither abandoned Russian defense ties nor restricted Eurasian dialogue despite Western pressure. Instead, New Delhi has widened all channels—deepening defense co-production with the US, sustaining energy ties with Moscow, and managing a complex relationship with China across competition, deterrence and cooperation. This can be accounted precisely for the behavior Washington anticipated, but perhaps underestimated in intensity.

Why Putin’s visit matters 

To the US, the optics of a confident, sanctions-resistant Russian leader receiving a warm Delhi welcome carry three strategic messages: one, that Russia retains influence where the West expected decline. India continues to leverage Russian defense support—particularly spare parts, legacy system maintenance and co-development initiatives that Washington cannot fully replace in the short term. Energy cooperation remains robust, and discounted Russian oil has been crucial to India’s inflation management.

Two, India will pursue autonomy even when US pressure peaks. Despite the growing US–India defense technology partnership—jet engine co-production, UAV collaboration, semiconductor cooperation—New Delhi refuses to limit strategic options. Putin’s visit reinforces India’s unwillingness to become a pillar of a US-led bloc.

Third, Eurasian consolidation remains a live possibility. Moscow’s outreach to India is not merely bilateral. It connects to broader projects—International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) dialogue, Arctic shipping and Asian energy integration—areas Washington must now monitor with renewed seriousness. India and Russia interact through UN and G20 in the global forums, regional groups such as Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), East Asian Summit (EAS), financial institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and extensive bilateral mechanisms (annual summits, Inter-Governmental Commission (IRIGC), 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue  and Strategic Economic Dialogue. In addition, in the sector-specific cooperation platforms like the Nuclear Energy, Defense Working Group, Space cooperation, energy and Education and cultural exchanges. 

These messages have direct consequences for how the US implements the NSS 2025. The US will respond by deepening India’s economic incentives. While NSS 2025 downplays ideological diplomacy, it elevates economic security and supply-chain diversification as central pillars. Putin’s visit will accelerate US efforts to firstly to expand critical mineral cooperation with India, secondly to attract Indian companies into US industrial ecosystems, thirdly to increase joint research platforms under QUAD and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for prosperity (IPEF), and lastly to fast-track bilateral trade negotiations previously stalled.

Washington will double down on offering India economic and technological leverage that Russia cannot match.

 Stricter defense technology protocols 

The US understands that India operates Russian-origin systems and engages in sensitive defense exchanges with Moscow. To prevent potential technology leakage, Washington is likely to introduce a more robust end-use monitoring, tighter controls on dual-use technology, and clearer segregation between US-led and Russia-linked Indian projects. 

This will not stall US–India defence cooperation, but it will make technology firewalls more prominent.

Acceptance of India’s strategic autonomy 

The NSS 2025 subtly accepts that India will not become a formal ally. Putin’s visit reinforces that assumption. Washington’s emerging approach is pragmatic: work with India where interests converge, avoid friction where they don’t. This opens space for a more mature, less expectation-heavy partnership.

A more fluid strategic landscape 

Putin’s India outreach reshapes the region in ways Washington will study closely.

Pakistan’s strategic relevance to Washington continues to decline. With India strengthening ties with both the US and Russia, there is little incentive for the US to return to older patterns of Pakistan-centric engagement. Islamabad’s utility becomes more functional—counter-terrorism, nuclear risk management—not geopolitical. 

A more competitive Eurasian environment gives these states greater bargaining power. The US, following its new NSS, will adopt: project-based engagement, maritime capacity-building, debt sustainability support, and supply-chain diversification with Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. 

These states will increasingly play China, India, Russia and the US against one another to secure economic benefits.

Quiet leverage in a multipolar moment

Nepal stands to gain more subtly than other South Asian states. 

A triangular pattern—India maintaining Russian ties, strengthening US partnership and managing China rivalry—creates strategic breathing room for Kathmandu. For the US, Nepal becomes valuable not as a geopolitical frontline but as a functional partner in sectors aligned with American priorities under NSS 2025: green energy and cross-border power trade, digital governance, cyber security, critical mineral mapping, private-sector investment in hydropower, and disaster response and counter-crime cooperation. 

Engagement will neither surge nor decline—but it will deepen sectoral, with fewer political expectations and more performance-based cooperation. This aligns with Washington’s new doctrine: selective, focused, outcome-oriented. 

For Nepal, the key is to maintain balanced diplomacy while leveraging its position within the India-US-China triangle and the emerging India–Russia connectivity frameworks.

A triangular future

Putin’s visit does not derail US-India cooperation. Instead, it forces Washington to adjust expectations, respect India’s independence and compete more intelligently. The NSS 2025 already anticipates this; the visit accelerates it. 

India emerges not as a camp follower but as a sovereign pole—the only major power capable of engaging Washington, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously without aligning with any. 

For South Asia, this means greater flexibility. For Russia, it preserves Eurasian influence. For the US, it demands strategic patience and economic creativity. 

And for the emerging world order, it signals a future defined less by blocs and more by fluid alignment, selective partnerships and overlapping spheres of cooperation.

The author, a Maj Gen (Retd) and strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu, writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy and stability

Nepal’s political landing has been one of remarkable transformations but with persistent fragility. From constitutional monarchy to federal, secular republic, the country has continually redefined its system of governance. Yet, the outcomes remain uneven: political instability, fragmented coalitions, patronage-driven governance, economic interruption, diplomatic distrust and declining public trust. The repeated neglect in the people’s noise has brought about the recent GenZ uprising, which has exposed the urgency for a state that delivers stability, accountability and credibility—not just representation.

As Nepal reflects on its political destiny, it must explore a hybrid model of governance — blending the parliamentary accountability of the United Kingdom, the institutional discipline of the United States, and the executive balance of France’s semi-presidential system. Such a synthesis could deliver what neither pure parliamentary nor presidential models have achieved in Nepal: a government that is stable yet accountable, professional yet democratic, and credible at home and abroad.

The limits of the current system

Nepal’s 2015 Constitution institutionalized a parliamentary democracy with federalism, secularism and proportional representation. Yet, it has also produced coalition instability and administrative paralysis. Prime Ministers change with alarming frequency, political parties prioritize alliances over governance, and lawmakers double as ministers, often compromising both legislative oversight and executive efficiency.

In this model, the state has become top-heavy but underperforming. Parliament, intended to be the guardian of accountability, has become an arena of political bargaining. The public perceives politics as self-serving, and governance as synonymous with corruption or inertia. The structural question, therefore, is not just who governs, but how Nepal governs.

Learning from global models

Accountability thru parliament

The Westminster model offers robust parliamentary control but is vulnerable to instability when coalitions dominate. Nepal’s adaptation of this model has suffered from party fragmentation, weak discipline, and limited professionalization of ministers.

Separation and professionalism

The American system demonstrates how a strict separation between the executive and legislature enhances efficiency. Cabinet members are appointed from outside Congress, ensuring that ministers are professionals rather than politicians. This approach insulates governance from partisan instability and rewards expertise and performance.

Balance thru dual executive

France’s semi-presidential model combines a ceremonial President as head of state and a Prime Minister accountable to Parliament. This dualism provides balance and continuity, ensuring that no single institution monopolizes power. It also allows the executive to remain stable even amid political transitions.

For Nepal, the lessons are clear: parliamentary instability can be offset by executive professionalism and constitutional balance. A hybrid framework that draws from these three systems can be tailored to Nepal’s scale, political culture and aspirations.

A proposed model for Nepal

A House-elected chief executive

The Prime Minister would remain the head of the government, elected by a majority of parliament members for a fixed four or five-year term. To prevent excessive politicking, a no-confidence vote should be restricted within the first two years of tenure. The Prime Minister should not hold any party office, ensuring that governance remains above partisan maneuvering.

Subject experts as ministers

A critical innovation would be to separate lawmakers from the executive. Ministers should be drawn from outside Parliament—from academia, civil service, security, intelligentsia, business and other professional sectors—vetted by a parliamentary confirmation committee. This professional cabinet would reflect meritocracy rather than political patronage. It would also help address public disillusionment with political elites and bring expertise into governance.

A lean, unicameral legislature

Nepal could abolish the National Assembly and operate with a unicameral Parliament of 125-150 members. The current size is costly and redundant, while duplication across two houses delays decision-making. A leaner legislature would enhance efficiency and focus on lawmaking and oversight. The electoral system could remain mixed—60 percent direct and 40 percent proportional—to preserve inclusivity.

A ceremonial prez

The President would serve as Head of State and constitutional guardian, with powers to ensure continuity during crises. Elected through an electoral college of Parliament and provincial assemblies, the President’s role would be symbolic but stabilizing—much like the German or Indian model.

Toward a system that works

Nepal could gradually move away from its costly and fragmented federal structure toward a union government system that retains local empowerment but restores national coherence. Federalism, though conceived to promote inclusion, has instead multiplied bureaucracy, diffused accountability, and strained public finances. A Union model—drawing lessons from Japan’s prefectural efficiency, France’s unitary yet decentralized administration, and the UK’s devolution framework—would streamline governance by abolishing redundant provincial layers while strengthening local bodies and professional administration. This approach would preserve representation where necessary but align authority, resources and responsibility under a unified executive and legislative framework, ensuring fiscal discipline, administrative clarity, and national stability.

Strengthened oversight institutions

Parliamentary committees—especially Public Accounts, National Security and Ethics—must become more independent and professional. The judiciary should retain constitutional independence, and the Constitutional Council should include respected professionals, not only party appointees.

Why this model fits Nepal

Stability thru structure:

A fixed-term Prime Minister and a professional cabinet would end the cycle of frequent government collapses. Continuity of governance would allow long-term planning—particularly for infrastructure, economic reforms and foreign policy.

Professionalism over patronage:

By selecting ministers from outside Parliament, Nepal would cultivate an executive focused on performance and delivery. This mirrors the US cabinet system, where expertise outweighs party loyalty. It also reduces corruption by severing the link between lawmaking and resource control.

Accountability sans instability:

Legislative oversight remains robust through committees, but the executive retains autonomy in implementation. This ensures accountability without paralyzing governance.

Efficiency and cost reduction:

A smaller, unicameral Parliament would save public expenditure and improve efficiency — vital for a small, resource-constrained nation.

Institutional balance:

A ceremonial president, an empowered parliament and a professional executive would together prevent both authoritarian drift and chaotic populism. The structure would encourage responsible governance rather than perpetual negotiation.

Challenges to reform

Reforming the Constitution will not be easy. Political elites are unlikely to give up ministerial privileges or the leverage that comes from coalition bargaining. Civil society must therefore drive the national conversation on governance reform—framing it not as a partisan debate but as a strategic necessity.

Another challenge lies in bureaucratic resistance. A professionalized cabinet must work with a reformed civil service, guided by clear performance metrics and ethical standards. Nepal’s success will depend on whether institutions—not individuals—become the true anchors of power.

Finally, there must be a cultural shift in how politics is practiced. Political parties should evolve from patronage machines into programmatic institutions that shape policy and national vision, not appointments and benefits.

Reimagining governance for credibility

Nepal’s quest for stability is not about replacing one form of government with another, but about refining its governance architecture to reflect its realities. The hybrid model offers a balance between democratic representation and administrative efficiency.

It is a model where Parliament governs through oversight, not occupation; where ministers serve through expertise, not entitlement; and where the people measure democracy not by rhetoric, but by delivery.

If Nepal succeeds in building such a system, it would set a regional example—a small state navigating complex politics through institutional strength and meritocratic governance. This would also complement India’s and China’s neighborhood strategies by ensuring Nepal’s internal credibility, which remains the foundation of any external stability.

Toward a governance compact

Nepal can no longer afford the cyclical instability that has eroded public faith and economic opportunity. It needs a Governance Compact 2040—an understanding across parties, provinces, and society that stability, merit and accountability must define the next political generation.

A hybrid constitutional model drawing from the discipline of the United Kingdom, the professional governance of the United States, and the executive balance of France could suit Nepal’s unique needs.

It would keep democracy accountable, insulate administration from partisan capture, and restore credibility to governance. Reimagining governance is not a rejection of democracy but its renewal. A hybrid model—where Parliament elects the Prime Minister, ministers are drawn from merit, and a lean structure is lean and functional that ensures efficiency—could transform Nepal toward “stability and integrity” from a state of perpetual transition to one of strategic coherence and credible democracy.

Nepal’s future stability will depend not on who rules, but on how it chooses to govern.

The author is Maj Gen (Retd) and a strategic affairs analyst based in Kathmandu. He writes on South Asian geopolitics, national security, and the intersection of governance, diplomacy, and stability

Nepal’s political landscape has been in a constant state of flux, and finds itself at a critical juncture in its democratic journey. Over the past three decades, Nepal has transitioned from a monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, and eventually to a federal secular republic. However, the ongoing political turbulence—punctuated by protests, dissatisfaction, and competing ideologies—has left the Nepali people disillusioned with the political system they once hoped would deliver on its promises.

Nepal’s political transitions have always been marked by external influence, particularly from India, which has had a notable role in the country’s path to democracy. So, decoding the intent and what went about in the recent one-to-one bilateral meeting between Prime Minister KP Oli and PM Narendra Modi holds further portrayal.

Legacy of political transitions

New Delhi has constantly portrayed a notable share in Nepal’s transition to democracy. The absence of a twin pillar foreign policy of a constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy in 2006 paved the way for the current federal secular republic.

On March 17 at the CPN-UML secretariat meeting chaired by PM Oli emphasized the importance of united efforts by republicans to counter the monarchist movement against the federal republic in addition to claims that India has played a role in the pro-monarchy movement. He also urged the party’s youth wing volunteers to “attack anyone trying to snatch away the rights that we fought for.”

Nepali Congress (NC) President and former PM Sher Bahadur Deba said that India does not support the royalist movement in Nepal.

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba while in Delhi raised a question about potential Indian support to the pro-monarchy protest with her Indian counterpart S Jaishankar, who denied any backing for the protests. Though PM Oli has not been officially invited to visit New Delhi, he had a bilateral meeting with Indian PM Modi on April 4 on the sidelines of the Sixth Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) summit in Bangkok. 

The 35-minute one-to-one discussion came at a time when protests were going on in Nepal demanding the restoration of monarchy and a Hindu state with a catchphrase of anti-corruption drive and end of federalism. This was a second bilateral meeting between Oli and Modi after the sidelines meeting during the 79th United Nations General Assembly in New York in Sept 2024. The difference is that the first was held with officials while the latter was one-to-one.

Complex political landscape

Nepal’s political arena is highly polarized, with three dominant ideological camps vying for influence. The first group consists of the status quoists, who advocate for the current federal secular republic. The second group is the reformists, who are pushing for structural political changes to address governance issues, corruption, and inefficiencies. Finally, the growing pro-monarchist movement that calls for the restoration of the monarchy, albeit in a symbolic role, with an elected Head of Government. These factions reflect a deep division in how the country’s future should be shaped.

This polarization, while enriching the political discourse, also makes it difficult to reconcile these opposing views. Each faction draws on different historical narratives, cultural values, and visions for Nepal’s national identity. The fundamental issue, however, is not about rejecting democracy but about the effectiveness of the system that was supposed to deliver a better future.

Governance crisis and public discontent

At the heart of the current dissatisfaction is poor governance. The public’s anger is not directed at democracy itself, but at the way it has been implemented. The promises made by the political leaders, from economic development to efficient governance, have largely gone unmet. Corruption remains rampant, institutions are weak, and political leaders are seen as more interested in maintaining their power than in serving the people.

This disillusionment is not just ideological; it is deeply pragmatic. The people are questioning whether the system can truly deliver. The notion of democracy, for many, has become synonymous with inefficiency, corruption, and political infighting. The failure to meet basic expectations has created a breeding ground for discontent, with many wondering whether the existing political framework can ever be fixed.

Global democratic backsliding

Nepal’s democratic challenges are not isolated; they are part of a global trend of democratic backsliding. Countries around the world—India, the US, Sri Lanka, Israel—are witnessing increased political polarization, the rise of populism, and the erosion of democratic norms. In this context, Nepal’s situation reflects a broader pattern of democratic disillusionment that is sweeping across many parts of the globe. This global backdrop, however, also provides an opportunity for Nepal. There is a chance to rethink democratic governance—not by retreating into authoritarianism but by rebuilding a more inclusive, accountable, and citizen-driven democracy. The key lies in re-establishing the connection between the people and their representatives, ensuring that the political system is genuinely responsive to the needs of the people.

What’s confidential about “boosting relations”? 

Headlines say: PM Oli and PM Modi agree to “boost Nepal-India relations” in their meeting on the sidelines of the Sixth BIMSTEC Summit. The one-to-one meeting is a strategic win for PM Modi and a purposeful attainment for PM Oli claiming that all officials including Minister of Foreign Affairs Arzu Rana Deuba encompassed a bilateral meeting that was changed at the last minute by the Ministry of External Affairs, India (MEA). 

What’s confidential about “strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation in areas such as development partnership, energy, connectivity, and people-to-people relations”. The phrase “mutually beneficial cooperation” in public statements may obscure deeper strategic negotiations. The MEA statement said “They expressed satisfaction at the progress in enhancing physical and digital connectivity, people-to-people linkages, and in the domain of energy. They agreed to continue working towards further deepening the multifaceted partnership between our two countries and peoples”. Nepal is a priority partner of India under its Neighbourhood First Policy. This meeting continues the tradition of regular high-level exchanges between the two countries.” 

On X PM Modi posts “India attaches immense priority to relations with Nepal. We discussed different aspects of India-Nepal friendship, especially in sectors like energy, connectivity, culture and digital technology. We also talked about some of the key positive outcomes from this year’s BIMSTEC Summit, especially in areas of disaster management and maritime transport.”

In a post on X, PM Oli said that he was delighted to meet Modi, had a meaningful and positive conversation and described the meeting as intimate. “Had a warm and heartfelt meeting with my dear friend, Prime Minister Shri @narendramodi Ji. Our discussions were highly meaningful and constructive. I express my appreciation over this cordial exchange.” 

During the same stretch of the secluded meeting, there are protests in the streets which have weakened all the political powers whether democratic forces or the communists in Nepal. In addition, the political powers behind the compelling of the 2015 constitution is ineffectual and ineffective. The focus could be with cultural ties, and geopolitical manoeuvring particularly China in view and the ongoing protests in the streets of Kathmandu.

Underlying strategic motives

Limiting China’s engagement that influences Indian security concerns—India is wary of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and growing political ties. The discrete nature of the meeting could indeed involve such discussions. Renouncing anti Indian oratory as a slogan for nationalism-Anti-Indian sentiment has been weaponized politically. India may be seeking Nepalese leaders to dial this down in return for greater cooperation.

Strengthening of Nepal and India deep cultural, religious and ethnic ties with arrangements even through constitutional reform-This would resonate with India’s soft power diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy is a core part of the “Neighbourhood First” policy. Constitutionally and not physically owned map of Nepal embracing Kalapani-Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh region as an impediment in relationship during Oli’s premiership that transformed ‘territorial claim’ to ‘occupied’-This remains a sticking point. Modi-Oli’s rapport might open doors for de-escalation or reinterpretation of constitutional stances to ease tensions.

Political context and transformation

Nepal may undergo a major transformation but not a principled constitutional shift. There is growing momentum for systemic reform, but not necessarily a dismantling of the ideal framework. All major parties, from NC to UML to Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) to RPP to Madhes-centric alliances with eight parties on board, seem interested in functional reform over structural revolution—more governance efficiency than ideological upheaval. The idea of a "reformed federal secular republic" is gaining quiet traction—a way to appease conservative, nationalist, and regional groups without overturning the constitutional ethos.

PM Modi and Delhi will retain substantial influence over Nepal’s political-economic direction. India remains Nepal’s largest trade partner, transit route, and a soft power heavyweight. Nepal’s fragile economy and political flux create a strategic vacuum India is eager to fill, especially amid China's growing interest.

Conclusion: Balanced, yet urgent

The PMs’ meeting on the sidelines of BIMSTEC is not just a symbolic continuation of bilateral ties but potentially a strategic recalibration. The confidentiality, the exclusion of key Nepali diplomats, and diplomatic subtleties hint at unspoken understandings on contentious topics. The expected transformation in Nepal is likely to be governance-oriented, not ideological, possibly backed or influenced by New Delhi’s geopolitical imperatives.

The Meeting and its timing with one-on-one meetings were strategic and involved a late-stage change by MEA, suggesting high confidentiality. High-level bilateral talks between PM Oli and PM Modi have always been significant due to both nations intertwining cultural, economic, and strategic ties. The MEA and both PMs’ statements reinforce the notion that the meeting, while framed in diplomatic language, likely involved deeper strategic discussions. The late-stage restructuring (excluding the Foreign Minister) raises questions of trust, exclusivity, or sensitive content, especially amidst domestic unrest in Nepal.

The national challenges are both status quo defenders and the supporters of change to rethink what democratic governance means in practice and in Nepal. It implicitly asks:

• Can Nepal create a democracy that delivers?
• Can it preserve diversity without fragmentation?
• Can it reform without losing headway?

The answer lies not in returning to past systems, but in building a new democratic consensus—inclusive, accountable, and rooted in justice. Structural flaws remain with federalism without proper devolution of power; judiciary questioned for political bias; weak checks and balances in governance and institutional corruption; economic struggle; environment vulnerability; food security; infrastructure connectivity and chain of supply and political instability. 

Thus, a call for constitutional reform seems timely—but it must avoid top-down imposition. Instead, reform should be participatory, deliberative, and aimed at creating a more functional democracy, not just changing symbols or structures.

The author is a retired major general of the Nepali Army