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Let’s start with a normal scene in Nepal-India relations. A head of government in Nepal shows commitment to improving Nepal-India relations. But whoever is in the opposition in the Parliament grows suspicious, questioning the very motive of the one in power. Three important interactions have occurred within a year with three visits and three schemas between top government officials of the two countries. They are clean energy (hydropower), infrastructure development and strategic connectivity. After Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to Delhi in April 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Lumbini in less than a month in May 2022. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal awaited a visit reversing his first visit to Beijing in 2008 and concluded the four-day trip to India recently with a focus on clean energy, strategic connectivity—both road and railways infrastructure development—easy monetary system, people-to-people relations and with Nepal’s entry into the India-led International Solar Alliance. This holds six projects and seven agreements with focus on power cooperation and development cooperation. The idea was to re-stress and re-visit the strategic means to achieve the end goals for a harmonious relationship. The latest developments are in keeping with India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ policy and PM Modi’s address to Nepal’s Parliament in August 2014, in which he expressed his country’s intent to ‘HIT’ Nepal by building Highways, I-ways and Transways. Making the most of HIT as well as security diplomacy with defense cooperation, law enforcement coordination and intelligence sharing as integral parts remain formidable challenges.   Strategic posture  During his recent visit to India, Dahal showed willingness to complement Indian needs, vis-a-vis political, energy and freshwater, with the hope that this will result in economic enhancement for the Nepali people. But Nepal-India ties are not going smoothly, what with ongoing border disputes that can come up as a political whip during elections, thereby impacting the political setups. Of several disputes along the 1,850-km Nepal-India border, disputes over the India-controlled Kalapani-Lipulek-Limpiadhura and the Susta region stand out. There is also the fallout of India’s Agnipath defense recruitment scheme for enlisting Nepali citizens in the Indian Army. Dahal’s reappointment as PM with support from the Nepali Congress after the withdrawal of support from the CPN-UML in the Parliament points toward a joint response from New Delhi and Washington. In this context, recent visits of US Under-secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland (in January) and USAID chief Samantha Power (in February) and the visit of India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra (in mid-February) are noteworthy. These trips underscore Nepal’s significance in the geostrategic scheme of things. Also important to note is the fact that the election of NC candidate Ram Chandra Paudel paved the way for the authentication of the Citizenship Amendment Bill that his predecessor, Bidya Devi Bhandari, had nixed. These maneuvers have political-economic-security corollary and a determination for stimulus influence over all countries in South Asia.   Security ties Political interests have changed as technology and geography have become more accessible and reachable than ever. Nepal-India security relations should also be read in this light. They refer to safety measures, or strength against possible detriment or undesirable coercion by nation states and non-state actors preventing the freedom to act. It is the safety from threats and protection of predominantly seven bodies–from economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, community security, human security, physical security to political security. Without peace and stability, sustained economic growth and poverty alleviation are not possible. Peace and stability in Nepal, India and the entire region is possible through security diplomacy. To achieve these ends, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence coordination are necessary between Nepal and India. The new threats to Nepal-India relationship involve obstruction in traditional security ties based on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950), so security diplomacy will be key in coming years. Military-to-military relationship, law enforcement coordination and intelligence community cooperation play an important role in fulfilling foreign policy objectives. While talking about military ties it will be contextual to delve a bit into the Agnipath recruitment scheme. Agnipath is about defense diplomacy that has a distinct setup—domestic, regional and international. The traditional practice of recruiting Nepali Gurkha into the Indian Army remains stalled with political concerns deprived from an understanding of what their absence really means. It is not just about the 75 percent that return after four years adding on to the unemployment list nor is it only about the possibility of unwanted elements misusing them against Nepal. It has strategic bearings garnering political trust, geopolitics, economic, diplomacy, employment opportunities and people-to-people relations. The two nations should move forward acknowledging the trends of defense diplomacy changing its discourse for peace or against peace, diplomacy for development or diplomacy for or against democracy.   The way forward Nepal-India relationship has been primarily viewed through a political lens and PM Dahal’s visit is no exception. The visit has emphasized political-economic-security outlooks of the relationship when world powers are striving for a new world order and Asia for a new normal. Foreign policy, diplomacy amongst different instruments of power and regional connectivity to address the strategic needs of South Asia and beyond—they all are equally important as diplomacy amongst the defenders of national interests. The colonial period, India’s independence, its strides in shaping a favorable security architecture in 1970-1990, its economic growth and global aspirations, Nepal standing out as a sovereign country during the colonial period and China consolidating its territorial gains after 1950 are some of the developments that beget attention. In a changing world, growing interests of China and India are not just in their ‘spheres of influence’, but well beyond as well. For China, it is the Indo-Pacific Region with multi-continental diplomatic engagements. For India, it is beyond its immediate neighborhood to Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia or the Persian Gulf. Nepal can play a significant role in addressing challenges facing not only India, but the South Asia region as a whole. These challenges include power shortages, flooding, inundation and shortages of freshwater, which have been impacting comprehensive security. The Joint Vision Statement on Power Sector Cooperation of April 2022 has now entered the sub-region through trilateral power connectivity between Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Being part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) will have geopolitical and geoeconomics propositions for Nepal. The transportation connectivity and border crossing arrangements between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) should remain an integral part of the international organization and plurality. The joint military exercises envisioned in the BIMSTEC will have a crucial role in addressing the changed dynamics of defense diplomacy, which needs strengthening. In this context, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s decision to conduct the first joint military exercise of 10 member-states in the disputed South China Sea this September is quite significant. Commenting on this development, Admiral Yudo Margono of Indonesia recently said that the exercise is aimed at strengthening “ASEAN centrality” and does not include any combat operations. Nepal and India security relationship is not and cannot remain bilateral; it is regional and international with ‘strategic connectivity’ focusing on power, freshwater, infrastructure, transportations connectivity as well as security connectivity. It has the potential to become an indispensable driver of modernity and progress as well as mutual economic growth in the region, with long-term power trade and management of water boosting reciprocally-beneficial ventures. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

There are various factors that contribute to promising and sometimes disappointing foreign policy outcomes adopted by Nepal and India regarding one another. It is hence virtuous to uncover the camaraderie and the discords that the foreign policy is facing. Foreign policies of both Nepal and India endures from contradiction, ad hoc measures, and inconsistency with an absence of short- and long-term strategic approaches narrating polarity of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multinational facets of relations, with an inclination to the Rational Actor model of diplomacy. But approaches of foreign policy by way of the political process, inter-branch politics, organizational process, bureaucratic political arrangements and consistency and functions of diplomacy endure to endorse the constituents, the most important of which are security, diplomatic and economic interests that often uphold, coexist and persuasively influence each other. With Cold War 2.0, rise of China and rivalry between the two largest economies, reorientation of neutrality and non-alignment and multi-alignment compels contemplation beyond the traditional domain of non-alignment that advocates sovereign equality of all states. It is important to encourage friendly relations amongst all countries, to advocate peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to oppose the use of force and nuclear weapons garnering the objectives of the Non-Alignment Movement. Nepal’s geographic positioning is significant in global politics. With the shift in geopolitics, Nepal has been the recipient of great power interest, and attaining more prominence with both immediate neighbors. Reassessing the foreign policy with all stakeholders for a united public policy and subjects of international law to safeguard the well-being of the Nepali people with the projection of national interests to the immediate neighbors and the world is essential. Small states like Nepal will form an integral part of the international order. India is Nepal’s largest trade partner  as well as  the largest source of total foreign investments, while Nepal is the ninth largest trading partner of India. China, meanwhile, has been the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal from 2015 onward. Nepal is also the seventh largest source of remittance to India, with $3.2bn a year remitted as per the World Bank. India provides transit for almost a third of Nepal’s trade in accordance with the Indo-Nepal Transit Treaty. What is wrong? Primarily, inconsistent Nepali and Indian national policies are paving way for governments to engage or intervene in their particular philosophical theory and reasoning, imprisoning Nepal-India rapport from time to time. Nepal and India lack a national foreign policy. The policy deficit and the influence of the institutions like the intelligence community, diplomatic community, the security community or personal association in the political settings has been the impulsive element for driving foreign policy, which has proved to be short lived. It is more driven by personalities who direct politics and polities lacking strategic outlook–like the 12-point agreement without an exit strategy. Security has been the driving factor rather than politics-diplomacy-security. The perception of Nepal and India relationship is geographically driven with Kathmandu as a forceful factor and the political parties opt for nationalism with anti-Indian oratory is more profound. People living in the urban areas or the cities, mountains, hills and the Tarai observe the ties with their own sensitivities and requirements. The political leaders, political parties and the government are the compelling drivers of the relationship, not the national foreign policy, which derives from national interests. These are the main constituents consequential to what Nepal and India foreign policy and relationship is today. This is not to stress that the Nepali policymakers are truthful and flawless. It cannot be repudiated that Nepal is occupied with conspiracy theories that attribute all in-house inconveniences to India. There is also a strong indication that past policy orchestrators in Nepal and India are responsible for the instabile national foreign policies. Nepal’s survival is not looking for new diplomatic philosophy but to follow the moralities of King Prithivi Narayan Shah that Nepal is a “yam between two boulders”. It won’t be a bridge at least in the near future as some political orchestrators examine. Nepal has had 20 governments in the last 30 years of them 12 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. Nepal-India special friendship has reached its lowest point after little more than half a century with various acknowledged factors. Foreign policy inconsistencies  Nepal and India have always stood with each other on their political journey from independence of India to Nepal’s declaration as a secular, federal republic. The political and social transformation in Nepal originated with India’s recognition of the Nepal Communist Party Maoist as one of the sources of political powers of the state together with monarchy and the democratic political forces. The two pillars of political governance, constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy abstained, finding a space for the third. But there remains a question if the prerequisites in the national strategic policy alteration was the national Indian foreign policy or if it was the day-to-day government. Foreign policies initiated with the British departure from the Asian region, with India’s and other nation states’ independence. Democracy as a political system was just introduced. The United Nations stood as the global body for recognition for small nations. The strategic surrounding south of the Himalayas was influenced by India and north of the Himalayas by China in making of the foreign policy. All three countries, Nepal, China and India, were occupied for their own unity and political systems. The US was the second country to establish diplomatic relations with Nepal with the opening of the embassy in Aug 1959 after the United Kingdom. When interpreting observances on diplomacy and Indian policies towards Nepal, four important subject matters stand out, pointing to the future of bilateral relationship. The first is India’s observation on China’s growing influence, which is believed to be well supported by the growing affiliation amongst the communist parties of both Nepal and China in addition the dilemmas in the Himalayas particularly the 2017 Sino-Indo border standoff or the Doklam standoff in addition the May 2020 skirmishes in the Sino-Indo border both in the Himalayas. Second, is the political instability, political trust, social aggravation and extra regional power’s influence in administering the country. Third is the reluctance of support from the Nepali side on the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which form the foundation of the special adherence. Finally, on the contrary, is the imperative example of the people-to-people relationship, cultural and traditional affinity, civilizational linkages and economic ties as the largest trade partner. Also perceptible is the prospect on the effects of the 12-point agreement that is questioning empathy. For Nepal, equidistance policy with immediate neighbors and friendship with all has been the appropriate phrase for prominent politicians and national political parties but is inappropriate. Domestic politics and particular leader’s interpretations detract from the relationship that should be based on national interests. Foreign policy is based on disagreements like border problems and challenges like floods and inundation, not strategic national interests. Four factors are evident. One, considering India as a hegemon with roles in day-to-day administering. Two, keenness is politics of convenience playing one nation to another alongside domestic nationalism common in times of elections. Three, ad hoc arrangements punctuated by hyper populism, not by principles and meritocracy. Lastly, lack of strategic thoughts of the imminent risk to national credibility and stability. In addition, the current relationship is based on foreign policies that lack the new geopolitical realities that circumscribe the two countries. Geostrategic situation also plays an important role in formulating national interests as it did in the late 1940 to mid 1950s. The driving factor in finding a new approach for foreign policy at present necessitates four considerations. The geographic positioning is vibrant with China and US rivalry and Tibet as the soft belly. China views Nepal as the buffer state in the center of the Himalayas with access to mainland India. China and India’s confrontation along the Himalayas is ongoing. China’s growing interests in South Asia will strengthen. Deduction  Picking up on these arguments, it is important to look into reality and perception that prominent political leaders, political parties and the system of governance in Nepal and India leave open to further worsening the relationships, not merely political and people-to-people but national interests and  national credibility. While striving for functional democracy, Nepal lives to thrive, opportunity to resolve and rebuild clarity, comprehensiveness, understanding, perceptiveness, decisiveness, perseverance for building confidence key components of foreign policy is visible but policymakers need to act. The region is divided into powers and small nations looking for growth who are sometimes trampled, questioning the sphere of influence and the regional security architecture. Sino-Indo competition in the Himalayas, Nepal-Indo resource management and in addition emerging China and the rising India look for preserving political space south of the Himalayas. China’s aspiration has come as a major irritant and a foreign policy challenge, but for Nepal it is an opportunity to reduce India dependency and to achieve progress. Buffer states whether in the Americas, Asia, Africa, Europe or the Oceanic have been facing political glitches and diplomatic setbacks but have also played a role to prevent conflict between two rival or potentially hostile great powers. The concept of buffer states can be tracked down as part of a theory of the balance of power that entered European strategic and diplomatic thinking in the 18th century. So, the strategic imperative is for India the fear of China’s influence taking over and vice versa or the competition for influence or control which does not occur to non-buffer states. The Himalayan nations Bhutan, Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim were buffer states between the British Empire and China. At the present time as well as time to come with China’s fortification of Tibet and growing interests as a global actor as well as the skirmishes that are occurring in the Himalayas has and will position Bhutan and Nepal as the buffer state for the balance of power. The discords are the arguments in the use of resources, absence of strategic planning, deficiency in regional outlook, centrality of values and principles, relevance of rules and norms and the shortfall in security judgment. Therefore, the commonalities are civilizational connections, people-to-people bonds, open border movement of goods and personnel, special arrangements like the defense relationship or defense diplomacy, economic ties and the pegged monetary arrangements. These needs to be strengthened. Nepal is robust internally but characteristic of vulnerability is often reflected with an exposure to a high degree of economic openness with dependence on strategic imports, a dependence on a narrow range of exports or services, and susceptibility to external economic shocks externally. Successful strategy of foreign affairs ends–and therefore begins–in the real world of international relations, and for Nepal and India, the understanding of the geopolitical shift and a win-win accord. The foreign policy has marched together in search for identity, inclusiveness, values and a democratic system. Together with finding national foreign and bring about constructive headways and wind-up instability in Nepal-India relationship in the new geopolitical realities, five possessions must be apparent:

• One, Nepal and Indian foreign policy should be well spelt out against the Rational Actor model or policies of a particular party or influence or as convenience. Nepal will be accustomed with the function of multilateral diplomacy in enriching and intensifying opinions to level the playing field of rival power politics. Though disadvantages exist but often can be circumvented, reduced and turned to strategic advantage depending on collective political harmony and the rule of law, a stringent emphasis on limited intents, quantitative and qualitative approaches and embracing creative answers.
• Second, strategic autonomy by pursuing national interests with cohesion or interrelation that complements smallness, which will contribute in generating a shared purpose and dependability in the foreign policy and diplomacy. This will lessen impediments in governance surfacing from competing or contradictory interests and perceptions of interests of powers.
• Third, engagement in developmental efforts with an operational foundation for strategic connectivity (energy, water, infrastructure) with support to strategic planning for the use of resources, strategic developmental efforts and security diplomacy.
• Fourth, as a buffer, Nepal to find a political and diplomatic resolution with a mutually agreed upon declaration for a demilitarized nation state in the sense of not hosting the military of either power but standing firm with its own military forces. Foreign policy of small states is diplomacy and diplomacy of small states is a subgroup of diplomacy.
• Lastly, landlocked, candidness, narrow-mindedness, flexibility, weakness and dependence are factors influencing engagement in the international system. To overcome vulnerability and constraints international development institutions and international partners must expand state-of-the-art solutions modeled to deliver correlated development and financing issues.

In conclusion, to emphasize on collective strategies to address common security challenges. India’s policy in South Asia is based on “Neighbourhood First” but Nepal and India relationship goes further because of geographical proximity, cultural and people-to-people correlation, economic or demographic conditions and democracy. If cross-cultural communication is effective, it winds up by influencing other global actors and regional actors or changing the international environment in ways favorable to both Nepal and India’s interests. As a remover of obstacles and an achiever of objectives it must begin with an accurate mental picture of domestic, regional and international realty, an understanding of the politics-economics-security of foreign policy at both Delhi and Kathmandu with security, prosperity, democracy and development as pillars of diplomacy. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

There is a need to acknowledge that the geostrategic environment is altering not just in South Asia but the whole world. It is very important for Nepal and India to find what issues will be fundamental in shaping the age-old (long standing) and bold (self-possessed) relations for a better and preferable destiny of the two countries. Nepal and India have come to these geostrategic circumstances, which are volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, with harmonies and discords. But the discords that these two countries have encountered reveal their commonalities, and they drive their relationship forward. This is the first of three parts article that aims to find answers to political-diplomacy-security disciplines with three subject matters: geostrategic apprehensions, foreign policy and lastly security relationship. The geostrategic apprehensions In the international pitch, India aspires to lead the global south. This is evident in its influence in global political affairs, with a rising status and engagements with political-economic-security groupings like the QUAD, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G7, G20 and ASEAN. The security architecture of South Asia with Indian perspective is shifting, forcing one to question the existing and imminent narratives and leave behind the past by taking lessons. The Himalayas as the barrier and a geographic challenge is lessening. So immediate neighborhoods are more a constraint from the regional security point of view. The South Asian security situation is deteriorating with resolute political and diplomatic support from great powers. The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) is the center for global politics, and South Asia is significantly vital in the IPR with India standing prominently and promising. There is a diplomatic maneuvering on the expansion of G7 to G10, and one of the member nations could be India. As G20 is not expected to be in action, G7 will play a crucial role on devising policies with the US, European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, advancing to the IPR with several geopolitical collaborative efforts like Build Back Better World for ecology, economy, infrastructure connectivity, or the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment—a collaborative effort by G7 to fund projects in developing nations based on the trust principles of the Blue Dot Network (BDN). The BDN is a multi-stakeholder initiative by the US, Japan and Australia for infrastructure development projects worldwide on measures of financial transparency, environmental sustainability and impact on economic development. India’s rise in engagement has also expanded to West Asia, East Asia and Far-east Asia with Act East policy, Look Far East Policy etc. and does not only remain in the immediate neighborhood though “Neighborhood First” policy remains at the core for Nepal and India. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party’s centennial anniversary has sent a strong message that China will no longer be bullied, oppressed or subjugated by foreign countries, or the US-led Western countries. China is expanding cooperation in South Asia, shaping the region as a bridge to the Indian Ocean, an alternative for connectivity, resources management and national security. The five states in the northern borders adjoining China along continental Himalayas and five nations (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) along the Indian Ocean will continue to be of interest to the powers involved particularly China, India and the US. One of the fundamentals of India and China relationship is “politics of space” with political interests, resources management and security leverages for stability, with economy as a priority as well as the shift in people’s perception. On the bilateral front between Nepal and India, a 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in New Delhi came into effect with the absence of an exit strategy in addition to the visualization of the upcoming geostrategic surroundings. This added to the mayhem in the relationship. The alteration of the political system essentially convinced the democratic force like the Nepal Congress to accept the Nepal Communist Party Maoist’s agenda to adopt a federal secular republic without comprehending the real actors behind the scene. Now, the Eminent Person Group report with suggestions to replace the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and also regulate the open border, which is the foundation of a special relationship, is also threatening the ties.   Conclusion   As the region shifts from the 20th century to the 21st century the power’s political interests have transformed with economic growth as well as a geography that is more accessible than in the latter half of the 20th century. One phase passed with India’s independence ending the colonial period. The second phase was when India shaped a favorable South Asia security architecture during the 1970 to the 1990s, as well as when Communist China solidified the expanded territory particularly Tibet in the 1950s. The third phase was when India persuaded Nepal to adopt democracy, secularism and a federal republic order. The imminent phase will be defined by political-geography. China and India’s growing interests are not only in their peripheries but beyond. For China, it is the Indo-Pacific Region with multi-continental diplomatic engagements. For India, it is beyond its immediate neighborhood, be it Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia or the Persian Gulf. The region is divided into two power blocks China and India. China has come as a major foreign policy challenge to India and the US-led West. The accessible Himalayas will revolve into further contest rather than act as a facilitator of peace. In this circumstance, Nepal and India should move together for a better and preferable destiny in search for identity, inclusiveness and value-based democratic system. India’s policy in South Asia is based on “Neighbourhood First” but Nepal and India relationship goes further, not just because of proximity, cultural and people-to- people connection. Successful strategy for foreign affairs should end and begin in the real world of international relations. And for Nepal and India, the understanding of the geopolitical shift can offer a win-win solution. If successful, this relationship will influence other global actors and regional actors. It may even change the international environment in ways favorable to both Nepal and India’s interests. To do so, Nepal and India must begin with an accurate mental picture of domestic, regional and international realties. They should have a sound understanding of the politics, economy and security aspects of foreign policy. Part II will be on the foreign policy tight spot and a common effort to comprehend The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

Helsinki and Stockholm’s applications of May 2022 to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked the end of neutrality and the policy of non-alignment in Europe.  Finland formally became a member of the bloc on 4 April this year, whereas Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace on 9 May 1994 and Riksdag approved it as part of the political and military structure. Historically, these moves did not destabilize the neutral states of the region.  These moves are a pointer to growing realignment of countries toward two rival blocs vying for global supremacy.  Non-Alignment Policy (NAP) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) can surely benefit a neutral and mostly underdeveloped world if it manages to forge a united front. Global diplomacy is shifting with a divide between the East and the West, challenging the existing monetary system and strengthening the defense capability of the East. The five founding nations of NAM—Egypt in the Middle East, Ghana in West Africa, India in South Asia, Indonesia in Southeast Asia and former Yugoslavia in Europe—are bolstering their presence in global politics, thanks to the emergence of a formidable Sino-Russian front.  Evolving national security strategies of the US and its allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, should be read against the backdrop of new threats to the US and democracies in Asia. The strategies will seek to keep Chinese power in check while their earlier versions were meant to reduce Soviet power during the Cold War.  The economic success of China over the past 30 years or so has given it strong enough influence to lead the Asian continent by consequently weakening the customary US geopolitical objective and challenging India’s intents of ensuring that the South Asian amphitheater remains free of hegemonic control.  As far as South and Southeast Asia are concerned, NAM encompasses all 10 member-states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) apart from all 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as 10 non-government organizations. It will be contextual to draw from the NAM summit held in Baku (Azerbaijan) on October 25-26, 2019. The summit stood for “Upholding the Bandung principles to ensure a concerted and adequate response to the challenges of the contemporary world”, recognizing that history reoccurs but with different undertones in a new geostrategic environment. The Baku declaration is likely to resonate at the 2023 summit to be held in Uganda, at a time of increased confrontations between Asian powers China and India and competition for supremacy between the US and China, marking a tectonic shift in geopolitics to the Indo-Pacific Region. Europe played a key role in the Cold War, while in Cold War 2.0, Asia will helm a similar role. In its earlier edition, the US-Soviet contest and European-Soviet played out, while Cold War 2.0 will see Sino-US competition and Sino-Indian dissension. Amid an unprecedented security scenario in Europe, where neutrality is becoming a thing of the past, smaller nations of the continent seem to be repositioning themselves. There was a time when smaller nations in Asia were part of the NAM. With global power shifting in the Indo-Pacific Region, their respective neutral stances may become a thing of the past.  What’s more, this shift from neutrality is happening simultaneously in Europe and Asia, giving rise to the question: “Will Asia’s challenges be Europe’s and vice-versa?” Europe neutral no longer Sweden’s 200-year-long policy of non-alignment, that outlasted both World Wars, is now history. Sweden and Switzerland have not been in a state of war internationally since 1815 and 1814, respectively. Another European country, Finland, adopted a policy of neutrality after World War II, recognized first through a treaty between Finland and the USSR in 1948 (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance).  The Finnish and Swedish departures from neutrality indicate growing military-political polarization and tensions in Europe. History seems to be repeating as confrontation tends to spread and exert pressure on multiple states, including those not actively involved in “taking sides”, to join one or the other side even as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland continue to remain neutral.  What prompts nation states to officially align with or against any major power bloc? Their own defense and security.    An illustration is the ongoing war in Europe where the two neutral states—Finland and Sweden—had to take cover for their very own security.  That is why Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed a Nordic unified air defense agreement aimed at countering Russia’s rising threat by operating jointly to neutralize threats. As per the new scheme of things, NATO will find an alternative corridor through the Baltic Sea for Nordic countries, given the high possibility of Russia sealing the existing Suwalki Gap, a narrow corridor separating Kaliningrad and Lithuania, in the event of increased hostilities.  Relevance of Asia’s neutrality Despite a shift from neutrality to non-neutrality in Europe, non-alignment is very much alive in Asia as India, Indonesia, Thailand and other middle powers have shown. Chances are that neutrality will get a boost once again, with Asia leading it. A 40-year-long ideological conflict established NAM during the Cold War. Today, 120 countries (mostly from Africa and Asia) are on board as its members, 19 nations as observers along with 10 organizations. Together, NAM accounts for 60 percent of the UN.  It all began in April 1955, when government representatives from 29 Asian and African nations took part in what is known as the Bangdung Conference under Indonesian President Sukarno to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development and decolonization. Political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality were the guiding principles of this landmark arrangement also known as ‘Panchsheel’ (five restraints) that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru had adopted to govern Sino-Indian relations. NAM primarily gained prominence during the Cold War; these days, the Global South (GS) is hogging the limelight in the wake of a growing opposition against the US-led West and the Sino-Russian clique. The main global challenges of the present—the Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine crisis, the Sino-American rivalry and the Sino-Indian competition—have made NAP more relevant.  GS can be a powerful platform to raise common concerns and interests of ‘swing states’, amid global conflicts, particularly between the two emerging Asian powers—China and India.  The two countries will surely compete for GS leadership. India’s relatively tensions-free ties with the West and China’s growing diplomatic reach worldwide means the two countries will affect global power dynamics significantly. In this context, it will be relevant to recall part of Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s speech made in January regarding his country’s G20 presidency and GS leadership: “Today, developing countries are worried over issues like rising prices of oil, food and fertilizers. They are also concerned about mounting debt and worsening economic conditions. Thus, it is our duty to become the voice of such countries, known as the GS in diplomatic terms”.  Also, India convened a virtual meeting on January 12-13 themed “Voice of the Global South Summit: for Human-Centric Development” with the participation of 120 leaders and ministers. The virtual session raised issues like global economy and climate change, rising inflation, energy, food issues and debt problems. China did not participate in the event.  More importantly, India held the 18th summit of G20 consisting of neutral countries as well as countries from the rival blocs—the US-led West and the Sino-Russian bloc. India’s growing influence comes at a time when China’s signature project of global significance—the Belt and Road Initiative—seems to be losing steam with debt problems afflicting many developing countries that have become part of the project.  As the Ukraine war rages on, China is seeking a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine, at a time when its ties with the US are at an all-time low. India’s relations with the West are not as hostile as China’s. This means the US-led West may be comfortable with New Delhi leading the GS instead of Beijing, with US foreign policy priorities toward India covering security, defense and technology acting as a bridge between the US and the GS. With more than 1.4bn people, India has become the world’s most populous nation by taking over China for the first time. In terms of the economy, though, India is at a disadvantage as it is just one-sixth of China’s 2022 nominal GDP. GS should not be politicized and focus should be on economic development and improving livelihoods. Receiver-sought assistance for lower-income nations should be a priority. Whoever lands GS leadership will have a greater chance of leading NAM as well, so the race for GS leadership is quite important.  Conclusion Neutralism, also called nonalignment in international relations, meant staying out of the war and all sorts of ideological or political interpretations during the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. US Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had first pursued this isolationist policy during the European wars between France and Great Britain after the French Revolution that followed the peace of 1815. It is more or less like the 20th century policy of neutralism that came as a distinct policy post-World War II. Recently, on February 23, one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly, in its 11th special emergency session, adopted a resolution calling for Russia’s immediate withdrawal in line with the UN Charter. Altogether 141 states stood for the resolution, seven (Belarus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria) stood against it while 32 states, including China, India and Pakistan, abstained. For the US and Europe, ‘abstaining’ can also mean neutrality, offering a dissimilar dimension of neutrality when it comes to the world body’s perception. As a concept that aims to foster an independent foreign policy and peaceful co-existence, NAM is still relevant despite the end of the Cold War.  As in the past, NAM is likely to find it hard to chart out united strategies on many issues arising due to shifts in global geopolitics. GS is essentially developing nations of Asia, Africa and South American countries, a region caught between a rising China and the US as well as its allies that are seeking to curb this rise. President Xi Jingping is likely to court the GS against the US, while India, with its multi-aligned foreign policy, is likely to do its bit to make smaller nations follow its path.  All in all, neutrality is likely to be more relevant in a rapidly-changing world, especially for smaller nations. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

A significant body of reliable data suggests that Asia will reshape the world order in the 21st century. A flurry of visits of prominent strategic figures and their statements point to a changing order, apart from some of the recent happenings. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) accountable for economic stability and peaceful coexistence in the world, attacked Ukraine, citing ‘a threat to its national security’, purportedly from the US-led West. This in itself was a strong enough indication of the importance of Asia in the global scheme of things. In Asia, Southeast Asia is strategically viable and East Asia is geo-strategically vital, whereas South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East are viable regions for expansion of influence for the formation of two power blocs’. These rival blocs under the global superpower US and emerging superpower China and Russia will, in all likelihood, engage in a fresh ideological conflict in the name of ‘communism’ versus ‘democracy’ for global supremacy using their hard, soft and smart power, marking the commencement of Cold War 2.0. This bipolar conflict between Sino-Russian and the US-led Western camps stands as a geopolitical challenge for swing states, which form a majority in the comity of nations. They will have have to take sides by undermining their aspirations for stability, prosperity and coexistence through bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral regional or international organizational mechanisms, for or against what the West has been describing as the “rule-based international order”. This strikes at the very core of the perception of neutrality espoused during the Cold War through the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which accounts for 60 percent of the UN member-states. Most of the 120 NAM member-states are from Africa and Asia, while another 19 nations are observers, apart from 10 organizations. China’s scheme of world order China, together with its ally Russia,  has been making its presence felt in the global arena, especially in recent weeks. Together, the two countries are challenging the post-1945 international order marked by interventions and sanctions by reviving global institutions in their interest. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and increasing economic clout, there are fears that a rising China will overturn the US-dominated global order. Taking cognizance of this, the US National Security Strategy has described China and Russia as competitors, apart from presenting a narrative of a world divided between democracies and autocracies, implying that those in the middle should be persuaded or pressured to choose sides. Whereas China’s real battle for supremacy is about understanding the differences of what China-led democracy and human rights means. In this scheme of things, the middle powers aspiring to be influencers in global politics—Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Africa and Turkey—place themselves not as swing states. Nonetheless, they are having to appease both China and the US. India’s relationship with Russia and the West gives it a strategic opportunity to subside the challenge of China’s dominations in the region and branch out its rising volume of trade and defense dependability on Beijing. Against this backdrop, notably, Chinese President XI Jingping and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida visited rival nations Russia, Ukraine and India at about the same time. These visits also highlight the significance of multilateralism, globalization and the shift in the global geostrategic environment. The Economist noted that these events opened a window onto the ‘world according to Xi’. The visit of Xi has brought about not only formidable hostility but an opportunity for China and the European Union to work hand in hand for peace and economic revival in the region. French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission Chief Ursula von der Leyen are in China as part of a double-header diplomacy to end the war, reconnect with the world and revive French as well as European economies and safeguard the continent’s interests in the Indo-Pacific Region. Macron’s visit outlines “shared responsibility for peace and stability” in Ukraine. China, with its close relationship with Russia reaffirmed in recent days, can play a major role in bringing about peace. The White House said that Macron discussed his trip to China and support for Ukraine during a phone call with President Joe Biden with the hope to “obtain from the Chinese a contribution to the global effort of North-South solidarity” and to build “a common agenda” on climate and biodiversity. In a speech at the World Economic Forum, EC Chief Leyen said future relations with China, the biggest trading partner with Europe, will focus on “de-risk not decoupling”. The EU leaders’ commitments clash as the visit coincides with a meeting between Taiwan President Tsai Ing-win and US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. About the US-Taiwan engagement, Beijing said it will “closely monitor the situation and firmly defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity”, and warned McCarthy that he would be “playing with fire” by meeting Tsai. An increasing presence of China in the Persian Gulf through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the entry of Saudi Arabia as an SCO observer state and its role as global truce broker—manifested through its role in re-establishing diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh after seven years of bitter resentment—point at a concerted effort to change the ‘Middle Eastern disorder’. Various conflicts in the Middle East have, at their root, the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, flanked by Israel and the US. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is part of Chinese soft power projection in the Middle East, exhibited also through Xi’s visit to Riyadh in December 2022 and hosting the president of Iran in February. The recent China visit of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil, Latin America’s largest trading partner, reflects on the two countries’ initiatives toward a new world order. President Lula’s recent visit, which follows his trips to Beijing in 2003 and in 2011 as president, comes as a fresh start after his predecessor Bolsonaro’s alienation in the international front—in a departure from Brazil’s image as a jewel of Latin American statecraft, a global climate leader and soft power heavyweight. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) are two sides of the same coin thrown for a beginning of a new monetary exchange and the collective defense mechanism. India and South Africa will not reject the approach as both nations are forging a multi-alignment foreign policy with democracy as a value-based political system. Xi’s visit to India in July to attend the SCO conference is another attempt to re-establish cordial relationship between Modi and Xi. In Southeast Asia, Singapore has agreed with China to upgrade ties paving the way for hi-tech cooperation, reaffirming to uphold the rule-based multilateral trade system, ensure stable and smooth operation of the global supply chain, investment, the digital economy, food security, finance and aviation with water and environmental projects. This reflects a “desire to set the strategic direction and chart the development of bilateral relations going forward”. In the meantime, Malaysia and China have agreed to negotiate over the ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have counterclaims over  Beijing’s claim over the key waterway through which $3trn trade takes place annually. China does not recognise the arbitration decision of not having legal basis for Beijing’s claim. Amid rising differences in Europe, negotiations are taking place in Southeast Asia with an improved relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the main focus on the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. At the same time, tensions are building up in the immediate neighborhood of Nepal with China ‘renaming’ 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh in the Himalayas, bordering China and India. This isn’t the first time; similar events  happened in 2017 and 2021 as well. The first border clash between China and India occurred on 15 June 2020, after a break of 45 years. Since then, frequent border intrusions have been taking place through infrastructure development, military deployments and capability enhancement. Amid rising tensions between the two Asian giants, the US State Department said: “Arunachal Pradesh is Indian territory and the US strongly opposes China’s unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims through incursions, be it in military or civilian, across the Line of Actual Control”. Russia's new foreign policy strategy identifies China and India as main allies. India and Russia maintained a close strategic, military, economic and diplomatic interaction during the Cold War. Both refer to this alliance as “unique and privileged”. Contradicting with the US and the West, China will also appeal to the voices of the Global South with preferences for reviving of NAM. US and the West in the rivalry More than a year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, the US has been the largest donor with close to $50bn in security, economic and humanitarian assistance. Western financial and military backing has been robust with an international coalition of partners, including the European Union and other members of the G7. The US is pushing the Group of Seven countries to take joint action against China if Beijing engages in economic coercion against the group's partners. The method of warfighting has changed, the method of backing and opposition are based on interests, not on international principles and law. For example, Russia has taken over the rotating presidency after 14 months of aggression, an arrest warrant being issued by the International Criminal Court for President Vladimir Putin and Moscow planning to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neighboring Belarus. Russia also headed the presidency in February 2022 when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine when the body was responsible for maintaining peace and combatting acts of international aggression. This in return is questioning the role of the UNSC, the UN’s most powerful organ. Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called Russia’s presidency of the UNSC a “slap in the face to the international community”. President Zelensky said it was time for a general overhaul of global institutions, including the UNSC. Amid a rising influence of China in Southeast Asia, the sole superpower is not sitting back, with Washington and the Philippines announcing plans to expand the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to comprise four new sites—Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan. This presence has strategic implications in the region and geostrategic outcomes in global politico diplomacy. A US Department of Defence press release issued on 3 April hailed it as a “big day for a core pillar of the US-Philippine alliance”, pointing that “four new EDCA sites will help us work together even more closely to meet the challenges we share." Also not to be lost is the fact that three countries—Japan, South Korea and the US—after five years, went on board on a joint anti-submarine exercise in the waters of Korean peninsula Lelu islands for a deterrence against growing threats from North Korea, a close ally of China. Causing obvious unease for China, the Taiwanese President on her visit to the US said: “It is self-evident that the peace we have maintained and the democracy we have worked so hard to build face unprecedented challenges.” Echoing President Reagan’s catchphrase of “peace through strength”, she said that “we are stronger when we work together”, calling for greater US-Taiwan defense, trade and economic cooperation. McCarthy said the relations between Taipei and Washington had “never been stronger”, indicating US bipartisan support for the move. “NATO’s door is open to more cooperation if India seeks that, NATO is more than happy to sit down anytime with India” said Ambassador Julianne Smith, US envoy to NATO in an informal exchange with Indian counterparts. But the fact is that joint defense exercises with most of the NATO members are proceeding in the Indo-Pacific Region, whether it is in the continental or maritime by the super, global, emerging, rising or small powers. It is just a matter of a short notice and arrangements that will permit for NATO to arrive at the IPR. Conclusion Some of the key factors underpinning the current global geostrategic environment point that the world order is shifting. Sources of grievance and conflict have been fortified by national interests rather than principles and values. War and peace have been prioritized when questions are arising for the sphere of influence and role that powers can play in global politics. There is a division regarding the “rules-based order and democracy”. Rival blocs in the making under China and the US are once again pointing to an evolving “communism vs democracy” conflict. The challenges facing Asia and events of strategic significance happening in the continent have become a matter of concern for not only Europe, but the whole world. The entry of Saudi Arabia in the SCO as a partner in the political-military forum led by Beijing and Moscow is significant, though the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to continue despite Beijing’s mediation. Nevertheless, China has managed to bring Washington’s ally into its orbit changing the strategic dynamics of the Middle East security architecture and the much-needed resources at its own backyard. The main focus of India’s geostrategic narrative is Tibet, Southeast Asians and the US. China will build a second narrative of smaller nations with nationalism of Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim in the Himalayas in addition the Maldives and Sri Lanka in the maritime and Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Summing up, the projection of global power—hard, soft or smart—will shift to the Indo-Pacific Region, with the US-China rivalry fueling it. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

A deterrence to some nations is provocation to others. The world is divided and the US competition with both China and Russia is seeing a surge. Flouting international principles, Russia, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, opted for aggression against Ukraine, citing increasing foreign influence in its sphere of influence.  Amid this, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterrus is laying stress on the importance of multilateralism and globalization for global stability and prosperity. Despite a large majority of the UN General Assembly adopting a resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine in February 2023, we continue to live amid ‘widespread death, destruction and displacement’. President Xi Jingping’s visit to Moscow and talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin is the 40th in-person engagement between the two in the last decade. This friendship between Beijing and Moscow is to a greater extent political in words than realpolitik in deeds. In international relations, all correlation has precincts and is grounded on strategic national interests. Xi’s visit comes when the West nods to reduce Russia’s military capability and economic condition to a certain brink is being taken as one of the objectives to minimize Russia’s provocations and President Putin’s mistrust. China is challenging this with lethal assistance to Moscow to exasperate the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). China is performing a title role resembling the role that the US played throughout the Cold War to position China and Russia in separate races, pursuing their interests even if ideologically inclined. But the geostrategic environment and strategic interests were very dissimilar back then.   XI’s visit to Russia came with China-brokered historic deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which offered an important peace-building opportunity for the two countries deep-seated in their doctrines, tangled in history and pursued via proxies across the Middle East. The reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Riyadh after seven years of bitter resentment has highlighted China’s role as a global truce-broker. This reflects China’s willingness to leverage economic clout in third-party negotiations, rejecting former reformist Deng Xiaoping’s non-interventionist mantra (hide your strengths and bide your time). Two, it marks the beginning of China’s expansion with probability of geostrategic alteration in the Persian Gulf in search for a new Middle East security order. Lastly, the viability of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCO growth will be a serious challenge to the US-led world order.  Against this backdrop comes Xi’s call for the Central Asian nations’ first summit, right after his return from Moscow. This shows China’s willingness to engage all countries in the region regardless of their association with one bloc or the other.  Takeaway of XI’s visit Xi’s Moscow visit resulted in strengthening of bilateral ties covering diverse facets like the economy, trade, technology and energy, highlighting Beijing’s desire to stick to globalization, multilateralism and internationalism.  China came with more of a peace proposal than a position for peace. There was little support in Eurasia and Europe amid Kyiv’s mention of the “new geopolitical realities” of Ukrainian lands occupied by Moscow. Ukraine declined the proposal and reiterated that Russian forces should pull out in accordance with the norms of international law and the UN charter.  Resolving the conflict, though talked about, was not included in the proposal. The main focus was on building a new world order and alignment against the US as a major threat by promoting “multipolar world” and on working together to “safeguard the international system—the UN” with a recognition that global power dynamics are shifting with a declining West and an ascending China. Xi said during the goodbye handshake “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care”.  Developing military trust and defense ties to counter the strengthening of NATO with the Indo-Pacific nations, and activities of QUAD and AUKUS would undermine regional peace and stability in Asia.  On the economy and energy buildup, with little choices other than to accept Chinese offers, Moscow voiced its keenness to support Chinese businesses replacing western enterprises, energy partnership and cooperation in advancing projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy with “new network supply chains” also through Mongolia. Both nations have profited with bilateral trade upsurge that accounts for almost a third of all Russian exports and Moscow’s emergence as China’s top oil supplier. Notably, the two countries have agreed to seek to increase their use of the local currency yuan rather than the US dollar for cross-border trade, including in oil and gas. Amid the emergence of blocs in the context of the Ukraine war, China’s regional neighbor Japan threw support behind Kyiv.  Visits to rival capitals Recent visits of President Xi and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida have strategic implications in foreign policy and the region, given that they represent the world’s second and third largest economies. These visits come barely a month after Sino-Japan security talks in Tokyo. While Beijing is concerned about Japan’s military buildup, Tokyo is also critical of China’s military ties with Russia.  While forging the ‘blueprint for China-Russia coordination’, Xi’s 12-point paper presented to Putin is a guideline or a position rather than a proposal. Putin praised the peace proposal, while Ukraine’s allies rejected it. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the “world should not be fooled” by a potential Sino-Russian peace plan that would ‘freeze’ in place the territories seized by Russian forces. The other focal issue was calling on the partners and counterparts in third countries to use the yuan as an alternative to the American dollar for mutual trade. Putin said, “we are in favor of using the Chinese yuan for trade between Russia and other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”. Reading between the lines, China appears bent on ‘soft power’ projection and has reinforced its dominance over Russia and as a beneficiary economically securing comprehensive trade agreements with cheap energy resources. In return, Putin has secured the much-needed patronage over Ukraine and just received a warrant from the International Criminal Court. Though the Chinese claim to be neutral, they are leaning more toward Russia as “great neighboring powers” against the west and appear determined to strengthen their global influence.  Coinciding with Xi’s Russia visit came Kishida’s visit to Ukraine. He is the first head of government of the G7 grouping to visit a country in conflict since World War II. Kishida’s visit to Kyiv and Bucha, where hundreds of civilians were killed by Russian forces, was meant to “show respect to the courage and patience of the Ukrainian people who are standing up to defend their homeland... and show solidarity and unwavering support”. Japan has contributed over $7bn to Ukraine and accepted over 2,000 displaced Ukrainians.   In New Delhi, while inviting PM Modi to attend the G7 meet in May, Kishida called for developing and Global South countries to raise their voices to defend the rules-based international order, help stop Russian war and action plans for a new Indo-Pacific initiative for a greater security and economic cooperation aimed at countering China’s influence in the region. As part of Japan’s new national security strategy adopted in December, 2022, it includes the use of development aid more strategically in support of like-minded emerging economies and infrastructure cooperation. In the defense realm, it includes deployment of long-range cruise missiles to strengthen its strike-back capability, support for maritime security and a provision of coast guard patrol boats and equipment.  The visit has four subtexts. One, the Asian powers in Europe’s conflict signify the importance of globalization in addition to echoing the linkages between European and Asian democracies and autocracies having geostrategic significance. Predicaments are well-observed in Taiwan, which is in the close vicinity of Japan, which recently held a summit with South Korea in more than a decade to normalize ties and forge a united front against North Korea. Two, Japan’s reassurance of its backing to the strategic ally (the US) and the West’s appeals in the context of this geopolitical turmoil. Third is the prevailing competition between China and Japan in East Asia leading to the uncertainty of neutrality and re-alignment when the global powers focus in the Indo-Pacific Region. Fourth is the reconstruction and humanitarian aid with ‘absolute rejection of Russia’s one-sided change to the status quo by invasion and force’. To conclude, it is an economic and image buildup to China. Xi brushed off Western criticism of his growing ties with Putin: “It is China’s strategic choice and will not change due to a temporary incident.” Chinese state media also reported, “Consolidating and developing China-Russia relations is China’s strategic choice made on the basis of its fundamental interests”.  The Xi-Putin summit did not produce a clear pathway on settling the Ukraine crisis as there was no confession that Russian invasion and military actions created the grounds for enduring violence and humanitarian crisis.   Firstly, the summit was part of ongoing efforts to advance a world order that counters Washington’s democratic allies, building on mistrust toward the US. Remarkably, China refused to join the blockade against Russia, providing Moscow with diplomatic, political and economic support instead. Secondly, Moscow is more isolated at the global stage and feeling the pain of sanctions while China is more likely to augment its global impression than truly safeguarding an arrangement to end the war as an impartial peace broker. Lastly, China will use this occasion to secure its position in Central Asia, Russia’s sphere of influence, to weaken Russia’s ties with India, one of China’s key rivals in South Asia. But it will, most likely,  fail to move the needle when it comes to ending the war.  The West and Russia with China are turning the war in Ukraine into a global contest, the aftermath of which will determine who gets to set the global political and economic rules for the coming decades.  The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland is on a visit to the Middle East and South Asia. Her stopovers in South Asia and the Middle East point at the significance of respective countries in the United States’ global and regional scheme of things. In Nepal, her first stop, Nuland sought to acquaint with the new political parties and the new administration. US engagement with and commitment to Nepal is not unaccustomed and ought not be undervalued. Nepal should comprehend the goodness in the relationship rather than giving it a political color. It is also an opportunity to strengthen Nepal’s foreign policy by having a cordial relationship with both the immediate neighbors while utilizing US support and accepting efforts for enhancing development commitments to convening the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The US can be a reliable partner in utilizing the resources for boosting the economy and enriching the national image. It is evident that the US is looking at Nepal to enhance cooperation and coordinate efforts for strengthening democratic appeals, enriching human rights and promoting the state policy as per Article 51 of the Constitution. Her next stop, India, is a rising power in the region and holds significance in conjunction with bilateral, regional and global issues. The trip also takes her to Sri Lanka, a country in need of support to stabilize the economy, protect human rights and promote reconciliation. Qatar, the next stop, has remained a strategic partner for peace and stability in the Middle East and the liabilities of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In all, the trip is a reflection of wide-ranging American interests in Asia.