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When greed and shortsightedness are primaries in scheming economic policies and adopting other policies that have their roots in political instability and political impulses, nations fail, nationals are dissatisfied and the private sector is discontented.

Greed is reflected in policy-making and policy implementation. Sectors like infrastructure development, administration processes and contract administration offer examples. Greed has been the root cause for institutionalization of corruption and bribery. Incompetence, ineffectiveness and inefficiencies are on the rise in Nepal where economic policies derive through political desires to acquire wealth for political parties as well as for individuals. Unwarranted and self-interested longing for wealth and power on the part of powers that be results in poor infrastructure development works that takes a huge toll with development efforts producing sub-standard and unacceptable outcomes. 

Institutionalization of corruption, greed-led policies, programs and contracts is emerging as one of the major ‘threats’ for Nepal’s sovereignty, national identity and stability. 

Scams like the Lalita Niwas land-grab offer an example. Nepal’s Parliament remains susceptible to greed-led policies even as some voices continue to challenge such policies. 

In national policies, the occurrences of greed can have across-the-board outcomes. The aim is to observe the repercussions of greed-led national policies and examine their prospective magnitudes on numerous compasses, including economics, social welfare and governance.

Characterizing good governance

The availability of international aid and loans largely depends on the extent of good governance in a recipient country and efforts toward development. Good governance-documented literatures are as old as human civilization. They lay stress on curbing corruption, hearing the voices of the marginalized/underrepresented peoples in decision-making, addressing the needs of the society and maintaining applicable standards of the finished work. Good governance is accountable, consensus-oriented, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, follows the rule of law, is participatory, responsive and transparent. 

Governance is often led by fear and greed and an insecure personal character. Fear that an individual is not capable enough to be placed in a favorable position where there is more budget. Personal behavior, also known as the greed personality trait (GPT), is personified by the craving to obtain further and the discontent of not ever having adequate, a trait associated with negative emotions/effect characteristics and aggressive conduct. These negative traits are turning into a national character, a setback for policy-making and forming a greed-free society in the long run. 

There is an involvement of several formal and informal actors as well as the civil society in governance. It may be a political cadre, who can influence decision-making in the interest of international donors that come with monetary pledges. Governments at various levels are one of the actors. Other actors can be landlords, heads of various associations, cooperatives, NGOs, INGOs, research institutions, religious structures and leaders, finance institutions, political parties and the military. They all can play important roles in making/shaping policies. Also, organized crime syndicates have influence particularly in government structures at the national level where decisions are arrived at and implemented. Informal decision-making structures like informal advisors, kitchen cabinets, land mafia and powerful families can influence decision-making, which often result in corrupt practices. 

The 21st century global economic crisis or financial crisis of 2008 highlighted the obsession and eventual ferocity of greed. It was an illustration of the type of recurrent greed that is prevalent in the economic system. The Asian Financial Crisis 1997 is another example of political inaccuracy in economic policies that impacted Southeast Asia.

Democracy sold out

Nepal has her own characteristics and own identity that need strengthening through democracy, but the opposite is happening. Greed-led practices to gain wealth for personal well-being are rampant, causing the investment meant for the nation to go waste.  It can be argued that the nature of corruption in democracies and autocracies for reforms are mere facades as there is corruption in infrastructure, tax collection, cross-border trade and government procurements.

This is part I of a two-part-series. 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

Private Royal Guards in the UAE are not the nucleus of the defense forces. There are private companies involved in providing protection and security to the VIPs and important installations in coordination with national defense or the UAE police forces. For example, a specialized and high-tech defense solution company, the International Golden Group, has been supplying human resources to the UAE armed forces, ministry of interior and other defense-security authorities. Nepalis are part of the Royal Guard Abu-Dhabi and Royal Guard Dubai, but their numbers are hard to get. The civil security in the UAE has a troop strength exceeding 100,000, with approximately 1000 employed as armed guards. 

There are many private international and national contracting involved in recruiting armed guards in different parts of the world to lower the costs of war. The personnel needed for long-drawn-out military involvements in troubled nation states like Afghanistan are outsourced to countries whose GDP relies heavily on remittances from labor migration like Nepal. 

Repercussions on stability 

Nepal has a population of around 30m, and it is expected to reach 35.32m by 2050. It is a young country with 20.8 percent of the national population aged 16-25 years and 40.68 percent aged 16-40 years, pointing at a population surplus or a youth bulge.

But the downside is that the unemployment rate for youths aged 15-29 is 19.2 percent compared to 2.7 per cent of the whole population. According to estimates, over 500,000 Nepali youths enter the labor force every year. These figures indicate the quantitative dimension of the employment challenge, something which the state, including political leadership, needs to deal with.

Pensions and salaries are received in large amounts when a nation relies heavily on remittance. There are 125,000 Nepali retirees from the British, Indian and Singapore security forces, who received a total of Rs 61.9bn in pensions in 2021.

Over the years, the government of Nepal, along with the international community, has demonstrated commitment to addressing the root causes of violence and terrorism, focusing on economic development, political inclusivity and social harmony while dealing with armed outfits. 

Initially a rebel group, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) waged a decade-long (1996-2006) insurgency but transitioned into mainstream democratic politics after a peace agreement with the government. 

Some other outfits include the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) that advocates for the rights of the Madhesi community and the Nepal Defense Army (NDA), a splinter of the Maoists that opposed the peace process and resumed armed activities in the mid-2000s. 

Conclusion 

Historically, Nepalis have become part of the defense forces of other nations through treaties or agreements. Contractors and agents have been part of the warfare mostly visible after the Gulf War. Of late, Nepali youths’ vulnerability to unwanted recruitment and undesired migration has become a matter of serious concern. This situation has arisen due to the lack of relevant domestic policies, lack of political accountability and domestic governance priorities, in the wake of Russia’s offense in Ukraine ignoring the obligations as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5).

Given this context, the government should take immediate action and implement measures to prevent Nepali citizens from joining the armed forces or forces that are not part of treaties and/or bilateral  agreements reached through memorandums of understanding or agreements.

Nepali citizens becoming part of the Russian armed forces is contrary to the spirit of the position that Nepal took at the UN Security Council meeting in March 2022. Such participation goes against Nepal’s foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment. 

Nepali citizens being part of Russian defense forces has four facets in the international geopolitical situation. It leads to the loss of international political trust as well as diplomatic unease and apprehension; contradicts Nepal’s non-aligned foreign policy as well as long-held stance at the UN, gives rise to political unaccountability and increases the risk of terrorist organizations, political parties or non-state actors using trained personnel. 

So, the government of Nepal and the Parliament need to keep a close watch on the activities of the citizens and circumstances surrounding them within the country and abroad. First, the government should revisit the rules and regulations regarding migration by adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 Dec 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217A). Secondly, it should ensure the repatriation of Nepali citizens if they are part of any contradicting treaty or bilateral arrangement, entered particularly through agencies and contractors. Thirdly, for the country to effectively benefit from weapons-trained youths, a number of measures can be taken. 

They include the formulation of a clear transition and reintegration plan for the weapons-trained youths; implementation of a dedicated program for utilizing their skills in service of the country; their mobilization for strengthening intelligence cooperation; amendment in recruitment policies and procedures for assimilation; induction into reserve forces with attractive compensation packages; career progression opportunities and partnerships and collaborations with foreign armed forces where Nepali individuals are serving to exchange knowledge, training methodologies, and best practices. This can contribute to the overall professional development of Nepal’s security forces and help in leveraging the skills of weapons-trained individuals.

Overall, a comprehensive approach is required to address the social, economic, and psychological aspects of the reintegration process to maximize the benefits of weapons-trained Nepali youths for Nepal’s security. Such measures can contribute to a strong and capable security apparatus, ensuring the safety and well-being of the nation and its citizens.

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on August 1 cautioning and asking the Nepali youths not to join mercenaries of any country in violation of existing treaties and agreements. Nepali citizens have been a part of several foreign defense forces since the colonial era. Shifting geostrategic dynamics, global rivalry, rise in global migration and conscription through different methods and routes are a matter of concern. As per media reports, it is estimated that youths have been recruited in the Russian forces and other defense forces and may also be part of non-state actors or armed groups that contradict national priorities and policies. The shift in warfare besides other support also has implications for defense enrollment that comes with lucrative offers. The youth’s desire to join foreign forces emanates mainly from the Nepali state’s failure to provide ample jobs to its growing young population. But what happens to the national security and credibility of a relatively small country like Nepal when its youths choose to become part of a group or another by violating international norms and values in a deeply divided world?

This question calls for serious thinking on the government’s part.   

The presence of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces not only serves as an employment opportunity but also contributes to the economic well-being of Nepal through remittances. Additionally, these individuals gain exposure, training and experience that can benefit Nepal's own security forces and contribute to the nation's overall development.
However, it's worth noting that there have been discussions and debates about the repercussions of large-scale recruitment of Nepali youths in foreign armed forces with the state’s agreement. Some argue that it leads to brain drain, depriving the country of skilled human resources, while others highlight the economic benefits and the opportunity for youths to gain valuable training and career prospects.

The Department of Foreign Employment (DoFE) has allowed Nepali citizens to work in 110 countries, but our youths have been working in almost 172 countries. Still, our political elites do not appear ill at ease. Perhaps this does not qualify as an issue requiring serious attention.     

Rising labor out-migration is a grave issue, but more worrisome is the trend of the youths becoming part of foreign defense forces and law enforcement in the absence of necessary bilateral diplomatic arrangements.

Per statistics, around five lakh youths in Nepal seek job opportunities every year and more than 1700 Nepali citizens travel for work every day. The state encourages the youths to go abroad for jobs, laying bare its incompetence. 

As per the national census 2021, approximately 3.5m migrant workers (14 percent of the national population) are working abroad. Of them, 2.2m are aged 25-35 years and 18.72 percent of them are female. International migration, emerging as a means of livelihood for the poor, has also become a source of foreign currency ($8.2bn) revenue, which makes up 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. Top five remittance sources are Saudi Arabia (20.6 percent), Malaysia (20.5 percent), India (19.3 percent), Qatar (13.4 percent) and the US (8.3 percent). 

In the last 10 months of the fiscal 2022/23, the DoFE issued work permits to 660,255 Nepali citizens, of which 600,000 have already left the country. 

What’s more, UNESCO data show an increasing number of Nepali students leaving the country to study abroad. The number of foreign-bound students more than doubled from 44,225 in 2017 to 95,268 in 2022. 

A good number of Indian citizens have found jobs in Nepal and so have the Nepalis in India, due to bilateral arrangements, the open border, cultural factors and contemporary reality. Per the World Bank’s Bilateral Remittance Matrix of 2017, while the Nepalis working in India send home around Rs 102bn every year (this includes Rs 72.57bn from 35,000 serving and 180,000 Gurkha veterans), the Indians working in Nepal send home almost triple the amount—Rs 302 bn. For India, Nepal is one of the top 10 sources of remittance. 

The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu estimates that 8m Nepali citizens are living and working in India and puts the number of Indian workers in Nepal at 600,000, whereas independent estimates suggest that 1 to 3m Nepalis are working in India. High mobility of workers across the border, cross-border marriages and a significant Indian population with family linkages in Nepal have made the picture unclear. There’s no denying the fact that migrations affect national stability and security.  

Youths in foreign forces 

The trends of warfare are evolving with technology and modern equipment, including nuclear, but human resources still play a crucial role.

Men aged 17 to 40 years from 140 nations can join the French Foreign Legion to safeguard French interests and secure French domains. Though the government of Nepal has no records nor settled accords, it is estimated that 300-350 Nepalis are serving as French Legionnaires on a singular premise. The US Army reportedly has more than 1000 Nepalis. 

The Tripartite treaty signed in 1947 concerns the rights of the Gurkhas recruited in military services of India and the United Kingdom. More than 4000 Gurkhas are serving the British Crown with a few hundred selected every year and 32,000 Nepali soldiers are serving in 40 Indian Gurkha battalions. Apart from providing jobs to individuals, these forces also help augment Nepal’s foreign currency reserves.

The path of fire

The ‘Agnipath Scheme’ meant to reduce India’s defense expenditure seems to have failed to impress the government of Nepal. The scheme has implications for job opportunities, the economy as well as the rights mentioned in the Tripartite Agreement, given that salary of the serving and pensions of the retired soldiers is an important source of Indian currency for Nepal’s economy, which relies overwhelmingly on imports from India. The scheme will permit only a quarter of the 46,000 soldiers between the age of 17-23 years to continue in service after four years and bid others adieu with a golden handshake of INR 1.7m.

Absence of diplomatic steps prior to the scheme’s announcement has created problems that India and Nepal would have been better off without. Three points should be noted in this context: The new entry scheme was not part of the tripartite agreement; it adds to the unemployment data after four years and that the trained returnees would be vulnerable to non-state actors. 

There are many more Nepalis serving in Singapore, Brunei, UAE and other destinations. 

The Gurkha Contingent or the Singapore Police Force, with roughly 2000 Gurkha personnel, has a role in maintaining law and order. Formed on the basis of a deal between Singapore and the British Government on 9 April 1949, which entrusts the British government with the recruitment, the contingent was mobilized to quell communal riots between the Chinese and Malays of Singapore. After the 9/11 attacks, these soldiers have also been providing security to the President and Prime Minister and guarding vital installations. 

The sultanate of Brunei is another nation that accommodates more than 500 Gurkha in the Brunei Reserve Unit or the Royal Brunei Gurkha Reserve Unit, a special elite guard force previously led by the British Commanders to protect the Royal family, the citizens and major oil installations. Known as the “Praetorian Guard”, it works as a special forces unit directly under the command of the Sultan as well as alongside the Special Forces Regiment and Special Combat Squadron of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces. 

This article is Part I of the two-part series 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

The diminution of and deliberation on the Nepali Army is neither contemporary nor should it be a distressing aspect but it emanates as misinforming and inaccurate to the statecraft and to the broader audience. 

In particular, the field of defense is one of the essentials like economy, governance and diplomacy to the country. None of these fields are thriving at present. 

As an instrument of national power of Nepal, the army is the only unswerving and consistent institution in diplomacy, with national and international credibility in addition to remaining as a uniting establishment of the Nepalis.

Reading between the lines

While floating expenditure reduction measures in the federal parliament, Bimala Rai Paudyal, one of the three candidates that the then then President Bidya Devi Bhandari had appointed to the National Assembly in Feb 2018 and Swarim Wagle, a lawmaker elected under the first-past-the-post system, proposed downsizing the Nepali Army, among other measures, to reduce national expenditure. 

Paudyal underlined the lack of strategic coordination and cooperation amongst the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defense, which is essential for border security. She added that the army had failed in its primary role—protecting the borders, pointing at repeated instances of border encroachment. 

“There’s no war going on within the country and there’s no possibility of either of the neighbors waging a war against the country. In the event of a war with either of the neighbors, there’s no possibility of us withstanding it,” Paudyal said, reasoning that there’s no need to keep a (roughly) 90000-strong army that cannot protect the country.  

Such remarks coming from a lawmaker have tremendously hurt the sentiments and self-esteem of servicemen and women, veterans as well as the citizenry. Soldiers and citizens fight with morale and self-confidence that wells up from their training, education and love for their respective countries. This is something that cannot be measured in monetary terms. 

There are many international examples about vested interests playing a major role in triggering wars. South Asia, for one, witnessed such wars during the 1970s. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine followed challenges to the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. 

Nepal can face similar consequences, given its geopolitical and geostrategic location. Nepal’s vote as one of the 141 nations in the UN in March 2022 against the Russian aggression is also a visualization of a similar state of affairs along its own borders. 

Lawmaker Paudyal should keep in mind that border security comes under the Ministry of Home Affairs during peacetime and not under the Ministry Defence. So, border violations are the result of a lack of coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs. 

The national budget for the coming fiscal 2023/24 (totaling 1.751trn) has allocated 14 percent to the security sector—for the defense ministry and the home ministry. 

On its part, the Nepali Army reimburses more than Rs1.7bn as tax to the government from its Welfare Fund apart from bringing in about $22m (Rs 25bn) to the country, which is approximately two percent of the national foreign income of $9.1bn (approx). The national army itself provides another five billion rupees for its educational, medical and welfare programs, which is borne by respective governments in almost all the countries. 

The government budget for the defense ministry appears paltry in comparison to the budget that the Nepali Army deserves for enhancing Nepal’s international prestige by helping maintain world peace through non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes as envisioned in the United Nations Charter.

Strategic interpretations

Nepal faces enormous challenges because it lies in the midst of three competing nations— China, India and the US—and one more bloc, the European Union.

History says that no government, no economic system, no currency, no empire lasts forever, yet almost everyone is surprised and ruined when they fall.

Given our physical location, we as a relatively small nation are likely to face serious challenges, contrary to the expectations of many of our political leaders. 

Marked by different political orders, security, economy and digital systems, the world is moving amid confrontations in the South Asian subcontinent and beyond. Cold War 2.0 is ongoing and the competition is palpable along Nepal’s borders unlike in a different continent with dissimilar technological capabilities during the Cold War. 

In this context, the Nepali Army can stand as a stimulating force for geostrategic balance of power in South Asia and beyond. 

Standing power

The Nepali Army is one of the instruments of national power that needs solidification with modernization, strengthening of its capabilities and digitalization, also in view of the fact that the Global Firepower Index 2023 has ranked Nepal 129th out of 145 countries.

The recent comments from political leaders have come without understanding of the unfolding geopolitical environment that may push small nations like Nepal toward deepening political uncertainty. 

In this context, a handful of political leaders making unsavory comments should not forget the role of the national army in upholding national honor and dignity. 

Deduction

At a time when Nepal’s dire prerequisite is to have a united strategic approach toward national interest, foreign policy and national security strategy, hollow comments from parliamentarians are most unwelcome. The Defense Minister has rightly expressed concern over such remarks, which show the lack of awareness on the part of the speakers on the importance of instruments of national power. 

It’s time state instruments like intelligence agencies paid attention to increasing geo-political influence. 

If you ask commoners questions about the role of the political parties and the Nepali Army, they will most definitely reply that the army has been acting as a far more responsible actor in service of the country and the people than the parties. 

National security and prestige cannot be compared with monetary value. Important individuals should bear in mind that impromptu remarks on sensitive topics at wrong places and wrong time do the country a great disservice. 

Downsizing the military is not a wise way to deal with national monetary challenges. 

A number of measures can be taken to manage the budget for national development. Doing away with a costly federal system can be an option. Downsizing the number of elected representatives, reducing the number of ministries and establishing strategic structures for addressing issues of national importance can help at a time of rampant corruption, political instability and loss of national credibility. These measures will bring in enough resources required for national development. 

All concerned must bear in mind that long transition adds up to challenges for national prosperity and stability. 

The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

Let’s start with a normal scene in Nepal-India relations. A head of government in Nepal shows commitment to improving Nepal-India relations. But whoever is in the opposition in the Parliament grows suspicious, questioning the very motive of the one in power. Three important interactions have occurred within a year with three visits and three schemas between top government officials of the two countries. They are clean energy (hydropower), infrastructure development and strategic connectivity. After Sher Bahadur Deuba’s visit to Delhi in April 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Lumbini in less than a month in May 2022. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal awaited a visit reversing his first visit to Beijing in 2008 and concluded the four-day trip to India recently with a focus on clean energy, strategic connectivity—both road and railways infrastructure development—easy monetary system, people-to-people relations and with Nepal’s entry into the India-led International Solar Alliance. This holds six projects and seven agreements with focus on power cooperation and development cooperation. The idea was to re-stress and re-visit the strategic means to achieve the end goals for a harmonious relationship. The latest developments are in keeping with India’s ‘Neighborhood First’ policy and PM Modi’s address to Nepal’s Parliament in August 2014, in which he expressed his country’s intent to ‘HIT’ Nepal by building Highways, I-ways and Transways. Making the most of HIT as well as security diplomacy with defense cooperation, law enforcement coordination and intelligence sharing as integral parts remain formidable challenges.   Strategic posture  During his recent visit to India, Dahal showed willingness to complement Indian needs, vis-a-vis political, energy and freshwater, with the hope that this will result in economic enhancement for the Nepali people. But Nepal-India ties are not going smoothly, what with ongoing border disputes that can come up as a political whip during elections, thereby impacting the political setups. Of several disputes along the 1,850-km Nepal-India border, disputes over the India-controlled Kalapani-Lipulek-Limpiadhura and the Susta region stand out. There is also the fallout of India’s Agnipath defense recruitment scheme for enlisting Nepali citizens in the Indian Army. Dahal’s reappointment as PM with support from the Nepali Congress after the withdrawal of support from the CPN-UML in the Parliament points toward a joint response from New Delhi and Washington. In this context, recent visits of US Under-secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland (in January) and USAID chief Samantha Power (in February) and the visit of India’s Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra (in mid-February) are noteworthy. These trips underscore Nepal’s significance in the geostrategic scheme of things. Also important to note is the fact that the election of NC candidate Ram Chandra Paudel paved the way for the authentication of the Citizenship Amendment Bill that his predecessor, Bidya Devi Bhandari, had nixed. These maneuvers have political-economic-security corollary and a determination for stimulus influence over all countries in South Asia.   Security ties Political interests have changed as technology and geography have become more accessible and reachable than ever. Nepal-India security relations should also be read in this light. They refer to safety measures, or strength against possible detriment or undesirable coercion by nation states and non-state actors preventing the freedom to act. It is the safety from threats and protection of predominantly seven bodies–from economic security, food security, health security, environment security, personal security, community security, human security, physical security to political security. Without peace and stability, sustained economic growth and poverty alleviation are not possible. Peace and stability in Nepal, India and the entire region is possible through security diplomacy. To achieve these ends, law enforcement cooperation and intelligence coordination are necessary between Nepal and India. The new threats to Nepal-India relationship involve obstruction in traditional security ties based on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950), so security diplomacy will be key in coming years. Military-to-military relationship, law enforcement coordination and intelligence community cooperation play an important role in fulfilling foreign policy objectives. While talking about military ties it will be contextual to delve a bit into the Agnipath recruitment scheme. Agnipath is about defense diplomacy that has a distinct setup—domestic, regional and international. The traditional practice of recruiting Nepali Gurkha into the Indian Army remains stalled with political concerns deprived from an understanding of what their absence really means. It is not just about the 75 percent that return after four years adding on to the unemployment list nor is it only about the possibility of unwanted elements misusing them against Nepal. It has strategic bearings garnering political trust, geopolitics, economic, diplomacy, employment opportunities and people-to-people relations. The two nations should move forward acknowledging the trends of defense diplomacy changing its discourse for peace or against peace, diplomacy for development or diplomacy for or against democracy.   The way forward Nepal-India relationship has been primarily viewed through a political lens and PM Dahal’s visit is no exception. The visit has emphasized political-economic-security outlooks of the relationship when world powers are striving for a new world order and Asia for a new normal. Foreign policy, diplomacy amongst different instruments of power and regional connectivity to address the strategic needs of South Asia and beyond—they all are equally important as diplomacy amongst the defenders of national interests. The colonial period, India’s independence, its strides in shaping a favorable security architecture in 1970-1990, its economic growth and global aspirations, Nepal standing out as a sovereign country during the colonial period and China consolidating its territorial gains after 1950 are some of the developments that beget attention. In a changing world, growing interests of China and India are not just in their ‘spheres of influence’, but well beyond as well. For China, it is the Indo-Pacific Region with multi-continental diplomatic engagements. For India, it is beyond its immediate neighborhood to Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia or the Persian Gulf. Nepal can play a significant role in addressing challenges facing not only India, but the South Asia region as a whole. These challenges include power shortages, flooding, inundation and shortages of freshwater, which have been impacting comprehensive security. The Joint Vision Statement on Power Sector Cooperation of April 2022 has now entered the sub-region through trilateral power connectivity between Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Being part of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) will have geopolitical and geoeconomics propositions for Nepal. The transportation connectivity and border crossing arrangements between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) should remain an integral part of the international organization and plurality. The joint military exercises envisioned in the BIMSTEC will have a crucial role in addressing the changed dynamics of defense diplomacy, which needs strengthening. In this context, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s decision to conduct the first joint military exercise of 10 member-states in the disputed South China Sea this September is quite significant. Commenting on this development, Admiral Yudo Margono of Indonesia recently said that the exercise is aimed at strengthening “ASEAN centrality” and does not include any combat operations. Nepal and India security relationship is not and cannot remain bilateral; it is regional and international with ‘strategic connectivity’ focusing on power, freshwater, infrastructure, transportations connectivity as well as security connectivity. It has the potential to become an indispensable driver of modernity and progress as well as mutual economic growth in the region, with long-term power trade and management of water boosting reciprocally-beneficial ventures. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

There are various factors that contribute to promising and sometimes disappointing foreign policy outcomes adopted by Nepal and India regarding one another. It is hence virtuous to uncover the camaraderie and the discords that the foreign policy is facing. Foreign policies of both Nepal and India endures from contradiction, ad hoc measures, and inconsistency with an absence of short- and long-term strategic approaches narrating polarity of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multinational facets of relations, with an inclination to the Rational Actor model of diplomacy. But approaches of foreign policy by way of the political process, inter-branch politics, organizational process, bureaucratic political arrangements and consistency and functions of diplomacy endure to endorse the constituents, the most important of which are security, diplomatic and economic interests that often uphold, coexist and persuasively influence each other. With Cold War 2.0, rise of China and rivalry between the two largest economies, reorientation of neutrality and non-alignment and multi-alignment compels contemplation beyond the traditional domain of non-alignment that advocates sovereign equality of all states. It is important to encourage friendly relations amongst all countries, to advocate peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to oppose the use of force and nuclear weapons garnering the objectives of the Non-Alignment Movement. Nepal’s geographic positioning is significant in global politics. With the shift in geopolitics, Nepal has been the recipient of great power interest, and attaining more prominence with both immediate neighbors. Reassessing the foreign policy with all stakeholders for a united public policy and subjects of international law to safeguard the well-being of the Nepali people with the projection of national interests to the immediate neighbors and the world is essential. Small states like Nepal will form an integral part of the international order. India is Nepal’s largest trade partner  as well as  the largest source of total foreign investments, while Nepal is the ninth largest trading partner of India. China, meanwhile, has been the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment in Nepal from 2015 onward. Nepal is also the seventh largest source of remittance to India, with $3.2bn a year remitted as per the World Bank. India provides transit for almost a third of Nepal’s trade in accordance with the Indo-Nepal Transit Treaty. What is wrong? Primarily, inconsistent Nepali and Indian national policies are paving way for governments to engage or intervene in their particular philosophical theory and reasoning, imprisoning Nepal-India rapport from time to time. Nepal and India lack a national foreign policy. The policy deficit and the influence of the institutions like the intelligence community, diplomatic community, the security community or personal association in the political settings has been the impulsive element for driving foreign policy, which has proved to be short lived. It is more driven by personalities who direct politics and polities lacking strategic outlook–like the 12-point agreement without an exit strategy. Security has been the driving factor rather than politics-diplomacy-security. The perception of Nepal and India relationship is geographically driven with Kathmandu as a forceful factor and the political parties opt for nationalism with anti-Indian oratory is more profound. People living in the urban areas or the cities, mountains, hills and the Tarai observe the ties with their own sensitivities and requirements. The political leaders, political parties and the government are the compelling drivers of the relationship, not the national foreign policy, which derives from national interests. These are the main constituents consequential to what Nepal and India foreign policy and relationship is today. This is not to stress that the Nepali policymakers are truthful and flawless. It cannot be repudiated that Nepal is occupied with conspiracy theories that attribute all in-house inconveniences to India. There is also a strong indication that past policy orchestrators in Nepal and India are responsible for the instabile national foreign policies. Nepal’s survival is not looking for new diplomatic philosophy but to follow the moralities of King Prithivi Narayan Shah that Nepal is a “yam between two boulders”. It won’t be a bridge at least in the near future as some political orchestrators examine. Nepal has had 20 governments in the last 30 years of them 12 after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. Nepal-India special friendship has reached its lowest point after little more than half a century with various acknowledged factors. Foreign policy inconsistencies  Nepal and India have always stood with each other on their political journey from independence of India to Nepal’s declaration as a secular, federal republic. The political and social transformation in Nepal originated with India’s recognition of the Nepal Communist Party Maoist as one of the sources of political powers of the state together with monarchy and the democratic political forces. The two pillars of political governance, constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy abstained, finding a space for the third. But there remains a question if the prerequisites in the national strategic policy alteration was the national Indian foreign policy or if it was the day-to-day government. Foreign policies initiated with the British departure from the Asian region, with India’s and other nation states’ independence. Democracy as a political system was just introduced. The United Nations stood as the global body for recognition for small nations. The strategic surrounding south of the Himalayas was influenced by India and north of the Himalayas by China in making of the foreign policy. All three countries, Nepal, China and India, were occupied for their own unity and political systems. The US was the second country to establish diplomatic relations with Nepal with the opening of the embassy in Aug 1959 after the United Kingdom. When interpreting observances on diplomacy and Indian policies towards Nepal, four important subject matters stand out, pointing to the future of bilateral relationship. The first is India’s observation on China’s growing influence, which is believed to be well supported by the growing affiliation amongst the communist parties of both Nepal and China in addition the dilemmas in the Himalayas particularly the 2017 Sino-Indo border standoff or the Doklam standoff in addition the May 2020 skirmishes in the Sino-Indo border both in the Himalayas. Second, is the political instability, political trust, social aggravation and extra regional power’s influence in administering the country. Third is the reluctance of support from the Nepali side on the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which form the foundation of the special adherence. Finally, on the contrary, is the imperative example of the people-to-people relationship, cultural and traditional affinity, civilizational linkages and economic ties as the largest trade partner. Also perceptible is the prospect on the effects of the 12-point agreement that is questioning empathy. For Nepal, equidistance policy with immediate neighbors and friendship with all has been the appropriate phrase for prominent politicians and national political parties but is inappropriate. Domestic politics and particular leader’s interpretations detract from the relationship that should be based on national interests. Foreign policy is based on disagreements like border problems and challenges like floods and inundation, not strategic national interests. Four factors are evident. One, considering India as a hegemon with roles in day-to-day administering. Two, keenness is politics of convenience playing one nation to another alongside domestic nationalism common in times of elections. Three, ad hoc arrangements punctuated by hyper populism, not by principles and meritocracy. Lastly, lack of strategic thoughts of the imminent risk to national credibility and stability. In addition, the current relationship is based on foreign policies that lack the new geopolitical realities that circumscribe the two countries. Geostrategic situation also plays an important role in formulating national interests as it did in the late 1940 to mid 1950s. The driving factor in finding a new approach for foreign policy at present necessitates four considerations. The geographic positioning is vibrant with China and US rivalry and Tibet as the soft belly. China views Nepal as the buffer state in the center of the Himalayas with access to mainland India. China and India’s confrontation along the Himalayas is ongoing. China’s growing interests in South Asia will strengthen. Deduction  Picking up on these arguments, it is important to look into reality and perception that prominent political leaders, political parties and the system of governance in Nepal and India leave open to further worsening the relationships, not merely political and people-to-people but national interests and  national credibility. While striving for functional democracy, Nepal lives to thrive, opportunity to resolve and rebuild clarity, comprehensiveness, understanding, perceptiveness, decisiveness, perseverance for building confidence key components of foreign policy is visible but policymakers need to act. The region is divided into powers and small nations looking for growth who are sometimes trampled, questioning the sphere of influence and the regional security architecture. Sino-Indo competition in the Himalayas, Nepal-Indo resource management and in addition emerging China and the rising India look for preserving political space south of the Himalayas. China’s aspiration has come as a major irritant and a foreign policy challenge, but for Nepal it is an opportunity to reduce India dependency and to achieve progress. Buffer states whether in the Americas, Asia, Africa, Europe or the Oceanic have been facing political glitches and diplomatic setbacks but have also played a role to prevent conflict between two rival or potentially hostile great powers. The concept of buffer states can be tracked down as part of a theory of the balance of power that entered European strategic and diplomatic thinking in the 18th century. So, the strategic imperative is for India the fear of China’s influence taking over and vice versa or the competition for influence or control which does not occur to non-buffer states. The Himalayan nations Bhutan, Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim were buffer states between the British Empire and China. At the present time as well as time to come with China’s fortification of Tibet and growing interests as a global actor as well as the skirmishes that are occurring in the Himalayas has and will position Bhutan and Nepal as the buffer state for the balance of power. The discords are the arguments in the use of resources, absence of strategic planning, deficiency in regional outlook, centrality of values and principles, relevance of rules and norms and the shortfall in security judgment. Therefore, the commonalities are civilizational connections, people-to-people bonds, open border movement of goods and personnel, special arrangements like the defense relationship or defense diplomacy, economic ties and the pegged monetary arrangements. These needs to be strengthened. Nepal is robust internally but characteristic of vulnerability is often reflected with an exposure to a high degree of economic openness with dependence on strategic imports, a dependence on a narrow range of exports or services, and susceptibility to external economic shocks externally. Successful strategy of foreign affairs ends–and therefore begins–in the real world of international relations, and for Nepal and India, the understanding of the geopolitical shift and a win-win accord. The foreign policy has marched together in search for identity, inclusiveness, values and a democratic system. Together with finding national foreign and bring about constructive headways and wind-up instability in Nepal-India relationship in the new geopolitical realities, five possessions must be apparent:

• One, Nepal and Indian foreign policy should be well spelt out against the Rational Actor model or policies of a particular party or influence or as convenience. Nepal will be accustomed with the function of multilateral diplomacy in enriching and intensifying opinions to level the playing field of rival power politics. Though disadvantages exist but often can be circumvented, reduced and turned to strategic advantage depending on collective political harmony and the rule of law, a stringent emphasis on limited intents, quantitative and qualitative approaches and embracing creative answers.
• Second, strategic autonomy by pursuing national interests with cohesion or interrelation that complements smallness, which will contribute in generating a shared purpose and dependability in the foreign policy and diplomacy. This will lessen impediments in governance surfacing from competing or contradictory interests and perceptions of interests of powers.
• Third, engagement in developmental efforts with an operational foundation for strategic connectivity (energy, water, infrastructure) with support to strategic planning for the use of resources, strategic developmental efforts and security diplomacy.
• Fourth, as a buffer, Nepal to find a political and diplomatic resolution with a mutually agreed upon declaration for a demilitarized nation state in the sense of not hosting the military of either power but standing firm with its own military forces. Foreign policy of small states is diplomacy and diplomacy of small states is a subgroup of diplomacy.
• Lastly, landlocked, candidness, narrow-mindedness, flexibility, weakness and dependence are factors influencing engagement in the international system. To overcome vulnerability and constraints international development institutions and international partners must expand state-of-the-art solutions modeled to deliver correlated development and financing issues.

In conclusion, to emphasize on collective strategies to address common security challenges. India’s policy in South Asia is based on “Neighbourhood First” but Nepal and India relationship goes further because of geographical proximity, cultural and people-to-people correlation, economic or demographic conditions and democracy. If cross-cultural communication is effective, it winds up by influencing other global actors and regional actors or changing the international environment in ways favorable to both Nepal and India’s interests. As a remover of obstacles and an achiever of objectives it must begin with an accurate mental picture of domestic, regional and international realty, an understanding of the politics-economics-security of foreign policy at both Delhi and Kathmandu with security, prosperity, democracy and development as pillars of diplomacy. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

There is a need to acknowledge that the geostrategic environment is altering not just in South Asia but the whole world. It is very important for Nepal and India to find what issues will be fundamental in shaping the age-old (long standing) and bold (self-possessed) relations for a better and preferable destiny of the two countries. Nepal and India have come to these geostrategic circumstances, which are volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, with harmonies and discords. But the discords that these two countries have encountered reveal their commonalities, and they drive their relationship forward. This is the first of three parts article that aims to find answers to political-diplomacy-security disciplines with three subject matters: geostrategic apprehensions, foreign policy and lastly security relationship. The geostrategic apprehensions In the international pitch, India aspires to lead the global south. This is evident in its influence in global political affairs, with a rising status and engagements with political-economic-security groupings like the QUAD, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the G7, G20 and ASEAN. The security architecture of South Asia with Indian perspective is shifting, forcing one to question the existing and imminent narratives and leave behind the past by taking lessons. The Himalayas as the barrier and a geographic challenge is lessening. So immediate neighborhoods are more a constraint from the regional security point of view. The South Asian security situation is deteriorating with resolute political and diplomatic support from great powers. The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) is the center for global politics, and South Asia is significantly vital in the IPR with India standing prominently and promising. There is a diplomatic maneuvering on the expansion of G7 to G10, and one of the member nations could be India. As G20 is not expected to be in action, G7 will play a crucial role on devising policies with the US, European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, advancing to the IPR with several geopolitical collaborative efforts like Build Back Better World for ecology, economy, infrastructure connectivity, or the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment—a collaborative effort by G7 to fund projects in developing nations based on the trust principles of the Blue Dot Network (BDN). The BDN is a multi-stakeholder initiative by the US, Japan and Australia for infrastructure development projects worldwide on measures of financial transparency, environmental sustainability and impact on economic development. India’s rise in engagement has also expanded to West Asia, East Asia and Far-east Asia with Act East policy, Look Far East Policy etc. and does not only remain in the immediate neighborhood though “Neighborhood First” policy remains at the core for Nepal and India. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party’s centennial anniversary has sent a strong message that China will no longer be bullied, oppressed or subjugated by foreign countries, or the US-led Western countries. China is expanding cooperation in South Asia, shaping the region as a bridge to the Indian Ocean, an alternative for connectivity, resources management and national security. The five states in the northern borders adjoining China along continental Himalayas and five nations (Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan) along the Indian Ocean will continue to be of interest to the powers involved particularly China, India and the US. One of the fundamentals of India and China relationship is “politics of space” with political interests, resources management and security leverages for stability, with economy as a priority as well as the shift in people’s perception. On the bilateral front between Nepal and India, a 12-point agreement between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in New Delhi came into effect with the absence of an exit strategy in addition to the visualization of the upcoming geostrategic surroundings. This added to the mayhem in the relationship. The alteration of the political system essentially convinced the democratic force like the Nepal Congress to accept the Nepal Communist Party Maoist’s agenda to adopt a federal secular republic without comprehending the real actors behind the scene. Now, the Eminent Person Group report with suggestions to replace the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and also regulate the open border, which is the foundation of a special relationship, is also threatening the ties.   Conclusion   As the region shifts from the 20th century to the 21st century the power’s political interests have transformed with economic growth as well as a geography that is more accessible than in the latter half of the 20th century. One phase passed with India’s independence ending the colonial period. The second phase was when India shaped a favorable South Asia security architecture during the 1970 to the 1990s, as well as when Communist China solidified the expanded territory particularly Tibet in the 1950s. The third phase was when India persuaded Nepal to adopt democracy, secularism and a federal republic order. The imminent phase will be defined by political-geography. China and India’s growing interests are not only in their peripheries but beyond. For China, it is the Indo-Pacific Region with multi-continental diplomatic engagements. For India, it is beyond its immediate neighborhood, be it Southeast Asia, East Asia, West Asia or the Persian Gulf. The region is divided into two power blocks China and India. China has come as a major foreign policy challenge to India and the US-led West. The accessible Himalayas will revolve into further contest rather than act as a facilitator of peace. In this circumstance, Nepal and India should move together for a better and preferable destiny in search for identity, inclusiveness and value-based democratic system. India’s policy in South Asia is based on “Neighbourhood First” but Nepal and India relationship goes further, not just because of proximity, cultural and people-to- people connection. Successful strategy for foreign affairs should end and begin in the real world of international relations. And for Nepal and India, the understanding of the geopolitical shift can offer a win-win solution. If successful, this relationship will influence other global actors and regional actors. It may even change the international environment in ways favorable to both Nepal and India’s interests. To do so, Nepal and India must begin with an accurate mental picture of domestic, regional and international realties. They should have a sound understanding of the politics, economy and security aspects of foreign policy. Part II will be on the foreign policy tight spot and a common effort to comprehend The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

Helsinki and Stockholm’s applications of May 2022 to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked the end of neutrality and the policy of non-alignment in Europe.  Finland formally became a member of the bloc on 4 April this year, whereas Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace on 9 May 1994 and Riksdag approved it as part of the political and military structure. Historically, these moves did not destabilize the neutral states of the region.  These moves are a pointer to growing realignment of countries toward two rival blocs vying for global supremacy.  Non-Alignment Policy (NAP) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) can surely benefit a neutral and mostly underdeveloped world if it manages to forge a united front. Global diplomacy is shifting with a divide between the East and the West, challenging the existing monetary system and strengthening the defense capability of the East. The five founding nations of NAM—Egypt in the Middle East, Ghana in West Africa, India in South Asia, Indonesia in Southeast Asia and former Yugoslavia in Europe—are bolstering their presence in global politics, thanks to the emergence of a formidable Sino-Russian front.  Evolving national security strategies of the US and its allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, should be read against the backdrop of new threats to the US and democracies in Asia. The strategies will seek to keep Chinese power in check while their earlier versions were meant to reduce Soviet power during the Cold War.  The economic success of China over the past 30 years or so has given it strong enough influence to lead the Asian continent by consequently weakening the customary US geopolitical objective and challenging India’s intents of ensuring that the South Asian amphitheater remains free of hegemonic control.  As far as South and Southeast Asia are concerned, NAM encompasses all 10 member-states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) apart from all 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as 10 non-government organizations. It will be contextual to draw from the NAM summit held in Baku (Azerbaijan) on October 25-26, 2019. The summit stood for “Upholding the Bandung principles to ensure a concerted and adequate response to the challenges of the contemporary world”, recognizing that history reoccurs but with different undertones in a new geostrategic environment. The Baku declaration is likely to resonate at the 2023 summit to be held in Uganda, at a time of increased confrontations between Asian powers China and India and competition for supremacy between the US and China, marking a tectonic shift in geopolitics to the Indo-Pacific Region. Europe played a key role in the Cold War, while in Cold War 2.0, Asia will helm a similar role. In its earlier edition, the US-Soviet contest and European-Soviet played out, while Cold War 2.0 will see Sino-US competition and Sino-Indian dissension. Amid an unprecedented security scenario in Europe, where neutrality is becoming a thing of the past, smaller nations of the continent seem to be repositioning themselves. There was a time when smaller nations in Asia were part of the NAM. With global power shifting in the Indo-Pacific Region, their respective neutral stances may become a thing of the past.  What’s more, this shift from neutrality is happening simultaneously in Europe and Asia, giving rise to the question: “Will Asia’s challenges be Europe’s and vice-versa?” Europe neutral no longer Sweden’s 200-year-long policy of non-alignment, that outlasted both World Wars, is now history. Sweden and Switzerland have not been in a state of war internationally since 1815 and 1814, respectively. Another European country, Finland, adopted a policy of neutrality after World War II, recognized first through a treaty between Finland and the USSR in 1948 (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance).  The Finnish and Swedish departures from neutrality indicate growing military-political polarization and tensions in Europe. History seems to be repeating as confrontation tends to spread and exert pressure on multiple states, including those not actively involved in “taking sides”, to join one or the other side even as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland continue to remain neutral.  What prompts nation states to officially align with or against any major power bloc? Their own defense and security.    An illustration is the ongoing war in Europe where the two neutral states—Finland and Sweden—had to take cover for their very own security.  That is why Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed a Nordic unified air defense agreement aimed at countering Russia’s rising threat by operating jointly to neutralize threats. As per the new scheme of things, NATO will find an alternative corridor through the Baltic Sea for Nordic countries, given the high possibility of Russia sealing the existing Suwalki Gap, a narrow corridor separating Kaliningrad and Lithuania, in the event of increased hostilities.  Relevance of Asia’s neutrality Despite a shift from neutrality to non-neutrality in Europe, non-alignment is very much alive in Asia as India, Indonesia, Thailand and other middle powers have shown. Chances are that neutrality will get a boost once again, with Asia leading it. A 40-year-long ideological conflict established NAM during the Cold War. Today, 120 countries (mostly from Africa and Asia) are on board as its members, 19 nations as observers along with 10 organizations. Together, NAM accounts for 60 percent of the UN.  It all began in April 1955, when government representatives from 29 Asian and African nations took part in what is known as the Bangdung Conference under Indonesian President Sukarno to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development and decolonization. Political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality were the guiding principles of this landmark arrangement also known as ‘Panchsheel’ (five restraints) that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru had adopted to govern Sino-Indian relations. NAM primarily gained prominence during the Cold War; these days, the Global South (GS) is hogging the limelight in the wake of a growing opposition against the US-led West and the Sino-Russian clique. The main global challenges of the present—the Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine crisis, the Sino-American rivalry and the Sino-Indian competition—have made NAP more relevant.  GS can be a powerful platform to raise common concerns and interests of ‘swing states’, amid global conflicts, particularly between the two emerging Asian powers—China and India.  The two countries will surely compete for GS leadership. India’s relatively tensions-free ties with the West and China’s growing diplomatic reach worldwide means the two countries will affect global power dynamics significantly. In this context, it will be relevant to recall part of Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s speech made in January regarding his country’s G20 presidency and GS leadership: “Today, developing countries are worried over issues like rising prices of oil, food and fertilizers. They are also concerned about mounting debt and worsening economic conditions. Thus, it is our duty to become the voice of such countries, known as the GS in diplomatic terms”.  Also, India convened a virtual meeting on January 12-13 themed “Voice of the Global South Summit: for Human-Centric Development” with the participation of 120 leaders and ministers. The virtual session raised issues like global economy and climate change, rising inflation, energy, food issues and debt problems. China did not participate in the event.  More importantly, India held the 18th summit of G20 consisting of neutral countries as well as countries from the rival blocs—the US-led West and the Sino-Russian bloc. India’s growing influence comes at a time when China’s signature project of global significance—the Belt and Road Initiative—seems to be losing steam with debt problems afflicting many developing countries that have become part of the project.  As the Ukraine war rages on, China is seeking a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine, at a time when its ties with the US are at an all-time low. India’s relations with the West are not as hostile as China’s. This means the US-led West may be comfortable with New Delhi leading the GS instead of Beijing, with US foreign policy priorities toward India covering security, defense and technology acting as a bridge between the US and the GS. With more than 1.4bn people, India has become the world’s most populous nation by taking over China for the first time. In terms of the economy, though, India is at a disadvantage as it is just one-sixth of China’s 2022 nominal GDP. GS should not be politicized and focus should be on economic development and improving livelihoods. Receiver-sought assistance for lower-income nations should be a priority. Whoever lands GS leadership will have a greater chance of leading NAM as well, so the race for GS leadership is quite important.  Conclusion Neutralism, also called nonalignment in international relations, meant staying out of the war and all sorts of ideological or political interpretations during the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. US Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had first pursued this isolationist policy during the European wars between France and Great Britain after the French Revolution that followed the peace of 1815. It is more or less like the 20th century policy of neutralism that came as a distinct policy post-World War II. Recently, on February 23, one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly, in its 11th special emergency session, adopted a resolution calling for Russia’s immediate withdrawal in line with the UN Charter. Altogether 141 states stood for the resolution, seven (Belarus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria) stood against it while 32 states, including China, India and Pakistan, abstained. For the US and Europe, ‘abstaining’ can also mean neutrality, offering a dissimilar dimension of neutrality when it comes to the world body’s perception. As a concept that aims to foster an independent foreign policy and peaceful co-existence, NAM is still relevant despite the end of the Cold War.  As in the past, NAM is likely to find it hard to chart out united strategies on many issues arising due to shifts in global geopolitics. GS is essentially developing nations of Asia, Africa and South American countries, a region caught between a rising China and the US as well as its allies that are seeking to curb this rise. President Xi Jingping is likely to court the GS against the US, while India, with its multi-aligned foreign policy, is likely to do its bit to make smaller nations follow its path.  All in all, neutrality is likely to be more relevant in a rapidly-changing world, especially for smaller nations. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand