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Helsinki and Stockholm’s applications of May 2022 to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked the end of neutrality and the policy of non-alignment in Europe.  Finland formally became a member of the bloc on 4 April this year, whereas Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace on 9 May 1994 and Riksdag approved it as part of the political and military structure. Historically, these moves did not destabilize the neutral states of the region.  These moves are a pointer to growing realignment of countries toward two rival blocs vying for global supremacy.  Non-Alignment Policy (NAP) and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) can surely benefit a neutral and mostly underdeveloped world if it manages to forge a united front. Global diplomacy is shifting with a divide between the East and the West, challenging the existing monetary system and strengthening the defense capability of the East. The five founding nations of NAM—Egypt in the Middle East, Ghana in West Africa, India in South Asia, Indonesia in Southeast Asia and former Yugoslavia in Europe—are bolstering their presence in global politics, thanks to the emergence of a formidable Sino-Russian front.  Evolving national security strategies of the US and its allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, should be read against the backdrop of new threats to the US and democracies in Asia. The strategies will seek to keep Chinese power in check while their earlier versions were meant to reduce Soviet power during the Cold War.  The economic success of China over the past 30 years or so has given it strong enough influence to lead the Asian continent by consequently weakening the customary US geopolitical objective and challenging India’s intents of ensuring that the South Asian amphitheater remains free of hegemonic control.  As far as South and Southeast Asia are concerned, NAM encompasses all 10 member-states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) apart from all 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as 10 non-government organizations. It will be contextual to draw from the NAM summit held in Baku (Azerbaijan) on October 25-26, 2019. The summit stood for “Upholding the Bandung principles to ensure a concerted and adequate response to the challenges of the contemporary world”, recognizing that history reoccurs but with different undertones in a new geostrategic environment. The Baku declaration is likely to resonate at the 2023 summit to be held in Uganda, at a time of increased confrontations between Asian powers China and India and competition for supremacy between the US and China, marking a tectonic shift in geopolitics to the Indo-Pacific Region. Europe played a key role in the Cold War, while in Cold War 2.0, Asia will helm a similar role. In its earlier edition, the US-Soviet contest and European-Soviet played out, while Cold War 2.0 will see Sino-US competition and Sino-Indian dissension. Amid an unprecedented security scenario in Europe, where neutrality is becoming a thing of the past, smaller nations of the continent seem to be repositioning themselves. There was a time when smaller nations in Asia were part of the NAM. With global power shifting in the Indo-Pacific Region, their respective neutral stances may become a thing of the past.  What’s more, this shift from neutrality is happening simultaneously in Europe and Asia, giving rise to the question: “Will Asia’s challenges be Europe’s and vice-versa?” Europe neutral no longer Sweden’s 200-year-long policy of non-alignment, that outlasted both World Wars, is now history. Sweden and Switzerland have not been in a state of war internationally since 1815 and 1814, respectively. Another European country, Finland, adopted a policy of neutrality after World War II, recognized first through a treaty between Finland and the USSR in 1948 (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance).  The Finnish and Swedish departures from neutrality indicate growing military-political polarization and tensions in Europe. History seems to be repeating as confrontation tends to spread and exert pressure on multiple states, including those not actively involved in “taking sides”, to join one or the other side even as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland continue to remain neutral.  What prompts nation states to officially align with or against any major power bloc? Their own defense and security.    An illustration is the ongoing war in Europe where the two neutral states—Finland and Sweden—had to take cover for their very own security.  That is why Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden signed a Nordic unified air defense agreement aimed at countering Russia’s rising threat by operating jointly to neutralize threats. As per the new scheme of things, NATO will find an alternative corridor through the Baltic Sea for Nordic countries, given the high possibility of Russia sealing the existing Suwalki Gap, a narrow corridor separating Kaliningrad and Lithuania, in the event of increased hostilities.  Relevance of Asia’s neutrality Despite a shift from neutrality to non-neutrality in Europe, non-alignment is very much alive in Asia as India, Indonesia, Thailand and other middle powers have shown. Chances are that neutrality will get a boost once again, with Asia leading it. A 40-year-long ideological conflict established NAM during the Cold War. Today, 120 countries (mostly from Africa and Asia) are on board as its members, 19 nations as observers along with 10 organizations. Together, NAM accounts for 60 percent of the UN.  It all began in April 1955, when government representatives from 29 Asian and African nations took part in what is known as the Bangdung Conference under Indonesian President Sukarno to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development and decolonization. Political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality were the guiding principles of this landmark arrangement also known as ‘Panchsheel’ (five restraints) that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and his Indian counterpart Jawaharlal Nehru had adopted to govern Sino-Indian relations. NAM primarily gained prominence during the Cold War; these days, the Global South (GS) is hogging the limelight in the wake of a growing opposition against the US-led West and the Sino-Russian clique. The main global challenges of the present—the Covid-19 pandemic, Ukraine crisis, the Sino-American rivalry and the Sino-Indian competition—have made NAP more relevant.  GS can be a powerful platform to raise common concerns and interests of ‘swing states’, amid global conflicts, particularly between the two emerging Asian powers—China and India.  The two countries will surely compete for GS leadership. India’s relatively tensions-free ties with the West and China’s growing diplomatic reach worldwide means the two countries will affect global power dynamics significantly. In this context, it will be relevant to recall part of Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s speech made in January regarding his country’s G20 presidency and GS leadership: “Today, developing countries are worried over issues like rising prices of oil, food and fertilizers. They are also concerned about mounting debt and worsening economic conditions. Thus, it is our duty to become the voice of such countries, known as the GS in diplomatic terms”.  Also, India convened a virtual meeting on January 12-13 themed “Voice of the Global South Summit: for Human-Centric Development” with the participation of 120 leaders and ministers. The virtual session raised issues like global economy and climate change, rising inflation, energy, food issues and debt problems. China did not participate in the event.  More importantly, India held the 18th summit of G20 consisting of neutral countries as well as countries from the rival blocs—the US-led West and the Sino-Russian bloc. India’s growing influence comes at a time when China’s signature project of global significance—the Belt and Road Initiative—seems to be losing steam with debt problems afflicting many developing countries that have become part of the project.  As the Ukraine war rages on, China is seeking a peaceful settlement between Russia and Ukraine, at a time when its ties with the US are at an all-time low. India’s relations with the West are not as hostile as China’s. This means the US-led West may be comfortable with New Delhi leading the GS instead of Beijing, with US foreign policy priorities toward India covering security, defense and technology acting as a bridge between the US and the GS. With more than 1.4bn people, India has become the world’s most populous nation by taking over China for the first time. In terms of the economy, though, India is at a disadvantage as it is just one-sixth of China’s 2022 nominal GDP. GS should not be politicized and focus should be on economic development and improving livelihoods. Receiver-sought assistance for lower-income nations should be a priority. Whoever lands GS leadership will have a greater chance of leading NAM as well, so the race for GS leadership is quite important.  Conclusion Neutralism, also called nonalignment in international relations, meant staying out of the war and all sorts of ideological or political interpretations during the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. US Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson had first pursued this isolationist policy during the European wars between France and Great Britain after the French Revolution that followed the peace of 1815. It is more or less like the 20th century policy of neutralism that came as a distinct policy post-World War II. Recently, on February 23, one year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UN General Assembly, in its 11th special emergency session, adopted a resolution calling for Russia’s immediate withdrawal in line with the UN Charter. Altogether 141 states stood for the resolution, seven (Belarus, Democratic Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua, Russia and Syria) stood against it while 32 states, including China, India and Pakistan, abstained. For the US and Europe, ‘abstaining’ can also mean neutrality, offering a dissimilar dimension of neutrality when it comes to the world body’s perception. As a concept that aims to foster an independent foreign policy and peaceful co-existence, NAM is still relevant despite the end of the Cold War.  As in the past, NAM is likely to find it hard to chart out united strategies on many issues arising due to shifts in global geopolitics. GS is essentially developing nations of Asia, Africa and South American countries, a region caught between a rising China and the US as well as its allies that are seeking to curb this rise. President Xi Jingping is likely to court the GS against the US, while India, with its multi-aligned foreign policy, is likely to do its bit to make smaller nations follow its path.  All in all, neutrality is likely to be more relevant in a rapidly-changing world, especially for smaller nations. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

A significant body of reliable data suggests that Asia will reshape the world order in the 21st century. A flurry of visits of prominent strategic figures and their statements point to a changing order, apart from some of the recent happenings. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) accountable for economic stability and peaceful coexistence in the world, attacked Ukraine, citing ‘a threat to its national security’, purportedly from the US-led West. This in itself was a strong enough indication of the importance of Asia in the global scheme of things. In Asia, Southeast Asia is strategically viable and East Asia is geo-strategically vital, whereas South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East are viable regions for expansion of influence for the formation of two power blocs’. These rival blocs under the global superpower US and emerging superpower China and Russia will, in all likelihood, engage in a fresh ideological conflict in the name of ‘communism’ versus ‘democracy’ for global supremacy using their hard, soft and smart power, marking the commencement of Cold War 2.0. This bipolar conflict between Sino-Russian and the US-led Western camps stands as a geopolitical challenge for swing states, which form a majority in the comity of nations. They will have have to take sides by undermining their aspirations for stability, prosperity and coexistence through bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral regional or international organizational mechanisms, for or against what the West has been describing as the “rule-based international order”. This strikes at the very core of the perception of neutrality espoused during the Cold War through the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which accounts for 60 percent of the UN member-states. Most of the 120 NAM member-states are from Africa and Asia, while another 19 nations are observers, apart from 10 organizations. China’s scheme of world order China, together with its ally Russia,  has been making its presence felt in the global arena, especially in recent weeks. Together, the two countries are challenging the post-1945 international order marked by interventions and sanctions by reviving global institutions in their interest. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and increasing economic clout, there are fears that a rising China will overturn the US-dominated global order. Taking cognizance of this, the US National Security Strategy has described China and Russia as competitors, apart from presenting a narrative of a world divided between democracies and autocracies, implying that those in the middle should be persuaded or pressured to choose sides. Whereas China’s real battle for supremacy is about understanding the differences of what China-led democracy and human rights means. In this scheme of things, the middle powers aspiring to be influencers in global politics—Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Africa and Turkey—place themselves not as swing states. Nonetheless, they are having to appease both China and the US. India’s relationship with Russia and the West gives it a strategic opportunity to subside the challenge of China’s dominations in the region and branch out its rising volume of trade and defense dependability on Beijing. Against this backdrop, notably, Chinese President XI Jingping and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida visited rival nations Russia, Ukraine and India at about the same time. These visits also highlight the significance of multilateralism, globalization and the shift in the global geostrategic environment. The Economist noted that these events opened a window onto the ‘world according to Xi’. The visit of Xi has brought about not only formidable hostility but an opportunity for China and the European Union to work hand in hand for peace and economic revival in the region. French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission Chief Ursula von der Leyen are in China as part of a double-header diplomacy to end the war, reconnect with the world and revive French as well as European economies and safeguard the continent’s interests in the Indo-Pacific Region. Macron’s visit outlines “shared responsibility for peace and stability” in Ukraine. China, with its close relationship with Russia reaffirmed in recent days, can play a major role in bringing about peace. The White House said that Macron discussed his trip to China and support for Ukraine during a phone call with President Joe Biden with the hope to “obtain from the Chinese a contribution to the global effort of North-South solidarity” and to build “a common agenda” on climate and biodiversity. In a speech at the World Economic Forum, EC Chief Leyen said future relations with China, the biggest trading partner with Europe, will focus on “de-risk not decoupling”. The EU leaders’ commitments clash as the visit coincides with a meeting between Taiwan President Tsai Ing-win and US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. About the US-Taiwan engagement, Beijing said it will “closely monitor the situation and firmly defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity”, and warned McCarthy that he would be “playing with fire” by meeting Tsai. An increasing presence of China in the Persian Gulf through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the entry of Saudi Arabia as an SCO observer state and its role as global truce broker—manifested through its role in re-establishing diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh after seven years of bitter resentment—point at a concerted effort to change the ‘Middle Eastern disorder’. Various conflicts in the Middle East have, at their root, the power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, flanked by Israel and the US. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is part of Chinese soft power projection in the Middle East, exhibited also through Xi’s visit to Riyadh in December 2022 and hosting the president of Iran in February. The recent China visit of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil, Latin America’s largest trading partner, reflects on the two countries’ initiatives toward a new world order. President Lula’s recent visit, which follows his trips to Beijing in 2003 and in 2011 as president, comes as a fresh start after his predecessor Bolsonaro’s alienation in the international front—in a departure from Brazil’s image as a jewel of Latin American statecraft, a global climate leader and soft power heavyweight. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) are two sides of the same coin thrown for a beginning of a new monetary exchange and the collective defense mechanism. India and South Africa will not reject the approach as both nations are forging a multi-alignment foreign policy with democracy as a value-based political system. Xi’s visit to India in July to attend the SCO conference is another attempt to re-establish cordial relationship between Modi and Xi. In Southeast Asia, Singapore has agreed with China to upgrade ties paving the way for hi-tech cooperation, reaffirming to uphold the rule-based multilateral trade system, ensure stable and smooth operation of the global supply chain, investment, the digital economy, food security, finance and aviation with water and environmental projects. This reflects a “desire to set the strategic direction and chart the development of bilateral relations going forward”. In the meantime, Malaysia and China have agreed to negotiate over the ongoing territorial dispute in the South China Sea. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have counterclaims over  Beijing’s claim over the key waterway through which $3trn trade takes place annually. China does not recognise the arbitration decision of not having legal basis for Beijing’s claim. Amid rising differences in Europe, negotiations are taking place in Southeast Asia with an improved relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with the main focus on the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. At the same time, tensions are building up in the immediate neighborhood of Nepal with China ‘renaming’ 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh in the Himalayas, bordering China and India. This isn’t the first time; similar events  happened in 2017 and 2021 as well. The first border clash between China and India occurred on 15 June 2020, after a break of 45 years. Since then, frequent border intrusions have been taking place through infrastructure development, military deployments and capability enhancement. Amid rising tensions between the two Asian giants, the US State Department said: “Arunachal Pradesh is Indian territory and the US strongly opposes China’s unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims through incursions, be it in military or civilian, across the Line of Actual Control”. Russia's new foreign policy strategy identifies China and India as main allies. India and Russia maintained a close strategic, military, economic and diplomatic interaction during the Cold War. Both refer to this alliance as “unique and privileged”. Contradicting with the US and the West, China will also appeal to the voices of the Global South with preferences for reviving of NAM. US and the West in the rivalry More than a year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, the US has been the largest donor with close to $50bn in security, economic and humanitarian assistance. Western financial and military backing has been robust with an international coalition of partners, including the European Union and other members of the G7. The US is pushing the Group of Seven countries to take joint action against China if Beijing engages in economic coercion against the group's partners. The method of warfighting has changed, the method of backing and opposition are based on interests, not on international principles and law. For example, Russia has taken over the rotating presidency after 14 months of aggression, an arrest warrant being issued by the International Criminal Court for President Vladimir Putin and Moscow planning to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to neighboring Belarus. Russia also headed the presidency in February 2022 when Moscow launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine when the body was responsible for maintaining peace and combatting acts of international aggression. This in return is questioning the role of the UNSC, the UN’s most powerful organ. Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba called Russia’s presidency of the UNSC a “slap in the face to the international community”. President Zelensky said it was time for a general overhaul of global institutions, including the UNSC. Amid a rising influence of China in Southeast Asia, the sole superpower is not sitting back, with Washington and the Philippines announcing plans to expand the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to comprise four new sites—Naval Base Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan. This presence has strategic implications in the region and geostrategic outcomes in global politico diplomacy. A US Department of Defence press release issued on 3 April hailed it as a “big day for a core pillar of the US-Philippine alliance”, pointing that “four new EDCA sites will help us work together even more closely to meet the challenges we share." Also not to be lost is the fact that three countries—Japan, South Korea and the US—after five years, went on board on a joint anti-submarine exercise in the waters of Korean peninsula Lelu islands for a deterrence against growing threats from North Korea, a close ally of China. Causing obvious unease for China, the Taiwanese President on her visit to the US said: “It is self-evident that the peace we have maintained and the democracy we have worked so hard to build face unprecedented challenges.” Echoing President Reagan’s catchphrase of “peace through strength”, she said that “we are stronger when we work together”, calling for greater US-Taiwan defense, trade and economic cooperation. McCarthy said the relations between Taipei and Washington had “never been stronger”, indicating US bipartisan support for the move. “NATO’s door is open to more cooperation if India seeks that, NATO is more than happy to sit down anytime with India” said Ambassador Julianne Smith, US envoy to NATO in an informal exchange with Indian counterparts. But the fact is that joint defense exercises with most of the NATO members are proceeding in the Indo-Pacific Region, whether it is in the continental or maritime by the super, global, emerging, rising or small powers. It is just a matter of a short notice and arrangements that will permit for NATO to arrive at the IPR. Conclusion Some of the key factors underpinning the current global geostrategic environment point that the world order is shifting. Sources of grievance and conflict have been fortified by national interests rather than principles and values. War and peace have been prioritized when questions are arising for the sphere of influence and role that powers can play in global politics. There is a division regarding the “rules-based order and democracy”. Rival blocs in the making under China and the US are once again pointing to an evolving “communism vs democracy” conflict. The challenges facing Asia and events of strategic significance happening in the continent have become a matter of concern for not only Europe, but the whole world. The entry of Saudi Arabia in the SCO as a partner in the political-military forum led by Beijing and Moscow is significant, though the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to continue despite Beijing’s mediation. Nevertheless, China has managed to bring Washington’s ally into its orbit changing the strategic dynamics of the Middle East security architecture and the much-needed resources at its own backyard. The main focus of India’s geostrategic narrative is Tibet, Southeast Asians and the US. China will build a second narrative of smaller nations with nationalism of Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim in the Himalayas in addition the Maldives and Sri Lanka in the maritime and Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Summing up, the projection of global power—hard, soft or smart—will shift to the Indo-Pacific Region, with the US-China rivalry fueling it. The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

A deterrence to some nations is provocation to others. The world is divided and the US competition with both China and Russia is seeing a surge. Flouting international principles, Russia, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, opted for aggression against Ukraine, citing increasing foreign influence in its sphere of influence.  Amid this, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterrus is laying stress on the importance of multilateralism and globalization for global stability and prosperity. Despite a large majority of the UN General Assembly adopting a resolution calling for an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine in February 2023, we continue to live amid ‘widespread death, destruction and displacement’. President Xi Jingping’s visit to Moscow and talks with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin is the 40th in-person engagement between the two in the last decade. This friendship between Beijing and Moscow is to a greater extent political in words than realpolitik in deeds. In international relations, all correlation has precincts and is grounded on strategic national interests. Xi’s visit comes when the West nods to reduce Russia’s military capability and economic condition to a certain brink is being taken as one of the objectives to minimize Russia’s provocations and President Putin’s mistrust. China is challenging this with lethal assistance to Moscow to exasperate the US, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). China is performing a title role resembling the role that the US played throughout the Cold War to position China and Russia in separate races, pursuing their interests even if ideologically inclined. But the geostrategic environment and strategic interests were very dissimilar back then.   XI’s visit to Russia came with China-brokered historic deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which offered an important peace-building opportunity for the two countries deep-seated in their doctrines, tangled in history and pursued via proxies across the Middle East. The reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Tehran and Riyadh after seven years of bitter resentment has highlighted China’s role as a global truce-broker. This reflects China’s willingness to leverage economic clout in third-party negotiations, rejecting former reformist Deng Xiaoping’s non-interventionist mantra (hide your strengths and bide your time). Two, it marks the beginning of China’s expansion with probability of geostrategic alteration in the Persian Gulf in search for a new Middle East security order. Lastly, the viability of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCO growth will be a serious challenge to the US-led world order.  Against this backdrop comes Xi’s call for the Central Asian nations’ first summit, right after his return from Moscow. This shows China’s willingness to engage all countries in the region regardless of their association with one bloc or the other.  Takeaway of XI’s visit Xi’s Moscow visit resulted in strengthening of bilateral ties covering diverse facets like the economy, trade, technology and energy, highlighting Beijing’s desire to stick to globalization, multilateralism and internationalism.  China came with more of a peace proposal than a position for peace. There was little support in Eurasia and Europe amid Kyiv’s mention of the “new geopolitical realities” of Ukrainian lands occupied by Moscow. Ukraine declined the proposal and reiterated that Russian forces should pull out in accordance with the norms of international law and the UN charter.  Resolving the conflict, though talked about, was not included in the proposal. The main focus was on building a new world order and alignment against the US as a major threat by promoting “multipolar world” and on working together to “safeguard the international system—the UN” with a recognition that global power dynamics are shifting with a declining West and an ascending China. Xi said during the goodbye handshake “Together, we should push forward these changes that have not happened for 100 years. Take care”.  Developing military trust and defense ties to counter the strengthening of NATO with the Indo-Pacific nations, and activities of QUAD and AUKUS would undermine regional peace and stability in Asia.  On the economy and energy buildup, with little choices other than to accept Chinese offers, Moscow voiced its keenness to support Chinese businesses replacing western enterprises, energy partnership and cooperation in advancing projects in oil, gas, coal, electricity and nuclear energy with “new network supply chains” also through Mongolia. Both nations have profited with bilateral trade upsurge that accounts for almost a third of all Russian exports and Moscow’s emergence as China’s top oil supplier. Notably, the two countries have agreed to seek to increase their use of the local currency yuan rather than the US dollar for cross-border trade, including in oil and gas. Amid the emergence of blocs in the context of the Ukraine war, China’s regional neighbor Japan threw support behind Kyiv.  Visits to rival capitals Recent visits of President Xi and Japanese PM Fumio Kishida have strategic implications in foreign policy and the region, given that they represent the world’s second and third largest economies. These visits come barely a month after Sino-Japan security talks in Tokyo. While Beijing is concerned about Japan’s military buildup, Tokyo is also critical of China’s military ties with Russia.  While forging the ‘blueprint for China-Russia coordination’, Xi’s 12-point paper presented to Putin is a guideline or a position rather than a proposal. Putin praised the peace proposal, while Ukraine’s allies rejected it. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the “world should not be fooled” by a potential Sino-Russian peace plan that would ‘freeze’ in place the territories seized by Russian forces. The other focal issue was calling on the partners and counterparts in third countries to use the yuan as an alternative to the American dollar for mutual trade. Putin said, “we are in favor of using the Chinese yuan for trade between Russia and other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”. Reading between the lines, China appears bent on ‘soft power’ projection and has reinforced its dominance over Russia and as a beneficiary economically securing comprehensive trade agreements with cheap energy resources. In return, Putin has secured the much-needed patronage over Ukraine and just received a warrant from the International Criminal Court. Though the Chinese claim to be neutral, they are leaning more toward Russia as “great neighboring powers” against the west and appear determined to strengthen their global influence.  Coinciding with Xi’s Russia visit came Kishida’s visit to Ukraine. He is the first head of government of the G7 grouping to visit a country in conflict since World War II. Kishida’s visit to Kyiv and Bucha, where hundreds of civilians were killed by Russian forces, was meant to “show respect to the courage and patience of the Ukrainian people who are standing up to defend their homeland... and show solidarity and unwavering support”. Japan has contributed over $7bn to Ukraine and accepted over 2,000 displaced Ukrainians.   In New Delhi, while inviting PM Modi to attend the G7 meet in May, Kishida called for developing and Global South countries to raise their voices to defend the rules-based international order, help stop Russian war and action plans for a new Indo-Pacific initiative for a greater security and economic cooperation aimed at countering China’s influence in the region. As part of Japan’s new national security strategy adopted in December, 2022, it includes the use of development aid more strategically in support of like-minded emerging economies and infrastructure cooperation. In the defense realm, it includes deployment of long-range cruise missiles to strengthen its strike-back capability, support for maritime security and a provision of coast guard patrol boats and equipment.  The visit has four subtexts. One, the Asian powers in Europe’s conflict signify the importance of globalization in addition to echoing the linkages between European and Asian democracies and autocracies having geostrategic significance. Predicaments are well-observed in Taiwan, which is in the close vicinity of Japan, which recently held a summit with South Korea in more than a decade to normalize ties and forge a united front against North Korea. Two, Japan’s reassurance of its backing to the strategic ally (the US) and the West’s appeals in the context of this geopolitical turmoil. Third is the prevailing competition between China and Japan in East Asia leading to the uncertainty of neutrality and re-alignment when the global powers focus in the Indo-Pacific Region. Fourth is the reconstruction and humanitarian aid with ‘absolute rejection of Russia’s one-sided change to the status quo by invasion and force’. To conclude, it is an economic and image buildup to China. Xi brushed off Western criticism of his growing ties with Putin: “It is China’s strategic choice and will not change due to a temporary incident.” Chinese state media also reported, “Consolidating and developing China-Russia relations is China’s strategic choice made on the basis of its fundamental interests”.  The Xi-Putin summit did not produce a clear pathway on settling the Ukraine crisis as there was no confession that Russian invasion and military actions created the grounds for enduring violence and humanitarian crisis.   Firstly, the summit was part of ongoing efforts to advance a world order that counters Washington’s democratic allies, building on mistrust toward the US. Remarkably, China refused to join the blockade against Russia, providing Moscow with diplomatic, political and economic support instead. Secondly, Moscow is more isolated at the global stage and feeling the pain of sanctions while China is more likely to augment its global impression than truly safeguarding an arrangement to end the war as an impartial peace broker. Lastly, China will use this occasion to secure its position in Central Asia, Russia’s sphere of influence, to weaken Russia’s ties with India, one of China’s key rivals in South Asia. But it will, most likely,  fail to move the needle when it comes to ending the war.  The West and Russia with China are turning the war in Ukraine into a global contest, the aftermath of which will determine who gets to set the global political and economic rules for the coming decades.  The author is a Strategic Analyst, Major General (Retd) of the Nepali Army, and is associated with Rangsit University, Thailand

US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland is on a visit to the Middle East and South Asia. Her stopovers in South Asia and the Middle East point at the significance of respective countries in the United States’ global and regional scheme of things. In Nepal, her first stop, Nuland sought to acquaint with the new political parties and the new administration. US engagement with and commitment to Nepal is not unaccustomed and ought not be undervalued. Nepal should comprehend the goodness in the relationship rather than giving it a political color. It is also an opportunity to strengthen Nepal’s foreign policy by having a cordial relationship with both the immediate neighbors while utilizing US support and accepting efforts for enhancing development commitments to convening the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. The US can be a reliable partner in utilizing the resources for boosting the economy and enriching the national image. It is evident that the US is looking at Nepal to enhance cooperation and coordinate efforts for strengthening democratic appeals, enriching human rights and promoting the state policy as per Article 51 of the Constitution. Her next stop, India, is a rising power in the region and holds significance in conjunction with bilateral, regional and global issues. The trip also takes her to Sri Lanka, a country in need of support to stabilize the economy, protect human rights and promote reconciliation. Qatar, the next stop, has remained a strategic partner for peace and stability in the Middle East and the liabilities of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In all, the trip is a reflection of wide-ranging American interests in Asia.