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When I first tasted fresh sumac at the spice market in Istanbul, the tangy flavor instantly transported me back to my childhood in Nepal. It reminded me of ‘bhakamilo’ (Rhus javanica Miller), a local Nepali berry we used to snack on during childhood after swimming in the Kahu Khola river. To my surprise, bhakamilo and sumac share a familial connection, both belonging to the Rhus genus in the Anacardiaceae family. While sumac (Rhus coriaria) is a staple in Middle Eastern cuisine, bhakamilo remains an underappreciated gem in Nepal. 

Sumac and bhakamilo are shrubs known for their vibrant berries and aromatic foliage. While sumac grows across the Mediterranean, bhakamilo thrives in the foothills of the Himalayas, between 800 and 1200 meters. Both are members of the Anacardiaceae family, which also includes mangoes, pistachios, and cashews. Bhakamilo is commonly found on hill slopes and forested areas of Nepal, flourishing in the temperate climate. Despite its abundance, its culinary potential remains largely untapped.

Bhakamilo holds a nostalgic place in traditional Nepali life. For many of us, its tangy taste evokes memories of carefree childhood days spent exploring forests and indulging in wild edibles. The reddish berries, often consumed fresh, offered a burst of tartness that became synonymous with rural living. However, unlike sumac, which has found its way into spice blends like za’atar and is widely used in Middle Eastern cuisine, Bhakamilo has not been integrated into Nepali culinary practices beyond its role as a wild berry snack.

In Middle Eastern cuisine, sumac is celebrated for its lemony flavor, often used to brighten salads, kebabs, and rice dishes. Bhakamilo could serve a similar purpose in Nepali cuisine. Its tanginess could enhance dishes like gundruk ko achar (fermented leafy green pickle) or kwati (mixed bean soup), adding a refreshing acidity that complements earthy flavors.

Bhakamilo’s versatility extends beyond traditional recipes. It could be used in marinades, dry rubs, or dressings for meats such as lamb or duck, much like it enhances fatty meats in Levantine dishes. Additionally, it could be sprinkled over salads, stirred into yogurt, or even incorporated into rice dishes. Its potential to bridge traditional and modern culinary styles makes it an exciting ingredient for chefs and home cooks alike.

Bhakamilo is rich in antioxidants, particularly tannins and anthocyanins, which contribute to its vibrant color and astringent taste. Traditional medicine in Nepal has long used bhakamilo for digestive ailments, sore throats, and inflammation. Its natural acidity stimulates digestion, making it a valuable addition to pickles and fermented foods. As scientific studies increasingly highlight the health benefits of sumac, including its anti-inflammatory and antimicrobial properties, bhakamilo could gain recognition as a wellness-enhancing ingredient.

As Nepali cuisine evolves, the time is right to reintroduce bhakamilo. Its tangy flavor and cultural significance make it a promising addition to contemporary dishes. Similar to za’atar, a spice mix using ground bhakamilo, herbs, roasted sesame seeds, and salt could create a distinctly Nepali seasoning. This blend could enhance flatbreads, salads, or marinades.

Nepal’s tradition of pickling could benefit from bhakamilo’s acidity. Incorporating it into chutneys and pickles would add a unique tang. Ground bhakamilo could be used as a garnish for dishes like sekuwa (grilled meat), choila (spiced meat salad), or bhuteko bhat (fried rice), providing both flavor and visual appeal.

Its sourness pairs well with creamy textures, making it an ideal addition to yogurt-based dips and sauces. Bhakamilo’s tang could elevate desserts such as rice puddings or fruit salads, offering a creative fusion of flavors.

Reintroducing bhakamilo into Nepali cuisine presents both challenges and opportunities. Its limited culinary awareness requires education for chefs, home cooks, and food enthusiasts. Additionally, harvesting and processing bhakamilo on a commercial scale might be challenging due to its specific habitat. However, the global interest in foraged and indigenous ingredients presents an opportunity for Nepal to position bhakamilo as a niche product with cultural and commercial value.

Local farmers, cooperatives, and entrepreneurs could play a pivotal role in bringing bhakamilo to market. Its potential as a culinary ingredient, combined with its health benefits, makes it an attractive proposition for both domestic and international markets.

Bhakamilo is a symbol of Nepal’s rich biodiversity and culinary heritage. Rediscovering its potential could reconnect the younger generation to their cultural roots through food. As Nepal’s cuisine continues to expand its horizons, embracing bhakamilo could serve as a bridge between tradition and innovation.

By exploring its diverse applications, Nepal can preserve the flavor of bhakamilo for future generations while introducing it to a global audience. This humble berry has the potential to become a staple spice, enriching dishes with its unique taste and connecting people to the vibrant landscapes where it grows.

The author is a UK-based R&D chef

The Asia-Pacific region has been grappling with a troubling trend of democratic backsliding. However, strengthening political participation among youths in the region can serve as a bulwark against the erosion of democratic norms.

This message was echoed by youth leaders who joined the Asia Center-led regional dialogue “Youth Voices, Strong Choices: Political Participation in the Asia-Pacific,” co-convened with the Global Democracy Coalition and Club de Madrid on 26 November 2024.

Apart from youth leaders, the event also brought together representatives from IGOs, INGOs and CSOs based in Thailand. With a total of 41 representatives, the event offered an opportunity for all present to share their views, present their activities and engage with youth beneficiaries.

Voicing their concerns, youth from Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Malaysia expressed their frustration at being excluded from political participation. They felt that if this concern can be addressed, youth can effectively contribute toward halting the democratic backsliding in Asia.

Among the challenges, they pointed out, was the lack of effort to remove barriers that hinder their participation within political parties. This includes the absence of youth engagement from rural communities and economically-disadvantaged groups who remain visibly disengaged from urban political party activities. The noticeable lack of representation from the working-class and marginalized communities has exposed the structural economic and political lack-of-resources barriers hindering youth participation within political parties in the Asia-Pacific region.

Even when youths hold decision-making roles, such as in parliament, young parliamentarians often face challenges in gaining influence within their parties and are kept from leadership roles. As a result, their potential to drive significant reforms or shape policies is frequently stifled, limiting their ability to advocate for the issues that matter most to youth and marginalised communities.

They also often lack the necessary resources and institutional support to build their capacity and sustain meaningful engagement in political settings. This lack of support manifests in various ways, including limited access to mentorship, insufficient opportunities for professional development and a scarcity of funding or logistical resources to carry out their initiatives.

Without these, young people often find it difficult to navigate the complexities of political systems, build strategic alliances or effectively champion their causes. The absence of such support further reinforces the barriers to youth involvement in politics, leaving young parliamentarians isolated and vulnerable to political marginalization.

To overcome these challenges, the youth gathered presented some ideas on how to build a culture of political engagement among the young people in the region.

First, promoting education and awareness programs that emphasise the importance of youth participation in democratic processes, human rights issues affecting them and their communities, and the value of civic responsibility is essential. Initiatives such as the Experiential Citizenship Education Programs for Schools, and Life Skills Development by CMCA (Children’s Movement for Civic Awareness) in India provide an opportunity for young adolescents and youths to engage in democratic processes at the grassroots level.

Second, establishing quality leadership and mentorship development programs helps equip young people with the skills and confidence necessary to engage in democratic processes and constructive advocacy within their societies. Toward this end, initiatives like the Women and Youth in Democracy Initiative (WYDE) Network of Young Decision-makers in Malaysia offer a platform for young leaders to build their capacity.

Third, creating or strengthening youth participation platforms such as youth councils, youth parliaments, and youth advisory boards, is crucial to ensure young people have a voice in democratic governance and decision-making. The Children’s Assembly in South Korea, for example, serves as a strong model of youth parliament, allowing youths to participate in the legislative process by proposing and debating solutions to real-world issues.

Finally, these initiatives must be complemented by policies that address the specific needs and challenges faced by youth, particularly those from marginalized communities, with legal and financial support to ensure meaningful opportunities for empowerment. Save the Children’s Adolescent and Youth Empowerment in Sri Lanka is an example of support for technical leadership aimed at ethical child participation, which feeds into governance and national-level practices.

In addition to these initiatives, it is also essential to rethink how youth can apply digital activism to build grassroots awareness about key challenges and direct electoral participation, providing a platform where youths can voice their concerns, share experiences and collaborate on solutions. This shift is particularly important in addressing the persistent barriers that continue to hinder youth participation in democratic processes, which remain dominated by an older generation that holds key decision-making positions.

By addressing the barriers that hinder youth participation in democratic processes, the gathering affirmed the need for constructive communication and active youth participation, along with providing youth with resources to sustain their momentum on a long-term basis.

The role of student movements and civil society collaborations in fostering collective action has proven successful in some instances, such as in Hong Kong, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Empowering youth is therefore not just a necessity; it is a crucial step toward building a more inclusive and resilient democracy to prevent further democratic backsliding. To this end, it is important to continue building a culture of democratic and civic participation among young people in the region.

In 2024, Nepal experienced significant turbulence both domestically and in foreign relations. In July, CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli assumed the Office of the Prime Minister for the third time, supported by the largest party, Nepali Congress (NC). Despite forming a numerically strong government, the coalition has struggled to instill hope for stability. Doubts persist about the government’s longevity, despite leaders from both NC and UML insisting it will last until the 2027 national elections. Economically, Nepal’s struggles continued, showing little improvement. While external economic indicators improved slightly, domestic challenges remained unaddressed.

 Relations with China and the US remained stable, but ties with India deteriorated. Nepal’s engagement with long-standing development partners progressed steadily. The Oli administration promised economic reforms, improved service delivery, job creation, and fostering optimism among youth. Additionally, NC and UML pledged to amend the constitution based on lessons from its implementation. However, progress on these fronts remained limited.

Economic stagnation persisted, with some gains in the stock market overshadowed by poor revenue collection and low capital expenditure. The continued practice of last-minute expenditure resulted in inefficient investment and inflationary pressures. The real estate sector, a significant revenue source, remained in decline, with annual revenues dropping from Rs 70bn pre-covid to Rs. 46bn. In contrast, tourism rebounded robustly. Data from Nepal Tourism Board revealed that 1,104,702 tourists visited Nepal in 2024, returning the industry to pre-pandemic levels.

Despite these improvements, general pessimism grew as thousands of youths sought opportunities abroad for education and employment. Public services showed little improvement, leaving citizens disillusioned. Promised constitutional amendments remain stalled, with NC and UML yet to form the joint mechanism required to initiate the process. The government’s slow progress on its commitments is fostering doubts about its ability to deliver.

The coalition faced a major test in September when floods and landslides ravaged the country, causing over 250 deaths and infrastructural losses worth billions. While Prime Minister Oli attended the 79th United Nations General Assembly in New York, his administration’s inadequate disaster response undermined public trust. Effective coordination could have saved lives, but the government’s failure in crisis management became a defining moment of its tenure, eroding its credibility.

Domestically, the arrest of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane for alleged involvement in cooperative fraud, money laundering, and organized crime dominated headlines. Police filed charges in the Kaski district court, but opposition parties, including CPN (Maoist Center) and Lamichhane’s RSP, labeled the arrest politically motivated. Meanwhile, the government faced criticism for shielding NC and UML allies accused of corruption while targeting opposition leaders.

Within the ruling UML, former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s return to active party politics sparked internal debate. Her participation in party programs signaled a comeback, with some leaders encouraging her involvement. The NC saw internal discussions on future leadership, with Shekhar Koirala campaigning for the presidency while the party President Sher Bahadur Deuba remained silent. NC General Secretary and president hopeful Gagan Kumar Thapa announced his candidacy, intensifying the contest. Similarly, the Maoist Center debated whether to reintegrate former Vice President Nanda Kishor Pun Pasang into its ranks.

Transitional justice saw a rare consensus among major parties on the need for a new bill, earning international praise. However, the government failed to appoint officials to transitional justice mechanisms, stalling progress. On the foreign front, Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China in December garnered significant attention. Marking a departure, he chose China for his first foreign visit, as he had in 2016 after awaiting considerable time for an invite from India. During the trip, Nepal signed a framework agreement for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, identifying 10 projects for implementation. China’s lobbying for swift action on these projects underscored its growing influence in Nepal.

Relations with India remained strained. Although bilateral engagements continued, Oli received no invitation to visit India. A notable achievement was a trilateral agreement among Nepal, India and Bangladesh to trade 40 MW electricity, allowing Nepal to sell electricity to a third country for the first time. Despite expectations of improved ties, relations between Oli and the Indian establishment remained lukewarm. Nepal’s relationship with the US remained stable as American officials visited Kathmandu to deepen engagement. However, the perception of US influence in Nepal’s domestic affairs continued to provoke mixed reactions.

Public sentiment grew increasingly pessimistic. Many youth believe the country’s trajectory will worsen, fueling frustration with major political parties. Anti-constitution forces have started gaining traction, exploiting public discontent. Despite their pledge to ensure stability, NC and UML face mounting skepticism about their ability to deliver meaningful change.

The Madhes Province Policy and Planning Commission released a report on Sunday highlighting the high poverty rate and deteriorating Human Development Index (HDI) in Madhes Province. The HDI encompasses factors such as education, health, employment, and infrastructure development that directly impact human life.

According to the report, the multidimensional poverty rate in Madhes is 24.02 percent, compared to the national average of 20 percent. Issues such as food insecurity, inadequate shelter, lack of clothing, and inability to afford medical treatment are categorized under multidimensional poverty. Madhes Province ranks second in both multidimensional poverty and economic poverty, with an economic poverty rate of 22.53 percent.

Despite some improvements, Madhes remains at the bottom of the HDI rankings among provinces. The overall poverty rate and multidimensional poverty rate in Madhes were 27.7 and 47.9 percent respectively in the base year 2018/19. By 2022/23, these rates had improved to 22.53 and 24.02 percent, but they fell short of the target to reduce the overall poverty rate to 21 percent.

Similarly, the HDI increased from 0.421 to 0.519 during the same period. However, Madhes still lags behind other provinces, with Mahottari and Rautahat performing the worst. The first periodic plan aimed to raise per capita income to $1,000, but only $875 was achieved by 2022/23. The plan also targeted an average annual economic growth rate of 9.0 percent, but the actual rate was limited to 2.5 percent due to internal and external challenges.

The report cites the global Covid-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and rising commodity prices, including petroleum, as key factors disrupting supply chains and hindering economic growth. The economic growth rate for Madhes was just 1.5 percent in 2022/23, with a per capita GDP of $868. For the fiscal year 2023/24, growth is estimated at 3.8 percent, with a per capita GDP of $892.

Breaking from the tradition of overly ambitious growth targets, the second periodic plan has adopted a nonlinear least square model to set realistic and achievable economic growth projections. Based on the GDP of 2022/23, the plan forecasts an average economic growth rate of 6.8 percent, with sectoral growth targets of 4.4 percent for the primary sector, 8.8 percent for the secondary sector, and 7.3 percent for the tertiary sector.

Regarding implementation, 60 percent of strategies and 57 percent of action plans have been executed under interrelated and overarching subject areas. Out of 143 proposed programs, 57—or 40 percent—have been implemented. Progress has been observed in only 70 of the 129 set indicators, with no sub-sector apart from forestry and environment exceeding 50 percent progress. Notably, data management and human resource development sub-sectors show no progress, and there is little coordination between climate change initiatives, disaster risk reduction, and indicator achievements.