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Uddhab Pyakurel is Dean and Associate Professor at Kathmandu University. He teaches  Political Sociology at School of Arts Kathmandu University. ApEx talked to him about the various dimensions of the GenZ movement and its aftermath.

How can the latest GenZ movement be understood from a sociological perspective?

The September uprising can be viewed as a public reaction to the attitude and behavior of Nepal’s major state stakeholders. Those who were taught or compelled to believe in the ideal model of governance have long harbored frustration toward the country’s political leadership. Ironically, political leaders themselves contributed to this cynicism. Over the years, while in opposition, they repeatedly told the public that Nepal was a “failed state” incapable of progress, often citing corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and foreign influence in their speeches and writings.

Regardless of their intent this persistent negativism gradually convinced citizens that Nepal’s society and polity were indeed facing severe challenges in governance and development. Even youths who were previously disengaged from political discourse watched these developments closely. When the government imposed a ban on social media, it became a trigger point. The youth mobilized rapidly, not just to understand the discourse but to contribute to it using new technologies and terminologies.

This was how the idea of “GenZ” found resonance in Nepal. Borrowed from the West, the term became a unifying identity for young, tech-savvy citizens with modern education. Thus, the movement found its roots in Nepal’s digital sphere before spilling into the streets.

Some observers hesitate to label the incident as a genuine social or political movement, citing it lasted for less than 48 hours. Yet, it should not be forgotten that within this short span, the movement forced the resignation of Nepal’s government. It was a feat unparalleled even by the revolutions of 1951, the People’s Movement of 1990, or Janaandolan II of 2006.

The extreme state violence on September 8 against peaceful protesters, followed by the unprofessional handling by security forces on September 9, were both deeply unfortunate and condemnable. These events led to chaos and destruction of property. However, compared to recent youth uprisings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the Nepali version maintained a democratic character, operating within the constitutional framework. Even though Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli was compelled to resign and seek refuge at the army barracks, the President took control and steered the transition in line with constitutional procedures.

What are the main goals and aspirations driving the movement?

In today’s capitalist environment, most youths are trained to pursue careers rather than to understand the country’s social realities. Their key concern, therefore, is whether Nepal offers an environment conducive to their aspirations. While the state attempted some reforms along capitalist lines, it failed to communicate its progress effectively. The absence of transparent information channels allowed frustration to deepen across all sections of society.

The September 8 mobilization, however, was driven by modest but powerful goals: systemic reform, transparency, and inclusiveness in governance. The movement directly questioned the political relevance of long-dominant leaders—CPN-UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Maoist Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Beyond anti-corruption slogans, the youth demanded pustantaran (a generational shift in leadership) so they could engage with new, relatable political figures in building a better Nepal.

How have political parties responded to these protests?

Unfortunately, most political parties have responded with reaction rather than reflection. The first few weeks following the protests created a sense of hope for change, as debates emerged around the issues raised by the youth. Gradually, however, party leaders, many of whom had gone silent during the unrest, resurfaced with defensive statements. While some acknowledged the youth’s concerns, no meaningful action followed. Except for the Nepali Congress, no major party initiated a serious internal discussion on pustantaran. None of the senior leaders stepped down. Two months after the protests, party leaders largely resumed business as usual, behaving as if nothing had happened on September 8 and 9. They dismissed the uprising as reactionary or undemocratic, thereby deflecting attention from their own failures to understand public sentiment.

In your opinion, is the government capable of holding elections on March 5?

There is no alternative to holding timely elections in Nepal today. The government was formed with a clear electoral mandate, and polls must be conducted no later than March 5, 2026. These elections will not only restore constitutional legitimacy but also provide a pathway for the change envisioned by the youth. As for capability, there appears to be no major obstacle preventing the government from organizing the elections. While some raise concerns about security, they overlook Nepal’s experience in 2008, when elections were successfully held amid far more difficult circumstances, when over 100 armed groups operated across the country and police posts in rural areas remained closed due to the insurgency. Compared to that period, today’s situation is much more stable and manageable.

What should be the political roadmap moving forward?

To honor the mandate of the youth uprising, Nepal must integrate young aspirations into its political future. A multi-party democracy cannot function without political parties, but it also cannot progress without reforming them. The responsibility now lies squarely with party leaders. They must show genuine gestures of change within their organizations. Amending party constitutions and ensuring internal democracy would send a powerful message to the youth that transformation is possible within the system. This could encourage the generation below 30 to participate meaningfully in politics and governance, which can be a potential win-win for both sides. Unfortunately, the current direction is worrying. The two largest parties in the dissolved House appear confused about the future, focusing more on criticizing the new transitional government than on addressing public grievances. If political leaders continue resisting change, youth anger may escalate, not just against individual leaders but against political parties and the democratic system itself. Such a scenario risks pushing Nepal into another constitutional crisis, threatening political and institutional stability. Let’s hope that wisdom prevails and Nepal avoids such an unfortunate and undemocratic path.

In this age of artificial intelligence, communication has become remarkably efficient at transferring knowledge, skills and disseminating opinions, which has revolutionized the entire socio-economic and political landscape of the country. When citizens become dissatisfied with the government, they voice their concerns through various means of expressions—chiefly newspapers, electronic media, and public speeches at mass gatherings. When the government’s off-color performance draws harsh castigation, the vulnerability to security threat intensifies.

People today are more aware than ever. They judge the entire functioning of the governance system—the power exercise mechanism for the management of the country’s internal and external affairs. In the name of establishing good governance, if it is marked by corruption, unaccountability, impunity, poor leadership and unresponsiveness, the nation becomes vulnerable to insecurity and instability. 

In such a state of vulnerability, overall governance becomes progressively weaker. Weak governance refers to the government’s inability to function effectively, resulting in a loss of trust among its citizens and international community. Once the trust deficit flows on the surface of government—citizen relations, public participation in socio-economic and political development declines. 

Sudan and South Sudan have endured relentless and devastating civil wars because of the utter failure of the public delivery system, widespread corruption, grossly unequal distribution of resources, deep-seated ethnic divisions, and exclusionary governance. Haiti’s frequent leadership changes and rampant corruption are another example of internal conflict resulting from weak governance, which invited insecurity across the country. Ineffective policing and low morale among security personnel allowed criminal gangs to gain control over parts of the capital. 

Even today foreign tourists rarely dare to visit the country, contributing to a continued decline in its economy. These two instances give an eye-opening lesson to all the developing nations about the dire consequences of the government’s failure to establish good governance. If the governance system deteriorates due to the shortsightedness of ruling leaders and ineffective performance of bureaucracy, it creates fertile ground for external powers to exploit such countries for their strategic interests. A country with a weak government is fertile ground for corruption, conflict and foreign interference.

Learning lessons 

In 1990, following the restoration of multiparty democracy, Nepal adopted a neoliberal policy in response to the global wave of liberalization. Liberalization necessitates strong competition across all spheres of national activity, including the economy, social development and political democratization. Competitive strength is gained through the cultivation of a highly skilled human resource base, the production of value-added industrial goods based on national resources, manufacturing of low cost-high value products, maintaining stable national policies, winning the trust of private sector, and upkeeping of a stable, transparent, corruptionless governance and fostering hassle free business environment. 

However, the expected outcomes of the goals envisioned through policies on industrial development, quality education, creation of a corruption-free society, promotion of professional ethics, reduction of inequality between rural and urban populations, modernization of agriculture, and the creation of job opportunities for youth were not materialized to the extent anticipated. In the past, during the election campaign, political parties used to entice voters with ambitious promises—pledging to transform Nepal into a ‘second Singapore’, generate employment and ensure free housing, clothing and food for all Nepali citizens. Unfortunately, such promises were never fulfilled. Rather, the youth were made to leave their homeland to seek employment abroad. as there were limited job opportunities within the country. This situation left young people and others frustrated and dissatisfied. 

Empirical studies reveal that if the public dissatisfaction with the government continues for long, it can pose a serious threat to national security, potentially triggering turbulence resulting through peaceful or violent actions. The GenZ (Nava Yuba) protest on Sept 8 began as a peaceful demonstration. However, under the guise of the GenZ movement, the next day witnessed unlawful activities of arson targeting historic government buildings, private residences, media houses, and business centers followed by looting of public and private property and killing of police personnel amid growing suspicions of infiltration. This was an unprecedented incident in the political history of Nepal. Even during the decade-long Maoist insurgency, no such incident had taken place.

Some politicians and intellectuals opine that the protests and destruction of Sept 9 caused by purported GenZ were orchestrated by foreign powers. But was the unrest truly instigated by external elements? This is indeed a sensitive and serious question. One thing is clear: weak governance invites foreign interference and fuels domestic discontent. No doubt, external actors are always active in attempts to destabilize the government to serve their interests. Nevertheless, it is the solemn duty and responsibility of all Nepali patriots—whether in government or outside it—to be vigilant and resolute in  sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. 

If Nepal becomes economically resilient and technologically advanced, its voice on global platforms will be far stronger than before. In such a case, no foreign power will be able to turn the country into its playground. It is also time to understand why governance remains so fragile in the Sahel region of Africa and how Ukraine has been enduring the ravages of war for the last three years. There are significant lessons to be learnt from their experiences. 

Despite its major mandate to conduct free and fair elections scheduled on 5 March 2026, the government simultaneously should ensure effective governance so that the people’s hopes for a better life do not go in vain.

The Nepali Congress (NC), Nepal’s oldest democratic party, finds itself mired in deep internal divisions. Factional rivalries, leadership disputes, and conflicting ambitions have pushed the organization into disarray. As the party grapples with a leadership crisis and intensifying power struggle, questions are mounting over its ability to present a united front and play an effective national role. The chronic intra-party rift has widened further after Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba named Purna Bahadur Khadka as the acting party president.

Deuba is currently in Singapore for treatment after being seriously injured during the Sept 9 protests, when demonstrators attacked him and set his private residence on fire. On two key issues—the party’s general convention and its position on current national affairs—the NC remains undecided. A power struggle has emerged among the party’s second- and third-tier leaders. Senior figures such as Khadka, Bimalendra Nidhi, and Prakash Man Singh are opposing calls to hold the party convention before the March 5 elections, while the reformist camp, led by General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa, is pushing for early elections within the party structure.

The party has splintered into multiple factions, each seeking to consolidate control. As a result, the organization has become a hostage to indecision, fueling fears of an eventual split. Another worrying sign for the party rank and file is the sharp decline in enthusiasm for renewing active membership. According to party insiders, of the roughly 800,000 members, only about 300,000 have renewed their membership so far, a signal of the party’s weakening grassroots presence. The continued infighting among top leaders, according to many, is likely to deepen frustration among the cadres.

NC General Secretary Bishwo Prakash Sharma has argued that a special general convention becomes mandatory if 54 percent of the general convention representatives formally demand it. He emphasized that the immediate issue is not whether the regular convention is held in Mangsir, Poush, or Baisakh, but whether to respond to the written demand of the majority for a special convention.

“The demand for a special general convention can be addressed only in two ways,” he wrote, “either by holding the special general convention itself or by organizing the regular convention within the same timeframe. This must be understood clearly without ifs, buts, or excuses.”

As the party’s Central Working Committee fails to take decisive action, various factions have begun holding separate internal meetings to advance their positions.

Sher Bahadur Deuba, who has led the party since 2016, is not expected to contest for the leadership again. This has set the stage for a fierce contest for the top post. General Secretary Thapa and senior leader Shekhar Koirala have already announced their candidacies for party president, while several other leaders are reportedly preparing to join the race.

Although there is hardly any consensus among the party’s senior leaders, many appear united in their intent to prevent Thapa from securing the presidency. How the internal negotiations unfold remains to be seen. If Thapa and Koirala reach an understanding, they could together secure the leadership. It is also unclear whether all of Deuba’s loyalists will support Khadka as their candidate. The Deuba faction itself is fractured, with some leaders aligning with Koirala and others with Thapa. It also remains uncertain whether Deuba will openly endorse any candidate or remain neutral.

The NC’s internal paralysis is having a direct impact on national politics. The two major parties—CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—have already clarified their positions on recent political developments. The UML maintains that the current government is unconstitutional and that the events of Sept 8–9 represent a regression; it has declared that it will not accept any elections held under Prime Minister Sushila Karki. The Maoist Center, led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, on the other hand, has decided to move ahead with the elections. The Nepali Congress, however, remains undecided. Immediately after the protests, the party had joined others in declaring the formation of the Karki government unconstitutional and in supporting the restoration of Parliament. But since then, its stance has become fragmented.

The leadership vacuum has allowed individual leaders to voice their own positions. General Secretary Thapa and his supporters favor holding elections and are engaging in talks with Prime Minister Karki, while Khadka and other senior leaders have remained silent. Meanwhile, a faction within the party has begun a signature campaign demanding the restoration of Parliament. One top leader commented, “The chances of holding elections appear slim. The only way to save the constitution is by restoring Parliament.”

NC leader Prakash Sharan Mahat has argued that the party should focus on addressing the national crisis instead of being consumed by internal disputes. “There has been no meaningful discussion on the national agenda, and that is unfortunate,” he said. “We should have been debating the causes of the crisis, possible solutions, and the party’s leadership role, but that has not happened.”

As Nepal moves toward the March 5 elections, tensions between Prime Minister Sushila Karki’s government and the main opposition, the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified MarxistLeninist (CPN-UML), have intensified. What began as political disagreement has evolved into a full-blown confrontation, with the UML positioning itself as the principal challenger to Karki’s administration.

Nepal’s political environment remains volatile since the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015. The three major parties—the Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Center)—have alternated between alliances and rivalries amid frequent government changes.
 

Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) was among the first to claim credit for saving the country from a constitutional crisis after the turmoil of September 8–9. He has since positioned himself as a key supporter and negotiator in the formation of the Karki-led government, even announcing early on that elections would be held on March 5.

Over the past few weeks, the relationship between the UML and the government has deteriorated sharply. PM Karki has reportedly refused to meet top leaders of the major political parties, including Dahal, UML Chair KP Sharma Oli, and NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba. At a recent press conference, she allegedly remarked that she “does not want to see the faces” of the three senior leaders, suggesting they should retire and make way for younger politicians.

This statement provoked strong reactions from both Oli and Dahal, though the latter remains broadly supportive of the government. Maoist leaders have accused Oli of failing to adapt to changing political realities, while UML leaders have denounced the Karki administration as “unconstitutional.”

In contrast, the Nepali Congress has maintained a cautious stance—neither overtly supporting nor openly criticizing the government—choosing to avoid the kind of direct confrontation pursued by the UML.

Two major issues have fueled the government-UML conflict. First, early in her tenure, PM Karki reportedly held consultations with security agency chiefs regarding the possible arrest of KP Sharma Oli over his alleged responsibility for the deaths of 19 students during the September 8 protests. The move infuriated the UML.

Soon afterward, a probe committee led by Gauri Bahadur Karki—under government pressure, according to UML leaders—suspended Oli’s passport and restricted his movement outside the Kathmandu Valley. Oli has repeatedly complained that he has been prevented from visiting his burned-down house in Jhapa, allegedly destroyed by protesters.

Meanwhile, Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal’s sharp remarks against UML leaders have further deepened hostilities. UML politburo member Mahesh Basnet has emerged as a leading voice against the government, organizing rallies and public programs that the Home Ministry has condemned as provocative.

At the heart of the dispute lies the contrasting interpretation of the September 8–9 protests.
The Karki government views the unrest as a “Gen-Z revolt”, a spontaneous youth uprising reflecting generational frustration. The UML, however, insists it was a political conspiracy aimed at undermining the party and destabilizing the country.

According to UML leaders, Gen-Z activists withdrew on the afternoon of September 8, and the subsequent violence on September 9 cannot be considered part of a youth movement. Oli has repeatedly dismissed the term Gen-Z, calling it “a western construct irrelevant to Nepal’s socio-political reality.”

UML has rejected the legitimacy of the Karki-led government, accusing it of acting unconstitutionally. On November 9, Oli alleged that “those who set the country on fire” during the protests are the same individuals now in power. The UML has declared a nationwide protest campaign, from grassroots mobilization to mass demonstrations in Kathmandu, to challenge what it calls a “repressive and illegitimate regime.”

As the government finalizes preparations for the March 5 elections, the UML is mobilizing on the streets, setting the stage for a high-stakes showdown. Meanwhile, the Karki administration has demanded the restoration of Parliament to establish what it calls a legitimate constitutional mandate.