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With just 20 days remaining before the election, a powerful anti-incumbency wave is sweeping across Nepal’s political landscape, placing senior leaders from all major parties under unusual pressure.  From long-established figures to leaders of relatively newer parties, few appear insulated from growing voter dissatisfaction.

A leader close to CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli recently acknowledged the changing mood, remarking, “This is the first time Oli is truly contesting an election.” The comment reflects a striking shift in electoral dynamics.

In past elections, established leaders relied heavily on party networks and traditional voter loyalties. This time, however, even prominent figures are engaged in intensive door-to-door campaigns, signaling that electoral victories can no longer be taken for granted.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, coordinator of the Nepal Communist Party and former chair of the CPN (Maoist Center), is also facing the heat. In recent public remarks, Dahal suggested that “external forces” are backing emerging political actors, a statement widely interpreted as a reference to the growing popularity of Kathmandu Metropolitan City Mayor Balendra Shah and other non-traditional figures. Dahal also argued that the “scenario on social media” differs from the “reality on the ground,” implying that digital enthusiasm may not necessarily convert into votes.

Analysts point to the rapid expansion of internet access and social media platforms as a key factor driving the current anti-incumbency sentiment. Platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, and YouTube have become central arenas for political debate, criticism, and mobilization.

Studies conducted in various democracies suggest that increased internet penetration can weaken trust in traditional political parties and institutions. In Nepal, social media has amplified scrutiny of incumbent leaders and provided space for alternative voices. The digital sphere has also facilitated the rise of populist and anti-establishment narratives, eroding the dominance of established political actors over public discourse.

Beyond digital influence, long-standing governance challenges appear to be fueling public frustration. Major political parties have alternated in power for decades, yet many structural issues—ranging from unemployment and corruption to weak public service delivery and political instability—remain unresolved.

Voters are increasingly questioning senior leaders who have held the prime ministerial office multiple times. “If you have been in power repeatedly, why have our problems not been addressed?” has become a common refrain at campaign events, according to party insiders. This cumulative dissatisfaction suggests that the current wave is not merely cyclical but rooted in deeper structural grievances.

Nepal’s electoral contests were traditionally shaped by competition among four principal forces: Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, the Maoists, and Madhes-based parties. However, the rise of new political forces and independent candidates has disrupted this familiar pattern.

While these emerging actors may lack extensive nationwide party structures, they are capitalizing on voter frustration and presenting themselves as credible alternatives. Observers note that the anti-incumbency sentiment does not appear to favor any single opposition party; rather, it reflects a broader desire for new and “fresh” faces in politics.

Despite the prevailing mood, incumbent leaders remain hopeful that strong grassroots networks and organizational capacity will help them withstand the challenge. They argue that online narratives do not always translate into electoral outcomes and that traditional campaign mechanisms still hold influence.

Nevertheless, the atmosphere leading up to the polls suggests that this election is shaping up as more than a routine contest among parties. For many voters, it appears to be a referendum on the political establishment itself.

The Election Commission (EC) has started dispatching ballot papers to 12 electoral constituencies in 10 districts of Karnali Province. 

According to the EC, ballot papers have been transported to the constituencies of Salyan, Rukum West, Dolpa, Mugu, Humla, Kalikot, Jumla, Jajarkot, Dailekh, and Surkhet in Karnali province, informed EC's deputy spokesperson Prakash Neupane. 

Likewise, the commission stated that ballot printing has been completed for 124 constituencies in 58 districts. A total of 15,778,000 ballots have been printed.

A total of 14,341 boxes ballot papers, according to the EC, have been packed so far. Currently, around 1,000 boxes of ballot papers are being packed daily and 1.3 to 1.5 million ballot papers are being printed. 

Ballot papers for the House of Representatives elections are being printed at Janak Education Materials Center Limited, Sano Thimi. 

In the first phase, 1,098,200 sample ballot papers were printed and sent to various districts, the EC stated. 

A total of 20,830,000 ballot papers for the HoR election towards proportional representation were printed, packed, registered, and prepared for transportation, it has been informed. 

Similarly, the EC has stated that 20,323,000 ballot papers are required to be printed for the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) election. Printing of ballot papers for the direct election system began on January 30. 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia Chairman Bill Huizenga has said that recent elections in Bangladesh and Nepal present new opportunities for U.S. engagement in South Asia.

In his opening remarks at a subcommittee hearing titled “South Asia: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region,” Huizenga described South and Central Asia as a dynamic region where young and growing populations are increasingly drawn to Western cultures and values rather than to what he called China’s “authoritarian alternative.”

Bordering India, both Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing significant political transformations. Bangladesh held general elections on February 12, following the July 2024 revolution that led to the ouster of an authoritarian government in September 2025. Meanwhile, Nepal is set to hold democratic elections on March 5 after youth-led protests overthrew the previous government.

Huizenga said these developments mark “new chapters for engagement” in South Asia and provide an opportunity to redefine U.S. relations with the new governments.

Emphasizing the strategic importance of the region, he reiterated that South and Central Asia remain vital to U.S. foreign policy interests, particularly as their young populations shape the political and economic future of the region.

Here is the full-text of his speech: 

Our strategy there is key to the United States national security and economic strength and our global presence. South and Central Asia is home to nearly 2 billion people, dynamic economies and strategic waterways that shape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

 Throughout the region, the President has successfully negotiated deals that open markets and advance U.S. Economic interests. Now we are going to engage and how we engage will define America's role in Asia for decades to come.

 China has come to the same conclusion, no surprise. Through its belt and road initiative, China engages in predatory lending to further its security interests and force smaller nations into debt traps. Furthermore, China has hardened its border with India, Nepal, and Bhutan, building infrastructure to support its military aspirations.

 Despite its distance from our shores, maintaining a free and open Indian Ocean is a priority for our national and our economic security. The Indian Ocean is one of the busiest maritime corridors on the Earth, carrying the lifeblood of global commerce and energy, including more than 80% of global seaborne oil trade.

Safeguarding these sea lanes through enhanced naval cooperation with partners and allies will only serve to counter China's growing influence and limit its malign behavior in the region. Alongside President Trump, I too see the importance of our naval base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian ocean. 

I echo this sentiment that preserving America's military fortitude in the region will deter Chinese coercion, prevent piracy, and ensure the free flow of American and world trade. Directly north of Diego Garcia, India, the largest democracy in the world and one of the fastest growing economies, remains a vital strategic partner. Just last week, President Trump brokered a historic trade deal with India, completely revamping US engagement with the country. The US-India trade deal sets India's tariff rate at 18%, one of the lowest regionally. Moreover, Delhi has agreed to buy more American energy. This deal will strengthen US-India relations, support American workers through manufacturing and joint technology ventures, and boost our exports.

Strengthening ties with New Delhi through defense cooperation, trade and technology partnerships advances our shared interests. I look forward to increasing cooperation, co-production and investment, especially under the new framework negotiated by the President. Bordering India, Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing political transformations. 

Bangladesh will hold free elections tomorrow following its 2024 July revolution, which ousted an authoritarian government in September of 2025, Nepalese youth overthrew the government and Nepal will hold democratic elections next month. Both of these instances offer new chapters for engagement in South Asia, defining US relations with these new governments. South and Central Asia is a dynamic region, young growing populations are more often drawn to western cultures and values than to China's authoritarian alternative.

Strategic US led diplomacy will make a difference in building alliances and achieving our mutual beneficial goals throughout the region. Our strategy in South Asia must be comprehensive, anchored in strong partnerships, economic engagement, and a commitment to democratic values. Our engagement in the region must advance American interests, but also continue to contribute to a more secure, prosperous and free Indian Ocean. I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Kapur regarding the administration's South and Central Asia strategy.

Countries, businesses, or communities can make money through carbon trade by cutting down on greenhouse gas emissions or by conserving the environment. Things like protecting forests, making clean energy, improving farming methods, and better waste management can all help cut emissions. When a project effectively cuts down on carbon emissions, it can earn carbon credits, which are proof that the emissions have been cut down. Companies or nations who need to cut their emissions to realise climate goals can then acquire these credits. In basic terms, carbon trade lets Nepal make money from other countries while conserving the environment. Nepal has a lot of forests, hydroelectric resources, farmland, and community-based conservation systems. Carbon trade is a big chance for the economy and the environment in this country.

The Government of Nepal created the Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 to handle this chance in a way that is organized and trustworthy. This rule sets up a nationwide framework for selling carbon and explains how carbon projects get approved, measured, reported, and validated. It also defines standards for issuing and keeping track of carbon credits, makes sure that the government is involved and that everything is open and honest, and safeguards national interests while participating in international carbon markets. In brief, Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 gives Nepal the legal right to take part in global carbon markets. This legal clarity is very important since foreign buyers only trust carbon credits that come from countries with clear laws, trustworthy institutions, and systems that work.

Carbon trading is not just good for the environment; it is also a way for countries to do business with each other. Carbon credits are like Nepal’s traditional exports, like tea, cardamom, carpets, or hydropower, in that they can be traded. Like any other export item, carbon credits must meet international standards, follow technical rules, and go through accepted verification and certification procedures. If people in other countries don't trust or accept Nepal’s carbon credits, they can’t be sold, no matter how good they are for the environment. Because of this, carbon trade should be seen as part of Nepal’s export strategy and trade facilitation objective, not just as an environmental policy concern.

Accreditation is a key idea in carbon trading. It basically decides who you can trust. Accreditation determines who may check carbon projects, what methods are acceptable for measuring emissions, whether Nepal’s procedures meet international standards, and whether international buyers would accept approvals given in Nepal. If certification mechanisms aren’t strong, transparent, or consistent, international buyers might not want Nepal’s carbon credits, ask foreign organizations to verify them again at a high expense, provide lower rates, or not buy from Nepal at all. These problems are like Non-Tariff Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade in that they make it harder for businesses to compete and get into the market.

Right now, Nepal can’t fully participate in international carbon markets because of some shortcomings in its accreditation system. There isn’t a strong national certification agency that focuses on carbon verification, and the Measurement, Reporting, and Verification requirements don’t yet match up with how things are done in the global carbon market. There aren’t many ways to verify and audit things in the country, and there aren’t any agreements with significant international carbon standards or registers to recognize each other’s work. Also, project developers and investors are unsure about what to do because procedures and timetables are not clear. These gaps make transactions more expensive, slow down approvals, and lower worldwide trust in Nepal’s carbon credits.

Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 needs to work well with international systems for Nepal to be successful around the world. One important step is to set up or choose a robust National Accreditation Body that can accredit carbon verifiers and validators in line with international standards. The regulation must make it clear that this kind of organization must work independently and openly. This would make Nepal less reliant on foreign verification organizations, lower the costs of domestic projects, and give the country more control over the carbon trading process.

It is also very crucial that Nepal’s Measurement, Reporting and Verification system is in line with worldwide standards. MRV methods must be scientifically valid, transparent, and aligned with international standards, including ISO-based frameworks and prominent voluntary carbon market methodologies. Nepal doesn’t need to come up with new ways to keep track of carbon; instead, it can modify and combine current worldwide methods to fit its own needs. This alignment makes sure that Nepali carbon credits are acknowledged around the world without any problems or extra checks.

Strong quality assurance and quality control methods are also needed to keep carbon trading honest and of high quality. Regular audits, defined standard operating procedures, protections against mistakes or manipulation, and professional certification of verifiers are all very important. These systems help keep Nepal’s good name and create trust over time with international buyers, investors, and registries.

Another important task is to set up mutual recognition agreements with major buyer countries and worldwide carbon standards. Nepal’s accredited verifiers and certified credits can be used internationally without having to be verified twice, thanks to mutual recognition. This lowers costs, speeds up transactions, and makes Nepal’s carbon credits more competitive. These kinds of agreements are common instruments for making international trade easier, and they can be used directly in carbon markets.

The national carbon registry is also very important for developing trust. A trustworthy registry must keep track of the generation, transfer, and retirement of carbon credits in a safe way, stop double counting, and make public information clear. It also has to work with foreign registries so that transactions can happen smoothly across borders. Carbon credits lose their worth and credibility in the market if there isn’t a reliable and interoperable registry.

For effective implementation, both transparency and predictability are crucial. People should be able to easily find out about and understand all of the regulations, procedures, fees, and deadlines that Carbon Trade Regulation 2082 sets. Processes should be digitized whenever possible to cut down on choice, delays, and uncertainty in administration. These concepts are very important for good trade governance and for investors to feel safe.

Finally, for carbon trading to be successful in the long run, there needs to be a lot of investment in increasing capacity. People in the government, verifiers, auditors, project developers, and local communities all need to learn how to do things and get technical training. Building local expertise means that Nepal can run its own carbon market and keep more of its economic value in the country. It also gives communities that safeguard natural resources more influence.

When accreditation and regulatory systems aren’t strong, carbon trading has high verification costs, long approval delays, and low trust from other countries. When these processes are made stronger, approvals happen faster, transaction costs go down, trust in Nepal goes up, and Nepal can charge more for its carbon credits. Fixing accreditation gaps is no longer merely a technical or administrative change; it is now a sort of trade facilitation reform.

Regulation 2082 of the carbon trade is a big step forward for Nepal, but it’s not enough on its own. For carbon trade to work well, accreditation needs to be reliable, standards need to be in line with international norms, systems need to be open, and organizations need to gain the trust of people around the world. If Nepal can create this base, carbon trade can bring in money from other countries, help local populations, protect forests, and make Nepal a stronger player in international commerce. Carbon is traded on confidence in global carbon markets. This trust is generated through strong accreditation, trustworthy processes, and institutional legitimacy, not promises. 

The author is a trade and trade facilitation expert