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The Nepali Congress (NC) occupies a singular and enduring position in Nepal’s political history. It is not merely one political party among others but the principal institutional carrier of Nepal’s democratic imagination. From its origins in anti-Rana resistance and exile politics, through the short-lived democratic experiment of the 1950s, the democratic restoration of 1990 and the post-conflict reconstruction after 2006, the NC has repeatedly stood at the center of regime change, constitutionalism and state-building. 

Unlike revolutionary or purely oppositional parties, the NC has combined resistance with responsibility, protest with governance, and idealism with compromise.

Yet historical centrality does not automatically translate into contemporary relevance or organizational vitality. Like many legacy democratic parties worldwide, the NC now confronts a complex crisis marked by ideological ambiguity, leadership inertia, organizational strain and growing distance from a rapidly changing society. This article offers a brief but integrated institutional analysis of the NC, examining its organizational evolution, internal democracy, leadership culture, governance record and reform dilemmas. It argues that the NC’s greatest strengths—moral legitimacy, adaptability and democratic restraint—have also produced structural fragilities that continue to undermine institutional consolidation. Understanding this paradox is essential not only for evaluating the party’s future but also for assessing the prospects of Nepal’s democratic project itself.

Conceptual framework: Parties, institutions and democratic mediation

In democratic theory, political parties are understood as mediating institutions between society and the state. They aggregate interests, articulate political alternatives, recruit leadership and structure political competition. Classical and contemporary scholarship emphasizes three interrelated dimensions of effective party institutionalization: organizational routinization, leadership legitimacy and internal democracy. Parties that fail to balance these dimensions risk either authoritarian capture, organizational decay or social irrelevance.

In post-authoritarian and resource-constrained societies, these tensions are magnified. Parties often emerge from resistance movements, privileging moral authority and personal loyalty over bureaucratic rules. While such traits enhance mobilization during struggle, they complicate later transitions to programmatic, rule-bound party organization. The NC exemplifies this dilemma. Born as a movement rather than a conventional electoral party, it carried movement logics—charisma, sacrifice, flexibility and informality—into periods that increasingly demanded institutional discipline, policy expertise and routinized leadership succession.

Origins and organizational culture: From resistance to electoral politics

The NC emerged through exile politics, underground networks, diaspora activism and cross-border coordination in India. Its early organizational life was shaped by repression and uncertainty. Survival depended on secrecy, trust and personal commitment rather than formal procedures. Leadership authority was earned through sacrifice and credibility, not electoral mandate. These formative experiences created a political culture in which loyalty and moral standing were valued above codified rules.

When democratic openings emerged—particularly after 1951 and later after 1990—the NC faced the challenge of transforming a resistance movement into a competitive electoral party. Formal organizational structures were gradually introduced, but movement culture persisted. Informal decision-making, personalized leadership and flexible norms remained dominant. This hybrid organizational form proved both resilient and unstable—capable of adaptation across regimes, yet resistant to full institutionalization.

Organizational architecture and leadership culture

Over time, the NC constructed a multi-tiered organizational architecture consisting of a central committee, district committees, local and ward units, and a range of sister as well as well-wisher organizations representing students, women, youth, labor, and identity- and profession-based groups. This structure enabled nationwide penetration and electoral reach, distinguishing the NC from regionally confined or ideologically narrow parties. Organizational breadth allowed the party to function as a national integrator in a socially and geographically diverse country.

Despite this formal decentralization, real authority often remained centralized, particularly in leadership selection, coalition bargaining and strategic decision-making. Leadership culture further shaped organizational life.

Foundational leaders commanded authority through moral legitimacy, intellectual stature, and personal sacrifice. Their leadership emphasized ethical restraint and democratic norms over procedural dominance or coercive control. As electoral politics normalized, leadership criteria shifted. Authority increasingly derived from electoral success, factional strength, and control over party machinery. This transition altered internal expectations, intensified competition, and reduced the unifying moral authority that had once moderated conflict. The absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms amplified leadership struggles and factional reproduction.

Factionalism and intra-party democracy

Factionalism has been a persistent and defining feature of the NC. While often portrayed as a pathology, factionalism within democratic parties can perform integrative functions: It can prevent authoritarian consolidation, provide channels for dissent and facilitate elite circulation. In the NC, factions historically emerged around charismatic leaders, generational divides and strategic disagreements rather than deep ideological schisms.

However, the costs of factionalism have been substantial. Persistent internal competition weakened organizational discipline, undermined public credibility and reduced policy coherence. Formal mechanisms of intra-party democracy—general conventions, internal elections and representative committees—coexist uneasily with informal power structures rooted in patronage, negotiation and loyalty networks. The gap between formal rules and actual practice defines the NC’s internal democracy: procedurally pluralistic yet substantively fragile.

Cadre development, resources, organizational capacity

Unlike cadre-based parties with systematic ideological training, the NC has relied largely on informal mentoring, experiential learning and movement socialization. This approach fostered commitment but limited programmatic coherence and policy capacity. Youth and student wings functioned as recruitment pipelines, yet they were frequently politicized and factionalized, reproducing internal divisions rather than cultivating new leadership.

Financial organization has remained a chronic challenge. Limited public funding, reliance on donor networks and opaque financial practices constrained organizational professionalism and accountability. Resource scarcity affected policy research, cadre training and organizational modernization, reinforcing dependence on informal networks and personalized leadership.

Governance record: Democratic stewardship and state-building

The NC is fundamentally a party of governance. Across Nepal’s modern political history, it has repeatedly assumed responsibility during periods of institutional transition, constitutional experimentation and post-conflict reconstruction. Its governing philosophy has emphasized democratic stewardship—procedure, consent and accountability—over coercion or revolutionary rupture.

Congress-led governments played foundational roles in constitutional development, including the 1959 and 1990 constitutions and the post-2006 constitutional process culminating in the promulgation of the new constitution in 2016 with sufficient consensus of a directly-elected constituent assembly. In each instance, the party advocated separation of powers, fundamental rights, judicial independence and parliamentary supremacy. Even when implementation was uneven, these normative commitments shaped the architecture of the Nepali state.

In parliamentary practice, the NC promoted legislative debate, committee systems and opposition rights, reinforcing democratic accountability. In social sectors, Congress governments expanded education, healthcare and early social protection, framing these investments as democratic foundations rather than populist concessions. Infrastructure development, regulatory institutions and fiscal governance advanced incrementally, constrained by limited state capacity and political fragmentation.

Governance limitations and democratic trade-offs

Despite these contributions, the NC’s governance record is marked by significant limitations. Slow policy implementation, uneven administrative capacity, weak monitoring mechanisms and pervasive patronage undermined effectiveness.

Corruption and clientelism eroded public trust, while governance during the Maoist insurgency strained democratic norms. Emergency measures, though often justified as crisis management, left institutional scars. Coalition politics, especially after 2017, diluted accountability, shortened government lifespans and encouraged policy incrementalism rather than structural reform. Federal restructuring after 2015 further complicated governance, overburdening institutions and exposing coordination failures between central, provincial and local governments. These shortcomings reflect not ideological incoherence but the structural difficulties of democratic governance under constraint.

Comparative perspective: Legacy democratic parties in South Asia

Comparatively, the NC occupies a middle ground among South Asian parties. Like several other South Asian parties, it shares a legacy-based leadership culture and factional pluralism. Unlike disciplined left parties, it tolerates internal contestation but struggles with coherence and policy discipline. In contrast to personality-driven regional parties, it retains nationwide presence and constitutional legitimacy.

Internationally, the NC’s trajectory mirrors that of many legacy democratic parties confronting populist challengers, social fragmentation and declining organizational loyalty. Its experience underscores the broader challenge of sustaining democratic parties in an era of electoral volatility and declining ideological attachment.

Recent challenges and the GenZ uprising

Post-2015, the NC navigated a landscape of political fragmentation and external influences. Elections in 2017 and 2022 saw the party alternate in power, often through unstable coalitions. Tenures focused on Covid-19 recovery, infrastructure and foreign relations, but they were marred by allegations of corruption and inefficiency. The 2022 elections positioned the NC as a key player, yet alliances shifted amid geopolitical tensions between India, China and the US.

The year 2025 marked a watershed crisis. In September, youth-led protests erupted across urban centers, demanding anti-corruption measures, accountability for past violence and systemic reforms. These demonstrations—triggered by the government ban on social media and further fueled by disillusionment with entrenched elites, economic woes and unacceptably high youth unemployment—resulted in clashes and casualties, leading to political upheaval, including government resignation, parliamentary dissolution and snap general elections scheduled for March 2026.

Critiques and the challenge of renewal

Contemporary critiques of the NC focus on ideological dilution, leadership inertia, organizational risk aversion and social disconnect. The democratic socialism and humanist ethics that once anchored Congress identity now appear programmatically vague. Leadership succession remains uneven and constrained, and youth engagement limited. Formal inclusion of women and marginalized groups has not consistently translated into substantive empowerment.

Yet decline should not be conflated with irrelevance. The NC retains nationwide organization, constitutional legitimacy and residual moral authority. Its crisis is one of renewal rather than existential collapse. Renewal requires institutionalizing internal democracy, professionalizing organization, strengthening policy capacity and reconnecting with emerging social constituencies.

Conclusion: An incomplete but indispensable democratic institution

The NC represents an incomplete yet indispensable democratic institution. Its historical legitimacy, adaptive capacity and commitment to democratic restraint have sustained Nepal’s democratic state through repeated crises. At the same time, personalized leadership, weak institutionalization and unresolved movement–party tensions continue to undermine organizational coherence and governance performance.

The future of the NC depends on its ability to transform moral authority into institutional strength, reconcile pluralism with discipline and align democratic ideals with governance delivery. Whether it succeeds will shape not only the party’s trajectory but the resilience of Nepal’s democratic project itself.

KP Sharma Oli has won the intra-party election for a third consecutive term. The party’s 11th General Convention, held this week in Kathmandu, is widely seen as a test of Oli’s popularity within the party following the GenZ protests of September 8–9, which had ousted him from power.

His re-election with a two-thirds majority signals that Oli continues to wield strong influence and remains popular among party cadres, if not in public. Party leaders say Oli’s resounding victory also serves as an endorsement of the political position he took against the GenZ movement.

Over the past 100 days since the September protests, Oli has consistently argued that the protests were directed against the party itself and that the party must resist forces conspiring to weaken it. His re-election suggests that a significant majority of party members have subscribed to this view.

Oli believes his victory is a response to claims—widely circulated after the September protests—that the era of traditional political parties and veteran leaders is over. During this period, both inside and outside major political parties, there was intense debate suggesting that current leaders should retire in recognition of the GenZ protests. Addressing the convention, Oli said, “Some forces are engaged in deceitful conspiracies against us; now such reactionaries have been crushed.”

A clear indication of this sentiment is the success of leaders who were vocal critics of the GenZ protests. For instance, General Secretary Shankar Pokharel, who strongly criticized the protests in their early days, was re-elected after defeating former Finance Minister Surendra Pandey. Similarly, Mahesh Basnet, who had publicly confronted GenZ leaders, was elected party secretary.

Soon after the GenZ protests, senior leaders including Ishwar Pokharel, Surendra Pandey, Gokarna Bista, Astha Laxmi Shakya, and Yubaraj Gyawali and others had urged Oli to step down as party chair, arguing that the killing of 19 students on September 8 had triggered a public backlash. Oli, however, remained defiant and chose to seek internal legitimacy through the party’s general convention.

Convention representatives ultimately re-elected him with nearly a two-thirds majority. Of the 2,277 delegates who voted, Oli secured 1,663 votes—almost 75 percent—while his challenger, Ishwar Pokharel, received only 564 votes. Only a handful of leaders who favored leadership change and were sympathetic to the GenZ protests succeeded in the elections.

For example, Gokarna Bista was elected vice-chairperson and Yogesh Bhattarai deputy general secretary. Both leaders had earlier advocated for age and term limits for the party president—two terms and a maximum age of 70. Both leaders have taken softer stance towards the demands of GenZ protestors. Bista and Bhattarai have expressed a relatively conciliatory approach toward the demands raised by the GenZ protestors. 

Since the beginning, Oli has framed the September 8–9 protests as a conspiracy by “foreign powers” aimed at dislodging him and his party from power. He has maintained that while he would accept the student-led protest held on the morning of September 8, he rejects the events of September 8–9 as a people’s movement, as characterized by the Sushila Karki-led government.

Without elaborating, Oli said after his re-election that his party was “betrayed” on September 9, the second day of the protests, and vowed not to allow a repeat. He instructed party organizations to ensure security at the community level, citing a lack of trust in the current government.

“We could be deceived again, so we must take responsibility for our own security. Form security teams in society,” Oli said, dismissing the current government as unconstitutional.

While Oli has not directly opposed the March 5 elections, he has expressed skepticism that the current government will be able to conduct them. He has warned the government to either make credible preparations for the polls or step down.

The CPN-UML has already filed a writ at the Supreme Court demanding the restoration of Parliament, and the largest party, Nepali Congress, has followed suit. Lawmakers from both parties are now preparing to jointly approach the Supreme Court seeking parliamentary restoration.

Following his re-election, Oli has adopted an even more aggressive posture toward both the government and the GenZ movement. Last week, the Sushila Karki-led government and GenZ representatives signed an agreement recognizing the GenZ movement as a people’s movement. Oli rejected the agreement, calling it “mere drama” and saying he would not accept it.

As a probe commission formed to investigate the September 8–9 events prepares to summon Oli, he has declined to appear. The document endorsed by the party convention has declared the commission invalid and demanded the formation of an independent investigation commission led by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court.

After consolidating his position as party chair, Oli’s immediate priority appears to be dislodging the current government and exerting pressure on the judiciary to revive Parliament. However, if the government proceeds with the planned March 5 elections, the UML is likely to participate in the polls.

The United States has maintained a notably low-key profile in Kathmandu amid policy uncertainty under the Donald Trump administration and shifting political dynamics in Nepal.

Washington’s decision to rebuke or roll back several longstanding policies, including the dismantling of USAID and the absence of clear strategic guidance, left US embassies abroad uncertain about their priorities. As a result, US engagement in Nepal declined sharply, accompanied by a noticeable drop in high-level visits between Kathmandu and Washington.

It was only in Aug 2025 that President Trump appointed Sergio Gor as the next US ambassador to India and special envoy for South and Central Asian affairs. During this interim period, the US Embassy in Kathmandu worked largely behind the scenes to persuade the new administration to continue the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact.

Shortly after State Department officials began re-engaging on South and Central Asia, Nepal experienced major political upheaval that led to the fall of the KP Sharma Oli-led government. Unverified reports and rumors alleging the involvement of US-backed non-governmental organizations in Sept 8–9 GenZ protests further reinforced Washington’s cautious approach and contributed to its subdued public posture.

Following the formation of a new government under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, the US formally welcomed it. Since then, however, there have been no public US statements on elections or Nepal’s internal political developments. While the ambassador and senior embassy officials continue to attend public events, they have largely refrained from commenting on domestic politics or the broader trajectory of bilateral relations.

This restraint has fueled concerns in Kathmandu about the Trump administration’s priorities toward Nepal. Addressing these concerns this week, senior State Department officials said the US is recalibrating—not withdrawing—its assistance. They indicated that future support will be narrower and more selective, focused on areas that serve US national interests and align with President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.

Allison Hooker, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said the administration’s aid strategy represents a calibration, not a pullback. “The US is a Pacific power, and the future of the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to our core national interests,” she said, emphasizing that Washington’s commitment to the region remains firm.

As senior US officials step up visits to other South Asian countries, diplomatic sources suggest Kathmandu could see similar engagements in the coming days, potentially offering clearer signals of Washington’s evolving approach to Nepal.

Three months after GenZ protesters took to the streets demanding accountability, their attention has begun to shift toward the ballot. With elections scheduled for 5 March 2026, at least 28 new political parties have registered, each hoping to lead the country. While the GenZ protest triggered this surge in registrations, most of the new outfits are led not by the protesters themselves but by older, established figures. More than ideology, these parties are driven by individuals. As Nepal heads toward what is likely to be the most crowded election in its history, ideological differences among the new parties remain strikingly narrow.

Although the GenZ protest opened political space, it did not produce a unified political organization of its own. That vacuum has instead been filled largely by established political figures, technocrats, and public personalities who moved quickly to institutionalize protest-era discontent.

Several of the post-protest parties are led by figures with long careers inside the political or state apparatus. Former police chief Sarbendra Khanal, who resigned from CPN-UML, has launched the Samunnat Nepal Party on a platform of “good governance and prosperity,” drawing heavily on his law-and-order credentials. The newly registered Nepali Communist Party, coordinated by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, was formed through the merger of ten parties and groups, including Dahal’s CPN (Maoist Center) and Madhav Kumar Nepal’s CPN (Unified Socialist). Likewise, Netra Bikram Chand, a veteran of the Maoist insurgency who had previously rejected parliamentary politics, has registered the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) to contest elections for the first time, marking a strategic shift rather than a generational rupture.

A second cluster of new parties is driven by technocrats and administrators who present themselves as alternatives to traditional party politics. The Ujyalo Nepal Party, led by former energy secretary Anup Raj Upadhyay, with Nepal Electricity Authority chief Kulman Ghising as a key patron, emphasizes efficient governance and infrastructure delivery. Similarly, the Gatisheel Loktantrik Party, chaired by political sociology professor Dinesh Prasai, frames its agenda around economic growth, employment generation, and institutional reform, while explicitly accepting the existing constitutional order.

Although the GenZ protest opened political space, it did not produce a unified political organization of its own. That vacuum has been filled largely by established political figures, technocrats, and public personalities looking to institutionalize protest-era discontent

Local populists and issue-based leaders form another segment of the post-protest surge. The Shram Sanskriti Party, led by Dharan Mayor Harka Sampang, centers its political identity on “Harkabaad,” an ideology closely tied to Sampang’s personal leadership style and his emphasis on labour dignity and civic mobilization. While such parties draw energy from grassroots popularity, their heavy reliance on individual figures raises questions about internal democracy and long-term sustainability.

Across these diverse formations, a common pattern emerges: party structures have been created rapidly, driven less by clearly differentiated ideologies than by individual leadership, reputation, and visibility. Although the GenZ protest challenged the political status quo, its institutional aftermath has so far reinforced a familiar model of personality-led politics, suggesting that while the banners may be new, the centers of power largely remain unchanged.

Despite the sharp increase in party registrations, ideological distance among most post-protest parties remains limited. Across manifestos and public statements, one notices recurring themes: good governance, anti-corruption, employment generation, and institutional reform. But they offer little clarity on how these goals would be pursued or how they differ meaningfully from one another in practice.

Only a handful of parties articulate distinct ideological positions. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by Chand, openly advances scientific socialism and the long-term goal of a proletarian state, marking a rare case of ideological consistency even as the party enters electoral politics for the first time. At the other end of the spectrum, technocratic formations such as the Gatisheel Loktantrik Party explicitly reject constitutional change, defending the existing federal, republican, and parliamentary system while focusing narrowly on economic management and service delivery.

Most other parties occupy a crowded middle ground, blending reformist rhetoric with personality-driven agendas. The Shram Sanskriti Party’s “Harkabaad,” for instance, emphasizes labor dignity and local development but remains closely tied to the political authority of its founder. Similarly, parties such as the Samunnat Nepal Party and the Ujyalo Nepal Party frame their programs around governance efficiency rather than ideological realignment, reinforcing a trend toward managerial politics over structural transformation.

Conspicuously absent from this surge, however, is a broadly unified GenZ political force. Although the protest was driven largely by young citizens frustrated with corruption, unemployment, and political exclusion, youth in most newly registered parties appear primarily as supporters or symbols rather than as decision-makers shaping leadership and policy.

An important exception is the Rastriya Pariwartan Party, led by GenZ activist Rajesh Pratel, who was injured during the protest. Founded with the stated aim of carrying forward the movement’s demands, the party positions itself as a vehicle to translate street-level mobilization into institutional reform. Its leadership and narrative remain closely tied to the protest generation, making it the clearest attempt so far to build a youth-led political organization rather than merely appropriate GenZ rhetoric.

The gap between protest and party reflects deeper constraints facing youth-led politics in Nepal. The decentralized nature of the GenZ movement, combined with distrust of formal political institutions and limited access to resources, has made sustained organization difficult. As a result, the political energy generated on the streets has largely been absorbed into existing leadership frameworks rather than producing a new generation of political leadership.

Taken together, the post-protest party surge has expanded the number of political choices on paper but not necessarily the range of political ideas or voices in practice. While GenZ grievances have entered party rhetoric, their translation into ideology, leadership, and institutional power remains limited, raising questions about whether electoral participation alone can deliver the structural change the movement demanded.

According to the Election Commission, Nepal currently has 143 registered political parties, of which 114 have completed the required process to participate in the upcoming election. Prior to the GenZ protest, the total stood at 122, indicating a sharp rise in registrations during the post-protest period.

The rapid expansion of political parties is expected to reshape the dynamics of the March elections, raising concerns about vote fragmentation and the durability of new entrants. Past elections suggest that a high number of registered parties does not necessarily translate into meaningful competition. In 2017, 91 parties were registered but only 55 contested, while in 2022, 78 of 86 entered the race. Many smaller parties failed to secure seats or sustain organizational activity beyond a single electoral cycle, highlighting the structural challenges faced by new entrants.

The post-GenZ surge risks intensifying vote division, particularly among urban, youth, and protest-oriented voters now courted by multiple parties offering similar reformist agendas. Analysts warn that overlapping constituencies and narrow ideological distinctions could weaken the collective electoral impact of anti-establishment forces, inadvertently benefiting larger, better-organized parties with stable voter bases.

Sustainability remains another major challenge. Several newly registered parties lack nationwide organizational networks, financial resources, and experienced grassroots cadres. Many are concentrated around individual leaders or specific regions, making them vulnerable if early electoral results fall short of expectations. Nepal’s political history shows that without institutional depth, internal democracy, and long-term mobilization strategies, new parties often struggle to survive beyond a single election.

At the same time, even limited electoral success could have indirect consequences. Smaller parties may influence public debate, pressure mainstream parties to adopt reform agendas, or emerge as coalition actors in closely contested constituencies. Whether post-protest parties can move beyond symbolic participation and establish themselves as lasting political forces will depend not only on electoral performance but also on their ability to translate protest-era demands into durable political organization.

The 28 new political parties registered after the GenZ protest include Rastriya Janamukti Party, Shram Sanskriti Party, Gatisheel Loktantrik Party, Nagarik Unmukti Party, Nepali Communist Party, Rastriya Pariwartan Party, Rastriya Janamat Party, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Rastra Nirman Dal Nepal, Rastriya Urjasheel Party, People First Party, Ujyalo Nepal Party, Swabhiman Party, Hamro Party Nepal, Nagarik Sarbochatta Party Nepal, Janadesh Party Nepal, Sarbhabhauma Nagarik Party, Nagarik Sewa Party, Jay Matribhumi Party, Pragatisheel Nagarik Party, Sharbodaya Party, Samunnat Nepal Party, Nagarik Bachau Dal, Nepal Janasewa Party, Samabesi Samajbadi Party, Aawaj Party, Janata Loktantrik Party, and Jana Aadhikar Party.

With such a flood of new parties, questions remain about their ideologies, leadership, and the extent to which they represent genuine political alternatives.

Shram Sanskriti Party

The Shram Sanskriti Party was founded and is chaired by Harka Sampang, the mayor of Dharan. Sampang, who holds a Master’s degree in Political Science, has articulated a party ideology he calls “Harkabaad,” which emphasizes the balanced development of nature, culture, and technology alongside fostering a “culture of work.” However, by centering the ideology on his own name, Sampang risks narrowing ideological space within the party and limiting room for internal debate and dissent.

The party stresses both mandatory and voluntary labour as central tools for eliminating poverty and inequality. It also advocates democratic reforms, including a directly elected executive and proportional representation in Parliament. Other key policies include recognition of all indigenous languages, the preservation of a secular state, and an inclusive model of local development focused on villages and sustainable industries.

Sampang first gained national attention during the local elections in Dharan Sub-metropolitan City, where he defeated candidates from the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML by a large margin. He campaigned aggressively against corruption and administrative irregularities within the municipality. After his election, he gained further popularity by organizing citizen-led labor initiatives, including public work programmes that provided water to residents.

Following the GenZ-led protest that toppled the KP Oli government, Sampang traveled to Kathmandu to stake a claim for the interim prime ministership. He later returned home after expressing dissatisfaction with the appointment of Sushila Karki as interim prime minister. He is now leading the Shram Sanskriti Party in an assertive election campaign. The party prioritizes nominating publicly popular figures as candidates and appears disinclined toward electoral alliances.

Gatisheel Loktantrik Party

Led by political sociology professor Dinesh Prasai, the Gatisheel Loktantrik Party places economic transformation and good governance at the center of its agenda. Prasai serves as party chair, with Buddha Air executive Birendra Bahadur Basnet as a key backer.

The party’s platform focuses on job creation and growth through sector-specific initiatives, including tourism development, particularly the operation of Gautam Buddha International Airport, modernizing agriculture through fair crop pricing, improving education, and expanding the IT sector. It pledges “zero corruption, employment, and equitable prosperity,” and notably bars its own office-bearers from contesting elections in order to keep them focused on policy and institutional development.

Importantly, the party explicitly accepts Nepal’s 2015 constitution. It upholds federalism, republicanism, and the parliamentary system, and rejects proposals for a directly elected president or prime minister, which it views as undemocratic.

Rastriya Pariwartan Party

The Rastriya Pariwartan Party is chaired by Rajesh Portel, a young protester who was injured during the GenZ movement. Protel founded the party to carry forward the goals of the GenZ uprising.

The party pledges to honour the martyrs and injured protesters by pursuing reforms that include an immediate anti-corruption drive, constitutional amendments, such as provisions for a directly elected executive, and welfare support for victims of the movement. Pratel and his colleagues frame the party’s mission as translating the sacrifices of street protesters into concrete institutional change.

Ujyalo Nepal Party

The Ujyalo Nepal Party is led by Anup Kumar Upadhyay, a former secretary of energy, with Kulman Ghising, currently Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport and Minister of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation, and former chief of the Nepal Electricity Authority, serving as its patron. After an unsuccessful attempt to merge with the Rastriya Swatantra Party, the party is now in discussions to form an electoral alliance with Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah.

Traditionally centrist in approach, the party’s long-term goal is the establishment of community-based socialism. Upadhyay’s technocratic background, combined with Ghising’s reputation for efficient administration, positions the party as an “alternative” political force focused on good governance, infrastructure development, and effective public service delivery. Media personality Rima Biswokarma is also among its notable figures.

Janadesh Party Nepal

Janadesh Party Nepal is chaired by advocate Raman Kumar Karn, an attorney and secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association. Media veteran Rishi Dhamala serves as the party’s patron. The party emphasizes the concept of people’s mandate (janadesh) reflected in its name. Karn’s leadership draws on his legal background, while Dhamala’s wife, actress Aliza Gautam, holds an executive position within the party.

Samunnat Nepal Party

The Samunnat Nepal Party is led by Sarbendra Khanal, a former Inspector General of Police. Khanal has described the party’s core agenda as “good governance and prosperity.” After resigning from CPN-UML, he registered his own party to contest elections.

With a long career in public security, Khanal positions the party as a law-and-order–oriented reformist force with a nationalist flavour. Party sources indicate that he aims to introduce bureaucratic discipline and a development-oriented approach to governance.

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

Registered with the aim of advancing scientific socialism and achieving a higher stage of communism, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by Netra Bikram Chand, is participating in elections for the first time. Drawing on the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and other communist thinkers, Chand has pursued a strategy of building a new communist center by uniting like-minded forces.

The party seeks to establish a people’s government led by the proletariat, workers, laborers, farmers, and patriots, guided by communist principles. After participating in the decade-long Maoist armed revolution, Chand split from the Maoist mainstream during the peace process and formed his own party. Although the party briefly pursued a strategy of unified people’s revolution, it later returned to peaceful politics. Chand had secured central committee approval to reunite with the CPN (Maoist Center), but following the formation of the Nepali Communist Party, he withdrew from the plan and registered his party independently with the Election Commission.

Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party

Following the merger of the Maoist Center with other leftist factions, including the CPN (Unified Socialist), to form the Nepali Communist Party, leaders such as Janardan Sharma, Ram Karki, and Sudan Kirati joined former prime minister Baburam Bhattarai to establish the Pragatisheel Loktantrik Party. The party also includes Santosh Pariyar, who split from the Rastriya Swatantra Party.

The party has formed a five-member presidium and a 151-member central committee and has adopted the election symbol previously used by the Naya Shakti Party, with Bhattarai serving as patron. It is actively seeking alliances with parties such as the Rastriya Swatantra Party, Janamat Party, and various GenZ groups, and emphasizes policies aimed at empowering youth and encouraging their participation in politics.

Hamro Party Nepal

Hamro Party Nepal was founded by activists led by Khagendra Sunar, who gained prominence for campaigning against the atrocities, exploitation, and oppression faced by the Dalit community. Sunar was initially named as a prospective minister in the Karki-led interim government but was prevented from assuming the role after a polygamy case involving another individual with the same name surfaced due to an administrative oversight.

Sunar has stated that the party was established to advocate for the rights and liberation of the Dalit community, which has endured centuries of caste-based discrimination. However, he remains a controversial figure, with several other cases currently pending in court.

Lok Raj Baral, Political analyst

Prior to elections, the number of political parties typically surges, and this time is no different. However, many new entrants fail to consider the foundational principles required to build a lasting party. These are often individual-centric formations created around the election cycle, and they tend to be short-lived and perform poorly. I do not believe most new parties will make a significant impact. While a few may win seats, established parties such as CPN-UML, Nepali Congress, and the Nepali Communist Party will remain dominant due to their extensive grassroots organizations.

That said, GenZ voters, youth, and first-time voters are likely to reject traditional establishments, which will reduce the vote share of major parties. Even so, they are likely to finish on top, while most new parties may forfeit their election deposits.

Ayodhi Prasad Yadav, Former Chief Election Commissioner

In a multi-party democracy, a surge in the number of political parties should not necessarily be viewed negatively. During the election of the second Constituent Assembly, for instance, even more parties contested than today. Such proliferation indicates that people retain faith in the democratic process.

Ultimately, the situation will be resolved through the election itself, as the three-percent threshold for proportional representation helps maintain stability. In a democracy, voting is both a right and a duty, so the right to vote cannot be restricted. Citizens are free to choose their representatives, and it is through elections that winners are determined. As the country remains in a transitional phase, one can hope this process will lead to positive change and transformation.