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The parliamentary election scheduled for March 5 has attracted significant international attention. Major powers such as the United States, India, and China are closely watching the development, assessing the possible poll outcomes and their implications for them. Although all have maintained a cautious public stance to avoid the appearance of interference, their interest reflects deeper strategic, political, and economic concerns.

Global scrutiny

The Sept 8-9 GenZ protests were unprecedented in terms of their speed of mobilization and institutional impact. Within hours, key state mechanisms appeared paralyzed. The scale and intensity of the protests surprised observers worldwide. For Nepal’s immediate neighbors, the implications were especially serious. India and China, both of which share borders with Nepal, were concerned about possible spillover effects. India’s concerns were heightened by its open border and deep socio-political ties with Nepal, prompting policymakers to consider how similar unrest might affect its own domestic environment. China, highly sensitive to instability in its neighborhood, also watched the situation closely. Against this backdrop, the international community is now carefully observing how Nepali leaders respond and what direction the country takes after the elections.

The rise of new political forces

The emergence of parties such as the Rastriya Swatantra Party and other alternative political forces signals a potential shift in Nepal’s political landscape. For decades, external partners have worked with fragile coalition governments marked by frequent leadership changes, inconsistent policies, and a widening gap between promises and implementation. Diplomatic and development engagements were often disrupted by ministerial reshuffles and shifting alliances. Many in the international community see the possible rise of new leadership as an opportunity for greater policy coherence, particularly in foreign affairs and economic governance. If new actors form the government, their foreign policy direction and governance priorities will be closely scrutinized. However, new political parties have not clearly laid out their foreign policy priorities in their election manifestos. However, they have recognized that handling the relationship with major powers is a difficult and delicate task. International observers are also watching leadership shifts within traditional parties, including the potential rise of figures such as Gagan Thapa within the Nepali Congress.

The politicization of foreign policy

Several key bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been drawn into domestic political debates. The 1950 Treaty and border issues with India have often been used for political mobilization rather than genuine agendas to be addressed through sustained diplomatic engagement. India will be closely watching how the new political parties or new leaders of traditional political parties handle those issues when they form the government. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact with the United States became highly politicized, as did discussions around the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the State Partnership Program. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative faced controversy and delays. For major powers, such politicization complicates long-term planning and implementation. Many international observers believe that new political forces may avoid repeating the mistakes of past leaders by handling foreign policy matters with greater consistency and pragmatism.

Economic reform and the investment climate

Nepal’s strategic location and untapped economic potential have long attracted interest from both major and middle powers. The United States has consistently urged improvements in Nepal’s investment climate to encourage greater private-sector involvement. Under the Trump administration, economic and business interests were prioritized. With the shutdown of USAID, trade, investment, and China-related issues have become central pillars of Nepal–US engagement. China, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea share similar concerns about Nepal’s business environment. Relationships with Japan, Australia, South Korea and other countries are equally important because they are in a well-position to invest in Nepal.  Despite some legal reforms, structural challenges—such as bureaucratic delays, regulatory uncertainty, and weak implementation—continue to discourage large-scale investment. International stakeholders hope that a new government, especially one with a strong reform mandate, will focus on improving the ease of doing business and advancing meaningful structural reforms.

Nepal’s geopolitical balancing act

Nepal has historically followed a policy of non-alignment while expanding diplomatic and economic ties with competing global powers. The international community is closely watching whether the new government that emerges after the GenZ movement will continue this approach or adopt a different strategic alignment. Over the past decade, China’s economic presence and political influence in Nepal have grown, prompting caution in India and among Western countries. The shifting balance of influence in Kathmandu carries broader regional implications. As a result, the upcoming election is viewed not merely as a domestic political event but as a potential turning point in Nepal’s external relations. Traditional political parties have generally adhered to the principle of non-alignment, while newer political forces have yet to clearly articulate their foreign policy positions. In fact, most parties have deliberately avoided taking firm stances on foreign policy issues in their election manifestos. The West will put emphasis on greater transparency, accountability in the new government’s handling of domestic and international issues. Like in the past, they will closely watch Nepal’s dealing with China. China will be more assertive to secure its security and strategic interests along with pressing the new government to implement the past agreement reached between two countries when Xi Jinping visited Nepal in 2019. India’s prime concerns are security, investment, new government’s approach to pending issues, China factor and new government’s approach with the West. The new priorities of the Trump administration in Nepal will be implementation of MCC, trade and investment, security cooperation and Nepal's response to the US policy on human trafficking and illegal migrants.

Conclusion

As election day approaches, major countries are publicly refraining from overt involvement or endorsement. Western nations appear open to the emergence of new political forces, hoping for improved governance and greater policy stability. India has indicated its willingness to work with any elected government, though it remains attentive to how new leaders might shape bilateral relations. China, while maintaining its principle of non-interference, is reportedly cautious about potential shifts that could weaken traditional communist forces in parliament and disrupt policy continuity. 

The Election Commission has clarified vehicles carrying essentials including drinking water, milk, fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, and petroleum products do not require a permit to operate on the day of the election to  the House of Representatives. 

The Commission has stated that Vehicle Permit Procedures, 2082 notes that the vehicles used for telecommunication services, drinking water, electricity, and sewage maintenance, and hospital service (for the movement of hospital doctors and health workers from home to hospital and from hospital to home) will not require a permit to operate on March 5.

Meanwhile, the Commission has recommended to the Government of Nepal to make arrangements so that such vehicles are used only by the concerned users and do not carry unrelated passengers.

In addition, no pass is required for vehicles carrying passengers traveling to and from the airport for international and domestic air services.  

Similarly, vehicles carrying pregnant women, women who are unable to walk, women carrying their own children, women with disabilities, physically challenged people, senior citizen voters who are unable to walk, and one of their helpers will also be able to operate without restrictions.

Vehicles of diplomatic missions with the number plate marked 'CD', vehicles used by observers holding observer identity cards issued by the Commission (only at the places mentioned in the identity cards), vehicles used for monitoring and supervision by the National Human Rights Commission, and vehicles of media persons with press passes will be able to operate smoothly.

Similarly, an integrated vehicle movement desk with representatives from the Election Commission, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the District Administration Office, Kathmandu has been established on the Election Commission premises to oversee arrangements related to vehicle operation on Election Day. 

The District Administration Offices, Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, and Lalitpur are issuing vehicle passes from the same desk.

Nepal’s current election campaign has evolved into a contest not only of agendas but of tone, political memory, and competing claims over who can best safeguard the republic’s future. While most leaders publicly prioritize stability, governance, and development, their messaging styles—and the political histories they invoke—diverge sharply.

KP Sharma Oli and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML) frame the election as a decisive choice between tested leadership and risky experimentation. Oli’s tone is assertive, combative, and strongly nationalist.

His campaign heavily references two defining moments of his premiership: his stance during the 2015 India–Nepal border disruption and the 2020 constitutional amendment introducing Nepal’s revised political map, incorporating Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura. Through video messages and public speeches, UML portrays these episodes as evidence of strong leadership defending sovereignty. The party has even framed Sept 8–9 protests as conspiratorial attempts to destabilize the nation and drawn parallels between Nepal’s emerging GenZ activism and “color revolutions,” suggesting foreign-influenced unrest.

The overarching message is clear: only experienced and established leaders can protect sovereignty and ensure economic prosperity. Oli argues that new parties are politically immature and incapable of governing effectively. Aware that youth voters are gravitating toward newer political forces, UML has produced targeted media content urging young voters to trust traditional parties.  Its slogan—CPN-UML now, because the country comes first—reinforces a narrative of national duty and continuity. Party leaders further suggest that Nepal has made significant progress since the democratic restoration of 1990, and that UML’s return is necessary to prevent regression.

In contrast, Pushpa Kamal Dahal adopts a more measured and institutional tone. Rather than foregrounding combative nationalism, he presents himself as a guardian of the federal democratic system born from the 2006 peace process. By invoking his partnership with Girija Prasad Koirala during the Comprehensive Peace Accord, Dahal underscores his claim as one of the architects of the republic. Earlier, he was aggressive toward Oli and aligning himself with new political parties, but of late he is stating that NC, UML and his party will have to collaborate with the forces that burnt down Singhadurbar.

His campaign frames the election as a choice between safeguarding constitutional achievements—federalism, secularism, inclusion—and risking political regression. Unlike Oli, Dahal’s criticism of emerging parties is restrained. He questions their preparedness and long-term seriousness but avoids labeling them threats to the nation. His tone reflects his evolution from insurgent commander to institutional stakeholder: reform, in his framing, must occur within the constitutional system, not through destabilizing rupture.

Gagan Kumar Thapa of the Nepali Congress seeks to position himself between old and new. His rhetoric emphasizes governance reform, anti-corruption, and institutional accountability while defending the democratic legacy of Nepal’s oldest democratic party. Rather than Oli’s defensive nationalism or Dahal’s legacy-based system protection, Thapa projects modernization within tradition, arguing that renewal can and must happen from inside established institutions. Thapa’s says that both Oli’s UML and new political parties are taking extremist positions which can be detrimental for the country. He urges people to vote for the NC’s centrist position.

Outside traditional party hierarchies, new political figures channel voter frustration more directly. Balendra Shah (Balen) employs a blunt, anti-elite style, appealing strongly to urban youth with calls for transparency and technocratic efficiency. His tone is disruptive and unapologetically critical of entrenched political culture. Balen Shah is highlighting the failure of the traditional political parties. He does not seem ideological but is trying to play on the failure of the traditional political parties.

Similarly, Rabi Lamichhane of the Rastriya Swatantra Party frames his campaign around injustice, accountability, and systemic reform. His rhetoric is often confrontational and personally charged, shaped in part by legal controversies that he presents as examples of political persecution. His appeal lies in grievance-driven populism and demands for structural overhaul. At the same time, Lamichhane’s tone is vindictive. He has publicly said that as traditional political parties registered politically motivated cases against him, he will take revenge.

Taken together, the campaign reveals a fundamental tension in Nepali politics. On one side stand leaders like Oli and, in a different register, Dahal—arguing that experienced hands are essential to preserve sovereignty, stability, and constitutional order. On the other side are reformist and anti-establishment figures who insist that generational change, accountability, and structural reform are necessary to move the country forward.

The debate is therefore less about stated goals—since nearly all claim to support stability and development—and more about political trust: whether Nepal’s future lies in consolidating the system built since 2006, or in reshaping it through new leadership and disruptive reform.

As Nepal gears up for elections, campaign agendas may extend beyond routine political promises. One meaningful focus could be legal reform—especially revisiting criminal procedural laws to ensure timely execution of judgments. By prioritizing informed dialogue and legislative amendment, political parties have an opportunity to strengthen Nepal’s justice delivery system and restore public confidence in the rule of law.

“No Judgement of any Court, no order of any Judges, is of any use unless it can be enforced,” rightly said Lord Denning. The administration of criminal justice does not conclude with the pronouncement of judgment. The effectiveness, credibility, and authority of judicial decisions depend largely upon their proper execution.

The National Criminal Procedure Code, 2074 (hereinafter code) under Chapter-15 (Sections 151 to 168) constitute a comprehensive statutory framework governing the recording, execution, postponement, remission, and enforcement of sentences, fines, compensation, pardoning and related orders. After all, executio est finis et fructus legis—an execution is the end and the fruit of law.

Reference may be made to one of the most famous judgments of England. Lord Hewart, CJ, stated it in R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924), where he said: “Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

Constitutionally speaking, Article 126(2) of the Constitution of Nepal provides that “everyone shall comply with the orders or decisions given by the court in the course of judicial proceedings.” Likewise, Section 18(1) of the Justice Administration Act, 2073 states that “except as otherwise provided in this Act or the prevailing law, a decision made by any court, body, or authority in the course of judicial proceedings shall be final, and all concerned parties shall abide by such decision.”

Time for legal reform

It is reasonable to argue that the Code is an enlarged version of the State Cases Act, 2049. It provides limited procedural arrangements for private prosecution cases. The code should have incorporated a separate chapter dealing specifically with procedural aspects of private prosecution, such as the lapse of dates, securing dates, and other procedural safeguards.

Section 165(11), which stipulates that personal claims cannot be recovered, the state bears the cost of the prisoner’s ration during imprisonment, effectively shifts the financial burden to the state due to the non-realization of personal claimed amounts. As a result, the state is subjected to an unnecessary burden even in cases arising out of purely private transactions between individuals. In such cases, private individuals are required to approach the court through an application to realize their claims in accordance with judgments delivered in their favor.

As in private prosecution cases, state criminal cases should also recognize the Government of Nepal as the petitioner at the stage of execution. The responsibility of the government should not end with the filing of the case. Rather, it should demonstrate proactive and sustained efforts at the execution stage, similar to its role during investigation and the filing of the charge sheet.

The execution of judgments cannot take their true and effective shape unless state mechanisms commit themselves to withholding state services—such as the issuance or clearance of electricity bills, water bills, or the registration or renewal of transport services—from judgment debtors.

The state should establish a common portal containing information on defendants who have failed to furnish fines, compensation, claimed amounts, or to serve jail sentences as mandated by court judgments. The government should restrict public services to those who fail to comply with court orders and judgments. An amendment could be introduced in this regard under Section 160 of the code and other relevant laws.

Executive’s role is essential

Non-execution of court verdicts fosters a culture of impunity. While the state possesses the police, administrative machinery, prisons, and other executive mechanisms with adequate means to enforce court verdicts, the courts themselves lack enforcement agencies.

Judgments cannot be enforced in letter and spirit unless state mechanisms stand on an equal footing when it comes to execution. The court verdicts cannot be effectively implemented until and unless the executive organs of the state are equally involved in the execution process.

In countries like India, the United States, England, and China, the judicial department delivers judgments, but the executive branch ensures their execution, reflecting the principle of separation of powers.

Other laws

Meanwhile, Section 166 of the Code provides a priority order for recovery, placing fines first, government claims second, followed by compensation, claimed amounts, and lastly other amounts in question.

This provision has significant consequences in cases involving banking offenses, cheque dishonor cases, and private prosecution cases. As a result, plaintiffs in private prosecution cases often suffer in the realization of their claims, as the law mandates the recovery of fines before addressing private claims.

Section 155 allows first-time offenders sentenced to one year or less to substitute imprisonment with a monetary payment—Rs 300 per day. Courts must record reasons and obtain a good conduct deed before granting relief. The amendment changed the language from “may” to “shall,” making the release by payment mandatory.

Way forward

As per Judgment Execution Directorate’s data (as of 17 Nov 2024), there are 106,265 persons whose imprisonment remains to be executed (of which 2,538 are foreign nationals). The remaining imprisonment amounts to 118,613 years, 3 months, and 5 days. The outstanding fines total Rs 2,998,629,509, of which the government’s share is Rs. 212,264,153. Compensation yet to be paid to victims of crime amounts to Rs 931,191,131. Additionally, there are 37,718 pending applications related to judgment execution.

This data paint a depressing reality. But who is to blame? Courts? Certainly not. The courts’ job is to pronounce verdicts and oversee their execution, but the actual enforcement rests with the executive branch.

The court’s job is to judicially examine the case. It is improper for the court to side with the winning party or act against the losing party in the name of executing a judgment.

“A punishment imposed in accordance with a judgment does not attain its purpose unless it is actually executed. A judgment that cannot be enforced also loses its real significance,” held the Supreme Court in the case of Nimesh Lakhe v Lalitpur District Court, et al.

A democratic state should encourage debate and ensure court verdicts are enforced. The executive’s role is crucial—not just in filing cases, but also in implementing judgments. The judiciary’s sole job is to deliver justice; delays in enforcement are the executive’s responsibility.

To uphold the rule of law and end impunity, timely execution of judgments is essential, following practices in other countries. Let’s protect the judiciary, the temple of justice, and make this a priority—even as an election agenda—for good governance and democracy.

The authors work at the Supreme Court and have a keen interest in academic discussions on law