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Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli began his four-day official visit to Beijing on Monday at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, Premier Li Qiang. This marks Oli’s first bilateral foreign trip since assuming office for the third time in July, signaling a significant step in Nepal-China relations.

During the visit, Oli is set to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping and hold bilateral talks with Premier Li. Discussions will focus on mutual interests, including connectivity, infrastructure development, trade and transit, energy cooperation, tourism, and fostering people-to-people ties, according to Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The two countries are also expected to sign some key agreements. Notably, China will provide a $20mn grant to Nepal, alongside a new bilateral development cooperation framework to be implemented from 2025 to 2029. Projects such as the Tokha-Khahare Tunnel Road, the Special Economic Zone at the Korala border, and the feasibility study for a cross-border railway line are likely to advance, Information and Technology Minister Prithvi Subba Gurung said. Oli has chosen China over India as his initial foreign destination, breaking the longstanding practice of Nepali prime ministers beginning their tenure with a visit to India. 

Oli’s choice to visit China first rather than India is “not unexpected, but rather a reflection of the increasing policy choices of South Asian countries,” Lin Minwang, a deputy director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University, told the Global Times on Sunday. He further noted after coming to power, Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu also chose to visit China first instead of India, and other South Asian countries are actively developing relations with China. “This reflects changes in Nepal's domestic politics and its policy toward China.”

Besides choosing China for his first official trip, Oli’s visit is drawing attention for other reasons as well. One of them is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

A task force from the two parties has revised the draft of the BRI implementation plan initially proposed by the Chinese side in 2020. The document, now titled Framework for Cooperation instead of BRI Implementation Plan, has been sent to the Chinese side for initial negotiations, though it is yet to be finalized.

This trip comes at a time when China is pushing to strengthen BRI cooperation. There are concerns over what sort of agreement will be signed with Beijing on BRI on which India and western countries are cautioning Nepal to maintain transparency and avoid possible debt burden. Domestically, there are also suspicions that the coalition of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML could crack, as two parties have divergent views on how to deal with China. Oli has a history of fostering strategic agreements with China, including the landmark Transit and Transport Treaty of 2016. 

China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Mao Ning, highlighted the importance of Oli’s visit in strengthening bilateral ties. “Despite changing international and regional dynamics, China-Nepal relations have grown steadily over the past 69 years, exemplifying equality and win-win cooperation between countries of different sizes,” she said. Mao emphasized deepening strategic trust, advancing high-quality BRI cooperation, and achieving progress in the China-Nepal partnership.

The Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML seem to have agreed on a common position on how to approach China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the initiative has garnered support domestically, it remains uncertain whether China will accept Nepal's proposed terms, according to multiple sources.

A task force from the two parties has revised the draft of the BRI implementation plan initially proposed by the Chinese side in 2020. The document, now titled Framework for Cooperation instead of BRI Implementation Plan, has been sent to the Chinese side for initial negotiations, though it is yet to be finalized. The NC and UML are of the view that projects under the BRI should be funded through grants rather than loans. This condition may come up in high-level discussions, as BRI traditionally does not include provisions for grants.

During a meeting with her Chinese counterpart, Minister for Foreign Affairs Arzu Rana Deuba reiterated this same position agreed by the two coalition parties. However, Beijing has yet to formally respond. A senior Nepali official remarked, “The document prepared by the Nepali side is vague, but it is progress. It signals that Nepal is moving forward with the  BRI, which might encourage the Chinese side to sign the document.” According to the official, the Chinese side is desperate to change the narrative that since the signing of the BRI framework in 2017, not a single project has been executed in Nepal.

A UML leader privy to the development said: “The document does not mention about the investment modality which will be settled during the project implementation phase.”

Given the great power rivalry which has also affected the BRI project, the Chinese officials may accept the document. China is reportedly eager to alter the perception of inaction regarding the BRI in Nepal. Beijing has highlighted the Pokhara International Airport as a BRI project, despite its unclear status within the initiative. During a recent meeting in Chengdu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized the progress in the joint construction of the BRI, including the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, which he claimed benefits the Nepali people.

Under the BRI framework, Nepal and China will discuss areas such as connectivity, investment, trade, tourism, agriculture and infrastructure development. If China agrees to Nepal’s proposed document, specific projects may be announced during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit. CPN-UML General Secretary Shankar Pokhrel suggested that the new agreement could pave the way for mobilizing Chinese resources for Nepal's development.

According to officials, Chinese officials have also emphasized implementing agreements reached over the past decade, including those signed during President Xi Jinping’s 2019 visit to Nepal, rather than pursuing entirely new ones. The two countries are also discussing potential cooperation in the energy sector, including the construction of  cross-border transmission lines, a likely agenda item during Oli’s visit.

Additionally, Beijing is expected to seek renewed commitments from Nepal on the One-China policy. During her meeting with Wang, Foreign Minister Deuba reaffirmed Nepal’s adherence to the policy, asserting that Tibet (Xizang) and Taiwan are integral parts of China. She also assured that Nepal would not allow its territory to be used for activities harming China’s interests, nor support foreign interference in China’s internal affairs.

Raunab Singh Khatri, co-founder of the Aranika Project, a research firm that studies Nepal-China relations, recently published an article commenting on the evolving nature of the BRI. He noted: “The area of China’s international engagement has diversified; from hard infrastructure under the BRI, the trend slowly and gradually shifted toward digital and health connectivity, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic.”

“Will the BRI projects even take off in Nepal? The consensus among Nepali politicians is that Nepal can only accept grants and not loans—but the dilemma is that BRI is, by and large, a commercial project that is backed by “The Big Four” Chinese policy banks, Silk Road Fund, EXIM Bank, CDB, etc.”

Min Bhavan

Nov 28

As I sipped my steaming cup of tea, the conversations among a group of men sitting nearby flowed effortlessly. Their back-and-forth transitioned smoothly from trivial topics to politics and the economy. The lively discussion was briefly interrupted when a man entered the tea shop. He was no stranger to the group or the shop owner; in fact, he was a district-level leader of the ruling CPN-UML. Addressing him as Dai (elder brother), the group warmly welcomed him and eagerly sought his opinion on the current political climate.

The UML leader, however, voiced dissatisfaction with both his party and the government. He began by criticizing the disorganization at the UML’s mass meeting at Durbarmarg on November 22. From there, he turned his attention to Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s leadership, accusing a small circle of party leaders—many of whom had lost in the national elections—of monopolizing control over the party and the prime minister’s secretariat. According to him, this group had even restricted access for senior leaders to the party office and Baluwatar.

He also remarked that Oli’s impulsive public statements were tarnishing his reputation. To lighten the mood, he shared a witty observation: “Sher Bahadur Deuba gains by saying very little, Pushpa Kamal Dahal is losing weight from his inconsistent statements, and Oli cheapens himself by talking excessively—even on topics like complex medical issues he doesn’t understand.” The group erupted in laughter.

One participant offered a sobering comment: “The country is being run by ODD—Oli, Deuba, and Dahal—dashing all hopes for stability or progress.”

The conversation then shifted to the struggles of Pokhara and Bhairahawa International Airports, which are facing debt stress due to insufficient international flights. A participant familiar with the aviation sector suggested that Pokhara Airport’s main issue isn’t its debt but its operations. “If the government convinces China to schedule at least two weekly flights and boosts domestic traffic, the airport could start generating revenue and tackling its debt problems,” he said. Another agreed, cautioning that operational inefficiencies would keep the airport unsustainable even if China waived the loans.

The group’s attention turned to Oli’s upcoming visit to China and whether Nepal should focus on loans or grants under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). “China’s inconsistent stance on the BRI doesn’t help clarify the matter,” one participant observed. The group didn’t dwell on the topic, reflecting the uncertainty surrounding the initiative.

Next, the discussion pivoted to the Kathmandu Metropolitan City’s decision to fine the UML Rs. 100,000 for littering during its mass meeting at Durbarmarg. A taxi driver parked nearby joined in and voiced his opinion. “Even if Balen (the mayor) is wrong, the UML should have accepted the fine. It would set an example for everyone else,” he argued. He went on to share how his neighbor had been fined Rs. 5,000 for throwing waste on the street. Pointing to the Tinkune-Baneshwar area, he added, “Look how clean this stretch has become under Balen’s leadership. We should support him.”

A participant interjected with praise for Balen, suggesting that if Nepal had a directly elected prime minister or president, Balen would win easily. Another participant noted how Rabi Lamichhane had once enjoyed similar popularity but had since seen his reputation decline due to allegations of involvement in a cooperatives scam. By now, about ten people had gathered in the tea shop, many taking turns criticizing Rabi. One person exclaimed, “If Balen gets elected, he’ll turn Nepal into Switzerland in just a few years!”

As the group gradually dispersed, only three of us remained in the tea shop. One of the men began sharing his personal struggles, prompting his friend to offer comforting words: “Happiness isn’t something others give you. Find joy in what you earn. We can live contentedly within our means.” Reflecting on their hardships, he added, “Our generation has endured a lot, but at least our children are spared from the same difficulties.”

The conversation shifted to the growing trend of youth migration for work and education. “It’s not just international migration; internal migration is significant too. People are moving to cities,” one participant observed. “Kathmandu doesn’t feel as crowded as it did four or five years ago.”

At that moment, a few more people entered the tea shop. One of them, a local from near the Pashupatinath Temple, brought up corruption in the temple’s management. “Anti-graft bodies are ignoring it,” he lamented. This led to a discussion about the role of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA).

“The CIAA has become toothless,” remarked one participant. “Political parties now rely on the Central Investigation Bureau (CIB), which they manipulate for their own interests.”

As the tea shop returned to its usual hum, the conversations left me with a lasting impression of a country grappling with immense challenges yet full of voices ready to speak out.

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba departed for China on Thursday at the invitation of her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. Her visit aims to set the tone for Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s upcoming trip to Beijing, scheduled for December 2.

Deuba is set to meet with Wang on Sunday (November 29) to finalize the agenda for Oli’s visit. Oli’s four-day visit has drawn attention to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has become a focal point of national political discourse. The ruling coalition of CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress (NC) remain divided on how to approach the BRI, prompting behind-the-scenes negotiations to form a unified position ahead of the visit.

The extent of any consensus between the two parties remains unclear. A key point of contention lies in Beijing’s 2020 BRI Implementation Plan. The NC has expressed significant reservations about the document, and a task force has proposed revisions, including changes to its title. Whether Beijing will accept these modifications is uncertain. While all three major parties now agree that Nepal should not accept loans under the BRI, a critical question lingers: Does the BRI framework include provisions for grants?

Speaking with the media before her departure, Foreign Minister Deuba sought to downplay the perceived differences between the two coalition partners. “The media hype about disagreements is exaggerated. A joint task force is addressing the concerns, and much will depend on how the negotiations unfold,” she said. However, official documents suggest that grants are not part of the BRI framework. Research indicates that China has not provided grants for BRI projects, aligning with the initiative’s emphasis on shared development rather than international aid.

The BRI White Paper underscores its collaborative nature, stating that it prioritizes equal participation, voluntary engagement, and freedom from political or economic preconditions. It explicitly notes that the BRI is neither an aid program nor a geopolitical tool but a framework for joint development.

Kalyan Raj Sharma, chairperson of the Nepal-China Friendship Forum, criticized the ongoing debate over loans versus grants, calling it “inherently problematic.” He argued that the BRI is a corporate framework requiring Nepal to define its priorities. “We should focus on two aspects: small-scale project collaboration and long-term infrastructure development. Within this framework, modalities could include grants, concessional loans, or others. First, let’s finalize our vision before getting bogged down in loan-versus-grant debates,” he said.

UML leader and former Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali echoed this sentiment, stressing the need to align Nepal’s interests with the Chinese initiative. “Instead of determining where our priorities overlap with the BRI, our discussions have been reduced to a binary narrative of loans versus grants,” Gyawali remarked. He maintained that under the current economic climate, Nepal should avoid loans for large infrastructure projects.

Former Foreign Secretary Madhu Ram Acharya was more critical, describing Nepal’s engagement with the BRI as a “classic case of how not to negotiate.” He highlighted rushed, top-down negotiations and excessive politicization. “The BRI Implementation Plan formalizes the ‘strategic partnership’ agreed upon during President Xi Jinping’s visit in 2019. Such a comprehensive agreement should not be signed hastily or without safeguarding Nepal’s national interests,” Acharya argued.

As Oli’s visit to China approaches, the BRI remains a complex issue at the intersection of domestic politics and international diplomacy. Nepal faces the delicate task of navigating its priorities while ensuring that the collaboration benefits its development goals. Whether the visit will yield clarity on the BRI and its modalities remains to be seen, but it is clear that the framework offers opportunities—if Nepal can negotiate effectively.

Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML are working to bridge their differences over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ahead of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s Beijing visit. The NC has taken a firm stance against accepting loans for BRI projects, focusing instead on grants or concessional financing to avoid economic burdens.

A four-member task force representing both parties in the coalition has developed a unified position on the draft BRI implementation plan proposed by China. According to party leaders, the task force’s draft of Nepal’s response has been forwarded to the Chinese side. If China agrees, a new agreement to advance the BRI will be signed during Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China from Dec 2 to 6.

At the leadership level, the NC and UML have reached a consensus that loans under the BRI are unacceptable. Prime Minister Oli has reiterated this position in Cabinet meetings and public forums, emphasizing Nepal’s unwillingness to take loans. This position aligns with the stances of three major parties—NC, UML, and CPN (Maoist Center)—who agree that Nepal’s current economic challenges make loans untenable.

In June, former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal expressed in Parliament that Nepal prefers grants over loans and that, if loans are essential, they should be concessional, with interest rates not exceeding 1.5 percent. Dahal also stated that Nepal seeks financing from China under terms similar to those offered by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

However, China’s official stance on the BRI does not include grant provisions. A 2023 Chinese white paper describes the BRI as a joint development initiative rather than a foreign aid program, emphasizing mutual contributions and shared growth. “The principle of joint contribution highlights that the BRI is not an international aid program or a geopolitical tool but a collaborative effort for shared development,” the document states. So far, China has not publicly addressed Nepal’s request for grants.

The Pokhara International Airport loan has become another contentious issue. Nepal is considering asking China to waive the loan. Dahal had made a similar request during his tenure, and now the Oli administration is preparing to do the same.

In September, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Bishnu Poudel requested China to waive the airport loan. However, Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song has indicated that waiving such loans may be difficult.

Initially, the NC was staunchly opposed to the BRI, but it has softened its position. NC leaders now believe the BRI could be viable if China offers grants for infrastructure projects. To further these discussions, Minister for Foreign Affairs Arzu Rana Deuba is traveling to Beijing to prepare for Prime Minister Oli’s visit. Rana is expected to finalize the drafts of agreements that could be signed during the visit.

With a tentative consensus between coalition partners, the risk of political instability appears to have been mitigated. A senior NC leader remarked, “We should not oppose the BRI outright but must ensure Oli doesn’t sign any agreements that could lead Nepal into a debt trap.”

In recent weeks, social media platforms are abuzz with suggestions for Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli regarding his official trip to Beijing from Dec 2–6. Although the visit has not been officially announced, preparations are underway, and debates surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Nepal-China relations have intensified, often factoring in India’s role in the equation.

On Nov 25, former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai shared his perspective on social media, stating that he could not attend Oli’s consultation meeting but wanted to offer advice. “Nepal is the oldest independent and sovereign country in South Asia, and one of the oldest in the world. It has every right and responsibility to assert and maintain its sovereignty, come what may,” he wrote. Highlighting Nepal’s unique geopolitical position between rising powers China and India, Bhattarai stressed the need to maintain friendly relations with all parties for national interests. He advocated leveraging opportunities presented by the BRI, just as Nepal has done with India and the US, to boost its economy. While he supports the BRI, his stance on whether Nepal should opt for loans or grants remains unclear.

Political polarization on the BRI continues, with Chinese Ambassador Cheng Song actively lobbying key political leaders to create a favorable environment for its adoption. As the visit approaches, Indian media and think tanks have weighed in. On Nov 22, Rishi Gupta from the Asia Society published an article in The Print titled “India does not need to sweat over Oli’s China drift—Nepal knows the limits.” The piece sparked reactions in Nepal. Aneka Rebecca Rajbhandari, co-founder of The Arnika Project, criticized Indian analysts for their narrow security-focused lens on Nepal-China relations. Similarly, Akhilesh Upadhyay, former editor of The Kathmandu Post and columnist at Hindustan Times, remarked that Indian analysts suffer from an “imperial gaze” toward smaller neighbors but noted that Chinese attitudes are not significantly different.

Despite the ongoing discourse on the topic, Prime Minister Oli has yet to secure full support for the BRI. While he asserts that loans should not fund BRI projects, key coalition partner Nepali Congress (NC) remains hesitant. On Nov 22, Pankaj Das, who identifies himself as a cadre of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) cadre and observer of Nepal’s geopolitical affairs, noted a shift in NC’s stance. In his post, he said: “When in government, NC opposed the BRI. In opposition, it rejected both loans and grants. Now, as part of the government, it might consider BRI projects if grants are provided.” Das also suggested that NC and the UML have already agreed in principle to pursue BRI agreements.

Prominent voices on social media have added to the debate. Ajaya Bhadra Khanal, a media personality, suggested that Nepal should carefully examine and remove any suspicious provisions in the BRI implementation plan. In a X (formerly Twitter) post directed at NC General Secretary Gagan Thapa, he emphasized the risks of adopting China’s economic model, which may lead to long-term challenges. Similarly, Pramod Raj Sedhain, a self-taught geopolitical analyst, posted on X that public debate and scrutiny, akin to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) discussions, are essential for BRI projects. He advocated for transparency and parliamentary debates to ensure accountability.

The lack of transparency surrounding Nepal’s BRI framework agreement, signed in 2017, has fueled further suspicion. Although a four-page document is publicly available, its official status remains unconfirmed. Vijay Kant Karna, a researcher in international relations, stated in a X post on Nov 21 that secret agreements on strategic projects like the BRI are unacceptable without broad stakeholder consultations. He called for comprehensive discussions, similar to those held for the MCC, to ensure public trust.

“China’s BRI strategic plan needs comprehensive discussions in all stakeholders like MCC. Secret accord without proper discussions in parliament and political parties will not be acceptable,” he stated.

Comparisons to past foreign aid initiatives have also surfaced. Journalist Prakash Timalsina highlighted how King Mahendra successfully leveraged Cold War-era assistance from Russia, India, and China for projects like the Mahendra Highway and Araniko Highway. In response, journalist Birat Anupam remarked that he supports both the MCC and the BRI, a stance he described as rare in Nepal’s polarized discourse. Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa criticized political parties for undermining national decision-making by relying on foreign support for their political and economic agendas.

“Political parties who are taking not just political support but also economic support from foreign powers for their interests are gradually losing the decision-making power for the national interest,” Thapa argued.

Jainendra Jeevan, a political analyst, warned the NC against adopting an overly rigid stance on the BRI. He argued that antagonizing China, a global power, could strain relations with the ruling UML and alienate other pro-China groups. Jeevan added that without hidden political or military agendas, foreign initiatives like the MCC and BRI could benefit Nepal. However, he stressed the importance of balanced engagement to safeguard national interests.

As Oli’s visit approaches, he has intensified consultations with coalition partners and stakeholders. While dozens of bilateral issues could be addressed, the BRI dominates public discourse. Oli’s previous visits to China were marked by major agreements: the 2016 Transit and Transport Agreement and discussions on railway projects in 2018. The 2024 visit is poised to center on the BRI. Although Oli has not explicitly outlined his agenda, he has emphasized the need for tangible outcomes from the trip.

Interestingly, social media trends reveal a gradual consensus even among NC-leaning experts, who now acknowledge the importance of engaging with the BRI while opposing loans. Left-leaning intellectuals, on the other hand, have long advocated for concessional loans under the BRI framework. This evolving sentiment underscores the complexity of Nepal's position. While the BRI offers economic opportunities, its dominance in public discourse has overshadowed other pressing bilateral issues with China.

In the backdrop of these debates, public demand for transparency and accountability grows louder. Citizens, analysts, and politicians alike agree that robust discussions, both in Parliament and the public sphere, are essential for any agreements under the BRI. Lessons from past controversies, like the MCC, highlight the importance of open dialogue and clear communication to prevent misunderstandings and foster trust.

The stakes of Prime Minister Oli’s upcoming visit are high. Balancing the BRI’s potential benefits with its financial and geopolitical implications will require careful diplomacy. At the same time, ensuring that domestic consensus aligns with national interests remains challenging.

Top leaders’ take

“During my visit, there will be no agreements related to loans. However, the claim that Nepal is at risk of falling into a debt trap is untrue. If we ever need loans, we are free to seek them from any source.” - Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli

“Nepal should not take loans from China under the BRI, as the country lacks the capacity to handle such financial commitments. However, we are open to accepting grants.” - Sher Bahadur Deuba, NC President

“Nepal should proceed with the BRI projects, as they align with our national interests. Having already joined the BRI framework, we must move forward to realize its potential benefits.” - Madhav Kumar Nepal, CPN (Unified Socialist) Chairperson

“Consultations between the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML regarding Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China are ongoing. There are no significant differences between the two parties, and I am traveling to China to assist with preparations for the visit.” - Arzu Rana Deuba, Minister for Foreign Affairs

“Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is facing pressure during this trip because the ruling coalition partner, the Nepali Congress, opposes certain aspects of the BRI. Specifically, the NC is firmly against taking any loans. It will be interesting to see how China views this dynamic during the visit.” - Jhala Nath Khanal, CPN (Unified Socialist) senior leader

“The agreements signed with China in the past must be implemented during PM Oli’s visit. The BRI projects should be executed in both letter and spirit, and the implementation plan must be finalized during this trip.” - Pushpa Kamal Dahal, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson

Nov 20

Mid Baneshwor, Kathmandu

Newspaper readership might be declining, but in Kathmandu’s tea shops, the headlines are still the spark for lively gossip. I’ve been noticing this ever since I started writing this column. That’s why tea shop owners make sure there’s at least one fresh newspaper on hand every morning—it’s as essential as the tea itself.

The other day, I stepped into a small tea shop in Mid-Baneshwor. It was quiet, just two people sipping tea. When one of them left, I worried the shop might be too empty to gather a decent story. But the man sitting next to me saved the day. He grabbed a copy of Naya Patrika and blurted out: “This is what happens in Nepal all the time. It’s unfair!”

The headline he was reacting to reported political meddling in the investigation of cooperative fraud. Apparently, only opposition leaders were being targeted, while ruling party leaders were conveniently off the hook. He was especially riled up about the arrest of Rabi Lamichhane, the chairman of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, calling it a politically motivated move.

Soon, another patron chimed in, steering the conversation toward corruption during the Panchayat era. He claimed the final years of the regime were riddled with shady deals, especially as the country transitioned to a multi-party democracy in 1990. According to him, revenue offices became cash cows for politicians, with prime ministers cutting deals to place senior officials there in exchange for a slice of the earnings.

Just then, three regulars strolled in, greeting the owner as they made themselves comfortable. The focus shifted to Durga Prasai’s recent arrest. Opinions were flying in all directions. Some defended the government’s move, while others speculated it was an attempt to suppress a rally Prasai had planned. One man brought up Prasai’s claims about Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli having stakes in a Cambodian telecom company. While some dismissed it as nonsense, others argued that Oli’s past visits to Cambodia and the involvement of Nepali businesspeople made it worth investigating.

At this point, someone brought up how easy it is to fake documents and media nowadays. “Deepfakes,” I interjected. That word caught their attention, and I explained what I knew about the technology. Then I slipped back into listening mode as the debate continued.

The conversation took a personal turn when an older man joined us and ordered tea without sugar. He shared how diabetes had been a constant battle for him over the past decade. “It’s tough being alone,” he said. His wife had passed away five years ago, and his children were settled abroad in Canada and Australia. His son was in town for Dashain, mainly to get some dental work done because healthcare is so expensive overseas.

This opened the floodgates to a discussion on medical tourism. One man remarked how even wealthy Nepalis return home for affordable treatment. The conversation turned to lifestyle changes, with some advocating dietary adjustments over exercise. The tea shop owner joined in, admitting he also had diabetes but relied solely on medication.

Talk of health gave way to real estate woes. The older man mentioned trying to sell land in the far-western region but lamented the sluggish market. “Nobody’s buying unless it’s for building a house,” he said. A man from Kavre added that the recent floods and landslides had made things worse. Showing photos on his phone, he pointed out how risky it was to invest in flood-prone areas now. For once, everyone agreed.

The tea shop owner eventually joined the chat, venting about the government declaring a public holiday to mourn a former speaker’s death—after office hours had already started. “What’s the point?” he grumbled. The topic fizzled out quickly, though, with most patrons uninterested.

Finally, the discussion turned to politics, as it always does. The ruling CPN-UML’s decision to hold street protests on November 22 came under fire. “Why is a ruling party blocking roads?” one man asked. Another accused the UML of giving Durga Prasai too much attention. As they debated the party’s stance on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), my time ran out. I had to leave for a meeting, but the conversation was still going strong when I stepped out.

Once again, the tea shop had delivered—a microcosm of Kathmandu’s concerns, debates, and daily life, all over a cup of tea.

On 21 Nov 2006, Nepal’s Seven Party Alliance and the Maoist party signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), officially bringing an end to a decade-long violent insurgency that claimed over 17,000 lives. Over the past 18 years, significant achievements have been made, such as the drafting of a new constitution and the integration of Maoist combatants into the political mainstream. However, the issues of addressing war-era human rights violations and providing adequate relief to victims remain unresolved.

The passage of the Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Third Amendment) Act in August 2024 has brought a sense of optimism among cross-party leaders, who believe it aligns with a 2014 verdict by Nepal’s Supreme Court and responds to concerns raised by the international community. While foreign governments, including China, have expressed their support for the new law, victims are still skeptical about whether it will lead to meaningful prosecutions for serious human rights violations and whether the reparations process will be sufficient to address their grievances.

The government is now in the process of appointing new members to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), both of which have been without leadership for years. A total of 156 individuals have applied for positions within these bodies, but there are concerns about whether the commissions can perform effectively, given their troubled history.

In the past, both commissions were undermined by political interference, lack of resources, infighting among members representing different political parties, and non-cooperation from the bureaucracy. When the commissions were first appointed in 2015, they made little progress, and despite some advances in the investigations following a second set of appointments in 2019, there was no substantial breakthrough. Since 2022, both bodies have been nearly defunct, with the TRC receiving 63,718 complaints from victims, and the CIEDP receiving around 3,200 complaints related to disappearances, yet no significant action has been taken.

Although the recent amendment to the law introduces some progressive changes, it still contains vague provisions regarding the definition of human rights violations, the punishment for such violations, and the timelines for investigating them. This has made the process of investigation and prosecution more complicated. While victims were consulted during the drafting of the bill, they were not involved in the creation of regulations, guidelines, or procedures for its implementation. Suman Adhikari, a vocal representative of victims, points out that this lack of consultation in the final stages of the process is a significant oversight.

CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who was a signatory of the CPA, has praised the agreement as a foundational document for Nepal’s federal democratic republic and inclusive democracy. He emphasized that the country is now in the process of concluding the remaining tasks of the peace process. However, completing the transitional justice process is far more complicated than political leaders may suggest. Its success depends on a number of factors that must be addressed by the government, political parties, the bureaucracy, and international actors.

One of the key issues is the process of appointing commission members. In the past, appointments were made based on political affiliations rather than merit, resulting in members who lacked the necessary expertise and spent much of their time learning on the job. To avoid repeating this mistake, future appointments must prioritize merit and technical competence, rather than political loyalty.

Another significant challenge is ensuring that the commissions have the resources and staff necessary to carry out their work. In the past, bureaucratic non-cooperation and frequent staff transfers hampered the functioning of these bodies. The new leadership must ensure that qualified personnel are appointed to these commissions and that logistical and financial resources are available to support their work. Additionally, the government must ensure that the commissions operate independently, without undue political interference. Past experience has shown that senior political leaders have often tried to influence investigations into cases involving their own party members.

Effective coordination between the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the transitional justice bodies is also essential for the process to succeed. The NHRC has repeatedly emphasized that commissions must operate in accordance with international standards and be responsive to the needs of victims. The NHRC’s recent statement expressing concern about the current process indicates that there are still issues to be addressed, particularly in terms of coordination and transparency. The government must ensure that the commission is able to function independently and in line with international best practices, without political interference.

Financial support for the commissions is another major hurdle. In the past, a lack of funding and cooperation from the international community hindered the progress of transitional justice mechanisms. The government must work closely with international partners to secure the financial resources necessary for both the commissions’ operations and the reparations process. However, this issue has not yet been adequately addressed, and if left unresolved, it could prevent the commissions from fulfilling their mandate.

Ultimately, the success of the transitional justice process depends on the commitment of political parties to allow the commissions to function independently and impartially. The government must ensure that the commissions are adequately resourced, staffed with qualified professionals, and free from political interference. If these conditions are met, Nepal may finally be able to deliver justice to the victims of the conflict and complete the peace process that began with the signing of the CPA.