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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has deepened the rift between coalition partners as Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s upcoming visit to China draws nearer. Leaders from both parties have become more outspoken, publicly presenting their positions. Former Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali criticized the Nepali Congress (NC) for creating unnecessary obstacles in implementing the BRI.

He remarked, “They (NC leaders) signed the BRI framework agreements but now they are complicating the issue.” This statement highlights the growing divide between the two parties.

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Oli held discussions with NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba on the same issue. Gyawali remarked, “Obviously, there are differences between the two parties, but we will resolve them before Oli’s visit.” 

PM Oli is keen on signing the BRI implementation plan prepared last year, but the NC opposes it. Similarly, the UML supports finalizing certain BRI projects, while the NC strongly opposes them. NC leader Prakash Sharan Mahat, who was foreign minister when the BRI framework was signed in 2017, stated that the NC would accept only grants, not loans, under the BRI. He added, “It’s fine if China provides grants for BRI projects, but there is no need for loans. China has not honored its commitments to Nepal regarding grants.”

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba will visit China at the end of this month to prepare for PM Oli’s trip. Her visit will determine the future of the BRI’s progress. Shortly after taking office, Rana emphasized that more public discussions are needed before signing any agreement. UML Senior Vice-chair Ishwar Pokhrel is also in China for bilateral talks. The coalition has tasked Minister Rana with making preparations after consulting with leaders from both NC and UML.

The two countries are working on a draft implementation plan, but NC and UML remain divided. China is leveraging its influence over Nepal’s communist parties to facilitate BRI implementation. If the rift between NC and UML widens further, it could threaten the government’s stability. While the two parties have differences on domestic issues, they have managed to coexist, but tensions over the BRI are likely to escalate. NC leaders cite the example of the Pokhara International Airport to argue that infrastructure projects funded by Chinese loans are not economically viable.

CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal has been making provocative statements these days. While his rhetoric lacks a clear roadmap, it hints at potential shifts in Nepal’s political landscape. Recently, Dahal admitted he had made a mistake by forming alliances with the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML, alliances he has benefited from for over a decade. Despite this, he vowed that his party would contest the upcoming elections independently.

Inconsistent statements characterize Dahal’s political narrative. He has repeatedly claimed he has no intention of becoming prime minister during the current Parliament's term, set to expire in 2027. Yet, on November 16, he unveiled a potential strategy for reclaiming power. He declared that his party’s “magic number of 32” in the House of Representatives could topple the existing coalition. This assertion underscores his urgency to reassert dominance, as Maoist leaders acknowledge that failure to break the NC-UML coalition before the 2027 elections could spell trouble for their party's survival. A senior Maoist leader candidly remarked, “To maintain at least our current strength, we must either ally with the NC or UML, which necessitates dismantling the coalition.”

Maoist leaders believe the current government faces two primary vulnerabilities. First, while Nepal’s bilateral relations are progressing, New Delhi appears hesitant to fully back the UML-led government under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. According to a senior Maoist leader, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Indian policymakers have shown greater engagement with the NC than with Oli, raising doubts about the coalition’s stability.

Secon, disagreements over China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could exacerbate tensions. The UML, led by Oli, is eager to finalize a BRI implementation plan to demonstrate tangible progress. However, this push might create rifts within the coalition, as the NC remains wary of BRI commitments. Oli’s cautious handling of the issue reflects these internal dynamics, providing Dahal an opportunity to capitalize on the discord.

Dahal’s recent interactions with New Delhi reveal his strategic pivot. His interview with The Hindu showcased his criticism of Oli for allegedly playing the ‘China card’, signaling Dahal’s intent to align with India’s geopolitical priorities. Over the past six to seven years, Dahal has cultivated stronger ties with New Delhi, aligning mutual interests during his premiership. Notably, his government signed a long-term energy trade deal with India, facilitating Nepal’s electricity export to Bangladesh through the Indian grid. This agreement not only bolstered Dahal’s domestic image by stabilizing the energy sector but also endeared him to New Delhi.

In contrast, Dahal refrained from signing any major agreements with Beijing, including a proposed BRI implementation plan in 2023. His reluctance to engage with China, a departure from Oli’s precedent, has likely pleased New Delhi. Furthermore, Dahal avoided contentious issues such as the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report and Nepal’s border disputes with India, which UML leaders like Oli have persistently raised. His softer stance on these matters aligns with India’s preference to keep them off the bilateral agenda.

Dahal’s rapport with BJP leaders has also grown, allowing him to leverage India’s influence on Nepal’s political landscape. On contentious issues like secularism, Dahal has conveyed his flexibility, indicating no objection to removing secularism if major parties agree—a stance likely to resonate with the BJP’s ideological agenda.

Aware of shifting international dynamics, Oli recently acknowledged in a party meeting that external conditions may not favor his government. While the UML leadership claims improved relations with India, Dahal’s positioning suggests he might still be New Delhi’s preferred candidate for prime minister. His track record of aligning with India on strategic issues strengthens this perception.

Even if Dahal fails to secure the premiership, he appears open to supporting Sher Bahadur Deuba of the NC until the elections, contingent on an electoral alliance. However, this proposal faces resistance within the NC. While Deuba’s faction fears losing to the UML without Maoist support, a significant section of the NC remains opposed to collaborating with the Maoists, citing ideological and policy differences.

Adding to the coalition’s challenges are disputes over governance issues. The NC and UML have clashed over topics such as the removal of Kul Man Ghising as the head of the Nepal Electricity Authority and the issuance of ordinances to facilitate party splits. These disagreements further expose the fragility of their partnership, creating an opening for Dahal to exploit.

Dahal’s political maneuvers reflect his ambition to return to power by navigating Nepal’s complex internal and external dynamics. By aligning with New Delhi’s strategic interests and exploiting fissures within the NC-UML coalition, he positions himself as a key player in shaping the country’s political future. However, whether he can convert these efforts into a tangible political comeback remains uncertain. The coming months will reveal if Dahal’s strategy of leveraging alliances and external support will succeed or if the Maoists will face an uphill battle to remain relevant in Nepal’s shifting political landscape.

On Nov 15, Nepal marked a historic milestone by beginning to export 40 MW of electricity to Bangladesh via the Indian grid. This first-ever trilateral power transaction between Nepal, India, and Bangladesh symbolizes a significant step toward sub-regional power connectivity. In 2023, India announced its facilitation of this cooperation, setting the stage for broader regional energy trade. Currently, Nepal exports surplus hydroelectricity to the Indian market, and this agreement enables the export of electricity to Bangladesh, creating a foundation for future expansion.

Bangladesh has long expressed interest in investing in Nepal's hydropower projects and is now negotiating with Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) to import power generated by the 25 MW Trishuli and 22 MW Chilime hydropower projects. However, complexities arise from India’s policy of not purchasing electricity from hydropower projects involving Chinese investment. This forces Nepal to seek alternative markets, such as Bangladesh, for energy generated by China-linked projects. Over the past decade, India and China have vied to invest in Nepal’s hydropower sector, but India has established a dominant presence. While discussions between Nepal and China on a potential power trade agreement continue, tangible progress remains limited.

Nepal’s hydropower sector currently comprises 124 operational plants with a combined capacity of 2,600 MW, alongside 235 projects under construction. Presently generating approximately 2,700 MW, Nepal is projected to reach 10,000 MW within the next decade. Yet, inadequate transmission infrastructure hampers optimal utilization, with hydropower plants forced to scale down production during the monsoon. Remote hydropower projects remain disconnected from the national grid, compelling the government to prioritize transmission line construction.

The Ministry of Energy, Water Resources, and Irrigation has introduced an ambitious plan, the Energy Development Roadmap and Action Plan 2023–2035. This blueprint envisions meeting Nepal’s projected peak demand of 13,500 MW by 2035 while exporting 15,000 MW to India and Bangladesh. Achieving this target necessitates generating 28,500 MW of renewable energy within the timeframe. Both India and Bangladesh seek clean energy sources to meet growing demands, and Nepal’s abundant hydropower offers a sustainable solution.

Uncertainty surrounding Nepal’s electricity market persisted for years, but key agreements have fostered confidence. A pivotal moment came in January 2023, when Nepal and India signed a long-term energy agreement, with India committing to purchase 10,000 MW of electricity over the next decade. This agreement has spurred international investment interest in Nepal’s hydropower sector.

Earlier, in April 2022, Nepal and India signed a joint vision statement on power sector cooperation. This agreement highlighted joint hydropower development, cross-border transmission infrastructure, and bi-directional power trade. Both countries also pledged to expand collaboration under the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal) framework, incorporating mutually beneficial terms. India’s quest for renewable energy aligns with its commitment to achieving net-zero emissions by 2070, positioning Nepal as a key energy partner. India has also deepened energy ties with Bhutan, exporting electricity and exploring new energy trade avenues.

Nepal has already started exporting surplus electricity to India during the monsoon, reaching nearly 1,000 MW in 2023. Power trade is seen as a vital means to reduce Nepal’s trade imbalance with India. Cross-border transmission lines, such as an 18-km link under the US Millennium Challenge Corporation's support, are crucial for enhancing energy trade. India is also assisting in constructing additional transmission infrastructure to strengthen bilateral energy connectivity.

Beyond India, Bangladesh is emerging as a promising energy market for Nepal. According to Bangladesh’s 2023 energy report, its total power consumption is 24,911 MW, with natural gas accounting for 45 percent, coal 11 percent, imports 11 percent, diesel 4 percent, furnace oil 26 percent, and hydropower contributing less than 1 percent. This dependency on fossil fuels highlights the need for clean energy, creating vast opportunities for cooperation with Nepal.

Other South Asian countries, such as Pakistan and Bhutan, also possess significant hydropower potential. Pakistan's estimated hydropower capacity is 60,000 MW, of which only 8,000 MW has been developed. Bhutan, with its long-standing energy partnership with India, demonstrates the feasibility of harnessing hydropower for regional benefit.

While bilateral agreements have gained traction, the prospect of a regional energy framework remains uncertain. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) signed a framework agreement on electricity cooperation in 2014, emphasizing regional power trade, energy efficiency, and conservation. However, strained relations between India and Pakistan have hindered progress. Similarly, BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) has shown potential. The fourth BIMSTEC Summit in Kathmandu in 2018 proposed forming an intergovernmental group to enhance energy cooperation, particularly in hydropower and renewables.

Recent developments, such as Nepal’s trilateral power trade agreement with India and Bangladesh, could serve as a model for broader regional collaboration. By overcoming geopolitical challenges and fostering synergy, South Asian countries can unlock the immense potential of renewable energy trade. A united effort can transform the region into a hub of sustainable energy, benefiting all stakeholders while addressing pressing environmental and economic challenges.

8:00 am, Nov 14

New Baneshwor

The tea shop was buzzing with energy, but I managed to find an open seat amid the crowd. A lively group of around ten people had already gathered, deeply engrossed in conversation on various societal issues, including the latest political developments. They were discussing the recent passing of Bimala Gauchan, a Gandaki Province Assembly member who had succumbed to dengue. Some shared personal stories, recounting how family members and friends had also fallen victim to this spreading disease.

One man remarked, “Dengue has even reached the hill districts now. Back in 1992, I spent a year in Mustang, and there wasn’t a mosquito in sight because of the cold.” Another chimed in, “With more roads connecting remote areas, dengue is spreading even to the mountains.” Predictably, the group began criticizing the government’s inability to control the outbreak in Kathmandu Valley and beyond. The mention of Manang and Mustang brought the discussion to another familiar topic. “People in Manang are incredibly wealthy. If the rest of Nepal were as prosperous, we’d be the richest country in South Asia,” someone declared.

The group briefly touched on the recent arrest of Deepak Manange, a member of the Gandaki Province Assembly, though no one seemed eager to dive into his controversies. Meanwhile, a man near the entrance, buried in a newspaper, interrupted loudly, “Every page is filled with stories of corruption, crimes, and road accidents!” This drew the group’s attention. They began talking about a recent tragic accident in Kageshwori Manohara, where one person had died in a collision involving a car driven by Prakash Bhujel, a self-styled shaman with a social media following, and a motorcycle.

The conversation shifted to shamanism. Some argued that such beliefs were outdated and harmful, while an older gentleman, likely in his seventies, shared how a shaman had treated his paralysis 30 years ago. Another participant admitted he didn’t believe in shamanism but respected those who did. They noted that Bhujel had promised to cooperate with authorities—something, one remarked, that many politicians might not be so quick to do.

After a short lull, talk shifted to Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s upcoming trip to China. “The Western countries will be watching his every move,” someone stated bluntly. They mentioned China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the projects it entails but didn’t delve deeply into it. A participant speculated that Oli would likely avoid any major agreements with China, though few seemed interested in exploring the topic further.

Out of nowhere, someone brought up the rising trend of love marriages in Nepal. An older man expressed disapproval, claiming that such marriages often lead to divorce. “Eighty percent of love marriages end in separation,” he said, “inviting new societal problems.” This sparked a debate about the “right” age to marry. “Decades ago, people married at 18 or 20; now, they’re waiting until their 30s,” someone observed. Soon, the discussion broadened to cover the declining population trend in Nepal and beyond, linked to delayed marriages. Another man spoke about the growing empowerment of women in Nepali society, noting that women now play key roles in household decisions, with men ceding some of their traditional authority.

By 8:30, the group began to disperse, each heading off to start their day. As the tea shop slowly emptied, I lingered over my black tea, debating whether to order another cup or leave. Just then, two young men entered, looking like they were in their twenties. One ordered tea with milk, while the other opted for black. Curious, the one with milk asked why his friend preferred it plain. “I have gastritis,” he replied. They soon fell into a conversation about their hectic college and work schedules, complaining that they barely had time to eat properly.

In lowered voices, they shared their financial struggles. “I earn just Rs 8,000 a month, working from 11 am to 7 pm, but it barely covers rent and food,” one said, as they lamented the rising prices of tea and snacks. “I spent all my savings during Dashain and Tihar; I have nothing left now,” he added. Their conversation turned to their future plans—whether to stay in Nepal or try their luck abroad. They looked visibly worried, the uncertainty of their future weighing on them. Just then, four students entered, asking the shopkeeper for cigarettes, who politely pointed them to the designated smoking area.

Last week, I began a weekly column titled Teashop Gossip, where I’ll be capturing and sharing these vibrant exchanges that unfold in Nepal’s local tea shops. For years, these spots have been more than just places for tea—they’re forums where people from all walks of life come together to discuss the pressing issues of our time. In this column, I aim to present these conversations as they happen, preserving the raw voices, views, and insights of the people

CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal on Thursday made a pointed statement, accusing Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli of “playing the China card” by choosing to visit China before India. In an interview with The Hindu, former Prime Minister Dahal criticized Oli’s upcoming China visit, calling it a deliberate attempt to court Beijing, which he deemed misguided. Dahal also suggested that India-Nepal relations are strained due to the new government’s policies and cautioned that tensions over border disputes could resurface.

Dahal highlighted his own efforts to strengthen India-Nepal ties during his 18-month tenure, which ended in July. Oli is scheduled to travel to Beijing for an official visit in early December, preceded by a preparatory trip by Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba at the end of this month.

Apparently, the planned visit is no music to the ears of New Delhi and other international observers. . Historically, Indian policymakers and think tanks have accused Nepali leaders of leveraging the ‘China card’ to sidestep India’s influence, a notion dating back to 1950. Although Indian analysts often claim Nepal uses its ties with China strategically, Nepali leaders deny this characterization.

Dahal’s comments have drawn sharp criticism from the ruling CPN-UML. Bishnu Rijal, the party’s Central Committee member, labeled Dahal’s remarks as ‘anti-Nepal’ and damaging to the country’s self-esteem, adding that such statements could provoke tensions with neighboring countries. Rijal further claimed that Dahal’s comments reflect frustration over the fall of his government in July and expose his divisive views on Nepal’s two largest neighbors.

Dahal’s statement is also likely to provoke Prime Minister Oli and his coalition partner, the Nepali Congress. Since the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, Nepal’s political and diplomatic circles have actively debated the ‘China card’ issue, with leaders reiterating that Nepal aims to maintain balanced relations with both India and China.

As Oli’s administration accelerates preparations for the China visit, the trip has captured the attention of media and experts in both New Delhi and Beijing. Qian Feng, director at Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute, told the Global Times that Nepal’s cooperation with China does not necessarily imply a shift away from India, stressing that ties with both neighbors can coexist harmoniously.

Oli’s agenda for the Beijing trip reportedly includes discussions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the implementation of previous agreements between Nepal and China.

Nepal’s diplomatic balancing act with India and China isn’t new. Nihar Nayak, an expert on Nepal-China relations, describes in his book Strategic Himalayas how King Mahendra effectively leveraged the ‘China card’ in the 1950s and 60s, a policy later continued by his son, King Gyanendra. Nayak notes that Gyanendra’s tilt toward China, including his moves at the 13th SAARC summit and his arms purchases from China and Pakistan, exemplified efforts to reduce Nepal’s reliance on India. According to Nayak, even some Maoist leaders have attempted to play the ‘China card’ in recent years, albeit unsuccessfully.

As Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli prepares for his official visit to China, political and diplomatic circles are actively debating the state of Nepal’s relationship with India. Observers suggest this move reflects Oli’s strained relationship with New Delhi and points to a shift in India’s approach toward Nepal. Many Indian politicians, bureaucrats, think tanks, and media figures often attribute fluctuations in bilateral relations to the Nepali side.

Critics in New Delhi argue that Nepali leaders often make commitments in India but fail to uphold them once back in Kathmandu. Similarly, Indian authorities frequently accuse Nepali politicians of politicizing critical bilateral issues for party or personal gain. Nepal’s internal political instability and lack of consensus on key foreign policy matters are also seen as contributing factors to the inconsistent relationship. A foreign policy expert from New Delhi remarked that India seeks a reliable partner in Kathmandu but finds it challenging to trust Nepali leaders, who are perceived as unpredictable.

While these criticisms may hold some truth, there’s also a need for reflection on India’s approach toward Nepal.

One current debate centers on Prime Minister Oli’s planned visit to China, a departure from the tradition of a new Nepali prime minister making their first official trip to India. However, this tradition has been broken before; in 2011, for instance, India did not invite then-Prime Minister Jhala Nath Khanal, and in 2008, Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited Beijing before later affirming India as his first political visit destination. India’s decision not to invite Oli this time has stirred speculation in political circles that New Delhi is dissatisfied with Nepal’s recent policy moves. At a time when economic cooperation has been progressing, India's hesitation to invite Oli risks undermining bilateral relations, potentially stirring suspicion and impacting other areas of the partnership.

Soon after the formation of the new government, there were talks about a visit from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Nepal, though this has yet to materialize. There are differing views within India’s bureaucracy and ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), leading to mixed signals that complicate Nepal’s understanding of India’s priorities. Unlike in the past, senior BJP leaders have recently engaged with Nepal’s political parties and bureaucracy, but a lack of alignment between India’s political and bureaucratic circles seems to be creating further challenges. India’s handling of issues around trade and assistance has also contributed to tension, with frequent reports of delays in the movement of goods between the two countries, fueling a trust deficit that affects the broader relationship.

There are other factors that call for reflection in both Kathmandu and New Delhi. Among Indian policymakers, there is often a perception that Nepal is solely responsible for any disturbances in bilateral relations. The case of the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) report illustrates this imbalance; India’s reluctance to receive the report has affected  bilateral relations, and the situation will likely remain unresolved unless addressed. Other areas, such as the difficulties faced by Nepali citizens in India and along the border, also deserve more attention from Indian policymakers.

Since 2017–18, New Delhi has maintained a policy of engaging with whichever party leads the Nepali government, a position that should continue. While India may have reservations about Nepal’s growing ties with Washington and Beijing, both sides should openly discuss India’s legitimate security concerns. But for now, a significant trust deficit persists between Nepal and India, which could potentially worsen after Oli’s China visit. Both New Delhi and Kathmandu need to actively work on bridging this gap. Although there was hope for renewed bilateral cooperation after 2014, missteps from both sides since 2016 have strained relations. Only through earnest reflection and engagement can meaningful progress be made.

7:30 am, Nov 5

Thimi, Bhaktapur

There are usually around 10 people in the small tea shop I frequent during my morning walks. I stop by for black tea and to hear what people think about contemporary politics and society. I often encounter my neighbors, who walk nearly the same route. The tea shop regularly witnesses heated debates on political and other issues.

Like yesterday, I ordered my black tea and listened to a man–familiar by face, though we have never been formally introduced–expressing his frustration at the current state of the country. "These old political parties have done nothing in the past three decades except make money for themselves and their families," he says, arguing that today’s politicians don’t care about the problems the country is facing.

Another person says we need new faces in politics to transform the country. An elderly man suddenly interjects, "They (the three parties) have just put one new leader, hinting at Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane, in a big hole, and are conspiring against another new face (Balendra Shah, mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City)." Yet another participant questions the political parties' commitment to nationalism.

 A person, seemingly sympathetic to Nepali Congress (NC) or CPN-UML, interrupts to say that while the country needs new leadership, it shouldn’t be like the current crop of self-proclaimed new leaders – apparently referring to Lamichhane, who is currently in the custody of Kaski police for investigation over alleged cooperative fraud.

The conversation suddenly shifts from politics to agriculture when one man, after his second cup of tea, bids farewell, saying he needs to buy vegetables and reach home before 8. This sparks a discussion about vegetables, with everyone agreeing that domestic agricultural production has declined substantially. The group is unanimous in blaming politicians for the skyrocketing vegetable prices.

There is also shared concern about agricultural land turning barren. "Traditionally, we shipped grains and vegetables from villages to cities, but now it’s reversed. You see trucks carrying produce from cities to rural areas," says one participant, a driver by profession. Others recall how rural residents used to earn money by selling food grains and agricultural products. They all reminisce about childhood, when, except for salt and sugar, every household was self-reliant in daily essentials and food grains, barely needing cash. "We need an extreme situation, like a blockade, to force politicians and farmers to rely on agriculture again," another suggests.

The blame returns to the major political parties–NC, UML, and CPN (Maoist Center). The group criticizes their agricultural policies while in government. With successive governments focusing on sending youth abroad for employment, fertile lands lie barren, and the situation may worsen, they say.

They find the dependence on India for food rather worrying. "Some 40-50 years ago, Indian farmers came to Bhaktapur for vegetables and other seeds; now we get our seeds from India. Nepal used to sell seeds along the Nepal-India border," one participant says. The group agrees that without special attention to reviving agriculture nationwide, Nepal faces an impending food crisis. In these tea shop gatherings, I listen more than speak, gaining insight into people's thoughts on contemporary issues.

I have started a weekly column titled ‘Teashop Gossip’, where I will try to share the lively conversations that unfold in local tea shops. For years, tea shops have served as a public place where people from all walks of life meet and discuss contemporary issues. In this column, I will present these discussions just as they are, capturing the voices, views, and insights that arise without any alterations.

Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) chairman and former Deputy Prime Minister Rabi Lamichhane has spent 13 days in police custody in Kaski, sparking street protests from his party members and supporters who argue his arrest is politically motivated. They contend Lamichhane is uninvolved in the alleged misappropriation of cooperative funds and that his detention is intended to weaken RSP. Lamichhane, previously a TV show presenter and managing director of Gorkha Media, which owns Galaxy Television, was arrested based on a parliamentary probe into cooperative fund misuse nationwide.

Some cooperative victims have filed cases against Lamichhane in Pokhara and Lumbini. While the parliamentary panel found no direct evidence linking Lamichhane to cooperative fraud, it noted substantial cooperative funds had flowed into Gorkha Media, where Lamichhane holds a minor share and acted as managing director. Police are investigating him on charges of cooperative fraud, money laundering, and organized crime. Reports indicate JB Rai, a key figure connected to the case, is in communication with state authorities, signaling his willingness to return to Nepal and assist in the investigation.

The Rupandehi court has permitted police to arrest Lamichhane for further inquiry, suggesting that the process may extend, particularly given the money laundering charges. Lamichhane’s lawyers argue that his role as managing director of Gorkha Media does not inherently imply misappropriation, emphasizing that his lack of direct involvement in cooperatives exempts him from fraud charges. Meanwhile, RSP leaders claim Lamichhane’s arrest is part of a broader political agenda to hinder RSP’s influence, which critics view as an attempt to interfere with judicial processes through public protests and pressure on the government. They are also said to be in talks with the ruling parties to make an environment for his release stating that investigation can be continued even after freeing him.

Lamichhane, who transitioned from popular television host to political leader, founded RSP in 2022. His efforts to advocate for Nepali migrant workers and expose corruption earned him substantial public support, propelling his party to become the fourth-largest in the House of Representatives with 21 seats. 

Growing public dissatisfaction against major political parties—Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—also helped the party. Initially, RSP had few prominent faces aside from Lamichhane, but figures like Swarnim Wagle have since joined, expanding the party's profile.

Lamichhane’s political career was hit by one controversy after another right from the beginning. Soon after he was elected to the House of Representatives and became Minister for Home Affairs, the legality of his citizenship came into question. He was also accused of holding dual passports. He lost his parliament seat over his citizenship controversy and had to re-contest the election from Chitwan, which he won comfortably.  The issue of his citizenship has already been resolved but the one relating to his alleged dual passport still remains.

Lamichhane’s arrest over cooperative fraud has polarized public opinion. Some view it as a necessary legal action following parliamentary recommendations, while others see it as an orchestrated attack by established parties seeking to stymie RSP’s rise. RSP leaders highlight inconsistencies in enforcement, citing the government’s reluctance to arrest figures linked to cooperative fraud within the ruling coalition, such as Dhana Raj Gurung from Nepali Congress and others associated with CPN-UML. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli noted that 600 arrests have been made in connection with cooperative fraud, though RSP claims selective enforcement targeting Lamichhane alone is politically driven.

The 2022 general elections and subsequent by-elections indicated that RSP could pose a significant threat to the three major parties. But whether Lamichane’s arrest could benefit the party or affect its popularity remains unknown. Already, there are concerns that if Lamichhane gets convicted, the party could face a political setback. RSP is yet to build its organizational structure, particularly at the local level. The party has solely relied on its popularity as an alternative political force against the old parties to win votes. 

Now amid Lamichhane’s prolonged detention, his party is concerned by signals indicating his potential detention until the Chhath festival. RSP leaders say this extension represents systematic harassment and misuse of state resources. The Kaski District Government Attorney's Office will decide whether to formally charge Lamichhane based on the ongoing police investigation. If charged, he would face suspension from his parliamentary seat and trials in Rupandehi and Chitwan for alleged involvement in cooperative fraud.

The RSP has adopted a dual strategy of mobilizing street protests and engaging in dialogues with other political entities to secure Lamichhane’s release. They have organized a protest coordination committee led by Vice-chairman Dol Prasad Aryal, alongside a political-civic dialogue committee headed by Wagle, to build alliances with like-minded parties, civil society, and the public. Although RSP’s constitution allows its vice-chairpersons to manage operations in Lamichhane’s absence, internal confusion over shared responsibilities has prevented the appointment of an acting president.

With RSP claiming retaliatory state actions against their leader, they continue to press for his release, advocating for an investigation that respects due process while cautioning against a selective legal approach that could undermine public trust.