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India and China have emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas as a foundation for strengthening their overall bilateral relationship. A statement issued after the 24th round of the Special Representatives’ Dialogue on the Boundary Question said that the two countries agreed to establish an expert group under the working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border issues. This group will explore “early harvest” measures in boundary delimitation in the disputed areas.

They also agreed to form a working group to improve border management and maintain stability along the frontier. Both sides will use existing diplomatic and military mechanisms to carry forward the process of border management and discuss steps toward de-escalation, starting with principles and modalities.

These agreements underscore efforts to normalize relations that had been severely strained since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. If the peace-building measures move forward as planned, India-China ties could see significant improvement, creating new dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

 India and China decided to reopen border trade through three designated trading points, Lipulekh Pass, Shipki La Pass, and Nathu La Pass.   

Issuing a press statement, a spokesperson at Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the constitution of Nepal has already incorporated Nepal’s official map, which clearly establishes that Limpuyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani, located to the east of the Mahakali River, are integral parts of Nepal. The Nepal government has objected to any activities in the area, reminding both countries that the Kalapani region is an integral part of Nepal.

Similarly, India has said that its position on the matter is consistent and clear.  Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh pass commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades. This trade had been disrupted in recent years due to Covid and other developments, and both sides have now agreed to resume it, India said in a statement.  As regards territorial claims, our position remains that such claims are neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence. Any unilateral artificial enlargement of territorial claims is untenable, the statement issued by India reads.

In 2015, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China, two sides had agreed to hold negotiation on augmenting the list of traded commodities, and expand border trade Nathu La, Qiangla/Lipu-Lekh Pass and Shipki La. At that time, Nepal had protested the India-China agreement sending a protest letter to both countries.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting China after six years to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin. India and China also discussed a wide range of issues linked to the BRICS Summit. BRICS nations are considering the creation of a common currency, a proposal that has drawn criticism from US President Donald Trump. India and China agreed to support each other in hosting major diplomatic events: India will host the 2026 BRICS Summit, while China will host in 2027. This provides new opportunities for bilateral and regional engagement.

The two sides also agreed to resume direct flight connectivity between the Chinese mainland and India, suspended during the Covid-19 pandemic and not restarted due to strained ties. They will also finalize an updated air service agreement. The Kailash Manasarovar Yatra has already resumed, and beginning next year, the scale of Indian pilgrimages is expected to increase.

In addition, both sides pledged to take concrete measures to facilitate trade and investment flows, jointly maintain peace in the border areas through friendly consultations, and uphold multilateralism. They agreed to enhance coordination on major international and regional issues, maintain a rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, and promote a multipolar world that safeguards the interests of developing countries, according to the statement.

After the Doklam crisis, Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held two informal summits—the first in Wuhan in April 2018, and the second in Chennai in Oct 2019—which significantly helped improve ties. In 2018, China had proposed a “two plus one” model, under which India and China would consult or cooperate on development projects in South Asian countries. That idea, however, faded amid worsening bilateral ties.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that since the beginning of this year, bilateral relations have moved onto a path of steady development and the boundary situation has continued to stabilize. He added that China attaches great importance to Prime Minister Modi’s visit to attend the SCO Tianjin Summit and looks forward to India’s active contribution to its success.

Following the completion of the United States’ foreign aid review under the Donald Trump administration, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact has resumed work with “renewed momentum and shared commitment from both sides.”

This week, MCA Nepal signed two major contracts to advance its electricity transmission line projects. Deputy Vice-president of MCC John Wingle, who is currently visiting Nepal, has been in talks with government officials to address technical challenges, primarily related to land acquisition and forest clearance. These issues have slowed progress on transmission construction. Despite significant cuts to US foreign assistance, the Trump administration decided to continue MCC projects in Nepal, framing MCC support not as aid, but as an ‘investment to promote business growth and stability worldwide.’

In signing these contracts, Wingle reaffirmed the US commitment to shared priorities and Nepal’s development goals. “We are honored to work alongside our Nepali counterparts to improve the availability and reliability of electricity in Nepal and enhance regional power trade and integration.” From 2018 to 2022, MCC projects deeply polarized Nepali society, facing both strong support and open opposition, notably from China. Under the agreement, MCC projects must be completed within five years, but two years have already passed. Delays from the American side have raised the likelihood of deadline extensions.

In domestic politics, the Election Commission has decided that Ranjita Shrestha will remain chairperson of the Nagarik Unmukti Party, despite claims from rival leaders that she had been removed. The Commission said the rival faction failed to follow proper procedures to change the leadership. The party, founded by Resham Chaudhary, has been in turmoil over internal disputes. It has announced plans to withdraw support for the government but has yet to formally notify officials due to the ongoing feud.

Similarly, tensions within the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) escalated this week. On Aug 13, a clash broke out in Kathmandu between supporters of party chair Rajendra Lingden and those of his rival, Dhawal Shumsher Rana. The Rana faction has been openly criticizing Lingden ahead of the party’s upcoming general convention and is reportedly creating parallel structures nationwide, deepening internal divisions. Earlier this year, the RPP organized protests in Kathmandu and other districts calling for the restoration of monarchy.

The CPN (Unified Socialist) also faced internal strife after former Prime Minister Jhala Nath Khanal declared that the party’s split was a mistake and urged Chairman Madhav Kumar Nepal to step down. Following discussions, both leaders have agreed to minimize their differences and refrain from public criticism in line with party statutes.

Meanwhile, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chairman Rabi Lamichhane’s attempt to secure release from judicial custody failed after the court denied bail. In his absence, the party remains embroiled in controversy and continues to obstruct Parliament over the visit visa scam. Lamichhane has requested to be transferred to Kathmandu, but the government has not acted despite a court clearance.

Inside the Nepali Congress (NC), efforts are underway to unseat Sher Bahadur Deuba as parliamentary party leader, led by Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Kumar Thapa. However, they lack the sufficient number of lawmakers supporting the proposition. This week, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli said a senior NC leader privately confirmed the shortfall and reiterated his belief that the current coalition will continue until the 2027 national elections.

The NC has, however, resolved a dispute in Bagmati Province. Chief Minister Indra Bahadur Baniya secured a confidence vote after Deuba persuaded Bahadur Singh Lama to support him, reportedly promising ministerial positions to Lama’s allies.

Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari has continued low-profile political activities despite her party rescinding her membership. Reports suggest she is preparing to open a contact office to formalize her engagements. For years, she has used the Madan Bhandari Foundation as a platform, which prompted Prime Minister Oli to criticize its activities this week. Many leaders once close to Bhandari are now distancing themselves, fearing disciplinary action.

The CPN-UML is preparing for its statute convention, where key outcomes are already expected — no 70-year age limit and no two-term leadership cap. Next year’s leadership selection convention is anticipated to endorse Oli’s continuation. Party leaders have compared Oli’s leadership ambitions to those of India’s Narendra Modi and China’s Xi Jinping.

In the CPN (Maoist Center), Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal indicated no imminent change in government, saying there were no plans to form or join a new coalition. Prime Minister Oli suggested Dahal made the statement after failing to alter the current alliance.

Beyond party politics, Ramhari Khatiwada, chair of the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee of Parliament, resigned this week, stating he had always served as an honest representative. He told the House session on Tuesday that he returned his official vehicle and benefits the day an error in the Civil Service Bill’s “cooling-off period” provision came to light.

Prominent Madhesi leader Anil Kumar Jha left the Loktantrik Samajbadi Party led by Mahanta Thakur and revived the Nepal Sadbhawana Party. In a separate development, the Nepal government endorsed the country’s first National Artificial Intelligence Policy (2025). The US, India and China have expressed interest in supporting Nepal’s AI initiatives, though governance frameworks are still being developed.

In the Madhes Province, monsoon rains have finally arrived, ending a prolonged drought and accelerating paddy transplantation. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, planting has been completed on 77 percent of paddy fields in eight districts and could reach 80 percent this year. Officials warn, however, that delayed planting may reduce productivity.

Nepal has also waived climbing fees for 97 lesser-known mountains, ranging from 5,870 to 7,132 meters, located in Karnali and Sudurpaschim provinces. The move aims to attract climbers to new destinations, boost local economies and diversify Nepal’s mountaineering offerings.

For more than a decade, Nepali politics has been defined by three dominant figures: KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. As party chiefs and multiple-time prime ministers, they have established themselves as indomitable forces. Among the three, it now seems almost certain that Oli and Dahal will retain control of their respective parties for at least the next five years—if not longer.

In the past two weeks, the CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) held their Central Committee and Standing Committee meetings, respectively. The outcomes of these meetings will have far-reaching implications, particularly regarding leadership transitions. Both Oli and Dahal have further solidified their grip by weakening and isolating potential rivals. These developments starkly contrast with the widespread public desire, especially among the youth, for a generational change in leadership.

A significant section of Nepal’s youth continues to call for immediate leadership renewal. Many believe that since the same leaders have held sway over both party and government for more than three decades and failed to deliver, new leaders should be given a chance. Having become prime minister multiple times, these leaders have used the power and resources of the state to entrench their positions. Ministerial portfolios and key appointments were handed to loyalists, while dissenting voices were sidelined.

There have also been instances where state law enforcement agencies were allegedly used to harass internal party opponents. As a result, many young leaders have either aligned themselves with top leaders or remained silent, compromising the core values of intra-party democracy and leadership handover.

The internal dynamics of major parties tell a different story altogether. Youth leaders of NC, UML and Maoist Center—who once demanded a leadership transition—are now retreating from those positions. In recent Central and Standing Committee meetings, not only did they refrain from calling for change, but many also openly endorsed the current leadership.

The UML’s Central Committee meeting cleared the way for Oli to lead the party for a third consecutive term. The party decided to amend its statute, removing the 70-year age limit and the two-term cap tailored specifically to facilitate Oli’s continuation. But more than just a policy shift, both senior and youth leaders publicly declared that there is “no alternative” to Oli. Even former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s attempt to challenge Oli by reentering active politics was thwarted; the party revoked her general membership for doing so.

Oli is now virtually assured to be re-elected party chairman at the UML’s 11th General Convention, expected later this year. Party leaders argue that Oli's leadership is essential to securing victory in the 2027 elections. In reality, he may continue leading the party as long as his health allows. Since taking the helm in 2015, Oli has consolidated power, sidelined rivals, and built a loyal inner circle. Two pivotal moments helped him secure dominance: the departure of senior leaders like Madhav Kumar Nepal and Jhala Nath Khanal, and the failed leadership challenge by Bhim Rawal, who was eventually expelled. That episode sent a clear message: challenging the leadership comes with consequences. More recently, Brinda Pandey and Usha Kiran Timalsina were suspended for six months for voicing dissent, reinforcing the party’s intolerance for internal opposition.

A similar scenario unfolded in the Maoist Center’s Standing Committee meeting. Senior leader Janardhan Sharma raised the issue of leadership change, only to be rebuked by nearly the entire committee. Out of 50 members, just three supported his proposal that Dahal, who has been at the helm since the 1980s, should begin transitioning party leadership to the next generation. Rather than supporting Sharma, other members criticized him. The party issued a warning that no leader should make public statements against its leadership. “There is a growing tendency to speak against party leadership and violate party discipline,” said Maoist leader Haribol Gajurel. 

The situation in the NC remains uncertain. Party President Deuba is unlikely to amend the party statute to pursue a third term. Leaders Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa appear poised to contest the presidency. A third candidate from the Deuba camp may also run, while other senior leaders, who lack serious electoral prospects, may enter the race merely to secure bargaining positions in the party or government. Despite this, Deuba remains a strong presence, and the party's top leadership appears to be consolidating its hold.

Meanwhile, in the CPN (Unified Socialist), a breakaway faction of UML, Madhav Kumar Nepal maintains tight control despite facing corruption allegations. He has publicly warned senior leader Jhala Nath Khanal to leave the party for speaking against him. Despite mounting pressure, Nepal has refused to hand over the reins to a younger generation.

With these developments, the debate around leadership handover in major Nepali parties has significantly lost momentum. Over the years, these senior leaders, each of whom has held the prime ministership multiple times, have consistently used state resources to strengthen their internal party positions and marginalize opposition. With youth leaders increasingly dependent on the senior leadership for political opportunities and resources, they remain unable, or unwilling, to mount a meaningful challenge.

Over the past few months, Nepal and India have stepped up engagement on multiple fronts, including long-overdue meetings of bilateral mechanisms. While the exact date of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to New Delhi is yet to be finalized, Indian officials confirm that preparations are underway, and the visit is likely to take place before Dashain. India has also been engaging with a wide cross-section of Nepali society in the lead-up.

Nepal-India relations faced significant turbulence, especially after 2015, which strained bilateral ties. However, in recent months, both sides appear to be moving toward a reset. Kathmandu and New Delhi have now prioritized economic and development partnerships over longstanding contentious issues.

Two key unresolved matters, the map row and the report prepared by the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG), remain sensitive. While political parties such as the Nepali Congress, CPN (Maoist Centre), and various Madhes-based parties have largely shelved the EPG issue, some CPN-UML leaders continue to raise it, albeit with less intensity.

India’s renewed outreach to Kathmandu comes amid a shifting regional context: Donald Trump’s inauguration and subsequent US aid cuts to Nepal, political developments in Bangladesh, and a brief but deadly India-Pakistan conflict. In late July, New Delhi hosted an all-party delegation of Nepali members of parliament. According to the Indian readout, the discussions centered on expanding the multifaceted bilateral partnership.

On July 28 and 29, the seventh meeting of the India-Nepal Boundary Working Group (BWG) was held in New Delhi. The BWG had been inactive since 2019 due to the map dispute. Although this meeting did not address contentious territorial issues, both sides adopted updated modalities for inspecting, repairing, and maintaining boundary pillars, and agreed to expedite work in these areas. They also finalized a three-year work plan and committed to using advanced technologies for boundary-related tasks.

In the third week of July, the home secretary-level meeting between the two countries covered the full spectrum of bilateral security cooperation and border management. The two sides finalized the text of an agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. They also agreed to work toward the early conclusion of a revised extradition treaty, another longstanding and sensitive issue.

India also launched a collaborative initiative in partnership with the UN World Food Programme to support rice fortification and supply chain management in Nepal. The project aims to address gaps in Nepal’s fortified rice supply chain, particularly in procurement, data collection, and human resource capacity, through knowledge exchange with India’s successful public distribution system. It offers Nepali stakeholders the chance to learn from India’s experience in applying digital technologies to food logistics.

Speaking at a public event this week, foreign affairs expert Mohan Lohani, as quoted by the Press Trust of India, said that India is advancing rapidly in economic growth, development, and technological innovation. “Nepal should try to benefit from the progress made by our southern neighbor,” he said.

Another foreign policy expert, Nischal Nath Pandey, advised Prime Minister Oli to travel overland for his New Delhi visit, arguing that it would allow him to observe India’s significant progress in infrastructure, especially road transport.” During the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has made remarkable progress in development and road connectivity, and Nepal should learn from the experiences gained by India,” Pandey said.

As preparations for Prime Minister Oli’s India visit continue, both sides are working to finalize a major project or agreement to be announced during his meeting with Prime Minister Modi. Government officials suggest that resolving issues related to the long-pending Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project could be one such announcement. According to sources, the Indian side has conveyed that when the two prime ministers meet, a substantial breakthrough should be unveiled.

Deputy General Secretary of the CPN (Maoist Centre), Janardhan Sharma, has challenged Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s monopoly and continued leadership of the party. However, most members of the party’s Standing Committee have sided with Dahal, leaving Sharma politically isolated.

Sharma had hoped for internal support to break Dahal’s long-standing grip on the party. Instead, colleagues have urged him to issue a self-criticism for making internal matters public. His call for leadership change has now cost him his standing within the party. Like in the CPN-UML, senior Maoist leaders argue that Dahal should continue leading the party, citing his central role in the armed insurgency, the peace process, and the constitution-drafting effort.

Only a handful of leaders, such as Ram Karki and Parshuram Tamang, have echoed Sharma’s call for change. Both have proposed that Dahal assume a ceremonial role, transferring executive powers to the younger generation. Karki, in particular, has proposed a rotational leadership model, arguing that transitions in communist parties are often problematic. He cited historical examples, noting that even leaders like Lenin and Mao struggled with succession. Dahal, who has been at the party’s helm since the 1980s, shows no indication of stepping down.

“We should establish a leadership transition system while Chairperson Dahal is still healthy and active,” Karki said, emphasizing that his proposal does not seek to remove Dahal, but to place him in a respected role while others assume executive authority.

With party elections approaching, it is now almost certain that Dahal will be re-elected as chairman. Party leaders have warned against making statements that could undermine party unity. Dahal himself has accused "reactionary forces" of conspiring to divide the party since it entered mainstream politics in 2006. Earlier, he had challenged Sharma to leave the party if dissatisfied with his leadership.

A few weeks ago, Sharma made waves by saying that, with the exception of Manmohan Adhikari, all top communist leaders had accumulated significant wealth. At a party meeting, Sharma stated he was willing to self-criticize for his public remarks, on the condition that Dahal also take responsibility for the party’s collective failures.

He also proposed convening a special convention to elect new leadership. He accused Dahal of spreading rumors of a party split to suppress dissent. “We once had three million members. That has dropped to just one million. The leadership should self-criticize for that,” Sharma said. “If speaking about party reform violates policy, I’m ready to face the consequences.”

During the insurgency, leaders Mohan Baidya and Baburam Bhattarai had also challenged Dahal. Baidya left in 2012 to form a separate party, and Bhattarai followed in 2015 to establish a socialist party. Since then, Dahal has enjoyed a largely unchallenged monopoly. Narayan Kaji Shrestha briefly attempted to build a rival faction but lacked broad support, having joined the Maoist party only in 2009.

In recent years, Sharma has emerged as the most vocal challenger to Dahal’s leadership, but his efforts have so far been undermined by the lack of internal support. In response, Dahal has focused on unifying communist parties to consolidate his position. He is in talks with CPN (Unified Socialist) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal and has also reached out to smaller leftist groups.

Meanwhile, internal rivalries among second-rung leaders like Shrestha, Sharma, Agni Sapkota, and Barshaman Pun have only reinforced Dahal’s position, as none are willing to back each other as the next leader. They all seem more comfortable working under Dahal’s leadership.

At 70, Dahal has given no indication of retiring. The CPN-UML’s recent decision to remove the term limit for its top leader has created a favorable environment for Dahal to continue. As things stand, both KP Oli and Dahal are expected to remain at the top of their respective parties for at least another 5–10 years. In contrast, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba is set to retire in 2027, as party rules bar him from seeking a third term.

It has been exactly 109 years since the world’s first press council was established in Sweden in 1916. Its goal was to create an independent media self-regulatory body facilitated by the state, but guided by the broader media fraternity and the public. Since then, dozens of countries have formed, revised, dissolved, or renamed their press councils. In democratic nations, some councils have retained their autonomy; in autocratic regimes and much of the Global South, however, they often remain under government control.

Despite these variations, the core idea behind press councils has remained consistent: to serve as an intermediary between the press and the public, promoting professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards, while offering policy input to the government. Crucially, press councils are meant to operate on the principle of self-regulation, based on the strict implementation of a code of ethics, rather than through legal regulation enforced by other government bodies. A press council should be a collective effort involving the state, the media industry, and the public. While the government may support its effective functioning, it must not seek to control it.

Nepal adopted the idea of a press council earlier than many other countries. The Press Council Nepal (PCN) was established in 1971 based on the recommendations of a new communication plan. During the Panchayat era, it operated largely under government control. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, new legislation promised an independent council. However, successive chairpersons failed to uphold that promise, often becoming submissive to the government and their affiliated political parties.

There is a persistent tendency in Nepal to create overlapping institutions aimed at controlling the media, without clearly understanding or respecting their distinct mandates. The Media Council Bill, for instance, seeks to grant expanded powers to a new Media Council, many of which overlap with functions already assigned to existing government agencies. This has led to a widespread perception within the bureaucracy that PCN is merely another department under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, damaging its credibility and undermining its intended independence. Successive PCN leaderships have done little to challenge this perception.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a growing consensus among bureaucrats, politicians, and lawmakers in favor of tighter media control, often under the pretext of curbing misinformation and disinformation. The proposed Media Council Bill must be examined in this broader context. While it does not explicitly propose the formation of a media control body, it does aim to expand the council’s jurisdiction from print to digital platforms. The name of the institution is secondary; what matters is whether its independence, both structural and operational, is safeguarded.

The most serious flaw in the Bill is the excessive power it grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, particularly in appointing and removing council members. To protect the council’s autonomy, an independent commission, possibly involving a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, should be tasked with recommending the council’s leadership and members.

However, implementing such reforms may face resistance. Organizations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), politically affiliated journalist associations, and senior journalist groups may oppose changes that reduce their influence over appointments. Political parties and the bureaucracy may also seek to preserve their control through informal arrangements. In the last three decades, very few truly independent journalists or academics have been appointed to the council or similar bodies.

Parliament must seriously consider creating a transparent, independent appointment mechanism. Yet, many lawmakers lack a clear understanding of the press council’s core mission and values. Another concerning provision in the Bill is the transfer of authority to issue press accreditation certificates to the Media Council. This is not the council’s appropriate role. Even more troubling is the proposed provision allowing the council to revoke a journalist’s press pass for up to a year for violating the code of ethics. This directly contradicts the fundamental purpose of a press pass, which is to enable public information access, not serve as a tool for punishment.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting already imposes unnecessarily restrictive requirements for issuing press passes. Shifting that authority to the Media Council will only increase confusion and bureaucratic friction. Other provisions in the Bill also raise concerns, suggesting that the drafters may have drawn inspiration from press council models in more authoritarian regimes.

One welcome aspect of the Bill is the proposed removal of the council’s authority to classify newspapers. However, this change may also face resistance from journalist organizations, as classification has traditionally been used to control or reward media outlets. A separate entity, such as an Audit Bureau of Circulation, should be created to handle classifications for both print and digital platforms.

Overall, the Bill lacks a clear, forward-looking vision for the role and structure of the Media Council. It also fails to reflect on past institutional lessons. For the council to function effectively, it must have a strong, cooperative relationship with media organizations. At present, a significant trust deficit exists between the council and the Nepali media industry. The law should ensure not only participation from the media and public, but also their meaningful contribution to the council’s work. As drafted, the Bill envisions the Media Council more as a government department than an independent regulatory body. A complete overhaul is, therefore, necessary.

If parliament is truly committed to forming an independent media council, it should return the Bill to the Ministry with clear instructions to redraft it in consultation with all stakeholders, including international experts.

This debate is not about targeting the current government or any individual minister. The Bill was originally introduced by the previous government, but it now falls on the current one to refine and pass it. Political parties must rise above narrow interests and prioritize the long-term public good.

A strong, independent institution serves democracy and society, regardless of whether it aligns with a party’s immediate interests. When it comes to media accountability, as Denis McQuail puts it, two models exist: answerability and liability. Answerability is moral and social; it’s voluntary, cooperative, and involves non-material penalties. Liability, by contrast, is legal, imposed, and often punitive.

Press councils should operate on the answerability model. They should function as watchdogs that bark but do not bite, empowered to raise concerns, issue warnings, and alert stakeholders to ethical lapses, but not to take legal action against journalists. Evaluated through this lens, many of the Bill’s flaws become more evident, and more easily correctable.

So a humble appeal to parliament: step back from narrow debates and redraft the Bill from first principles. This is a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a free, accountable, and ethical press in Nepal.

Two major coalition partners, the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML, are reviewing the performance of government ministers, with plans to dismiss those deemed ineffective. Ministers were informed at the time of their appointment that they would face evaluation after one year and could be removed based on their performance. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and NC President Sher Bahadur Deub have begun consultations for a cabinet reshuffle. However, the move is likely to stir discord within both the NC and UML.

Overall, ministerial performance has been unsatisfactory. While ministers made lofty promises and generated noise, tangible results have been lacking. Meanwhile, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal is once again pursuing the unification of fringe communist parties to bolster his political position. With his attempts to spark friction between the NC and UML proving ineffective, he has shifted focus to party unification.

Dahal has reached out to CPN (Unified Socialist) Chairperson Madhav Kumar Nepal for immediate unification. However, many CPN (US) leaders and cadres prefer to return to the UML rather than merge with the Maoist Center. Should Nepal decide to unify with Dahal’s party, it could trigger a split in the CPN (US). Meanwhile, the UML has taken stricter measures to curb former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s activities within the party.

The UML has issued a circular instructing party units not to engage in any debate over Bhandari's potential return to active party politics. Intra-party tensions are also mounting in the Maoist Center, with Chairperson Dahal and senior leader Janardan Sharma exchanging public barbs. Dahal has accused internal forces of spreading false rumors that he is planning to split the party.

While Dahal shows no intention of relinquishing party leadership, a power struggle is underway. Senior leaders Sharma and Barshaman Pun are positioning themselves as his successors. In the Dahal-Sharma tussle, Pun appears to be aligning with Dahal to gain favor. All three major parties—NC, UML, and Maoist Center—face looming leadership crises as Deuba, Oli, and Dahal approach retirement.

The UML’s circular may hinder Bhandari’s ability to organize political events, as party leaders now fear disciplinary action. Since the party revoked her membership, many of her vocal supporters have stopped attending her programs. Though Bhandari has expressed her intent to stay active in politics, recent party decisions are likely to restrict her activities significantly.

Amid rumors of a challenge to Deuba’s leadership, Shekhar Koirala has admitted that his faction lacks the numbers to replace him as parliamentary party leader. Speaking publicly, Koirala said even Deuba is aware of this reality. Still, Koirala continues to ride the wave of anti-incumbency sentiment within the party to strengthen his own position, criticizing both the party and government leadership.

Deuba remains in a relatively secure position as Koirala and General Secretary Gagan Thapa, despite both wanting to prevent Deuba from returning as prime minister, remain rivals and are not working together. Their push to hold the party’s general convention before the 2027 election seems unlikely to succeed, as unresolved issues over active membership persist. Within the NC, realignments and the formation of new factions are expected in the coming days, as Deuba has announced he won’t contest the presidency again.

Meanwhile, the Nagarik Unmukti Party has expelled Chairperson Ranjita Shrestha over her alleged involvement in a corruption scandal. Once an emerging force in the 2022 parliamentary elections, the party had recently withdrawn its support to the government and now finds itself mired in internal conflict. In Nepal, intra-party power struggles have become a political norm, often resulting in splits.

The controversy surrounding the land-related bill remains unresolved. The ruling NC has proposed a five-point amendment to address differences, particularly with UML. Madhes-based parties have expressed dissent on several provisions. Upendra Yadav, chairman of the Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal, has said the bill violates the constitution and plans to challenge it in court. The Rastriya Swatantra Party has called for the bill to be returned to the Agriculture Ministry.

Parties are also preparing for the by-election in Rupandehi-3. It is still unclear whether the NC and UML will form an electoral alliance. Candidate selection is underway, and the by-poll is expected to serve as a barometer for current public support for political parties.

In Bagmati Province, the government faces renewed instability due to internal party rifts. Indra Baniya has been elected the party’s parliamentary leader, defeating incumbent Chief Minister Bahadur Singh Lama. Lama is under pressure to resign after losing control over his own party. Though the province had seen stability for the past year due to the NC-UML coalition, tensions are now resurfacing.

On a different front, the US government has officially confirmed that Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) projects will continue in Nepal, ending months of uncertainty. Both the Biden and Trump administrations have viewed MCC in Nepal as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Nepal’s decision to sign the BRI framework agreement with China earlier this year increased pressure on Washington to retain MCC support. A bipartisan consensus exists in the US on countering China’s growing influence, and the continuation of MCC underscores Nepal’s strategic importance, despite broader aid cuts.

Finally, Prime Minister Oli is scheduled to visit Turkmenistan from Aug 5–8 to participate in the Third UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries. Preparations are also underway for his likely visit to India in September, though the date has not been confirmed.

In recent years, Nepal has witnessed exponential growth in the use of various social media platforms. The most popular social media platforms include Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, Instagram, Snapchat, Instagram and LinkedIn. Among these, Facebook maintains strong dominance over the Nepali social media landscape. According to data from the NapoleonCat, there were 16,479,500 Facebook users in Nepal as of Aug 2024, accounting for 51.6 percent of the population. Of these, 55.9 percent were male. 

However, Facebook’s user base is gradually declining as adult users shift toward TikTok and GenZ increasingly favors platforms like TikTok and Instagram. Meanwhile, X is gaining popularity, particularly among news-savvy and politically-engaged users. But it has also become a tool for political propaganda, with ‘cyber armies’ from various political parties engaging in online smear campaigns and character assassination. This toxic environment is pushing intellectuals and thoughtful users away from the platform. 

LinkedIn, on the other hand, is growing steadily in popularity among professionals seeking networking and career development opportunities. The spread of misinformation, disinformation, hate speech and cybercrime has become a pressing issue globally. Many countries are grappling with how to regulate social media in ways that respect freedom of speech while addressing these concerns. While many European nations have developed balanced approaches, several South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, are using social media regulations to suppress political opposition.  

Nepal is no exception. For over 15 years, authorities have misused Section 47 of the Electronic Transaction Act to arrest journalists and silence critics. Recently, this trend has intensified, with ruling party leaders increasingly targeting those who voice dissent. Criticisms of the government or political parties are often misclassified as fake news or hate speech, even when it clearly is not. This raises concerns that new laws may also be exploited for similar purposes. 

In February, the government introduced the Social Media Act Bill in the National Assembly, the upper house of the country’s federal parliament. The Bill has sparked public debate due to several fundamental flaws. The first and foremost is the flawed legislative process itself: government officials involved in consultations have adopted a narrow, bureaucratic perspective.

There is a belief within bureaucracy that regulation can be achieved by simply creating a department. This approach fails to recognize that regulating digital platforms is far more complex than overseeing traditional media like radio, television or print which are historically governed by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and its subordinate bodies.

Social media regulation is multi-faceted and far-reaching. No state agency can realistically monitor an entire population. Yet the ministry appears to consult only with stakeholders like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), organizations of journalists affiliated with major political parties and a handful of non-governmental organizations close to the ruling parties. Independent academics and experts outside the political sphere are largely excluded from the process.

This issue is not limited to social media bills; similar problems exist in other media-related legislation. While parliament has the authority to correct fundamental flaws, lawmakers often lack necessary expertise. Many rely on briefings from NGOs. This limited input, combined with their often weak academic backgrounds, proves insufficient. Lawmakers frequently raise concerns merely to appease journalists rather than engaging meaningfully in the legislative process.

From top to bottom, the bill is riddled with problems. The preamble fails to affirm commitment to international treaties and conventions and other legal instruments to which Nepal is a party. The country has signed international treaties and conventions expressing its full commitment to upholding freedom of speech and expression. But the principles laid out by those international conventions often clash with the narrow understanding held by many Nepali politicians who view criticism as a threat rather than a democratic right.

The 2015 constitution, like its previous versions, contains progressive provisions when it comes to safeguarding freedom of speech and expression. The draft briefly touches the constitutional provision of freedom of speech and expression but remains silent about international commitment. Regarding the international part, the bill states that as other countries are formulating the news, Nepal also needs to formulate the law which is a misrepresentation of Nepal’s international commitments.  The Supreme Court has also delivered landmark verdicts upholding these rights.

However, recent rulings by lower courts appear to contradict the precedents set by the apex court. These decisions only briefly acknowledge the constitutional guarantee of free speech, signaling a shift away from the earlier commitment to protecting this fundamental right.

The Social Media Bill reflects this trend. It fails to clearly state that its purpose is to strengthen freedom of speech and expressions. Instead, it focuses more heavily on regulating social media users, given the impression that its main intent is to restrict, rather than protect, free expression.  

Undeniably, countries across the world are moving quickly to regulate social media to mitigate its negative impacts on society and democracy. But such efforts must never come at the cost of fundamental freedoms, especially freedom of speech, expression and press. Nepal should study how other nations have successfully enacted social media without undermining democratic rights.

Before drafting the bill, the government should have consulted with representatives of major social media companies. Content regulation and moderation are core to the functioning of these platforms, and without their cooperation, any regulatory framework is likely to fail. In this context, Nepal’s top political leadership should use its diplomatic and political channels to engage with these companies. For instance, a few months ago, there was communication between Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and Elon Musk on certain issues. This shows such outreach is possible.

Regrettably, the ministry issued a public notice demanding that social media giants register in Nepal and obtain licenses. It even set a deadline that went ignored. The ministry also threatened to shut down social media platforms, a move widely seen as immature and impractical. A more constructive approach would have been to initiate dialogue, revise the proposed provisions in consultation with these companies and then develop a feasible licensing system.

As it stands, the bill grants sweeping powers to a government-formed department to oversee all social media-related issues. Given the scale and complexity of regulating digital platforms, this is highly problematic. What’s needed is an independent, empowered commission—free from political interference, bureaucratic control, corporate influence and other vested interests. Such a body should be authorized to work directly with social media companies to ensure effective and fair regulation.

The current draft appears to be designed with the aim of removing political content critical of ruling parties. In recent years, there has been a clear trend of political parties using state agencies to target and punish critics of the government and party leadership. If passed without meaningful amendments, the bill risks becoming an extension of the Cyber Bureau, an institution that has already been misused for political purposes.

One positive aspect of the bill is its commitment to launching a large-scale awareness campaign on the responsible use of social media. It proposes to raise public awareness through publications, broadcasts, websites, seminars, public service announcements and dialogues. However, the government does not need to wait for the bill to be passed to begin this vital initiative.

In conclusion, the government must take proactive steps to address the fundamental flaws in the draft bill as it is evident that the agencies involved have failed to adequately study international best practices or documents prepared by global institutions.