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Nepal and China have reaffirmed their commitment to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), highlighting the framework agreement signed during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China in December last year. This development has been described as a milestone in enhancing bilateral ties.

In a political document presented to the Central Committee of his party, CPN-UML, Oli emphasized the significance of the agreement for Nepal-China relations. While the ruling coalition’s Nepali Congress (NC) has remained silent on the matter, China has actively engaged with Nepal’s political leadership to implement the agreement. Both Nepal’s Ambassador to China, Krishna Prasad Oli, and Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Chen Song, have expressed optimism about the initiative, using strikingly similar rhetoric on its potential benefits.

A new era of cooperation

Ambassador Oli noted that the framework agreement marks a turning point in bilateral cooperation under the BRI, nearly seven years after the initial memorandum of understanding. He stated that projects under the BRI would help transform Nepal from a landlocked to a land-linked nation. Citing examples, he mentioned plans to enhance the operational capacity of Bhairahawa and Pokhara international airports.

A centerpiece of this cooperation is the proposed cross-border railway between Nepal and China, part of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network. This ambitious project is envisioned to facilitate the flow of goods, people and services, further deepening Nepal-China ties.

Ambassador Oli dismissed concerns over a so-called ‘debt trap’ linked to Chinese financing, calling such claims baseless. In an interview with The Global Times, he underscored the BRI’s global success, noting its partnerships with over 150 countries in its decade-long history.

Progress on infrastructure

Feasibility studies for the cross-border railway are underway and expected to conclude by 2026. Upon completion, the project will enter the implementation phase. Additionally, efforts are being made to strengthen Nepal’s transmission grid lines, which are critical for enhancing regional connectivity.

Ambassador Oli also expressed Nepal’s support for China’s Global Development Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, reflecting broader alignment with Beijing’s strategic priorities.

According to Chinese official media outlets, Ambassador has said that Nepal supports the initiatives launched by China which were not mentioned in the bilateral documents.

In a meeting with Yang Wanming, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, according to The Global Times, Oli stated that Nepal supports the Global Development initiative and Global Civilization initiative proposed by China.  

China’s perspective

Chinese Ambassador Chen Song echoed the sentiments of deepening mutual trust and cooperation.

In an interview with The Global Times, he described the BRI framework agreement as a symbol of growing political and economic ties between the two nations.

According to Chen, the agreement will not only enhance bilateral relations but also contribute to regional stability and development by fostering collaboration between China and South Asian countries.

Chen highlighted the BRI’s role in strengthening people-to-people exchanges and cultural cooperation, particularly in the tourism sector, according to The Global Times.

Addressing debt-trap concerns

Ambassador Chen countered accusations of a ‘debt trap’, citing data from Nepal’s Public Debt Management Office. As of the 2023-24 fiscal year, Nepal’s external debt stood at Rs 1.25trn ($9.12bn). Of this, multilateral loans constituted 88.98 percent, while bilateral loans made up only 11.02 percent. Among bilateral creditors, Japan and India ranked first and second, with China accounting for a modest 2.82 percent of Nepal’s total external debt.

Chen criticized Western narratives about Chinese loans as attempts to discredit China’s partnerships with developing nations. He emphasized China’s commitment to offering low-interest loans, development assistance and investments tailored to Nepal’s needs.

Political dynamics

Domestically, the ruling UML has showcased the BRI framework agreement as a major achievement of Prime Minister Oli’s government. However, the NC has largely remained noncommittal, while the main opposition CPN (Maoist Center) has downplayed the agreement, seemingly to avoid crediting the Oli administration.

Meanwhile, China has intensified its engagement in Nepal, lobbying for further progress under the BRI framework. This proactive approach underscores Beijing’s strategic interest in Nepal as a critical partner in its broader Belt and Road vision.

This week, Nepal’s two major communist parties—CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center)—held their long-overdue Central Committee (CC) meetings. Both Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli of the UML and Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the Maoist Center share a common trait: they dominate their respective parties, using CC meetings as a formality to project inclusiveness, while key decisions are made unilaterally.

In the UML’s CC meeting, there was no meaningful discussion on pressing issues such as constitutional amendments. Yet, shortly after the meeting, Oli announced that amendments might be possible by 2030. The CC meeting lacked any substantive criticism of Oli’s leadership, with dissenting voices muted or expressed cautiously. This comes on the heels of the party expelling leaders Bhim Rawal, Binda Pandey and Usha Kiran Timalsina for opposing the decision to accept land from a controversial businessman for the party’s office construction. With the Supreme Court validating the land deal, Oli grew more assertive, urging party members to refrain from criticism.

During a party gathering after his China visit, Oli openly admired Xi Jinping’s unchallenged authority and expressed a desire for a similar dynamic in his party, where decisions faced no opposition. After seven months, the UML’s CC meeting was finally convened, but its purpose seemed more symbolic than functional. Critics labeled it a “rubber-stamp CC,” meant only to endorse decisions made by the top leadership without genuine consultation.

The CPN (Maoist Center) is in a comparable state. Chairman Dahal faces some resistance from senior leaders Janardhan Sharma and Barsha Man Pun, both vying to succeed him. However, this rivalry benefits Dahal by keeping them divided. The Maoist CC meeting made populist decisions to placate party members, such as rejecting alliances with the Nepali Congress (NC) and UML, opting instead to collaborate with revolutionary forces. It also pledged to restore the party’s organizational strength. However, as with UML, critical decisions on alliances and governance remain solely at Dahal’s discretion, with the CC expected to comply unquestioningly.

This week also saw a flurry of party activities concerning possible constitutional amendments. The Maoists proposed a directly elected executive head, a fully proportional electoral system, 50 percent female representation in state bodies and other progressive measures. Meanwhile, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) formed a task force under Santosh Pariyar, a former UML cadre, to draft its position on the issue. While RSP leaders, including its Chairman Rabi Lamichhane, are less ideological, Pariyar’s influence could shape the party’s stance. However, Oli downplayed the entire debate, reiterating that constitutional amendments might not occur until 2030. UML insiders suggest that Oli’s reluctance stems from opposition to radical agendas that conflict with his party’s stance, despite amendments being a key promise of the coalition government formed last year.

Inside the NC, preparations for the 15th General Convention are becoming a contentious issue. Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba has remained silent on the timeline, while senior leaders like Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa have already begun campaigning for party leadership. Some party members claim Deuba prefers postponing the convention until after the next national elections, fearing it could exacerbate internal factionalism and weaken the party’s electoral performance in 2027.

Meanwhile, in the Madhes region, discussions among Madhes-based parties about unity, alliances or a loose coalition are gaining traction. Grassroots pressure is mounting for these parties to unite ahead of constitutional amendments and the 2027 elections. However, historical divisions and rivalries make such efforts challenging, leaving the outcome uncertain.

On Tuesday morning, Nepal was jolted by a 6.8 magnitude earthquake centered in Tingri, Tibet, roughly 80 kilometers north of Mount Everest. The tremor felt across Nepal, Bhutan and India was the strongest since the devastating 2015 earthquake that claimed over 9,000 lives. This recent quake serves as a stark reminder of Nepal’s vulnerability to seismic activity, underscored by the frequent small-scale tremors in western Nepal in recent months. In 2023, a magnitude-5.7 earthquake in Jajarkot caused fatalities, highlighting the urgent need for preparedness.

Amid these concerns, there was a brief moment of respite as Nepal’s mountains received snowfall this week. While the snowfall offers temporary relief, the rapid melting of glaciers remains alarming. Nepal’s iconic snow-capped peaks are increasingly turning into barren black rocks, a stark indicator of climate change. Though the mountain regions anticipate more snowfall, there is no certainty. Unfortunately, Nepal currently lacks effective measures to address this environmental crisis.

It has been more than six months since Nepal’s two major political parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML, pledged to make amendments to the 2015 constitution. However, despite their promises, tangible progress remains elusive. A few weeks ago, they announced plans to form a two-party mechanism to address constitutional amendment issues. Yet, this initiative appears stalled, with little to no significant development.

Statements from Prime Minister and CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli suggest that a constitutional amendment is not on the immediate horizon. In fact, it may not occur until after the 2027 national elections. Without giving away the specifics, Oli indicated that any potential amendment might only take place in 2030. Regarding the flaws in the constitution, he remarked, “There are some flaws in the constitution which need to be rectified, but it will take place only in 2030 because now we do not have the two-thirds majority required for it.”

The NC has remained notably silent about its position on constitutional amendments. There have been no substantial deliberations within the party, and it is unclear if there is any agreement between the NC and UML on key issues. Both parties appear to share an interest in reforming the current electoral system to ensure political stability, but dissenting voices from Madhesi and Janajati leaders within their ranks could complicate such efforts.

If the two major parties fail to take the initiative, constitutional amendments are unlikely to materialize. When the NC and UML announced their willingness to amend the constitution while forming the government in July last year, it prompted other parties to clarify their positions. The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), which did not exist when the constitution was promulgated in 2015, has established a task force led by Chief Whip Santosh Pariyar to determine the party’s stance on constitutional issues. The RSP’s position on governance, federalism, and the electoral system remains ambiguous. The party’s decision not to field candidates for provincial assemblies in 2022 sparked speculation that it might oppose the federal structure. However, leaders like Pariyar have expressed support for federalism and related agendas.

Meanwhile, Madhes-based parties have begun consolidating their positions on constitutional amendments. These parties are working towards forming a loose alliance to present a unified stance. The first amendment to the constitution in 2016 addressed some of their demands, bringing an end to the Madhes Movement and lifting a four-month-long blockade imposed by India. However, the Madhes-based parties still advocate for further changes to fully address their grievances.

Constitutional amendment was also a key topic of discussion at the recently concluded Central Committee meeting of CPN (Maoist Center), the main opposition. The party has outlined three primary amendments: the introduction of a directly elected president, the adoption of a fully proportional electoral system, and ensuring 50 percent representation for women in state organs. Maoist Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal has championed these radical reforms, which could reshape Nepal’s political landscape if implemented.

The fifth-largest party, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), has also initiated internal discussions on constitutional amendments. The RPP’s agenda includes abolishing federalism, reinstating Nepal as a Hindu state, and reviving the monarchy. These proposals stand in stark contrast to the positions of most other parties and are unlikely to gain widespread support.

Despite these activities among smaller parties, the NC and UML’s lack of substantive discussion on constitutional amendments is striking. For instance, during a recent UML Central Committee meeting, there was no mention of the specific changes the party seeks to introduce. According to UML leaders, the party’s strategy is to prioritize constitutional amendments only after securing a majority in the House of Representatives.

The 2015 constitution is widely regarded as a product of compromise among four major political forces: the NC, UML, Maoists, and Madhes-based parties. While this consensus allowed for the constitution’s promulgation, it has also resulted in ambiguities and areas of contention that require resolution. The UML’s current stance appears to favor amendments tailored to its terms, further delaying the process due to the lack of cross-party consensus.

As Nepal approaches the 10th anniversary of the 2015 constitution, there has been no expert-led review of its implementation. A senior UML leader has emphasized that the government’s priority is to evaluate the constitution’s effectiveness before deciding on amendments. This cautious approach reflects broader hesitations within the NC, where internal dynamics and divergent views prevent the party from supporting UML’s amendment proposals wholeheartedly.

The road to constitutional amendment is fraught with challenges. Beyond the lack of political will among major parties, there are ideological divides that hinder consensus. For instance, the UML’s preference for amendments that align with its agenda clashes with the more inclusive demands of Madhes-based parties and Janajati leaders. Similarly, the Maoist party’s call for radical reforms faces resistance from parties advocating for minimal changes.

Furthermore, the failure to address constitutional issues risks deepening public disillusionment with Nepal’s political leadership. Many citizens view the 2015 constitution as a landmark achievement that needs refinement to better serve the nation’s evolving needs. The lack of progress undermines confidence in the political process and raises questions about the commitment of major parties to democratic principles and governance.

To move forward, Nepal’s political leadership must prioritize dialogue and consensus-building. A comprehensive review of the constitution’s implementation, involving legal experts, civil society, and diverse political voices, could provide a roadmap for amendments that address the nation’s pressing challenges. 

In an effort to strengthen its position, the CPN (Maoist Center) is preparing to revive some radical agendas, including the right to self-determination and ethnicity-based autonomous provinces—issues the party abandoned during the constitution drafting process in 2015. A political document presented by Maoist Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal during the party’s Central Committee meeting proposes reactivating the ethnic and caste-based structures established during the insurgency and the subsequent peace process. These structures were compromised during the constitution drafting process to reach consensus with other parties.

The Maoist party had originally proposed 14 autonomous provinces based on ethnic groups. However, this proposal was strongly opposed by the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML, who argued it could lead to national disintegration. As a result, the Maoists were forced to compromise. “The issue of identity-based federalism has been overshadowed, and we must apologize for this,” Dahal said at the ongoing Central Committee meeting. He emphasized the need to rebuild relationships with indigenous communities, Janajatis, and other marginalized groups—the party’s core constituencies—while reviving regional and caste-based party organizations.

Dahal has also expressed that the party should collaborate with revolutionary forces rather than parliamentary parties like the NC and UML. However, many Maoist leaders argue that Dahal raises such radical agendas only when relegated to the opposition bench in Parliament. A senior leader remarked, “Once he gains power through alliances with the NC or UML, he completely forgets these communities and even embraces rightist and Hindu fundamentalist agendas.”

From 2008 until the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Maoists, then the largest party, vigorously championed these issues. However, the party gradually abandoned them after its relegation to third place in the 2013 Constituent Assembly elections. Dahal has now urged party members to apologize and self-criticize for not prioritizing these agendas after the constitution drafting process. Despite becoming prime minister twice post-constitution promulgation—in alliance with the NC and UML—Dahal did little to address these issues.

The political document also outlines the party's position on constitutional amendments. The Maoists propose replacing the current system with a directly elected presidential system, a longstanding agenda they have pushed since joining the peace process. Additionally, they are preparing to reiterate their support for a fully proportional representation (PR) electoral system, which other major parties are unlikely to accept. Currently, the electoral system is a mix of PR and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP). The likelihood of major party agreement on adopting full PR remains minimal.

One of Dahal’s key proposals is to increase women’s representation in state organs from the current 33 percent to 50 percent, an initiative aimed at attracting female constituencies. These proposals are part of a broader strategy to revive the party’s waning influence. Despite maintaining its position as the third-largest party in the past two national elections and serving as a decisive force in government formation, the party’s overall strength has diminished. While it retains strongholds in some districts of the far and mid-western regions, its urban presence has weakened. Dahal acknowledges this in his document and proposes a roadmap to rebuild the party’s urban support.

The roadmap includes providing opportunities for youth within the party, increasing membership, maintaining financial transparency, and exposing the current government’s misdeeds. To regain urban support, Dahal emphasizes launching targeted campaigns in Kathmandu Valley, cities, and highway areas. He underscores the importance of establishing a strong presence in the capital, vital for implementing the party’s policies and strategies. Notably, the Maoists failed to secure a single seat in Kathmandu Valley during the 2022 elections, even with an electoral alliance with the NC.

To address urban challenges, Dahal’s document proposes tackling issues such as urbanization, traditional and cultural heritage preservation, waste management, water supply, drainage, and public transportation. He recalls the party’s failed 2009 urban revolt, which was quickly abandoned following protests from Kathmandu’s elite, whom he had derisively referred to as “Sukila Mukila.”

While Dahal’s proposals aim to rejuvenate the party, his underlying priority appears to be returning to power and destabilizing the current coalition government. Reports indicate that a faction of NC and Maoist leaders is discussing forming a new alliance. This has led some party leaders to question Dahal’s sincerity in advancing the party’s position. A senior Maoist leader, speaking anonymously, stated, “Once Dahal gains power, he forgets all these agendas and even avoids convening party meetings.”

In his document, Dahal has adopted a tough stance against Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli while maintaining a softer approach toward NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba, reflecting potential power-sharing considerations. Although Dahal and Oli frequently clash publicly, Dahal and Deuba rarely criticize each other in public forums.

Dahal’s proposals reflect an attempt to address both the party’s declining influence and the grievances of marginalized communities. However, internal skepticism remains about his commitment to these agendas, given his track record of abandoning them when in power. The Maoists face significant challenges in rebuilding their urban and national support base, particularly as they compete with stronger, more established parties.

Madhes-based political parties have begun deliberations on forming a unified political force to advance the region’s agendas. According to Madhesi leaders, they face mounting pressure from the local level and civil society to consolidate their efforts for greater impact.

This push for unity coincides with discussions on amending the constitution by two major political parties—Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML—an issue of critical importance to Madhes. Madhes-based parties, which did not initially endorse the 2015 constitution, saw only partial demands addressed through its first amendment in 2016.

Compounding this, Madhes has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, drawing heightened interest from global powers. While India has traditionally wielded strong influence over Madhes and its political actors, countries like the United States and China have increased their presence through non-governmental organizations and think tanks, further complicating the region’s dynamics.

Keshav Jha, a prominent Madhesi leader, highlighted the urgency of unification. “We are under public pressure to unite the parties or, at the very least, form an alliance or loose network,” he said. However, the past 15 years have been marked by both the emergence of influential political forces and frequent splits within Madhes-based parties.

Jha noted that recent discussions among Madhesi leaders explored possibilities for collaboration but acknowledged significant challenges. Many leaders and civil society figures attribute the fragmentation of these parties to personal ambitions for power. A senior Madhesi leader Laxman Lal Karna further accused the major national parties—NC, UML, and CPN (Maoist Center)—of engineering splits within Madhes-based parties to weaken their influence.

Before 2006, the Sadbhawana Party was Madhes’ sole dominant political force. However, the first Constituent Assembly elections saw the rise of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum under Upendra Yadav. The same year, senior NC leader Mahantha Thakur broke away to form the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP). Splits within these parties became a recurring trend, notably in 2009, when differences between Yadav and Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar over joining the UML-led  government led to a major division. This cycle of fragmentation continues to this day.

In the last decade, a shift has occurred as Madhes-based parties strive to establish themselves as national political entities rather than remaining confined to a regional identity. Sociologist Pranab Kharel noted that most parties have removed the term ‘Madhes’ from their names in pursuit of a broader appeal. A prominent example is the 2016 unification between Upendra Yadav and former Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai, who formed Naya Shakti to create a powerful national party. However, their efforts faltered due to personality clashes.

Kharel believes this identity struggle creates confusion. “There’s a lack of clarity on whether to operate as a provincial party for Madhes or expand as a national force. Personally, I think Madhes needs a strong provincial party to address its issues effectively,” he said. Despite leading the Madhes provincial government, the influence of Madhes-based parties in national politics has significantly waned due to internal divisions. Observers also point out that these parties face public scrutiny over unmet promises, with two elections held since the promulgation of the new constitution.

While the idea of unity among Madhes-based parties is gaining traction, observers caution that achieving it will be difficult. Personality clashes remain a significant hurdle, with no single leader commanding enough respect to unite all factions. Previous attempts to adopt rotational leadership systems also failed to resolve this issue. Additionally, ideological differences persist; leaders with backgrounds in liberal democracy clash with those rooted in leftist ideologies, making consensus elusive.

Amid these challenges, Keshav Jha notes a new polarization within Madhes. Anil Kumar Jha, leader of the Loktantrik Samajbadi Party, advocates for cooperation. “This is not the time to dwell on past weaknesses. We must take initiatives for a new kind of collaboration in Madhes,” he said. While he sees little potential for outright unification, he emphasizes the need for alliances and partnerships.

Raj Kishwor Yadav, vice-chairperson of the Janata Samajbadi Party, echoed this sentiment, stressing the importance of adapting to changing domestic and international dynamics. “The shifts in both domestic and global politics are affecting Nepal. We need fresh thinking when discussing alliances and unification,” he said. Similarly, Renu Yadav, another vice-chairperson of the Janata Samajbadi Party, emphasized that while multiple Madhes-based parties exist, they share common agendas.

Despite the challenges, the discourse around unification and collaboration among Madhes-based parties reflects a recognition of the region’s political fragmentation and the need for a cohesive approach to address its longstanding issues. Whether these efforts will lead to meaningful change remains to be seen.

In 2024, Nepal experienced significant turbulence both domestically and in foreign relations. In July, CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli assumed the Office of the Prime Minister for the third time, supported by the largest party, Nepali Congress (NC). Despite forming a numerically strong government, the coalition has struggled to instill hope for stability. Doubts persist about the government’s longevity, despite leaders from both NC and UML insisting it will last until the 2027 national elections. Economically, Nepal’s struggles continued, showing little improvement. While external economic indicators improved slightly, domestic challenges remained unaddressed.

 Relations with China and the US remained stable, but ties with India deteriorated. Nepal’s engagement with long-standing development partners progressed steadily. The Oli administration promised economic reforms, improved service delivery, job creation, and fostering optimism among youth. Additionally, NC and UML pledged to amend the constitution based on lessons from its implementation. However, progress on these fronts remained limited.

Economic stagnation persisted, with some gains in the stock market overshadowed by poor revenue collection and low capital expenditure. The continued practice of last-minute expenditure resulted in inefficient investment and inflationary pressures. The real estate sector, a significant revenue source, remained in decline, with annual revenues dropping from Rs 70bn pre-covid to Rs. 46bn. In contrast, tourism rebounded robustly. Data from Nepal Tourism Board revealed that 1,104,702 tourists visited Nepal in 2024, returning the industry to pre-pandemic levels.

Despite these improvements, general pessimism grew as thousands of youths sought opportunities abroad for education and employment. Public services showed little improvement, leaving citizens disillusioned. Promised constitutional amendments remain stalled, with NC and UML yet to form the joint mechanism required to initiate the process. The government’s slow progress on its commitments is fostering doubts about its ability to deliver.

The coalition faced a major test in September when floods and landslides ravaged the country, causing over 250 deaths and infrastructural losses worth billions. While Prime Minister Oli attended the 79th United Nations General Assembly in New York, his administration’s inadequate disaster response undermined public trust. Effective coordination could have saved lives, but the government’s failure in crisis management became a defining moment of its tenure, eroding its credibility.

Domestically, the arrest of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane for alleged involvement in cooperative fraud, money laundering, and organized crime dominated headlines. Police filed charges in the Kaski district court, but opposition parties, including CPN (Maoist Center) and Lamichhane’s RSP, labeled the arrest politically motivated. Meanwhile, the government faced criticism for shielding NC and UML allies accused of corruption while targeting opposition leaders.

Within the ruling UML, former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s return to active party politics sparked internal debate. Her participation in party programs signaled a comeback, with some leaders encouraging her involvement. The NC saw internal discussions on future leadership, with Shekhar Koirala campaigning for the presidency while the party President Sher Bahadur Deuba remained silent. NC General Secretary and president hopeful Gagan Kumar Thapa announced his candidacy, intensifying the contest. Similarly, the Maoist Center debated whether to reintegrate former Vice President Nanda Kishor Pun Pasang into its ranks.

Transitional justice saw a rare consensus among major parties on the need for a new bill, earning international praise. However, the government failed to appoint officials to transitional justice mechanisms, stalling progress. On the foreign front, Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China in December garnered significant attention. Marking a departure, he chose China for his first foreign visit, as he had in 2016 after awaiting considerable time for an invite from India. During the trip, Nepal signed a framework agreement for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, identifying 10 projects for implementation. China’s lobbying for swift action on these projects underscored its growing influence in Nepal.

Relations with India remained strained. Although bilateral engagements continued, Oli received no invitation to visit India. A notable achievement was a trilateral agreement among Nepal, India and Bangladesh to trade 40 MW electricity, allowing Nepal to sell electricity to a third country for the first time. Despite expectations of improved ties, relations between Oli and the Indian establishment remained lukewarm. Nepal’s relationship with the US remained stable as American officials visited Kathmandu to deepen engagement. However, the perception of US influence in Nepal’s domestic affairs continued to provoke mixed reactions.

Public sentiment grew increasingly pessimistic. Many youth believe the country’s trajectory will worsen, fueling frustration with major political parties. Anti-constitution forces have started gaining traction, exploiting public discontent. Despite their pledge to ensure stability, NC and UML face mounting skepticism about their ability to deliver meaningful change.

Writer and journalist Sudheer Sharma’s new book, Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha, unveiled in August, offers a comprehensive account of the key figures, issues, and phenomena that have shaped Nepal-China relations. The book spans from the era of King Narendra Dev in the 7th century to 2008, when Nepal’s 240-year monarchy came to an end. Sharma’s other book, Himal Pari ko Huri, published simultaneously, explores new trends in bilateral relations post-2008, though this review focuses solely on Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha.

In the introductory section, Sharma highlights a problem in Nepal’s public discourse about its northern neighbor. He identifies two contrasting perspectives: one group idolizes China and dismisses criticism, while the other harbors deep-seated prejudice. Sharma aims to provide an objective account of this trans-Himalayan relationship, presenting little-known historical facts and anecdotes. He maintains a neutral tone, avoiding personal biases in his analysis.

As a writer and journalist, Sharma excels in meticulous documentation, gathering new insights through his strong rapport with senior politicians and officials, and offering sharp political and geopolitical analysis. These strengths, evident in his acclaimed earlier work, Nepal Nexus, are similarly reflected in this book.

The book delves into the political, trade, cultural, and people-to-people relations between Nepal and China. Sharma credits King Narendra Dev and Princess Bhrikuti with laying the foundation of Nepal-China relations. He highlights the flourishing trade between Nepal and Tibet that began in the 7th century and thrived until the 1950s. Sharma also explores how this trade fostered robust people-to-people connections.

However, he documents the gradual decline of these ties after China took control of Tibet, imposed strict regulations on Nepali residents in Lhasa, and tightened visa rules. A study conducted by China in the late 1950s revealed that a Nepali shop in Lhasa, established a thousand years earlier, was still operational at the time. Three shops were found to be between 500 and 1,000 years old, and four others ranged from 200 to 500 years. Today, the number of Nepali shops in Lhasa has drastically declined, and Sharma notes that Nepal’s trade with Tibet—dating back 1,400 years to King Narendra Dev’s time—is nearing extinction.

In the chapter Bhikshu, Bidrohi, and Bampanthi, Sharma asserts that the foundation of Nepal-China relations is rooted more in cultural, religious, trade, and people-to-people ties than in political connections. He highlights the significant role played by Buddhist monks and nuns in fostering bilateral relations since ancient times. The chapter begins with a reference to an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping, published in Nepali newspapers, where Xi mentions the collaboration between the Chinese monk Fa Hien and Nepali monk Buddhabhadra over 1,600 years ago to translate Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

Sharma also revisits the well-known narrative of Nepali Princess Bhrikuti’s marriage to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo and mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzang (Huen Tsang), who visited Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, leaving invaluable written accounts of his pilgrimage. This chapter offers a chronological account of Nepal-China engagements from the 7th century to the 1950s, demonstrating Sharma’s meticulous research and dedication to historical accuracy.

The chapter Mao and Mahendra provides a compelling overview of the relationship between Nepal’s monarchy and China, detailing personal connections between Nepal’s kings and Chinese leaders, which both sides leveraged for mutual benefit. For instance, Mahendra, as crown prince, secretly traveled to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong. The chapter includes several examples of the close proximity between the two sides.

Sharma discusses how the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided financial and other support to Nepal’s communist parties but refrained from supporting armed insurgencies, including the CPN-UML-led rebellion in Jhapa and the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Since the 1950s, China has consistently stated that it does not aim to export its revolution to Nepal. Although the CPC secretly offered financial aid to Nepal’s communist parties in the past, it never supplied arms or ammunition—a lesser-known aspect of Nepal-China relations.

Formal ties between the CPC and Nepal’s communist parties ended following King Mahendra’s royal coup. While China maintains that it does not export its revolution or ideology, Sharma highlights the irony that two major revolutions in Nepal—the Jhapa communist uprising and the Maoist insurgency—were launched in Mao Zedong’s name, despite receiving no Chinese support once they turned to armed struggle. Instead, the rebels were advised to join the political mainstream.

On the relationship between China and Nepali communist parties, Sharma writes: “China was always attracted to Nepal's communist parties due to two reasons: communism and nationalism. Communism is their shared ideology, and Nepal’s communist parties have viewed China as a protector of nationalism. This is why Nepal’s communist-led governments have historically maintained closer ties with China than other administrations.” He also discusses China’s changing approach to Nepal’s internal politics and its overt efforts to consolidate Nepal’s communist forces, suggesting that China may view Nepal’s communist parties as a potential substitute for the monarchy as a stable political institution.

The Khampa revolt is another major factor in Nepal-China relations. Sharma provides fresh insights into the Tibetan Khampas’ 18-year armed rebellion against China. According to the book, King Mahendra’s death marked a turning point for the Khampas, as his successor, King Birendra, adopted a less supportive stance. Following his state visit to China in 1973, King Birendra began military preparations to suppress the Khampas. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly assured Birendra that the United States would not interfere, citing an agreement with President Nixon on the Tibetan issue. Upon returning to Nepal, Birendra initiated joint discussions with China on disarming the Khampas and began providing regular updates on their activities.

The book is a valuable resource for understanding Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China. It examines key narratives, such as China’s policy shift after Nepal’s monarchy was abolished in 2008, its perception of Nepal as a gateway to India and South Asia, its primary concern with Tibet’s security, and its encouragement of Nepal’s communist parties as a reliable political force. However, critics may argue that while Sharma offers fresh insights and unearths historical documents, much of the book reiterates existing narratives about Nepal-China relations.

The KP Sharma Oli-led administration is striving to improve its ties with New Delhi but has yet to achieve substantive results. Despite repeated attempts to mend relations, ruling party leaders and foreign policy experts suggest that bilateral relations between Nepal and India may be deteriorating rather than improving. A series of unresolved issues and missteps on both sides seem to have created a widening gulf.

During his earlier tenure and as an aspiring prime minister, Oli believed that the so-called ‘Delhi Durbar’—referring to India's political establishment—was obstructing his political aspirations. However, in a strategic political maneuver, Oli secured the premiership with the support of the Nepali Congress, a traditional ally of India.

Once in office, Oli took a series of initiatives aimed at establishing a cordial relationship with New Delhi. Like many of his predecessors, Oli hoped to receive an immediate invitation for an official visit to India as a gesture of goodwill. However, this invitation never materialized. Reports from Indian media suggest that New Delhi was initially open to welcoming Oli in August or September. However, India later withdrew the invitation, allegedly due to Oli’s insistence on preconditions—specifically, his demand that India announce steps to resolve the ongoing border dispute.

The border dispute, commonly referred to as the “map row,” stems from competing territorial claims over areas such as Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh. While Oli has consistently advocated for progress on this issue, New Delhi appears reluctant to prioritize it, viewing it as a sensitive topic better deferred. Diplomats note that this impasse has fueled mistrust and contributed to the stagnation of bilateral relations.

A meeting between Prime Minister Oli and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York was seen as an opportunity to break the ice. However, according to diplomatic insiders, the meeting failed to yield any significant breakthrough. Analysts suggest that this outcome is emblematic of deeper issues in the relationship.

The unresolved border dispute is not the only factor straining ties. Another contentious issue is the fate of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, finalized in 2018. The report, a collaborative effort by experts from both countries, was intended to recommend ways to enhance Nepal-India relations. However, India has shown little interest in accepting or even acknowledging the report, a stance that has frustrated Nepal.

Since becoming prime minister, Oli has repeatedly highlighted the importance of the EPG report in his speeches and public appearances. He has even used public platforms, such as the launch of former Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa’s book on the Indian blockade, to criticize India’s handling of the issue. During the event, Oli remarked, in a satirical tone, that Indian leaders seem too busy to formally receive the report.

This persistence, according to analysts such as Chandra Dev Bhatta, may have further irritated New Delhi. India, for its part, appears to view the EPG report as an unwelcome complication, and this view is shared by several Nepali political parties, including the Nepali Congress, the CPN (Maoist Centre), and Madhes-based parties. Despite this, Oli’s UML continues to push the issue, creating additional friction in bilateral ties.

Adding to the tensions is Nepal’s decision to align with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy. The agreement, signed under Oli’s leadership, has been a point of contention since its inception. India has long opposed the BRI, citing sovereignty concerns, particularly because certain projects under the initiative traverse disputed territories.

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba’s recent visit to India seemed aimed at clarifying Nepal’s stance on the BRI. However, her trip failed to achieve its objectives. Indian leaders declined to meet her, reportedly due to either scheduling conflicts or dissatisfaction with her role in supporting the BRI framework agreement. This chilly reception was in stark contrast to her earlier visit in August, during which she was warmly received and even handed over an invitation from Oli to Modi for a visit to Nepal. Modi accepted the invitation but deferred setting a date, suggesting it would be decided through diplomatic channels.

The cooling of ties is not limited to Oli’s government. A senior Nepali Congress leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that even the relationship between the NC and India has soured. According to the leader, India was displeased with the NC for forming a coalition government with the UML. Additionally, India reportedly disapproved of the NC-led government’s decision to sign the BRI agreement with China.

Despite these challenges, certain aspects of Nepal-India relations remain functional. Bilateral mechanisms continue to operate, with regular meetings and consultations taking place. Nepali ministers frequently visit India, and there has been a noticeable strengthening of military ties between the Nepal Army and the Indian Army.

However, a senior Indian academic who closely follows bilateral relations noted that while India remains committed to engaging with the Nepali public, it has grown wary of working with Oli. “Oli’s strategic agreements with China could have implications for India’s security. I don’t foresee a cordial relationship between him and New Delhi in the near future.”

This situation bears similarities to the events of 2020 when the map row first escalated. After a prolonged communication breakdown, India sent Samant Kumar Goel, the chief of its intelligence agency RAW, as a special envoy to meet Oli. The visit facilitated a wide-ranging discussion of bilateral issues and temporarily eased tensions. However, subsequent political instability in Nepal, including Oli’s dissolution of Parliament, derailed progress.

Diplomats and political leaders now suggest that both governments should consider employing a combination of official and back-channel diplomacy to rebuild trust. Despite Oli’s recent efforts to use track two channels to resolve disputes, these initiatives have so far failed to deliver results.

For Nepal and India, the path to repairing relations will require addressing both long-standing disputes and emerging challenges. Progress will depend on a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue and a mutual commitment to preserving and strengthening a historically close relationship that remains vital for both nations.