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It has been nearly six decades since the UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights popularly known as ICCPR. Article 19 of ICCPR states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”

In Nepal’s case, the 1990 constitution, for the first time, recognized citizens’ right to demand information held by public agencies on matters of public importance. Actually, Nepal was ahead of other South Asian countries when it came to providing constitutional guarantee to Right to Information. Now, other South Asian countries are making a huge progress on RTI but Nepal is lagging behind. In Nepal, progressive constitutional provision remained largely unimplemented in the absence of a supportive law. Successive governments after 1990 did not pay any attention to formulate such legislation due to a lack of awareness about its importance for the effective functioning of the democracy.

The 2015 constitution further strengthened this right, stating that every citizen shall have the right to demand and receive information on any matter of personal and public interest, with exception of information legally designated as confidential. To support these constitutional guarantees, the Right to Information Act was enacted on 21 July 21 followed by the National Information Commission in 2009. Nepal now has both legal and institutional frameworks to protect people’s right to information. Yet, in practice, progress has been limited.

Government and non-governmental agencies, particularly the National Information Commission, have been active in raising awareness about the importance of RTI for democracy. Numerous training and seminars have been conducted, mainly targeting government officials. While these efforts have raised some awareness, they are often repetitive and ineffective. Nonetheless, journalists and activists have increasingly used RTI as a tool to expose corruption, which is a positive development.

The tendency to seek information from government bodies has grown, but it remains largely confined to activists and has yet to spread widely among ordinary citizens. Serious challenges continue to hinder effective implementation of the law. The most fundamental issue is the persistent failure to instill in political leaders and government officials that people have a right, not a privilege, to access information of public importance.  Political leaders rarely encourage transparency; instead, they often side with bureaucrats in suppressing information. In many cases, leaders have even instructed agencies to withhold information rather than disclose it.

There still is a mindset among the politicians and bureaucracy that granting or denying access to information is at their discretion. In reality, the law has clearly stated what type of information may be withheld. This includes information that jeopardizes sovereignty, integrity, national security, public peace and stability, or that interferes with criminal investigation, inquiry and prosecution, or sensitive economic, trade and monetary matters. Beyond these exceptions, government agencies are obligated to provide information without restrictions. Instead of adhering to the law, many government agencies impose unnecessary conditions with the deliberate intent of suppressing information. Politicians and officials alike fear that if full disclosure were made, their corruption and irregularities would be exposed.

As per the law, every public office should appoint an information officer. While such officers do exist in government offices, they are rarely empowered. Most lack access to the information they are meant to provide, leaving people empty-handed when they make requests. On paper, government agencies appear to comply with proactive disclosure requirements by publishing reports every three months. In reality, these documents do not reveal anything about actual activities. They are often little more than recycled introductions and lists of duties and responsibilities; reprinted again and again to create the illusion of transparency.

The National Information Commission cannot remain satisfied with this surface-level compliance. Its focus must go beyond repetitive training seasons for government officials. Instead, it should actively monitor the information that government agencies are making public and investigate misleading practices and demand that agencies change their current approach to proactive disclosure. The priority in earlier years was to ensure that agencies appointed information officers and began publishing regular reports. That phase has passed. Now, the challenge is to push for meaningful disclosure of substantive information. The government offices should stop reprinting empty profiles again and again, taking both the public and the Commission for granted.

Another vital component is that people are not aware about the importance of their rights and responsibilities of the government agencies. While publicity campaigns have informed people that an RTI law exists, very few people understand its details and how to use it effectively. Knowledge remains confined to a small circle of political leaders, activists and professionals working in the field. Even students do not have comprehensive knowledge about RTI even though RTI has been incorporated in the school and university curricula. Students know about the RTI only from a narrow examination perspective, with little understanding of its practical application.

The National Information Commission, which is tasked with ensuring implementation of this law, should change its working style. Going beyond its routine seminar and lectures, it should identify bottlenecks and directly confront agencies that are misleading the public by publishing background information while concealing what truly matters. As a journalist, I often visit the websites of government agencies to read their proactive disclosure documents to find new information about works accomplished by them. But they always disappoint me. The format provided by the National Information Commission for the proactive disclosure, which is focused on background and general information rather than the substantive information, itself is problematic. Similarly, it should explain why government agencies are not empowering the information officers to provide the information. Similarly, it should find out why two decades of awareness campaigns have failed to build genuine public understanding. It should study new ways to disseminate the information in the ever-changing information ecosystem.

In conclusion, politicians and government agencies have yet to internalize that the right to information is a cornerstone of democracy. Now, we have to move on to phase two of the implementation of RTI—one that ensures not just the existence of laws and institutions but their effective use as well. Most importantly, people must be able to seek information without fear.

At present, many hesitate to approach officials for information, worried that they might be targeted if they do so. With corruption at unprecedented levels, especially at the local level where political leaders and bureaucrats are often complicit, the culture of opacity still persists. Breaking this cycle will require stronger enforcement, fearless oversight and a genuine political commitment.

Ahead of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s expected visit to New Delhi, the long-standing border dispute between Nepal and India has resurfaced. The controversy follows the recent India-China agreement to resume trade through the Lipulek pass, a territory disputed between Nepal and India. In 2020, Nepal amended its constitution to incorporate Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limiyadhura within its official map. The government has formally objected to the India-China agreement, while India maintains that border trade through Lipulekh has been ongoing since 1954.

This development puts pressure on Prime Minister Oli, as political parties are urging him to raise the issue during his upcoming India visit. Leaders from the ruling Nepali Congress have already made public statements pressing PM Oli to act. Although both sides have previously agreed that boundary issues should be resolved through diplomatic talks, little progress has been made, and the dispute remains one of the most complex in bilateral relations. For now, China has not responded to Nepal’s objection. 

Meanwhile, Nepali Ambassador to China Krishna Prasad Oli met with Liu Jinson, director-general of the Department of Asian Affairs of Chinese Foreign Ministry. It is unclear whether two sides discussed this issue. The Chinese readout states that both sides had friendly and in-depth exchanges of views on China-Nepal relations and cooperation projects.  Interestingly, Oli will also travel to China later this month to attend the SCO meeting as an observer. Lawmakers have raised this issue in the Parliament, asking the government to take up this issue with New Delhi and Beijing. 

Meanwhile, India-China relations appear to be warming after both countries signed a series of agreements this week, a notable shift since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. Western nations, particularly the US, are watching these regional dynamics closely, especially as US-China and India-U.S ties remain strained over trade and tariffs.

Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri visited Nepal recently to extend an official invitation to Prime Minister Oli for his India visit. During his stay, Misri met a wide range of political leaders and discussed bilateral issues. While it is now confirmed that Oli has accepted the invitation, the two governments have yet to finalize the date. 

Turning to domestic politics, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) have been boycotting Parliament, demanding a probe into the recent visa scam. However, the tables may be turning. 

The ruling coalition is preparing to impeach Deputy Speaker Indira Rana Magar over her alleged role in writing a letter to the American Embassy recommending visas. Observers see this move as a pressure tactic against the RSP, forcing the party to soften its stance. If the RSP refuses to compromise, its deputy speaker may face impeachment. A section of the Nepali Congress, led by Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa, has criticized the ruling coalition’s move, calling it an abuse of the parliamentary majority.

Meanwhile, former President Bidya Devi Bhandari has refused to step back from active politics. She continues to insist that her party membership, held for forty years, cannot be revoked. Recently, she visited the party office in Biratnagar and met with supporters despite a directive banning such activity. She has now opened an office in Kathmandu to run her political work more systematically. Prime Minister Oli, however, has remained silent on her actions. Notably, in the party’s recent Central Committee meeting, leaders Surendra Pandey and Yubaraj Gyawali voiced their dissent against the decision to strip Bhandari of her membership, criticizing the leadership for avoiding the issue in official party documents.

On another front, teachers are once again on the streets after the government failed to fulfill its promises. The ruling coalition had pledged to pass the Education Bill to address their demands, but the legislation has stalled. With protests growing, the government faces increasing pressure to act quickly.

In the opposition camp, CPN (Maoist Center) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal continues to project himself as central to national politics. Speaking at a recent program, he claimed that even while in opposition he has shouldered the “sole responsibility” of national politics, warning that the country’s situation could deteriorate if he were to withdraw from that role.

In legal developments, the Supreme Court has issued a mandamus order to proceed with an investigation against Janata Samajbadi Party Chairman Upendra Yadav for his alleged involvement in the 2007 Gaur massacre. In that clash, 27 cadres of the then CPN (Maoist) were killed in violence with members of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal. The ruling comes just weeks after Yadav exited the government, and he has since been sharply critical of the ruling coalition.

On the international stage, Nepal took an important step by ratifying the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. On Aug 18, WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala received Nepal’s instrument of acceptance from Ambassador Ram Prasad Subedi. Only three more ratifications are needed for the agreement to take effect. Okonjo-Iweala praised Nepal’s leadership, calling its move significant for both landlocked and least-developed countries.

In public health, the World Health Organization confirmed that Nepal has eliminated rubella as a public health problem. The achievement reflects years of immunization campaigns and strengthened disease surveillance. While rubella is usually mild in children, it can cause severe complications in pregnancy, making this milestone particularly important.

In technology, Communication and Information Technology Minister Prithvi Subba Gurung announced that 5G services will be launched in Kathmandu and Pokhara by January 2026. He added that the government is working to improve internet quality nationwide under the Digital Nepal initiative.

Finally, the Nepali Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army will hold the fifth edition of the Sagarmatha Friendship joint military exercise in Nepal from Sept 6. The 10-day exercise will focus on counter-terrorism, combat tactics, and disaster management, underscoring deepening military ties between the two neighbors.

India and China have emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas as a foundation for strengthening their overall bilateral relationship. A statement issued after the 24th round of the Special Representatives’ Dialogue on the Boundary Question said that the two countries agreed to establish an expert group under the working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border issues. This group will explore “early harvest” measures in boundary delimitation in the disputed areas.

They also agreed to form a working group to improve border management and maintain stability along the frontier. Both sides will use existing diplomatic and military mechanisms to carry forward the process of border management and discuss steps toward de-escalation, starting with principles and modalities.

These agreements underscore efforts to normalize relations that had been severely strained since the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. If the peace-building measures move forward as planned, India-China ties could see significant improvement, creating new dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

 India and China decided to reopen border trade through three designated trading points, Lipulekh Pass, Shipki La Pass, and Nathu La Pass.   

Issuing a press statement, a spokesperson at Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the constitution of Nepal has already incorporated Nepal’s official map, which clearly establishes that Limpuyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani, located to the east of the Mahakali River, are integral parts of Nepal. The Nepal government has objected to any activities in the area, reminding both countries that the Kalapani region is an integral part of Nepal.

Similarly, India has said that its position on the matter is consistent and clear.  Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh pass commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades. This trade had been disrupted in recent years due to Covid and other developments, and both sides have now agreed to resume it, India said in a statement.  As regards territorial claims, our position remains that such claims are neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence. Any unilateral artificial enlargement of territorial claims is untenable, the statement issued by India reads.

In 2015, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China, two sides had agreed to hold negotiation on augmenting the list of traded commodities, and expand border trade Nathu La, Qiangla/Lipu-Lekh Pass and Shipki La. At that time, Nepal had protested the India-China agreement sending a protest letter to both countries.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is visiting China after six years to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin. India and China also discussed a wide range of issues linked to the BRICS Summit. BRICS nations are considering the creation of a common currency, a proposal that has drawn criticism from US President Donald Trump. India and China agreed to support each other in hosting major diplomatic events: India will host the 2026 BRICS Summit, while China will host in 2027. This provides new opportunities for bilateral and regional engagement.

The two sides also agreed to resume direct flight connectivity between the Chinese mainland and India, suspended during the Covid-19 pandemic and not restarted due to strained ties. They will also finalize an updated air service agreement. The Kailash Manasarovar Yatra has already resumed, and beginning next year, the scale of Indian pilgrimages is expected to increase.

In addition, both sides pledged to take concrete measures to facilitate trade and investment flows, jointly maintain peace in the border areas through friendly consultations, and uphold multilateralism. They agreed to enhance coordination on major international and regional issues, maintain a rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, and promote a multipolar world that safeguards the interests of developing countries, according to the statement.

After the Doklam crisis, Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held two informal summits—the first in Wuhan in April 2018, and the second in Chennai in Oct 2019—which significantly helped improve ties. In 2018, China had proposed a “two plus one” model, under which India and China would consult or cooperate on development projects in South Asian countries. That idea, however, faded amid worsening bilateral ties.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that since the beginning of this year, bilateral relations have moved onto a path of steady development and the boundary situation has continued to stabilize. He added that China attaches great importance to Prime Minister Modi’s visit to attend the SCO Tianjin Summit and looks forward to India’s active contribution to its success.

Following the completion of the United States’ foreign aid review under the Donald Trump administration, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact has resumed work with “renewed momentum and shared commitment from both sides.”

This week, MCA Nepal signed two major contracts to advance its electricity transmission line projects. Deputy Vice-president of MCC John Wingle, who is currently visiting Nepal, has been in talks with government officials to address technical challenges, primarily related to land acquisition and forest clearance. These issues have slowed progress on transmission construction. Despite significant cuts to US foreign assistance, the Trump administration decided to continue MCC projects in Nepal, framing MCC support not as aid, but as an ‘investment to promote business growth and stability worldwide.’

In signing these contracts, Wingle reaffirmed the US commitment to shared priorities and Nepal’s development goals. “We are honored to work alongside our Nepali counterparts to improve the availability and reliability of electricity in Nepal and enhance regional power trade and integration.” From 2018 to 2022, MCC projects deeply polarized Nepali society, facing both strong support and open opposition, notably from China. Under the agreement, MCC projects must be completed within five years, but two years have already passed. Delays from the American side have raised the likelihood of deadline extensions.

In domestic politics, the Election Commission has decided that Ranjita Shrestha will remain chairperson of the Nagarik Unmukti Party, despite claims from rival leaders that she had been removed. The Commission said the rival faction failed to follow proper procedures to change the leadership. The party, founded by Resham Chaudhary, has been in turmoil over internal disputes. It has announced plans to withdraw support for the government but has yet to formally notify officials due to the ongoing feud.

Similarly, tensions within the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) escalated this week. On Aug 13, a clash broke out in Kathmandu between supporters of party chair Rajendra Lingden and those of his rival, Dhawal Shumsher Rana. The Rana faction has been openly criticizing Lingden ahead of the party’s upcoming general convention and is reportedly creating parallel structures nationwide, deepening internal divisions. Earlier this year, the RPP organized protests in Kathmandu and other districts calling for the restoration of monarchy.

The CPN (Unified Socialist) also faced internal strife after former Prime Minister Jhala Nath Khanal declared that the party’s split was a mistake and urged Chairman Madhav Kumar Nepal to step down. Following discussions, both leaders have agreed to minimize their differences and refrain from public criticism in line with party statutes.

Meanwhile, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chairman Rabi Lamichhane’s attempt to secure release from judicial custody failed after the court denied bail. In his absence, the party remains embroiled in controversy and continues to obstruct Parliament over the visit visa scam. Lamichhane has requested to be transferred to Kathmandu, but the government has not acted despite a court clearance.

Inside the Nepali Congress (NC), efforts are underway to unseat Sher Bahadur Deuba as parliamentary party leader, led by Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Kumar Thapa. However, they lack the sufficient number of lawmakers supporting the proposition. This week, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli said a senior NC leader privately confirmed the shortfall and reiterated his belief that the current coalition will continue until the 2027 national elections.

The NC has, however, resolved a dispute in Bagmati Province. Chief Minister Indra Bahadur Baniya secured a confidence vote after Deuba persuaded Bahadur Singh Lama to support him, reportedly promising ministerial positions to Lama’s allies.

Former President Bidya Devi Bhandari has continued low-profile political activities despite her party rescinding her membership. Reports suggest she is preparing to open a contact office to formalize her engagements. For years, she has used the Madan Bhandari Foundation as a platform, which prompted Prime Minister Oli to criticize its activities this week. Many leaders once close to Bhandari are now distancing themselves, fearing disciplinary action.

The CPN-UML is preparing for its statute convention, where key outcomes are already expected — no 70-year age limit and no two-term leadership cap. Next year’s leadership selection convention is anticipated to endorse Oli’s continuation. Party leaders have compared Oli’s leadership ambitions to those of India’s Narendra Modi and China’s Xi Jinping.

In the CPN (Maoist Center), Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal indicated no imminent change in government, saying there were no plans to form or join a new coalition. Prime Minister Oli suggested Dahal made the statement after failing to alter the current alliance.

Beyond party politics, Ramhari Khatiwada, chair of the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee of Parliament, resigned this week, stating he had always served as an honest representative. He told the House session on Tuesday that he returned his official vehicle and benefits the day an error in the Civil Service Bill’s “cooling-off period” provision came to light.

Prominent Madhesi leader Anil Kumar Jha left the Loktantrik Samajbadi Party led by Mahanta Thakur and revived the Nepal Sadbhawana Party. In a separate development, the Nepal government endorsed the country’s first National Artificial Intelligence Policy (2025). The US, India and China have expressed interest in supporting Nepal’s AI initiatives, though governance frameworks are still being developed.

In the Madhes Province, monsoon rains have finally arrived, ending a prolonged drought and accelerating paddy transplantation. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, planting has been completed on 77 percent of paddy fields in eight districts and could reach 80 percent this year. Officials warn, however, that delayed planting may reduce productivity.

Nepal has also waived climbing fees for 97 lesser-known mountains, ranging from 5,870 to 7,132 meters, located in Karnali and Sudurpaschim provinces. The move aims to attract climbers to new destinations, boost local economies and diversify Nepal’s mountaineering offerings.

For more than a decade, Nepali politics has been defined by three dominant figures: KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. As party chiefs and multiple-time prime ministers, they have established themselves as indomitable forces. Among the three, it now seems almost certain that Oli and Dahal will retain control of their respective parties for at least the next five years—if not longer.

In the past two weeks, the CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) held their Central Committee and Standing Committee meetings, respectively. The outcomes of these meetings will have far-reaching implications, particularly regarding leadership transitions. Both Oli and Dahal have further solidified their grip by weakening and isolating potential rivals. These developments starkly contrast with the widespread public desire, especially among the youth, for a generational change in leadership.

A significant section of Nepal’s youth continues to call for immediate leadership renewal. Many believe that since the same leaders have held sway over both party and government for more than three decades and failed to deliver, new leaders should be given a chance. Having become prime minister multiple times, these leaders have used the power and resources of the state to entrench their positions. Ministerial portfolios and key appointments were handed to loyalists, while dissenting voices were sidelined.

There have also been instances where state law enforcement agencies were allegedly used to harass internal party opponents. As a result, many young leaders have either aligned themselves with top leaders or remained silent, compromising the core values of intra-party democracy and leadership handover.

The internal dynamics of major parties tell a different story altogether. Youth leaders of NC, UML and Maoist Center—who once demanded a leadership transition—are now retreating from those positions. In recent Central and Standing Committee meetings, not only did they refrain from calling for change, but many also openly endorsed the current leadership.

The UML’s Central Committee meeting cleared the way for Oli to lead the party for a third consecutive term. The party decided to amend its statute, removing the 70-year age limit and the two-term cap tailored specifically to facilitate Oli’s continuation. But more than just a policy shift, both senior and youth leaders publicly declared that there is “no alternative” to Oli. Even former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s attempt to challenge Oli by reentering active politics was thwarted; the party revoked her general membership for doing so.

Oli is now virtually assured to be re-elected party chairman at the UML’s 11th General Convention, expected later this year. Party leaders argue that Oli's leadership is essential to securing victory in the 2027 elections. In reality, he may continue leading the party as long as his health allows. Since taking the helm in 2015, Oli has consolidated power, sidelined rivals, and built a loyal inner circle. Two pivotal moments helped him secure dominance: the departure of senior leaders like Madhav Kumar Nepal and Jhala Nath Khanal, and the failed leadership challenge by Bhim Rawal, who was eventually expelled. That episode sent a clear message: challenging the leadership comes with consequences. More recently, Brinda Pandey and Usha Kiran Timalsina were suspended for six months for voicing dissent, reinforcing the party’s intolerance for internal opposition.

A similar scenario unfolded in the Maoist Center’s Standing Committee meeting. Senior leader Janardhan Sharma raised the issue of leadership change, only to be rebuked by nearly the entire committee. Out of 50 members, just three supported his proposal that Dahal, who has been at the helm since the 1980s, should begin transitioning party leadership to the next generation. Rather than supporting Sharma, other members criticized him. The party issued a warning that no leader should make public statements against its leadership. “There is a growing tendency to speak against party leadership and violate party discipline,” said Maoist leader Haribol Gajurel. 

The situation in the NC remains uncertain. Party President Deuba is unlikely to amend the party statute to pursue a third term. Leaders Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa appear poised to contest the presidency. A third candidate from the Deuba camp may also run, while other senior leaders, who lack serious electoral prospects, may enter the race merely to secure bargaining positions in the party or government. Despite this, Deuba remains a strong presence, and the party's top leadership appears to be consolidating its hold.

Meanwhile, in the CPN (Unified Socialist), a breakaway faction of UML, Madhav Kumar Nepal maintains tight control despite facing corruption allegations. He has publicly warned senior leader Jhala Nath Khanal to leave the party for speaking against him. Despite mounting pressure, Nepal has refused to hand over the reins to a younger generation.

With these developments, the debate around leadership handover in major Nepali parties has significantly lost momentum. Over the years, these senior leaders, each of whom has held the prime ministership multiple times, have consistently used state resources to strengthen their internal party positions and marginalize opposition. With youth leaders increasingly dependent on the senior leadership for political opportunities and resources, they remain unable, or unwilling, to mount a meaningful challenge.

Over the past few months, Nepal and India have stepped up engagement on multiple fronts, including long-overdue meetings of bilateral mechanisms. While the exact date of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to New Delhi is yet to be finalized, Indian officials confirm that preparations are underway, and the visit is likely to take place before Dashain. India has also been engaging with a wide cross-section of Nepali society in the lead-up.

Nepal-India relations faced significant turbulence, especially after 2015, which strained bilateral ties. However, in recent months, both sides appear to be moving toward a reset. Kathmandu and New Delhi have now prioritized economic and development partnerships over longstanding contentious issues.

Two key unresolved matters, the map row and the report prepared by the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG), remain sensitive. While political parties such as the Nepali Congress, CPN (Maoist Centre), and various Madhes-based parties have largely shelved the EPG issue, some CPN-UML leaders continue to raise it, albeit with less intensity.

India’s renewed outreach to Kathmandu comes amid a shifting regional context: Donald Trump’s inauguration and subsequent US aid cuts to Nepal, political developments in Bangladesh, and a brief but deadly India-Pakistan conflict. In late July, New Delhi hosted an all-party delegation of Nepali members of parliament. According to the Indian readout, the discussions centered on expanding the multifaceted bilateral partnership.

On July 28 and 29, the seventh meeting of the India-Nepal Boundary Working Group (BWG) was held in New Delhi. The BWG had been inactive since 2019 due to the map dispute. Although this meeting did not address contentious territorial issues, both sides adopted updated modalities for inspecting, repairing, and maintaining boundary pillars, and agreed to expedite work in these areas. They also finalized a three-year work plan and committed to using advanced technologies for boundary-related tasks.

In the third week of July, the home secretary-level meeting between the two countries covered the full spectrum of bilateral security cooperation and border management. The two sides finalized the text of an agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. They also agreed to work toward the early conclusion of a revised extradition treaty, another longstanding and sensitive issue.

India also launched a collaborative initiative in partnership with the UN World Food Programme to support rice fortification and supply chain management in Nepal. The project aims to address gaps in Nepal’s fortified rice supply chain, particularly in procurement, data collection, and human resource capacity, through knowledge exchange with India’s successful public distribution system. It offers Nepali stakeholders the chance to learn from India’s experience in applying digital technologies to food logistics.

Speaking at a public event this week, foreign affairs expert Mohan Lohani, as quoted by the Press Trust of India, said that India is advancing rapidly in economic growth, development, and technological innovation. “Nepal should try to benefit from the progress made by our southern neighbor,” he said.

Another foreign policy expert, Nischal Nath Pandey, advised Prime Minister Oli to travel overland for his New Delhi visit, arguing that it would allow him to observe India’s significant progress in infrastructure, especially road transport.” During the tenure of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has made remarkable progress in development and road connectivity, and Nepal should learn from the experiences gained by India,” Pandey said.

As preparations for Prime Minister Oli’s India visit continue, both sides are working to finalize a major project or agreement to be announced during his meeting with Prime Minister Modi. Government officials suggest that resolving issues related to the long-pending Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project could be one such announcement. According to sources, the Indian side has conveyed that when the two prime ministers meet, a substantial breakthrough should be unveiled.

Deputy General Secretary of the CPN (Maoist Centre), Janardhan Sharma, has challenged Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s monopoly and continued leadership of the party. However, most members of the party’s Standing Committee have sided with Dahal, leaving Sharma politically isolated.

Sharma had hoped for internal support to break Dahal’s long-standing grip on the party. Instead, colleagues have urged him to issue a self-criticism for making internal matters public. His call for leadership change has now cost him his standing within the party. Like in the CPN-UML, senior Maoist leaders argue that Dahal should continue leading the party, citing his central role in the armed insurgency, the peace process, and the constitution-drafting effort.

Only a handful of leaders, such as Ram Karki and Parshuram Tamang, have echoed Sharma’s call for change. Both have proposed that Dahal assume a ceremonial role, transferring executive powers to the younger generation. Karki, in particular, has proposed a rotational leadership model, arguing that transitions in communist parties are often problematic. He cited historical examples, noting that even leaders like Lenin and Mao struggled with succession. Dahal, who has been at the party’s helm since the 1980s, shows no indication of stepping down.

“We should establish a leadership transition system while Chairperson Dahal is still healthy and active,” Karki said, emphasizing that his proposal does not seek to remove Dahal, but to place him in a respected role while others assume executive authority.

With party elections approaching, it is now almost certain that Dahal will be re-elected as chairman. Party leaders have warned against making statements that could undermine party unity. Dahal himself has accused "reactionary forces" of conspiring to divide the party since it entered mainstream politics in 2006. Earlier, he had challenged Sharma to leave the party if dissatisfied with his leadership.

A few weeks ago, Sharma made waves by saying that, with the exception of Manmohan Adhikari, all top communist leaders had accumulated significant wealth. At a party meeting, Sharma stated he was willing to self-criticize for his public remarks, on the condition that Dahal also take responsibility for the party’s collective failures.

He also proposed convening a special convention to elect new leadership. He accused Dahal of spreading rumors of a party split to suppress dissent. “We once had three million members. That has dropped to just one million. The leadership should self-criticize for that,” Sharma said. “If speaking about party reform violates policy, I’m ready to face the consequences.”

During the insurgency, leaders Mohan Baidya and Baburam Bhattarai had also challenged Dahal. Baidya left in 2012 to form a separate party, and Bhattarai followed in 2015 to establish a socialist party. Since then, Dahal has enjoyed a largely unchallenged monopoly. Narayan Kaji Shrestha briefly attempted to build a rival faction but lacked broad support, having joined the Maoist party only in 2009.

In recent years, Sharma has emerged as the most vocal challenger to Dahal’s leadership, but his efforts have so far been undermined by the lack of internal support. In response, Dahal has focused on unifying communist parties to consolidate his position. He is in talks with CPN (Unified Socialist) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal and has also reached out to smaller leftist groups.

Meanwhile, internal rivalries among second-rung leaders like Shrestha, Sharma, Agni Sapkota, and Barshaman Pun have only reinforced Dahal’s position, as none are willing to back each other as the next leader. They all seem more comfortable working under Dahal’s leadership.

At 70, Dahal has given no indication of retiring. The CPN-UML’s recent decision to remove the term limit for its top leader has created a favorable environment for Dahal to continue. As things stand, both KP Oli and Dahal are expected to remain at the top of their respective parties for at least another 5–10 years. In contrast, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba is set to retire in 2027, as party rules bar him from seeking a third term.

It has been exactly 109 years since the world’s first press council was established in Sweden in 1916. Its goal was to create an independent media self-regulatory body facilitated by the state, but guided by the broader media fraternity and the public. Since then, dozens of countries have formed, revised, dissolved, or renamed their press councils. In democratic nations, some councils have retained their autonomy; in autocratic regimes and much of the Global South, however, they often remain under government control.

Despite these variations, the core idea behind press councils has remained consistent: to serve as an intermediary between the press and the public, promoting professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards, while offering policy input to the government. Crucially, press councils are meant to operate on the principle of self-regulation, based on the strict implementation of a code of ethics, rather than through legal regulation enforced by other government bodies. A press council should be a collective effort involving the state, the media industry, and the public. While the government may support its effective functioning, it must not seek to control it.

Nepal adopted the idea of a press council earlier than many other countries. The Press Council Nepal (PCN) was established in 1971 based on the recommendations of a new communication plan. During the Panchayat era, it operated largely under government control. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, new legislation promised an independent council. However, successive chairpersons failed to uphold that promise, often becoming submissive to the government and their affiliated political parties.

There is a persistent tendency in Nepal to create overlapping institutions aimed at controlling the media, without clearly understanding or respecting their distinct mandates. The Media Council Bill, for instance, seeks to grant expanded powers to a new Media Council, many of which overlap with functions already assigned to existing government agencies. This has led to a widespread perception within the bureaucracy that PCN is merely another department under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, damaging its credibility and undermining its intended independence. Successive PCN leaderships have done little to challenge this perception.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a growing consensus among bureaucrats, politicians, and lawmakers in favor of tighter media control, often under the pretext of curbing misinformation and disinformation. The proposed Media Council Bill must be examined in this broader context. While it does not explicitly propose the formation of a media control body, it does aim to expand the council’s jurisdiction from print to digital platforms. The name of the institution is secondary; what matters is whether its independence, both structural and operational, is safeguarded.

The most serious flaw in the Bill is the excessive power it grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, particularly in appointing and removing council members. To protect the council’s autonomy, an independent commission, possibly involving a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, should be tasked with recommending the council’s leadership and members.

However, implementing such reforms may face resistance. Organizations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), politically affiliated journalist associations, and senior journalist groups may oppose changes that reduce their influence over appointments. Political parties and the bureaucracy may also seek to preserve their control through informal arrangements. In the last three decades, very few truly independent journalists or academics have been appointed to the council or similar bodies.

Parliament must seriously consider creating a transparent, independent appointment mechanism. Yet, many lawmakers lack a clear understanding of the press council’s core mission and values. Another concerning provision in the Bill is the transfer of authority to issue press accreditation certificates to the Media Council. This is not the council’s appropriate role. Even more troubling is the proposed provision allowing the council to revoke a journalist’s press pass for up to a year for violating the code of ethics. This directly contradicts the fundamental purpose of a press pass, which is to enable public information access, not serve as a tool for punishment.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting already imposes unnecessarily restrictive requirements for issuing press passes. Shifting that authority to the Media Council will only increase confusion and bureaucratic friction. Other provisions in the Bill also raise concerns, suggesting that the drafters may have drawn inspiration from press council models in more authoritarian regimes.

One welcome aspect of the Bill is the proposed removal of the council’s authority to classify newspapers. However, this change may also face resistance from journalist organizations, as classification has traditionally been used to control or reward media outlets. A separate entity, such as an Audit Bureau of Circulation, should be created to handle classifications for both print and digital platforms.

Overall, the Bill lacks a clear, forward-looking vision for the role and structure of the Media Council. It also fails to reflect on past institutional lessons. For the council to function effectively, it must have a strong, cooperative relationship with media organizations. At present, a significant trust deficit exists between the council and the Nepali media industry. The law should ensure not only participation from the media and public, but also their meaningful contribution to the council’s work. As drafted, the Bill envisions the Media Council more as a government department than an independent regulatory body. A complete overhaul is, therefore, necessary.

If parliament is truly committed to forming an independent media council, it should return the Bill to the Ministry with clear instructions to redraft it in consultation with all stakeholders, including international experts.

This debate is not about targeting the current government or any individual minister. The Bill was originally introduced by the previous government, but it now falls on the current one to refine and pass it. Political parties must rise above narrow interests and prioritize the long-term public good.

A strong, independent institution serves democracy and society, regardless of whether it aligns with a party’s immediate interests. When it comes to media accountability, as Denis McQuail puts it, two models exist: answerability and liability. Answerability is moral and social; it’s voluntary, cooperative, and involves non-material penalties. Liability, by contrast, is legal, imposed, and often punitive.

Press councils should operate on the answerability model. They should function as watchdogs that bark but do not bite, empowered to raise concerns, issue warnings, and alert stakeholders to ethical lapses, but not to take legal action against journalists. Evaluated through this lens, many of the Bill’s flaws become more evident, and more easily correctable.

So a humble appeal to parliament: step back from narrow debates and redraft the Bill from first principles. This is a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a free, accountable, and ethical press in Nepal.