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Writer and journalist Sudheer Sharma’s new book, Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha, unveiled in August, offers a comprehensive account of the key figures, issues, and phenomena that have shaped Nepal-China relations. The book spans from the era of King Narendra Dev in the 7th century to 2008, when Nepal’s 240-year monarchy came to an end. Sharma’s other book, Himal Pari ko Huri, published simultaneously, explores new trends in bilateral relations post-2008, though this review focuses solely on Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha.

In the introductory section, Sharma highlights a problem in Nepal’s public discourse about its northern neighbor. He identifies two contrasting perspectives: one group idolizes China and dismisses criticism, while the other harbors deep-seated prejudice. Sharma aims to provide an objective account of this trans-Himalayan relationship, presenting little-known historical facts and anecdotes. He maintains a neutral tone, avoiding personal biases in his analysis.

As a writer and journalist, Sharma excels in meticulous documentation, gathering new insights through his strong rapport with senior politicians and officials, and offering sharp political and geopolitical analysis. These strengths, evident in his acclaimed earlier work, Nepal Nexus, are similarly reflected in this book.

The book delves into the political, trade, cultural, and people-to-people relations between Nepal and China. Sharma credits King Narendra Dev and Princess Bhrikuti with laying the foundation of Nepal-China relations. He highlights the flourishing trade between Nepal and Tibet that began in the 7th century and thrived until the 1950s. Sharma also explores how this trade fostered robust people-to-people connections.

However, he documents the gradual decline of these ties after China took control of Tibet, imposed strict regulations on Nepali residents in Lhasa, and tightened visa rules. A study conducted by China in the late 1950s revealed that a Nepali shop in Lhasa, established a thousand years earlier, was still operational at the time. Three shops were found to be between 500 and 1,000 years old, and four others ranged from 200 to 500 years. Today, the number of Nepali shops in Lhasa has drastically declined, and Sharma notes that Nepal’s trade with Tibet—dating back 1,400 years to King Narendra Dev’s time—is nearing extinction.

In the chapter Bhikshu, Bidrohi, and Bampanthi, Sharma asserts that the foundation of Nepal-China relations is rooted more in cultural, religious, trade, and people-to-people ties than in political connections. He highlights the significant role played by Buddhist monks and nuns in fostering bilateral relations since ancient times. The chapter begins with a reference to an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping, published in Nepali newspapers, where Xi mentions the collaboration between the Chinese monk Fa Hien and Nepali monk Buddhabhadra over 1,600 years ago to translate Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

Sharma also revisits the well-known narrative of Nepali Princess Bhrikuti’s marriage to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo and mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzang (Huen Tsang), who visited Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, leaving invaluable written accounts of his pilgrimage. This chapter offers a chronological account of Nepal-China engagements from the 7th century to the 1950s, demonstrating Sharma’s meticulous research and dedication to historical accuracy.

The chapter Mao and Mahendra provides a compelling overview of the relationship between Nepal’s monarchy and China, detailing personal connections between Nepal’s kings and Chinese leaders, which both sides leveraged for mutual benefit. For instance, Mahendra, as crown prince, secretly traveled to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong. The chapter includes several examples of the close proximity between the two sides.

Sharma discusses how the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided financial and other support to Nepal’s communist parties but refrained from supporting armed insurgencies, including the CPN-UML-led rebellion in Jhapa and the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Since the 1950s, China has consistently stated that it does not aim to export its revolution to Nepal. Although the CPC secretly offered financial aid to Nepal’s communist parties in the past, it never supplied arms or ammunition—a lesser-known aspect of Nepal-China relations.

Formal ties between the CPC and Nepal’s communist parties ended following King Mahendra’s royal coup. While China maintains that it does not export its revolution or ideology, Sharma highlights the irony that two major revolutions in Nepal—the Jhapa communist uprising and the Maoist insurgency—were launched in Mao Zedong’s name, despite receiving no Chinese support once they turned to armed struggle. Instead, the rebels were advised to join the political mainstream.

On the relationship between China and Nepali communist parties, Sharma writes: “China was always attracted to Nepal's communist parties due to two reasons: communism and nationalism. Communism is their shared ideology, and Nepal’s communist parties have viewed China as a protector of nationalism. This is why Nepal’s communist-led governments have historically maintained closer ties with China than other administrations.” He also discusses China’s changing approach to Nepal’s internal politics and its overt efforts to consolidate Nepal’s communist forces, suggesting that China may view Nepal’s communist parties as a potential substitute for the monarchy as a stable political institution.

The Khampa revolt is another major factor in Nepal-China relations. Sharma provides fresh insights into the Tibetan Khampas’ 18-year armed rebellion against China. According to the book, King Mahendra’s death marked a turning point for the Khampas, as his successor, King Birendra, adopted a less supportive stance. Following his state visit to China in 1973, King Birendra began military preparations to suppress the Khampas. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly assured Birendra that the United States would not interfere, citing an agreement with President Nixon on the Tibetan issue. Upon returning to Nepal, Birendra initiated joint discussions with China on disarming the Khampas and began providing regular updates on their activities.

The book is a valuable resource for understanding Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China. It examines key narratives, such as China’s policy shift after Nepal’s monarchy was abolished in 2008, its perception of Nepal as a gateway to India and South Asia, its primary concern with Tibet’s security, and its encouragement of Nepal’s communist parties as a reliable political force. However, critics may argue that while Sharma offers fresh insights and unearths historical documents, much of the book reiterates existing narratives about Nepal-China relations.

The KP Sharma Oli-led administration is striving to improve its ties with New Delhi but has yet to achieve substantive results. Despite repeated attempts to mend relations, ruling party leaders and foreign policy experts suggest that bilateral relations between Nepal and India may be deteriorating rather than improving. A series of unresolved issues and missteps on both sides seem to have created a widening gulf.

During his earlier tenure and as an aspiring prime minister, Oli believed that the so-called ‘Delhi Durbar’—referring to India's political establishment—was obstructing his political aspirations. However, in a strategic political maneuver, Oli secured the premiership with the support of the Nepali Congress, a traditional ally of India.

Once in office, Oli took a series of initiatives aimed at establishing a cordial relationship with New Delhi. Like many of his predecessors, Oli hoped to receive an immediate invitation for an official visit to India as a gesture of goodwill. However, this invitation never materialized. Reports from Indian media suggest that New Delhi was initially open to welcoming Oli in August or September. However, India later withdrew the invitation, allegedly due to Oli’s insistence on preconditions—specifically, his demand that India announce steps to resolve the ongoing border dispute.

The border dispute, commonly referred to as the “map row,” stems from competing territorial claims over areas such as Kalapani, Limpiyadhura, and Lipulekh. While Oli has consistently advocated for progress on this issue, New Delhi appears reluctant to prioritize it, viewing it as a sensitive topic better deferred. Diplomats note that this impasse has fueled mistrust and contributed to the stagnation of bilateral relations.

A meeting between Prime Minister Oli and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York was seen as an opportunity to break the ice. However, according to diplomatic insiders, the meeting failed to yield any significant breakthrough. Analysts suggest that this outcome is emblematic of deeper issues in the relationship.

The unresolved border dispute is not the only factor straining ties. Another contentious issue is the fate of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) report, finalized in 2018. The report, a collaborative effort by experts from both countries, was intended to recommend ways to enhance Nepal-India relations. However, India has shown little interest in accepting or even acknowledging the report, a stance that has frustrated Nepal.

Since becoming prime minister, Oli has repeatedly highlighted the importance of the EPG report in his speeches and public appearances. He has even used public platforms, such as the launch of former Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa’s book on the Indian blockade, to criticize India’s handling of the issue. During the event, Oli remarked, in a satirical tone, that Indian leaders seem too busy to formally receive the report.

This persistence, according to analysts such as Chandra Dev Bhatta, may have further irritated New Delhi. India, for its part, appears to view the EPG report as an unwelcome complication, and this view is shared by several Nepali political parties, including the Nepali Congress, the CPN (Maoist Centre), and Madhes-based parties. Despite this, Oli’s UML continues to push the issue, creating additional friction in bilateral ties.

Adding to the tensions is Nepal’s decision to align with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy. The agreement, signed under Oli’s leadership, has been a point of contention since its inception. India has long opposed the BRI, citing sovereignty concerns, particularly because certain projects under the initiative traverse disputed territories.

Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba’s recent visit to India seemed aimed at clarifying Nepal’s stance on the BRI. However, her trip failed to achieve its objectives. Indian leaders declined to meet her, reportedly due to either scheduling conflicts or dissatisfaction with her role in supporting the BRI framework agreement. This chilly reception was in stark contrast to her earlier visit in August, during which she was warmly received and even handed over an invitation from Oli to Modi for a visit to Nepal. Modi accepted the invitation but deferred setting a date, suggesting it would be decided through diplomatic channels.

The cooling of ties is not limited to Oli’s government. A senior Nepali Congress leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, acknowledged that even the relationship between the NC and India has soured. According to the leader, India was displeased with the NC for forming a coalition government with the UML. Additionally, India reportedly disapproved of the NC-led government’s decision to sign the BRI agreement with China.

Despite these challenges, certain aspects of Nepal-India relations remain functional. Bilateral mechanisms continue to operate, with regular meetings and consultations taking place. Nepali ministers frequently visit India, and there has been a noticeable strengthening of military ties between the Nepal Army and the Indian Army.

However, a senior Indian academic who closely follows bilateral relations noted that while India remains committed to engaging with the Nepali public, it has grown wary of working with Oli. “Oli’s strategic agreements with China could have implications for India’s security. I don’t foresee a cordial relationship between him and New Delhi in the near future.”

This situation bears similarities to the events of 2020 when the map row first escalated. After a prolonged communication breakdown, India sent Samant Kumar Goel, the chief of its intelligence agency RAW, as a special envoy to meet Oli. The visit facilitated a wide-ranging discussion of bilateral issues and temporarily eased tensions. However, subsequent political instability in Nepal, including Oli’s dissolution of Parliament, derailed progress.

Diplomats and political leaders now suggest that both governments should consider employing a combination of official and back-channel diplomacy to rebuild trust. Despite Oli’s recent efforts to use track two channels to resolve disputes, these initiatives have so far failed to deliver results.

For Nepal and India, the path to repairing relations will require addressing both long-standing disputes and emerging challenges. Progress will depend on a willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue and a mutual commitment to preserving and strengthening a historically close relationship that remains vital for both nations.

The CPN-UML’s decision to expel senior leader Bhim Rawal and strip Binda Pandey and Usha Kiran Timsena of their responsibilities has once again exposed the fragile state of intra-party democracy in Nepal’s political parties. The three leaders were penalized for opposing the party’s controversial acceptance of a land donation from businessman Min Bahadur Gurung, who is under government scrutiny for tax evasion.

Rawal’s expulsion is the culmination of years of tension with party leadership, stemming from his candidacy against KP Sharma Oli for party chairperson post in 2021. Pandey and Timsena, regarded as intellectuals within the party, have consistently scrutinized party decisions through a critical lens. Defending the move, senior UML leaders argue that penalizing dissenters is necessary to maintain discipline and prevent anarchism. However, political scientists and the public are unconvinced, seeing it as a severe blow to the already fragile intra-party democracy.

As the UML chair, Oli has consolidated power to the extent that dissent within the party is almost nonexistent. Since his rise to leadership in 2015, he has strengthened his control, leaving no significant factions to challenge him. Leaders who once opposed him, such as Madhav Kumar Nepal and Jhala Nath Khanal, have already left the party to form the CPN (Unified Socialist). Rawal’s candidacy against Oli in 2021 was a rare act of defiance.

In a Facebook post defending the party’s recent actions, General Secretary Shankar Pokharel shared a statement emphasizing party discipline. While party leaders frame their decisions as a matter of maintaining order, public discourse has shifted to the broader implications for intra-party democracy. The UML’s decision to accept Gurung’s land donation is particularly contentious. Despite a favorable Supreme Court verdict, some within the party believe that funds for party buildings should come from member contributions rather than external donations. Pandey has openly stated her opposition, criticizing the lack of internal consultation before the party’s decision to accept the donation.

The challenges facing the UML are not unique. Intra-party democracy in Nepal’s major political parties is notoriously weak. Most parties are dominated by a single leader who dictates the party’s direction and enforces strict adherence to decisions. Internal deliberations are rare, and dissenting voices are often punished as violations of party discipline. This autocratic culture stifles debate and innovation, ultimately harming the parties and the democratic process.

Nepali Congress (NC) leader Nain Singh Mahar emphasizes robust intra-party democracy as a prerequisite for a thriving national democracy. The suppression of dissent has historically led to splits within Nepal’s political parties. The UML’s split in 2021, when Nepal, Khanal and others formed a new party, is a prominent example. Similarly, the CPN (Maoist Center) has experienced multiple splits, while the NC itself has a history of intolerance toward dissenting voices, forcing many leaders to leave over the years.

The suppression of dissent within parties often leads to long-term consequences. In the case of the UML, the lack of dialogue and inclusivity has eroded trust among members and weakened the party’s internal cohesion. Political analysts argue that the leadership should prioritize fostering an environment where differing opinions are valued and debated rather than silenced. A healthy democracy within parties is essential not only for their survival but also for strengthening democratic norms in the country as a whole.

The broader implications of weak intra-party democracy extend beyond individual parties. When political organizations fail to uphold democratic principles internally, they are less likely to champion these values in governance. This creates a vicious cycle where authoritarian practices within parties translate into autocratic tendencies in national politics.

For Nepal’s democracy to thrive, analysts say political parties must evolve into institutions that encourage participation, debate and accountability. Without these reforms, the cycle of suppressing dissent and fragmenting political entities is likely to continue, undermining the country’s democratic aspirations.

Gaushala, Dec 27

On a chilly winter morning, I entered a tea shop in Gaushala for a hot cup of tea. The establishment was already abuzz with banters shared over steaming cups. I noticed six people inside. Most appeared to be regulars—devotees visiting the Pashupatinath temple, I reckoned.

In one corner of the shop, four men were engrossed in a discussion about public transport and traffic rules in Kathmandu Valley. Two of them were bus drivers, and the other two were taxi drivers. One bus driver explained that he transports school children for a private school during the morning and evening hours while operating on regular routes at other times. “During office hours, many buses are busy ferrying school children. That’s why people are left stranded, waiting endlessly at bus stops,” one of the taxi drivers remarked.

The group agreed that schools should not be allowed to use public vehicles, as it causes inconvenience for commuters. They also discussed how much money could be earned working for private schools. However, the bus driver noted that the school had not paid the bus owner for months.

The conversation then shifted to traffic rules. One taxi driver complained that large buses create chaos for smaller vehicles and motorbikes, but the traffic police ignore them. “If we make even a minor mistake, we are penalized immediately. But buses break lanes, cause accidents, and intimidate smaller vehicles. They’re practically immune to the rules,” he claimed.

The four spoke openly and candidly, unbothered by the presence of others in the shop. One of them said, “There is a nexus between the umbrella organization of public buses, the traffic police, and politicians. That’s why the traffic rules remain unenforced and ineffective.”

Another man entered the tea shop and ordered black tea without sugar. He asked the group, “Will they send him (Rabi Lamichhane) to jail for money laundering?” No one responded. He continued, stating that leaders of the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN (Maoist Centre) had amassed more wealth than Lamichhane and couldn’t explain the sources of their income. One man agreed, arguing that proper investigations would reveal that almost all politicians would end up in jail for money laundering due to the lack of transparency in their earnings. “They live luxurious lives and have amassed huge wealth—what is the source of their income?” he questioned.

At another table, a man was reading the news about political parties’ plans to amend the constitution. “Parties say they are amending the constitution to ensure political stability. However, it’s the political parties, not the constitution, that are responsible for instability,” he said, adding that conflicting opinions among the parties had prevented a consensus on amendments. Others in the tea shop remained silent, seemingly unfamiliar with the details of constitutional changes.

Another hot topic was the ruling UML’s decision to take disciplinary action against Bhim Rawal, Binda Pandey, and Usha Kiran Timalsina for dissenting over the party’s decision to accept land donations from businessman Min Bahadur Gurung. The party expelled Rawal from general membership and suspended Pandey and Timalsina for six months.

The tea shop was sharply divided on this issue. One man, likely a UML sympathizer, defended the move, arguing that party members must adhere to discipline and not oppose the official line. Another man disagreed, stating that leadership in a major party like UML should tolerate dissenting voices. “You cannot expect all leaders and cadres to share the same views in a large party like UML. Suppressing dissent will weaken the party’s strength,” he argued.

The discussion then shifted to Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba’s recent visits to Europe and India. One man pointed out that during her previous visit to India, the minister had met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other high-ranking officials. However, this time, she failed to meet any government officials. He claimed this reflected strained relations between the two countries under the current government.

Another man disagreed, questioning why Nepal’s prime minister would need India’s support at all. Yet another offered a reflective perspective: “Why do our leaders go abroad without sufficient preparation for high-level visits? If she went for health reasons, as has been claimed, she shouldn’t have addressed public programs.”

One participant added that despite the prime minister’s claim of an impending visit to India, Rana’s visit suggested otherwise. He speculated that India might be displeased after Prime Minister Oli’s decision to visit China first and sign the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement.

The 1950s were a transformative period in Nepal’s history, marked by significant changes both domestically and internationally. The end of the 104-year Rana autocracy ushered in a democratic era. Following the restoration of democracy in 1950, successive governments began implementing policy changes aimed at reshaping various facets of society.

Internationally, this decade was characterized by geopolitical shifts. India had recently gained independence, Pakistan emerged as a new state, and China asserted control over Tibet, which shares Nepal’s northern border. The rise of the Communist Party in China further altered the region’s dynamics. During this time, Nepal signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty 1950 with India, establishing a foundational framework for bilateral relations that remains influential today. As Nepal’s importance grew for both India and China, it also attracted attention from Western powers, particularly the United States. Breaking away from its prolonged isolation, Nepal embraced an open-door policy, receiving reciprocal interest from major global actors.

Domestically, Nepal faced numerous challenges. The absence of established institutions and policies essential for democratic governance hindered progress. Political parties were in their infancy, lacking the experience necessary to manage the aspirations of a transitioning society. To address the needs of the people, Nepal began dismantling its feudal policies and institutions, laying the groundwork for social, economic, and structural reforms.

Despite the abundance of literature on Nepal’s modern political history, much of the existing research tends to focus on prominent events, individuals, and familiar narratives. A new publication, Nepal in the Long 1950s, by Martin Chautari—a Kathmandu-based think tank—offers a fresh perspective on this critical period. Edited by Pratyoush Onta, Lokranjan Parajuli, and Mark Liechty, the book moves beyond the conventional focus on political milestones, delving into nuanced social and cultural dimensions that provide a broader understanding of the era.

The editors frame their exploration of the “Long 1950s” within the theoretical lens of French historian Fernand Braudel, who argued that history is shaped by enduring structural forces rather than discrete events or individuals. By situating Nepal’s transitions within broader regional and global contexts, the book sheds light on how internal developments were influenced by external dynamics and vice versa.

The ten chapters in Nepal in the Long 1950s examine diverse aspects of the decade’s transformation. For instance, Prawash Gautam’s chapter explores the rise of Kathmandu tea shops as public spheres, illustrating how these spaces fostered public opinion and supported pro-democracy movements during the decline of the Rana regime. Bandana Gyawali examines the ideological shift from “progress” to “development” in state policies, reflecting broader societal transformations. Peter Gill provides an in-depth analysis of land reform debates, arguing that legislative efforts were not inevitable outcomes of the 1950 revolution but the result of dynamic political processes involving a range of actors.

In another chapter, Onta investigates the short-lived Nepal Sanskritik Parishad, presenting it as part of a utopian cultural revival project in post-Rana Nepal. Sharad Ghimire discusses the 1954 floods, emphasizing how the disaster legitimized the state’s bureaucratic expansion and foreign aid initiatives, particularly in Chitwan’s Rapti Valley. Parajuli examines the founding of Tribhuvan University, analyzing the interplay of internal and external forces in shaping Nepal’s oldest and largest academic institution.

The second section of the book, titled “The World in Nepal,” shifts focus to the influence of foreign specialists, institutions, ideologies, and tourism on Nepal during this transformative decade. These chapters illustrate how global forces interacted with local contexts to reshape the nation’s development trajectory.

By combining previously published works with new contributions, Nepal in the Long 1950s offers an interdisciplinary approach to understanding this pivotal decade. It moves beyond conventional political history to provide fresh insights into the social, cultural, and geopolitical dimensions of mid-20th-century Nepal. This compilation is a significant addition to the study of Nepal’s modern history, offering readers a deeper and more nuanced understanding of a transformative period.

When the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN-UML formed a coalition in July this year, they announced plans to review and amend the constitution, which has governed the country for a decade. This declaration not only stirred national politics but also captured the attention of external actors with a vested interest in Nepal’s constitutional framework. These international stakeholders, having invested significantly in crafting what they saw as a progressive charter, are eager to discern the nature and scope of the proposed amendments.

Domestically, the proposal has elicited a range of responses. The CPN (Maoist Center) and Madhes-based parties have warned against regressive changes, cautioning the coalition not to undermine federalism or inclusion whereas the royalist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) is optimistic that the NC and UML might align with their agenda of dismantling federal structures and reinstating Nepal as a Hindu state. Recognizing the issue's sensitivity, NC and UML leaders have taken a cautious approach, repeatedly affirming their commitment to federalism and secularism. They are wary of destabilizing the political environment and mindful that any mishandling of the amendment process could spark unrest.

After six months of deliberation, the coalition has initiated groundwork for potential amendments. Leaders emphasize that this does not signal immediate changes but rather the beginning of a meticulous and inclusive process. A task force has been established to draft a base document, incorporating input from various sectors of society and analyzing the constitution's perceived shortcomings since its promulgation in 2015. Nepal’s constitution has undergone only two amendments: the first in 2016, addressing Madhes-based parties’ demands and resolving India's blockade, and the second in 2020, incorporating Nepal’s updated political map.

Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak has clarified that the amendment process will not unfold overnight. According to him, the task force will first identify areas requiring changes before engaging other political parties for broader consultations. The primary objective, he noted, is to enhance political stability. Leaders from both the NC and UML argue that the current electoral system, which combines First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR), is inherently flawed. They propose transitioning to a purely FPTP system for electing members of the House of Representatives while addressing inclusion through alternative mechanisms. This proposal has strong backing within the two ruling parties but faces stiff opposition from the Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties, who advocate for a fully proportional representation system.

Proponents of electoral reform within the NC and UML contend that the existing mixed system inhibits the likelihood of a single-party majority, perpetuating coalition governments and political instability. They argue that a streamlined electoral framework is essential for fostering governance continuity. However, achieving consensus on this issue remains a daunting task. Opposition parties have expressed deep reservations, and even within the NC and UML, some factions are cautious about pushing too hard on electoral reform without broader support.

Federalism has also emerged as a contentious topic. Within the NC and UML, voices are growing louder for a re-evaluation of Nepal’s federal structure. While senior leaders have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the existing model, many within their ranks argue that provincial structures are inefficient and should be dismantled. They believe resources would be better allocated by strengthening local and central governments. Yet, this proposition is staunchly opposed by the Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties, who view federalism as a cornerstone of Nepal’s inclusive democratic framework.

The issue of secularism adds another layer of complexity. There appears to be a tacit agreement among key leaders—Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba and Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal—that the secular provision could be revisited. However, none of them is willing to openly champion this controversial change. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, a long-time critic of Nepal’s secular status, has reportedly lobbied for its removal. According to insiders, even Dahal has privately signaled to BJP leaders that he might support scrapping secularism if Oli and Deuba also endorse the move.

In addition to these major issues, the task force is expected to examine other constitutional provisions based on a decade of implementation. These may include judicial reforms, provisions for decentralization and mechanisms to ensure greater accountability within state institutions. The goal, according to NC General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa, is to address the coalition-driven nature of current governance. Thapa emphasizes that the amendments aim to pave the way for single-party governments that can function effectively for a fixed term, reducing the instability caused by frequent coalition changes.

As the NC and UML prepare to move forward, opposition parties are not sitting idle. The Maoist Center and Madhes-based parties are reportedly conducting internal deliberations to solidify their positions on constitutional amendments. They are expected to challenge the ruling coalition’s proposals, particularly on issues related to federalism, inclusion and electoral reform.

Ultimately, the success of the constitution amendment process hinges on the durability of the NC-UML coalition. Despite ideological differences, the two parties have demonstrated a pragmatic approach, focusing on maintaining their alliance. From parliamentary cooperation to task forces on governance and foreign policy, they are working to align their priorities. However, their ability to achieve meaningful reforms will depend on forging consensus with other political forces and navigating a complex web of domestic and international expectations.

Nepal’s constitution, taken as a landmark achievement in 2015, faces its most significant test yet.

Who will succeed Nepali Congress (NC) President Sher Bahadur Deuba? This question dominates discussions within the party as Deuba’s tenure nears its end. According to the party statute, he cannot contest for a third term, setting the stage for what is expected to be a fierce competition among senior leaders to take up the party’s mantle.

Senior party figures have already begun internal lobbying and consultations. The stakes are high, as the NC faces increasing public dissatisfaction with its leadership. This discontent is not unique to the NC; major political parties across Nepal are under scrutiny for their inability to deliver on public expectations. The choice of the next NC president is being watched closely, not only domestically but also internationally. The party’s rank and file is  yearning for a dynamic leader who can revitalize its organizational structure and restore public trust, which has eroded significantly over the past few years amid the rise of new political forces.

Deuba has so far refrained from signaling any preference for his successor and is expected to maintain this neutrality. In a recent interaction with the media in Biratnagar, he dismissed speculations about endorsing a candidate, stating that the party’s general convention will decide the new leadership. However, his inner circle—leaders like Purna Bahadur Khadka, Bimalendra Nidhi and Prakash Man Singh—are all keen to secure his endorsement. Another potential contender, Bal Krishna Khand, was once considered a strong candidate but has faded into the background due to his alleged involvement in the fake Bhutanese refugee scandal. For now, none of these leaders have formally announced their candidacy, but behind-the-scenes maneuvering is intensifying.

Among these figures, Khadka stands out for his loyalty, as he has never openly challenged Deuba’s leadership whereas Nidhi and Singh have previously contested against Deuba, alongside Shekhar Koirala, in the party’s 14th General Convention. During the second round of that election, Nidhi and Singh strategically supported Deuba, helping him defeat Koirala. As a gesture of gratitude, Deuba later backed Singh’s spouse, Srijana Singh, as the NC candidate for Kathmandu Mayor in the local elections.

Singh currently holds the influential positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Urban Development. Nidhi, despite a history of strained ties with Deuba after contesting for the presidency, is actively seeking to mend fences. He argues that his seniority and status as a prominent Madhesi leader make him a deserving candidate. However, his task is far from easy, as he must navigate both internal rivalries and the broader dynamics of party politics.

From the anti-Deuba camp, two prominent leaders—Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Thapa—are gearing up for the race. Koirala has already launched a nationwide campaign to bolster his candidacy. In contrast, Thapa is taking a more calculated approach, weighing his moves carefully to avoid jeopardizing his relationship with Deuba. Over the years, the two have found common ground on several issues, which has eased tensions between them. Deuba has even publicly praised Thapa’s contributions within and beyond the party, signaling a certain level of mutual respect.

At the same time, there is speculation that Deuba is working to elevate his spouse, Arzu Rana Deuba, to a senior party position—possibly vice-president—during the upcoming 15th General Convention. This potential move adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing leadership contest, as it could shift internal alliances.

Koirala, for his part, remains vocal in his criticism of the party’s leadership and the government’s performance. Thapa, in contrast, has adopted a more measured tone, carefully calibrating his public statements to preserve his rapport with Deuba. Despite his relatively weak organizational base, Thapa enjoys strong support among the party’s youth, who view him as a symbol of hope and renewal. His popularity among younger members gives him a distinct advantage, even as he faces challenges in consolidating his position within the broader party structure.

It remains unclear whether Koirala and Thapa will form another alliance, as they did in the 14th convention, or choose to compete independently. In the previous convention, their alliance saw Koirala lose the presidency while Thapa secured his position as general secretary. This time, both leaders are carefully weighing their options. All prospective candidates are eager to secure Deuba’s endorsement, given his strong influence over the party’s Central Working Committee, provincial structures and local levels. However, Deuba’s silence on the matter has left many in his camp anxious.

Candidates like Koirala and Thapa have reportedly reached out to Deuba’s allies, offering positions in their potential leadership teams to win support. Yet, insiders say Deuba is likely to remain non-committal until the eleventh hour, a strategy that could leave his faction in a state of uncertainty. As the NC moves closer to this crucial juncture, the party’s leadership race promises to be a defining moment for its future.

Dec 19, Balkot, Bhaktapur

“This country will never improve, believe me,” a man declared as I entered the teashop. His voice, laden with frustration, carried across the room. “People are suffering endlessly—corruption is rampant, and those aligned with the major political parties are getting richer, while people like us continue to struggle.”

The conversation quickly shifted to Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chairperson Rabi Lamichhane, turning the teashop into a lively arena of debate. “Look,” one man said in Lamichhane’s defense, “the media allegations about his unusual bank transactions have already been proven baseless. His wife clarified they’re just repaying a home loan in installments.”

Not everyone was convinced. Another participant retorted, “The details of the ongoing police investigation are still unclear. Let’s not jump to conclusions.”

Since starting this column, I’ve noticed Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah rarely faces criticism, while opinions on Lamichhane remain sharply divided. In this teashop, too, some argued that Nepali Congress and CPN-UML supporters were targeting Lamichhane out of political vendetta, while others accused him of involvement in cooperative fraud.

The discussion veered towards the apparent disinterest of Nepali youth in politics. “Young people in their 20s today have no understanding of the political movements of 2006-2007, or even the contributions of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML,” commented a participant who seemed educated and politically aware.

According to him, the younger generation’s detachment stems from the lack of coverage of Nepal’s significant democratic milestones—like the movements of 1950, 1980, 1990, and 2006—in the school curriculum. “They don’t value democracy because they’ve never experienced autocracy,” he stated, as others listened in reflective silence.

He reminisced about his college days when campuses were vibrant political hubs. “Now, private colleges are politically apathetic. Government colleges still show some awareness, but it’s fading fast,” he said with concern.

Another voice in the room offered a starkly different perspective. “The root of Nepal’s problems lies in the end of the Panchayat regime in 1990 and the premature establishment of democracy,” he asserted. Democracy, he claimed, deeply politicized Nepali society and fractured its unity. “Before 1990, we were united. Our forefathers helped one another, and there was a sense of community. Now, politics has divided us.”

While some nodded in agreement, others appeared skeptical, challenging his romanticized portrayal of the past.

As expected, the conversation shifted again, this time to the escalating trend of youth migration for education and employment abroad. Most blamed political instability and job scarcity, but one person took a different stance. “It’s not just unemployment,” he said. “Today’s youth migrate for luxury. They see the affluence of wealthy countries and dream of that lifestyle, even if they can earn well here.”

He argued that migration is a global phenomenon, not limited to Nepal. “Even in countries like China and India, youth are leaving. Job creation and political stability might not solve this entirely,” he said, expressing concern over Nepal’s ageing population. “Soon, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Germany, which face their own ageing crises, will offer attractive packages to lure our workers.”

Another participant turned the focus to internal migration and its consequences. “As people flock to Kathmandu for education and jobs, fertile land in villages is being abandoned,” he lamented. “If another crisis like Covid-19 forces us back to the villages, we’ll face severe problems with no food to sustain us.”

The discussion also touched on the rampant spread of misinformation. One man claimed Prime Minister Oli had been attacked during a visit to Banepa, only to be contradicted by another participant who called the video fake. “How can it be fake when there’s a video?” another argued, illustrating the confusion sowed by unverified information.

The topic then shifted to a recent video of UML leader Surya Thapa, head of the parliamentary probe panel investigating cooperative fraud. In the video, widely shared on social media, Thapa defended Rabi Lamichhane, stating no evidence linked him to the cooperative scandal. The debate over the authenticity of such claims reflected the broader challenge of discerning truth in a digitally driven society.