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Arzu Rana Deuba, a Central Working Committee member of the Nepali Congress, has been appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the KP Sharma Oli-led government. This marks her first ministerial role, and she has undertaken a portfolio of significant importance amidst the rapidly evolving regional and international geopolitical landscape.

Although this is her first ministerial position, her extensive experience over the past three decades in observing state functions—partly through her role as the spouse of five-time Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba—affords her a unique advantage. She has been privy to high-level negotiations and has cultivated valuable personal connections, positioning her favorably compared to her predecessors. 

Coming from a well-educated family, Deuba also possesses a strong command of English, which is crucial for effective communication in bilateral talks and negotiations. Without relying on a translator, she can clearly and articulately present Nepal’s stance on both regional and international platforms. 

How she fares in her job is yet to be seen, especially in today’s volatile geopolitical climate. 

One of Deuba’s foremost challenges, says foreign policy expert Bijaya Kanta Karna, will be aligning the growing interests of major powers with Nepal’s national interests. 

Navigating the dynamics between the United States and China, as well as India and China in South Asia, is a significant task for the new government. Karna suggests that Nepal should leverage this complex situation to attract more investment and technology, thereby garnering international attention in Nepal’s favor.

The government must maintain balanced and cordial relations with all major powers, resisting pressures to align too closely with any one nation. Since the international media often frames new governments of Nepal as being “pro-China” or “pro-India,” influencing global perceptions, it is crucial for the Oli government to craft and project its own narrative.

Binoj Basnyat, a former major general of Nepal Army and political analyst, says the change in the coalition government and the alliance of the main two constitutional forces to form a national government reflect underlying constitutional weaknesses, political instability, institutional corruption, politicization of institutions, and erratic foreign policy behavior. He adds this situation arose as Nepal underwent significant transformation since 2008, while also facing the emergence of Cold War 2.0, a new global order marked by complex interactions of conflict, cooperation and competition among geopolitical rivals.

Basnyat suggests Nepal’s foreign policy should pursue three key objectives. First, domestic measures to ensure meritocracy, realism and honesty as the foundation for implementing national foreign policy within the framework of national interests. Second, economic diplomacy, which includes programs, policies or activities aimed at improving the economic well-being and quality of life for the community. This involves addressing geopolitical aspirations by accepting geographic realities, national necessities and democratic values. Third, upholding the principles of Panchasheel to protect freedom of action and maintain equilibrium with its competing partners and immediate neighbors, China and India, and global rivals, China and the US. 

Nepal’s strategic endeavors, Basnyat says, should follow a visionary approach, encompassing immediate, short-term and long-term development planning within national strategic policies to address financial arrangements. This will help avoid geopolitical uncertainty and prevent falling into strategic traps linked to political and economic conditions imposed by global visions.

As for foreign policy, he adds Nepal should strive for neutrality and a non-alignment policy to foster economic development, following the theme of ‘Yam between two boulders’ within a uniquely Nepali political and governance system.

On specific issues, Prime Minister Oli and the Nepali Congress (NC) have differing views, particularly on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Following an agreement with Oli’s CPN-UML, the NC officially decided against taking loans under the BRI, preferring terms similar to those offered by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Conversely, UML leaders advocate moving forward with BRI projects on concessional loans. 

NC and UML are also not on the same page on some issues related to India. Foreign Minister Deuba, like her predecessors, is likely to face pressure from the opposition and other parties to address the ongoing border dispute with India. However, during former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to India last year, both nations agreed to allow more time for diplomatic mechanisms to address this issue.

To address the pressing economic challenges, particularly stagnation and job creation, the new government requires the support of major powers and long-standing development partners to attract investment. International investment in Nepal has declined in recent years, while external debt has increased. To reverse this trend, Deuba could play a key role here for setting up effective coordination among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers.

The NC-UML coalition has yet to finalize the government’s policies and programs, leaving its foreign policy orientation and priorities somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, significant shifts in foreign policy are unlikely. Effective foreign policy will depend on proper coordination and communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister. Historical precedent shows that conflicts can arise when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister hail from different parties.

The new government is expected to put economic diplomacy at the center of its engagement with major powers, setting aside other differences. Economic recovery and infrastructure development are key priorities for Nepal. Both coalition parties agree that Nepal should not align with any single country but should engage major powers on economic issues rather than geopolitical tensions. 

The new government’s foreign policy will likely be driven by domestic agendas, such as economic recovery, job creation and securing funding for infrastructure development. In order to accomplish these agendas, Prime Minister Oli must avoid actions that could undermine trust with major powers and other development partners.

Throughout Monday, the media and political circles were on edge due to reports of a possible change of government. Even top leaders of major parties were struggling to uncover what had transpired during recent meetings between Sher Bahadur Deuba, leader of the main opposition Nepali Congress, and KP Sharma Oli, CPN-UML chairman and a major coalition partner in the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government. 

The secrecy maintained by Deuba and Oli regarding the content of their meetings has further fuelled the rumor that NC is attempting to remove Dahal from power by forming a new alliance with UML. 

Despite the rapid developments on Monday and chatter on social media, there were no clear indications of any top-level political maneuvers. 

But according to multiple sources, it is evident that Congress has indeed offered the premiership to Oli, who was ousted from power in 2021 following a Supreme Court order. Oli and his party may take some time to decide on the offer from NC, the largest party in the 275-member House of Representatives. 

After a long gap, Deuba visited Oli's residence in Balkot this Saturday, following two rounds of talks in Kathmandu. There are reports that Deuba and Oli have agreed to form a national consensus government to address current issues such as constitutional implementation and economic challenges. Oli has repeatedly stated that the country cannot progress in its current state and is consulting within his party about the NC’s offer.

Oli is reportedly dissatisfied with the government's performance, including the recently passed budget, which he claims was introduced without coalition consultation. This makes it difficult for him to make an immediate decision, especially since his closest rival, NC, has offered him the prime ministerial position.

In a meeting with his party’s top leaders on Monday, Deuba mentioned his cordial relationship with Oli but refrained from commenting further on their ongoing talks. Deuba did not share concrete details with his party colleagues. On the same day, Prime Minister Dahal and Oli held a lengthy discussion, but neither side disclosed the content of their meetings. When asked about the possibility of becoming prime minister, Oli told journalists that he might not assume the role this year.

Amid discussions of an NC-UML alliance, Prime Minister Dahal addressed the Cabinet, assuring them that the current government would continue for a long time. Government Spokesperson Rekha Sharma stated, “The prime minister briefed that media reports regarding a new government are untrue and there have been no talks about forming a national unity government.”

Sources indicate that Oli favors forming a national unity government rather than a coalition of just two parties. The key agenda for such a government would be to amend the constitution, change the current electoral system, and remove secularism from the constitution.

Over the past two weeks, former president Bidya Devi Bhandari has reentered the spotlight of national politics for two main reasons.

First, Bhandari attended a CPN-UML function in Kathmandu for the first time since her retirement, addressing an audience of five thousand UML women cadres. Second, media reports suggested she renewed her UML party membership, which she had relinquished after becoming president in 2015. However, neither the UML nor Bhandari has confirmed this.

Following these reports, some lawmakers questioned whether Bhandari could continue receiving state benefits if she renewed her party membership. Nonetheless, since her retirement, she has chosen to reside in her private home, declining the government's offer of official residence.

Tika Dhakal, Bhandari’s former advisor, refuted the media claims, calling them false and aimed at tarnishing her image. Dhakal emphasized that Bhandari does not need formal membership to participate in party activities and would renew her membership openly and transparently if she chose to do so—and with significant party support.

UML leaders close to Bhandari suggest her return to active politics is possible and not prohibited by the Constitution. They believe she would be a unifying figure within the party and a prominent national leader due to her clean image and widespread acceptability.

Speculations about Bhandari’s political comeback began even before her retirement. In a notable instance, during an informal gathering before her departure from Sheetal Niwas, leaders like UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli and then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and CPN (Maoist Center) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal asked her about potential return. Bhandari, however, avoided committing to such plans, leaving the decision open.

Political circles continue to buzz about Bhandari’s intentions. Some argue she leads an informal faction within the UML against Oli, although both she and Oli have remained publicly silent on this matter. It is believed that any political move by Bhandari would aim for consensus rather than conflict with Oli.

Second-tier UML leaders, such as Bishnu Pokhrel, Ishwor Pokhrel, and Shankar Pokhrel, are vying for leadership but might support Bhandari as a unifying figure. Given her legacy and broad acceptance, party leaders see her as a strong candidate for leading the party after Oli.

Bhandari has not ruled out a return to politics. In an interview with this journalist  in November last year, she said: “I have not made a decision regarding a return to active politics at the moment.”  As for Oli’s potential successor, the former president said it was “an internal matter” of the party.

“It is premature to discuss leadership after Oli, as we still have a long way to go before the convention,” said Bhandari, suggesting the UML members to focus on strengthening the party rather than hankering for power. 

Based on Bhandari’s statements and recent actions, it appears she might re-engage in politics by the next UML convention or before the 2027 elections. UML leaders believe she supports the unification of leftist alliances, which could see Oli as prime minister, Dahal as president, and Bhandari leading the party if a coalition is formed after the 2027 elections.

The House of Representatives on Tuesday witnessed a heated debate as cross-party lawmakers raised multiple pressing issues that need immediate government attention. Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha was absent, so Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal responded to the questions. 

One key topic was China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). PM Dahal reminded lawmakers that the BRI Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2017 during his second term as prime minister.

In Sept 2023, during Dahal’s visit to China, the two sides held discussions on finalizing the BRI implementation plan. Nine months later, Dahal informed Parliament that the implementation plan is in its final stages and will be signed soon, although he did not specify the dates. Lawmakers expressed concerns about the potential debt burden on Nepal if loans are taken to finance infrastructure projects under the BRI.

PM Dahal reassured lawmakers that Nepal prefers grants over loans and, if loans are taken, they would be concessional to avoid a ‘debt trap’. He stated, “I have clearly told the Chinese side that Nepal cannot afford high-interest rates and prefers the same interest rates as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.” 

Nepali Congress lawmaker Ram Hari Khatiwada requested that grants be prioritized over soft loans, emphasizing that any loan interest rates should not exceed 1 to 1.5 percent. Transparency regarding the interest rates of BRI loans is often lacking, with rates reportedly at two percent or higher.

Lawmaker Shishir Khanal from the Rastriya Swatantra Party argued that there should be parliamentary deliberations about the BRI agreements with China. Due to the lack of debate in Parliament, negative perceptions of the BRI have arisen outside of it, Khanal said.  While the two countries are negotiating the implementation plan, the government has yet to publicize it.

Lawmakers also questioned the PM about issues relating to India. Despite the report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) being almost inactive, PM Dahal assured lawmakers that efforts are underway to submit the EPG report to both sides. He acknowledged that he did not bring up the issue during his visit to India last year to avoid straining bilateral relations. Lawmakers also inquired about the ongoing map dispute with India and the progress made in diplomatic negotiations. PM Dahal stated, “Efforts are underway to resolve this issue through bilateral mechanisms formed to address boundary disputes.”

The issue of Nepalis trapped in the Russia-Ukraine war was prominently raised, but PM Dahal did not provide a clear answer about the government’s efforts. Unofficial figures indicate that around three dozen Nepalis who joined the Russian army have died, and hundreds are trapped in the war zone. The PM mentioned that both sides are in constant talks to resolve the problem and that a committee has been formed to provide recommendations on managing the movement of people between Nepal and Russia.

Recently, the government has faced criticism for recalling ambassadors before completion of their terms and violation of its own recruitment standards for new ambassadors. PM Dahal admitted these shortcomings and pledged that future appointments would be merit-based and better managed.

PM Dahal also faced questions about efforts to convene the SAARC summit, stalled since 2014. He attributed the delay to souring relations between India and Pakistan but did not mention the impact of recent developments in Afghanistan. He stated, “I have clearly talked with Indian Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar about the need to organize the SAARC summit, but India has indicated there are complexities involved.” With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi taking office for a third consecutive term, fresh debates about the possibility of organizing the SAARC summit have emerged.

The PM also addressed questions related to Gorkha recruitment and the 1947 tripartite agreement among Nepal, India, and the UK. He emphasized the need to update the agreement in the changing context, based on national consensus. A section of Nepali politicians has long demanded the scrapping of the treaty.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has seen mixed progress in Nepal since the two countries signed the agreement in 2017. A common narrative suggests that no significant projects have been completed under the BRI framework, leading many foreign policy observers to conclude that China has not succeeded in expanding its influence in Kathmandu, largely due to implicit pressure from the West and India. 

Nevertheless, the implementation of BRI remains a top agenda item in interactions between representatives of the Communist Party of China and Nepal’s political parties, especially the communist ones, which have expressed dissatisfaction over the perceived slow progress.

From the Chinese perspective, several soft and hard projects launched in Nepal fall under the broader BRI framework. However, China is pushing for the implementation of more infrastructure projects, as globally, the BRI is perceived mainly as an infrastructure initiative. 

Beyond BRI, China’s reach and influence in Nepal have significantly expanded across various sectors—from education to security, from village to national levels, and from electric vehicles to airline companies. Recent interactions even include the judiciary and parliament, with notable exchanges of visits between officials from both countries.

In November last year, Nepal’s Chief Justice Bishowambhar Prasad Shrestha visited China, followed by a reciprocal visit this week by Liu Guixian, a senior justice of the Supreme People’s Court of China. Senior leaders from Nepal’s National Assembly and the Speaker of the House of Representatives have also visited China in recent years.

Recent examples of China-Nepal cooperation include Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chen Song’s participation in multiple events. These events illustrate China’s diverse offerings to Nepal, such as organizing the first intra-party school Chinese pop dance competition involving students from 13 primary and secondary schools, and a cardiovascular screening program by specialists from Fuwai Yunnan Hospital, which provided screenings for 4,682 Nepali children diagnosed with congenital cardiovascular disease, offering them free treatment in China.

Additionally, China has resumed the China Higher Level Education Fair, halted for two decades, and Nepal’s colleges and universities are increasingly offering Chinese language courses. The number of scholarships for Nepali students to study in China has also increased, as has the participation of Nepali bureaucrats going to China for education. Beyond education and health, China is also interested in importing Nepali tea, and the two countries are working on petroleum product collaborations. These are just some instances where there is a long list of new areas of collaboration between the two countries. 

For a long time, Western and European countries have been expanding their influence in Nepal through non-governmental organizations. Now Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also becoming more active in Nepal. The China Foundation for Rural Development (CFRD), for instance, has been working in the areas of health, education, and other social issues, particularly in the Tarai region. Recently, CFRD provided aid to fire-affected people in the Mahottari district but this is not the first time. CFRD has been providing support in Madhes region since 2015 and it continues to expand. 

China has developed networks and projects to engage with all segments of Nepali society, and Ambassador Song has been instrumental in enhancing bilateral engagement through active social media presence and interactions with media personnel.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Narayan Kaji Shrestha has been a strong supporter of bilateral projects, frequently attending events organized by the Chinese Embassy and other Chinese-funded local organizations. Shrestha is notably the only minister in the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government, who has been consistently pushing for the signing of the BRI implementation plan, which remains pending.

As China aspires to engage more with Nepal, bilateral visits are expanding, with politicians from various levels visiting China. But it is noteworthy that visits by leaders from the Nepali Congress (NC) are fewer compared to those from communist parties. This could be due to fewer invitations from China or a lack of interest from senior NC leaders. Despite this, both Chinese and NC leaders acknowledge the historical role of bilateral relations, often referencing BP Koirala’s contributions from the 1960s.In summary, while progress on the BRI in Nepal may have been slow, overall Chinese engagement in the country has picked up speed, balancing hard and soft power. The Nepal-China border, which had been largely closed since 2015 and further impacted by Covid-19, has recently reopened, facilitating increased movement of people and goods. This week, the two countries are holding their 16th Secretary-level meeting to review the entire bilateral relationship. To measure China's influence in Nepal solely through the BRI lens is to overlook the broader picture. 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has hailed the export of electricity from Nepal to Bangladesh via the Indian grid as a landmark in sub-regional energy cooperation. 

Speaking at a joint press conference with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in New Delhi on Saturday, Modi emphasized that the swift implementation of such large-scale initiatives in multiple areas within just one year reflects the dynamic pace and scope of bilateral relations.

Last year, Nepal and India signed a long-term power trade agreement, which included India's consent to facilitate the sale of Nepali electricity to Bangladesh. Officials from Nepal and Bangladesh are currently finalizing the modalities of this agreement.

The joint statement underscored the commitment to expanding power and energy collaboration and developing intra-regional electricity trade. This includes competitively-priced power generated from clean energy projects in India, Nepal, and Bhutan, transmitted through the Indian electricity grid. To support this initiative, India will expedite the construction of a 765 kV high-capacity Katihar-Parbatipur-Bornagar interconnection, with suitable Indian financial assistance, to serve as a key anchor for grid connectivity.

Modi and Hasina also discussed regional issues, highlighting the potential of the India-Bangladesh relationship as a major anchor for regional and sub-regional integration under the BIMSTEC, SAARC, and IORA frameworks. They committed to working together on global platforms to advance their common interests, particularly those of the Global South.

As part of sub-regional connectivity initiatives, India will provide transit facilities for the movement of Bangladeshi goods to Nepal and Bhutan via the railway network. The two leaders also reiterated their commitment to the early operationalization of the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement to enhance sub-regional connectivity.

Recognizing the significant contribution of their partnership to regional peace, security, and stability, India and Bangladesh reaffirmed their commitment to a free, open, inclusive, secure, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. With converging visions for the Indo-Pacific and awareness of the region's vulnerability to climate change, India and Bangladesh will co-lead the ‘Disaster Risk Reduction and Management’ pillar of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI). They will cooperate to mitigate disaster risks, build disaster-resilient infrastructure, and contribute to the sustainability of their shared maritime region.

Narendra Modi was sworn in for his third consecutive term as India’s prime minister on Sunday. The ceremony, held at Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi, was  attended by leaders from neighboring countries, highlighting strong regional ties. 

Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Sri Lanka’s President Ranil Wickremesinghe, Maldives’ President Mohammad Muizu, Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, Seychelles’ Vice-President Amhed Afif, and Mauritius’ President Prithvirajsing Roopun were among the attendees.

Modi, who began inviting his neighboring counterparts when he was elected the prime minister for the time in 2014, has continued with the tradition for his third-term as well, apparently signaling that he will stick to ‘Neighborhood First’ policy. Under Modi’s stewardship, this policy continues to evolve, focusing on mature, nuanced, and practical responses to regional issues. 

A prime example is India's measured approach to anti-India rhetoric from Maldives President Mohammad Muizu, who attended Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. Enhanced development and economic partnerships with neighboring countries have also marked this period, achieving greater regional connectivity, infrastructure improvements, and stronger development cooperation. Now, all South Asian countries are seeking an enhanced economic and development partnership with India avoiding geopolitical and other issues. 

Except with Bhutan, India's relationship with neighboring countries witnessed many highs and lows during Modi’s first two terms as India’s prime minister. With Nepal, significant progress has been made in cultural, economic, and development spheres despite past disputes like the economic blockade and the map row, which still cast a shadow over the relationship. Trust between India and Nepal is yet to return to the high levels seen in 2014.

India’s relations with Pakistan remain strained, affecting regional cooperation and the functionality of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Ties with the Maldives are also fraught, with little signs of improvement. As a regional leader aiming for global influence, India is expected to play a proactive role in mending ties with its smaller neighbors and addressing their concerns. 

Over the past few years, India has projected itself as a leader and voice of the Global South or more importantly South Asia. As a strong prime minister, Modi and his government could have played a vital role to resolve the issues with the South Asian countries. In his third tenure, Modi leads a coalition government. It might not be easy for him to take decisions without the consent of ruling partners.

Nitish Kumar, chief minister of Bihar and his Janata Dal (United), the second-biggest ally, will also have a greater say when it comes to Modi government’s Nepal policy. Though India’s external policy is under the control of the Union government, of late, states are having greater influence on those countries which share borders with them. 

A significant concern for India is the growing Chinese influence in the region. While India seeks to reduce this influence, its neighbors are increasingly looking to China for assistance and investments. As Modi looks ahead to lead India for the historic third consecutive term, smaller neighbors like Nepal will be keenly watching India’s ties with China, because they believe improved India-China relationship will make it easier for them to deal with both countries. 

But foreign affairs experts say the India-China relationship, strained by border disputes, is unlikely to improve soon, impacting India’s relations with its smaller neighbors. Modi’s third term presents a long list of tasks to strengthen ties with neighboring countries, essential for regional connectivity, collaboration, and stability. The Nepal-India relationship, in particular, is expected to sail smoothly without major hurdles.

India’s 18th Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament) election results are out, with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) securing the majority needed to form a new government. Although the BJP did not achieve a single-party majority as it did in 2014 and 2019, coalition support ensures that Narendra Modi will enter a historic third consecutive term, a first since 1962. 

The election results indicate a weakening of the BJP’s dominance, a resurgence of the Indian National Congress, and a growing influence of regional parties. This also marks the return of coalition governance in India after a decade. Since Nepal and India are close neighbors, a pertinent question arises: What will India’s Nepal policy look like under Modi’s third term? Over the past decade, Nepal-India relations under Modi's leadership have seen many fluctuations. 

Modi’s emphasis on the ‘neighborhood first policy’ in 2014 placed Nepal at the forefront. However, Nepal-India relationship hit its lowest point right after Nepal promulgated its new constitution in 2015. Seemingly to show its disapproval of Nepal’s new charter, India imposed an undeclared border blockade for about six months, causing an economic and humanitarian crisis in Nepal that was still reeling from the devastating earthquake of 2015.

Relations began to improve from mid-2016 but hit another rocky patch during the 2019 map dispute. Despite these highs and lows, Modi visited Nepal five times during his first two terms. Under his leadership, bilateral mechanisms were revived, several long-standing issues were resolved, and numerous connectivity projects—such as the cross-border pipeline, Integrated Check Post, railways, roads, and digital connectivity— were advanced. In the final months of this second term, two countries signed a power agreement to export Nepali electricity in India and Bangladesh. 

Recently, bilateral relations have stabilized, and with Modi’s third term, major changes to India's Nepal policy are unlikely. Over the past decade, the BJP has strengthened its ties with Nepal's political parties. In several instances, Nepali leaders are employing BJP channels to reach out to the highest level of government to resolve outstanding issues.

This elevation of bilateral relations to a political level has opened more communication channels. Prior to 2014, interactions were largely limited to bureaucratic and security agencies, with minimal high-level exchanges. Recently, the relationship has evolved into a robust development partnership, though some contentious issues remain unresolved. 

While the BJP has faced criticism for allegedly fueling Hindu radicalism, these claims lack independent verification. Before the elections, political analysts speculated that the BJP might push to turn both India and Nepal into Hindu states in Modi’s third term. However, the return of a hung parliament may hinder such plans. The Modi government should reassure Nepali leaders that there is no such agenda in Nepal. 

Continuation of Modi as prime minister presents an opportunity for Nepal to address pending issues and explore future avenues. Compared to the BJP, the Indian National Congress and other parties have fewer communication channels with Nepal's political leaders. Key contentious issues, such as the Peace and Friendship Treaty and border disputes, require intense diplomatic and political dialogue. Both sides must avoid politicizing these issues to maintain healthy bilateral relations. India’s Nepal policy is expected to remain stable for India’s political parties are not much divided on foreign policy issues. 

Nepal government and political parties need a clear strategy for engagement with India. All political parties in Nepal should unify on major issues with India, ensuring that changes in government do not disrupt bilateral relations. Consistent positions from major political leaders, regardless of their power status, will facilitate smoother negotiations with India on contentious issues. It would have been better if those issues were settled when there was a powerful government led by Narendra Modi for 10 years. 

Enhanced coordination between political leadership and bureaucracy is essential. Rather than focusing solely on India’s Nepal policy, Nepal must prepare its own strategy for dealing with India, which is poised to become the world’s third-largest economy. The key question is how Nepal will manage this relationship, with economic and development partnerships forming the foundation of bilateral ties over the past decade.