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Director General of Commerce Department of Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, Chen Jung, and Consul General of Nepal in Lhasa, Laxmi Prasad Niraula, held a meeting today at latter's office.

During the meeting, they discussed various issues including relations between the two countries as well as business, commerce, transit, trade fair and trade facilitation committee meetings, according to the Consulate General of Nepal, in Lhasa.

Stating that the two countries have historic relations, Consul General Niraula extended gratitude for China's continuous support to Nepal.

He expressed the belief that Nepal will get such type of support in the days to come as well.

Lauding the role played by the Consulate General of Nepal to strengthen relations between the two countries, Director General Chen said China was always ready to support in strengthening relations between the two countries and in Nepal's development.

In the meeting, both sides agreed to further strengthen Nepal-China trade, commerce and transit sector as well as to take initiatives to export Nepal's agro products to China.

Similarly, commitments were made to take initiatives to resolve problems seen in checkpoints, developing physical infrastructures there, exchanging visits, participating trade fairs and festivals to be organized in both countries and moving ahead in a coordinative manner for people's welfare, added the Consulate General of Nepal.

Nepal and China have reaffirmed their commitment to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), highlighting the framework agreement signed during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China in December last year. This development has been described as a milestone in enhancing bilateral ties.

In a political document presented to the Central Committee of his party, CPN-UML, Oli emphasized the significance of the agreement for Nepal-China relations. While the ruling coalition’s Nepali Congress (NC) has remained silent on the matter, China has actively engaged with Nepal’s political leadership to implement the agreement. Both Nepal’s Ambassador to China, Krishna Prasad Oli, and Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Chen Song, have expressed optimism about the initiative, using strikingly similar rhetoric on its potential benefits.

A new era of cooperation

Ambassador Oli noted that the framework agreement marks a turning point in bilateral cooperation under the BRI, nearly seven years after the initial memorandum of understanding. He stated that projects under the BRI would help transform Nepal from a landlocked to a land-linked nation. Citing examples, he mentioned plans to enhance the operational capacity of Bhairahawa and Pokhara international airports.

A centerpiece of this cooperation is the proposed cross-border railway between Nepal and China, part of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network. This ambitious project is envisioned to facilitate the flow of goods, people and services, further deepening Nepal-China ties.

Ambassador Oli dismissed concerns over a so-called ‘debt trap’ linked to Chinese financing, calling such claims baseless. In an interview with The Global Times, he underscored the BRI’s global success, noting its partnerships with over 150 countries in its decade-long history.

Progress on infrastructure

Feasibility studies for the cross-border railway are underway and expected to conclude by 2026. Upon completion, the project will enter the implementation phase. Additionally, efforts are being made to strengthen Nepal’s transmission grid lines, which are critical for enhancing regional connectivity.

Ambassador Oli also expressed Nepal’s support for China’s Global Development Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, reflecting broader alignment with Beijing’s strategic priorities.

According to Chinese official media outlets, Ambassador has said that Nepal supports the initiatives launched by China which were not mentioned in the bilateral documents.

In a meeting with Yang Wanming, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, according to The Global Times, Oli stated that Nepal supports the Global Development initiative and Global Civilization initiative proposed by China.  

China’s perspective

Chinese Ambassador Chen Song echoed the sentiments of deepening mutual trust and cooperation.

In an interview with The Global Times, he described the BRI framework agreement as a symbol of growing political and economic ties between the two nations.

According to Chen, the agreement will not only enhance bilateral relations but also contribute to regional stability and development by fostering collaboration between China and South Asian countries.

Chen highlighted the BRI’s role in strengthening people-to-people exchanges and cultural cooperation, particularly in the tourism sector, according to The Global Times.

Addressing debt-trap concerns

Ambassador Chen countered accusations of a ‘debt trap’, citing data from Nepal’s Public Debt Management Office. As of the 2023-24 fiscal year, Nepal’s external debt stood at Rs 1.25trn ($9.12bn). Of this, multilateral loans constituted 88.98 percent, while bilateral loans made up only 11.02 percent. Among bilateral creditors, Japan and India ranked first and second, with China accounting for a modest 2.82 percent of Nepal’s total external debt.

Chen criticized Western narratives about Chinese loans as attempts to discredit China’s partnerships with developing nations. He emphasized China’s commitment to offering low-interest loans, development assistance and investments tailored to Nepal’s needs.

Political dynamics

Domestically, the ruling UML has showcased the BRI framework agreement as a major achievement of Prime Minister Oli’s government. However, the NC has largely remained noncommittal, while the main opposition CPN (Maoist Center) has downplayed the agreement, seemingly to avoid crediting the Oli administration.

Meanwhile, China has intensified its engagement in Nepal, lobbying for further progress under the BRI framework. This proactive approach underscores Beijing’s strategic interest in Nepal as a critical partner in its broader Belt and Road vision.

In 2024, Nepal experienced significant turbulence both domestically and in foreign relations. In July, CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli assumed the Office of the Prime Minister for the third time, supported by the largest party, Nepali Congress (NC). Despite forming a numerically strong government, the coalition has struggled to instill hope for stability. Doubts persist about the government’s longevity, despite leaders from both NC and UML insisting it will last until the 2027 national elections. Economically, Nepal’s struggles continued, showing little improvement. While external economic indicators improved slightly, domestic challenges remained unaddressed.

 Relations with China and the US remained stable, but ties with India deteriorated. Nepal’s engagement with long-standing development partners progressed steadily. The Oli administration promised economic reforms, improved service delivery, job creation, and fostering optimism among youth. Additionally, NC and UML pledged to amend the constitution based on lessons from its implementation. However, progress on these fronts remained limited.

Economic stagnation persisted, with some gains in the stock market overshadowed by poor revenue collection and low capital expenditure. The continued practice of last-minute expenditure resulted in inefficient investment and inflationary pressures. The real estate sector, a significant revenue source, remained in decline, with annual revenues dropping from Rs 70bn pre-covid to Rs. 46bn. In contrast, tourism rebounded robustly. Data from Nepal Tourism Board revealed that 1,104,702 tourists visited Nepal in 2024, returning the industry to pre-pandemic levels.

Despite these improvements, general pessimism grew as thousands of youths sought opportunities abroad for education and employment. Public services showed little improvement, leaving citizens disillusioned. Promised constitutional amendments remain stalled, with NC and UML yet to form the joint mechanism required to initiate the process. The government’s slow progress on its commitments is fostering doubts about its ability to deliver.

The coalition faced a major test in September when floods and landslides ravaged the country, causing over 250 deaths and infrastructural losses worth billions. While Prime Minister Oli attended the 79th United Nations General Assembly in New York, his administration’s inadequate disaster response undermined public trust. Effective coordination could have saved lives, but the government’s failure in crisis management became a defining moment of its tenure, eroding its credibility.

Domestically, the arrest of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane for alleged involvement in cooperative fraud, money laundering, and organized crime dominated headlines. Police filed charges in the Kaski district court, but opposition parties, including CPN (Maoist Center) and Lamichhane’s RSP, labeled the arrest politically motivated. Meanwhile, the government faced criticism for shielding NC and UML allies accused of corruption while targeting opposition leaders.

Within the ruling UML, former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s return to active party politics sparked internal debate. Her participation in party programs signaled a comeback, with some leaders encouraging her involvement. The NC saw internal discussions on future leadership, with Shekhar Koirala campaigning for the presidency while the party President Sher Bahadur Deuba remained silent. NC General Secretary and president hopeful Gagan Kumar Thapa announced his candidacy, intensifying the contest. Similarly, the Maoist Center debated whether to reintegrate former Vice President Nanda Kishor Pun Pasang into its ranks.

Transitional justice saw a rare consensus among major parties on the need for a new bill, earning international praise. However, the government failed to appoint officials to transitional justice mechanisms, stalling progress. On the foreign front, Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China in December garnered significant attention. Marking a departure, he chose China for his first foreign visit, as he had in 2016 after awaiting considerable time for an invite from India. During the trip, Nepal signed a framework agreement for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, identifying 10 projects for implementation. China’s lobbying for swift action on these projects underscored its growing influence in Nepal.

Relations with India remained strained. Although bilateral engagements continued, Oli received no invitation to visit India. A notable achievement was a trilateral agreement among Nepal, India and Bangladesh to trade 40 MW electricity, allowing Nepal to sell electricity to a third country for the first time. Despite expectations of improved ties, relations between Oli and the Indian establishment remained lukewarm. Nepal’s relationship with the US remained stable as American officials visited Kathmandu to deepen engagement. However, the perception of US influence in Nepal’s domestic affairs continued to provoke mixed reactions.

Public sentiment grew increasingly pessimistic. Many youth believe the country’s trajectory will worsen, fueling frustration with major political parties. Anti-constitution forces have started gaining traction, exploiting public discontent. Despite their pledge to ensure stability, NC and UML face mounting skepticism about their ability to deliver meaningful change.

Writer and journalist Sudheer Sharma’s new book, Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha, unveiled in August, offers a comprehensive account of the key figures, issues, and phenomena that have shaped Nepal-China relations. The book spans from the era of King Narendra Dev in the 7th century to 2008, when Nepal’s 240-year monarchy came to an end. Sharma’s other book, Himal Pari ko Huri, published simultaneously, explores new trends in bilateral relations post-2008, though this review focuses solely on Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha.

In the introductory section, Sharma highlights a problem in Nepal’s public discourse about its northern neighbor. He identifies two contrasting perspectives: one group idolizes China and dismisses criticism, while the other harbors deep-seated prejudice. Sharma aims to provide an objective account of this trans-Himalayan relationship, presenting little-known historical facts and anecdotes. He maintains a neutral tone, avoiding personal biases in his analysis.

As a writer and journalist, Sharma excels in meticulous documentation, gathering new insights through his strong rapport with senior politicians and officials, and offering sharp political and geopolitical analysis. These strengths, evident in his acclaimed earlier work, Nepal Nexus, are similarly reflected in this book.

The book delves into the political, trade, cultural, and people-to-people relations between Nepal and China. Sharma credits King Narendra Dev and Princess Bhrikuti with laying the foundation of Nepal-China relations. He highlights the flourishing trade between Nepal and Tibet that began in the 7th century and thrived until the 1950s. Sharma also explores how this trade fostered robust people-to-people connections.

However, he documents the gradual decline of these ties after China took control of Tibet, imposed strict regulations on Nepali residents in Lhasa, and tightened visa rules. A study conducted by China in the late 1950s revealed that a Nepali shop in Lhasa, established a thousand years earlier, was still operational at the time. Three shops were found to be between 500 and 1,000 years old, and four others ranged from 200 to 500 years. Today, the number of Nepali shops in Lhasa has drastically declined, and Sharma notes that Nepal’s trade with Tibet—dating back 1,400 years to King Narendra Dev’s time—is nearing extinction.

In the chapter Bhikshu, Bidrohi, and Bampanthi, Sharma asserts that the foundation of Nepal-China relations is rooted more in cultural, religious, trade, and people-to-people ties than in political connections. He highlights the significant role played by Buddhist monks and nuns in fostering bilateral relations since ancient times. The chapter begins with a reference to an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping, published in Nepali newspapers, where Xi mentions the collaboration between the Chinese monk Fa Hien and Nepali monk Buddhabhadra over 1,600 years ago to translate Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

Sharma also revisits the well-known narrative of Nepali Princess Bhrikuti’s marriage to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo and mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzang (Huen Tsang), who visited Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, leaving invaluable written accounts of his pilgrimage. This chapter offers a chronological account of Nepal-China engagements from the 7th century to the 1950s, demonstrating Sharma’s meticulous research and dedication to historical accuracy.

The chapter Mao and Mahendra provides a compelling overview of the relationship between Nepal’s monarchy and China, detailing personal connections between Nepal’s kings and Chinese leaders, which both sides leveraged for mutual benefit. For instance, Mahendra, as crown prince, secretly traveled to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong. The chapter includes several examples of the close proximity between the two sides.

Sharma discusses how the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided financial and other support to Nepal’s communist parties but refrained from supporting armed insurgencies, including the CPN-UML-led rebellion in Jhapa and the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Since the 1950s, China has consistently stated that it does not aim to export its revolution to Nepal. Although the CPC secretly offered financial aid to Nepal’s communist parties in the past, it never supplied arms or ammunition—a lesser-known aspect of Nepal-China relations.

Formal ties between the CPC and Nepal’s communist parties ended following King Mahendra’s royal coup. While China maintains that it does not export its revolution or ideology, Sharma highlights the irony that two major revolutions in Nepal—the Jhapa communist uprising and the Maoist insurgency—were launched in Mao Zedong’s name, despite receiving no Chinese support once they turned to armed struggle. Instead, the rebels were advised to join the political mainstream.

On the relationship between China and Nepali communist parties, Sharma writes: “China was always attracted to Nepal's communist parties due to two reasons: communism and nationalism. Communism is their shared ideology, and Nepal’s communist parties have viewed China as a protector of nationalism. This is why Nepal’s communist-led governments have historically maintained closer ties with China than other administrations.” He also discusses China’s changing approach to Nepal’s internal politics and its overt efforts to consolidate Nepal’s communist forces, suggesting that China may view Nepal’s communist parties as a potential substitute for the monarchy as a stable political institution.

The Khampa revolt is another major factor in Nepal-China relations. Sharma provides fresh insights into the Tibetan Khampas’ 18-year armed rebellion against China. According to the book, King Mahendra’s death marked a turning point for the Khampas, as his successor, King Birendra, adopted a less supportive stance. Following his state visit to China in 1973, King Birendra began military preparations to suppress the Khampas. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly assured Birendra that the United States would not interfere, citing an agreement with President Nixon on the Tibetan issue. Upon returning to Nepal, Birendra initiated joint discussions with China on disarming the Khampas and began providing regular updates on their activities.

The book is a valuable resource for understanding Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China. It examines key narratives, such as China’s policy shift after Nepal’s monarchy was abolished in 2008, its perception of Nepal as a gateway to India and South Asia, its primary concern with Tibet’s security, and its encouragement of Nepal’s communist parties as a reliable political force. However, critics may argue that while Sharma offers fresh insights and unearths historical documents, much of the book reiterates existing narratives about Nepal-China relations.

On Dec 5, Nepal and China signed the Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation (FBRC) during Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s visit to China. While both sides have refrained from disclosing the agreement’s full details, the government has repeatedly emphasized that Nepal is not obligated to take loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, this assurance has not fully dispelled concerns, as the exact modalities of financing remain unclear.

Under the agreement, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s National Development and Reform Commission will act as the implementing agencies. It has been clarified that the BRI is not a bilateral treaty; rather, it will be governed by the laws of each participating country. Additionally, Nepal retains the option to collaborate with third countries in implementing the projects listed under the BRI.

The agreement refers to “aid financing,” a term that has sparked diverse interpretations. The ruling coalition insists that loans are not part of the arrangement, but the absence of concrete definitions leaves room for ambiguity. It is also unclear how this framework differs from the 2017 BRI agreement. Officials have revealed that 10 projects have been shortlisted under the BRI, ending years of speculation about its implementation in Nepal.

Chinese state news agency Xinhua offered some insights, citing the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). According to Xinhua, the agreement emphasizes the principles of planning together, building together, and benefiting together. It seeks to enhance cooperation in critical areas, including the economy, transportation, trade, and industrial development. The NDRC hailed the agreement as a step toward deepening political trust between Nepal and China and fostering high-quality Belt and Road collaboration.

In an interview with CGTN, Prime Minister Oli described the FBRC as a comprehensive umbrella agreement that encompasses diverse sectors such as infrastructure, culture, health, and education. He highlighted its potential to align Nepal’s development strategy with China’s, calling the agreement a significant milestone in bilateral cooperation.

Officials involved in the negotiations stated that the FBRC reflects Nepal’s proposals, with minimal changes from China. A previous draft implementation plan sent by China in 2020 had stalled due to Nepal’s indecision. In 2023, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government came close to signing the plan, but the effort was abandoned at the last moment. Ahead of Oli’s visit, the Nepalese government formed a task force to revise the document, which ultimately produced the FBRC.

Semanta Dahal, a task force member, explained in an Onlinekhabar article that the Chinese draft resembled a broad agreement rather than a focused implementation plan. The FBRC, on the other hand, prioritizes economic and project development cooperation, retaining only the already-listed projects under the BRI. Dahal noted that a dedicated mechanism for future BRI discussions would be established soon.

The FBRC identifies 10 projects, providing clarity after years of uncertainty surrounding BRI’s implementation in Nepal. These projects include the Tokha-Chhare tunnel, the Hilsa-Simikot road, the Kimathanka-Khandbari road and bridge, the Keyrung-Kathmandu trans-border railway, Amargadhi City Hall, a 220kV transmission line, Madan Bhandari University, Kathmandu Scientific Center and Science Museum, the China-Nepal Industrial Park in Damak, and the Jhapa Sports and Athletics Complex.

Of these, the railway and tunnel projects are long-term endeavors requiring at least a decade to commence. Feasibility studies for these projects are underway with Chinese assistance. Negotiations for road projects are in progress, while the construction of the transmission line depends on a power trade agreement between the two countries. The remaining projects are relatively small, reinforcing Nepal’s cautious approach to avoid taking on large-scale loans under the BRI.

China has established mechanisms like the Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to support BRI initiatives. By mid-2023, the SRF had committed $22bn across 75 projects, while the AIIB, with 106 members, had approved $43.6bn for 227 projects globally. These initiatives span transport, energy, public health, and other sectors, promoting connectivity and sustainable development.

In recent years, China has shifted its focus toward smaller development projects that promise immediate returns. This approach reflects a growing reluctance to fund large infrastructure projects that lack financial viability. Consequently, Nepal and China have avoided selecting major projects under the BRI, except for the railway and tunnel.

The FBRC represents a cautious yet significant step in Nepal-China relations. While it marks progress in operationalizing the BRI, questions remain about financing and execution. The agreement signals Nepal’s intent to address its development needs without over-relying on debt. With ten projects identified and mechanisms for future negotiations in place, the FBRC lays the groundwork for collaboration, even as it underscores the challenges of aligning development ambitions with financial realities.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s first official visit to China on Dec 2-5 after assuming office in July has garnered significant attention both domestically and internationally. Central to discussions following the visit is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which overshadowed other bilateral issues.

A key outcome of Oli’s visit was the signing of a Framework for Belt and Road Cooperation, marking progress in Nepal’s engagement with the BRI. For the first time, 10 specific projects under the BRI were identified. These projects are divided into two categories: long-term ventures like cross-border railways and tunnel projects, which require significant investment and time, and smaller, less capital-intensive initiatives.

To finance these projects, Nepal and China agreed on an “aid financing modality,” widely interpreted by economists as concessional loans. However, details of the agreement remain undisclosed, leaving even ruling parties unclear about the specifics. Prime Minister Oli has stated that Nepal will accept grants, not loans, under the BRI framework. Upon his return, he assured: “During negotiations, the issue of loans did not arise. Implementing specific projects may require separate discussions.”

The agreement represents a breakthrough in the ongoing narrative that BRI had stagnated in Nepal since the first framework agreement in 2017. Critics had attributed the delay to geopolitical factors, including external pressures. Following Nepal's endorsement of the US-backed Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2022, China had been eager to advance the BRI, questioning why Nepal accepted the MCC but hesitated on the BRI. The new agreement allows China to showcase progress, countering claims of inactivity.

For Oli, the deal offers a political advantage. He faced pressure from within his party, particularly senior leaders like former President Bidya Devi Bhandari, to demonstrate progress on the BRI. The agreement has been welcomed by many leaders in Oli’s party, CPN-UML, and is likely to gain support from the CPN (Maoist Center) as well, though its Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal may downplay the achievement.

The timing of the agreement is notable. In 2023, an implementation plan was nearly finalized under Dahal’s premiership, but he deferred the matter during his visit to China. Fringe communist parties, ideologically aligned with Beijing, have also expressed support for the deal. Notably, Oli’s previous tenure in 2016 saw the historic signing of the Transit and Transport Agreement with China to diversify Nepal’s trade and transit options, cementing his reputation as a leader seeking stronger ties with Beijing.

Foreign policy analysts argue that endorsing the BRI after the MCC helps Nepal maintain geopolitical balance. Internally, the deal has helped avert potential friction between the Nepali Congress (NC) and UML. Oli managed to secure Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba’s backing, unlike Dahal, who failed to involve Narayan Kaji Shrestha from his party during earlier BRI discussions.

However, critics describe the agreement as more symbolic than substantive. The NC, a key coalition partner in the Oli-led government, has expressed concerns over its alignment with prior consensus. Former Foreign Minister NP Saud noted that the agreement contradicts the party’s stance to accept only grants under the BRI. He warned that this issue could escalate within the party. Similarly, NC leader Nain Singh Mahar stated that the deal diverges from the party’s position. The government is now under pressure to disclose the agreement's details to address these concerns.

Soon after his return, Oli met with a task force formed to build consensus between the NC and UML on the deal. The meeting aimed to preemptively address dissatisfaction within the coalition, as some NC leaders opposed to the BRI may leverage the issue politically.

Beyond the BRI, Oli’s visit emphasized implementing past agreements rather than signing new ones, aligning with long-standing Chinese priorities. While some expected Prime Minister Oli to negotiate a loan waiver for the Pokhara International Airport, he clarified that no such discussions occurred. Nine agreements were signed during the visit, accompanied by a joint press statement.

Chinese media highlighted the significance of Oli choosing China for his first bilateral visit. Hu Zhiyong, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, observed that this choice signals Nepal’s prioritization of ties with China. Qian Feng, from Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute, emphasized Nepal’s strategic importance in maintaining stability in Tibet and its growing role in BRI partnerships. Hu added that South Asian countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives have benefited from BRI projects, and Nepal, too, seeks a share of this “big cake for cooperation.”

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli has said Nepal-China relations were further strengthened with his recent China visit.

PM Oli said it while speaking at a news conference organized at Tribhuvan International Airport after he returned home from China, completing the four-day official visit today. The two-country relations were further strengthened, which benefits Nepal, he argued.

"Various agreements were made on the projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during my visit, from which Nepal will reap utmost benefits," PM Oli reminded, adding that separate discussion and agreements would be made on each project.

The Head of the government also shared that Nepal and China signed the agreement on BRI cooperation framework in Beijing. The agreement was signed by Secretary at Foreign Ministry, Amrit Bahadur Rai, from Nepali side while the Vice Chair of the National Development and Reform Commission, Liu Sushe, from the Chinese side. 

The agreements were made in the program attended by PM Oli and his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang. Similarly, the both Prime Ministers signed the agreement on mutual assistance.

Some of the projects are on Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel Way construction, promotion of trade between Nepal and China, export of thermally processed buffalo meat from Nepal to China and exchange of certificates on completion of 9-story Durbar Square building by China. 

Also included in the agreement are on development projects, and economic and technological aid.

The discussions were held also on the issues like expansion of connectivity, development of industrial infrastructures, agriculture, trade, tourism, investment, science and technology, sports, natural disaster management, expansion of two-country relations at people-to-people level, and poverty alleviation.

Nepal will now be able to export thermally processed water buffalo meat to China. Officials of the two countries signed a protocol to facilitate water buffalo meat export to China during the China visit of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. This agreement is part of nine bilateral understandings reached between the two nations on Tuesday.

The protocol enables Nepali businesses to export cooked and processed water buffalo meat to China under Chinese guidelines. This follows the cabinet’s approval on June 30 of an agreement to export cooked buffalo meat to China.  Nepal and China held preliminary discussion on meat exports during former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s China visit in September last year.

According to Global Times, China has beefed up efforts on the diversification of beef imports in 2024. This is expected to reduce market fluctuations due to over-reliance on any single market, while providing more opportunities for other countries through high-level opening-up.

Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development say China’s General Administration of Customs (GACC) had provided Nepal with a 150-page document outlining stringent standards for meat imports. These include disease-free certification, hygiene standards and compliance with phytosanitary measures. Only the meat of water buffaloes under 30 months of age and raised under specified conditions will qualify for the export.

According to the MoALD, Nepal produces around 194,090 tons of water buffalo meat annually. Nepal’s water buffalo population is estimated at around 5.13m.

China, the largest importer of meat in the world, can be a lucrative export market for Nepal. The northern neighbor imported about 2.74m tons of beef in 2023, up 1.8 percent year-on-year, hitting a new high, according to Global Times. Imports over the first four months of 2023 stand at 1m tons, up 22 percent compared to the same period of 2023. It is difficult to get data on water buffalo meat consumption in China as Chinese customs import data categorise buffalo meat together with other cattle raised for meat under the category ‘meat of bovine animal’.

China mainly imports beef from countries including Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. It recently lifted a ban on five Australian beef exporters as demand outpaces its domestic production.

I feel singularly privileged to join you all and speak to this august gathering of intellectuals, aspiring scholars, and esteemed friends of Nepal.

I extend my profound gratitude to the President of the University for his generous invitation. While in my youth, I had read of the inspiring stature of the Peking University. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal May Fourth Movement began at this University in 1919. That movement was an important turning point in the history of modern China. 

As I stand here at “Yan Yuan”, it is indeed a matter of pleasure to interact with the professionals and students who are at this temple of knowledge, and cradle of creativity. This atmosphere, which is full of academic energy and spark is truly inspiring. In our Sanskrit literature, there is an ancient aphorism: “Asatoma sadgamaya; tamaso ma jyotirgamaya”, which reflects our quest to move away from ignorance to truth, darkness to the light. In this context, what I am going to share with you today are the contemplations that I carry from my pursuit for that light. 

Nepal and China are the land of ancient wisdom. The teachings of great philosophers and sages have inspired generations, touching many lives across the world. Many great civilizations grew up in this part of the world—and greatness of those civilizations are unshakable foundations of our society. And those civilizations still resonate in our journey toward modernity. Our region has a richness of dedication and diligence. Our ancestors were able to build on those attributes and achieved progress while the rest of the world was still in the darker shadows and deeper slumber. 

And our forebears—they were not only the thinkers. They were innovators, and visionaries whose contribution is a legacy to Asia as well as the world. When I say these, it is not to say that all was well all the times in the history of the region. We had our share of turbulence and challenges. We saw the darker phases. We saw people being subject to deprivation and tyranny. Societies were unequal and fractured due to the stifling cages of discriminatory societal norms.  

But despite this, the ray of hope, the beam of wisdom and light for innovation was never extinguished in the region. The rise and resurgence of Asia today is based on this civilizational foundation. 

Today, the responsibility is ours to carry that torch, to build on the path laid down by our ancestors, and to expand the frontiers of human progress. And, in this direction, I admire the headway being made by China, her people and institutions like Peking University.

The world today talks of decay in democracy, or democracy in retreat. These trends implore us to ask broader questions—what exactly is democracy? When does democracy really deliver? Has democracy been able to rise beyond mere cosmetics? Does one size fits all in the name of democracy?

Often, the notion of democracy has been confined to binary boxes. Often, the process of democracy has been confined to a few cosmetic checklists. Often, the understanding of democracy has been truncated—with lopsided focus on single aspects of electing the representatives. 

Then how do we see a bigger picture? 

We must envision democracy as not merely a political framework but also a social system—one that upholds the dignity of every individual, inspires a sense of boundless potential, and fosters an environment of safety and security for all. 

While taking forward the ideas of democracy, debates emerged regarding its class character, leading to the distinction between what is often termed ‘Old’ and ‘New’ democracy. In ‘Old’ democracy, a privileged class—often referred to as the bourgeoisie—took the lead, while the toiling masses remained subordinate throughout the process of political transformation. 

In contrast, ‘New’ democracy saw the working class take the forefront, collaborating with oppressed and exploited groups from various strata of society. Historically, Nepali society and the economy bore strong feudal characteristics. For centuries, the country was ruled by a hereditary monarchy, often disconnected from the aspirations and needs of its people. During the 104 years of Rana oligarchy, while the rest of the world witnessed profound modernization, Nepal remained isolated. This period is often regarded as a ‘lost century’ in Nepal’s quest for democracy and development.

Nepal’s journey to political transformation stands as a unique model in global history. Unlike many movements worldwide, where political struggles were predominantly led by parties representing a single class, Nepal's political revolution was a collaborative effort, uniting representatives from competing classes.

The dawn of democracy began in Nepal in 1951 with the overthrow of the Rana autocracy after years of relentless struggle. But in 1961, monarchy recaptured absolute power and banned the political parties and imposed the partyless ‘Panchayat-system’. 

Yet, the resilience of the Nepali people prevailed, and the political movement of 1990 restored multiparty democracy, heralding a new era. Yet, that tryst with democracy proved to be fleeting. An armed conflict that erupted in 1996 inflicted immense human suffering and plunged the nation into further instability. The king, who ascended the throne following the mysterious royal massacre, once again seized absolute power, curtailing freedoms and undermining democratic progress. 

However, through our unwavering commitment to a home-grown peace process, this dark and tumultuous decade drew to a close in 2006 with ‘Comprehensive Peace Accord’.  In 2008, the monarchy was abolished, and in 2015, a highly progressive constitution was adopted, written by elected representatives. This historic document, rooted in the principles of social justice, has become a cornerstone of Nepal's democratic transformation.

Nepal’s political history is unique in the sense that both major political forces—left leaning and the right leaning—when they divide, monarchy usurps more power; yet, when united, they have consistently succeeded in subduing autocracy and advancing people’s freedom.

The post 1990s political landscape is shaped by these two distinct forces. In different junctures of Nepali history, different forces emerged as determining political actors: Rana versus king, king versus political parties, constitutional force versus violent force. Eventually, extremism perished when two parties—Nepali Congress and CPN -UML representing two trends together stabilized the political landscape.

At different milestones, these political parties demonstrated enough vision and maturity to forge alliances against autocracy. What I am sharing with you today is the story of our struggle for freedom, the story of transformation of our polity, the story of perseverance and resilience of Nepali people. 

Guided by the philosophy of Marxism, and under the visionary leadership of the People’s Leader Madan Bhandari, my party developed the principle of People's Multi-Party Democracy (PMD). 

PMD consists of synthesis of three key dimensions of the people’s struggles in Nepal: patriotism, social change, and democracy. 

The PMD, initially presented as the program of the Nepali revolution, sought the development of national capital and the transformation of the mode of production. It envisioned a constitution, written by the people themselves, as they are sovereign authority. 

This vision of comprehensive democracy embraces the political, economic, social and cultural aspects to empower the individual and society. At the economic sphere –mere rights to make choices won't suffice. Let’s be honest about this––for a vast number of people living in deprivation, the freedom to choose doesn’t mean much. Sustainable development and shared prosperity should empower people to expand their choices while ensuring social justice. 

In the socio-cultural sphere––tolerance and compassion are the key pillars. The first and last line of defence of democracy should be built in the minds of people––in their values, in their way of living.  

There is another equally important aspect of human life which implores us for the vision of comprehensive democracy. And that is the expanding frontier of technology. 

What if the unfolding of technological revolution ends up creating a large segment of people who become ‘irrelevant’ for the job market? Won’t such a marginalization of humans be a recipe for disaster?

Any scenario of that kind will not only be morally hollow but will also be socially disturbing and politically unfair. Democracy cannot thrive in the echo-chambers built by algorithms of new technology. 

My vision of ‘Comprehensive Democracy’ measures success not merely by economic growth but by the well-being of its people. And I see such a broader appreciation of democracy in President Xi’s vision of the “whole process people’s democracy”, which is rooted in China’s historical traditions, culture, and socio-economic development. 

The vision championed by the Communist Party of China, the way its party cadre are selected and promoted, are the pragmatic practice of democracy and meritocracy. CPC stands as a compelling testament to the idea that "one size does not fit all" in the name of democracy.

With our political issues mostly settled, we are wholeheartedly and single-mindedly focused on socio-economic transformation. We have instilled our vision in our constitution that envisions building a “socialism oriented” society. At this period of time, we are striving to lay robust foundations for a model of socialism uniquely tailored to our needs and aspirations.

We have encapsulated socialism with Nepali characteristics in our national aspiration––"Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepali!’ This aspiration is built on the pillars of economic equity and societal well-being.

For us, prosperity means economic growth with equity—ensuring a level playing field for all, equitable access to quality education and healthcare as fundamental rights and providing social safety nets and empowering marginalized communities. 

Achieving this requires––robust democratic institutions that ensure political stability, good governance, and transparency, fostering a culture of trust and social harmony.

Cultivating a culture of democracy and participation at every level of society strengthens social cohesion and peace—prerequisites for collective happiness. 

This vision aspires to harmonize both material progress and the well-being of all. Nepal and China, the lands of Buddha and Confucius, share a rich history of harmonious coexistence and enduring friendship. As trusted neighbours and steadfast partners, our two nations collaborate closely in various areas of mutual interest.  

Nepal remains deeply committed to the ‘One China Principle’, a consensus upheld by all political parties in the country. We admire the visionary initiatives of President Xi such as the Belt and Road Initiative in the spirit of shared prosperity and win-win cooperation. China has lifted 800m of its people out of poverty and set an inspiring example of ‘prosperity with happiness’, where growth encompasses well-being and equity. 

China’s miraculous economic development offers valuable lessons for Nepal as it embarks on its own developmental journey. Together, Nepal and China can envision a future of shared prosperity and enduring friendship, inspired by mutual respect and the pursuit of a better world for all.

Excerpts from the speech delivered at Peking University 

Nepal and China have signed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Cooperation Framework. The agreement was signed today in Beijing.

Acting Foreign Secretary Amrit Bahadur Rai and China's National Development and Reform Commission's Deputy Head Liu Sushe signed the document on behalf of their respective sides.

The signing ceremony took place on the third day of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's four-day official visit to the People's Republic of China at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang.

Nepal and China have signed various bilateral agreements in presence of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. PM Oli is presently on a four-day official visit to China, beginning Monday.

The signing of agreements followed a bilateral meeting between the premiers of both neighbors.

The documents signed and exchanged by the both sides are: Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, Letter of Exchange on Tokha-Chhahare Tunnel, MoU on Trade Promotion Cooperation, Protocol on Requirements on Thermally Processed Buffalo Meat Products to be Exported from Nepal to China, MoU on Development Plan (2024-2029) and Letter of Exchange on Cash Assistance.

Similarly, additional agreements signed today include Handover Certificate of the Completion of the Reconstruction of Nine-storey Basantapur Tower, MoU on Volunteer Chinese Language Teachers, and MoU between Public Service Broadcasting Nepal Television and China Media Group, according to Foreign Ministry's Spokesperson Krishna Prasad Dhakal.  

Spokesperson Dhakal said that both sides on the occasion held discussions on expansion of connectivity, industrial and infrastructure development, cooperation in health, agriculture, trade, tourism, investment, science and technology, sports, disaster management, people-to-people relations between the two countries and enhancement of mutual cooperation in poverty alleviation.

Nepal and the People's Republic of China have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) related to cooperation and collaboration in various eight areas including trade promotion and exchange of technical assistance in the presence of the Prime Ministers of both countries today.

The MoU on mutual collaboration was inked after the bilateral meeting between Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People.

Prime Minister Oli is currently in Beijing in connection with a four-day official visit to China.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army presented a guard of honor to PM Oli before the bilateral meeting.

The Nepali delegation led by Prime Minister Oli arrived in the Chinese capital on Monday.

Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli left for Beijing, China on Monday.

He left for China at the cordial invitation of Chinese Premier Li Qiang.

Tourism Minister Badri Prasad Pandey, Deputy Chief at the Nepal-based Chinese Embassy Wang Sin and chief of security agencies among others bade farewell to the Prime Minister.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Oli will call on Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

Prime Minister Oli will hold talks with his Chinese counterpart Li Qiang and exchange views on various issues of mutual interest.

Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress Zhao Leji is also scheduled to call on Prime Minister Oli.

Prime Minister Oli is scheduled to address a program at Peking University during the visit.

He is also scheduled to address the Nepal-China Business Forum to be jointly organized by the Embassy of Nepal in Beijing, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

PM Oli was accompanied by his spouse Radhika Shakya.

The Nepali delegation includes Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Arzu Rana Deuba, PM's Chief Advisor Bishnu Prasad Rimal, Economic and Development Advisor Dr Yubaraj Khatiwada, parliamentarians, high-ranking government officials, private sector representatives and media persons.

The PM-led delegation is scheduled to return home on December 5.

Rivers and mountains have been and will continue to be an enduring feature of Nepal-China friendship. Rugged terrains and rare rough patches in bilateral relationship notwithstanding, people-to-people exchanges between the two countries have thrived and will, in all likelihood, continue to thrive in the coming days, years and ages. The visit of Faxian to Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha, in the fifth century, the visit of Xuanzang in the seventh century, the marriage of Nepali Princess Vrikuti with King Songtsen Gampo in the seventh century and the visit of Nepali monk Buddhabhadra, the first Nepali monk to visit China, in the fifth century and the contributions of Nepali artist Arniko in China, including the construction of the White Pagoda, are among the key highlights of these exchanges.

Nepali people, including those living in the Himalayan region, have thriving relations with the Chinese people. They get their supplies from nearby Chinese markets, graze their cattle in pastures across the border in accordance with mutual arrangements, sell their products across the border and often find their soulmates there.

About 70 years ago, our two ancient countries established (updated, rather) their diplomatic relations. These years have also been marked by peace and amity between the two neighbors, with no major dispute, border or otherwise. This relationship achieved a key milestone during this time with the construction of the Kodari highway that has played a key role in improving connectivity between our two countries. Yet another highlight of this relationship is increasing Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. 

Against this backdrop, recent times have seen a disturbing tendency of dragging China’s flagship BRI project into controversy. They are as strong as the soaring mountains and as dynamic as the rivers born there. 

China can help Nepal tap the potential of her rivers for injecting life into her economy by investing in or providing assistance for the construction of multipurpose projects with hydropower, irrigation, navigation, fisheries and drinking water as components. There is also a huge scope for transformation of fossil fuel-run transport systems into green energy-run systems.  It can also help make sure that Gautam Buddha International Airport and Pokhara International Airport take off in a real sense.

On its part, Nepal will continue to be sensitive toward Chinese security concerns and abide by the principle of Panchsheel.      

In summary, Nepal-China relationship has a huge scope. Let’s hope that Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s upcoming visit to China will be yet another step in realizing that scope. 

The Kaligandaki Corridor serves as a direct route connecting India and China.

This nationally significant project links the renowned Muktinath Temple in Mustang with Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha, boosting both religious and cultural tourism.

Indian tourists have increasingly begun using the corridor to visit Muktinath, making it the most efficient route for their pilgrimage. According to Harihar Sharma, Deputy Mayor of Jaimini Municipality, the corridor also connects tourists from the Kaligandaki coastal area to Lumbini.

“The face of Baglung has transformed due to the southern corridor, which is currently undergoing blacktopping,” Sharma noted. The corridor includes a 44-kilometer stretch in Baglung, passing through Balewa, Kushmisera, and Jaidi, before connecting to Gulmi via Chhisti Chhischilo.

“The corridor has opened the door to South Baglung's development. Roads have been paved within five years of its opening. Indian tourists can now access Muktinath, while Chinese tourists can reach Lumbini, fostering trilateral trade relations,” Sharma added.

Since the corridor’s expansion, large cargo trucks and tourist buses have started arriving at Muktinath from Gaindakot via Jaiminidham, Baglung Kalika, and Panchakot. Once road paving is complete, the corridor is expected to see significant traffic, making it the shortest route for travelers entering Baglung, Myagdi, and Mustang from India.

According to local resident Sanam Rana, the convergence of the Kaligandaki Corridor and the Mid-Hill Highway in Baglung will further enhance tourism development in the region.

In the five years since its opening, various segments of the 495-kilometer corridor—extending from Gaindakot to the Korala border crossing with China—have been rapidly upgraded and paved. Inaugurated in 2018 with support from the Nepali Army, the corridor now enables Chinese tourists to travel to Lumbini through this route.

The corridor, planned 24 years ago, is progressing toward completion. It is being developed in two key sections: the 224-kilometer Gaidakot-Ramdi-Maldhunga segment, and the 255-kilometer Maldhunga-Beni-Jomsom segment. According to Kalpana Adhikari, Chief of the Kaligandaki Corridor Gaindakot-Maldhunga Project Office, 162 kilometers, or 67 percent, of the Gaidakot-Maldhunga segment has already been blacktopped.

The corridor has significantly simplified travel from Lumbini to Mansarovar via Muktinath. Campaigner Tikaram Dhakal anticipates further accessibility improvements after the road paving is complete.

With the corridor’s activation, Indian pilgrims are now traveling to Muktinath via the Ruru region, while Dhakal highlights the need to attract Buddhist pilgrims from China to Lumbini, the sacred birthplace of Lord Gautam Buddha.

The corridor, envisioned from Gulmi 24 years ago, connects several prominent pilgrimage sites, including Triveni Dham, Devghat Dham, Keladi Dham, Ramdighat, Ranighat, Rudrabeni, Setiveni, Purti Ghat, Jyamrighat, Palpa Bhairabhsthan, Baglung Kalika, Galeshwor Dham, Kagbeni, Muktinath, and Damodar Kunda.

CPN (Maoist Center) Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal on Thursday made a pointed statement, accusing Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli of “playing the China card” by choosing to visit China before India. In an interview with The Hindu, former Prime Minister Dahal criticized Oli’s upcoming China visit, calling it a deliberate attempt to court Beijing, which he deemed misguided. Dahal also suggested that India-Nepal relations are strained due to the new government’s policies and cautioned that tensions over border disputes could resurface.

Dahal highlighted his own efforts to strengthen India-Nepal ties during his 18-month tenure, which ended in July. Oli is scheduled to travel to Beijing for an official visit in early December, preceded by a preparatory trip by Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba at the end of this month.

Apparently, the planned visit is no music to the ears of New Delhi and other international observers. . Historically, Indian policymakers and think tanks have accused Nepali leaders of leveraging the ‘China card’ to sidestep India’s influence, a notion dating back to 1950. Although Indian analysts often claim Nepal uses its ties with China strategically, Nepali leaders deny this characterization.

Dahal’s comments have drawn sharp criticism from the ruling CPN-UML. Bishnu Rijal, the party’s Central Committee member, labeled Dahal’s remarks as ‘anti-Nepal’ and damaging to the country’s self-esteem, adding that such statements could provoke tensions with neighboring countries. Rijal further claimed that Dahal’s comments reflect frustration over the fall of his government in July and expose his divisive views on Nepal’s two largest neighbors.

Dahal’s statement is also likely to provoke Prime Minister Oli and his coalition partner, the Nepali Congress. Since the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, Nepal’s political and diplomatic circles have actively debated the ‘China card’ issue, with leaders reiterating that Nepal aims to maintain balanced relations with both India and China.

As Oli’s administration accelerates preparations for the China visit, the trip has captured the attention of media and experts in both New Delhi and Beijing. Qian Feng, director at Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute, told the Global Times that Nepal’s cooperation with China does not necessarily imply a shift away from India, stressing that ties with both neighbors can coexist harmoniously.

Oli’s agenda for the Beijing trip reportedly includes discussions on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the implementation of previous agreements between Nepal and China.

Nepal’s diplomatic balancing act with India and China isn’t new. Nihar Nayak, an expert on Nepal-China relations, describes in his book Strategic Himalayas how King Mahendra effectively leveraged the ‘China card’ in the 1950s and 60s, a policy later continued by his son, King Gyanendra. Nayak notes that Gyanendra’s tilt toward China, including his moves at the 13th SAARC summit and his arms purchases from China and Pakistan, exemplified efforts to reduce Nepal’s reliance on India. According to Nayak, even some Maoist leaders have attempted to play the ‘China card’ in recent years, albeit unsuccessfully.