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Tens of thousands of Nepali speakers in India’s north-eastern state of Assam feel let down by the upgraded National Register of Citizens (NRC) of India that was published on August 31. (Assam is the first Indian state to upgrade its NRC compo­nent.) As many as 80,000 Nepali speakers have been excluded from this NRC list and they are worried about being stateless. But Ganga Poudel, vice-pres­ident of the Gorkha Develop­ment Council, says all hope is not lost. Anyone excluded from the final list has 120 days to appeal against the decision through a foreigner’s tribunal. Poudel says he would do all he can to help those whose names did not appear on the list.

A total of around 31.1 million people in the state had applied to have their names listed, but about 1.9 million people were excluded. Most of them are people who migrated to Assam from Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Poudel says those people whose citizen­ship is questionable or whose surnames differ from those of their parents or children have been left out.

As many as 2.5 million Nepali-speaking people live in Assam. About 25 percent of them were missing from an earlier draft list. “We were confident that these names would appear on the final list, but that did not happen,” says Poudel. He adds that some may be rendered stateless if they are not able to submit certain documents to prove residency.

Indian media have men­tioned that if the victims do not get justice in international courts, they can knock on the doors of the Indian High Court and Supreme Court. Many independent bodies claim that although this option is available, as many as 25,000 Nepali-speakers would still not make it to the list. Those whose names did not appear on the list could be arrested and detained. But Assam’s Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal says that just because their names are not on the list does not mean they will be taken into custody.

Assam shares borders with Bhutan and Bangladesh and is considered a sensitive state. The Indian government claims that there is illegal trafficking of humans and animals into the state. It says the list was updated in order to check ille­gal immigrants from Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Secu­rity in Assam has been beefed up since the publication of the list.

There are Nepalis in every district of Assam. The major­ity of residents in Surajpur district are Nepalis, and there is a big group of people from western Nepal in Kamrup metropolis.

The All Assam Gorkha Stu­dent Union has asked for a thorough investigation as it believes the list is flawed. Pres­ident Prem Tamang has been protesting the process of cre­ating this list from the start, claiming that it discriminates against Nepali speakers.

According to the 2011 population census, there are about 31.1 million people in the 33 districts of Assam.

State visits are the highest level of diplomatic engage­ment between two sovereign countries. They signal the two are in good terms, value one another, and want to further bilateral ties. By visiting Nepal four times in the five years of his first term as the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi conveyed the great value he placed on Nepal-India ties. (Of course, he wouldn’t have come if these trips also didn’t boost his pro-Hindu credentials and his image of a globally recognized statesman back home.) Modi had come to Nepal within two months of becoming prime minister in May 2014. In his second inning, he hasn’t been here for three months. Even in this short time, Modi has already visited nine countries, including making state visits to other neighborhood countries like the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan. This suggests something is amiss in Nepal-India relations, which is also why India has refused to accept the joint EPG report. Perhaps it was Nepal’s reluctance to make an official statement in recognition of India’s recent decision on Jammu & Kashmir—unlike the Maldives and Bhutan. Per­haps the Indians are unhappy with the growing proximity of the Nepali political class with the Chinese. Or perhaps Modi sees no personal benefit in visiting Nepal after his second electoral victory.

By contrast, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will be in Kathmandu on September 8 to pave the way for the long-awaited Nepal visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Again, a state visit is also a lot of signaling. So, if Xi comes, will it be an unmistakable sign of exemplary Nepal-China ties? Not nec­essarily. It will be more a case of the Chinese wanting to give a clear message to other powers that it is still a potent force in Nepal. The message is aimed less at the Indians (whom the Chinese still see as their ‘juniors’) than at the Americans (whose success the Chinese want to emulate in every field). The unfolding of the military-centric Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in Nepal is a big bother up north.

Xi, with his penchant for grandeur, could announce some big projects in Nepal, including in PM Oli’s home district of Jhapa. And Xi will be warmly received. Whatever the per­sonal calculations of individual NCP leaders, as a political party, they are unanimous about the urgency of enhanc­ing relations with China. This is why a priority of the new National Security Policy is to ‘prevent another blockade’ at any cost. This, in the reckoning of the ruling communist party grandees, will be possible only through more balance between India and China.

Xi’s Kathmandu trip could also hasten Modi’s, in what will be his first since his reelection. India and China are not openly confrontational these days. Yet they have also come to view each other as natural adversaries in South Asia jostling for influence in the region, particularly after India’s embrace of the IPS. The Indian political leadership will not let its tra­ditional sway in the region wane easily. Now that the Nepali foreign minister has spoken in favor of India’s stand on J&K, Modi will have an added incentive to visit Nepal. But after the fanfare that will surround Xi’s visit, Nepal will be under pressure to match it when Modi comes to town.

 Kathmandu was not densely populated in those days. Singha Durbar was surrounded by fields where one could hear jack­als howl at night. It was not easy to go to and come back from Singha Durbar in the middle of the night. There were no taxis and lawmakers had no private vehicles. Except for a few elites, almost everybody com­muted on foot. “Once all the members of the House of Representatives assembled on the midnight of 30 June 1959, the Secretary read out the following letter received from the Chief Sec­retary of the King. To begin House proceedings, we have nominated Giri Prasad Budathoki as the exec­utive chairperson,” states a parlia­mentary record.

King Mahendra had felt a sense of alarm after the Congress won a two-third majority in the country’s first parliamentary election. From the very beginning, he was into expand­ing the circle of people critical of the Congress. The first example of that was the nomination of the party’s loudest critics to the upper house of parliament. On the nomination list was Dil Bahadur Shrestha, who had lost in the election. Others like Surya Bahadur Thapa, Nagendra Prasad Rijal, Mukti Nath Sharma, Chandra Man Thakali, Pashupati Ghosh, and Tsering Tenzin Lama, all of whom had been defeated in the polls, ended up becoming members of the upper house. Well-known Con­gress denouncers like Bharat Mani Sharma, Bal Chandra Sharma and Laxman Jung Bahadur Singh were among those chosen by the king. Differences between Mahendra and BP had arisen ever since the time of the upper house nomination.

King Mahendra adopted a policy of promoting whoever reviled BP the most. Bishwa Bandhu Thapa, the then Congress whip had once told me, “King Mahendra wanted to belittle BP at any cost. But instead of doing that himself, he used oth­ers. The palace has a habit of find­ing people to malign those it does not approve of, while managing to maintain a veneer of respectability for itself.”

Mahendra was afraid of being a ruler in name only as long as BP was prime minister. His primary interest was to rule the country directly. To that end, Mahendra was keen on using his loyalists to discredit the prime minister and the parliamen­tary system.

When BP was appointed prime minister, the palace started conspiring against the Congress from within the party itself. It brought into its fold Dr Tulsi Giri and Bishwa Bandhu Thapa, who were close to BP. It started invit­ing lawmakers for lunch and rous­ing them to go against the govern­ment. King Mahendra was eager to use anyone he could find—from hermits to spies—in order make the government a failure.

On 30 January 1960, he went on a tour of western Nepal, where he said in a speech: “I also want to tell you that I have certain duties, such as protecting the sovereignty, nationality and other interests of the country. Never ever will I quit doing whatever it takes to clear any hurdle in safeguarding such inter­ests—for which I want every Nepali’s support.”

A series of such speeches had prompted speculation that Mahen­dra would dissolve the government. The number of people unwilling to pay taxes and registering complaints with the palace against the govern­ment was on the rise.

Prime Minister Koirala had also suspected a conspiracy against him. Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Subarna Shumsher, who was on a visit to Calcutta, had told BP that the king was planning a coup, but because the date of the British queen’s visit to Nepal had already been set, he probably would not mount it before that. Before leaving for Calcutta, Subarna Shumsher had told BP that he would discuss the king’s plan with him in detail once he returns to Kathmandu. The British queen was scheduled to visit Nepal on 26 February 1961. The Congress had guessed that a coup against a democratic government would not take place on the eve of the visit of a country’s queen where the parliamentary system was born. The prediction turned out to be stupendously wrong O

Next week’s ‘Vault of history’ column will discuss the immediate aftermath of the royal coup

Nepal has over the past few years seen growing penetration of the US and China in its military. India has always been the primary outside military force in Nepal, as well as a major defense supplier. Now there are new actors in the fray, raising concerns that Nepal could find itself entangled in the military components of the American Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Chinese BRI. Kamal Dev Bhattarai talked to Deepak Prakash Bhatta, a security expert and lawmaker of the ruling Nepal Communist Party.  

There is much talk of the IPS in Nepal these days. Some argue that as it is a military strategy, Nepal should not subscribe to it.

When we talk about our relationship with the wider world or with a specific country like America, we first need to first be aware of our current political and economic situations as well as of our priorities. The current government leadership does not have a clear working modality on this. First, we need to formulate a national development policy and on that basis our security, foreign and other policies can be developed. Only after the formulation of this development policy will we be able to evaluate our relations with India, China, the US, and frame our national interests. Then we can start a discourse on the role of China’s BRI, the US’ IPS and India’s ‘Make in India’ in Nepal’s development process.

Again, our government does not have a clear policy on how to derive maximum benefit from the IPS, largely because we do not have a national development policy. The US has listed us among its IPS partners but alliances are their necessity. Our necessity is not a military alliance. I see this as a continuation of America’s pivot or rebalancing policy and it falls under the grand strategy of maintaining the status of ‘America First’. We should not be troubled by such a strategy. We should rather collaborate with the US even while we continue to work within vibrant regional frameworks. We should learn to strike a balance.

Is the US trying to drag Nepal into a costly military strategy?

From the American perspective, trying to get Nepal into its military orbit is normal. But accepting some military support should also not be seen as an acceptance of a military alliance. At the same time, we are conducting joint military exercises with India, China and other countries on specific issues such as engineering, information technology, and terrorism. But despite having a stable government, we have not made our position clear. We go to whoever invites us, and if there is criticism, we have a tendency of saying that we went there unknowingly.

America’s military influence and interest seems to have increased in Nepal of late. What could be the reason?

With the goal of retaining its global superiority in the current multi-polar world, the US is working to create new alliances and bases. After the conclusion of our peace process, we have seen more US activities here. Through the IPS, and by projecting India as its champion in the region, America wants to promote democracy and its principles and it expects India will remain its strategic partner in the region. But it is not easy to make an alliance with India, unlike with, say, Pakistan. India also looks after its own economic and strategic interests.

Sometimes, we analyze things by projecting ourselves as an important player. The reality is that we are indeed in an important place but we are yet to develop any kind of national capacity. It may also be a compulsion of big powers to show that Nepal is in their area of influence. This is not a propaganda issue. We should not be in a hurry at the policy level.

Nepal’s old defense partners were India and the US. How do you see China’s new role as a military partner of Nepal?

China has an aggressive presence not only in Nepal. But the crux of matter is how we move ahead. As our threats multiple, our military and strategic alliance with China will further increases.

Does the BRI have greater security and strategic than economic components?

Some western countries are asking us to question the BRI, citing the issues of debt-trap and sovereignty. They have come up with policy papers on the BRI and its implications. On the other hand, China has invested heavily in science and technology. When a powerful country comes up with such a grand strategy, the military component figures prominently. Therefore, the BRI has a military component and there is a desire to engage militarily. The military component has also been mobilized through private security companies.    

There is a competition between the BRI and the IPS. Under the BRI, new infrastructures are being built. China has the Shanghai Economic Cooperation (SCO) which deals with broader regional and international issues. Under the BRI, China is inviting more and more countries for discussion. As a backup structure, China has the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. Top positions of this bank are occupied by citizens of other countries. For some time, we should be open to development projects under both the BRI and the IPS.  We can benefit from other big economies too. We should go beyond India, China and the US.

So we should cooperate with the IPS and the BRI despite their clear military and strategic components?

They obviously have military and strategic components. But we cannot have a policy of going one step forward and two back. There is a tendency of us stepping back based on the reaction of one country to our engagement with another country. With such a flawed approach, we will get nowhere. We cannot remain aloof in this inter-dependent world.

How should Nepal should collaborate with Chinese militarily?

There should be sectoral collaboration with Chinese military in areas such as medicine, engineering, intelligence, terrorism, and disaster management. We need collaboration in all these sectors because if we face a disaster tomorrow, India and China will be first countries to help us. We should look for compatibility. We should be in a position of responding to them when they come to assist us. Similarly, we may face new security threats and challenges, further boosting military collaboration with China.

In this context, how should Nepal reform its security bodies?

We should first discuss the right size of our army. If development is a key priority for the next 10 years, how many army battalions do we need for such development? There is no clarity on how we are going to mobilize our security forces. During army integration, there was the talk of creating a separate directorate for development-related activities. I don’t know what happened to it.  

Is it right to say our defense collaboration with India is stuck while such collaboration with China is increasing?

First, we are going to establish a National Defense University. We are working to produce knowledge. We already have a war-college. The Armed Police Force has a Masters’ course at its commanding staff college. In Nepal Police, the academy is extremely capable. So we have a good understanding of our security discourse. 

In the past, there was dependency on India in the area of study; now we are diversifying. As far as the perception that Nepal is tilting towards China is concerned, the situation is different. I just returned from China. The Chinese say they are ready to do many things here if only Nepal can come up with concrete plans. Indian media often says Nepal is tilting towards China, which is not true.

What could be repercussions of major powers continuing to increase their penetration in Nepal Army?

In terms of our economy and our investment in the security sector, we are not in a position of exerting ourselves militarily. The threats and challenges of cyber world are increasing. We alone cannot fight these challenges. So we need collaboration. In the digital world, we need to cooperate with all three big powers we are talking about. Their presence will be more pertinent in coming days because they are coming up with technology-driven policies and strategies.

How do you read the new national security policy?

This is the second edition of the national security policy. The first edition had come during the transition from the interim constitution to the new constitution and subsequent implementation of federalism. We have already adopted a federal structure and province-level discussions about possible security challenges of the provinces would have been fruitful. For example, Province 2 is connected only with India while Province 6 is connected only with China. But the whole of our country is connected with both India and China. Similarly, the least developed Sudurpaschim province is connected with both India and China. National security discussion should thus be made more vibrant. There should be discussions in the national security council on Nepal’s relations with emerging and big powers, as well as issue-specific discussions. I think there has been a hurry while finalizing the document.

The policy has identified blockade as a major threat to national security. What is your take?

The two latest national crises we faced were the earthquake and the blockade. If we want to decrease our dependence on the country that imposed the blockade, our focus should be on the finalization of the national development policy. The draft laws on the new national security council are not in line with the constitution. All these show we are working in haste. We are suffering from the hangover of short-lived governments that could do no long-term planning.