Submit your Article

A research recently published by Christopher K Colley for the Stimson Center, an American think tank, nudged me to contemplate doing something I have never done before: Write a piece on foreign policy centered on Nepal from the perspective of Beijing. 

The paper, The Emerging Great Game Chinese, Indian and American Engagement in South Asia, is interesting, though not much in terms of its quite narrow and limited recommendations on how the USA can better counter the existing regional dynamics over the region. 

Instead, it is of great value for its fairly balanced analysis of what China, India and the USA have been doing (or not doing) in order to assert their positions in Kathmandu and Dhaka. 

Colley, an assistant professor of International Security Studies at the United States Air War College, highlights how ably China has been capable of outpowering its two big rivals in Nepal.

At the same time, the author, quite correctly, underscores that it has not been entirely all smooth sailing for Beijing. 

China has been overtly perceived to favor the leftist parties, which recently formed a new coalition, a tactic that can often backfire.

Indeed, the political instability in Kathmandu and the overall volatility of national politics is at least partially induced by the same game that Beijing learned so ably from other foreign powers jockeying for influence in Nepal. 

And it is a sort of chain reaction: As China steps up its game, more push backs and initiatives are put in place by its rivals to offset its increasingly more vocal foreign policy in Nepal. 

But connectivity and infrastructure are the elements that have been so central to Beijing’s approach to both Nepal and Bangladesh (and by extension to the entire world) and that have been distinguishing it from other big players. 

We need to give credit to Beijing that the Belt and Road Initiative is certainly very ambitious, perhaps even too much. 

Symbolically speaking, the BRI has been extremely important because it offered a clear vision of a future based on connectivity and with it comes a very clear and eye-catching narrative. 

No matter the confusion attached to the BRI, what really counts is that the Chinese were able to portray it as a game-changer initiative that is still unmatched by other geopolitical rivals. 

At the same time, though, concrete results and benefits on this front, as Colley explains, are mostly still to be seen on the ground in both nations. 

In this regard, it is still remarkable that Kathmandu and Beijing have not signed the implementation framework of the BRI as yet.  

India has been trying with its Look East Policy but, beyond the fact that it has never been focused on Nepal, the initiative is more like a strategy rather than a concrete, tangible initiative like the BRI.

The EU Global Gateway Initiative not only was designed very lately and it is still in its infancy, it’s still very far from being relevant and certainly did not make a mark in Nepal 

The USA does not have any infrastructure programs in the region. Unless we consider the highly complex and possibly impractical India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor (IMEC) signed last year during the India G20, it is a joint venture with the European Union and seven other countries. 

Considering the unrivaled level of connectivity projects China aims to build in Nepal, Beijing should do a much better job in terms of outreach. 

Students, civil society and think tanks in Nepal should be engaged to better explain not only the BRI but also the more recently launched Global Civilization Initiative that still remains a mystery for many observers. 

This public outreach will probably be met with similar attempts by the USA and India while I am not entirely confident that the EU can be up to playing this game. 

China could also get out of its comfort zone and explain its human rights approach.

It knows, in advance, that the primacy of economic rights, a cornerstone of China’s official policies, can be relatively well received here but with some caveats. 

On the one hand, the Chinese model of top-down governance centered on effectiveness of policies and quick delivery of results can easily find admirers in Nepal, a country plagued by ineffective governance. 

On the other hand, in a nation that fought tooth and tooth for its freedoms in its decades-long quest for democracy, not once but multiple times, the same argument of the primacy of economic rights over political and civil liberties won’t go very far nor persuade the majority. 

Even a much more proactive PR and public engagement with the citizenry of the country won’t be enough. 

Such activities should also be matched by what really matters: A change in substance in China’s overall approach to Nepal and by extension, in the way it traditionally deals with developing nations around the world. 

It is now crystal clear that the Nepali side has been quite skillful at pushing back in terms of terms and conditions that Beijing has been offering for the BRI projects.

A country like Nepal, often portrayed as a weak nation, has been doing a masterful job at asserting its own strategic interest in its relationships with China.

So, if China really wants a breakthrough with Kathmandu, it has to show a much higher level of flexibility on how the BRI can be rolled out. 

It needs to accept the key terms, quite reasonable if you think about it, that Nepal is demanding: Grants and very nominal interest rates on the loans that it needs to take. 

Beijing should be much more effective and persuasive at explaining how it can really be transformative for Nepal to have a direct railways connection with its southern borders.  

Considering the staggering sums involved and the sheer complexity of the undertaking, it is obvious that Kathmandu does not want to incur huge debts.

Could Nepal offer China a new template on how to deal with the world, a much less rigid one and more attuned to the needs of the recipient nations? 

The Dragon Boat race on the occasion of the Chinese New Year was a big boost for the image of China in the country.

Yet it is not nearly enough to dispel some of the concerns that many harbor toward Beijing. 

It would not be surprising if an increasing number of people in Nepal start showing some annoyance toward China using the same heavy-handed approach that New Delhi has been, for so long, accused of. 

For sure, Nepal does not need neither big brothers nor big sisters. 

It needs reliable partners that, while overtly and covertly pursuing their strategic interests, also allow Nepal to play the same game by maximizing its own national priorities.

This means to be okay with the fact that Kathmandu might also and, very respectfully, say “no” to them as they do not align with its core interests . 

Accepting this new reality means that Nepal is growing and moving steadfastly toward becoming a developed nation, a country that is not afraid of exerting its own sovereign interests. 

It will also imply that its core partners have been effective at fulfilling what should be their primary mission in Nepal: Helping the nation to stand more confidently and more ambitiously on its own feet. 

The author writes about politics, human rights and development in Nepal and the Asia-Pacific

Information technology has become one of the most rapidly developing fields, and every business organization, nation, and many other institutions are shifting toward digitalization. It has become a blessing for all, transforming the traditional approaches to business, bureaucracy and working culture into digital formats. There was a time when sensitive and confidential government information was kept in books and on paper, but now, from the central to the local level, government organizations are increasingly digitized. The government’s responsibility is to protect confidential and sensitive data, as well as important infrastructure, from cyberthreats.

Cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy have become major topics of discussion in public forums, yet concrete steps and a clear path have not been established by policymakers. These discussions should be prioritized by Nepal's think tanks, policymakers, parliament, cabinet, and bureaucracy. However, they have not yet become top agendas for these stakeholders. There is an increasing rate of cybercrime in Nepal, including financial theft, identity theft, phishing attacks, cyberbullying, data breaches and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. According to records from 2022, Nepal ranked 94th on the global cybersecurity index, which measures four main criteria: Cybersecurity, economic safety, physical and infrastructure safety, and social safety.

In terms of cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy, Nepal faces challenges but also opportunities for improvement. Diplomatic agendas concerning global security diplomacy often revolve around protecting digital infrastructure, sensitive and confidential data, banks, defense systems and critical infrastructure from cyberthreats, both domestic and international. It’s crucial to recognize that safeguarding against cyberthreats isn’t solely about national sovereignty and security but also about societal well-being. The definition of protecting national sovereignty, defense, and security is evolving with technological advancements. To effectively address these challenges, Nepal needs a multi-faceted approach to cybersecurity policy. This approach should encompass technical measures, a robust policy framework, and international cooperation. By engaging with other nations and organizations, sharing best practices, and collaborating on cybersecurity initiatives, Nepal can strengthen its cybersecurity posture and better protect its digital assets and citizens.

Cybersecurity concerns are not limited to national issues; they have become global issues. Nepal should engage in diplomatic dialogue with other nations, focusing on cyber diplomacy, negotiations, and agreements to combat cyberthreats across borders. State-sponsored attacks have become increasingly common, frequently making headlines. These attacks originate from one country targeting another or from state-sponsored cyberthreat groups. Their objectives include espionage, the destruction of critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, transportation, electricity, dissemination of political messages and more.

We might have heard about the news of more than 1500 government websites going down due to a cyberthreat, which took over 3.5 hours to restore the servers. This incident marked one of the biggest cyberthreats for Nepal. It’s the responsibility of our government to protect our sensitive and confidential data. International agencies have ranked Nepal as one of the high-risk countries in terms of cyberthreats.

Nepal maintains diplomatic relations with over 100 countries and is a member of various international agencies such as the United Nations, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, SAARC, BIMSTEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Nepal should raise cyber diplomatic agendas in international forums and with other countries to protect critical infrastructure and develop international cooperation to combat cyberthreats. Situated between two digital powerhouses, India and China, Nepal can serve as a bridge for cyber dialogue and collaboration between South and East Asia. By fostering positive relationships with neighboring nations and actively engaging in regional initiatives like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Nepal can position itself as a key player in shaping the cybersecurity future of the region.

The government should prioritize the formulation of comprehensive cyber security strategies at all levels, including policymakers and think tanks. Although the Cabinet endorsed the National Cybersecurity Policy in 2023, it requires further refinement and updates to align with technological advancements. Additionally, the government should prioritize capacity-building for human resources and enhance threat intelligence sharing mechanisms. Cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy have become hot topics, and the government and its relevant departments need to take them more seriously. If we look at bureaucracy and the defense system, we are still following traditional approaches, and this agency plays a major role in cybersecurity. The government should take immediate action to amend policies, such as incorporating cybersecurity modules into the public commission examination system. Moreover, cybersecurity education should be made mandatory at the university level for all faculties, and there should be a dedicated cybersecurity examination module in the PSC examination.

Although Nepal Police has established a Cyber Bureau, there is a shortage of human resources for cyber defense. The government needs to take this matter seriously and focus on capacity-building within the Nepal Police Cyber Department and the army's defense sector. Alternatively, the government can explore public-private partnerships for cyber-defense, investigation, enforcement of cybersecurity standards, and establishing a cyber-defense task force. If these options are not feasible, the government should consider establishing a dedicated cyber-defense task force and recruiting highly skilled staff at the section officer level. Numerous well-established organizations, such as CryptoGen, Vairav Tech, Eminence Ways, Security Pall, Logpoint, and many freelancers are already engaged in similar work with international companies.

Nepal can initiate cybersecurity and cyber diplomatic agreements with SAARC nations and prioritize these agendas at the UN assembly. The objectives include exchanging cyberthreat intelligence, enhancing cyber incident response and mitigation capabilities, promoting research and development, building capacity, and pledging not to support state-sponsored attacks or target critical infrastructure systems of other nations.

Policy recommendations

• Think tank organizations such as PRI, Daayitwa, IIDS, and other stakeholders should establish dedicated departments and prioritize research and development related to cybersecurity and cyber diplomacy. They should actively advise the Nepal government on policy formation and maintain ongoing dialogue on these matters.
• The government should establish dedicated departments for cyber threat intelligence and cyber-defense, or enhance the capacity of the existing cyber bureau. It should make cybersecurity training mandatory for staff members of Nepal Police, Nepal Army, and the bureaucracy to promote awareness. Additionally, every department staff should be required to undergo security awareness training twice a year, as insider threats pose significant challenges to every office.
• Nepal government’s Department of Foreign Affairs should continue dialogue and delegations with countries that have diplomatic agreements for cyber dialogue. It should also engage in international forums to ensure compliance with global standards.
• Universities should prioritize the development of international standards and updated syllabus in the education system. They should focus on capacity-building for university students and make cybersecurity modules mandatory at the secondary and lower secondary levels.

The author is pursuing an MSc in Cybersecurity at Islington College and has over 4 years of working experience in the field of software development

The Right to Information (RTI) is widely regarded as a vital tool for citizen empowerment, governmental accountability, corruption prevention, information accuracy and fostering fairness in public discourse. The implementation of RTI is still challenging despite the RTI act promulgated over a decade and a half ago. This article delves into the current status of RTI implementation in Nepal, key progress, major challenges and the way forward.

Policy context

The concept of RTI began in Nepal’s policy landscape dates back to 1990. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal in 1990, for the first time, ensured RTI as a fundamental right. Subsequent legal milestones such as the Interim Constitution 2007, Right to Information Act 2007, Right to Information Regulation 2009 and the Constitution of Nepal-2015 have contributed to establishing RTI as a cornerstone of democracy, good governance and equity in Nepal. The 2015 constitution explicitly emphasizes “full freedom of the press” in its preamble and has included the ‘right to information (Article 27)’ as one of the fundamental rights. However, the constitution's allowance for “reasonable restrictions” lacks clear legal definition, posing a significant challenge. This ambiguity, coupled with the absence of a precise operational framework for the “protection of national interest,” could potentially empower state authorities to impede RTI. There are a few attempts of the government to impose restrictions on people’s right to information. For instance, in 2023, the government classified 87 policy areas as ‘confidential’, a move later retracted due to pressure from advocacy groups like the Federation of Nepali Journalists.

Implementation status

The RTI Act of 2007 defines entities established under the constitution, parliamentary acts, or government authority, including those receiving government, foreign, or international organization funds as public bodies. These bodies are mandated to regularly update information for public access, ensure accessibility for citizens and disseminate information through national languages and mass media. The Act requires these bodies to proactively disclose information every three months. 

Government ministries and departments are ahead on proactive disclosure compared to other entities such as political parties, NGOs/CBOs and foundations. A Nov 2023 letter from the National Information Commission (NIC), instructing courts to maintain proactive disclosure, still indicates that even courts have struggled to uphold the proactive disclosure.

Regarding information dissemination, government offices, compared to other entities such as NGOs, political parties and foundations, have performed better. Most government offices in Kathmandu disseminate a wide range of information, covering aspects such as organizational structure, duties, employee details, services offered, decision-making processes and more, through various mediums, including websites, boards, pamphlets and digital platforms. Ministries and departments also adhere to this practice, extending it to provincial and local levels. The government offices however have not been disseminating financial information, including financial transactions. NGOs, political parties and foundations are also found publishing information in various platforms, but their information is more to showcase their progress rather than providing all the detailed information as indicated by the law.

Following the act instructed to do so, government ministries, departments and offices have a provision of an Information Officer for the purpose of disseminating information. The name of the Information Officer is publicly displayed on either the website or office notice board, or both. However, these officers are often not communication experts but are assigned based on personal interest. The appointment of the information officer is mostly on an ad-hoc basis and without considering specific qualifications.

NGOs and foundations, which used to have communications focal points even earlier than the act’s provision, are still centered around showcasing organizational progress and building the organization's image rather than serving as a link between the people and the organization. As information seekers and media wrongly perceive the I/NGOS and foundations as the ‘dollar farming’ means and have negative connotation, inquiry by the press or the individual about the work of the I/NGOs are seen as potentially harmful. In response to this perceived threat, communication officers utilize their networks and expertise to minimize media and public inquiries into their work, aiming to mitigate potential negative consequences. Another significant issue with I/NGOs is their lack of a culture of responding to applicants regarding bid outcomes. These organizations issue calls for Expression of Interest (EoI), receive various proposals and decide on procuring services or goods from one of the vendors. However, many of them often fail to inform all the non-successful applicants of the outcome, including which bidder bagged the contract. Many of them remain silent even when inquiries are made via email on this.

Info commission’s role

The National Information Commission (NIC), established under the RTI Act of 2007 to safeguard, promote, and implement RTI in the country, reported receiving a total of 1,068 appeals in 2079-80 BS (2022-23).  Out of the appeals made, NIC resolved 1,054 cases, which is 99.04 percent. It is important to note that most of the appeals received by NIC in the last fiscal year (72.05 percent) were related to local government. This indicates both public interest in accessing local government information and a tendency for local government representatives to be more reluctant to provide such information.  Additionally, in 2023-24, NIC instructed the Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, chief ministers of all seven provinces of Nepal, all local governments, and the BP Koirala Institute of Health Sciences to ensure transparency in public procurement. Furthermore, NIC initiated legal action against the chiefs of four public institutions for non-compliance with the RTI law.

Challenges

In the context of Nepal’s literacy rate, which is 76 percent according to the latest census, the awareness of RTI at the citizens’ level is really low and this has affected RTI implementation. Another prominent challenge is the lengthy and time-consuming process, which often discourages common people from utilizing it. There have been instances where information seekers faced attacks or harassment, and government officials displayed unhelpful attitudes, creating unfavorable environments for accessing information. Additionally, there have been reports of hurdles in registering RTI applications and instances where requests were ignored, psychologically disempowering individuals from seeking information. Despite the RTI being enacted over a decade and a half ago, it is still wrongly perceived as a right primarily for journalists.  Even among those aware of RTI, there is a lack of habit in seeking information from government offices. Language barriers further compound the issue, as information is primarily disseminated in Nepali, neglecting the substantial portion of the population whose first language is not Nepali.

Way forward

In order to strengthen RTI in Nepal, a comprehensive strategy is imperative. This involves awareness campaigns targeting citizens to boost understanding of RTI rights, utilizing various communication channels and languages for maximum impact, simplifying RTI application procedures and adequate guidance and support to RTI applicants. Equally important is the implementation of specialized training programs for Information Officers. Encouraging proactive disclosure of information by all public entities is vital to enhance transparency. Addressing language barriers, enforcing public accountability, engaging with the media to amplify awareness, strengthening oversight by the National Information Commission (NIC), fostering community engagement and conducting regular evaluations of RTI implementation efforts are additional important steps to strengthen it.

The author is a media researcher 

[email protected] 

Nepal is already caught in the geopolitics of great power competition, and we cannot escape from it. The only option left for us is building our capacity to deal with the fast-changing geopolitical situation. There is a national consensus that Nepal should use the current situation as an opportunity to advance its economic interests. Foreign and geopolitical experts, including this scribe, often wonder whether we have built our capacity to deal with the complex, uncertain, and chaotic world. In one way or another, Nepal is already bearing the brunt of increasing geopolitical tensions. The pressing issues that the global community is confronting are growing tensions between the US and China, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Taiwan tension, the Middle East crisis and the impacts of climate change. The impact of those issues in Nepal is evident in the conduct of foreign policy, the economy, and to some extent, the domestic political landscape. Over the past few years, we have already become hostages of indecision, ill-decisions, delayed decisions, or fractured decisions on important bilateral, regional or global issues.

To deal with the complex geopolitical situation and other global issues, Nepal needs to pay serious attention to strengthen the existing mechanisms and create new structures, if required. First, it needs to make the existing mechanisms effective. Second, it needs to work out whether it needs new mechanisms. Third, there should be effective and timely coordination among the key state institutions. 

Let's begin with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). The ministry has 10 divisions covering all countries, regional and global organizations. However, these divisions fall short of human resources and expertise to deal with global issues, given the workload of all divisions. The creation of divisions is based on geography, not issues. Like in many other countries, there are no think tanks within the ministry to support its functioning. Nor is MoFA tolerant or positive about the government think-tank, the Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA). MoFA officials have yet to realize the importance and role of think-tanks. They think, since they are involved in all bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations, they have first-hand information on all issues and do not require inputs from any think-tanks. That is why, for a long time, the IFA has been left totally paralyzed.

And it is because of this hubris, the units within MoFA have failed to produce in-depth reports on important bilateral and regional issues. Take the examples of America's Indo-Pacific Strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative. There has been no serious research and studies on either of these. As MoFA has not developed its capacity, other ministries and departments cannot take its support. Based on conversations with government officials, this scribe can conclude that there is a vague understanding of these issues among them, and they are facing difficulties in taking decisions. There is another side to the story too; there is a lack of independent experts and scholars who can conduct in-depth study and research on what Nepal's position should be in the changing geopolitical situation. There are some non-government think-tanks doing research, but government agencies and officials do not take them seriously due to their poor quality.

The underlying problem is that there is a serious flaw in the appointment of the foreign minister. Those who have at least some idea about foreign policy or geopolitics should be appointed foreign minister. On the one hand, the tenure of foreign ministers is usually short, while on the other, it takes several months for them to grasp the basic knowledge of how MoFA functions and what the key issues are. Foreign embassies or permanent representatives are one of the important wings of the ministry. However, they are almost dysfunctional. Barring some exceptions, Nepal is sending inexperienced, low-profile politicians as its ambassadors to key global capitals such as New Delhi, Washington and Beijing. 

There are some basic problems with ambassadors appointed on political quotas. First, they lack knowledge of the basics of how diplomacy works. Second, they usually do not cooperate with their respective division at the ministry; they do not even feel comfortable reporting to the foreign secretary. They work directly with the foreign minister or the prime minister. Whereas, career ambassadors have the tradition of not taking decisions out of fear of being dragged into controversy. That is why they confine themselves to day-to-day administrative tasks. There is, therefore, a need for a complete overhaul in the functioning of the ministry and its units.

Another equally important issue is the lack of cooperation between state mechanisms, mainly the Office of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (OPMCM). Currently, there is a lack of coordination between OPMCM and the Foreign Minister. In some cases, the OPMCM takes decisions without consulting or informing MoFA. One example of this is the appointment of ambassadors. There is also a lack of coordination between the foreign ministry and other ministries. In principle, all decisions and communication related to foreign policy should be conducted through MoFA, but this is not happening. At the same time, there is a lack of consultation between MoFA and security agencies. Not only is there a lack of coordination among ministries, but there is also a lack of coordination between MoFA, and provincial and local governments.

Experts have been raising this issue for a long time. But political leaders do not take these issues seriously because they are wielding foreign policy to advance their party and personal interests. If all the activities and processes are made transparent, they fear losing the privilege of making secret deals or appeasing others to remain in power. This is why they usually do not want to include MoFA officials in talks with other countries, except in formal delegation-level meetings. At the same time, Nepal seriously lacks capable human resources to deal with the complex geopolitics. This should be our priority issue although it may not be a priority issue for our politicians. Our politicians should realize that they alone cannot handle foreign policy in this complex geopolitical situation. Politicians may have certain issues with the foreign ministry, but there cannot be its replacement. They, however, have all rights to restructure it.