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Contemporary global discourse is saturated with calls for multipolarity. Leaders from Beijing to Brasília, from Moscow to New Delhi invoke a new world order—one where power is shared more equitably among diverse states and regions, and the dominance of any single power is curbed. Yet, despite these slogans and shifting alliances, the reality remains more concentrated than advertised. The United States continues to act—and be treated—as the primary actor on the global stage, wielding unmatched capabilities across military, economic, technological, and institutional domains. In effect, the world is staging a multipolar play, but the US remains its lead performer—a solo show on a multipolar stage.

Consider military power. As of 2024, the United States accounted for roughly 37 percent of global military expenditures, with a defense budget exceeding $1trn (SIPRI estimate)—more than the next nine countries combined, including China and Russia. Its global military footprint includes over 750 bases across more than 80 countries, reinforcing rapid deployment capabilities and sustained influence in every major region. In contrast, China, the oft-touted peer competitor, has only one overseas military base and far less capacity for power projection.

The United States continues to dominate global affairs through unilateral decisions that often override international consensus. In Ukraine, Washington has led the global response to Russia’s action with over $75bn in aid and a sweeping sanctions regime that even neutral powers like India and Turkey have had to navigate under pressure. In the Middle East, the US carried out the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in 2020 and continues to conduct airstrikes on Iranian-linked targets in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen—frequently without international consultation. The pattern holds in Gaza, where the US has repeatedly vetoed UN ceasefire resolutions during the 2023–24 conflict, even as civilian casualties mounted and allies grew uneasy. In these arenas, global powers like China and Russia have issued condemnations, but lack the influence or institutional weight to meaningfully counterbalance American actions.

Latest examples include the US Air Force and Navy attacks on three nuclear facilities in Iran on June 22 as part of the Iran–Israel war, the US support to the Israeli war in Gaza, against Hamas who no longer poses a strategic threat to Israel, even by the standards of some 600 retired Israeli security officials, including former heads of intelligence agencies. Prior to it in December last year, amidst the Russian warnings, the US helped bring down Syria’s Assad regime—the closest Russian ally in the Middle East. Forget the eastward expansion of NATO disregarding its own assurance to Russia that it would not do so.

This solo performance extends to East Asia, where the US continues to maneuver around its “one-China” policy by deepening ties with Taiwan through arms deals, diplomatic visits, and strategic signaling—all while China, despite its rise, remains unable to prevent these moves. In Syria, the US maintains troops and control over resource-rich regions in defiance of Damascus, as Russia looks the other way and China stays diplomatically detached. India, often seen as a rising multipolar player, has largely opted for strategic silence or hedging in each of these conflicts. Across these cases, the US not only acts without deference to global opinion—it also forces others to adjust to its decisions. The result is a world that may appear multipolar in discourse, but in practice still revolves around a single actor exercising disproportionate power with little external constraint.

In economic terms, US financial primacy remains foundational. The US dollar still constitutes around 60 percent of global foreign exchange reserves and is involved in 88 percent of all currency transactions. US capital markets continue to serve as the world’s main liquidity pool, and American technology firms lead in innovation and digital infrastructure. Even US domestic legislation—such as the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act—has reshaped global industrial policy by incentivizing foreign firms to align with American interests and supply chains, frequently overriding WTO norms or multilateral negotiation channels. See how the US has threatened India with additional tariffs should the latter continue buying Russian oil.

Moreover, the United States retains unmatched normative and institutional leverage. It plays a leading role in NATO, the G7, the Bretton Woods institutions, and dominates voting power in the IMF and World Bank. Even when institutions falter, the US increasingly relies on ad hoc or bilateral mechanisms to maintain influence, such as AUKUS, the Quad, and security pacts in the Indo-Pacific—sidestepping multilateral gridlock with flexible but US-centered architectures.

During his second term, President Trump has intensified the use of economic sanctions and tariffs as central pillars of his foreign policy, particularly targeting Iran and China. A “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has been reactivated, with a primary goal of driving the country’s oil exports to zero. This has involved a significant increase in sanctions, with roughly three-quarters of new designations since January 2025 aimed at disrupting Iran's revenue streams. For instance, the Treasury Department has targeted over 115 individuals, vessels, and companies across 17 countries, including a “vast shipping empire” led by Iranian oil tycoon Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. These sanctions have also been extended to third-party entities in China, India, and the UAE for their role in facilitating the trade of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, such as the sanctioning of six Indian companies for engaging in over $220m in trade with Iran.

In addition to targeted sanctions, the administration has employed broad tariffs to isolate and pressure nations. The average applied US tariff rate rose from 2.5 percent to an estimated 27 percent in the first few months of the second term, the highest level in over a century. A universal 10 percent tariff was imposed on all imports, while country-specific tariffs were also used to escalate trade disputes. For example, tariffs on Chinese goods peaked at 145 percent, leading to retaliatory tariffs of 125 percent from China. The administration has also leveraged weapons supply as a foreign policy tool. While not directly providing vast amounts of military aid to Ukraine, the US has authorized weapons sales through its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, committing approximately $960m and pressuring NATO allies to increase their defense spending to five percent of GDP by 2035. This strategy of combining economic pressure, isolation, and arms sales to allies underscores a transactional and unilateral approach to international relations.

What seems strange is the extreme selfish behaviour of the competitors, a phenomenon reflected in the Nepali expression hul ma jyan jogaaoo (stay safe in the crowd), an attitude that lets a rooster fight the jackal alone! It is not hard to see how the US woos one opponent when it is attacking the other, successfully bringing down the regime in question. Only the US knows the wheel rotates.

Thus, the international system is characterized less by balanced multipolar governance than by fragmented resistance surrounding a persistent unipolar core. The United States continues to act, and be perceived, as the system's indispensable actor, even as rhetorical coalitions challenge its dominance. The world may speak the language of multipolarity, but until that rhetoric is translated into shared institutions, joint rule-making, and collaborative enforcement, the global order remains a solo performance by the United States—backed by unmatched capability and strategic depth—on a stage filled with understudies.

Since 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia birthed the modern nation-state, security has worn a uniform and a mustache built on borders, battles and men in command. This legacy still decides who gets to protect the nation and whose voices are heard in matters of security. In response to these limitations, what if we asked a different question: Whose security are we referring to, and at what cost?

Feminist Security Studies (FSS) challenges this traditional view, urging us to think beyond state power and military might. It draws attention to everyday threats facing communities, especially women, and calls for a broader, human-centric understanding of security. Nepal’s security history, like much of the world’s, has largely highlighted male figures. Yet women, too, have long stood guard. As early as the 18th century, Queen Rajendra Rajya Laxmi Devi, who served as regent from 1777 to 1785, led crucial military and political campaigns that helped annex principalities such as Lamjung, Kaski, and Tanahun, playing a pivotal role in the early stages of Nepal’s unification. In the 19th century, women resisted during the Nalapani War of 1814–16, Chaitamaya Dangol became Nepal’s first female police constable in 1951, and thousands more took up arms or advocated for peace during the insurgency. 

Clearly, Nepali women have long been an integral part of the nation’s security fabric. Today, Nepal contributes significantly to UN peacekeeping missions, with over 6,800 female peacekeepers deployed since 1958. However, few women influence national security policymaking, revealing a persistent gap. Nepali women uphold international peace in UN blue, yet their impact on Nepal’s own security policies remains minimal. This selective inclusion raises urgent questions: Whose security is prioritized? What threats are recognized? Who defines security expertise?

In 2011, Nepal became the first South Asian country to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 and 1820; policy frameworks aimed at advancing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in the aftermath of the 1996–2006 armed conflict. The NAP aimed to ensure women's  protection and participation in peacebuilding and recovery. But more than a decade later, the  Women, Peace and Security agenda promise remains largely unfulfilled. Implementation has been piecemeal, reliant on donor funding, scattered workshops and lacking institutional ownership or political will. Government agencies failed to allocate dedicated budgets, and key officials remained unaware of its goals. 

Meanwhile, the UN, which authored the resolutions, stepped back. UNMIN, for example, framed implementation as solely Nepal’s responsibility. This hands-off approach reflects a broader issue: global institutions like the UN often rely on state-led mechanisms without addressing the structural limitations that prevent local transformation. Without genuine commitment, such frameworks risk becoming symbolic paperwork, disconnected from the realities they were meant to change. 

To understand why these commitments fail to take root, we must confront the structural and cultural norms that continue to exclude women from the security arena. Traditional beliefs, some dating back centuries, still influence modern security discourse. Ancient texts like Chanakya Niti Darpan depict women as vulnerable outside familial protection, reinforcing hierarchies that prize obedience over autonomy. These views, cloaked in tradition, persist in institutions today, shaping how we define threats and whose lives matter.

This exclusion has real costs. Research shows male-dominated security structures often overlook non-traditional threats like sexual violence, food insecurity and displacement issues that disproportionately impact women. In Nepal, security continues to be narrowly defined through militarized lenses, sidelining the human security concerns women are uniquely positioned to raise.

Feminist scholars have long critiqued traditional frameworks for being masculinized and blind to women's lived experiences. As Swati Parashar and Carol Cohn argue, this narrow lens misses vital issues like sexual violence, displacement and economic insecurity. The World Bank reports that 104 countries restrict women from certain jobs, 59 lack laws against workplace harassment and 37 offer no protections for pregnant workers. These legal gaps highlight how institutional discrimination fosters everyday insecurity for women, in both conflict and peacetime.

In conflict zones, the failures are even starker. Women often endure a continuum of violence, including sexual assault used as a weapon of war. Yet these threats remain largely invisible in dominant security narratives. Gendered power dynamics aren’t just in policy, they are embedded in institutional cultures, limiting women's leadership and participation. This exclusion not only reinforces injustice, but also weakens peacebuilding outcomes. To address these limitations, some governments have embraced a Feminist Foreign Policy, a practical approach embedding gender equality in diplomacy and defense. Nordic countries offer successful models. 

Sweden, the first to formally launch such a policy in 2014, integrated gender considerations into diplomacy, aid and defense. The 2023 Women, Peace and Security Index ranks Norway, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden among the top nations for gender-inclusive security outcomes.

This global trend raises a transformative question: What if women shaped security? Security might then prioritize peace through dialogue instead of dominance. Women are proven peacebuilders, negotiators and connectors. According to  UN Women,  peace agreements are 35 percent more likely to last 15 years when women are involved. Their communication and relational skills make them effective in conflict resolution, trust-building and community engagement. Research from Namibia, Rwanda and South Africa shows female peacekeepers are seen as less intimidating and more community-oriented. Surveys confirm that women’s participation in the security sector is associated with fewer misconduct complaints and more effective conflict resolution. Such outcomes are not anecdotal; they are measurable. Women’s presence in the security sector is consistently associated with enhanced public trust and reduced abuse. 

Today’s threats range from wars and cyberterrorism to the risk of nuclear proliferation by non-state actors. In such a world, gender-inclusive security policies are not just ideal, they are essential. We must redefine ‘security expertise’ to include emotional intelligence, empathy and collaborative leadership. Integrating women’s perspectives brings deeper insight into root causes of instability and helps shift from tokenism to transformation.

Investing in tailored training, mentorship and leadership pipelines for women in peacebuilding, security and disarmament is essential. Equally crucial is breaking down silos: Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs, security agencies, civil society, academia and UN peacekeeping must collaborate to develop gender-sensitive strategies for resilience and justice. Also, policy must evolve. A gender lens should not just count how many women are present but question why so few rise in rank, and what systemic barriers persist. From societal bias to institutional discrimination, cultural shifts are needed along with the full implementation of standards like the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation. Gender analysis must become a norm, not an afterthought. Security impacts people differently; ignoring this means missing half the picture. Intersectional approaches must guide reform so that security becomes not a fortress to defend, but a community to care for.

True transformation demands more than surface-level inclusion. It requires shifting power, rethinking protection and viewing peace as a participatory process rooted in dignity and justice. Women must be recognized not just as beneficiaries, but as experts and leaders in the security domain. When we broaden the definition of who shapes security, we create more resilient, inclusive solutions that reflect both the complexity of today’s threats and the humanity of those most affected.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nepal and China. Over these seven decades, the two neighbors have forged a relationship grounded in mutual respect, non-interference, and shared aspirations for development, peace, and prosperity. This is a unique model of partnership rooted in trust and mutual respect

On 1 Aug 1955, Nepal and  China formally established diplomatic relations. Seventy years later, this historic milestone provides a timely moment to reflect on a multifaceted partnership that has evolved from ancient civilizational exchanges into a dynamic 21st-century cooperation model. Built on the core principles of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and non-interference, Nepal-China relations continue to hold significant relevance for Nepal’s foreign policy trajectory and development ambitions.

A relationship rooted in geography, shaped by history

Nepal and China are more than just neighbors; they share more than seventeen centuries-old ties through trade, religion, culture, and kinship across the Himalayas. The exchanges between Lumbini and Lhasa, between artists and monks, are testimonies to a relationship that predates formal diplomacy. The 1956 Nepal-China Boundary Agreement and subsequent treaties not only delineated borders but also laid the foundation for long-term cooperation.

In modern diplomatic history, China has consistently respected Nepal’s territorial integrity and political independence, while Nepal has firmly adhered to the One-China Policy. This diplomatic symmetry has helped both countries build a resilient and trust-based relationship, despite changing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia and beyond.

Development, connectivity, and the promise of the BRI

China has played a critical role in Nepal’s development efforts through grants, soft loans, and infrastructure projects. From the construction of the Araniko Highway in the 1960s to ongoing efforts in energy, hydropower, airport expansion, and digital connectivity, Chinese cooperation has left visible footprints in Nepal’s development landscape. 

The signing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement in 2017 marked a new phase in economic diplomacy. While its implementation has been slow and requires better clarity and transparency, the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network—envisioned under the BRI—holds transformative potential for Nepal, particularly in trade facilitation, energy transit, and cross-border infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Nepal must approach such initiatives with strategic foresight—ensuring debt sustainability, environmental safeguards, and equitable benefits for local communities.

Beyond infrastructure: People, culture, and soft power

Nepal-China relations are increasingly shaped by people-to-people engagement. Thousands of Nepali students pursue higher education in China, supported by scholarships. Cultural exchange programs, tourism, and media collaboration have helped build a more nuanced understanding between the two societies.

China established the Confucius Institute in Nepal to promote Chinese language and culture. Regular cultural delegations, exhibitions and performances are organized to strengthen people-to-people relations. There is a growing dissemination of Chinese narratives in Nepali media, especially around regional geopolitics and BRI. Chinese media outlets such as Xinhua News Agency and China Radio international have partnership with Nepali media.

China promotes Nepal as a tourism destination among Chinese citizens and has included Nepal in approved travel destinations. Joint branding of heritage sites such as  Lumbini is  part of soft tourism diplomacy. In times of crisis, such as the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake and the Covid-19 pandemic, China provided critical humanitarian support to Nepal, reinforcing a spirit of solidarity. Such gestures are not merely symbolic but serve as catalysts for strengthening trust among the general public.

The strategic imperative for Nepal

As Nepal seeks to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), strategic partnerships with neighbors like China become indispensable. However, Nepal must adopt a clear, consistent, and country-owned foreign policy, grounded in national interest and inclusive development priorities.

The trade imbalance between Nepal and China remains a persistent challenge. Addressing it requires improved access to the Chinese market, support for Nepali agricultural and handmade exports, and the upgrading of border infrastructure at key points like Rasuwagadhi, Tatopani and Mustang. Furthermore, as climate change disproportionately affects the fragile Himalayan ecosystem, Nepal and China should deepen cooperation on climate resilience, biodiversity conservation, and green technology transfer.

Looking ahead: Rethinking the next chapter

As Nepal and China commemorate 70 years of friendship, both countries must reimagine their cooperation in light of emerging global challenges—climate change, poverty, digital transformation, and regional security. Future collaboration must focus not only on infrastructure, but also on green development, youth exchange, public health, and social inclusion.

Diplomatic anniversaries are more than ceremonial milestones—they are opportunities to reflect, renew, and re-energize relationships as well as to reimagine the future. The 70th anniversary offers both Kathmandu and Beijing the chance to reaffirm their strategic trust, expand areas of cooperation, and ensure that their partnership contributes meaningfully to regional harmony and Nepal’s long-term national interest. Nepal must seek cooperation for changing from landlocked to land linked.

The 70th anniversary of Nepal-China relations should catalyze a broader conversation among policymakers, academics, and civil society about what an equitable, future-oriented partnership looks like in a rapidly changing global order.

In this next phase, cooperation must move beyond state-to-state interactions and become more inclusive of youth, local governments, academic institutions, and marginalized communities—ensuring that the benefits of diplomacy and development reach the grassroots.

As a small but strategically located nation, Nepal must continue to walk a balanced diplomatic path—maintaining friendly ties with both its neighbors while protecting its autonomy and advancing a just, inclusive development agenda.

The Nepal-China partnership, built over seven decades, can continue to be a model of asymmetric yet respectful diplomacy—one that champions sovereignty, mutual benefit, and the shared dreams of two peoples.

As we look ahead, the friendship between Nepal and China must continue to be guided by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. A true celebration of this historic milestone would be not only in looking back with pride—but also looking forward with purpose.

The author is former Nepali ambassador to China

It has been exactly 109 years since the world’s first press council was established in Sweden in 1916. Its goal was to create an independent media self-regulatory body facilitated by the state, but guided by the broader media fraternity and the public. Since then, dozens of countries have formed, revised, dissolved, or renamed their press councils. In democratic nations, some councils have retained their autonomy; in autocratic regimes and much of the Global South, however, they often remain under government control.

Despite these variations, the core idea behind press councils has remained consistent: to serve as an intermediary between the press and the public, promoting professionalism, integrity, and ethical standards, while offering policy input to the government. Crucially, press councils are meant to operate on the principle of self-regulation, based on the strict implementation of a code of ethics, rather than through legal regulation enforced by other government bodies. A press council should be a collective effort involving the state, the media industry, and the public. While the government may support its effective functioning, it must not seek to control it.

Nepal adopted the idea of a press council earlier than many other countries. The Press Council Nepal (PCN) was established in 1971 based on the recommendations of a new communication plan. During the Panchayat era, it operated largely under government control. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, new legislation promised an independent council. However, successive chairpersons failed to uphold that promise, often becoming submissive to the government and their affiliated political parties.

There is a persistent tendency in Nepal to create overlapping institutions aimed at controlling the media, without clearly understanding or respecting their distinct mandates. The Media Council Bill, for instance, seeks to grant expanded powers to a new Media Council, many of which overlap with functions already assigned to existing government agencies. This has led to a widespread perception within the bureaucracy that PCN is merely another department under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, damaging its credibility and undermining its intended independence. Successive PCN leaderships have done little to challenge this perception.

Simultaneously, there appears to be a growing consensus among bureaucrats, politicians, and lawmakers in favor of tighter media control, often under the pretext of curbing misinformation and disinformation. The proposed Media Council Bill must be examined in this broader context. While it does not explicitly propose the formation of a media control body, it does aim to expand the council’s jurisdiction from print to digital platforms. The name of the institution is secondary; what matters is whether its independence, both structural and operational, is safeguarded.

The most serious flaw in the Bill is the excessive power it grants to the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, particularly in appointing and removing council members. To protect the council’s autonomy, an independent commission, possibly involving a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, should be tasked with recommending the council’s leadership and members.

However, implementing such reforms may face resistance. Organizations like the Federation of Nepalese Journalists (FNJ), politically affiliated journalist associations, and senior journalist groups may oppose changes that reduce their influence over appointments. Political parties and the bureaucracy may also seek to preserve their control through informal arrangements. In the last three decades, very few truly independent journalists or academics have been appointed to the council or similar bodies.

Parliament must seriously consider creating a transparent, independent appointment mechanism. Yet, many lawmakers lack a clear understanding of the press council’s core mission and values. Another concerning provision in the Bill is the transfer of authority to issue press accreditation certificates to the Media Council. This is not the council’s appropriate role. Even more troubling is the proposed provision allowing the council to revoke a journalist’s press pass for up to a year for violating the code of ethics. This directly contradicts the fundamental purpose of a press pass, which is to enable public information access, not serve as a tool for punishment.

The Department of Information and Broadcasting already imposes unnecessarily restrictive requirements for issuing press passes. Shifting that authority to the Media Council will only increase confusion and bureaucratic friction. Other provisions in the Bill also raise concerns, suggesting that the drafters may have drawn inspiration from press council models in more authoritarian regimes.

One welcome aspect of the Bill is the proposed removal of the council’s authority to classify newspapers. However, this change may also face resistance from journalist organizations, as classification has traditionally been used to control or reward media outlets. A separate entity, such as an Audit Bureau of Circulation, should be created to handle classifications for both print and digital platforms.

Overall, the Bill lacks a clear, forward-looking vision for the role and structure of the Media Council. It also fails to reflect on past institutional lessons. For the council to function effectively, it must have a strong, cooperative relationship with media organizations. At present, a significant trust deficit exists between the council and the Nepali media industry. The law should ensure not only participation from the media and public, but also their meaningful contribution to the council’s work. As drafted, the Bill envisions the Media Council more as a government department than an independent regulatory body. A complete overhaul is, therefore, necessary.

If parliament is truly committed to forming an independent media council, it should return the Bill to the Ministry with clear instructions to redraft it in consultation with all stakeholders, including international experts.

This debate is not about targeting the current government or any individual minister. The Bill was originally introduced by the previous government, but it now falls on the current one to refine and pass it. Political parties must rise above narrow interests and prioritize the long-term public good.

A strong, independent institution serves democracy and society, regardless of whether it aligns with a party’s immediate interests. When it comes to media accountability, as Denis McQuail puts it, two models exist: answerability and liability. Answerability is moral and social; it’s voluntary, cooperative, and involves non-material penalties. Liability, by contrast, is legal, imposed, and often punitive.

Press councils should operate on the answerability model. They should function as watchdogs that bark but do not bite, empowered to raise concerns, issue warnings, and alert stakeholders to ethical lapses, but not to take legal action against journalists. Evaluated through this lens, many of the Bill’s flaws become more evident, and more easily correctable.

So a humble appeal to parliament: step back from narrow debates and redraft the Bill from first principles. This is a vital opportunity to strengthen democratic institutions and ensure a free, accountable, and ethical press in Nepal.