Pride of Nepal
How are you feeling right now?
I feel overwhelmed. I think right now, the world has seen what a human being is capable of, given you are completely committed and dedicated. I am happy this will set a good example for the upcoming generation.
It’s an astonishing feat you have just achieved, climbing all 14 peaks in the world above 8,000m in just six months. The previous record for the same feat was nearly eight years. How did the idea even occur to you?
I did the Everest, Lhotse and Makalu mountains within five days back in 2017. I later realized I could have done it in three, had I not rested. A lot of people didn’t believe me at the time but the idea for this record came to me back then.
What motivates you to constantly keep pushing your limits? Is it something you learned, or were you born like that?
I have always had the desire to do the impossible. For that, I think you have to believe in yourself first. I joined the British Army and then became a commando and finally joined the Special Forces. But I couldn’t stop at that. I had to aim higher. I think everyone can achieve the goals in their lives if they mold themselves accordingly and believe in their vision.
How were you as a school kid? Were you very ambitious even at that time?
Very ambitious (laughs). I was the House Captain in my school (Small Heaven School, Chitwan) in Grade 7 and became the Head Boy of the school in Grade 9.
How did you end up in the British Army in 2003? Was it something you always wanted to do?
I had family in the British Army and that was what inspired me to join the force from an early age.
How hard was it for you to leave your budding military career for an uncertain mountaineering future?
I spent 16 years in the British Army. For 10 years I was actually fighting while for another six years I was in lower risk areas. I gave it up to focus on my dream. It was not only for me though. I wanted to open the avenue for other Nepali climbers as well. I wanted to challenge human limitations and open the scope for further imagination on what a human body can achieve. Of course a lot of dedication and commitment was necessary but I was prepared for it.
Are you already planning your next audacious venture?
My focus right now is on producing a feature film based on my adventures which is expected to release in 2021. I will always be doing some climbing in between but I am not targeting any records for now.
What message would you like to give to all those who supported your venture in cash or kind?
The project was never about me individually or a race or a community. It was about the limits a human being can push to, and for that, I got support from all over the world. Even China gave me the otherwise tricky permit that helped me complete my record. For all the support I got and towards all my well-wishers, I want to stay humble and respectful while I continue doing my work.
What are your other hobbies besides mountaineering?
It’s all extreme sports. I like diving (under water) and skydiving. Will you continue climbing mountains and setting new records, or are you also thinking of breaking records in other fields? I have not had the time to think about that. But you never know.
(Interviewed by Sunny Mahat)
Nepal’s vital infra projects in China’s hands
The big-power rivalry in Nepal is getting curiouser and curiouser. India imposed a crippling blockade on the landlocked country for its reservations over Nepal’s new constitution. Gasping for life, the country and the then KP Oli government naturally turned to China, Nepal’s only other immediate neighbor. He went there in 2016 and signed many vital agreements, most importantly the Trade and Transit Treaty and a deal to import a third of Nepal’s oil from the northern neighbor. The goal was to forestall another blockade-like situation at all cost. His policy of ‘diversifying’ away from India paid electoral dividends— and at long last led to Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit. The Indians are worried. What does the growing Chinese presence in Nepal mean? Does it pose a direct threat to Nepali democracy? Does it spell an end to its traditionally dominant role? India and China have seldom cooperated for the benefit of third countries in the region, and it would be naïve to expect them to do so now, never mind Wuhan or Malappuram.
There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the ruling parties in Nepal and China helps bring the two countries closer. “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this massive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge,” writes SD Muni, an old Nepal hand in India for The Quint.
Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army and another Nepal expert, believes it is more a case of Nepal being “somewhat fearful of China and doing things after receiving some signal from Beijing.” Yet most Indian analysts also seem quietly confident that Nepal is trying in vain to overcome the hard constraints of geography.
How did you view Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal?
The visit had been pending since 2014. We had been hearing different reports that Xi was not happy with the preparations for his trip or that he was not visiting Nepal. Finally, he visited Nepal and conveyed a big message. In my understanding, no foreign leader has had the impact that Xi did during his two-day state visit. When Indian Prime Minister Modi went to Nepal for the first time in 2014, it was billed as landmark. Modi also won the hearts and minds of the Nepali people.
Preparations for Xi’s visit were taking place for a long time. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Kathmandu a month ago. A delegation of the Chinese Communist Party had also visited Nepal. And a seminar on Xi’s political thought was recently held in Kathmadu.
Before his visit, Xi himself wrote an article that was published in private and government newspapers. He went to Nepal with a new blueprint for bilateral relations. He said China would help Nepal become ‘land-linked’ instead of ‘land-locked’. He talked about the Nepal-China Economic Corridor under the Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity.
The visit was the outcome of well-thought-out preparations. Its timing was also significant. Currently, Nepal has a communist government with a big majority in the parliament. In this context, the visit by the paramount leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a turning point in Nepal’s history.
What did you think of the agreements signed during Xi’s visit?
The agreements do not have much substance as there are no deliverables. The financial assistance, however, is important. There have been agreements to conduct feasibility studies of some connectivity projects, which are significant. But until and unless India gets involved in such vital connectivity projects, China will not invest its money and tech-nology. There is no economic benefit in extending the railway line up to Lumbini, because the flow of tourists only would not sustain it. The main target of the railway line is obviously India’s market. Nepal has always wanted to be a bridge between its northern and southern neighbors. When Baburam Bhattarai was the prime minister, he pushed the concept of trilateral coopera-tion. However, India’s focus is on continuing and enhancing bilateral cooperation because it thinks of itself as the dominant power in South Asia. As far as the economic corridor is concerned, it would gain signifi-cance if India joins it. India-China relationship is tense at the moment and it is poised to remain so for long. Therefore, the feasibility study of China-Nepal-India economic corridor is challenging. Billions of rupees are required for the construction of roads and railway lines.
How do you evaluate the current state of Nepal-India and Nepal China relations?
The two cannot be compared because Nepal and India share an open border, whereas the Nepal China border is a closed one. Nepal and India also enjoy close military cooperation. China, with a closed border with Nepal, cannot demand the same type of relations that India has with Nepal. There may be flaws in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship, but the fact remains that the two countries share an open border. There is frequent movement of people, one lakh Nepalis are currently employed in the Indian security forces and two lakhs of them receive pensions. In terms of geography too, the major Chinese population hubs are much farther from Nepal than are Indian population hubs. With some caution I would say that Nepal fears China. Nepal frequently says Taiwan is part of China, it keeps reaffirming the one-China policy, it strictly curbs anti-China activities, it closes the office of the Dalai Lama, and bars the celebration of his birth-day. All these indicate that Nepal is somewhat fearful of China and does things after receiving some signal from Beijing. Now that Nepal has a communist majority government, there is more pressure than in the past. But China is giving more devel-opment assistance to Nepal as well.
How can India minimize China’s influence on Nepal?
India should focus on completing its development projects in Nepal on time. All its works, be it the Rax-aul- Kathmandu railway line or any other development project, should be of high quality. However, major development projects are already in China’s hands. Nepal is handing over projects to build airports, roads and hydropower plants to China. China-Nepal eco-nomic corridor is under construc-tion. The letter of exchange men-tions investment in infrastructure and hydropower projects. In the past, there was no such focus. Now China is constructing transmission lines in Nepal.
Are you suggesting that Nepal is already in China’s fold?
We cannot say that. My analysis is based on the current political situation in Nepal. What type of political equation emerges in the future cannot be predicted.
(Our India correspondent Asha Thapaliya talked to Mehta in Delhi)
Unrealistic to expect China to replace India as Nepal’s biggest trade partner
After the 2015 Indian blockade, Nepal concluded a series of trade and transit deals with China. Yet there has been no progress on either front. Why?
It is true that we have been unable to increase our trade with China. The first reason is lack of connectivity. Our transport networks have not been properly developed. Of the six open border points between Nepal and China—Humla, Mugu, Mustang, Keyrung, Tatopani, Olangchungola and Kimathanka—only two—Tatopani and Rasuwagadhi—are connected by motor roads. And even they are in a bad state. The problem is not on the Chinese side, which already has the needed infrastructure.
The second reason is Nepal’s low production and productivity. Although over 8,000 Nepali products have duty-free access to China, we have not been able to export much. In the last fiscal, total imports from China totaled Rs 205 billion while exports were worth a meagre Rs 2 billion. Even the little we do export—products like medicinal herbs, vegetables, woolen carpets, Thangka paintings, handicrafts—end up in Tibet. We have no export at all to mainland China. The third reason is non-tariff barriers—those related to quarantine, food standards and administrative hurdles. Language is also a barrier as communication between Nepali and Chinese traders is not easy.
How do you view the 20-point agreement signed during President Xi Jinping’s visit?
The agreement has strategic significance as it is focused on connectivity, mainly rail connectivity. Yet bringing the Chinese railway line to Nepal is time-consuming and costly. But if we could at least develop north-south roads, Nepali territories will be better connected with China, making trade easier. The multi-dimensional connectivity and trans-Himalayan connectivity mentioned in the 20-point agreement is a milestone development and could potentially enhance bilateral trade—but only if accompanied by product-development and enhancing our productive capacity. For that, we need more Chinese investment. China’s labor-intensive industries are relocating to South-East Asian countries. China itself is focusing on high-tech goods and services. As wage levels rise in China, it has found labor-intensive industries non-competitive. Why not bring some of those industries here?
You talked about the big trade deficit. Can you name four or five products that Nepal can profitably export to China?
We have to focus on niche products. For example, we can produce medicinal herbs in our hill and mountain regions for Chinese markets. To that end, we have to create large farms for cultivating and processing medicinal herbs. Similarly, the government should invest more in research and development. Currently, the herbs found in the Himalayas are collected and traded in raw form. There is no value addition or processing. And these products are exported informally. We have to formalize this. We have to develop specific economic zones for specific products like medicinal herbs, wool, mountain goats and sheep, and pashmina.
Another vital exportable product is handicrafts. Thanka and various types of statues can also be exported to China. We should also better explore the Chinese market to understand what they really want. It is a dynamic process; we cannot stick with the same products all the time. Again I focus on connectivity. All trade with China today is via ocean routes, which takes 40 to 45 days. If we can use land routes, it will come down to 10 or 12 days.
There is a big debate about the cross-border rail line and its costs. Instead of the railway, should better cross-border roads be our priority?
We have to consider both, but the priority should be roads as they are both cheaper and quicker to build. For railway lines, we need heavy investment, technical manpower, and a lot of time and effort. In the short term, railway is not viable economically. It can be justified only if it links India and China via Nepal. Chinese President Xi has said that he will help Nepal be a ‘land-linked’ country. But India is mum on this. If both India and China are willing to trade through Nepal, a railway line may be justified.
In high-volume trade, transport via railway is cheaper than transport via road. But, again, in the current low-volume trade, building a railway line may not be justified.
We signed the Transit and Transport Agreement with China in 2016, and this year the two countries finalized its protocol. But is it at all feasible for Nepal to trade with third countries via China?
It is very important to have Chinese transit facilities as strategic options. But in practical terms, it would be difficult to replace India with China in transit. The nearest sea-port in China is 4,000 km from the Nepali border while the nearest Indian port is just 700-800 km away.
What other technical difficulties will Nepal face in using China to transit goods?
The first is the long distance, which entails higher cost. Second, there is no railway connectivity up to the Nepal border, and transport networks are fragmented. Third, as goods will have to be transferred between, say, railways and trucks, that too will add to the cost.
There is a need for a comprehensive study on the movement of cargo via both Indian and Chinese routes to third countries, which will tell us which route is more viable.
Even if transit via China is costly, can’t we profitably trade with the Chinese mainland by developing proper linkages?
The Chinese mainland with its major population centers are far from Nepal. Tibet itself is eight times the size of Nepal. It has a limited absorptive capacity in the sense that it has just three million people. Just crossing Tibet will cost a lot. What we can do is develop distribution centers or parks in cities near Nepal like Keyrung. If you request China to develop such distribution parks with big areas, exporters from Nepal can send their goods there and Chinese traders can pick them up.
India still places many restrictions on the import of Nepali goods. If most of these restrictions were lifted, would Nepal need to explore other options?
Almost 60 percent of our export goes to India. Almost two-third of our import is also from India. Still, there are certain barriers while exporting goods to India. Practically India does not impose any custom duty on Nepali agriculture and industrial products and only three items—alcohol, tobacco and perfume—are on its sensitive list. But there are many non-tariff barriers. The trucks carrying Nepali tea are stopped at the border. A tea sample is then taken to a laboratory in Patna. It takes five to six days to get a final report, which makes the whole operation costly.
In that case, is there a possibility of China replacing India as Nepal’s biggest trading partner?
I do not think so because import from China is increasing and we have to do a lot to increase exports. Until we enhance our competiveness it is difficult to increase our exports. We have an open border with India and there are many similarities between the two countries. So it might not be possible to replace India with China in the near future.
India Searches for answers as Xi’s visit spawns myriad questions
The big-power rivalry in Nepal is getting curiouser and curiouser. India imposed a crippling blockade on the landlocked country for its reservations over Nepal’s new constitution. Gasping for life, the country and the then KP Oli government naturally turned to China, Nepal’s only other immediate neighbor. He went there in 2016 and signed many vital agreements, most importantly the Trade and Transit Treaty and a deal to import a third of Nepal’s oil from the northern neighbor. The goal was to forestall another blockade-like situation at all cost. His policy of ‘diversifying’ away from India paid electoral dividends— and at long last led to Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit. The Indians are worried. What does the growing Chinese presence in Nepal mean? Does it pose a direct threat to Nepali democracy? Does it spell an end to its traditionally dominant role? India and China have seldom cooperated for the benefit of third countries in the region, and it would be naïve to expect them to do so now, never mind Wuhan or Malappuram.
There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the ruling parties in Nepal and China helps bring the two countries closer. “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this massive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge,” writes SD Muni, an old Nepal hand in India for The Quint.
Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army and another Nepal expert, believes it is more a case of Nepal being “somewhat fearful of China and doing things after receiving some signal from Beijing.” Yet most Indian analysts also seem quietly confident that Nepal is trying in vain to overcome the hard constraints of geography.
After the formation of the two-third communist government last year, Nepal has been more assertive in its foreign policy conduct under the new slogan “amity with all, enmity with none”.Mainly, the government is trying to strike a balance among three major powers—India, China and the US—while also reaching out to key development partners. Balancing the three powerhouses, which sometimes have conflicting interests, has proven to be a Herculean task. In particular, Nepal faces the challenge of simultaneously handling the American Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Adding to Nepal’s challenge is the growing perception in India and the US that the communist government is steadily tilting toward China.
Despite claims to the contrary, the Americans and the Chinese have introduced the IPS and the BRI respectively in order to augment one’s own clout and contain the other. India, meanwhile, has been maintaining a low profile in Nepal amid the Sino-American rivalry. Although the IPS projects India as a strategic partner, the latter’s position on the American strategy remains unclear.
Southern discomfort
Growing Chinese influence in South Asia has long been a concern for India. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal, a first by a Chinese president in over two decades, must have added to the worry. Xi sent a clear message that China would help Nepal realize its dream of transforming itself from a ‘land-locked’ to a ‘land-linked’ country. Since the Indian blockade of 2015-16, Nepal has adopted a policy of diversifying its trade and transit options. Xi’s visit and the agreements on connectivity projects he signed in Kathmandu have given a boost to the policy.
India has not issued an official statement on Xi’s trip to Nepal; Indian officials in Kathmandu maintain that they are still evaluating the broader implications of the visit. But comments from former diplomats, foreign policy commentators and media practitioners suggest that New Delhi is wary of the growing Chinese footprint in Nepal. Indian government officials, however, have been downplaying the import of Xi’s trip and making routine statements that there is nothing out of the ordinary about such visits and India has no reason to be bothered.
Such statements notwithstanding, India has had reservations over Nepal’s decision to join the BRI. India also expressed displeasure with Nepali officials when Nepal and China began their first ever military drill in 2017. India is not happy with their growing military ties and says that the Indian and Nepali armies enjoy an unparalleled special relationship.
Following the Indian blockade, Nepal signed a transit and transport treaty with China, ending its supply system’s total dependence on India. The protocol to the treaty has been finalized, and both countries are working to enhance rail and road connectivity in order to implement the agreement. New Delhi has felt uneasy over the proposed infrastructures such as railways, roads and tunnels.
Imran Khan and KP Oli
Nihar R. Nayak, a research fellow with IDSA, a New Delhi-based think tank, says, “It is a bilateral visit concerning Nepal and China, so there is nothing much for India to comment on. Elevating comprehensive partnership to strategic partnership is the only phrase that India could have concern with.” But he adds that India expects Nepal to address its core issues while making agreements with other countries, be it China or the US.
What are those core issues though? “India’s genuine security interest in Nepal, including the perils of terrorism; big infrastructures built by third countries in Nepal and their implications; and possible threats and challenges to multi-party democracy in Nepal,” replies Nayak. Two other vital Indian concerns, according to him, are the protection and smooth functioning of Indian projects in Nepal and adverse climatic impact in Nepal’s Himalayas.
“Xi Jinping is free to visit any country. But if he invites Imran Khan just before he comes to India for an informal summit and visits Nepal just after, people will read meaning into it,” said Ashok Malik, a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, in a recent interview with NDTV.
“As Xi and Oli discuss the CNEC [China-Nepal Economic Corridor], the elephant in the room is PM Modi. It is no secret that Delhi is wary of China’s infrastructure projects in Nepal. On its part, Beijing has often suggested that India must be part of the CNEC; for many projects will not be commercially viable without India’s participation,” wrote C. Raja Mohan, Director at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, for The Indian Express on October 13.
There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) helps bring the two countries closer. Stating that China has posed cultural, ideological and political challenge to Nepal, SD Muni, an expert in Nepal-India relations, writes in a recent article for The Quint: “There is a degree of complacency at the strategic level in India that in the long run, the Chinese cultural push will not last—Chinese language is difficult to inculcate, and Chinese values and lifestyles are alien to the Nepalese. And even if this view stands validated, enough damage might be done by then to India’s vital interests in Nepal.”
Muni adds, “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this massive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge. It is still licking its wounds caused by the most grotesque political intervention in Constitutional affairs in 2015.”
Plus or minus
China has proposed new formulas to mitigate Indian concerns over big infrastructure projects. For instance, it first came up with a proposal of trilateral cooperation, which did not materialize. Last year, China put forward a new proposal of ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation, which entails consulting each other before launching big projects in small South Asian countries. Though India has not reacted to it, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, soon after Xi’s visit to India and Nepal, said that Modi and Xi discussed ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation.
“The two leaders also agreed to expand ‘China-India Plus’ cooperation, push forward facilitation of regional inter-connectivity, and work with other related parties to strike the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement as early as possible,” Xinhua news agency quoted Wang as saying at a media briefing.
Pramod Jaiswal, Senior Fellow with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, another New Delhi-based think tank, tells APEX that there is little India can do to counter Chinese influence in Nepal. “China’s rise has opened up new space in all South Asian countries. But in Nepal, India has also given additional scope to China through its flawed policies and failed diplomacy.” The best India can do, he adds, is complete with China “with better projects, bigger grants and smoother implementation of development programs.”
Interview with Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army
Nepal’s vital infra projects in China’s hands
How did you view Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal?
The visit had been pending since 2014. We had been hearing different reports that Xi was not happy with the preparations for his trip or that he was not visiting Nepal. Finally, he visited Nepal and conveyed a big message. In my understanding, no foreign leader has had the impact that Xi did during his two-day state visit. When Indian Prime Minister Modi went to Nepal for the first time in 2014, it was billed as landmark. Modi also won the hearts and minds of the Nepali people.
Preparations for Xi’s visit were taking place for a long time. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Kathmandu a month ago. A delegation of the Chinese Communist Party had also visited Nepal. And a seminar on Xi’s political thought was recently held in Kathmadu.
Before his visit, Xi himself wrote an article that was published in private and government newspapers. He went to Nepal with a new blueprint for bilateral relations. He said China would help Nepal become ‘land-linked’ instead of ‘land-locked’. He talked about the Nepal-China Economic Corridor under the Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity.
The visit was the outcome of well-thought-out preparations. Its timing was also significant. Currently, Nepal has a communist government with a big majority in the parliament. In this context, the visit by the paramount leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a turning point in Nepal’s history.
What did you think of the agreements signed during Xi’s visit?
The agreements do not have much substance as there are no deliverables. The financial assistance, however, is important. There have been agreements to conduct feasibility studies of some connectivity projects, which are significant. But until and unless India gets involved in such vital connectivity projects, China will not invest its money and tech-nology. There is no economic benefit in extending the railway line up to Lumbini, because the flow of tourists only would not sustain it. The main target of the railway line is obviously India’s market. Nepal has always wanted to be a bridge between its northern and southern neighbors. When Baburam Bhattarai was the prime minister, he pushed the concept of trilateral coopera-tion. However, India’s focus is on continuing and enhancing bilateral cooperation because it thinks of itself as the dominant power in South Asia. As far as the economic corridor is concerned, it would gain signifi-cance if India joins it. India-China relationship is tense at the moment and it is poised to remain so for long. Therefore, the feasibility study of China-Nepal-India economic corridor is challenging. Billions of rupees are required for the construction of roads and railway lines.
How do you evaluate the current state of Nepal-India and Nepal China relations?
The two cannot be compared because Nepal and India share an open border, whereas the Nepal China border is a closed one. Nepal and India also enjoy close military cooperation. China, with a closed border with Nepal, cannot demand the same type of relations that India has with Nepal. There may be flaws in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship, but the fact remains that the two countries share an open border. There is frequent movement of people, one lakh Nepalis are currently employed in the Indian security forces and two lakhs of them receive pensions. In terms of geography too, the major Chinese population hubs are much farther from Nepal than are Indian population hubs. With some caution I would say that Nepal fears China. Nepal frequently says Taiwan is part of China, it keeps reaffirming the one-China policy, it strictly curbs anti-China activities, it closes the office of the Dalai Lama, and bars the celebration of his birth-day. All these indicate that Nepal is somewhat fearful of China and does things after receiving some signal from Beijing. Now that Nepal has a communist majority government, there is more pressure than in the past. But China is giving more devel-opment assistance to Nepal as well.
How can India minimize China’s influence on Nepal?
India should focus on completing its development projects in Nepal on time. All its works, be it the Rax-aul- Kathmandu railway line or any other development project, should be of high quality. However, major development projects are already in China’s hands. Nepal is handing over projects to build airports, roads and hydropower plants to China. China-Nepal eco-nomic corridor is under construc-tion. The letter of exchange men-tions investment in infrastructure and hydropower projects. In the past, there was no such focus. Now China is constructing transmission lines in Nepal.
Are you suggesting that Nepal is already in China’s fold?
We cannot say that. My analysis is based on the current political situation in Nepal. What type of political equation emerges in the future cannot be predicted.
(Our India correspondent Asha Thapaliya talked to Mehta in Delhi)
