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Why could the two transitional bodies make no headway?

The intent itself was flawed. You cannot expect good results from a wrong approach, and this is what happened in the past four years. The law was formulated to serve the interest of leaders who were themselves human rights violators. The core purpose of the law was to provide blanket amnesty on war-time cases instead of justice to victims. The law granted the commission rights to make recommendations to the government irrespective of the position of conflict victims. The concerns of the victims were ignored. We knocked on the door of the Supreme Court against some of its provisions but the government hurriedly endorsed it and the commissions were subsequently formed. The people who have in-depth knowledge of and experiences with transitional justice were blocked and office-bearers were appointed along political lines. Later, the Supreme Court asked the government to amend the flawed provisions but the parties ignored the verdict. The commissions thus became platforms for parties to appoint their loyalists and show the international community the transitional justice system was functioning. There was the tendency of delaying the process and tiring the victims out.

How do you rate the performance of the two commissions in the past four years?

We were consulted only six months after the two commissions were formed. There were questions over whether the conflict victims were a priority for the commissions. We were saying the law itself was flawed but those who were appointed claimed it was fine. The terms of the office-bearers were repeatedly extended for no good reason and without any concrete work plan. The timeframe the commissions needed to complete their work was not properly defined. There were inter- and intra-commission fights. And they did not coordinate with national and international rights organizations. The government did not allocate enough resources.

In your view what were the legal hurdles to investigating war-era cases?

Obviously, the law was the key. The United Nations, the National Human Rights Commission, several NGOs and the international community have repeatedly been saying that the law should be amended in line with the 2015 Supreme Court verdict. But political parties and successive governments have chosen to ignore the ruling.

Now the government is again preparing to appoint new office-bearers to the two commissions. What is your take on this?

First, we have to analyze why the previous commissions could not work. There should be a comprehensive review without any prejudice. Whose mistake was it? The governments, the political parties, or the commissions? The Recommendation Committee had pledged to review all aspects of previous commissions but there has been no progress so far. The previous commissions were not able to settle even a single war-era case, which is a shame. More than that, the commissions cannot work if new laws are not formulated in line with the Supreme Court verdict and the victims’ suggestions. Without meaningful participation of the conflict victims, the TJ process can never reach a logical conclusion. The government and the commissions alone cannot drive the process. If you try to impose something from the political level, the results will be unproductive, as was evident in the past four years.

How should the transitional justice process proceed then?

First, the job of the Recommendation Commission should be put on hold. There should be meaningful consultations with all stakeholders, and we should have the right to fix the modality of those consultations. The government cannot dictate anything. The new act should accommodate the outcomes of such consultations. Similarly, the two transitional justice commissions should have a clear working calendar. The people who have in-depth knowledge of transitional justice should be given the responsibility, for which the government needs to prepare a roster of possible candidates.
 

Are you suggesting that as things are conflict victims have no hope of justice?

Obviously. Under the current circumstances, there is no room for hope. There are attempts to reappoint those who were removed earlier from the commissions. This will be a futile exercise.

A lot obviously depends on the political will of the major political parties. What is their stance on it?

They either want to scrap the whole process or settle it as per their wish. They do not intend to provide justice to the victims or to settle war-era cases. Politicians are saying all war-era issues should be forgotten in the ‘new Nepal’.

What is the position of the conflict victims on this?

First, all the appointments and processes should be credible and transparent, and convey a clear message to the victims that their genuine concerns will be addressed. The Recommendation Commission invited us for consultations twice, but did not heed even one of our suggestions. The consultations were just a show. The most important factor is to build trust. The people appointed based on political quotas cannot investigate the complaints filed against their political masters. Without a trustworthy process, we cannot expect a trustworthy result. There are around 63,000 complaints with the commission; we first have to identity the modality of settling them. There should be clarity on whether all complaints should be handled individually or whether some should be dealt with collectively.

Are you suggesting that you have no platform on which to voice your concerns?

We don’t have such a platform. The society does not listen to us. Politicians often want to avoid this issue. Even media coverage has decreased. There should be public hearings in different places where the victims can express their plight and concerns.

How do you evaluate the concerns of the international community toward transitional justice?

Their concerns have gradually dissipated, particularly after the formation of a strong government led by Nepali Communist Party Chairman KP Oli. Though they still issue statements in our support, their concerns are now marginal. The country now has a stable government, which is saying that transitional justice is a purely domestic issue and as such the international community should not speak about it.

What should the conflict victims do if war-era cases are not settled through national mechanisms? Any plans to take them to international platforms?

It is an issue of humanity and not confined to national boundaries.  For now, conflict victims want to settle all issues domestically. But if the government continues to ignore us, we will have no option but to seek justice elsewhere.

What is your vision for the IFA?

I decided to take this responsibility with a couple of objectives in mind. First, the IFA is the sole government think tank working on diplomacy, foreign policy and security issues. The tragedy is that in the 26 years since its establishment, it has gotten progressively weaker. I have some ideas about reforming it.

Second, we have some conventional issues that lack proper research. We need to provide support to the government through in-depth analysis and policy recommendations on international relations, strategic affairs and security issues. Even on Kalapani, there has not been much in-depth and evidence-based research on the Nepali side. Such research would have helped government agencies to come up with compelling arguments at the negotiating table. So we plan to develop this organization as a platform for researchers.

Third, we cannot compete with big countries on hard power and economy. We can protect our sovereignty and territorial integrity only through astute diplomacy. Now we are facing a host of new issues and challenges related to the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s ‘Neighborhood first’ policy. We have to groom the new generation for research on all these issues. This organization can play a vital role on this front as well.

You mentioned Kalapani. Does the IFA have specific plans related to it?

Kalapani is an old issue. Regarding disputed border areas, we have sufficient evidence. But we have not been able to organize all the pieces of evidence in a systematic way. First, we have to identity the encroached areas. We have heard the British Library has some relevant documents. We have to collect evidence from 1816 (at the time of the Sugauli Treaty) by coordinating with our diplomatic missions abroad. We are planning to organize a workshop with experts from various sectors. We will form an expert panel which can assemble various pieces of evidence. We can submit the workshop document as policy recommendation to the government and also use it for academic purposes.

PM Oli says the government is still busy collecting evidence on Kalapani. But the public sentiment is that it should be resolved immediately.

It is a crucial issue as the scale of encroachment in Kalapani is very high. Nepal is a small country and the relations between two of our big neighbors are not so cordial. In case of some geopolitical confrontation between them, there could be further encroachments, and we plan to identify such risk areas. Our first job is to identity encroached areas and the second is to flag high-risk areas. 

There is perpetual speculation about a resource crunch, both human and financial, at the IFA. What has been your assessment?
It has just been a week since I joined the office. What I feel is that this organization’s usefulness is increasing. So the government should be generous in providing human and financial resources.
 

On a separate note, how do you evaluate the Oli government’s foreign policy?

Over the past 70 years, our focus was more on addressing the genuine security interests of our two big neighbors, and maintaining a delicate balance between them.

With China’s rise in recent decades, new dynamics have been added to Nepal’s geopolitics. The US invited Nepal’s foreign minister after 17 years and said that Nepal can play a vital role in the Indo-Pacific region. 

The world order is shifting to the East and Nepal occupies a highly strategic space. The traditional two-way rivalry has been converted into a three-way rivalry. We can feel the magnitude of American involvement with its offer of the $500 million MCC grant. Handling this three-way rivalry won’t be easy.

As someone who closely studies Nepal-China ties, help us understand the new ‘strategic partnership’ between them.

The term ‘alliance’ was frequently used during the Cold War. After that, American President Bill Clinton started using the term ‘strategic’ during his tenure. Barack Obama used the term ‘engagement’ and his ‘Pivot to Asia’ was all about greater engagement with the continent. Now the Trump administration is reverting to an old terminology.

In essence, ‘strategic partnership’ is a new form of an ‘alliance’, a word that countries today prefer not to use. Strategic partnership entails giving due importance to a country. It suggests deep engagement between two countries. In that sense, strategic partnership is a vague terminology as it could entail military, economic and cultural cooperation. ‘Strategic’ does not mean only military partnership.

But there is suspicion that China wants to deepen military engagement with Nepal under the guise of a strategic partnership.

That is not true. Our engagement with China cannot be at both political and military levels. Now the key area of cooperation is economic. China is now facing many challenges, and its focus now is economic or development partnership. China could have identified Nepal as an important economic partner. 

The BRI, new agreements on trade and transit, and other Chinese aid are closely linked to economic partnership. Now there could be a question about the difference in the nature of the American IPS and Nepal’s strategic partnership with China. Given our location and economic limitations, we cannot afford military partnership with any country. Not only Nepal, other American allies in Asia have also clarified that they cannot join the IPS in a way that affects their economic collaboration with China.

You mean Nepal-China strategic partnership is strictly economic?

Yes. China has pledged to help us become a land-linked country, an example of economic collaboration. Bilateral military exercises with India, China and the US are important for us. But our military engagement should not be targeted against any particular country. We have a cautious approach to the IPS as it aims to contain China. Geopolitically, we are in a sensitive area, we share a border with China, and we shelter Tibetan refugees. That is why we have to have a ‘wait and see’ approach with regard to the IPS. We should not rush in matters that have strong military components.

But won’t shunning the IPS and embracing the BRI pose problems for Nepal?

All the initiatives of world powers have strategic implications. Economic diplomacy also has a strategic purpose. There is no free lunch. Nepal has already joined the BRI, which China says is an economic project, and that its key components are connectivity, economic collaboration and investment. But the IPS mentions strengthening all 26 countries in this region in terms of security, economic assistance and bilateral exchanges. As the IPS states military engagement and the US itself has defined it as a military project, we cannot compare it with the BRI. Yes, tomorrow we could discover that the BRI too has security components. But for now, we have to give China the ssbenefit of the doubt.

Could you shed some light on the much-discussed Nepal-China strategic partnership?

During Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit, the two countries agreed to elevate their ‘comprehensive economic partnership’ to ‘strategic partnership’. China is very clear about the strategic partnership with Nepal. First, it is not an alliance. In Chinese foreign policy, we never seek alliance with other countries; this is a fundamental of our policy that everyone should understand. Strategy in my understanding means China has put Nepal in its foreign policy priority. It is also about long-term relationship for broader economic cooperation.

There is skepticism in Nepal that such a partnership could be transformed into a security alliance?

As I said, the strategic partnership with Nepal does not have any security and defense implications and it is all about enhancing economic collaborations.

What are the other issues related to this strategic partnership?

By strategic partnership we want to emphasize that we have given importance to Nepal. Both sides should discuss the areas of focus like agriculture and infrastructure based on mutual consultations. There are several areas on which two countries can work together.

In the second informal summit between Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi in October, China pushed the ‘China-India Plus’ concept. What does it actually entail?

This means having consensus between China and India to jointly promote economic development in this region. This is not limiting, like the idea of trilateral cooperation, which is about three countries. There could be four-side or five-side cooperation. The Plus formula is multi-lateral cooperation and not limited to China, India, and Nepal.

Does it mean India and China would consult each other before big infrastructure projects in Nepal?

It is about benefiting from each other’s competitive advantage. India has its own comparative advantage. China is competent in infrastructure, and China also has plenty of financial resources. In big projects you have to combine all sides, combine all comparative advantages. In Afghanistan, this concept is already being implemented. India and China are together training young diplomats there. In the second informal summit in India, Chinese President Xi and Indian Prime Minister Modi have agreed to extend this cooperation in other regions such as Africa and South East Asia.

Will India-China Plus minimize possible conflict between India and China in Nepal?

Of course. This concept entails enhancing economic cooperation in this region. It is not only about big projects but all types of cooperation.

But does not the ‘Plus’ concept minimize Nepal’s role?
Again, China-India Plus is not only about trilateral co-operation. It could also be multilateral. When I was in Dhaka, some experts there said that Bangladeshis do not want to be clubbed under Plus. I fully understand such feelings. But we can also have China-Nepal Plus; or China, India, US Plus Nepal. There is no problem.

Is this Plus concept confined to economic and infrastructure issues or does it also touch security issues?
It is limited to economic cooperation. No security policy or defense policy here.

In Nepal, the railway with China is often a subject of intense debates. What are the prospects of Chinese railway coming to Nepal?

We have a bright future for connectivity projects. Now, I think railway still has many technical problems because of the high mountains. There are also chances of earthquake in the proposed area. We have to go through studies and choose best options. We should not hurry to build a railway line. We have to move ahead carefully as this connectivity is for long term; not for one day or one year.

Nepal has already signed up to China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) but there are continued concerns over debt trap.

The debt trap diplomacy terminology was actually coined by Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney, famous for his hostile view of China. He coined this term in 2017 just before the first Belt and Road Summit in Beijing. The debt trap is a misnomer. See Bhutan. Many Indian companies have invested in hydropower projects there and Bhutan is struggling to pay back the loan. But no one talks about any debt trap there. This is pure propaganda.

What about the modality of investment in the proposed railway with Nepal?

The multi-dimensional connectivity concept includes highways, railways and opening more border points. Nepal can use Chinese airports too. Investment modalities are still up for discussion.

Nepal is already in the BRI but India is yet to join it. How optimistic are you that India will come around?

It is clear that India will not join the BRI in the near future. India has given some reasons on why BRI is bad for it. India is ready for economic cooperation but it does not like the label of BRI and we are flexible on this as well. But rest assured there will continue to be great economic cooperation between the two countries.

How does China view the border dispute between Nepal and India?

The Spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has clarified on this. China has not taken any position on it and we are hopeful that India and Nepal can settle it through peaceful negotiations. China also prefers to settle boundary disputes through peaceful means. We resolved our boundary dispute with Nepal in 1961 so there is no dispute between the two countries. India has also encroached on some Chinese territory in its new map.

How did you see the recent US report?

The US comes up with such reports on an annual basis, and its reports are considered credible, given the huge American investment in security and intelligence. The US has been publishing various reports on Nepal for a long time. This time, they emphasized two issues. Their findings on the TIA is trustworthy and objective. But I do not completely agree with the US assessment of the activities of the Indian Mujahideen. But we cannot dismiss these findings casually.

The Indian Mujahideen was somewhat active here at one point, but the situation has improved. Our security forces have been able to curb their activities. 

You say the report cannot be dismissed. How then should we deal with the threats?

Our security forces should be aware and alert about the possible presence of terrorists in Nepal. First, there are flaws in the TIA’s security arrangements. Second, we have an open border with India. The report also states that the open border has been misused for human trafficking, trans-border crime, terrorist activities, drugs and arms trafficking. During the insurgency, more than 90 percent of the total arms had been smuggled into Nepal. The government and security agencies need to accept the US report as a source of information and carve out an appropriate policy to preempt possible terrorist acts. Similarly, coordination among security forces needs to be improved.

You said the concerns over the TIA were credible. How so?

I do not completely agree with the report but there are some security lapses at the TIA. We have had a plane hijacked from our airport and there are frequent reports of smuggling of gold and drugs from the TIA. 

Some claim the US brought out the report to justify bolstering its security presence in Nepal.

As a superpower that tries to impose its hegemony, the US has been active in Nepal too. Such tendencies are more prevalent in South Asia. American focus shifts constantly. In different years, it has focused on different countries such as Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Somehow, there are always some terrorist activities taking place in South Asia so regional and international threats constantly emerge from the region. If there are regional and global security threats emanating from Nepal, global powers will obviously play here.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal last month, Nepal and China agreed to elevate their bilateral relation to a strategic level. How do we read this agreement?

For the first time in Nepal’s diplomatic history, Nepal has signed an agreement of strategic partnership with a country, although the document says that such a partnership is only for economic purposes. There are mainly two types of partnership in bilateral relationship: comprehensive economic partnership and strategic partnership. While the former deals with social, economic and cultural issues, the later includes strategic, defense and security components. A comprehensive partnership is elevated to a strategic partnership if the countries feel the need to cooperate in strategic, defense and security areas. First, there is a diplomatic relationship between two countries. An upgrade of the diplomatic relationship results in a comprehensive economic partnership, and the elevation of a comprehensive partnership leads to a strategic partnership. If two countries collaborate further on defense-related issues, they opt for an alliance.

Does strategic partnership with China go against the principles of Nepal’s foreign policy?

Till date, Nepal is committed to non-alignment, Panchsheel and the UN charter. Until Xi’s visit, Nepal had not forged a strategic partnership with any country. A strategic partnership contradicts the norms and values of non-alignment and other fundamentals of Nepal’s foreign policy.  Nepal is sandwiched between two emerging powers. We are naturally closer to India than to China in terms of geography, culture, economy, transit, communications, etc.
 

But the government has clarified that the strategic partnership is purely economic in nature and Nepal will soon have similar agreements with India and other countries.

Yes. Right after Xi’s visit, Prime Minister KP Oli said Nepal would sign a strategic partnership with India as well. But how many countries can you have strategic partnerships with? What does strategic partnership mean? It seems that we are talking about strategic partnership without knowing its crux.

How would you relate the IPS and our strategic partnership with China?

The US has said it would have strategic partnerships with Nepal and Sri Lanka. But Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali has repeatedly said that Nepal will not join the IPS. On the one hand, Nepal is repeatedly expressing its dissatisfaction with the IPS. On the other, we are forging a strategic partnership with China.

What are the chances of a full-blown alliance with China?

First, the strategic partnership was forged without any preparations on the Nepali side. Second, the Chinese wanted to sign an extradition treaty in Xi’s presence. Third, if you read Xi’s article published in Nepali newspapers prior to his visit, you see that he had emphasized a defense partnership. Fourth, in 2017 China came up with a document much like the IPS titled ‘China’s Policies on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation’ and it has recently come up with a white paper on the same. Both the documents mention defense cooperation with neighboring countries.

If you sign a strategic partnership, you have to be ready to discuss security and geopolitical issues. In the future, China may force us into an alliance citing common security threats. What will Nepal do if China proposes an alliance, with the argument that the two countries have common security threats? We agreed to a strategic partnership without any homework on its long-term implications. This is a major shift in Nepal’s foreign policy.
 

How do the US and India see our new strategic partnership with China?

After Nepal signed on to the BRI in 2017, there have been changes in the American and Indian approaches to Nepal. They have not officially commented on the Nepal-China strategic partnership. But ever since Nepal signed on to the BRI, there has been a series of visits by top US officials, who have all shown concerns over the BRI, a debt trap and Chinese investments in Nepal. There is a view in Delhi and Washington that the communist government in Nepal tilts toward China. It seems they are now preparing a counter-strategy.

The IPS aims to minimize Chinese influence in Nepal and both India and the US want to maintain their sway. Therefore, India and the US could adopt a more aggressive Nepal policy in the coming days. There are signs of an escalation in the rivalry between India, China and the US after the strategic partnership. In fact, Nepal has invited such escalation. I see the possibility of increasing strategic rivalry in Nepal. Such a tussle does not serve our national interest. In the past, we were too close to India, and now we have got too close to China.