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First, an old query. Is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS)?

The IPS report was unveiled last June when the Shangri-La Dialogue was underway in Singapore. Unveiled by the US Department of Defense, it included many military components. The document speaks for itself. The same November, the US unveiled its foreign policy which stipulated that the IPS would be a part of the US foreign policy.  

Now, there are debates on whether the MCC is a part of the IPS. When we initiated the process for the MCC, Baburam Bhattarai was the prime minister and Barsha Man Pun the finance minister. They formally requested the US government to make Nepal part of the MCC. On the basis of the request, the American government began to assess if the MCC could be implemented in Nepal. They accessed things like Nepal’s human rights situation, and freedom of speech and expression. In the end, Nepal qualified for the grant.

At the same time, Nepal is in a sensitive place. In terms of both economic and military power, the US and China are competing with each other. We have seen the disputes of South China Sea and Middle East where two countries are competing, and the IPS orientation also demonstrates that competition. China has invested massively in infrastructures of neighboring countries through the BRI.  Therefore, whether we want it or not, whether the Americans accept it or not, the MCC has tried to address the larger geopolitics of this region. That said, the BRI’s objective is to support infrastructure development, and the objective of the MCC is also to help Nepal’s infrastructure development. Therefore, whether it is a part of the IPS should not make huge difference.

Would you say it was an intellectual dishonesty on the part of the US to retrospectively lump the MCC under the IPS?

By denying it is a part of the IPS, the US is becoming too defensive on the MCC. There was no need for that. They are saying that the IPS is their approach in this region. Similarly, the American state minister during his Nepal visit has clearly said that the MCC is a part of the IPS. They have mentioned the IPS as a foreign policy goal of the US government. So there is lack of consistency. They are becoming defensive just to placate public opinion on the MCC in Nepal. They should have clearly said that it is our foreign policy component and the MCC is focused on infrastructure development. From the start, the BRI narrative has been that it is a support for infrastructure development, which has been established as well. The MCC narrative could have been developed in a similar way. 

How do you evaluate the divisions in the ruling party over the MCC grant? Are these divisions based on ideology or have they more to do with intra-party dynamics?

There are two sides to it. Let’s look at our recent political history. Nepali Congress formed majority government in 1990 under Girija Prasad Koirala. For some months, the government ran smoothly but after that a dissatisfied group within the party, under the leadership of Ganesh Man Singh, started protesting against it. The size of the power pie is small and there are limited opportunities for leaders and cadres. More than that, right now, there is a constitutional cap on the number of ministers. In the past, there was a trend of appointing government critics as ministers. PM Oli’s dispensation does not allow for that. Our politics is filled with opportunism over money, power and prestige. Some people outside are always clamoring for their day in the sun.

Next, there could be ideological reasons. NCP leader Bhim Rawal has come up with some points, for instance he has objected to the provision of parliamentary endorsement of the MCC. Like former speaker Krishna Bahadur Mahara, a large group of former Maoists are against it. Among former UML leaders, Rawal has been very vocal. So the current divisions over the MCC are partly a clamor for opportunity, and are partly based on ideology.

Is it the case that PM Oli and Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali, as government representatives, feel a kind of pressure from the Americans to endorse the MCC compact?

Successive governments after 2012 have signed to pass the MCC proposal and they all have accepted its conditions.  So if you think responsibly, you cannot backtrack from it. It is also directly related to a superpower. Therefore, we should have had a long and intense discussion before signing it. Yet this discussion is taking place after it has already been signed.  I am saying that this should be seen as one-time exception and be endorsed by the parliament. In the future, if we renew the MCC, there should be renegotiations on some points.

Do you see Chinese pressure behind the opposition to the MCC in Nepal?

I do not think the Chinese have lobbied with the Nepal Communist Party. There is a lot of space to do politics on the MCC. Some are trying to project themselves as nationalists. There is competition inside the party to be seen as nationalists and create space for themselves in politics. But I do not believe that the Chinese have come in a systematic way on this issue.

Coming back to the parliamentary endorsement of the MCC, do you support it?

The most unjustifiable condition of MCC is the parliamentary endorsement. Our constitution clearly lays out two legislative functions of parliament: endorsing bills to make them laws and endorsing treaties and conventions. Either you have to present the MCC accord as bilateral treaty, like the Mahakali Treaty, but it is not a treaty. Now, it is in the form of a bill. There is vast difference between treaties/conventions and bills. In conventions, state party or the government is responsible, but in case of bills, they are applicable to all citizens of Nepal once endorsed.

A safe way for the government is to present it as a treaty and endorse it with two-third votes. There are technical problems and there are big political implications as well. That is why parliamentary endorsement is not right. If we had not signed up for the MCC accord, I would have objected to its parliamentary endorsement. As we have already signed it, we can perhaps renegotiate. But I am not sure the US would be ready to drop parliamentary endorsement.

Would it be right to say that accepting the MCC is tantamount to accepting the IPS? There is also a kind of conspiracy thinking in some quarters that if we endorse the MCC accord, it will allow the Americans to station its army in Nepal.

I am saying that the IPS is a military strategy but the MCC is not. The IPS is part of the US foreign policy, so is the MCC. However, we have already entered the broader US foreign policy umbrella. As far as US military presence is concerned, we need a separate agreement for that. There is no military or security component in the MCC.

What do you make of the rumor that part of the reason Krishna Bahadur Mahara was removed from the speaker’s post was his resistance to the MCC accord?

I am not convinced Mahara stopped the MCC proposal. As finance minister, Mahara was involved in the MCC process. What I say is that there was bargaining inside the ruling party on the MCC issue. There was bargaining on who gets what with the passage of the MCC. Some are using it as a tool to boost their nationalistic credentials and strengthen their political position. On the other hand, they could also jeopardize the country’s relations with the US. Agni Sapkota has publicly said he is against the MCC. If he becomes the new speaker, it will be interesting to see how he behaves. If he passes the MCC bill, we should understand that his opposition was part of his bargaining tactic.

Let’s move to transitional justice. How do you see the appointment of new office-bearers in the two transitional justice bodies?

In April last year, the tenure of previous office bearers ended. The government then formed a committee led by former chief justice Om Prakash Mishra to recommend new names.  In this period, conflict victims and national and international stakeholders continued to argue that previous laws were insufficient, and they should be amended. They said appointments should be made only after the amendment in order to make the process more trustworthy. They were also saying conflict victims should be consulted and have a say in the overall process. Taking conflict victims into confidence was the right idea. But the committee took 11 months to make its recommendations. By the time it made the recommendations, even the tenure of the committee had expired.  

What would you say has been the major failing of our transitional justice process?

A major problem of our transitional justice process is absence of trust. The government takes human rights defenders and civil society members as spoilers of the process. In the eyes of conflict victims, both the civil society and the government work for their own interests. Therefore, until these three forces come together and an environment of trust is built, this process cannot move ahead in a consensual way, which is mandatory to reach to a logical conclusion. So the government should have worked on confidence building measures with all stakeholders. After that the role of commissions should have been defined and the role of conflict victims in the overall process identified. Similarly, there should have been work to segregate judicial and non-judicial components of transitional justice.

Government and opposition parties agreed to form the two commissions amid a climate of mistrust. They just concluded consultations in all provinces. For the same purpose, they had prepared a questionnaire. When victims entered the hall, they were given those questionnaires, which were to be filled within three hours, as if it was a university exam. There were loaded legal and constitutional terms in there. People from rural areas did not understand those terms.  The language of healing that the state was supposed to speak was missing. It is also a national healing process. We have a huge trust deficit and the current working style cannot bridge that gap. 

But haven’t the major parties vowed to amend the laws in line with the recommendation of the Supreme Court and international practices?

To amend the law, you need to build certain confidence. The problem is that the government is yet to recognize conflict victims as stakeholders in this process. For example, a family breadwinner is still declared as disappeared. All properties are under his name. He had taken out a loan on the basis of those properties. The bank has been publishing notices with the photo of the disappeared person, asking him to pay the money back. His wife wants to pay the loan by selling the property but the cabinet has not taken any decision to transfer the property in her name. So she is helpless.

As per existing laws, if a person goes missing for 12 years, family members can declare him or her dead and you can transfer property to the rightful heir.  But allowing this will be tantamount to allowing the issue of disappearance to be diverted. The government wants to reach that point. The government wants the duration of disappearance to cross 12 years so that the family would register the death certificate and claim the property. It will dilute the issue of disappearance. That is why there is still no law to criminalize enforced disappearance. There is still no law to criminalize torture because torture of conflict era cannot be proven as all evidences have gone. This is not a healing language. These are delaying tactics.

Don’t you think the two transitional justice commissions, now that they have office-bearers, will be able to resolve the remaining tasks of transitional justice?

The transitional justice process has three main components: judicial, political, and administrative. The judicial component can be addressed through commissions. The political and administrative components should be addressed by the government of the day. Truth seeking is a judicial component. For example, there are around 40,000 conflict-era cases in my calculation. Each and every one of them should be classified. You have to establish truth in every case. Some cases could be settled through reconciliation, which is a major part of the peace process. Serious human rights violations should be categorized as such and cases filed through the special court. There would be reparation in remaining cases.

Political component entails reconciliation. You can bring local government and provincial government on board in this process.  Additionally, we have a Supreme Court verdict that you can go for reconciliation only after the consent and informed participation of conflict victims. Next, the government has to take decision to transfer the property of disappeared people to their rightful owners, which helps keep the issue of disappearance alive. The government declared the security personnel killed in insurgency martyrs but not others who died back then. Reparation is another political and administrative part of the peace process. There are several issues which need to be addressed by the political leadership as the commissions on their own cannot resolve them.

So you don’t see much hope of timely justice for conflict victims.

Yes, I can say that. I wish for the success of those who got appointed to the two commissions. But do the people appointed to the commissions have any knowledge about transitional justice? Have they worked with conflict victims? Not even one of them, I am afraid. 

Agni Sapkota has been implicated in a war-time murder. Can he become the next speaker?

His murder case is pending at the Supreme Court. Kavre district court has issued an arrest warrant against him. If it is an ethical issue, he cannot be elected the speaker. The main qualification for speakership is having high moral ground.

There is continuation on some issues, while we have made adjust­ments on some other issues. Some fundamentals of foreign policy remain unchanged. For example, given our geopolitical situation, we have to maintain strict neutrality, as advised by our founding father. Non-alignment, UN charter and Panchsheel are issues on which there is continuation. Another important continuation is in not allowing our soil to be used against any country.

But foreign policy priorities also keep changing as per our domes­tic needs. In the past, there was political conflict, so achieving peace and making it sustainable was our priority. We told the international community that our key priority was achieving peace and so they should support us.

After the completion of the major parts of the peace process, consti­tution drafting was our priority. After the promulgation of the new constitution, we formed a strong and stable government. Now, after having institutionalized and con­solidated political gains, we are on the path of economic prosperity. Prosperity is a key government as well as foreign policy agenda. The changes in domestic policy should be clearly reflected in the country’s foreign policy. In this context, we have to know what is happening at the regional and global levels. We have to catch up with the changes in our immediate neighborhood too. Foreign policy is a dynamic field and we have to continuously make adjustments. But at the heart of it, foreign policy is always an extended form of domestic policy.

Diversification seems to be the central theme of the government foreign policy. What does this entail? For one, closer ties with China appear to be the priority.

We are always guided by our national requirements and needs. In this period, two issues drove us towards diversification. First, we were too dependent on outside power, and suffered for it. So we sought to diversify our options. We signed the Transit and Transport Agreement with China in 2016. It was a major breakthrough because before that, third-country trade was possible only via India. But only policy-level decision was not suffi­cient; there was a need to make it workable. We signed subsequent agreements, including protocol, to make the agreements feasible.

Another important aspect is building necessary infrastructure to ensure our access to transit facilities. This could have been difficult 50 years ago but today’s Tibet is largely developed and much changed. Now, there are better road, rail and other infrastructures in Tibet and if we can benefit from them, why not? Inter-independency is a reality in today’s globalizing world. We have to look through the lens of compar­ative advantages. But first you have to be better connected.

What kind of connectivity are you talking about?

We want to be connected through railways, waterways, roads, and other means. In the past, due to the strict electricity guidelines imposed by India, there was confu­sion about our possible electricity markets. We successfully eased the restrictions and now there is a favor­able environment for electricity trading. When it comes to energy cooperation, we have made good progress with Bangladesh. Nepal, Bangladesh and India are close to trilateral electricity coopera­tion. We should always look at the broader context. If there are more options, we can bring more investment and be in a better place in marketing our products.

Nepal government seems intent on building the inter-country railway while China seems to be emphasiz­ing the roads. Is this the right reading?

I humbly request you to follow the official documents. When it comes to railway, the agreement we forged stands. Now we are in the phase of preparing the Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the railway. Apparently China was not too keen on it but then during Chinese President Xi Jin­ping’s Nepal visit, the two coun­tries actually signed an agree­ment on the DPR, and the two sides are now working on pre­paring the DPR. The proposed Raxaul-Kathmandu railway line has also gotten momentum. We need both roads and railway. It is not a question of choosing one over the other. We all know that it takes comparatively less time to build roads than to build railway. We also know that bringing a railway is a difficult task given our difficult geographical terrains. The roads will be completed soon but it does not mean that the railway will not progress for the same reason. Both the projects will move ahead simultaneously.

Another burning issue right now is the Millennium Chal­lenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal compact. Why so much confusion over it?

The process of MCC began in 2011 and we signed it in 2017 September. The incumbent gov­ernment is fully committed to all points of the MCC agreement. This is about continuity of the agreement signed with a coun­try. One month ago, I was in Washington DC and conversed with high-level government offi­cials there, including President Trump’s advisor who follows this region. They categorically told me that Indo-Pacific is not a formal organization. According to them, the basic concept is to name this region Indo-Pacific, and all the activities they carry out in this region fall under this broader concept. But it does not mean that the MCC is under Indo-Pa­cific because there are MCC projects beyond the Indo-Pacific region as well, including in Africa.

We have to be accountable to the document we have signed. We are not responsible for anything beyond that. The US has not come up with any proposal to change the agree­ment we signed in 2017. In a dem­ocratic and open society like ours, issues are raised from different per­spectives and we have to take that in a normal way. Some issues are raised with little knowledge, some with an intent of knowing more, and some on the basis of curiosity. The Nepal Communist Party is a respon­sible party running the government, and Prime Minister Oli has time and again said that whatever agreement we have signed will be honored.

Are you suggesting that it really does not matter if the MCC falls under the Indo-Pacific Strategy?

There is no clarity on the meaning of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. What is Indo-Pacific? What do they want from it? They tell us it is a concept according to which the Indo-Pacific region should be open, free, and where democracies are promoted. It has not taken any organization­al shape. If they broadly explain that whatever they do in this region bilaterally is under Indo-Pacific, what can we do until and unless they come up with an organizational shape? Again, we are responsible for the agreement and nothing else. When we signed the MCC compact in 2017, there was no mention of Indo-Pacific. It is a five-year project and Nepal chose construction of transmission lines and upgrade of roads under the MCC grants.

Lastly, you were a member of Nepali half of the Eminent Per­sons’ Group (EPG). What do you make of India’s delay in receiving the report?

I do not want to comment much on it because right now I am not in the EPG. What I will say is that the EPG process was initiated at the highest political level. A consensual report has been prepared covering all areas of bilateral relations. We agreed to submit the final report to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi first. What we didn’t expect was the kind of indifference we now see from India. Still, I am hopeful that the EPG report will be received as soon as possible.

 How would you respond to the criticism that President Bhandari often oversteps her constitution­al limits?

It is the president’s duty to abide by and protect the constitution and to promote national unity. As far as the issue of the president meeting ministers or leaders is concerned, they take place at the request of these ministers and leaders. If an individual or group seeks an appointment, the president has to give them time and listen to them. If the president cannot even meet political leaders and people from various walks to discuss contempo­rary national issues, why do we need the president’s office at all? What she is doing is entirely constitution­al. You cannot give a single example of President Bhandari acting like an executive president, as she has been criticized in some quarters of doing. In the past, too, President Ram Baran Yadav used to meet polit­ical leaders, also on constitutional matters. Such meetings and consul­tations come under normal practice. So let us not protest for the heck of it and drag this hallowed institution into controversy.

What about the allegation that she has tried to influence the functioning of the ruling Nepal Communist Party, for instance by inviting its top leaders for a meeting when a separate NCP standing committee meeting was going on?

We have to be clear on these issues. First, the NCP standing committee meeting got extended beyond the scheduled time. Some of the com­mittee leaders had already sought an appointment with the president and they kept their appointment. Other government officials were also pres­ent at the meeting and they together discussed issues of national interest.

Did the president call the meet­ing or did the leaders seek it themselves?

The leaders sought an appoint­ment with the president, and not the other way round. Those leaders who met the president had also informed the party’s standing committee that they would do so.

The president has also been accused of trying to run the gov­ernment by proxy, for instance by picking her own favorite as the next House speaker.

The president has no such right. It is the responsibility of the parlia­ment and political parties to elect the new speaker. In democratic countries, political parties drive the parliamentary process. The presi­dent has no role in this whatsoever.

Did President Bhandari act as a guarantor of honest implemen­tation of the gentleman’s agree­ment between PM KP Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal?

No, the president played no such role. PM Oli and party Chair Dahal frequently go to meet the president. In fact, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba and senior leader Ram Chandra Poudel can also meet the president. I don’t think either PM Oli or party Chairman Dahal consider themselves so polit­ically weak that they have to seek the president’s mediation. They are capable of settling these issues on their own.

You deny every allegation lev­eled against the president. If she is blameless, why the constant barrage of criticism against her?

See, Nepali Congress has not spoken about it. Even other fringe opposition parties including Mad­hes-based parties have not said any­thing about the president. Most of the criticism against her comes from within the ruling Nepal Communist Party. Some leaders who are not sat­isfied with PM Oli are venting their ire on the president. They forget that the president is an institution, the protector of the constitution. It is not about a particular individual.

What about one after another media report about the presi­dent’s alleged extra-constitution­al steps?

The media should play the role of watchdog. They should not indulge in yellow journalism. If there are bad things happening, they can write about them, but only on an objec­tive basis. Journalism is a sensitive area and even a small mistake can create huge problems. Look at what happened with the Hrithik Roshan incident. All reporting should be fact-based. Without fact-based jour­nalism, the society will face many troubles. The problem right now is that negative mindset prevails everywhere.

We also get to hear rumors about the ailing PM Oli handing over executive powers to President Bhandari.

How can the president exer­cise executive rights? Is there any constitutional provision to do so? Absolutely not. It is possible only if you destroy the current consti­tution. The constitution provides all executive rights to the prime minister. To be prime minister, first you have to be a member of par­liament, and the president is not. Without becoming an MP, how can she become an executive? Until and unless this constitution is function­al, the president cannot take up executive rights.

But can’t the constitution be amended?

Is it possible to amend the consti­tution for the same? Will all parties agree to it? I do not see any such pos­sibility. Even if the parliament does so, the people and the society won’t accept it. Our president has not even thought about this issue. It is a ploy to defame the prime minister as well as the president’s office. The prime minister is somewhat sick but he is still very capable of steering the country in the right direction.

Who then is benefiting by drag­ging the president into contro­versy?

There are many people and con­servative forces that are displeased with the current political dispen­sation and the constitution. Some external forces too are against this constitution. Soon after the consti­tution was promulgated, there was a blockade. People who opposed the constitution in 2015 now accept it. In history, there have been several instances where internal and exter­nal forces worked to sabotage the constitution and democracy. There is another factor as well. In the histo­ry of Nepal, almost all governments that were toppled were brought down not due to opposition parties but due to intra-party rifts. Now, KP Oli is facing difficulties from his own party leaders.

So the ruling party leaders are themselves trying to drag the president into controversy?

Yes, there have been such attempts. As I said, opposition par­ties have no problem with the func­tioning of the president.

One common criticism of the president is that her caval­cade often obstructs traffic and makes people’s life difficult. Why doesn’t the president’s office lis­ten to public criticism?

Nepal Army has taken the full responsibility for the president’s security as she is their ceremonial chief. We even consulted the army chief about the traffic issue. “If there is a security lapse tomorrow, who will take responsibility?” the army chief asked us in return. He added that the army will have to give full-fledged security to the president. We proposed some concessions to provide relief to the people but the army was adamant. This is not only the case of Nepal, it happens in oth­er countries as well. It is the security bodies that assess security risks, and it is not for the president to say what level of security they need. Even in normal times, people face traffic jams. But if there is 10-20 minute delay during the president’s visit, we get agitated. We have to respect the organization. Again, this is not about an individual.

Does the president heed the sug­gestions of advisors like you?

The president spends hours seek­ing advice from us on respective areas. She is very receptive to our ideas.

There are also complaints about the president’s opulent lifestyle, for instance about her penchant for new vehicles, her helicopter travels, and her office seeking greater space.

The only vehicle added in the president’s office in the past two years is one electric car, which costs no more than 5-6 million rupees. All other vehicles are old. There are talks of the president getting a new helicopter. But the office has not bought any. She uses the army’s heli­copter, which is old and without any air-conditioning. So far as the issue of land for Sheetal Niwas expansion is concerned, the process was ini­tiated during Ram Baran Yadav’s tenure when there was a Nepali Congress-led government. Now, if the president stops this process, people will say the president has become active.

How difficult is it for the presi­dent to stay completely neutral in a thoroughly politicized soci­ety like Nepal?

There is saying that democracy is one of the worst systems but there is also no better system. The political system remains within the demo­cratic framework. It is also true that a president cannot be elected with­out the support of political parties. As the president comes from a par­ticular party, the party always seeks some benefit from the office. This is so everywhere. There is always party pressure.

Why have the president’s advi­sors like you been largely silent when she is being so widely crit­icized?

If we speak, people say that the president is becoming active. They say that the advisors are supposed to give suggestions to the presi­dent, not defend her. Yet, they crit­icize us when we speak. It is not easy for us

How do we understand India’s recent Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Reg­ister of Citizens (NRC)?

Apart from Nepal, all South Asian states emerged from the colonial rule. In 1947, when the British left the subcontinent, all of them got new independent identities. Ban­gladesh came into being in 1971. In between, Sikkim was merged with India. In that sense, Nepal is the oldest, never-colonized nation-state in the sub-continent. Looking at the current debates in India on who are Indians and who constitute India, there are two historical inflection points.

One was in 1947 when India and Pakistan were born. The other landmark is the 1971 creation of Bangladesh. Who is an Indian? All those living in India during the time of British departure are Indians. The nation-states emerged after 1947, and there is constant churn in the Indian subcontinent about this idea of citizenry and who belongs where. Populations are still in a flux. Plus, even the Indian union’s international boundaries are being challenged in places like Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. At the same time, externally, after 70 years, the sub-continent is still in the making.

In 1947, about 10 million people migrated to India, in what was the biggest population movement in history. Then millions of refugees were forced out in 1971 from today’s Bangladesh when it was East Paki­stan. India was the natural home for all these populations. In a sense, the current move is to settle the popula­tion. But is it possible to ignore that some people have been living in the same place for the past 70 years?

What do you make of the implan­tation of the NRC in Assam?

The NRC came out in 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi and Prafulla Kumar Mahant negotiated in the wake of the Assam movement (1979-1985) against immigrants. Assam had received many people from Bangla­desh and those threatened by other population movements in the rest of India. Who is son of soil (Bhumipu­tra)? That was the core issue of the Assam movement in the 1980s. Rajiv Gandhi negotiated with them, and the idea for National Registration of Citizens was born.

Since then the Assamese have been asking for the implementa­tion of the Rajiv-Prafulla accord that decides who is Assamese and who is not. The Supreme Court then asked the Indian government to start the registry. According to the NRC, you have to prove your birth and pro­longed stay in a place.

That created problems because besides the indigenous people and minorities, many outsiders have come and settled in Assam. But as these outsiders could not produce the requisite documents, two mil­lion people are not registered. It was hard in terms of time and money, and created anxiety among minori­ties. This is precisely the moment the two-third BJP majority govern­ment decided to act. Why this par­ticular moment? They wanted to isolate the minority community.

The Indian government says it wants to kick out illegal immi­grants. Who are these illegal immigrants?

The countries adjoining Assam are all Muslim countries. Recently, the influx of Rohingya refuges to Bangladesh and from Bangladesh to India has highlighted the salience of the NRC. This is strange. India has always been open for refugees and those from Tibet and even Pakistan have been welcomed. The people who came to India in 1947 were not refugees but forcefully displaced because of partition. They became refugees after a government Act. The NRC in Assam is complicated by the fact that outgoing chief justice of India Ranjan Gogai is also Assamese. Instead of taking a judicial stance, he looked at the issue from national security perspective while deciding about Rohigya and the NRC.

Therefore the NRC was imple­mented with a legal background, perhaps as the fulfillment of the Rajiv-Prafulla agreement as the native populations saw it.

What about the fate of around 500,000 Nepali-speaking people in Assam?

When the NRC process was going on in Assam, so was the election campaign. The election gave over­whelming majority to Modi-Shah party. I remember Amit Shah speak­ing in Darjeeling wearing a Nepal cap and addressing the Nepali-speaking population, called Gorkha popu­lation. Nepali identity in India is always riddled with problems because there is Nepali homeland for Nepali-speaking people, which is Nepal.

The idea of homeland always cre­ates a problem for people resid­ing in another country that speaks a foreign language. If you have a homeland where your language and family and ancestors originate, you belong to them, you belong there. Therefore, it is interesting the way Gorkha identity was invented in Darjeeling and many parts of India and even in Burma. People would play on the idea of homeland. So, as Amit Shah said during the elections, Gorkhas need not fear, as they are Hindus. He could have said you have been here for over 70 years, and hence you are our citizens. But he did not say that.

What are the difficulties in reg­istration for the Nepali-speaking community in Assam?

From our side, we need to be politically correct while describing the Nepali-speaking people across the border. We assume they are Nepali and we create problems for them. The Nepali-speaking popula­tion faces the crisis of citizenship in the Northeast, even with the NRC. The Citizenship Amendment Act will not capture them because they are not refugees. Nepalis went there a century ago as economic migrants. They settled there and contributed to the Indian economy. The new CAA talks about forced refugees coming from a couple of neighbor­ing countries and it is not applicable to Nepali-speaking community. But the NRC does matter to them.

The NRC is a cumber­some process, a kind of proof that you are work­ing here, you own land, you belong to this land. But people are always on the move for jobs. The Nepali-speaking community is a pio­neering commu­nity establishing Assam as an agri­culture land. But the Nepali-speak­ing population also lack documents required to claim citi­zenry. Three to five lakhs is a big number. Where do they go? If your name is not there, you will be immediately sent to a camp. I do not know how many people went to camp but the possibility is immi­nent. You become aliens in your own place where you have been for over half a century. Under normal citizenship law, if you live in a coun­try for 1-15 years, you are entitled to something. The current registration is very problematic. For example, an elder brother is included but the younger brother is not, a wife is but her husband is not, a father is but his daughter is not.

In Burma, Nepali speaking Bur­mese have started giving themselves two names: One Burmese name and another Nepali name. Why? In census, if you say you are a Nepali, the Burmese authorities can say that since you are from Nepal you have to go back. In both Assam and Myanmar, they have a homeland, i.e. Nepal, and the government can say you have to go back. Then they become stateless because even we do not recognize them. So the NRC is basically creating statelessness. It is a fascist mentality, manifest of a tension between identity politics and citizenry politics.

But, theoretically, what is the harm in keeping a registry of your people?

Theoretically, it looks fine. But there are different ways of doing it. Some argue that it is like a demone­tization process because everybody has to be in a line to prove their citizenship. Is it possible?

Is the CAA singularly targeted at Muslims? Otherwise, why are the Christians, who are seen by hardcore Hindus in Nepal as a threat to their identity, exempt­ed under India’s CAA?

At the heart of the current dis­pensation in India is the BJP and many of its leaders especially Modi and Shah who have been socialized as RSS Pracharaks. There is a big debate on whether the BJP is RSS. But the intellectual and cultural sources or understanding of Indian history and civilization comes from the RSS. They believe that India is a Hindu-majority country. Their ori­entation is that Gandhi and Nehru cheated on India by giving Pakistan to Muslims but not ‘Bharat’ to Hin­dus.

But it has a colonial legacy. There is no Christian India. Christians are not a threat to them but Muslim Pakistan is. Again, they think Paki­stan is for Muslims but there is no parallel state for Hindus.

So there is a psychology of loss or loss of self. They want to cre­ate a Hindu- self. This is precisely what has happened in Kashmir. When Kashmir was negotiated, it was given special status and was always seen as Muslim-majority. Their reading was that giving special status to the Muslim majority would undervalue the Hindu-majority in Jammu. Even in local areas, there are Muslim pockets. Muslims are a threat for them.

But if there is no minority, there is no democracy. If there is no dis­sent, there is no democracy. If all things are the same color, there is no democracy. Democracy in Pakistan has a problem because everybody is the same. Diversity and pluralism are the fundamentals of democracy.

Is there a possibility of the Modi government’s religious experi­ments being repeated in Nepal?

What happens in India always affects us. Both good and bad things flow from the south. But there are differences between Nepal’s idea of Hinduism and India’s idea of Hin­dutva. In our society we practice Sanatani Hinduism. It means our local customs and practices inform the idea of Hinduism. For example, eggs and meet are offered at our Ganesh temples. In India, religious rituals and practices are different. So what we are practicing is Hindu Santan tradition. Ours is not sani­tized Hinduism or pure Hinduism, but mixed with different cultures. Hindutva is politics. We do not do politics in the name of religion here.

We did try politics based on reli­gion by introducing the threat of Christians but that did not play out well. But in India, Hindutva is propa­gated against Islam. In India religion is divisive or a fault-line, just like in the US race is a fault-line. In our country, religion is not a fault line so far. But if we learn bad things from India, it could become a fault-line.

There are fears that if the Mus­lims who are being persecuted in Northern India enter Nepal as refugees it could create security problems.

When you push someone against the wall, what will they do? They will find ways to get out. We have an open border. Nepal has always wel­comed people. In Nepal, foreigners are never suspected. Its character is welcoming that is why tourism is booming. I talk from experience. When foreigners traveled in rural areas we were never suspicious. In 1965, we welcomed Tibetan refu­gees. In 1971, we welcomed refugees from Bangladesh. We also welcomed Bhutanese refugees. I expect people will come. But to change the refugee question into national security ques­tion is an easy way out. It is a linear argument to say Muslim refugees are a national security issue. Big powers could ask us why we welcomed the people they chased out. On human­itarian ground, we should be ready to welcome them. I see it from a liberal framework. The government might decide otherwise but people should be welcoming