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The strategic interest in Nepal seems to be growing by the day, be it the interest of India, China, the US, or the Europeans. But our prime minister was recently in Baku to take part in the NAM Summit. How do you see these twin developments?

On the issue of NAM, it has to account for its own relevance. First, consider the nomenclature. Non- aligned against whom? This is the big unanswered question. The moment we say non-alignment, it means non-alignment with certain powers. It was at the time of Cold War when certain countries came together under the visionary leadership of leaders like Nehru, Sukarno and Tito that the NAM was created. They thought of a group that would not align with the US or the USSR. But after the Cold War, there are no more two superpowers. So why nonalignment? Second, in the multi-polar world, countries like India and China are coming up and there is a larger space for Germany and Brazil, and Russia is resurgent. In that context, where is NAM going to be?

Third, we are hanging on to a past relic. This was also evident in India’s approach. PM Narendra Modi has already skipped two NAM summits. This year he sent a ceremonial vice-president. We also sent our vice-president to the previous NAM summit. This time, despite his ill health, PM Oli decided to attend himself. It was taxing on his health because it was a very short trip. We have not been able to sell the idea that the head of government himself has to participate. But, yes, the summit gives you a platform to interact with global leaders and to forge personal ties with other heads of government and heads of the state.

The Oli government says it adheres to NAM principles as it is still not aligned to any big power, for instance the US, China or India. Can’t non-alignment be defined that way?

Well, it can be. This year’s NAM summit took place in Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. We don’t have any embassy in the Caucasus. So it was a good opportunity to understand the Caucasia region and Central Asia. Those countries have a lot of energy and gas which could be brought to South Asia. If we aspire to expand our foreign relation we can think of new embassies in Central Asia. The countries there should also be encouraged to open embassies here. That way the summit in Baku was an opportunity to expand the horizon of Nepal’s foreign policy. But there was no interaction between Nepal and those countries.

But PM Oli saw it fit to meet the Venezuelan President, didn’t he?

This government has tried to have good relations with countries with left governments. It was evident during the PM’s visits to Vietnam and Cambodia, and in his meeting top leaders from North Korea and Venezuela.

But don’t you think it is still a good idea for comparably smaller powers like Nepal to band together under NAM to protect their interests against the big powers? 

But by sending its vice-president, India has signalled that NAM is more a ceremonial body. So it has significance, it has history, but it is more ceremonial, and has more of a symbolic value. We could have done a similar thing. But the fact that our executive prime minister participated in the summit obviously gave us an opportunity to interact with global leaders. But as far as the utility of NAM is concerned, it is diminishing very fast.

Again, what about the idea of smaller countries coming together to safeguard their interests?

We no longer live in a bipolar world with two superpowers and are slowly entering a multi-polar world.  As I mentioned earlier, there is resurgence of Russia, India and China. The US under Trump shows some unpredictability but right now it is nonetheless the sole superpower. I do not think NAM’s current leadership is up to handling the challenges of this multi-polar world. NAM was initiated by some visionary leaders but they are now all gone. The current NAM leaders do not have that kind of international personality. For NAM to be significant, it has to have an economic component as well. Also, if you look at multilateral institutions like United Nations, WTO, and NAM, they are facing a problem today because everybody is now talking about ‘my country first’. The United Nations is having a serious fund-crunch. There are reports that it may not be able to pay its staff. If the UN is so neglected, does NAM stand a chance?

One concept that is closely linked to NAM is Panchasheel. After his return from NAM summit, our Foreign Minister said Panchsheel principles like peaceful coexistence and sovereignty are still relevant for Nepal.

Panchasheel was actually mooted between India and China for their peaceful coexistence. I have a slightly different take on it. Indo-Nepal relations go back to the time of Ram and Sita, and much before Panchsheel was even thought of. So how can we have India-Nepal relation based on Panchsheel?  Second, our constitution says that our foreign policy is based on the UN charter and Panchsheel, and so we apparently have to abide by it. But we have to look at the practical side of things as well. Our relations with both India and China date back to pre-historic times. Now, we are trying to build connectivity through railway, roads and optical fibers. There is now a direct flight between Kathmandu and Beijing. Foreign policy parameters are also changing. We should not get bogged down with old concepts like NAM.

But NAM is also a platform for Nepal to assert its sovereignty. Our prime minister for instance got prominent space in Baku.

Yes, we have to be active in these multilateral organizations but let us make sure we also have correct representations there. Our diplomats are also highly qualified, not only to project our international image but also to ensure that our economic needs are met.

Who is setting Nepal’s foreign policy priorities right now?

It is the prime minister. It is a top-heavy structure. All vital positions are occupied by Nepal Communist Party. Do NCP leaders have expertise in every field, from economics to literature, from academicians to foreign policy, virtually everything? This is where the problem lies. It looks like NCP does not need expertise from outside.

In the end, how to you evaluate the foreign policy of Oli government in its 20 months in office?

There are both plus points and minus points. The plus points are: the visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping which took place after a long hiatus, the government pushing hard for better connectivity with both the neighbors, Nepal being heard and taken seriously by foreign partners because we have become more active, and the visit by Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali to Washington.

On the minus side, the core issues remain. Nepali flights are still banned in European countries. Even though Visit Nepal Year is approaching we have not been able to solve this issue. Our foreign missions remain inactive and there is no clear ToR of some embassies. Regarding Indo-Nepal relation, why has the EPG report not been submitted to the two prime ministers? Why couldn’t we have provided for submitting the final report to the two foreign ministers instead? Some of these core issues  remain unsettled.

How are you feeling right now?

I feel overwhelmed. I think right now, the world has seen what a human being is capable of, given you are completely committed and dedicated. I am happy this will set a good example for the upcoming generation.

It’s an astonishing feat you have just achieved, climbing all 14 peaks in the world above 8,000m in just six months. The previous record for the same feat was nearly eight years. How did the idea even occur to you?

I did the Everest, Lhotse and Makalu mountains within five days back in 2017. I later realized I could have done it in three, had I not rested. A lot of people didn’t believe me at the time but the idea for this record came to me back then.

What motivates you to constantly keep pushing your limits? Is it something you learned, or were you born like that?

I have always had the desire to do the impossible. For that, I think you have to believe in yourself first. I joined the British Army and then became a commando and finally joined the Special Forces. But I couldn’t stop at that. I had to aim higher. I think everyone can achieve the goals in their lives if they mold themselves accordingly and believe in their vision.

How were you as a school kid? Were you very ambitious even at that time?

Very ambitious (laughs). I was the House Captain in my school (Small Heaven School, Chitwan) in Grade 7 and became the Head Boy of the school in Grade 9.

How did you end up in the British Army in 2003? Was it something you always wanted to do?

I had family in the British Army and that was what inspired me to join the force from an early age.

How hard was it for you to leave your budding military career for an uncertain mountaineering future?

I spent 16 years in the British Army. For 10 years I was actually fighting while for another six years I was in lower risk areas. I gave it up to focus on my dream. It was not only for me though. I wanted to open the avenue for other Nepali climbers as well. I wanted to challenge human limitations and open the scope for further imagination on what a human body can achieve. Of course a lot of dedication and commitment was necessary but I was prepared for it.

Are you already planning your next audacious venture?

My focus right now is on producing a feature film based on my adventures which is expected to release in 2021. I will always be doing some climbing in between but I am not targeting any records for now.

What message would you like to give to all those who supported your venture in cash or kind?

The project was never about me individually or a race or a community. It was about the limits a human being can push to, and for that, I got support from all over the world. Even China gave me the otherwise tricky permit that helped me complete my record. For all the support I got and towards all my well-wishers, I want to stay humble and respectful while I continue doing my work.

What are your other hobbies besides mountaineering?

It’s all extreme sports. I like diving (under water) and skydiving. Will you continue climbing mountains and setting new records, or are you also thinking of breaking records in other fields? I have not had the time to think about that. But you never know.

(Interviewed by Sunny Mahat)

The big-power rivalry in Nepal is getting curiouser and curi­ouser. India imposed a crip­pling blockade on the landlocked country for its reservations over Nepal’s new constitution. Gasping for life, the country and the then KP Oli government naturally turned to China, Nepal’s only other immedi­ate neighbor. He went there in 2016 and signed many vital agreements, most importantly the Trade and Transit Treaty and a deal to import a third of Nepal’s oil from the northern neighbor. The goal was to forestall another blockade-like situation at all cost. His policy of ‘diversifying’ away from India paid electoral dividends— and at long last led to Xi Jinping’s Nepal visit. The Indians are worried. What does the growing Chinese presence in Nepal mean? Does it pose a direct threat to Nepali democracy? Does it spell an end to its traditionally dominant role? India and China have seldom cooperated for the benefit of third countries in the region, and it would be naïve to expect them to do so now, never mind Wuhan or Malappuram.

There is also a perception in Delhi that the common ideology of the ruling parties in Nepal and China helps bring the two countries closer. “India does not seem to have any effective ideas to meet this mas­sive Chinese cultural, ideological and political challenge,” writes SD Muni, an old Nepal hand in India for The Quint.

Ashok Mehta, a retired general of the Indian Army and anoth­er Nepal expert, believes it is more a case of Nepal being “some­what fearful of China and doing things after receiving some signal from Beijing.” Yet most Indian ana­lysts also seem quietly confident that Nepal is trying in vain to overcome the hard constraints of geography.

How did you view Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Nepal?

The visit had been pending since 2014. We had been hearing different reports that Xi was not happy with the preparations for his trip or that he was not visiting Nepal. Finally, he visited Nepal and conveyed a big message. In my understanding, no foreign leader has had the impact that Xi did during his two-day state visit. When Indian Prime Minister Modi went to Nepal for the first time in 2014, it was billed as landmark. Modi also won the hearts and minds of the Nepali people.

Preparations for Xi’s visit were tak­ing place for a long time. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Kathmandu a month ago. A delega­tion of the Chinese Communist Party had also visited Nepal. And a seminar on Xi’s political thought was recently held in Kathmadu.

Before his visit, Xi himself wrote an article that was published in private and government newspapers. He went to Nepal with a new blueprint for bilateral relations. He said China would help Nepal become ‘land-linked’ instead of ‘land-locked’. He talked about the Nepal-China Eco­nomic Corridor under the Trans Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Con­nectivity.

The visit was the outcome of well-thought-out preparations. Its timing was also significant. Currently, Nepal has a communist government with a big majority in the parliament. In this context, the visit by the paramount leader of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is a turning point in Nepal’s history.

What did you think of the agree­ments signed during Xi’s visit?

The agreements do not have much substance as there are no delivera­bles. The financial assistance, how­ever, is important. There have been agreements to conduct feasibility studies of some connectivity projects, which are significant. But until and unless India gets involved in such vital connectivity projects, China will not invest its money and tech-nology. There is no economic benefit in extending the railway line up to Lumbini, because the flow of tourists only would not sustain it. The main target of the railway line is obviously India’s market. Nepal has always wanted to be a bridge between its northern and southern neighbors. When Baburam Bhattarai was the prime minister, he pushed the concept of trilateral coopera-tion. However, India’s focus is on continuing and enhancing bilateral cooperation because it thinks of itself as the dominant power in South Asia. As far as the economic corridor is concerned, it would gain signifi-cance if India joins it. India-China relationship is tense at the moment and it is poised to remain so for long. Therefore, the feasibility study of China-Nepal-India economic corridor is challenging. Billions of rupees are required for the construction of roads and railway lines.

How do you evaluate the current state of Nepal-India and Nepal China relations?

The two cannot be compared because Nepal and India share an open border, whereas the Nepal China border is a closed one. Nepal and India also enjoy close military cooperation. China, with a closed border with Nepal, cannot demand the same type of relations that India has with Nepal. There may be flaws in the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship, but the fact remains that the two countries share an open border. There is frequent movement of people, one lakh Nepalis are currently employed in the Indian security forces and two lakhs of them receive pensions. In terms of geography too, the major Chinese population hubs are much farther from Nepal than are Indian population hubs. With some caution I would say that Nepal fears China. Nepal frequently says Taiwan is part of China, it keeps reaffirming the one-China policy, it strictly curbs anti-China activities, it closes the office of the Dalai Lama, and bars the celebration of his birth-day. All these indicate that Nepal is somewhat fearful of China and does things after receiving some signal from Beijing. Now that Nepal has a communist majority government, there is more pressure than in the past. But China is giving more devel-opment assistance to Nepal as well.

How can India minimize China’s influence on Nepal?

India should focus on completing its development projects in Nepal on time. All its works, be it the Rax-aul- Kathmandu railway line or any other development project, should be of high quality. However, major development projects are already in China’s hands. Nepal is handing over projects to build airports, roads and hydropower plants to China. China-Nepal eco-nomic corridor is under construc-tion. The letter of exchange men-tions investment in infrastructure and hydropower projects. In the past, there was no such focus. Now China is constructing transmission lines in Nepal.

Are you suggesting that Nepal is already in China’s fold?

We cannot say that. My analysis is based on the current political situation in Nepal. What type of political equation emerges in the future cannot be predicted. 

(Our India correspondent Asha Thapaliya talked to Mehta in Delhi)

After the 2015 Indian blockade, Nepal concluded a series of trade and transit deals with China. Yet there has been no progress on either front. Why?

It is true that we have been unable to increase our trade with China. The first reason is lack of connectiv­ity. Our transport networks have not been properly developed. Of the six open border points between Nepal and China—Humla, Mugu, Mustang, Keyrung, Tatopani, Olangchungola and Kimathanka—only two—Tatopa­ni and Rasuwagadhi—are connected by motor roads. And even they are in a bad state. The problem is not on the Chinese side, which already has the needed infrastructure.

The second reason is Nepal’s low production and productivity. Although over 8,000 Nepali prod­ucts have duty-free access to China, we have not been able to export much. In the last fiscal, total imports from China totaled Rs 205 billion while exports were worth a mea­gre Rs 2 billion. Even the little we do export—products like medicinal herbs, vegetables, woolen carpets, Thangka paintings, handicrafts—end up in Tibet. We have no export at all to mainland China. The third reason is non-tariff barriers—those related to quarantine, food standards and administrative hurdles. Language is also a barrier as communication between Nepali and Chinese traders is not easy.

How do you view the 20-point agreement signed during Presi­dent Xi Jinping’s visit?

The agreement has strategic sig­nificance as it is focused on con­nectivity, mainly rail connectivity. Yet bringing the Chinese railway line to Nepal is time-consuming and costly. But if we could at least develop north-south roads, Nepali territories will be better connected with China, making trade easier. The multi-dimensional connectivity and trans-Himalayan connectivity men­tioned in the 20-point agreement is a milestone development and could potentially enhance bilateral trade—but only if accompanied by prod­uct-development and enhancing our productive capacity. For that, we need more Chinese investment. China’s labor-intensive industries are relocating to South-East Asian countries. China itself is focusing on high-tech goods and services. As wage levels rise in China, it has found labor-intensive industries non-competitive. Why not bring some of those industries here?

You talked about the big trade deficit. Can you name four or five products that Nepal can profit­ably export to China?

We have to focus on niche prod­ucts. For example, we can pro­duce medicinal herbs in our hill and mountain regions for Chinese markets. To that end, we have to create large farms for cultivating and processing medicinal herbs. Similarly, the government should invest more in research and devel­opment. Currently, the herbs found in the Himalayas are collected and traded in raw form. There is no val­ue addition or processing. And these products are exported informally. We have to formalize this. We have to develop specific economic zones for specific products like medicinal herbs, wool, mountain goats and sheep, and pashmina.

Another vital exportable product is handicrafts. Thanka and various types of statues can also be export­ed to China. We should also bet­ter explore the Chinese market to understand what they really want. It is a dynamic process; we cannot stick with the same products all the time. Again I focus on connectivity. All trade with China today is via ocean routes, which takes 40 to 45 days. If we can use land routes, it will come down to 10 or 12 days.

There is a big debate about the cross-border rail line and its costs. Instead of the railway, should better cross-border roads be our priority?

We have to consider both, but the priority should be roads as they are both cheaper and quicker to build. For railway lines, we need heavy investment, technical manpower, and a lot of time and effort. In the short term, railway is not viable economically. It can be justified only if it links India and China via Nepal. Chinese President Xi has said that he will help Nepal be a ‘land-linked’ country. But India is mum on this. If both India and China are willing to trade through Nepal, a railway line may be justified.

In high-volume trade, transport via railway is cheaper than transport via road. But, again, in the current low-volume trade, building a railway line may not be justified.

We signed the Transit and Trans­port Agreement with China in 2016, and this year the two coun­tries finalized its protocol. But is it at all feasible for Nepal to trade with third countries via China?

It is very important to have Chi­nese transit facilities as strategic options. But in practical terms, it would be difficult to replace India with China in transit. The nearest sea-port in China is 4,000 km from the Nepali border while the nearest Indian port is just 700-800 km away.

What other technical difficulties will Nepal face in using China to transit goods?

The first is the long distance, which entails higher cost. Second, there is no railway connectivity up to the Nepal border, and transport networks are fragmented. Third, as goods will have to be transferred between, say, railways and trucks, that too will add to the cost.

There is a need for a comprehen­sive study on the movement of cargo via both Indian and Chinese routes to third countries, which will tell us which route is more viable.

Even if transit via China is costly, can’t we profitably trade with the Chinese mainland by developing proper linkages?

The Chinese mainland with its major population centers are far from Nepal. Tibet itself is eight times the size of Nepal. It has a limited absorptive capacity in the sense that it has just three million people. Just crossing Tibet will cost a lot. What we can do is develop distribution centers or parks in cities near Nepal like Keyrung. If you request China to develop such distribution parks with big areas, exporters from Nepal can send their goods there and Chinese traders can pick them up.

India still places many restric­tions on the import of Nepali goods. If most of these restric­tions were lifted, would Nepal need to explore other options?

Almost 60 percent of our export goes to India. Almost two-third of our import is also from India. Still, there are certain barriers while exporting goods to India. Practi­cally India does not impose any custom duty on Nepali agriculture and industrial products and only three items—alcohol, tobacco and perfume—are on its sensitive list. But there are many non-tariff barriers. The trucks carrying Nepali tea are stopped at the border. A tea sample is then taken to a laboratory in Pat­na. It takes five to six days to get a final report, which makes the whole operation costly.

In that case, is there a possibil­ity of China replacing India as Nepal’s biggest trading partner?

I do not think so because import from China is increasing and we have to do a lot to increase exports. Until we enhance our competive­ness it is difficult to increase our exports. We have an open border with India and there are many sim­ilarities between the two countries. So it might not be possible to replace India with China in the near future.