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Nestled between India and China, Nepal possesses a unique and complex trade history, along with significant market opportunities. However, the country faces multiple constraints—including geographical challenges, weak infrastructure, procedural bottlenecks, and an often unstable political-economic environment. Moreover, the government’s approach to trade negotiations tends to be reactive, shaped by perceived contexts rather than long-term strategy. In this light, it is essential to institutionalise effective standard operating procedures (SOPs) for trade negotiations. Such SOPs would ensure consistency, enhance transparency, and provide strategic direction across bilateral, subregional, and regional trade engagements.

The need for an SOP

Nepal’s trade diplomacy currently relies heavily on ad hoc arrangements and the personal experience of individual bureaucrats. This knowledge-driven, personality-based approach often leads to inconsistencies, a lack of institutional memory, and missed opportunities on bilateral, regional, and multilateral platforms.

A national SOP would promote coherence across government departments and ensure continuity during political transitions. It would also empower negotiation teams with procedural clarity and sectoral insights while presenting Nepal as a prepared and credible counterpart in international forums.

Core SOP features for trade negotiations

Institutional mechanisms

Since the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) leads trade negotiations, it should initiate the formation of a formal negotiation coordination committee. This body should include representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, private sector associations, academia, legal experts, and provincial authorities. Together, they would set national priorities, vet negotiation positions, and guide strategies.

SOP cycle

Pre-negotiation phase: Conduct data-driven impact assessments, define national priorities, consult relevant stakeholders, and prepare position papers.

Negotiation phase: Select delegation members, assign roles, and maintain real-time internal coordination.

Post-negotiation phase: Identify legal provisions, outline ratification processes, create implementation roadmaps, and establish monitoring indicators.

Sectoral working group

A specialised group should bring together representatives from transit service providers, agriculture, digital trade, transport logistics, and quality assurance sectors to provide technical expertise. Key issues should include Nepal’s transit rights and infrastructure cooperation. The SOP must prioritise multimodal transport corridors, efficient cross-border logistics, and enhanced trade facilitation through modernised customs systems and logistics hubs.

Trade facilitation

Efforts should focus on easing the movement of people, goods, services, capital, and data—while remaining mindful of risks associated with automation and digitalisation. Nepal must align with the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and leverage regional initiatives such as BBIN, BIMSTEC, SAARC, SASEC, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

To support this, a negotiation readiness toolkit is needed. This should include templates, records of past negotiations, sectoral briefings, simulation exercises, and case studies. Trade facilitation measures must align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and be benchmarked accordingly.

Establishing bodies such as a National Trade Negotiation Council (NTNC), a National Trade Consulting Forum, or a Trade Intelligence and Analysis Unit is crucial for institutional continuity and informed decision-making.

Infrastructure development—including rail, road, and inland waterway connectivity—must be a priority. Logistical alignment, mutual recognition of standards and certifications, and the promotion of low-carbon, climate-smart trade chains should drive Nepal’s trade agenda.

Legal and risk mitigation

Trade agreements must include robust provisions for dispute resolution, force majeure, and other legal safeguards. It is vital to protect the interests of small producers, uphold environmental standards, and ensure policy space for future reforms.

Inclusion and capacity building

An inclusive trade negotiation process must involve wide consultations with the private sector, civil society, and marginalised communities. The SOP should ensure that all relevant stakeholders are engaged meaningfully.

Capacity building is essential. Members of the negotiation team must receive training in legal interpretation, economic analysis, negotiation tactics, and language skills. Ongoing collaboration with think tanks and trade institutions will enhance capacity and knowledge.

Meeting key performance indicators (KOIs) and conducting annual performance reviews by independent experts will help ensure the negotiation team’s effectiveness and accountability.

Conclusion

Institutionalising SOPs for trade negotiations through a phased, strategic approach is crucial for Nepal. This process should be backed by technical and financial support, and ensure coherence between national development plans and regional trade commitments. Effective monitoring and evaluation must be embedded to achieve desired trade outcomes and social impact.

Nepal should not view its position between two dominant economic powers as a limitation, but a strategic opportunity. By transitioning from a reactive player to a proactive influencer in regional and global trade, Nepal can better serve its national interests. Now is the time to establish a negotiation process that is strategic, inclusive, and driven by national priorities—one that enables Nepal to negotiate with confidence, not just consent.

The appointment of Mohammad Yunus as Chief Advisor of Bangladesh, after the acrimonious removal of Sheikh Hasina, signifies an unparalleled shift in the nation’s political course. Globally recognized as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and innovator of microfinance via Grameen Bank, Yunus ascended to the highest executive role amid a period of national upheaval. His leadership has emerged when Bangladesh faces a confluence of challenges—severe economic downturn, waning investor confidence, geopolitical strife in South and Southeast Asia and a domestic landscape characterised by civil upheaval and institutional exhaustion. 

The unelected top official of Bangladesh has been in the news since the ouster of his predecessor, Sheikh Hasina. When the students of Bangladesh, after the uprising, chose Yunus as a top executive, they must have had a few things in their minds: his international stature, his closeness to the Western governments, his reputation as a global economist and finally, for some, his secular credentials. These qualities of Yunus are not providing dividends for the current political climate of Bangladesh. The most recent example of this tension has been the visible opposition from Bangladesh’s Army to the Yunus-proposed ‘humanitarian corridor’.  

Other than that, in a recent speech in Beijing, Yunus stated that India’s northeastern territories are ‘landlocked’ and suggested that Bangladesh could serve as their natural conduit to the Indian Ocean. Although ostensibly a harmless appeal for regional connection and collaboration, the speech directly aligned with Beijing’s geopolitical characterization of India’s vulnerabilities. Chinese state media promptly disseminated Yunus’s statements, portraying Bangladesh as a neutral yet empathetic regional participant. The political characterization of India’s Northeast is very sensitive. India regards this region as strategically vital, mainly because of the constricted Siliguri corridor, often called the ‘Chicken’s Neck’—and symbolically significant for its domestic cohesion. The speech was interpreted in New Delhi as an implicit endorsement of China's enduring attempts to undermine Indian sovereignty in Arunachal Pradesh and to globalize the geopolitical character of the Northeast.

India's response was prompt and multifaceted. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a pointed retort, affirmed that the Northeast is “central to India’s growth narrative, not peripheral or isolated,” clearly countering Yunus’ assertion, with geographic and diplomatic connotations. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar intensified the matter by publicly alleging that Yunus was “cherry-picking narratives” and emphasized to Dhaka the profound economic, cultural and historical dimensions of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

Central to India’s response is the Siliguri corridor—a 22-kilometer-wide land passage linking the remainder of India with its northeastern states. The ‘Chicken’s Neck’ is commonly referred to as one of the nation’s most significant strategic vulnerabilities. Yunus’ comments directly contributed to India’s enduring apprehension of encirclement. The episode revitalized New Delhi’s security dialogue, with Indian defense strategists cautioning about a ‘chicken with two necks’, wherein Bangladesh and China may exert pressure on India’s most vulnerable spot together.

It was another blow to an already fragile relationship between India and Bangladesh, considering Bangladesh’s ex-PM Sheikh Hasina is currently residing in India, fearing persecution in Bangladesh. The current Bangladesh government has demanded her return from India. On its part, the government of India has been wary of the current regime as it has “failed to stop the persecution of minorities after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina”. 

While the current regime in Bangladesh has signalled strong ties with China, they are yet to see any material impact. Other than that, Pakistan has also made overtures toward Bangladesh, which the current regime has welcomed, but the strategic and economic viability of this relationship is in question. The political climate in the West has also changed drastically since the arrival of Donald Trump as US president. His transactional relationship is haunting the US’ oldest and most steadfast allies. In his first term, Trump was particularly interested in the Indo-Pacific to counter China. Bangladesh finalized its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2023 during Hasina’s tenure, which more or less aligned with the US’ vision. However, the US is currently dealing with two evolving crises in Gaza and Ukraine, and the Indo-Pacific has again taken a back seat. The other economic powers are trying to cut deals with the US because of Trump’s trade war threat.

Yunus must embrace a more equitable and realistic strategy that harmonizes with Bangladesh’s domestic circumstances and the shifting geopolitical environment to traverse the intricate political and diplomatic landscape ahead. Although advantageous, his global credentials and reformer persona must now be enhanced by a more profound engagement with regional nuances and state institutions. In the light of the recent tensions with India, it would be wise for Yunus to implement confidence-building measures that strengthen Bangladesh’s dedication to regional peace and cooperative benefits, especially on connectivity, trade and border security. This does not inherently necessitate a withdrawal from alliances with other nations, such as China; nevertheless, it demands meticulous recalibration to prevent the appearance of strategic alignment with any one entity. 

Simultaneously, Yunus must tackle national issues regarding governance and institutional credibility. Establishing communication lines with political players, especially moderate opposition factions and civil society, may alleviate tensions and facilitate a more inclusive political process. Enhancing civilian-military interactions will be crucial for ensuring policy continuity and internal consistency. His initiatives, including the humanitarian corridor, must be conveyed transparently and deliberated within national institutions to prevent misunderstandings or suspicions of unilateralism.

Bangladesh’s future will likely hinge on its capacity to sustain strategic flexibility while strengthening internal cohesion. As global power dynamics change and regional alliances develop, Yunus’ leadership will be evaluated on his ability to establish Bangladesh as a constructive regional participant, engaging with all significant actors without excessive dependence on any, and grounding its diplomacy in national consensus and institutional robustness.

The author is pursuing his doctoral research from the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi

China has established the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), marking it the world’s first intergovernmental legal body dedicated to resolving international disputes through mediation. The signing ceremony, held last week in Hong Kong, saw the participation of Nepal’s Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba, alongside around 400 high-level representatives from 85 countries spanning Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

Designed to function similarly to the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, IOMed is positioned as a potential alternative to the World Trade Organization (WTO). China has actively encouraged Nepal to join the organization at the earliest. During a sideline meeting at the event, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed his hope that Nepal would soon become a member, emphasizing the opportunity to jointly contribute to enhancing global governance.

While Minister Deuba did not offer any commitment to being a member-state, Nepal’s participation in the event is meaningful. Observers say it signals that Nepal could join the Chinese initiative in future. 

According to Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, Wang Yi noted that more than 80 countries and nearly 20 international organizations sent representatives to the ceremony. He highlighted that this strong turnout demonstrates broad international support for mediation as a dispute-resolution mechanism, one that aligns with the interests of developing countries and adheres to the principles of the UN Charter.

The organization operates across three key areas. First, it provides mediation services for disputes between states, submitted by mutual consent. Official documents explain that such disputes must not be excluded by a concerned state through a formal declaration, nor may they involve a third state without its prior approval.

Second, IOMed facilitates mediation for commercial or investment disputes between a state (or an international organization) and private entities from another state, again requiring mutual consent. Third, it offers mediation for disputes arising from international commercial relationships between private parties.

China began laying the groundwork for IOMed in 2022, collaborating with like-minded nations to issue a joint statement. From South Asia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are among the founding members, alongside Algeria, Belarus, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand and Zimbabwe.

The organization promotes mediation as a flexible, cost-effective and efficient means of resolving disputes, emphasizing a party-driven approach. Chu Kar-kin, a member of the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies, in an interview with The Global Times, described IOMed as a “new chapter in global dispute resolution,” underscoring its role in fostering peaceful and harmonious settlements.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang reiterated China’s longstanding commitment to resolving differences through mutual understanding, dialogue and win-win cooperation.

Tian Feilong, a law professor at Minzu University of China, told Global Times that IOMed reflects China’s traditional legal culture, which prioritizes consensus and reconciliation over adversarial litigation. This approach, he argued, strengthens international cooperation and social capital, distinguishing it from Western legal mechanisms rooted in confrontation.

He further noted that IOMed embodies the spirit of internationalism and the vision of a "community with a shared future for mankind," reinforcing rule-of-law principles in global governance. By championing mediation, China seeks to offer a more collaborative and inclusive model for resolving international disputes, aligning with its broader diplomatic philosophy.

Reading books about food is the next best thing to enjoying good food. I have realized that it makes me appreciative of different cultures and cuisines. I’ve also come to know about different kinds of food, despite not having been to certain countries, and as a result become more experimentative with my meal choices. 

Earlier, say till a few years back, it was hard to get many ingredients that I read about in various novels. I could only imagine what a certain dish would taste like. But now we are spoilt for choice as we get everything in the markets here. For local ingredients, bazaars in Ason and Patan are best while Bhatbhateni and Salesberry stock almost everything else. These days when I read about dishes I want to try, I can easily replicate them at home and I love it. It makes my reading experience even more immersive. 

Here, I’m recommending three books that have really made me want to go out of my comfort zone in the kitchen while making me drool excessively while reading them.

The Second-Worst Restaurant in France by Alexander McCall Smith

Paul Stuart is a famous cookbook writer but he can’t, for some reason or other, seem to be able to finish his latest book. Then his cousin suggests that he join her at a house she has rented in the French countryside and he takes up her offer. As the two get used to a calm life there, befriending the locals including the owners of the infamous restaurant that is known to be the second-worst eatery in France, Paul realizes that there is no escaping life no matter where he goes. I like Alexander McCall Smith’s writing. I have read several of his other books and find them to be witty and heartwarming. ‘The Second-Worst Restaurant’ is the second book in the Paul Stuart series by the Scottish author. 

Love & Saffron By Kim Fay

This book reminds you how good food and a good life are two sides of a coin. It’s a heartwarming tale of friendship and how the right food can cure most heartaches. A life-changing friendship begins when Joan Bergstrom sends a fan letter to food writer Imogen Fortier. As the two women communicate, through letters, they build a rapport that helps them appreciate the good things in life as well as get through some difficult times. As the novel follows two women in the 1960s, there’s an old world charm to the plot and I really enjoyed the setting and the pace. ‘Love & Saffron’ is essentially a story about the power of female friendships and food that will leave you feeling happy and hungry. 

Heartburn by Nora Ephron

I haven’t read many novels by Nora Ephron as I’m not really a fan of her brand of stories which is mostly romance. I also heard that she uses ghostwriters and whether that is true or not, it put me off her books even more. So I surprised myself when I picked up ‘Heartburn’ but I was intrigued by the blurb. I’m glad I decided to read it because it was so satisfying. It’s also hilarious. Rachel Samstat discovers her husband is cheating on her when she is seven months pregnant. So the cookbook writer turns to food for comfort. The book alternates between Rachel trying to win him back and wishing him dead with many of her favorite recipes thrown in the mix.