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In 2024, Nepal experienced significant turbulence both domestically and in foreign relations. In July, CPN-UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli assumed the Office of the Prime Minister for the third time, supported by the largest party, Nepali Congress (NC). Despite forming a numerically strong government, the coalition has struggled to instill hope for stability. Doubts persist about the government’s longevity, despite leaders from both NC and UML insisting it will last until the 2027 national elections. Economically, Nepal’s struggles continued, showing little improvement. While external economic indicators improved slightly, domestic challenges remained unaddressed.

 Relations with China and the US remained stable, but ties with India deteriorated. Nepal’s engagement with long-standing development partners progressed steadily. The Oli administration promised economic reforms, improved service delivery, job creation, and fostering optimism among youth. Additionally, NC and UML pledged to amend the constitution based on lessons from its implementation. However, progress on these fronts remained limited.

Economic stagnation persisted, with some gains in the stock market overshadowed by poor revenue collection and low capital expenditure. The continued practice of last-minute expenditure resulted in inefficient investment and inflationary pressures. The real estate sector, a significant revenue source, remained in decline, with annual revenues dropping from Rs 70bn pre-covid to Rs. 46bn. In contrast, tourism rebounded robustly. Data from Nepal Tourism Board revealed that 1,104,702 tourists visited Nepal in 2024, returning the industry to pre-pandemic levels.

Despite these improvements, general pessimism grew as thousands of youths sought opportunities abroad for education and employment. Public services showed little improvement, leaving citizens disillusioned. Promised constitutional amendments remain stalled, with NC and UML yet to form the joint mechanism required to initiate the process. The government’s slow progress on its commitments is fostering doubts about its ability to deliver.

The coalition faced a major test in September when floods and landslides ravaged the country, causing over 250 deaths and infrastructural losses worth billions. While Prime Minister Oli attended the 79th United Nations General Assembly in New York, his administration’s inadequate disaster response undermined public trust. Effective coordination could have saved lives, but the government’s failure in crisis management became a defining moment of its tenure, eroding its credibility.

Domestically, the arrest of Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) President Rabi Lamichhane for alleged involvement in cooperative fraud, money laundering, and organized crime dominated headlines. Police filed charges in the Kaski district court, but opposition parties, including CPN (Maoist Center) and Lamichhane’s RSP, labeled the arrest politically motivated. Meanwhile, the government faced criticism for shielding NC and UML allies accused of corruption while targeting opposition leaders.

Within the ruling UML, former President Bidya Devi Bhandari’s return to active party politics sparked internal debate. Her participation in party programs signaled a comeback, with some leaders encouraging her involvement. The NC saw internal discussions on future leadership, with Shekhar Koirala campaigning for the presidency while the party President Sher Bahadur Deuba remained silent. NC General Secretary and president hopeful Gagan Kumar Thapa announced his candidacy, intensifying the contest. Similarly, the Maoist Center debated whether to reintegrate former Vice President Nanda Kishor Pun Pasang into its ranks.

Transitional justice saw a rare consensus among major parties on the need for a new bill, earning international praise. However, the government failed to appoint officials to transitional justice mechanisms, stalling progress. On the foreign front, Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China in December garnered significant attention. Marking a departure, he chose China for his first foreign visit, as he had in 2016 after awaiting considerable time for an invite from India. During the trip, Nepal signed a framework agreement for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, identifying 10 projects for implementation. China’s lobbying for swift action on these projects underscored its growing influence in Nepal.

Relations with India remained strained. Although bilateral engagements continued, Oli received no invitation to visit India. A notable achievement was a trilateral agreement among Nepal, India and Bangladesh to trade 40 MW electricity, allowing Nepal to sell electricity to a third country for the first time. Despite expectations of improved ties, relations between Oli and the Indian establishment remained lukewarm. Nepal’s relationship with the US remained stable as American officials visited Kathmandu to deepen engagement. However, the perception of US influence in Nepal’s domestic affairs continued to provoke mixed reactions.

Public sentiment grew increasingly pessimistic. Many youth believe the country’s trajectory will worsen, fueling frustration with major political parties. Anti-constitution forces have started gaining traction, exploiting public discontent. Despite their pledge to ensure stability, NC and UML face mounting skepticism about their ability to deliver meaningful change.

The Madhes Province Policy and Planning Commission released a report on Sunday highlighting the high poverty rate and deteriorating Human Development Index (HDI) in Madhes Province. The HDI encompasses factors such as education, health, employment, and infrastructure development that directly impact human life.

According to the report, the multidimensional poverty rate in Madhes is 24.02 percent, compared to the national average of 20 percent. Issues such as food insecurity, inadequate shelter, lack of clothing, and inability to afford medical treatment are categorized under multidimensional poverty. Madhes Province ranks second in both multidimensional poverty and economic poverty, with an economic poverty rate of 22.53 percent.

Despite some improvements, Madhes remains at the bottom of the HDI rankings among provinces. The overall poverty rate and multidimensional poverty rate in Madhes were 27.7 and 47.9 percent respectively in the base year 2018/19. By 2022/23, these rates had improved to 22.53 and 24.02 percent, but they fell short of the target to reduce the overall poverty rate to 21 percent.

Similarly, the HDI increased from 0.421 to 0.519 during the same period. However, Madhes still lags behind other provinces, with Mahottari and Rautahat performing the worst. The first periodic plan aimed to raise per capita income to $1,000, but only $875 was achieved by 2022/23. The plan also targeted an average annual economic growth rate of 9.0 percent, but the actual rate was limited to 2.5 percent due to internal and external challenges.

The report cites the global Covid-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and rising commodity prices, including petroleum, as key factors disrupting supply chains and hindering economic growth. The economic growth rate for Madhes was just 1.5 percent in 2022/23, with a per capita GDP of $868. For the fiscal year 2023/24, growth is estimated at 3.8 percent, with a per capita GDP of $892.

Breaking from the tradition of overly ambitious growth targets, the second periodic plan has adopted a nonlinear least square model to set realistic and achievable economic growth projections. Based on the GDP of 2022/23, the plan forecasts an average economic growth rate of 6.8 percent, with sectoral growth targets of 4.4 percent for the primary sector, 8.8 percent for the secondary sector, and 7.3 percent for the tertiary sector.

Regarding implementation, 60 percent of strategies and 57 percent of action plans have been executed under interrelated and overarching subject areas. Out of 143 proposed programs, 57—or 40 percent—have been implemented. Progress has been observed in only 70 of the 129 set indicators, with no sub-sector apart from forestry and environment exceeding 50 percent progress. Notably, data management and human resource development sub-sectors show no progress, and there is little coordination between climate change initiatives, disaster risk reduction, and indicator achievements.

Resolutions are overrated and perhaps destined to fail because of just how overly ambitious they are. This year, me and a few of my friends—comprising a medical doctor, a psychologist who has been practicing for five years, and an engineer who quit her job last year and runs her own business now—decided to list down some things we’d like to do in 2025.

We have always made shared resolutions but this year we decided to deviate from the usual routine and call them mindful habits. We’re also going to take it slow and not give up on a habit even if we fail a few times. I’ve asked for permission to share our list of habits or changes we’d like to make this year to inspire you all to maybe pick one or two to incorporate in your life or make a list of your own. Here are our top five things that we are going to follow in 2025 for a more disciplined and healthy lifestyle.

Meditate daily, even if for just 10 minutes

A couple of years ago, I took up yoga and meditation. I joined an online class and started doing an hour of it every day. The changes in me weren’t immediate but over time, people started commenting that I was calmer and happier. I had actually felt the changes in me before others noticed. I wouldn’t get upset over small things and was able to let things go without creating a fuss. Then after six months, the classes got over and I didn’t rejoin. I thought I could carry on without guidance. But then I started becoming erratic with my practice. This year, we’re planning to restart mediation and do 10 minutes to begin with. We will build up from there. Our aim is to make a habit to meditate for at least 30 minutes daily in the next six months.

Spend time outdoors

Exposure to morning sunlight is important to set the tone of the day. It’s also a good thing to do to get your daily dose of Vitamin D which is crucial for bone, muscle, and nerve health. All of us spend most of our time indoors, at work or at home, so we have decided to spend at least 10 to 15 minutes out in the sun as soon as we wake up. It could be while drinking a cup of tea or reading the papers. But this one is non-negotiable and it shouldn’t be that hard since all we have to do is open the door, step out into our balcony or garden area, and just bask in the sun. Alternatively, we have also decided to try to go out for short walks, mid-work, or spend some time in nature after we reach home.

Eat meat on the weekends

All of us agreed that we’d like to eat less meat this year. Many studies have shown that meat, especially processed meat, isn’t the healthiest thing for your body. We contemplated becoming a vegetarian for a year before deciding it would be too much too soon. So to take it slow and ease ourselves into it, we’ve decided to eat meat on the weekend and stick to a plant-based diet on the weekdays. This seems more doable than going vegetarian. This way we get to satisfy our non-veg cravings and we also have to experiment with our food, since we have to start eating all kinds of vegetables  and grains to compensate for the meat.

Sugar control 

Not eating sugar isn’t possible for us but for those who think they can do it, it’s one of the best gifts they can give themselves. Sugar is responsible for inflammation in the body which leads to many health issues, especially in the long run. Cutting down on sugar can help you lose weight, keep your blood pressure in check, and also prevent a lot of chronic diseases. We’ve all tried to stop eating sugar in the past and we’ve all failed miserably. So in 2025, our goal is to cut down on sugar and be mindful of what we are eating. We’re going to eat chocolates, but not every day. We’re going to have a slice of cake but we’ll stick to having it once a week at the most. The idea is to have as little sugar as possible while ensuring we don’t abstain from it altogether. This way, we believe, we will be able to give up sugar completely in the future.

Keeping our word

Oftentimes, we say we will do something and forget about it or we make promises knowing that we might not be able to keep it. We say yes when we want to say no. This sometimes has us doing things we wouldn’t have been involved in if we hadn’t said yes without thinking or if we had had the presence of mind to think things through. One of the things I’d personally like to change in 2025 is being able to keep my word. My friends agreed that if we all made promises we could keep, we’d feel better about ourselves and our reputations, at work and on a personal front, would also be so much better.

Writer and journalist Sudheer Sharma’s new book, Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha, unveiled in August, offers a comprehensive account of the key figures, issues, and phenomena that have shaped Nepal-China relations. The book spans from the era of King Narendra Dev in the 7th century to 2008, when Nepal’s 240-year monarchy came to an end. Sharma’s other book, Himal Pari ko Huri, published simultaneously, explores new trends in bilateral relations post-2008, though this review focuses solely on Bhikshu, Byapar ra Bidroha.

In the introductory section, Sharma highlights a problem in Nepal’s public discourse about its northern neighbor. He identifies two contrasting perspectives: one group idolizes China and dismisses criticism, while the other harbors deep-seated prejudice. Sharma aims to provide an objective account of this trans-Himalayan relationship, presenting little-known historical facts and anecdotes. He maintains a neutral tone, avoiding personal biases in his analysis.

As a writer and journalist, Sharma excels in meticulous documentation, gathering new insights through his strong rapport with senior politicians and officials, and offering sharp political and geopolitical analysis. These strengths, evident in his acclaimed earlier work, Nepal Nexus, are similarly reflected in this book.

The book delves into the political, trade, cultural, and people-to-people relations between Nepal and China. Sharma credits King Narendra Dev and Princess Bhrikuti with laying the foundation of Nepal-China relations. He highlights the flourishing trade between Nepal and Tibet that began in the 7th century and thrived until the 1950s. Sharma also explores how this trade fostered robust people-to-people connections.

However, he documents the gradual decline of these ties after China took control of Tibet, imposed strict regulations on Nepali residents in Lhasa, and tightened visa rules. A study conducted by China in the late 1950s revealed that a Nepali shop in Lhasa, established a thousand years earlier, was still operational at the time. Three shops were found to be between 500 and 1,000 years old, and four others ranged from 200 to 500 years. Today, the number of Nepali shops in Lhasa has drastically declined, and Sharma notes that Nepal’s trade with Tibet—dating back 1,400 years to King Narendra Dev’s time—is nearing extinction.

In the chapter Bhikshu, Bidrohi, and Bampanthi, Sharma asserts that the foundation of Nepal-China relations is rooted more in cultural, religious, trade, and people-to-people ties than in political connections. He highlights the significant role played by Buddhist monks and nuns in fostering bilateral relations since ancient times. The chapter begins with a reference to an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping, published in Nepali newspapers, where Xi mentions the collaboration between the Chinese monk Fa Hien and Nepali monk Buddhabhadra over 1,600 years ago to translate Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

Sharma also revisits the well-known narrative of Nepali Princess Bhrikuti’s marriage to Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo and mentions the Chinese monk Xuanzang (Huen Tsang), who visited Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, leaving invaluable written accounts of his pilgrimage. This chapter offers a chronological account of Nepal-China engagements from the 7th century to the 1950s, demonstrating Sharma’s meticulous research and dedication to historical accuracy.

The chapter Mao and Mahendra provides a compelling overview of the relationship between Nepal’s monarchy and China, detailing personal connections between Nepal’s kings and Chinese leaders, which both sides leveraged for mutual benefit. For instance, Mahendra, as crown prince, secretly traveled to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong. The chapter includes several examples of the close proximity between the two sides.

Sharma discusses how the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided financial and other support to Nepal’s communist parties but refrained from supporting armed insurgencies, including the CPN-UML-led rebellion in Jhapa and the decade-long Maoist insurgency. Since the 1950s, China has consistently stated that it does not aim to export its revolution to Nepal. Although the CPC secretly offered financial aid to Nepal’s communist parties in the past, it never supplied arms or ammunition—a lesser-known aspect of Nepal-China relations.

Formal ties between the CPC and Nepal’s communist parties ended following King Mahendra’s royal coup. While China maintains that it does not export its revolution or ideology, Sharma highlights the irony that two major revolutions in Nepal—the Jhapa communist uprising and the Maoist insurgency—were launched in Mao Zedong’s name, despite receiving no Chinese support once they turned to armed struggle. Instead, the rebels were advised to join the political mainstream.

On the relationship between China and Nepali communist parties, Sharma writes: “China was always attracted to Nepal's communist parties due to two reasons: communism and nationalism. Communism is their shared ideology, and Nepal’s communist parties have viewed China as a protector of nationalism. This is why Nepal’s communist-led governments have historically maintained closer ties with China than other administrations.” He also discusses China’s changing approach to Nepal’s internal politics and its overt efforts to consolidate Nepal’s communist forces, suggesting that China may view Nepal’s communist parties as a potential substitute for the monarchy as a stable political institution.

The Khampa revolt is another major factor in Nepal-China relations. Sharma provides fresh insights into the Tibetan Khampas’ 18-year armed rebellion against China. According to the book, King Mahendra’s death marked a turning point for the Khampas, as his successor, King Birendra, adopted a less supportive stance. Following his state visit to China in 1973, King Birendra began military preparations to suppress the Khampas. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly assured Birendra that the United States would not interfere, citing an agreement with President Nixon on the Tibetan issue. Upon returning to Nepal, Birendra initiated joint discussions with China on disarming the Khampas and began providing regular updates on their activities.

The book is a valuable resource for understanding Nepal’s diplomatic relationship with China. It examines key narratives, such as China’s policy shift after Nepal’s monarchy was abolished in 2008, its perception of Nepal as a gateway to India and South Asia, its primary concern with Tibet’s security, and its encouragement of Nepal’s communist parties as a reliable political force. However, critics may argue that while Sharma offers fresh insights and unearths historical documents, much of the book reiterates existing narratives about Nepal-China relations.