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In my previous column, I discussed how chronic political instability is affecting the conduct of our foreign policy. Here, I delve into how foreign powers, big and small alike, influence Nepal’s foreign policy. We often criticize our politicians for their lack of maturity and consistency. In most foreign policy discourses, I often hear this question: Who will believe us (read our politicians)? It is a reality that our politicians are neither serious nor have they realized their weaknesses. But it would be unjust to solely blame our politicians without considering other aspects like how foreign powers are behaving with us. Nepal’s key priorities are economic prosperity and social development. For a long time, we have been mobilizing our foreign policy to achieve these goals.

From Prithivi Narayan Shah to the current set of leaders, all have realized that Nepal is situated between India and China, understanding the difficulties of being caught between two global powerhouses. For a long time, our Rana rulers tried to live in isolation out of fear that opening up could threaten their regime. Nevertheless, they still endeavored to serve both their personal interests and national interests. After the 1950s, Nepal began diversifying its economic, security, development and trade policies or looking beyond its immediate neighbors. Let’s consider the current situation. We are conducting our foreign policy in accordance with the 2015 constitution.

Article 51 of the constitution states: “Safeguarding the freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity, nationality, independence, and dignity of Nepal, the rights of the Nepalis, border security, economic well-being, and prosperity shall be the basic elements of the national interests of Nepal.” Nepal places economic diplomacy at the forefront of its engagement with the wider international community. We need money and technology to accelerate social development and economic prosperity. Lately, we have been vocal about our reluctance to take on significant loans, preferring grants for infrastructure development. Our stated position is that we will not align with any strategic or military blocs.

Nepal takes a neutral position in regional and international conflicts, consistently advocating for their resolution through peaceful means, with some exceptions resulting from adventurous policies of our politicians. Nepal believes in non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, non-aggression, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. For instance, Nepal opposed the Russian attack on Ukraine while maintaining a neutral stance on other issues. Many argue that this stance contradicts Nepal’s non-alignment policy, but it aligns with our stated policy. If one sovereign country attacks another, Nepal cannot remain neutral and opposes such actions but avoids taking sides.

Our message is clear: we do not wish to be embroiled in big power rivalries, and we urge major powers not to involve us in their geopolitical games. Currently, amid the Middle East crisis, we maintain the same policy. If not a zone of peace, we aspire to become a zone of investment. We have a straightforward message for major powers: we understand and protect your security and other legitimate concerns, but only a prosperous and strong Nepal can effectively address those issues, so invest in our country. Of course, challenges such as corruption and bureaucratic red tape exist, but the investment climate in Nepal is comparatively favorable, and we have big markets like India and China in close proximity. Despite getting huge support from major countries in Nepal’s social and economic development, the country is starting to feel the heat of geopolitical tensions. As these tensions escalate, there is a fear among our politicians that major powers may pull Nepal into their orbit through economic assistance. As major powers roll out strategic initiatives one after another, there are concerns that Nepal may become ensnared in a geopolitical ambush. Not only politicians, but senior bureaucrats also find themselves in awkward positions as they consolidate all bilateral issues under one strategic basket. And, there is a lack of understanding among politicians and bureaucrats about these issues, and there have been no efforts to educate them.

By closely monitoring negotiations between our leaders and major powers, we can see that our leaders are facing pressure. Whenever they engage in talks with their counterparts, they struggle to avoid committing to strategic projects outright. Since they cannot outright reject them out of fear for their regime’s stability, they attempt to reassure that Nepal could consider such initiatives after thorough study and consensus at home. Due to such apprehensions, our politicians are even hesitant to accept pure development projects without strings attached. Similarly, diplomats in Kathmandu bypass the due process in dealing with Nepal. Instead of going through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign countries tend to approach political leaders and certain ministries directly seeking their consent. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be unaware of a host of initiatives proposed by major powers. If there is institutional memory, foreign countries cannot complain about policy inconsistency or lack of ownership across governments. If all proposals go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which remains unaffected by changes in government, it ensures policy continuity to some extent.

Our stance remains that, due to our geopolitical location and other factors, we cannot align with major powers. Whether termed neutral, non-aligned or otherwise, our bottom line is clear: we seek engagement solely on economic terms. If major powers engage with Nepal in this manner, frequent changes in government may not pose significant difficulties. Therefore, support and invest in Nepal, so that we can safeguard the security and other legitimate interests of our friends. If major powers attempt to turn Nepal into a battleground for their conflicts, it will be detrimental not only to the Nepali people but also to the major powers. We understand that our neighboring countries, both near and distant, desire to see a stable and prosperous Nepal, as it serves their interests. My request to all: we aspire to grow with you as a sovereign and peaceful country. As I mentioned in my previous opinion piece, major countries should not favor one party over another or play them against each other. Instead, they should adopt a Nepal-centric policy with the economy at the forefront. Moreover, major parties should collaborate to formulate a common position on the issues mentioned above. We want to declare Nepal as a Zone of Investment.

More than a decade ago, it would be news when coffins arrived at Tribhuvan International Airport on the cargo hold of airliners, bearing migrant workers who had died in the Gulf or Malaysia. The plywood boxes would be carried by grieving relatives to Aryaghat, the bodies in plastic sheeting unwrapped for cremation.

The numbers escalated from the occasional coffin to two, three, then several a day. As the far-flung regions also started sending out migrants, the returning bodies had to be taken for cremation or burial to the home villages. Even as the returning dead stopped making news, a transport industry sprang to provide delivery service from TIA.

The Red Suitcase is a film of short dialogues and long silences, tracing the journey of one driver (Saugat Malla) on his Bolero pick-up as he picks up a body and carries it along the Sindhuli Highway and scenic backroads to deliver it to the village of Beyul.

Among the many fascinating elements in the film is the choice of name for the hamlet. In the Himalayan Buddhist belief system, ‘beyul’ is a valley of refuge for those escaping sectarian strife, political subjugation or failed crops. Here Beyul is an idyll of a bhitri madhes village, and the Bolero breaks the peace as it arrives, spewing diesel and churning up the gravel, arriving at the house kept by a young mother (Shristi Shrestha) and her newborn infant.

Along the way, Saugat’s character meets a disabled veteran of the Indian Gorkha battalion (Bipin Karki), who served and was wounded in Kashmir. A bitter man, he lives alone in a roadside hut in whose driveway the pick-up parks for the night. We learn that the driver fled his village after his beloved school-teacher was murdered by insurgents. Seeking survival in the metropolis, he ends up as the chauffeur of last journeys.

Between sips of raksi, the conversation between the demobilized soldier and the driver encapsulates the concerns of the times: a polity that forces its youth outward, a nation-state which sends its citizens to fight for another country, and a rural society devastated by internal conflict. But nothing is overplayed in writer-director Fidel Devkota’s expert script and cinematography.

Two spectral episodes bracket the story of the traveling coffin, one involving the wife and another the Bolero sarathi. These are best left for the reader to observe and reach an understanding at the cinema hall.

Whether you are carried away by the story of The Red Suitcase or not depends on your mental conditioning as regards the emptying villages of Nepal, including Beyul where only the women are left to tend the homesteads. The extended silences in darkness and half-shadows allow for reflection on the fate of the characters, and what happened to their resource-rich country.

In the screening this writer attended, a few in the audience were clearly uncomfortable with Devkota’s technique. At the half-time break, some giggled self-consciously and a man asked someone in the next row, ‘Ae bhatija, nidaeko ho?!’ But by the time the end credits came up, he had gone pensive as had others in the hall.

As an aside, perhaps The Red Suitcase can sensitize the Department of Civil  Aviation to provide a more dignified arrival for the migrant dead at TIA. While the earlier practice of the coffins emerging into the regular baggage collection area has ended, the Department must customize special pushcarts for transport to where the grieving families await. Till today, relatives have to lay the coffins sideways across two regular airport trolleys and awkwardly push them in tandem.

The Red Suitcase, meanwhile, does its bit to provide respect to the dead and living. At the village Beyul, the newborn’s name, Asha, holds out the possibility of a better tomorrow.

Don McLain Gill is a geopolitical analyst, author, and lecturer at the Department of International Studies, De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines. Kamal Dev Bhattarai of ApEx talked with him about the changing geopolitical situation and regionalism. 

How do you see the history of regionalism in South Asia?

Following the Second World War, there has been a significant shift toward the formulation of trade and inter-state relations. As a result, states became eager for a new model that would not only promote and expand trade but would also contribute to peace by establishing international cooperative agreements and institutions to support them. Since the 1960s, there has been a noteworthy increase in regional cooperative projects all over the world. This pushed the developing world to explore the possibilities and opportunities of regional cooperation. However, it was important for states to recognize certain requirements in order to forge an effective regional group. One of these requirements was the need to look outward and limit self-centered interests that may hinder collective goals. However, this seems to be easier said than done, given the variation in every state’s history and priority, which may conflict with regional priorities.

Like elsewhere, the concept of regional cooperation gained attraction and acceptance in South Asia. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 to enhance and promote intra-regional trade and economic cooperation. Later, South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed in 1993. This was then followed by the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement, which came into effect in 2006. However, Despite the enthusiasm brought by the spread of regional cooperation, the results have not been entirely praiseworthy.

While talking about regionalism in this area, SAARC obviously comes at the forefront, but it is in a state of limbo.  Do you see any chance of SAARC’s revival?

 It is crucial to understand that each region consists of its own dynamics and characteristics. Both external and internal factors must be taken into consideration when evaluating the success and effectiveness of regional cooperation. South Asian states have similar geographical, cultural, and societal features that are supposed to create a conducive environment for effective cooperation. Nevertheless, despite such advantageous factors, South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world. This can be attributed to both economic and non-economic factors ranging from tariff and non-tariff barriers and lack of comparative advantage to physical connectivity, divergent threat perceptions, and asymmetric power relations. 

Moreover, the evident historic dilemma between India and Pakistan poses a critical challenge for SAARC’s revival. Most especially since Pakistan’s consistent support for terror activities throughout the region serves as a major impediment to attaining a conducive environment for regional growth and cooperation. Moreover, Pakistan’s desire to involve extra-regional powers like China to undermine India’s territorial integrity, security, and sovereignty presents a deep-rooted challenge for the regional organization to come out of.

Can BIMSTEC become an alternative to SAARC?

With the rise of the Indo-Pacific construct, South Asia has become a sub-region to a greater Indo-Pacific. This creates more opportunities for South Asian states to expand the scope and boundaries of cooperation beyond the immediate neighborhood and into the other subregions of the Indo-Pacific. Thus, the utility of interregional frameworks like BIMSTEC must be maximized by its members to explore more opportunities for economic and security cooperation amidst the deadlock faced in SAARC. 

BIMSTEC serves as an important sub-regional arrangement where both South and Southeast Asian states can diversify and strengthen alternative economic options at a time when the Indo-Pacific is facing critical shifts brought by the unfolding US-China power competition. This provides an opportunity for BIMSTEC to regain its significance, given the vital economic and security linkages between Bay of Bengal and the Western Pacific. For South Asian states, this presents an important avenue to offset the strategic losses faced from SAARC and reinvest in alternative inter-regional platforms such as BIMSTEC.

Can countries of this region consider creating another regional bloc?

I believe it is unlikely for South Asian states to devote resources again to establish another regional organization. This contradicts the emerging trend in the Indo-Pacific of forging loose and area-specific arrangements between states that share common interests, concerns, and goals. Such arrangements can be in the form of minilateral groupings. I believe there is more potential for like-minded South Asian states to cooperate on key issue areas of mutual interest and concern through such a framework rather than reinvesting in traditional forms of regional cooperation.

Why did South East Asia succeed in embracing a robust regional body like ASEAN, but South Asia failed to do so?

ASEAN and SAARC are two regional organizations that were formed during the Cold War Era amidst the emerging trend toward regionalism and regional economic cooperation. However, ASEAN's function as a regional bloc is far more successful than that of SAARC. While the former is often considered as the benchmark for regional cooperation in the developing world, the latter is known for being the least integrated region in the world. There are several reasons behind this vast operational gap. Unlike SAARC, ASEAN has invested in enhancing connectivity projects between its member countries. Moreover, ASEAN’s intra-regional trade, despite its limitations, remains quite praiseworthy at 25 percent compared to SAARC, which is barely at five percent. 

However, aside from economic evaluations, it is more important to highlight the geopolitical differences between both organizations. Unlike ASEAN, the power dynamics in SAARC is far more asymmetrical. Moreover, the intersectional historical, cultural, and political dynamics of SAARC members are also significantly different from ASEAN members. The nature of protracted intra-regional conflicts, ongoing land boundary tensions, and cross border terrorism in South Asia is also more complicated than that of Southeast Asia. Thus, these are some of the important factors that need to be acknowledged in better understanding why SAARC continues to trail behind when it comes to regional integration.

How do the major powers like the US and China see regionalism in South Asia?

The US-China power competition centers on either strengthening or revising the established order in the Indo-Pacific. For the past few years, China has been seeking to present an alternative order in the form of the Global Security Initiative, which aims to push its role in Asia at the expense of US leadership. This may lead Beijing to exploit loopholes in key regional organizations to turn it against the West. We have seen attempts from China to turn the BRICS and SCO as anti-West groupings, but it has been unsuccessful. 

Similarly, the US and China are also competing for influence within ASEAN. However, such a scenario is unlikely for SAARC, given the lack of influence the organization has on South Asian politics. Therefore, it is likely for the US and China to directly engage with regional states for the purpose of deepening their respective strategic footprints in the vital sub-region of the Indo-Pacific.

Major political parties are busy forming and toppling governments at both the federal and provincial levels. Even a month after the change in the coalition at the center, the process of forming new governments in the provinces remains incomplete. Provincial governments have become even more unstable than the federal government. 

At the same time, major political parties are engaged in blame-games. The country is facing numerous challenges, such as an economic recession, rampant corruption, and poor governance. Even worse is the  silence of parties over sensitive issues that demand immediate and urgent attention. Over the past few months, Hindu-Muslim clashes in the Tarai region and Christian-Hindu clashes in the hill region have been escalating. Last week, the local administration in Sunsari had to impose a curfew for a couple of days to calm tensions. This week, tensions brewed when a rally organized by Hindu organizations was disrupted by another group. These incidents are not isolated; similar clashes are erupting in different parts of the country.

This surge in inter-community conflicts marks a troubling departure from Nepal's history of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence among its diverse communities. It is evident that certain vested interests are sowing seeds of discord in Nepali society by providing financial and logistical support to fuel these tensions. Nepal's security agencies, including the Nepal Army, have ground information about the groups trying to create disturbance in Nepali society. It is time to act tough to control these activities. This should become the agenda of major political parties in Parliament. Unfortunately, parties preoccupied with power struggles have yet to take the issue seriously.

Major political parties must prioritize addressing this escalating social crisis. They must unequivocally denounce these divisive activities and urge their members to refrain from participating in such provocations. Similarly, civil society, media and other social organizations, including religious organizations, must also rally to confront this challenge. Such tensions could spiral out of control any time, unleashing a new crisis which will be more detrimental than the Maoist insurgency. The inaction from the government and political parties is surprising. As a first step, Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal should call an all-party meeting to discuss this agenda.