Vault of history V : The ‘wily maharaj’
After Juddha Shumsher announced his abdication and turned from a despotic ruler into a ‘saintly maharaj’, he gave an advice to his nephew Mohan Shumsher: “Serve Padma Shumsher the way Bharat served Ram.” Juddha was referring to the characters in the Hindu epic Ramayana, in which Bharat is steadfastly loyal to his half-brother Ram. Even during Ram’s 14-year exile to the forest, Bharat didn’t usurp the throne.
For Mohan Shumsher, Juddha’s advice was meaningless. Using various machinations and trickery, Mohan made it difficult for Padma to stay in the country. When Padma went to India for medical treatment, Mohan forced him to resign from there. And on 30 April 1948, Mohan crowed himself ‘Shree Teen’. There was a time when the king used to put the crown on the Rana prime minister’s head, but that tradition had been broken for some time, and the Ranas had started putting the crown on themselves and declaring themselves ‘maharaj’. Once they became ‘Shree Teen’, they turned into an autocrat. Like Louis XIV, the Rana prime ministers claimed they were the state.
The Ranas were declared colonels and generals as soon as they were born. Surprised by such tradition, the British used to call them ‘toy generals’. Ordinary Nepalis couldn’t be expected to summon the nerve to comment on the ways of the Ranas, who had been running a family oligarchy for three generations with an iron fist. When the Ranas were walking in the street, commoners had to stand still and salute them. Those who didn’t were put on a list of ‘suspicious’ people.
One of Mohan Shumsher’s brothers was Krishna Shumsher, who was on the prime ministerial roll and the designated hazuria (roughly, ‘most trusted’) general of Padma Shumsher. Krishna was a firm supporter of Padma’s progressive policies. Padma’s policies and Krishna’s activities had alarmed the likes of Mohan Shumsher, Babar Shumsher and Bahadur Shumsher, who were afraid that the expansion of liberal policies would spell the demise of the Rana regime and prevent them from becoming prime minister.
Mohan Shumsher’s family wasn’t happy that Krishna was the hazuria general of Padma Shumsher. But once Mohan became prime minister, he tried to keep Krishna close. Krishna, however, didn’t want to stay in Nepal. Mohan tried to make him the envoy to Britain, but Krishna refused. He set off for India in December 1949, giving up his post and leaving behind some property in Kathmandu, including Shital Niwas, the current residence of the President. (He also left behind Rs 300,000 for its maintenance.) In India, Krishna invested in various businesses and amassed a big fortune. He believed the Rana rule wouldn’t survive long if it didn’t introduce reforms.
When Mohan Shumsher became prime minister, he adopted repressive policies, much like during Juddha’s reign. Mohan’s brothers, who had control over the army and the government, began wielding power with reckless abandon. They started uttering threatening statements to intimidate critics. “Our reign was acquired through swords and we will rule another 100 years with the power of swords,” they said openly. By the time Mohan Shumsher appeared on the scene, the Ranas had ruled the country for 102 years under the threat of a sword. To instill fear in the commoners, Mohan’s brothers told stories of Hitler and Mussolini, and even put up their portraits in their palaces.
The next column in the ‘Vault of history’ series will discuss how the ‘unequal’ 1950 treaty came to be signed at the fag end of Mohan Shumsher’s reign
Also read:
Vault of history I : Saintly despot
Vault of history II : Juddha the villain
An economic case for legal marijuana
3 Economic benefits
APEX Series
MARIJUANA
3 Economic benefits
4 Downsides (Apr 12)
5 Government stand (Apr 26)
Chintan Tiwari, 21, a young entrepreneur, is already planning to cash in on the growing global marijuana economy. He has opened accounts on international shopping websites and is planning for photo shoots of hemp bags, slippers and kurtas he wants to sell globally. Although there are existing manufacturers selling hemp products in the US and Europe, Tiwari sees an opportunity for himself as a reseller and marketer. “I see bags which I can easily outsource for 600-700 rupees being sold for 30-35 dollars on international websites. If cannabis is legalized in Nepal and raw materials for the hemp products can be easily procured, it’s going to be a million-dollar business for me.” Similarly, Nawaraj Adhikari, who makes hemp bags in his handicraft workshop at Nepaltar, Balaju, is all praise for Nepali hemp products which he says are popular mostly among Japanese tourists for their strength, durability, exotic looks and non-allergic properties. “I source raw materials from local vendors in Thamel who get them from the rural parts of Nepal where cannabis still grows wildly. The security forces destroy any plantations they find but somehow the traders manage to secure the non-consumable parts of the plant and make hemp fibers with them,” Adhikari says. “But as our suppliers can only source them from the wild, the raw materials are expensive.”
The worldwide legal cannabis industry is projected to grow to $16.9 billion in 2019
Adhikari buys hemp cloths for Rs 300-350 a meter, depending on the quality. He thinks that as many developed countries have legalized the consumption and farming of marijuana, Nepal should follow suit, at least for commercial purposes. He sees a huge potential in hemp clothing, which he believes can replace many other artificial fibers.
Globally, many countries that had earlier banned the “psycho-active” substance have now opened up to its diverse recreational, medicinal and commercial use. The world has realized that the cannabis plant can not only be rolled up for a joint, but can also be used for medical purposes as well as for manufacturing durable, breathable textiles, beauty products, food products like hemp milk or hemp protein powder, paper, construction materials and much more.
According to Arcview Market Research and its partner BDS Analytics, the worldwide legal cannabis industry is projected to grow to $16.9 billion in 2019, a significant increase from $12.2 billion in 2018.
Another research firm Grand View Research, Inc. forecasts a global legal marijuana market of $146.4 billion by 2025. According to Financial Times, spending on cannabis in Canada has hit $4.4 billion in the fourth quarter of this year, equivalent to 0.5 percent of all household spending. Non-medical cannabis now accounts for 11.2 percent of all spending on alcohol, tobacco and cannabis in the country where cannabis was legalized only in October 2018.
There is strong economic rationale to legalize marijuana
A report prepared by Robert Gersony for the USAID claims that the cannabis ban of 1976 backfired for the Nepali government, which might have partly fueled the Maoist revolution decades later
Nepal is losing out on a great opportunity to top up its dwindling forex reserves because of the government’s reluctance to legalize cannabis. Before its 1976 ban, “the government used to issue contracts for cannabis plantations and export the final products,” says Dr Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, who was Minister of Finance when the official ban came into effect. “We had to ban cannabis because of the pressure from the West, mainly the US. I remember they threatened us with blockage of all aid if we failed to do so. Politically as well, the West was not pleased with the king’s regime, which it called undemocratic. So the government succumbed.”
Thapa also informs that although cannabis was taxed in the country, it was never mentioned in the official budget. APEX searched the annual budget documents from 1970 to 1976, and failed to find any data on cannabis revenues.
As a reward for the cannabis ban, Thapa says, the US offered meager indirect compensations by introducing substitute crops and helping with some development work. The government, however, was reluctant to completely enforce the ban. Although it officially stopped the contracts, it was lenient with farmers and consumers. Thapa informs the ban was met with a small resistance from the Tarai, which was later stifled since it was unorganized. “Why should we give up the use of our native plant which we have been using for generations just because of foreign pressure?” was the argument from the Tarai.
The traditional use of medical marijuana in Nepal is also confirmed by the state-run Singha Durbar Vaidhyakhana Samiti, one of the oldest ayurvedic medicine manufacturers in the country. “We have traditional medicines that have been passed down from the Malla era [13th century]. Unfortunately, we have not made any cannabis medicine for the past 15-20 years due to the paucity of raw material,” says Bamshadip Sharma Kharel, the managing director of Vaidhyakhana. “Our archives show that cannabis was a key ingredient for medicines for multiple ailments like diarrhea, sexual disorders, psychiatric problems, as well as for a general medicine.”
Suited to marijuana
Nepali ayurvedic medicines infused with cannabis are exclusive and if developed, can profitably sell their patent rights abroad, Kharel argues. “While the rest of the world is only now researching cannabis for medical purposes, we’ve long known its medicinal value. If only cannabis was legalized, we could be bringing in huge revenues.”
“With the legalization of marijuana, Nepal has a strong economic opportunity to capitalize on its geographic and agricultural suitability for marijuana. In the months of October, November and December, the marijuana crops in Nepal can reach for the heavens, growing 30 feet tall,” says Jim Gierach, former Chicago prosecutor and former Acting Chair and Vice Chair of internationally recognized ‘Law Enforcement Against Prohibition’ or LEAP. “Mexico produced 21,500 metric tons of marijuana in one year (2008), according to a US Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center report (2011). States in the US that have legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes (33 of 50 states)—and those uses are expanding—are running out of the product. With this, the magnitude of Nepal’s economic opportunity should be clear enough.”
Gierach, who is also a drafter of the proposed comprehensive amendment to a UN drug treaty, says a responsible international drug policy that controls the production, distribution, trade and consumption of marijuana and other psychoactive substances is coming. Gierach adds that decriminalization of marijuana removes criminal punishment but does not enable legal production, export and trade that legalization offers. “The United States cannot fairly take economic advantage of medical and recreational use of marijuana and deny other nations the same prerogative,” he says.
Although the Nepali government has no official record of the cannabis economy and the ban that was enforced by the US, a 2003 report titled “Sowing the wind…History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal’s Rapti Hills” prepared by Robert Gersony for the USAID claims that the cannabis ban of 1976 backfired for the Nepali government which might have partly fueled the Maoist revolution, decades later.
Rs 6bn back then
“The inhabitants of the Rapti region were prosperous before the ban, with the residents of Rukum, Rolpa, Salyan and Surkhet using the wildly abundant cannabis as a cash crop. From 1930 to 1970, the residents of the area had a stable income through cannabis. They even exported hash and charas to other parts of the world through India even during the Second World War,” the report reads. “The locals also used cannabis plants to produce ropes and traditional clothing.”
The once economically stable region collapsed in four years after the 1976 ban, reads the report, resulting in extreme poverty and out-migration. The USAID’s Rapti Development Program, which was offered as a sort of compensation for the cannabis ban, failed to provide an alternative source of income, hence turning the villages of the region into some of the poorest in the country.
How much cannabis Nepal produces is an interesting but unanswered question due to lack of proper research. A 2000 investigative report by Nepali Times shows Nepal was growing three million kg of ganja (dried marijuana plants) and charas (concentrated resin) every year with a street value of Rs 6 billion for “export” to India every year.
The Narcotic Drugs (Control) Act 1976 mandates 15 years to life imprisonment, and a fine of up to Rs 2.5 million, for those involved with narcotic drugs, and the Nepali media frequently reports of confiscation of charas, hashish and marijuana leaves. The police also destroy marijuana plants in the fields, a practice that has gained in momentum under Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa.
As cannabis and its byproducts are banned as ‘narcotics’, their underground market rate seems to depend on the agreements between the buyers and sellers. More than four decades after the cannabis ban, it is still not difficult to find a strain of the famous “Nepali” marijuana or a hash ball in any part of the country for a minimal price compared with what the country could gain if it could sell the product in the international market.
(Notwithstanding its possible contribution to the economy, legalizing marijuana may also come with its own set of problems, which is also the topic of the next article in this APEX Series)
From one to many
5 Is India losing influence in Nepal?
APEX Series
OLI GOVERNMENT AND INDIA
5 Is India losing influence in Nepal?
In this concluding part of the five-part, weekly APEX Series on ‘Oli government and India’, we examine how India continues to lose ground in Nepal following the 2015- 16 blockade. There are various signs of this. Recently, one of the most noted ones was Nepal opting for Chinese (instead of Indian) standards in laying its railway tracks. Nepal cited lower cost as a reason. But observers in India were quick to point out how this was yet another instance of New Delhi ‘losing out’ to Beijing in Nepal.
Three main reasons are responsible for New Delhi’s loss of influence over Kathmandu: the blockade of 2015-16, the transit and transport treaty Nepal signed with China in 2016, and the logjams in India-funded development projects in Nepal. Following the blockade, Indian interference in the internal politics of Nepal has been less conspicuous, and there are speculations that Indian policy on Nepal has changed. But Narayan Kaji Shrestha, a senior leader of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) and former foreign minister, says such a conclusion would be premature. “Now, India’s interference in internal matters of Nepal has been reduced but we have to wait to see if there has been a sea change in India’s Nepal policy post-blockade,” he says.
The blockade created a public opinion that Nepal’s trade and transit facilities should be diversified. The signing of the Transit and Transport Treaty between Nepal and China in 2016 ended, at least in principle, India’s monopoly on Nepal’s supply system. Using Chinese ports will be costlier, but they nonetheless offer alternatives for Nepal.
Not only China, western countries, especially the US, have also renewed their interest in Nepal after the blockade and particularly after the formation of a strong communist government in February 2018. Warning bells are ringing in Delhi which has traditionally been loath to see Nepal slip out of its ‘sphere of influence’.
The slow decline of Indian hegemony
Observers point to three major reasons: the blockade of 2015-16, the transit and transport treaty between Nepal and China in 2016 and the endless delay in India-funded development projects in Nepal
On February 25, The Global Times, a Chinese newspaper, published a news story titled ‘Nepal gauges interests in choosing China rail norm’. It said, “Considering that a majority of Nepal’s third-country trade currently runs through India, a plan to hitch Nepal’s rail system to Chinese standards will reduce the landlocked nation’s dependence on India. New Delhi has to accept the fact that Nepal is strengthening its economic cooperation with China, and make the best policy choices for itself.” It also said, “Choosing the Chinese gauge standard is an economic move by Nepal, and it has nothing to do with Kathmandu’s political stand.”
Of course that didn’t prevent Indian diplomats and commentators from presenting it as an example of growing Chinese influence in Nepal and the failure of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s neighborhood first policy. Indian government officials also raised objections to Nepal’s use of the Chinese gauge standard.
In an interview with The Print, an online news portal, India’s former National Security Advisor Shiva Shankar Menon reacted to the news story, expressing displeasure with Nepal choosing the Chinese gauge standard. “I do not think our relationship with Nepal is where it should be,” he said.
Three major reasons
All this hints at the worry felt by Indian diplomats, academicians and journalists about Delhi gradually losing its influence in Nepal to Beijing. Observers point to three major reasons: the blockade of 2015-16, the transit and transport treaty Nepal signed with China, and the logjams in India-funded development projects in Nepal.
On 30 August 2015, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) endorsed a new constitution and set September 3 as the date to promulgate it. Soon after, India sent its foreign secretary S Jaishankar to Kathmandu as a special envoy to advise Nepali leaders to either stop or postpone the promulgation of the constitution and bring Madhes-based parties on board. Jaishankar’s advice was not heeded, and when Nepal promulgated the constitution, India imposed a five-month-long border blockade, which caused a humanitarian crisis in Nepal, a country hit by a major earthquake just a few months earlier. India denies it imposed a blockade and that the supply disruptions were a result of security concerns emanating from protests on the border by Madhes-based parties.
“I do not have evidence to prove that the Indian state was complicit in the blockade. As a scholar, I can speak only on the basis of evidence and facts. Let’s assume India had no hand in the blockade. In that case, India could have supported Nepal. It could have airlifted essentials like food and fuel into Kathmandu. It did not. That hurt bilateral relations,” says Constantino Xavier, a fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings India, in an interview with APEX.
Following the blockade, Indian interference in the internal politics of Nepal has been less conspicuous, and there are speculations that Indian policy on Nepal has changed. But Narayan Kaji Shrestha, a senior leader of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) and former foreign minister, says such a conclusion would be premature. “Now, India’s interference in internal matters of Nepal has been reduced but we have to wait to see if there has been a sea change in India’s Nepal policy post-blockade,” he says.
After the signing of the 12-point understanding between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists in 2005 in Delhi, the promulgation of the constitution was probably the first instance of Nepal making a major political decision without consulting India. Another instance was the holding of three tiers of elections in 2017, although India had some reservations. By contrast, India was closely consulted during the integration of the Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army in 2012.
Geja Sharma Wagle, a political analyst and commentator, believes India is losing its traditional influence in Nepal because of a few factors, such as India’s coercive diplomacy and its interference in Nepal’s political affairs. “India has abused the Madhes card time and again. And while India only promises development projects, China delivers,” says Wagle.
The China factor
The blockade created a public opinion in Nepal that its trade and transit facilities should be diversified and its exclusive dependence on India minimized. Such an opinion resulted in a favorable environment for the Nepal government to improve connectivity with countries other than India, mainly China.
The signing of the Transit and Transport Treaty between Nepal and China in 2016, the first ever in Nepal’s history, ended, at least in principle, India’s monopoly on Nepal’s supply system. The protocol of the agreement is ready, and is expected to pave Nepal’s way for using Chinese ports and roads for trade with third countries. Using Chinese ports will be costlier for Nepal, but in case it faces blockades and difficult times in the future, it can look to China.
The way development projects are handled is another possible reason behind diminishing Indian clout in Nepal. At a time when there are complaints that Indian development projects take too long, China has given an impression that it complete projects on time. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has also piqued interest in Nepal.
According to the Xinhua news agency, “China pledged the highest foreign direct investment (FDI) to Nepal three years in a row as the Himalayan country received China’s pledge of 427 million US dollars in last fiscal year 2017-18.” It further says, “China topped the chart in committing FDI to Nepal in fiscal years of 2016-17 and 2015-16 too with a commitment of 76 million US dollars and 57 million US dollars respectively.” In the recent years, China has invested heavily in major infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of the Ring Road in Kathmandu and the construction of an international airport in Pokhara.
China has also become more influential in other spheres such as the bureaucracy, security agencies and media. The Nepal Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are increasing cooperation, and the two conducted their first-ever joint military drill in 2018, raising eyebrows in New Delhi.
The 1950 treaty is a bone of contention between the two countries and a major political topic in Nepal
Striking a balance
Another significant development in the last couple of years is the formation of the Nepal-India Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG), and the discourse surrounding it about Nepal’s desire to change its special relationship with India.
Indian bureaucrats and diplomats apparently fear that implementing the recommendations proposed by the EPG report will further reduce India’s traditional influence in Nepal by bringing about three major changes in Nepal-India relations. First, with more regulatory measures, the dynamics of the open Nepal-India border would change. Second, Nepal would be free to import weapons from third countries without India’s consent. Third, there would be greater clarity on other provisions of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty.
The 1950 treaty is a bone of contention between the two countries and a major political topic in Nepal. “Naturally, Nepal wants to diversify its options in order to reduce its dependence on India. At the same time, there still are elements that make Nepal-India relationship more unique and special. Even today, Nepali citizens are allowed to join the Indian civil service and armed forces based on the 1950 treaty,” says Xavier. “Nepal could consider abrogating the treaty. But you have Nepali citizens serving as officers in the Indian air force. The open border is yet another aspect of the special relationship between Nepal and India. Again, it is up to Nepal to decide whether it wants to do away with this.”
Not only China, western countries, especially the United States, have renewed their interest in Nepal after the Indian blockade in 2015-16 and particularly after the formation of a communist government with a two-third parliamentary majority in February 2018. The recent visit of Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali to the US, where he discussed with his American counterpart Nepal’s role in the US’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, has been widely considered an example of growing US interest in Nepal.
There is a sort of domestic consensus in Nepal that it should strike a balance between its two neighbors by putting economic diplomacy front and center. Says Wagle, “Nepal should strike a diplomatic, strategic and economic balance between emerging global powers like India and China. It should respect their core interests. Neither country is a substitute for the other. Nepal should take maximum advantage of its location between two economic giants”.
Vault of history IV : Padma’s reforms and exile
It was customary for members of the Rana family to be swathed in expensive robes and ornaments, and to constantly try to outcompete other members through ostentatious displays of wealth. Padma Shumsher, by contrast, used to dress modestly until he became prime minister. He didn’t have much wealth either. Kathmandu’s power worshippers weren’t very close to him. Only after he became prime minister did his entourage of sycophants expand.
Padma did not even move to Singha Durbar, the prime minister’s quarters, during his 28-month-long rule. He governed from his own palace in Bishalnagar. He spent time with the likes of Rishikesh Shah and Surya Prasad Upadhyaya, who were known for their democratic views. Obviously, this did not go down well with the Rana family. It was because of his social circle that Padma became inclined toward progressivism.
It was during Padma’s rule that a ‘scientific reform’ movement was started. Government of Nepal Act, 2004 was formulated. (It was scheduled to be issued on the first day of the Nepali year 2005, i.e. 13 April 1948.) Ensuring fundamental rights without going against local customs and conduct was the main attraction of that law.
The act had a provision for a council of ministers with at least five members. They could serve for four years after being nominated by the prime minister and taking a religious vow. The law stipulated that only close confidants of the prime minister could serve in the cabinet. A council of ministers was a novel experiment in a regime run completely under a military system.
During Padma’s reign, a legislative body, in which the prime minister sat, was formed in order to give the country a glimpse of the parliamentary system. Padma Kanya College was established to provide education for women. For the first time in Nepal’s history, an electoral exercise was carried out in Kathmandu.
In that era, Padma Shumsher was considered a ‘timid’ PM. Later he was counted among the more reformist Rana rulers
Also for the first time, a demonstration was staged in Kathmandu on 14 April 1947. City residents had never seen an open demonstration. Recalls Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, a senior diplomat who was then a student at Durbar High School, “It was the first time that a mass demonstration was held in Kathmandu, with participants chanting slogans like ‘Jindabad’ and ‘Jaya Nepal’ in support of BP Koirala and Nepali National Congress. Students ran out of classes and joined the demonstration.”
Those who had led the demonstration were arrested, but Padma granted them amnesty. Jayatu Sanskritam, a student uprising, took place a couple of months later.
Because there was no budgetary system then, the account of revenue and expenditure was kept a secret throughout the Rana rule. The prime minister’s salary wasn’t made public either. Padma Shumsher wanted to create a budgetary system and make it public. He also wanted to fix the prime minister’s salary at Rs 300,000 (three lakhs) a year. But his successor Mohan Shumsher didn’t let him do that, arguing that the ‘Shree Teen’ would be called ‘Teen-lakhe prime minister’. Still, Padma Shumsher increased the country’s development budget by Rs 2.262 million, taking it from Rs 752,000 to Rs 3.22 million. Reformative measures like these naturally spooked the descendants of Chandra and Juddha. They started fearing that Padma’s ways could spell the end of the Rana rule.
They applied all sorts of technics to plant fear in Padma’s mind and got him trapped in a spiral of suspicion. He started wondering if he’d meet the same fate as the slain Ranodip. And in March 1948, Padma fled, with his money, to Rachi, India on the pretext of seeking medical treatment.
Before he’d formally resigned, his successor Mohan Shumsher moved to the prime minister’s residence in Singha Durbar, which was an extravagant palace built by Mohan’s father Chandra Shumsher. Padma died in Calcutta in 1961.
In that era, Padma was considered a ‘timid’ prime minister. Later he was counted among reformist Rana rulers.
Next week’s ‘Vault of history’ column is on Mohan Shumsher, the last Rana prime minister
Also read:
Vault of history I : Saintly despot
