Tibet and big power politics
In May, two federal lawmakers—Pradeep Yadav of the Samajbadi Party (SP) and Iqbal Miya of the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJP-N)—took part in a program jointly organized by the Latvian Parliamentary Support Group for Tibet and the International Network of Parliamentarians in Latvia’s capital Riga.
The news of their participation drew the attention of the federal parliament and Speaker Krishna Bahadur Mahara as the two had attended the program without the parliament’s consent. Participation in such a program by Nepali legislators was deemed to be against the country’s ‘One-China policy’. Later, both the lawmakers pleaded ignorance about the program’s significance and said they left Riga as soon as they discovered the program’s real nature.
The SP still initiated an internal investigation and suspended Yadav from the party’s primary membership for six months. (He remains suspended.) The SP is a new party formed after the unification between the Federal Socialist Party led by Upendra Yadav and Naya Shakti Nepal Party led by Baburam Bhattarai. The RJPN is mum on Miya’s participation in the program.
This episode demonstrates the seriousness with which Nepali political parties treat Tibet-related issues. Almost all parties profess full commitment to the ‘One-China policy’; they are either in favor of controlling anti-China activities on Nepali soil or they do not speak against it. Irrespective of who leads the home ministry, the security forces are instructed to take strict measures against anti-China activities by Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
In recent times, there has been a sort of consistency in Nepal’s policy on the Tibetan community. In the past two and half decades, no government in Nepal has issued any document that would recognize Tibetans as refugees.
After the formation of the two-third majority government led by KP Sharma Oli, the Ministry of Home Affairs has been stricter still on the activities of Tibetans residing in Nepal. This year, for example, public celebration of the Dalai Lama’s birthday was banned.
Anxious US, besieged China
Officials from the United States and several European Union member states frequently bring up the issue of Tibetan refugees’ human rights with their Nepali counterparts. They voice their concern over the suppression of the rights of Tibetan refugees in Nepal, citing the informal arrangements reached three decades ago between the Nepal government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee on allowing Tibetans to travel to India via Nepali territory. They complain that the agreements are not being honored. The annual human-rights report of the US State Department always discusses at length the situation of Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
“In July the government attempted to limit freedom of expression for the members of Kathmandu’s Tibetan community by initially rejecting requests from the Tibetan Buddhist community to celebrate the Dalai Lama’s birthday publicly. Tibetan Buddhists eventually were allowed to hold an event in the largest settlement in Kathmandu,” the 2018 US State Department’s human-rights report states.
Particularly after 2008, when Nepal’s monarchy was abolished, China started taking the activities of Tibetan refugees here seriously. Given the fragile political situation in Nepal back then, Beijing was worried that anti-China activities could increase. As such, China took up the Tibetan refugee issue with Nepali political parties and started cultivating deeper ties with them.
That was the year in which, during the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics when the world’s attention was trained on China, Tibetans staged several protests in Kathmandu—in front of the Chinese Embassy in Bhatbhateni, in front of the UN headquarters in Pulchowk, and in Boudha where a significant number of Tibetans reside. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested. The protests were followed by a series of high-level visits by Chinese officials to Nepal. China also beefed up security along its border with Nepal and imposed stronger restrictions on cross-border movements. A WikiLeaks entry from 2010 says, “Beijing has asked Kathmandu to step up patrols… and make it more difficult for Tibetans to enter Nepal.”
Tightening noose
Although the US and some European countries continued to urge the Nepal government to ensure the human rights of the Tibetans living here, their activities have been further constricted in recent years. In the past five years, there haven’t been any public protests against China and security forces have been instructed to curb any activity that might have an anti-China whiff.
Soon after the 2015 earthquake, China closed the Tatopani checkpoint and moved the settlement on the Tibetan side elsewhere. This was done to control the movement of Tibetans to Nepal.
Similarly, China has provided Nepal with a list of Tibetans who it believes are engaged in anti-China activities. In the third week of June, Nepali immigration officials at the TIA deported an American national who had the same name as someone on the list. The American Embassy in Kathmandu took the issue seriously and questioned Nepal on the deportation of its citizen. Whether or how Nepal responded to the inquiry remains unknown.
Given the strict steps taken by the Nepal government, the number of Tibetans entering Nepal has decreased. According to the UNHCR, 53 Tibetans transited the country in 2017, and only 31 from January through September 2018. The government had issued UNHCR-facilitated exit permits for recent arrivals from Tibet who were transiting while traveling to India. The number of such arrivals has gone down of late, as Nepal has adopted a policy of preventing Tibetans from entering the country.
There is no official record of the number of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Various reports suggest that around 20,000 Tibetans, who came to Nepal after 1959, live here. From 1959 to 1989, Nepal recognized and registered Tibetans crossing the border as refugees. But since the 1990s Nepal has stopped allowing Tibetan refugees to live in Nepal permanently.
Informal obligation
For Tibetans who want to escape China, Nepal is their temporary shelter. From Nepal, they head for Dharamsala in northern India where the Dalai Lama lives with around 80,000 Tibetan refugees. But after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 2014, the Indian government seemed intent on limiting the cross-border activities of Tibetan refugees. In any case, as Nepal is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, officials say it is not obliged to grant refugee rights to Tibetans.
China is of the view that the Tibetans who cross the border illegally are not refugees and request for the immediate return of those apprehended in Nepal. China often accuses western countries of fomenting troubles in Tibet by using Tibetans in Nepal and India. The US provides funds for the NGOs working for the cause of Tibetan communities in Nepal. No high-level US official on a visit to Nepal fails to raise the issue of their human rights. Since 2012, the US has been supporting the Tibetan communities in India and Nepal through USAID.
Most recently, the American Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) authorized $210 million a year between 2019 and 2013, to go to the NGOs helping with “preserving cultural tradition and promoting sustainable development, education, and environmental conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in other Tibetan Communities in China, India and Nepal.”
The US and some other western countries say that basic rights, such as freedom of speech, assembly, movement and other rights of refugees, should be granted to the Tibetan community in Nepal. While Tibetans living in Nepal enjoy these rights to a certain degree, the Nepal government remains fully committed to a ‘One-China policy’ and to curbing any anti-China activity on Nepali soil.
Arduous road ahead for Nepal’s GOP
After the disastrous 2017 parliamentary polls, Nepal’s Grand Old Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has been going through a deep leadership crisis. Soon after the election debacle, there were strong voices in the party in favor of an impromptu General Convention to elect new leadership. Youth leaders in particular are of the view that the current leadership can no longer run the party well, hence the need for new leadership to revitalize it.
After continuous inside pressure, a Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting this week decided to initiate the process of holding the convention within a year. The pressure came mainly from senior leaders Ram Chandra Poudel, Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala. Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba has been facing the heat for failing to transform the party’s structure into a federal setup and to play an effective role as the head of the main opposition party in the parliament.
As part of the preparations for the 14th General Convention, the CWC has decided to alter the party’s organizational structures into interim structures appropriate for the federal setup. As per an agreement, a CWC meeting in the second week of December will prepare a specific timeframe for the convention. Similarly, the party is all set to start the process of renewing active membership.
This means that the race for party presidency has well and truly begun. Congress leaders believe there will be new alignments in the lead-up to and during the convention. At the 13th GC, there were three factions led by Deuba, Poudel and Sitaula, an arrangement which has continued till date. Senior leader Shekhar Koirala has not taken any side but is preparing to fight for party presidency himself.
Changing face
Youth leaders think that the current leadership—which not only means Deuba but also other senior leaders like Poudel, Sitaula and General Secretary Shashank Koirala—cannot effectively lead the party in the face of a strong Nepal Communist Party which has a near two-thirds majority in the House. “We have high respect and love for our incumbent leaders, but it’s clear that they cannot reform the party. The public will no longer accept them as the party’s face. A change is the need of the hour,” says Congress youth leader Gagan Thapa.
Many party leaders believe an ordinary leadership cannot take the party into the next set of elections, and that it needs charismatic leaders who can communicate with the people with a powerful message. While some think young leaders like Thapa can play that role, the old generation leaders are unlikely to accept his leadership. The NC, many believe, is therefore going through the worst leadership crisis in its seven-decade history.
According to a CWC member, completely displacing the incumbent leadership in a party like the Congress is not possible. Leaders and cadres have a hierarchical mentality; they think youth leaders should wait until the older generation retires. “The NC has leaders who have emerged from a long struggle, served jail terms and are totally dedicated to the party. They are not ready to hand over leadership to the new generation easily,” says Puranjan Acharya, a political analyst and a close observer of Congress politics.
Deuba seems to be in no mood to give up his claim to party leadership in the next GC though. He has publicly said that he would take rest only after elevating the party’s position in national politics. “The party lost the last elections badly while Deuba was its president. He does not want to retire with the tag of an incompetent party president,” said a leader close to Deuba.
Divided he wins
Despite his unpopularity among the youths and criticism by rival factions, Deuba maintains a strong hold on the party’s organizational base. So he is likely to emerge victorious in the next GC if multiple factions fight for presidency.
There is talk of an anti-Deuba alliance in the Congress, but it is unclear how or whether it will happen. Poudel, who claims to be senior to Deuba, complains he is always relegated to second position in the party. Poudel’s several attempts to become prime minister and party president have been unsuccessful. He was defeated by Deuba in the race for party presidency at the 13th convention. Poudel’s faction is weaker but is in the limelight because of the presence of popular youth leaders such as Gagan Thapa and Pradeep Poudel. The senior leader has confided to his close aides that he wants to lead the party once and then retire. He wants all leaders in the anti-Deuba camp to support him in his bid for party presidency.
Not everyone will oblige. Shekhar Koirala has been making preparations to stake his own claim on party presidency, although leaders from the Poudel faction, such as Prakash Man Singh, Ram Sharan Mahat and Arjun Nara Singh KC, argue that Shekhar is a junior leader in terms of his active party politics.
“That argument makes me sad. I accept that I am junior. But what is the status of the party that is now being led by seniors? I respect them. But the logic that juniors cannot fight for presidency is unacceptable,” Koirala told APEX.
Though they have their differences, three members of the Koirala family—Shekhar, Shashank and Sujata—seem to have come together in the past couple of years. But it is still unclear whether Shashank will support Shekhar. Shashank has not yet given any clues about his plan; he has only spoken broadly about the need for a change in party leadership.
Which seems possible only if everyone decides to gang up against Deuba. Shekhar is trying to incentivize Gagan into supporting him by offering him the post of General Secretary. Shekhar claims that if Gagan and his young supporters back him, he would completely hand over party leadership to youth leaders at the 15th convention. The Koirala family, because of BP’s legacy, still enjoys considerable support; despite limited leadership skills and lack of a clear agenda, Shashank Koirala was elected General Secretary at the 13th GC by a wide margin.
Deuba believes it would be easy for him to win party presidency if there are multiple candidates. So he will try to prevent a possible gang-up against him, according to a senior party leader.
Arduous road ahead for Nepal’s GOP
After the disastrous 2017 parliamentary polls, Nepal’s Grand Old Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has been going through a deep leadership crisis. Soon after the election debacle, there were strong voices in the party in favor of an impromptu General Convention to elect new leadership. Youth leaders in particular are of the view that the current leadership can no longer run the party well, hence the need for new leadership to revitalize it. After continuous inside pressure, a Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting this week decided to initiate the process of holding the convention within a year. The pressure came mainly from senior leaders Ram Chandra Poudel, Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala. Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba has been facing heat for failing to transform the party’s structure into a federal setup and to play an effective role as the head of the main opposition party in the parliament.
As part of the preparations for the 14th General Convention, the CWC has decided to alter the party’s organizational structures into interim structures appropriate for the federal setup. As per an agreement, a CWC meeting in the second week of December will prepare a specific timeframe for the convention. Similarly, the party is all set to start the process of renewing active membership.
This means that the race for party presidency has truly begun. Congress leaders believe there will be new alignments in the lead-up to and during the convention. At the 13th GC, there were three factions led by Deuba, Poudel and Sitaula, a state of affairs that has continued till date. Senior leader Shekhar Koirala has not taken any side but is preparing to fight for party presidency himself.
Changing face
Youth leaders think that the current leadership—which not only means Deuba but also other senior leaders like Poudel, Sitaula and General Secretary Shashank Koirala—cannot effectively lead the party in the face of a strong Nepal Communist Party which has a near two-thirds majority in the House. “We have high respect and love for our incumbent leaders, but it’s clear that they cannot reform the party. The public will no longer accept them as the party’s face. A change is the need of the hour,” says Congress youth leader Gagan Thapa.
Many party leaders believe an ordinary leadership cannot take the party into the next set of elections, and that it needs charismatic leaders who can communicate with the people with a powerful message. While some think young leaders like Thapa can play that role, the old generation leaders are unlikely to accept his leadership. The NC, many believe, is therefore going through the worst leadership crisis in its seven-decade history.
According to a CWC member, completely displacing the incumbent leadership in a party like the Congress is not possible. Leaders and cadres have a hierarchical mentality; they think youth leaders should wait until the older generation retires. “The NC has leaders who have emerged from a long struggle, served jail terms and are totally dedicated to the party. They are not ready to hand over leadership to the new generation easily,” says Puranjan Acharya, a political analyst and a close observer of Congress politics.
Deuba seems to be in no mood to give up his claim to party leadership in the next GC. He has publicly said that he would take rest only after elevating the party’s position in national politics. “The party lost the last elections badly while Deuba was its president. He does not want to retire with the tag of an incompetent party president,” says a leader close to Deuba.
Divided he wins
Despite his unpopularity among the youths and criticism by rival factions, Deuba maintains a strong hold on the party’s organizational base. So he is likely to emerge victorious in the next GC if multiple factions fight for presidency.
There is talk of an anti-Deuba alliance in the Congress, but it is unclear how or whether it will happen. Poudel, who claims to be senior to Deuba, complains he is always relegated to second position in the party. Poudel’s several attempts to become prime minister and party president have been unsuccessful. He was defeated by Deuba in the race for party presidency at the 13th convention. Poudel’s faction is weaker but is in the limelight because of the presence of popular youth leaders such as Gagan Thapa and Pradeep Poudel. The senior leader has confided to his close aides that he wants to lead the party once and then retire. He wants all leaders in the anti-Deuba camp to support him in his bid for party presidency.
Not everyone will oblige. Shekhar Koirala has been making preparations to stake his own claim on party presidency, although leaders from the Poudel faction, such as Prakash Man Singh, Ram Sharan Mahat and Arjun Nara Singh KC, argue that Shekhar is a junior leader in terms of his active party politics.
“That argument makes me sad. I accept that I am junior. But what is the status of the party that is now being led by seniors? I respect them. But the logic that juniors cannot fight for presidency is unacceptable,” Koirala told APEX. Though they have their differences, three members of the Koirala family—Shekhar, Shashank and Sujata—seem to have come together in the past couple of years. But it is still unclear whether Shashank will support Shekhar. Shashank has not yet given any clues about his plan; he has only spoken broadly about the need for a change in party leadership.
Which seems possible only if everyone decides to gang up against Deuba. Shekhar is trying to incentivize Gagan to support him by offering him the post of General Secretary. Shekhar claims that if Gagan and his young supporters back him, he would completely hand over party leadership to youth leaders at the 15th convention. The Koirala family, because of BP’s legacy, still enjoys considerable support; despite limited leadership skills and lack of a clear agenda, Shashank Koirala was elected General Secretary at the 13th GC by a wide margin.
Deuba believes it would be easy for him to win party presidency if there are multiple candidates. So he will try to prevent a possible gang-up against him, according to a senior party leader
Brothers in arms?
chinese President Xi Jinping’s much-anticipated visit to Nepal hangs in the balance. Yet there is no doubt in the minds of the Americans that China’s footprint in Nepal is increasing dangerously, with or without the visit. Partly to curb China’s growing strategic ambitions, which are reflected in Xi’s mammoth BRI project, the US is also increasing its military cooperation in South Asia, including with Nepal. It is now doing so under the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). The US is already Nepal’s second biggest defense partner after India. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, unveiled by the US Department of Defense on 1 June 2019, talks about further enhancing defense partnerships in the region. “Within South Asia, we are working to operationalize our Major Defense Partnership with India, while pursuing emerging partnerships with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal,” the document says.
In the view of retired Major General of Nepal Army Binoj Basnyat, who is now a political and security analyst, “Nepal-US relationship has been cordial for many decades. It received prominence after the 2019 IPS report, which mentions China as a competitor to the US.” Interestingly, Nepal-US military cooperation began even before the official signing of an agreement on economic cooperation. While the first economic cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed in 1951, it was in 1949 that the US gave military equipment to the Nepal Army for the first time.
In the early 2000s, two major developments—the escalating Maoist conflict and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—prompted the US to increase its military help to Nepal. The US Mission Nepal Security Cooperation Office officially opened in June 2001 and a military attaché was appointed at its Kathmandu mission. Earlier, security cooperation between the US and Nepal was handled by the US Embassy in Delhi.
Coming to the present day, for 2019-2020, the US has increased Nepal’s training and equipment budget by nearly $65 million. It has supported disaster response in various provinces as well. The US has been offering an increasing array of courses, not only to Nepali security personnel but also to its civil servants. In recent years, mainly after the promulgation of the constitution and China’s assertive inroads into Nepal, American military collaboration with the small Himalayan country has grown in spades....
Military ties destined to grow on the face of an assertive China
The US is Nepal’s second biggest defense partner after India. The two of them had a monopoly on Nepal’s defense sector for a long time—until China started collaborating with Nepal from the mid-1980s. Now, China has emerged as a major defense partner of the Nepal Army as well. The three powerhouses are already in a race to deepen their engagement with Nepal’s security forces. In this part of the APEX series on Nepal-US relations, we explore the various dimensions of defense cooperation between the two countries. (Earlier, APEX had done a detailed story on Nepal’s defense ties with China.)
The US, with its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), has already given a clear message that it would increase its military influence in Nepal. The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, unveiled by the US Department of Defense on 1 June 2019, clearly talks about enhancing defense partnership with South Asian countries, including Nepal. “Within South Asia, we are working to operationalize our Major Defense Partnership with India, while pursuing emerging partnerships with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, and Nepal,” the document says.
“The United States seeks to expand our defense relationship with Nepal, focused on HA/DR [humanitarian assistance/disaster relief], peacekeeping operations, defense professionalization, ground force capacity, and counter-terrorism. Our growing defense partnership can be seen in the establishment of the US Army Pacific-led Land Forces Talks in June 2018, our senior most military dialogue with Nepal,” the document further says.
Foreign policy experts and security analysts expect the defense collaboration between the two countries to increase, and argue that such collaboration should be within the framework of Nepal’s foreign policy. “Nepal-US relationship has been cordial for many decades. It received prominence after the 2019 IPS report, which clearly mentions China as a competitor to the US,” says retired Major General of Nepal Army Binoj Basnyat, who is now a political and security analyst.
Early start
Nepal’s location plays an important role in shaping the dynamics between India and China, he adds, and strategic connectivity through the BRI will alter big powers interests. Basnyat reckons various factors will make the Nepal Army play a bigger role in shaping the strategic dynamic; therefore, the defense relationship between the armies of Nepal and the US will increase, which in turn will have both political and security implications. “Nepal must refrain from being part of any strategic initiative that goes against the spirit of its foreign policy,” says Basnyat.
Interestingly, Nepal-US military and defense cooperation began even before the official signing of an agreement on economic cooperation between them. While the first economic cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed in 1951, it was in 1949 that the US government gave military equipment to the Nepal Army for the first time. There are no official records of US military assistance to Nepal in the 1950s, but it seems to have increased after China occupied Tibet in 1951 and King Mahendra imposed the Panchayat regime in 1960.
In 1959, US Ambassador to Nepal Henry E. Stebbins gave a meaningful message. He announced that Nepal, to paraphrase SD Muni, was in the US defense radar, “as a protection against communist imperialism”. Following the 1962 India-China war, Nepal sought more military assistance from western countries. King Mahendra also wanted to strengthen the capacity of Nepal’s security forces in order to curb the anti-Panchayat movement.
During his visit to the US in 1963, Foreign Minister Tulsi Giri discussed the prospect of military assistance with American officials. The US agreed to give Nepal light weapons, military equipment and medical supplies. Agreement to this end was signed in 1964 and all support was provided in the form of aid.
The following year, the American military experts consisting of nine Signals Corps and eight Vehicles Maintenance Corps arrived in Nepal. In 1965-66, the US provided military assistance worth $1.8 million. In this period, the US also provided some support to the Tibetan rebels based in Khampa. Throughout the Cold War, the US continued its military assistance to Nepal.
Turning point
In the early 2000s, two major developments—the escalating Maoist conflict and the 9/11 terrorist attacks—prompted the US to increase its military assistance to Nepal. The US Mission Nepal Security Cooperation Office officially opened in June 2001 and a military attaché was appointed at its Kathmandu mission. Earlier, security cooperation between the US and Nepal was handled by the US Embassy in Delhi.
From 2001 to 2004, the US supported the then Royal Nepal Army with M16 and M4 rifles, helmets, parachutes and load bearing equipment. It also helped the RNA with the creation of the Mahabir Battalion, which is now a regiment. In this period, the two countries also began Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCETs) with special operations.
Between 2005 and 2014, the US supported the RNA in its transition to the Nepal Army and assisted with the integration of the Maoist combatants. Additionally, the US helped train and equip the Nepali peacekeeping missions abroad. It was also the start of the US support for disaster response, which is considered a major reason behind Nepal’s increased success in such operations.
American military cooperation and assistance to Nepal has grown further since 2015. Since that year, the US increased support to the Birendra Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (BPOTC) in Kavre district. After the earthquake in April 2015, a Disaster Response Station was opened at the Tribhuwan International Airport. Projects worth nearly $9 million were launched. During the earthquake, the US Army conducted various disaster response operations.
A blood bank at the Teaching Hospital in Maharajgunj came into operation soon after the earthquake. In 2015, the first ever airport disaster response plan for TIA was launched, which was written by CAAN with the US military support.
The US military also completed the construction of the BPOTC headquarters and medical facility. According to information provided by the US Embassy in Kathmandu, the building was designed and constructed by an entirely Nepali crew, and built to international safety and earthquake resistance standards.
In 2017, the US completed construction of the Hetauda Storage Warehouse for the storage of disaster response supplies. The same year it completed the Regional Crisis Management Center in Chhauni, Kathmandu.
For 2019-2020, the US has increased funding for training and equipment, the budget raised by nearly $65 million. It has supported disaster response in various provinces as well. In Gandaki Province, for example, it is building five new deep tube wells. In Province 7, it is constructing a blood bank. Similarly, it has supported the creation of the first regional airport disaster response plan at Pokhara Airport.
The US has also been offering an increasing array of courses, not only to Nepali security personnel but also to its civil servants.
In recent years, mainly after the promulgation of the constitution and China’s assertive inroads into Nepal, the US has enhanced military collaboration with the small Himalayan country. The frequency of high-level visits has gone up too .
Conflicting concerns continue to cripple transitional justice
Kathmandu: The conflict victims and the international community are getting antsy. They have been frustrated with the delay in the appointment of chairmen and members of the two transitional justice mechanisms, and with the federal government’s failure to amend a related Act in line with Supreme Court verdict.
This has put the government in a bind. The international community is putting pressure on the government to amend the Act as per the 2015 apex court verdict, in adherence with international standards, and on the basis of wider consultations with conflict victims and other domestic stakeholders.
The 2015 SC verdict had pointed to the failure of the ‘Enforced Disappearances Enquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act-2014’ to comply with principles of transitional justice and international practices. The thrust of its argument is that there should be no amnesty in cases of serious human rights violations committed by both the security forces as well as the Maoist party. Former Maoist leaders, however, see this verdict as a breach of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the guiding document of the peace process.
It has been over four years since the court order and successive governments have failed to amend the Act. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) have done little in past four years save for collecting nearly 66,000 complaints from conflict victims. The commissions were paralyzed due to lack of clarity in their mandate, insufficient resources and overbearing political pressure.
The tenure of chairs and members of the two commissions expired on March 15 and they have since been without leadership, giving rise to a fear that the complaints filed by conflict victims could be lost or manipulated. In the first week of March, the government had formed a new leadership recommendation panel under former chief justice Om Prakash Mishra.
“The indecision on recommending chairs and members is indicative of the pressure the two commissions have faced in the past four years,” says former TRC member Manchala Jha. “There is a psychology that if those close to party leaders are appointed, the leaders will be protected from war-era cases. It is a national issue and parties should rise above petty interest if they want it sorted,” she says, adding that she suspected the hand of ‘unseen forces’ in delaying the process and in giving continuity to a sort of instability in Nepal.
Deliberate delay
The recommendation committee has been unable to decide due to lack of political consensus. Both the ruling Nepal Communist Party as well as the opposition Nepali Congress are claiming TRC leadership. But even more serious is the delay in amendment of the related Act, as the government seems unable to accommodate the conflicting concerns of the former Maoist leaders, the security forces, and the international community.
According to sources, the UN and representatives of various embassies in Kathmandu discussed the delay in appointments and Act amendment a couple of weeks ago. The meeting concluded that both ruling and opposition parties were deliberately delaying the transitional justice process.
As in the past, the international community was all set to issue another statement calling on the government to settle the process soon. The government said it was ready to address their concerns but that there should be no public statement. Thus prompted, the international community has since adopted a policy of reminding government representatives of their transitional justice obligations behind closed doors.
In a meeting earlier this month with Markus Potzel, the Commissioner for South Asia in the German Federal Foreign Office, Law Minister Bhanu Bhakta Dhakal had reiterated the government’s commitment to make the kind of amendments the international community wanted. The meeting highlighted Germany’s deep concern with the TRC process, and also the European Union’s fears over the protracted peace process.
Foreign ambassadors based in Kathmandu are also repeatedly meeting Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali to express their concerns.
Consult us too
Then there are the conflict victims. Earlier this month, the Conflict Victim’s Common Platform submitted a memorandum to Minister Dhakal asking for a broader roadmap with a clear deadline for completion of the transitional justice process. The forum asked the government to consult all stakeholders in the peace process and to immediately halt the work of the recommendation committee.
“The process of amending the Act must begin instantly after meaningful consultation with the stakeholders including conflict victims, based on the spirit of the Constitution of Nepal, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Supreme Court ruling, and human rights conventions and declarations Nepal government is a part of,” the body said.
As the previous office-bearers of the two transitional justice bodies failed to live up to the expectation, there are concerns that new appointments would meet with the same fate. Conflict victims and international community thus argue that the two commissions should be independent and autonomous, with fixed jurisdictions and adequate authority. “The incapability of the office-bearers, who were picked on a political basis… by sidelining the principle of conflict transformation, peace building and transitional justice contributed to our distrust,” the conflict victim platform said in a statement.
At the same time, former child soldiers who were discharged in 2010 by then Madhav Kumar Nepal government are piling on the pressure to address their demands. They say even though they were used as soldiers during the Maoist conflict, they were not accommodated in the peace process. The informal leader of former child soldiers Lenin Bista has started highlighting their plight at various international forums. In a recent interview with APEX, Bista warned that the ‘disqualified’ former Maoist fighters could at any time lodge a case against senior Maoist leaders at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
The TRC is also a major bone of contention between Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and his fellow ruling NCP co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Oli is reportedly reluctant to once and for all settle transitional justice cases as the incomplete peace process could be used as a tool of leverage against Dahal in all future power-sharing negotiations. Dahal, meanwhile, is pitching for near blanket amnesty in all war-era cases, and the settlement of the peace process at the earliest.
Former Maoist leaders also do not want to amend the laws in line with SC verdict, and yet in that case they also fear being arrested abroad on charges of grave rights violations. They also want all cases lodged with the regular courts against various Maoist leaders handed over to the two transitional justice bodies.
Six decades of American aid
“…The principal aim of US policy in Nepal is therefore to keep the Communists—Chinese and other—from extending their influence to Nepal. The instrument of this policy is a large aid program. In the fiscal year that ended last June 30 the United States had poured into Nepal $21 million. This is $4 million more than the kingdom’s annual national budget,” reads a news report published in Los Angeles Times on March 1, 1961. The report by PK Padmanabhan with Kathmandu deadline further says, “The United States is participating in tripartite agreement with India and Nepal to build several north-south roads.”
This gives us a hint of the historical US development aid priorities in Nepal. The aid program has crossed six decades and there has been a shift in each decade.
1950s
The US was one of the first countries to extend development assistance to Nepal. The development cooperation goes back to 1951 when the US supported Nepal with its Point Four Program. On January 23, 1951, the two countries first signed on to bilateral aid programs. Roads, telephone exchange, eliminating malaria from Tarai and enabling agriculture were key priories of the US assistance to Nepal during the 1950s. In 1959, the US supported the development of a telecommunications system that provided Kathmandu with 1,000 telephone lines and the country’s first automatic exchange. The first US-supported road in Nepal was the 87-kilometer link between Bharatpur and Hetauda, part of the Rapti Development program. Similarly, the Hetauda-Kathmandu ropeway construction began in 1959. The US also supported several humanitarian efforts in Nepal at the time.
1960s
The 1960s saw a huge surge in American aid to Nepal. US President Dwight Eisenhower’s unexpected $15 million pledge to King Mahendra in April 1960 altered the magnitude of US involvement in Nepal’s development. USAID pursued programs in agriculture, health, education, and industrial development. After King Mahendra dissolved parliament and banned political parties in 1960, US aid was aimed at successful implementation of his Panchayat system, and the US supported building administrative structures across the country. The US took Panchayat system as a possible vehicle for mobilizing and developing Nepal’s human resources and for economic, social and democratic political development.
“The most important role in strengthening the Panchayat system in Nepal was played by US economic aid. On the ideological front—in propagating the democratic values of the system—the role of US Peace Corps volunteers and embassy officials was noteworthy,” writes SD Muni in his book ‘Nepal’s Foreign Policy’. King Mahendra, on the other hand, sought both economic and technical support to sustain his rule. In this decade, the US tried to discourage both Chinese and Russian aid to Nepal.
1970s
With the stabilization of the Panchayat system, the US reduced development aid to Nepal. The early 1970s were characterized by consolidation of projects initiated in previous decades and their reevaluation. Development assistance by the 1970s had become a complex affair. This was a time of shifting paradigms in development. The US priority areas in this period were doubling primary school enrolment, increasing the population served by health facilities from 16 to 46 percent, and establishing family planning services in 62 of 75 districts.
1980s
In 1980s, the US assistance to Nepal was focused on tapping into its potential. In this period, the US established the Female Community Health Volunteers cadre, supported agricultural development to convert chronic food-deficit areas to areas of moderate food surplus. From 1952 to 1986, the United States provided more than $368 million in bilateral development assistance. The US was a major development donor of Nepal when the movement for restoration for democracy picked up in the late 1980s.
1990s
USAID programs of this time reflect the worldwide American support for democratic government and free market. By 1990, American aid to Nepal was to the tune of $475 million. In 1990s, the US underlined the need of sound economic policies: competitive markets operating with minimum government regulation. It focused on accelerating the process of endowing private groups and users with control over and capacity to manage Nepal’s economically important renewable natural resources. In the 1990s, US development assistance engaged 247,000 households in high-value agricultural production, reached nearly 80 percent of Nepal's districts with lifesaving vitamin A supplements, and supported the management of more than 123,000 hectares of land by 1,300 Community Forest User Groups.
2000 to 2015
Promoting development gains while mitigating conflict was the primary purpose of development aid in this time. The US aid was again increased after 2000 for two reasons. The US, in the aftermath of 9/11, was concerned about the growing Maoist activities in Nepal. In this period, the US aid to Nepal was concentrated at increasing the state capacity to prevent Nepal from becoming a failed state. “Strengthening Nepal to prevent a Maoist takeover is key to achieving US regional and bilateral goals, including preventing the spread of terror, enhancing regional stability, promoting democracy, and protecting US citizens in Nepal,” wrote Bruce Vaughn, an analyst in Southeast and South Asian affairs at the US Congressional Research Service, in his 2006 report ‘Nepal: Background and U.S. Relations’.
“American foreign policy interests in Nepal seek to prevent the collapse of Nepal which, should it become a failed state, could provide operational or support territory for terrorists. Such a scenario could be destabilizing to the security dynamics of the region,” he wrote.
"Our relationship with Nepal spans over seven decades. We continue to maintain a strong and collaborative partnership with the Government of Nepal (GON) to improve the country’s quality of life through establishing robust health systems; modernizing the agriculture sector; promoting disaster risk reduction and preparedness, increasing access to quality education; ensuring gender and social inclusion across all paradigms; and encouraging democratic and transparent government practices and processes."
- Andrea “Andie” De Arment
Information Officer/
Spokesperson
US Embassy KathmanduReproduced
Post-2015
After years of political instability Nepal drafted a new constitution in 2015, laying the foundation for stability and development. Following the promulgation of the constitution, the US assistance to Nepal has sought to cement gains in peace and security, further democratic transition, support continued delivery of essential social services, scale up proven and effective health interventions, reduce extreme poverty, and address the challenges of food insecurity and climate change. Following the 2015 earthquake, the US had provided over $190 million in relief, recovery, and reconstruction.
In a major US development support, Nepal signed up to the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) South Asia compact in order to strengthen Nepal’s energy sector, improve regional energy connectivity, and control transport costs to encourage growth and private investment. “MCC’s investments will also support regional energy connectivity in South Asia by strengthening Nepal’s power sector and facilitating electricity trade with India. A stable and economically growing Nepal is in the best interest of not just the people of Nepal, but also the region and the United States,” the statement issued by US after the signing of the compact reads.
Struggling mini-parliaments
Case 1: On July 2, the parliament’s International Relations and Human Rights Committee instructed the government to cancel the holding of the International Indian Film Academy Awards (IIFAA) in Kathmandu. The government, however, expressed displeasure at the committee’s decision; it thought the decision was taken without sufficient
homework.
Case 2: A few weeks ago, the parliament’s State Affairs and Good Governance committee instructed the Public Service Commission (PSC) to halt the process to recruit 9,000 civil servants. The government said there was no need to stop the process. The Supreme Court (SC) agreed and allowed the PSC to go ahead with the recruitment. The parliamentary committee expressed displeasure, stating that the SC encroached on the parliament’s jurisdiction.
There are several other instances where the parliamentary committees’ decisions have courted controversy and criticism. Of late, there are fears that the committees’ significance has eroded—something that calls for serious reflection on the part of the parliament, the government and the political parties.
Are the parliamentary committees making mature decisions? Are their instructions being implemented by the government? How can we make these committees more effective and less controversial? These are frequently asked questions in political circles. The parliament itself needs to answer these questions honestly if it is to maintain its dignity, trustworthiness
and significance.
In parliamentary practice, parliamentary committees are regarded as mini-parliaments that hold their sessions in the absence of a full House. Observers therefore argue that any decision taken by these committees should be free from controversy and pressure, and that the government should carry out their instructions. The basic principle of having parliamentary committees is to divide lawmakers into small groups so as to enable serious work to be done in a more effective manner.
The goal is to assist the parliament in its functioning and make government agencies accountable to the parliament. The committees are mandated to monitor and investigate government policies and programs and issue directives accordingly. They make decisions on the basis of majority.
Committees under HoR
- Finance Committee
- International Relations and Human Rights Committee
- Industry-Commerce-Labor and Consumer Welfare Committee
- Law, Justice and Human Rights Committee
- Agriculture, Cooperatives and National Resource Committee
- Women and Social Committee
- State Affairs and Good Governance Committee
- Development and Technology Committee
- Education and Health Committee
- Public Accounts Committee
Committees under NA
- Sustainable Development and Good Governance Committee
- Bill Management Committee
- Transfer of Management and Government Committee
- National Concern and Coordination Committee
Joint Committees
- Parliamentary Hearing Committee
- Committee to monitor and evaluate the State Directives, Policy and
Responsibility
Where’s the research?
The problem, however, lies in the functioning of the parliamentary committees as they make important decisions without adequate research. Parliamentary committees are facing accusations that they depend heavily on secondary sources such as newspapers and information gathered by lawmakers while making decisions, most of which, as a result, end up being flawed. In several cases, the committees have taken decisions in haste without considering their implications. As lawmakers cannot be experts on all national and international issues, they need the support of professionals and experienced government officials.
“This is happening because the parliamentary committees do not consult experts. And their decisions are politically motivated,” says Mukunda Acharya, a former secretary at the parliament secretariat. Another reason behind the problem is the absence of senior government officials in these committees. Either an undersecretary or a section officer serves as the secretary of these committees.
“If senior staff are appointed, they can guide the lawmakers on vital issues, which reduces the chances of drawing controversy,” says Acharya. The committees are dominated by lawmakers who see politics in every issue rather than study it in a rigorous manner. Instead of undertaking serious research, the committees desire easy publicity and therefore pick up any random issue, hold meetings, and invite the media.
As such, the government has a handy pretext to ignore the committees’ instructions, resulting in a contempt of parliament. There is no official record of what proportion of instructions get implemented. A senior official at the parliamentary secretariat says the majority of instructions provided by the committees are gathering dust.
There are 10 thematic committees under the House of Representatives (HoR) and four under the National Assembly (NA). There are two joint committees. Each committee has a specific job as stipulated by the law, but there are many overlaps, and disputes over jurisdiction often arise.
“There is a sort of competition among the committees to show that they are doing something. So they sometimes take up issues that fall under another committee’s jurisdiction,” says Acharya.
Multiple maladies
There are several instances where a particular minister or a government official is invited by multiple parliamentary committees to hold discussions on the same issue, sometimes at the same time. Ministers and high-level government officials complain that there is no need to speak several times on the same issue. Failure to attend, however, will invite criticism of dishonoring the parliament.
There is a long list of work that the parliamentary committees are supposed to do. But they have so far failed to conduct their business effectively. The Speaker of the House is responsible for overseeing the functioning of all parliamentary committees, but he is not doing a good job. If a committee’s decision is controversial, the Speaker should call a meeting of the committee chairs and try to resolve the dispute.
Last year, a sub-committee under the Public Affairs Committee concluded that Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Rabindra Adhikari was complicit in corruption of Rs 4.3556 billion during the procurement of two wide-body aircraft. Later, the sub-committee’s conclusion was considered unjustified. Subsequently, the main committee formed a separate probe panel and the government also constituted a separate committee. Neither has made its report public.
Ruling party leaders publicly disparage the parliamentary committees. Earlier in the month, when the International Relations and Human Rights Committee directed the government to cancel the IIFAA event, both Prime Minister KP Oli and Minister for Communication and Information Technology Gokul Prasad Banskota publicly criticized the committee. A few days back, the Development and Technology Committee invited Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Raghubir Mahaseth for a discussion on public transport, but the minister declined the invite.
Though it is normal parliamentary practice to invite stakeholders, Mahaseth refused to speak in the parliament and blamed the committee of violating parliamentary norms. He claimed that the parliamentary committee took a decision in a casual manner without digging into the details of the matter.
Observers say the tendency of the executive encroaching on parliamentary affairs has grown under this government. Some lawmakers from the ruling parties believe they can take any decision because they have a two-thirds majority. “Unlike in the past, ministers are openly speaking against the decisions made by the parliamentary committees, which is a serious breach of parliamentary supremacy,” laments a senior parliament official.
Domestic and international trips that lawmakers affiliated with the parliamentary committees make have also drawn considerable flak. When a team of lawmakers from the Public Accounts Committee visited a European country to inspect the Nepali embassies there, it attracted criticism on the grounds that the committee did not have the mandate to monitor the embassies, as the Auditor General does that job on an annual basis. Even the government has expressed its dissatisfaction over such visits.
Oli wants to diversify Nepal’s relations. Is he on the right track?
Records with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) show that between 1960 and 1990 (i.e. during the Panchayat era), Nepal used to exchange frequent high-level visits with countries other than India and China. But such exchanges started petering out after the 1990 political change.
Data from the past two decades clearly show that Nepal’s high-level engagements have been confined to its two immediate neighbors, and that they have mostly been one way. In this period, there have been frequent high-level visits from Nepal to India and China, but fewer reciprocal visits to Nepal. High-level visits from India to Nepal have increased in the past couple of years, but such visits to Nepal from China have become rarer.
During the Panchayat regime, the kings tried to visit as many countries as possible. Such trips were aimed at garnering more development aid. The monarchy made efforts to reduce Nepal’s dependence on India and China for development needs.
Political parties agree that Nepal needs to diversify its bilateral relations beyond India and China, and that a stable government with a five-year mandate has opened a window of opportunity. The KP Oli-led government too has been trying to develop a narrative that it is diversifying its foreign relations. But there is little substance to back it up.
To meet the aspiration of graduating to a middle-income countries by 2030, Nepal has to maintain seven to eight percent annual growth. This calls for massive investment. Nepal needs an estimated $8 billion annual FDI inflow to graduate to a middle-income country in the next 10 years or so.
Money matters
One of the major factors that prompted the Oli government to diversify external relations is to bring in more foreign aid, much like what King Mahendra did in the 1960s and 70s. After the government was formed last year, Oli had expected a high volume of investment from India and China for infrastructure development. But except regular bilateral support, such investment did not materialize. During Oli’s state visits to India and China, no big economic package was announced; the focus was on completing pending projects. There was a time when its two big neighbors competed to provide more development aid to Nepal—but no more.
This led the Oli government to look beyond the immediate neighbors to the meet the country’s development needs. “We require massive investments in infrastructure development and advanced and innovative technology, for which our domestic resources are insufficient. We need the international community’s support and cooperation to fill the resource gap,” Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali is quoted as saying in his ministry’s website.
Foreign policy experts, however, say that while diversification is important, Nepal cannot overlook the roles of its neighbors for its economic development and prosperity. “Obviously we should broaden our foreign policy, but India and China are still the key to our economic development. Unfortunately, we haven’t been able to identify our priorities and define key national interests,” says Sundar Nath Bhattarai, Founder President of the Association of Former Career Ambassadors of Nepal.
Other foreign policy observers also think the new government has tried to diversify foreign relations, but without serious homework and without identifying priority areas. Visiting a plethora of countries without a substantial agenda, they stress, does not serve the country’s interest.
After taking charge of office, Oli has gone on eight foreign visits (see box). Attracting foreign investment is always a top priority of these visits. But the prime minister has not been able to draw investment from the countries he has visited in this period. “We should assess success on the basis of outcomes, not the number of visits,” says Bhattarai.
PM Oli’s foreign visits
- Europe: June 8-16, 2019
- India: May 30-31, 2019
- Cambodia and Vietnam: May 9-15, 2019
- Switzerland (Davos): 20-26 Jan, 2019
- Costa Rica: 27 September, 2018
- UNGA (New York): 22 Sept-3 Oct, 2018
- China: June 19-25, 2018
- India: April 6-8, 2018
Eggs in many baskets
Besides PM Oli, Foreign Minister Gyawali has also visited a number of countries and attended several bilateral and multilateral forums. In December last year, he visited the United States and held bilateral talks with US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo. Earlier, in November, Gyawali had visited Japan. In a gesture of reciprocity, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono visited Nepal the following month. These visits carried some weight as such visits had not taken place for a long time.
Europe was a good choice in terms of economic diplomacy, but PM Oli’s visits to the continent have come under scrutiny for a number of reasons. First, every visit of a head of government or state is either a ‘state’ or an ‘official’ visit. But PM Oli’s visits to the UK and France were designated as ‘formal’, in violation of established diplomatic practice.
Second, no bilateral agreements were signed during Oli’s visits to the UK and France. After India, the European Union is Nepal’s second largest trade partner, and Nepal has old ties with Britain and France. But Oli’s visits were marred by a lack of preparation. He could not meet the British monarch and no formal ceremony was organized for him. (Oli did meet Theresa May, but she had already resigned as prime minister.) In France also, Oli could not get an audience with President Emmanuel Macron. Nor was any substantial agreement signed to bring in investments. “In terms of investment and economic cooperation, European countries matter a lot for us, but merely visiting them would not yield the desired benefits,”
says Bhattarai.
That a Nepali prime minister visited Britain after 17 years was possibly the only positive feature of Oli’s trip. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba had officially visited the UK in 1996 and 2002, while Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala had visited France in 2001. In 1994, King Birendra had paid a state visit to France while he undertook an unofficial visit to the same country in 1989.
Earlier, PM Oli had visited Vietnam and Cambodia, which also drew flak on the grounds that Nepal does not have strong economic and diplomatic ties with them. “Foreign policy is not an area for adventures... In fact, diversification is a wrong word in international relations. Foreign policy is not an arena where you look to ‘diversify’, but to promote your national interests,” said former Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey in a recent interview with APEX.
Constantino Xavier, a fellow at Brookings India, a think tank in Delhi, is more sympathetic to the Oli government’s attempts at diversification. “Post-Wuhan, with China and India cooperating again, Nepal’s scope to play off its two neighbors has reduced,” he told APEX. “Diversification of relations under PM Oli in recent months is giving Nepal more options, especially beyond the great power competition between China, India and even the US
and Japan.
Xavier thinks that with political stability at home, and new ambassadors finally in place, the Oli government has greater incentives to expand relations with more countries, especially in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia. “The EU and multilateral organizations like the Asian Development Bank can play an important role in diversifying Nepal’s development options,” he says.
