It just does not compute. One is a political party elected by an over­whelming majority to realize the goals of their first fully-democratic constitution. The other reigns over an authoritarian system where the party can chop and change the nation­al charter and curtail people’s free­doms at its will. How can they even see eye-to-eye, much less sign a pact of everlasting friendship and mutual learning? But even while the recent bonhomie between Nepal’s NCP and China’s CPC seems farfetched, the two also have many things in common. Both are communist parties, at least nominally. It makes sense for two communist parties ruling two neighboring countries to try to share ideas and keep the communist flame alive—at a time when the embers of communism are being extinguished around the world, including in South Asia. Then there are domestic com­pulsions. The NCP government came to power on the back of a promise to build stronger relations with Chi­na following the Indian blockade. Likewise, as China’s economic mir­acle loses its sheen, Xi Jinping seeks greater validation for his leadership at home and abroad.

The NCP’s intimacy with China has not been without controversy. Polit­ical analyst Puranjan Acharya says the new proximity between the two parties “raises doubts about Nepali communist parties’ commitment to democracy and pluralism.” Yet another political observer, Shyam Shrestha, cautions us not to read too much into the communist-communist agreement. He reckons Nepali com­munists are far too indisciplined (and perhaps also reluctant) to implement the structured ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. But he also thinks this could be a great opportunity for Nepal to learn from “China’s miraculous material progress” in recent decades.

India and the US, Nepal’s two other important international partners, have been spooked. They view the communist government in Nepal with considerable suspicion, and each is trying to work out its new modus operandi. This decision of one Nepali party could thus have far-reaching consequences for the whole country. After emerging from a long bout of uncertainty and instability, Nepal risks plunging into another, which could be unleashed by a new wave of geopolitical competition.

Has the NCP sold its soul to its Chinese counterpart?

China has built an image in Nepal of a powerhouse that does not overtly interfere in its political affairs. China’s approach has been to cultivate ties with all political parties, with greater focus on the ruling ones. So it has had normal and steady relations with the Nepali Congress (NC), the current main opposition, and other parties, irre­spective of their size or political ideology.In recent times, and particularly after Xi Jinping assumed presidency in March 2013, there has been some shift in China’s approach to dealing with Nepali political parties, mainly the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP). In 2018, at the 19th National Congress, President Xi presented his political blueprint for the next 30 years—‘Xi Jinping Thought on Social­ism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’, simply known as ‘Xi Jinpingism’. This ideology has now been officially incorporated into the Chinese constitution.

In China, Xi Jinpingism is being taught to party leaders, cadres, bureaucrats and journalists, and has been included in school curric­ula. Of late, there has also been a concerted effort to export this ide­ology to other countries through the Communist Party of China (CPC). It may be a coincidence, but just when China introduced Xi Jinpingism, Nepal saw the ascendency of the NCP. A big section of the ruling party is in thrall to China’s political and development models.

Life after monarchy

China’s bid to strengthening Nepal’s communist parties began after the abolition of the monar­chy in 2008. During the decade-long insurgency (1996-2006), China did not support the Maoists; in fact it accused them of misusing the name of their Great Helmsman Mao. China even backed the monarchy to suppress the Maoist rebellion. But following the peace process and the monarchy’s abolition, China wanted to see a strong commu­nist force in Nepal. More recently, Chinese leaders encouraged the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center), the two largest commu­nist parties, to unite—or so believe many Nepalis.

When the NCP was born after the merger between the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center) in 2018, the Communist Party of China proposed to orient its leaders and cadres to Xi Jinpingism. “They offered to share his thoughts and we accepted. A further exchange of views will take place in the upcoming delibera­tions,” says Devendra Poudel, a member of the NCP School Depart­ment, which is responsible for the political schooling and training of the party rank and file.

Initially, the Chinese side had pro­posed the NCP School Department to learn its ideology and experience in running the party and the govern­ment. According to Nepali leaders, the Chinese had forwarded its pro­posal a year ago but it was delayed in the absence of the party’s School Department. “This should not be viewed as us embracing the policies of Xi Jinping. But we do also want to learn from China’s miraculous development,” Poudel adds.

This is not the first time the CPC has invited dozens of NCP delegates, both youth and senior leaders, to China to train them. A few months ago, a team led by Dev Gurung, a senior NCP leader, visited China to learn about Xi’s ideology and how the party and the government there function. Currently, the CPC has several training centers across the country to train both Chinese cad­res and representatives from other countries on Xi’s ideology.

Exporting ideas, importing trouble?

The latest bonhomie between the ruling communist parties of Nepal and China worries some. “NCP leaders being indoctrinated on Xi’s thoughts could further alienate a big mass in Nepal that is already suspi­cious of communists of any kind, especially during elections,” says Dr. Mrigendra Bahadur Karki, Executive Director of the Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), a think-tank. According to Karki, if Xi’s thoughts are being embraced as a counter to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it could backfire, giving the US, India and other western powers an excuse to propagate anti-China messages via Nepal. But how? “As it is a one-party state, there can be no meaningful political debates inside China. In this situation, if our ruling party embraces Xi’s thoughts, then other powers can denounce his thoughts in the name of criticizing the NCP. Such criticism could then spill over into China and create a difficult situ­ation there,” Karki clarifies.

In the past one year, there has been a series of exchanges between the NCP and the CPC focused on orientations and sharing ideas. In May 2018, Deputy Director of CPC Ma Zue Song was in Kathmandu to take part in a program mark­ing the 200th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birthday. He said that the NCP could play a big role in advanc­ing nation-building and socialist movements in South Asia. “We are ready to work with the communists and left forces around the world to observe, interpret, and lead through Marxism,” he said.

After party unification, senior NCP leaders such as Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and Jhala Nath Khanal have each visited China twice. Three provincial chief ministers—Mahenra Bahadur Shahi (Karnali), Prithvi Subba Gurung (Gandaki) and Shan­kar Pokhrel (Province 5)—have also gone to China. In April, a team led by NCP General Secretary Bishnu Poudel was in China for delega­tion-level talks. There is now little doubt that China wants a strong NCP-led government in order to secure its interests in Nepal. Cur­rently, 29 mayors elected on an NCP ticket are attending a seminar in Kunming, the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan. The partici­pants were selected by the Prime Minister’s Office.

Such exchanges have raised fears that the NCP could be influenced by how the party and the govern­ment function in China. In the past one-and-half years, there have been some indications that the KP Oli gov­ernment is trying to curtail media and civil rights granted by the con­stitution. The growing influence of the executive on the functioning of the legislature and the judiciary has also been a matter of alarm.

Show or substance?

Observers say a section of the NCP is highly impressed by Xi Jinpingism. Political analyst Puranjan Acharya thinks there is a clear danger of the NCP being influenced by this ideol­ogy. “Now China has a declared pol­icy of exporting the ideology of Pres­ident Xi Jinping, which our ruling party appears ready to embrace,” he says, adding that this raises doubts about Nepali communist parties’ commitment to democracy and plu­ralism. “NCP leaders are saying that they want to learn from China. In political parlance, learning means imbibing elements of the way in which the party system functions,” he says.

Chairman Mao had a declared pol­icy of not exporting ideology. In his first five-year term, President Xi had said that China neither exports nor imports any political ideology. The policy, however, was changed when Xi Jinping’s thoughts were incor­porated into the CPC constitution, and term limits for the country’s president and vice president were abolished.

Another political observer Shyam Shrestha believes China wants to publicize its political and develop­ment model across the world as per the decision of the 19th National Congress last year. “Obviously China wants Nepal to adopt its political and development model. But I do not think Nepali leaders will sub­scribe to this ideology.” Why not, especially as the two communist parties even signed an MoU on extensive sharing of ideas and visits in Kathmandu recently?

“For one, our communist leaders are not used to working in a system. It is hard to believe they will disci­pline themselves just because they now have an agreement with their Chinese counterparts,” Shrestha elaborates. But yes, he adds, our leaders could learn from China’s tremendous material progress in the past 30 years, “which has captured the world’s attention.”

Traditionally, China has built an image in Nepal of a power that does not interfere in its political affairs. China’s approach has been cultivating ties with all political parties, with more focus on the ruling ones. That is why China has a consistent and pretty normal relations with Nepali Congress (NC) and other fringe parties, irrespective of their political ideologies.

In recent times, mainly after Xi Jinping became China’s president, there has been some shift in China’s approach to dealing with Nepali political parties, mainly Nepal Communist Party (NCP). In 2018, at the 19^th National Congress, President Xi presented his political blueprint for the next 30 years, called the Xi Jinping “Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” which has now been officially incorporated into the constitution. This ideology is known as ‘Xi Jinpingism’.

Inside China, the ideology is being taught to party leaders and cadres, bureaucrats and journalists, and it has been included in school curricula. This is not limited to China. In recent times, there has been a concerted effort to export this ideology to other countries through Communist Party of China (CPC). It may be a coincidence but just when China introduced Xi Jinpingism, Nepal saw the emergence of the powerful Nepal Communist Party (NCP). A big a section of NCP is attracted to China’s political and development models.

Post-monarchy modus operandi

China’s bid to strengthening the communist parties in Nepal began after the abolition of monarchy. During the insurgency, China did not support the Maoist party; instead they charged the Nepali Maoists of misusing the name of their Great Helmsman. China then backed the monarchy to suppress the Maoist insurgency. When the Maoists emerged as the largest party in 2008, China wanted to see a strong communist force in Nepal. Subsequently, CPC leaders also encouraged CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) to unite.

When NCP was born in 2018 after the unification of UML and Maoists, CPC proposed to orient its leaders and cadres about the thoughts of Xi Jinping. “They proposed to share his thoughts and we accepted the proposal. In the upcoming deliberations, they will share views and we will present ours,” said Devendra Poudel, a member of the NCP School Department that is responsible for political indoctrination of party rank and file.

Initially, the Chinese side had proposed the NCP school department to share its ideology and experience in running the party and government. According to Nepali leaders, the Chinese had forwarded his proposal a year ago but it was delayed in the absence of the party’s school department. “This should not be viewed as us accepting the policies of Xi Jinping. We also want to learn from the miracle development of China,” Poudel added.

This is not the first time CPC has invited dozens of NCP delegates, both youth and senior leaders, to China to train them. A few months ago, senior leader of NCP Dev Prasad Gurung-led team visited China to learn about XI’s ideology and how the party and governments there function. Currently, CPC has several training centers across the country to train both internal cadres and representatives from other countries on Xi’s ideology.

Broader implications

The latest bonhomie between the ruling communist parties of Nepal and China worries some. “NCP leaders being indoctrinated on Xi’s thoughts could further alienate a big mass in Nepal that is already suspicious of communists of any kind, especially during elections,” said Dr. Mrigendra Bahadur Karki, Executive Director of the Center for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), a think-tank.

According to Karki, if Xi’s thoughts are being embraced as a counter to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, it could be counterproductive, giving the US, India and other western powers an excuse to propagate anti-China message via Nepal. But how?

“As it is a one-party state, there can be no meaningful political debates inside China. In this situation, if our ruling party embraces Xi’s thoughts, then other powers can criticize his thoughts in the name of criticizing NCP. This could create a difficult situation for China internally,” Karki clarifies.

In the past one year, there has been a series of exchanges between NCP and CPC focused on orientations and exchanging ideas. In May 2018, Deputy Director of CPC Ma Zue Song was in Kathmandu to take part in a program organized to mark the anniversary of Karl Marx’s birthday. He said that NCP could play a big role in advancing nation-building and socialist movements in South Asia. “We are ready to work with the communists and left forces around the world to observe, interpret and lead through Marxism,” he said.

After party unification senior NCP leaders such as Pushpa Kamal, Madhav Kumar Nepal, Narayan Kaji Shrestha, and Jhala Nath Khanal, have each visited China twice. Three provincial chief ministers—Mahenra Bahadur Shahi (Karnali), Prithvi Subba Gurung (Gandaki) and Shankar Pokhrel (Province 5)—have also gone to China. In April, NCP General Secretary Bishnu Poudel-led team also went to China for delegation-level talks.

There is now little doubt China wants a strong NCP-led government in order to secure its interests in Nepal.

On the fourth anniversary of the promulgation of a new constitution on September 20, the federal government has asked people to celebrate the day with deepawali and proud displays of the Nepali flag. Even t-shirts emblazoned with the flag have been printed for the day. But not everyone will be celebrating. Mad­hes-based parties plan on marking it as a ‘black day’. As does a big chunk of the Tharu community of Kailali district, the heart of their proposed Tharuhat province. Tikapur in Kailali, the site of the infamous 24 August 2015 clash between the police and Tharu protestors that led to the death of eight people, appeared calm during a recent visit. But scratch beneath the surface, and one can see the old wounds—inflict­ed by the horrendous events of 2015 and the subsequent arrest and detention of Resham Chaud­hary, the elected federal lawmak­er from Kailali-1 who was deemed the ‘mastermind’ of the Tikapur incident—are still raw. Following the 2015 clashes, the local Pahade and Tharu communities drew apart, and the chasm is yet to be bridged.

“Four years ago, I took part in the August 24 protests,” says a 35-year-old paan shop owner in Tikapur who refused to give his name. “Now all that I want is to be able to live peacefully and continue with my small business.” This was the com­mon sentiment of the members of the Tharu community I spoke to on my recent trip to Tikapur. Yet it would be wrong to infer that the fire in their belly for their rights has been extinguished.

In fact, most locals and political party representatives are unhappy at what they see as injustice being done to Chaudhary, people’s cho­sen representative. The calm is also illusory. As local politicians put it, it will take only a small spark to start another conflagration. The onus is on the promulgators of the new constitution—whose draft pro­voked the 2015 protests—to work out a formula that will be to the satisfaction of both the Pahadi and Tharu communities. Unless that happens, Tikapur will remain a tinderbox

Tikapur, a small town in the south-western district of Kailali that drew national attention following the 24 August 2015 killings of seven police personnel and a toddler, appears calm now. People are busy with their daily lives. Nor does there seem to be much appetite for violence.

But scratch beneath the surface and the situation is entirely different. Even after four years of the incident, the situation remains fraught with danger. Compared with the Pahadi community, the Tharus seem dissatisfied with the government and the major parties. Both the communities obviously want to avoid a repeat of the 2015 violence, but there are deep divisions between the two. Before the bloody incident, the relationship between the two communities was cordial.

Resham Chaudhary, who was elected a member of the federal House of Representatives from Kailali-1, as well as a dozen other local Tharus have been sent to prison for their roles in the killings. Their relatives vouch for their innocence and are furious with the authorities, which adds to the precariousness of the situation.

The Tikapur deaths resulted from a protest against an Akhanda Sudurpaschim (‘Undivided Far-West’) and in favor of a separate Tharu province. Less than a month later, the country promulgated a new constitution, which is still contested by Madhes-based parties, mainly the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal, on whose ticket Chaudhary won the election. The Tharus also feel aggrieved because while the demand of the Pahadi community for an undivided far-west was fulfilled, their demand for a Tharu province was not. According to the 2011 national census, Tharus constitute 41.53 percent of Kailali’s total population, followed by Chhetris (21-23 percent) and hill Brahmins (12.41 percent).

“The situation looks normal, but there is a clear psychological division between the Tharu and Pahadi communities,” says Unnati Chaudhary, a local journalist. “For example, people from one community are unlikely to go to a shop owned by a member of another. They would rather go to the market across the border in India. Some traders have already left the area.”

Resham Chaudhary and others are behind bars, she adds, “But why? Their families want to know the truth.” The government is yet to make public the report of the commission formed to unearth the truth about the killings and other aspects of various Madhes movements, of which the Tikapur incident is a part.

All behind one cause

There are differing views within the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) on how to view the Tikapur incident. A few days ago, NCP co-Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal reiterated that the Tikapur issue was a political one. KP Oli seems unsure about his stand, even as most of his former CPN-UML colleagues continue to see Tikapur deaths as a purely criminal act.

But at the local level, not only the Tharus, even the leaders of the ruling Nepal Communist Party as well as the main opposition Nepali Congress are unhappy with the inaction of the federal government and the political parties in dealing with the situation in Tikapur. “The old scars are yet to heal. Although the situation looks calm, it is actually quite volatile,” says Gopal Thapa, a district-level NCP leader. As he speaks, Thapa can barely hide his anger at the ‘injustice’ done to the people of Kailali-1.

There is consensus among local units of political parties in Kailali that the Tikapur violence was political (and not criminal), and should be resolved politically. This means Resham Chaudhary and others convicted for the 2015 deaths may have to be released. It is one of the major demands of the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal, but as the court has already issued a verdict, the government is not in a position to set them free. “But it is undoubtedly a political issue,” adds NCP’s Thapa.

That is also the position of the local wing of the Nepali Congress. “We firmly support the Tharus’ demand for withdrawing the cases against Resham Chaudhary and others. That would help restore social harmony here,” says Bhuwan Adhikari, president of the NC Kailali-1 constituency.

Dishonoring public mandate. 

At the same time, there are strong arguments against such a position. Many say the security personnel were killed in cold blood and there can be no amnesty for such a grave crime. My conversations with the locals have led me to conclude that the situation in Tikapur is so volatile that even a small trigger can cause an upheaval. None of those I talked to wanted to speak on the issue on record. People live in constant fear that they could be detained anytime, given their past experiences of witnessing the arrests of dozens of people in connection with the 2015 killings. Soon after the killings, many Tharus’ shops and houses were vandalized and property looted, but no proper investigation was carried out and nobody was tried.

Many people lost their jobs and struggled to make ends meet. Locals recalled the difficulties they faced after the incident, as a curfew was imposed for 45 consecutive days. To this day, people are cautious about taking part in political events. Whenever a political program is organized, security is beefed up. There is a perception among many Tharus that the government and the security forces protect only the Pahadi community. But despite differences over the constitution and other political issues, both communities want to maintain peace and harmony and prevent a spark in a tinderbox.

Resham Chaudhary’s incarceration means there is an absence of an elected representative in Kailali-1. Fearing arrest, he was underground for a long time following his landslide victory in the 2017 general elections. Finally, last year, he took the oath of office, but then the Kailali district court imposed a life sentence on him and 11 other people in connection with the Tikapur deaths. “The government and the political parties should make a clear decision. Either they should release Chaudhary or hold a by-election to elect a new member of parliament from this constituency,” argues Thapa. “How can you leave a constituency and its people without an elected representative for five years? It is a dishonor of the people’s mandate.”

Trouble brewing

Meanwhile, preparations are underway to launch another Tharu movement. Between 24 and 26 August, there was a Tharuhat-Tharuwan National Conference, which concluded by forming an 11-member Tharuhat-Tharuwan Rastriya Morcha led by leader Laxman Tharu. Security was tight during the
conference. According to journalist Chaudhary, people from both the Tharu and Pahadi communities were against such a huge gathering, fearing a possible communal riot or an outbreak of violence; they urged that the conference be held outside Kailali. In the run-up to and during the event, some radical youths even attempted to instigate people, but nothing untoward happened.

Formation of a separate Tharu state, release of local leaders who are facing court cases, ensuring the identity and dignity of this community, and inclusive and proportional representation of Tharus in all state organs—these were among the main demands voiced at the conference. The conference vowed to take the Tharu movement to new heights while also highlighting the urgent need to restore harmony between the two communities. 

The conference represented the first phase of a three-phase movement. The ongoing second phase, which ends September 20, the day of the constitution’s promulgation, is aimed at publicity and increasing awareness of Tharu issues. The third phase will start after marking September 20 as a black day. There are plans to stage protests in district headquarters and major towns, and to prevent the prime minister and federal ministers from entering Tharuhat areas. A call for an indefinite strike in the region is also in the cards. 

Security forces are keeping a close eye on the planned movement of the Tharu community. “We do not see the possibility of a major political eruption, but we have to be vigilant as people might be instigated to come out on the streets,” says a high-level security official in Tikapur.

Yibin municipality at the junction of China’s Sichuan, Yunnan and Geizhou provinces is one of the fast growing cities in China. It is known as the First City of Yangtze River, the Capital of China’s Liquor, and the Capital of Bamboo, among other things. In recent years it has also become a hub for high-tech mobile and car producers.

Oh, and this municipality is known as a city of tea. Yibin is one of the cradles of tea in the world. After over 3,000 years of development, the municipality has become the preferred place to enjoy and buy high quality tea. Sichuan province is the fourth leading tea producer in China, after Fujian, Yunnan and Hubei.

Yan Zewen, Chairman of the Sichuan Tea Industry, says, “To promote sustainable and healthy development of the tea industry chain, Sichuan Tea Group will be built as trans-regional model enterprise of multi-tea operation.” According to him, tea from here will be exported to over 20 countries, including in Europe.

Every year, this municipality organizes International Tea Conference with international company representatives and businessmen in attendance. In March this year, Nepal’s Minister for Minister for Agriculture and Livestock Development Chakrapani Khanal attended the third session of international conference. In the meeting with Chinese officials, Khanal proposed to transfer the technology to Nepal.

The climate of Yibin is favorable for the growth of tea. Due to this, the harvest time of tea here is 30 days ahead compared to other regions. March is a busy season for picking and subsequent months are devoted for process and packaging.

According to local officials, this industry has helped remove poverty, and ensure jobs for over 10,000 workers. In order to create capable manpower for the industry, the Sichuan Tea Industry Business College has been set up in the municipality. Similarly, Sichuan Tea Industry Technology Research Institute, the first-ever technology service platform in the province for tea industry technology, is undertaking research on tea technology, quality control, inspection, and information services.

Yibin city has a total tea plantation area of 1 million 86,300 acres, which produce 59,200 tons, valued at some 2.475 billion yuan. In the past decade, the brand value of Yibin tea has substantially increased, according to officials.

The Chinese delegation under Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not pleased. It had come to Kathmandu to prepare the ground for President Xi Jinping’s much-discussed Nepal visit. But neither could it get the Nepali side to finalize the BRI projects Nepal wanted China to help with, nor was it assured about the ‘security preparations’ for Xi’s trip.  

Possible protests in Nepal by pro-Tibet activists or by the local Muslim community over China’s treatment of its Uighurs are a big headache for China. The Chinese delegation would not have been reassured by the small protest in front of the Chinese Embassy by a group of women, on whatever pretext, when it was in town. This is perhaps the first time that there has been a public protest in front of the Chinese Embassy during the visit of a high-level dignitary from China. The Chinese were left wondering: Even with its supposedly foolproof preparations, how could Nepal Police have failed to guard the embassy periphery?

According to high-level intelligence officials in Nepal, the Chinese side has to be fully assured that there would be no such faux pas before they give the final stamp of approval to Xi’s Nepal visit. But if he comes, it will be a momentous occasion: the first time a Chinese president will be in Nepal in 23 years, after Jiang Zemin’s 1996 trip. The exact date and duration of Xi’s trip is yet to be worked out. Probably he will come. If the Chinese are fully assured of security, he could even stay the night. If not, it would be an eight- or nine-hour visit.

In 2016, when Xi visited Bangladesh, there were speculations that he could visit Nepal too. Many reckon the visit was cancelled due to the sudden collapse of the UML-Maoist coalition government. “In 2016, powerful forces were successful in blocking Xi’s visit. But this time, he is almost sure to come,” says Tanka Karki, a former Nepali ambassador to China.  

The Chinese will push for the signing of at least one major BRI project to justify Xi’s trip. Besides that, the visit of the Chinese president could also set in motion a geopolitical tug-of-war. Its consequences could be felt far into the future.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Xi’s route to Kathmandu

Barring a dramatic turn of events, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a state visit to Nepal next month. To lay the ground for the visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi completed a three-day trip to Kathmandu earlier this week. In recent years, high-level Chinese officials have been coming here with increasing frequency. But Xi will be the first Chinese President to come to Nepal in 23 years since Jiang Zemin’s trip in 1996.

Government officials say the Chinese foreign minister had three broad agendas—to take stock of the preparations for Xi’s security; to explore specific agendas during XI’s visit; and to create a conducive political environment for his visit. Wang held detailed discussions with Prime Minister KP Oli and President Bidya Devi Bhandari about Xi’s visit.

“Both sides underscored the importance of the exchange of high level visits on a regular basis in order to develop mutual trust and confidence, and to further strengthen bilateral relations,” reads the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of Wang’s visit. According to Nepali officials, the Chinese side will finalize the agenda and itinerary of Xi’s visit based on Wang’s inputs.  

During his recent Kathmandu trip, Wang seemed mainly concerned about the security dimension of President Xi’s Nepal visit. Former DIG of Nepal Police Hemanta Malla Thakuri believes there is no physical threat to foreign dignitaries in Nepal. But due to the recent unrest among the Uighur Muslim community in China, Thakuri adds, the Chinese may have felt some threat from this section in Nepal.

Then there is Tibet. “During any high-level visit from China, the main concern is possible protest by the Tibetan community in Nepal,” he says. “Even if there is a minor protest in which members of the Tibetan community can brandish Tibetan flags, the Chinese take it very seriously. So our security forces need to be on high alert.”

A senior intelligence officer with the National Investigation Department says the Chinese would finalize President Xi’s visit only after being completely assured. High-level security teams from China have been regularly visiting Nepal in the past few weeks. “Just to be double sure, Nepal Army will be deployed at the front row of the security arrangement,” says the NID official.

Settling for a pittance

During the Chinese foreign minister’s visit, the two countries signed three letters of exchanges: on a hospital recovery project in the district of Manang; on providing 5,000 emergency shelter tents; and on a volunteer Chinese teachers’ program. “It would have been better had these minor agreements not been signed during Wang’s visit, as the visit will be followed by Xi Jinping’s much-more consequential trip,” says a retired diplomat who has closely followed Nepal’s diplomatic history with China.

Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao did not visit Nepal during his two terms between 2003 and 2013, even though he was considered to have in-depth knowledge about Nepal and Tibet. During Hu’s tenure, Nepal was undergoing major political upheavals, such as the king’s direct rule, followed by the monarchy’s abolition, and the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly (CA) without delivering a constitution. Now that Nepal has a semblance of political stability, both sides see it as an appropriate time for the Chinese President to pay a visit.

In April this year, President Bhandari had extended an invitation to Xi during her visit to China. Xi had responded that he attached great importance to visiting Nepal, and that he would come here at a convenient time. During the visit, Bhandari and Xi had witnessed the signing of seven bilateral agreements, including the protocol to the Nepal-China Transit and Transport Agreement.

South Asian outlier

Xi is seen as the most powerful Chinese president after Mao Zedong. Last year, the Chinese Communist Party changed its statute, paving the way for Xi to lead country for longer than his recent predecessors. Given this context, a visit by Xi will be significant, and the Nepali side has long desired it. The Chinese side, however, has generally been noncommittal, citing lack of preparations.

In 2016, when Xi visited Bangladesh, there were speculations that he could visit Nepal too. Many politicians and diplomats reckon the visit was cancelled due to the sudden collapse of the CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Centre) coalition government. Some even argue that the government was toppled to forestall Xi’s visit. “In 2016, powerful forces were successful in blocking Xi’s visit. But this time, he is almost sure to come,” says Tanka Karki, a former Nepali ambassador to China.  

In his first five-year tenure, Xi visited several other South Asian countries but not Nepal. He visited Bangladesh in October 2016, in what was the first visit by a Chinese President to Bangladesh in 30 years. During the visit, Bangladesh and China signed 27 agreements worth billions of dollars. Similarly, Xi visited Sri Lanka in 2014, and Pakistan the following year. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have already gotten loans from China to execute projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India and Bhutan are two South Asian countries that have not joined the BRI. Several South East Asian countries have also launched infrastructure projects under the BRI framework.

BRI push

Soon after becoming Chinese president in 2013, Xi announced the mega infrastructure project, the One Belt One Road (OBOR), which was later named the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Xi’s signature project, it is now a major component of China’s foreign policy. So the BRI will be a major agenda during Xi’s visit to Nepal. Although Nepal signed an MoU on the BRI in 2017, there has not been much progress in selecting and implementing projects under it. Officials say preparations are underway to finalize some projects under the BRI and to form high-level mechanisms to look into BRI-related issues. Xi’s visit is expected to expedite these processes.

His visit could also strengthen bilateral ties at the top political level. Of late, China has given high priority to cultivating relations with Nepali political parties. Rail and road connectivity and Chinese investment in Nepal, including in hydropower, are potential areas of bilateral cooperation. But a major concern of the Chinese side has always been Nepal’s sluggish implementation of bilateral agreements.

Sundarnath Bhattarai of the China Study Center believes Xi’s visit would boost Nepal’s standing in the region. “China is not just our neighbor, it is an emerging global power. Xi’s visit is significant and will have wider regional implications,” he says. “The signing of the protocol to the Nepal-China Transit and Transport Agreement and some progress on railway connectivity are major achievements. Regarding railway projects, we have to try harder to bring India on board,” he adds.

Stopover or direct?

The exact date of Xi’s visit has not been finalized, but Nepali officials are confident it will happen sometime in October. What remains uncertain though is whether Xi will stop over in Kathmandu after his informal summit with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Chennai, or whether he will fly to Kathmandu directly from Beijing. It is also possible that Xi could come to Kathmandu from Tibet, where he will be in October to mark the 60^th anniversary of the ‘democratic reform’ in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Nepali officials have told their Chinese counterparts that a stopover visit after India would not send a positive signal, and it would be preferable if Xi came to Kathmandu via Tibet or directly from Beijing. While the nature and dates of the visit are unclear, preparations are in full swing to welcome Xi in Kathmandu. Usually, the Chinese side announces dates just before a visit. For instance, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2012 visit was kept under wraps until the last minute.  

On 17 September 2015, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) endorsed a new version of the constitution and set September 20 as the day for its promulgation. The very next day, India dispatched its then foreign secretary S. Jaishankar as a special envoy to convince Nepali leaders to delay the constitutional process. Soon after landing in Kathmandu, Jaishankar went to then CPN-UML Chair KP Oli’s residence in Balkot and urged him not to issue the stat­ute in a hurry. Jaishankar then held talks with then Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and senior CPN (Maoist Cen­ter) leaders. There was apparently a harsh exchange of words between Jaishankar and Nepali leaders over the constitution and the demands of Madhes-based parties. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal report­edly told Jaishankar that he should have visited 15 days earlier to make India’s case. All leaders conveyed a clear message to Jaishankar: the constitution would be promulgated on the set date as the CA had already endorsed it.

A senior ruling NCP leader recalls, “Jaishankar was furious. He warned that the constitution’s acceptance by other countries would be mean­ingless if India did not endorse it.” Oli then sent Pradeep Gyawali to Delhi as his envoy to convince Indian leaders of the validity of the constitutional process. Gyawali was meeting senior Indian government officials, including Jaishankar, when the constitution was promulgated back home.

Much water under the bridge

Coincidentally, Jaishankar was recently in Kathmandu as the Indian Minister for External Affairs for the fifth meeting of the Nepal-India Joint Commission. Through him, Prime Minister Oli extended an invitation to his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi to be the chief guest at Nepal’s Constitution Day cele­brations on Ashoj 3 (September 20). It’s probably too late now for Modi to accept the invitation, but the invite has raised an obvious question: Why did Oli extend it to the prime minister of a country that has not officially welcomed Nepal’s constitution? On 20 Sep­tember 2015, India had only ‘noted’ the promulgation of a new consti­tution in Nepal. Immediately after, it imposed an almost five-month-long economic blockade, ostensibly in support of the protesting Mad­hes-based parties; the real reason behind India’s disapproval of Nepal’s constitution remains a matterof speculation.

India even launched an interna­tional lobbying campaign to per­suade other countries that Nepal’s constitution is not inclusive and needs amendment. Only after the first amendment, which partially fulfilled the demands of the Mad­hes-based parties, did India lift the blockade.

A lot of water has flown under the bridge in the past four years. Madhes-based parties initially boy­cotted the 2017 local elections held under the aegis of the new consti­tution, but eventually joined the electoral process. They took part in the federal and provincial elections and have formed the government in Province 2. Similarly, they have lent support to the Oli government, and a top Madhesi leader Upendra Yadav is now a deputy prime minister. In a way, Madhes-based parties have accepted the charter, though they have not given up their demand for an amendment. India, however, no longer speaks about constitu­tion amendment. Jaishankar did not mention it in his recent meetings with leaders of Madhes-based par­ties. But India’s position in favor of an ‘inclusive constitution’ remains unchanged.

Kashmir conundrum

Observers say if Modi were to attend the Constitution Day cele­brations on September 20, it would signaled India’s endorsement of Nepal’s constitution. But why did PM Oli invite his Indian counterpart knowing full well that Modi has a packed calendar in September? He is scheduled to address an Indian audience in Houston, Texas on Sep­tember 22 and the United Nations General Assembly on September 28. Or was Oli hinting at the kind of impromptu foreign visits of Modi like his 2015 trip to Pakistan or 2018 visit to the Maldives?

“If PM Modi wanted to, he could have come to Nepal for a few hours on September 20,” says a foreign ministry official request­ing anonymity. “But it is also our fault. How could we invite India’s prime minister without any preparation?”

But this official also believes that Modi could have come here had the Nepal government taken a clear position on Kashmir, as Jaishankar had apparently urged PM Oli to do during his recent Kathmandu visit. India wanted Nepal to clearly state that Kashmir is an internal matter of India. But Nepal was under pressure from Pakistan and China not to issue such a statement.

In a surprise statement on Sep­tember 4, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali said that amending the Indian constitution to change Jammu & Kashmir’s status “was entirely the domain of the Indian government… and so we have no comment on that decision.” Many analysts have interpreted this com­ment as an endorsement of India’s recent steps in Jammu & Kashmir. But is this enough to lure Modi to Nepal? They are unsure.

Oli’s surprise?

“If the government wants to cel­ebrate the Constitution Day as a national day by inviting foreign dig­nitaries, there has to be sufficient consultations and preparations,” says Vijaya Kanta Karna, a political analyst. “By inviting Modi, the gov­ernment seems to be angling for full Indian support for the constitution.”

Some Madhes-based parties and civil society groups observe this day as a ‘black day’, as dozens of Mad­hesis were killed during protests around the time of the constitution’s promulgation. This is why “Modi’s participation in the Constitution Day celebrations would have hurt the sentiments of the Madhesi peo­ple,” says a senior Madhesi leader requesting anonymity.

Madhes-based parties have been pressing the government to amend the constitution without delay. As soon as PM Oli returns from Singa­pore, where he is currently undergo­ing medical treatment, these parties are preparing to hold decisive talks on amendment. Leader of Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) Raj Kishor Yadav says, “Our talks with PM Oli will determine our next move.” Pub­licly, Oli has made it amply clear that he is not in favor of another amendment.

Yet a section of the Madhesi lead­ership believes that Oli has ‘softened’ of late. “Perhaps it is the awareness of his mortality, but I find him much more amenable on Madhesi issues these days,” says another top Mad­hesi leader. “Perhaps he could just spring a last-minute surprise on constitution-amendment as well.”

 “The two leaders discussed Nepal’s central role in a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, [and] global issues, including North Korea,” reads the statement issued after Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali’s bilateral talks with his American counterpart Michael R. Pompeo in December last year.

The statement had ignited intense debates in Nepal’s political and dip­lomatic circles. Several observers and politicians, including some from the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), suspect that the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is a China contain­ment strategy. In this reading, the US is trying to draw Nepal into its security orbit to keep it from taking advantage of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). American officials, however, maintain that the IPS is not targeted against any country and is simply a document that gives direction to the American policy in this region. They stress that the IPS is not an alliance, let alone a military one, and that no country has to sign up to it.

Asked if the IPS is a counter strategy to the BRI, Paul Thomas, the Public Affairs Officer at the US Embassy in Kathmandu, replies: “No. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is a vision for this region and an articu­lation of US policy that has been con­sistent for decades, stretching back to the end of World War II.” Yet even Thomas acknowledges that in the US goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific “all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous, and are not domi­nated—economically or otherwise—by any one nation.” But IPS skeptics have no doubt that this ‘one nation’ is China.

Soon after Gyawali returned home, he was under pressure to clarify what Nepal’s ‘central role’ in the Indo-Pacific entailed. In the party’s standing committee meet­ing on December 22, Gyawali was grilled on the statement. He reportedly responded that although the US sought Nepal’s support, Nepal would not join any military alliance.

Such a response notwithstanding, several NCP leaders suspect that Gyawali made commitments during his US visit. Gyawali and Defense Minister Ishwar Pokhrel have repeat­edly said that Nepal would not join any military bloc. It’s mainly the former Maoist leaders—now part of the ruling NCP—who are critical of Nepal joining the IPS. Dev Prasad Gurung, for instance, has spoken critically about it in the parliament a number of times.

No plans or preparations

On June 1, the US Department of Defense made public its report on the IPS, which, among other claims, says America aims to enhance mili­tary partnership with Nepal.

The Indian Ocean Region is at the crossroads of global trade and com­merce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes.

“While the region offers unprec­edented opportunity, it is also con­fronting a myriad of security chal­lenges, including terrorism, trans­national crime, trafficking-in-per­sons, and illicit drugs. To combat these challenges, the United States seeks opportunities to broaden and strengthen partnerships with India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Ban­gladesh, and Nepal to respond to shared regional challenges,” the document says.

This shows the US considers Nepal a fairly important partner in its Indo-Pacific Strategy—despite Nepal government’s protestation to the contrary. In this context, how should Nepal deal with the IPS? Senior for­eign ministry officials do not seem to have a clear answer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has not had a detailed discussion on it, nor has it added a separate IPS desk.

“It is an American strategy and currently there are no issues that demand a permanent mechanism and regular communication,” says a senior MoFA official requesting anonymity. “We are a country in the Indo-Pacific region, and we have no option but to support this strategy. From now on it appears the US will deal with us exclu­sively through the IPS. So there is no question of us not joining it,” he adds.

American officials have already hinted that all US support to Nepal will henceforth come under the IPS umbrella. US Deputy Assistant Sec­retary of State for South Asia David J Ranz, during his visit to Nepal a few months ago, said that the Millen­nium Challenge Corporation (MCC), through which the US has outlined a $500 million grant to Nepal, is very much part of the strategy. While the Nepal government has regis­tered a proposal in the parliament to endorse the MCC, officials maintain Nepal should not join any military bloc or alliance under the IPS.

The government thus far has pre­pared no plans on the IPS. Senior MoFA officials bemoan the lack of guidance on the matter. “We already had to handle the BRI and now there is the IPS. So we have to devise a plan on how to skillfully navigate these two frameworks so as to safeguard and further our national interests,” says a former diplomat requesting anonymity.

Political leaders and foreign policy analysts are of the view that Nepal needs a lot of homework to deal with the IPS and the BRI successfully. “Both have military and strategic components,” says Deepak Prakash Bhatta, a security expert and NCP lawmaker. “Nepal has a tendency of stepping back based on the reaction of one country to our engagement with another. We will get nowhere with such a flawed approach. We cannot be aloof and reactive,” Bhatta adds.

Upendra Gautam, General Secre­tary at the Kathmandu-based China Study Center, views the IPS as a mil­itary strategy rather than an economic one. “I went through the Indo Pacific Strategy Report unveiled by the US Department of Defense. The US Ambassador to Nepal said it is a ‘partnership’. But it was prepared and made public by the Pentagon. I read the document and found many issues related to Nepal Army. Peacekeeping has been mentioned as a fundamental issue of the IPS and there is a role of the Army in peacekeeping.”

Competing narratives

Not only Nepal, other South Asian countries also face a dilemma on the IPS. As the IPS is still in a for­mative stage, no country has come up with a definite position on it. The dominant view among small South Asian countries is that they should derive benefit from the eco­nomic and governance components of the IPS. India, however, has not yet spoken about this strategy or the participation of its small neigh­bors in it. But a few weeks back, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs created a separate division to look after issues pertaining to the IPS.

Again, despite America’s claims to the contrary, the IPS is generally perceived in Nepal as a counter-strat­egy to China’s BRI, which could be why the government is having dif­ficulty striking a balance between the two. In fact, it has not issued any statement on it. Ministers and government officials are of the view that big countries like the US can prepare their regional strategy but there is no need to comment on it officially.

But what do the Americans think? How can Nepal benefit from the IPS? According to Paul Thomas of the US Embassy in Kathmandu, “the US IPS is a policy, not a club. It is a policy based around the vision of ensuring this region is free and open for generations to come.”

Nepal has already benefited from this policy, he adds, including through US contribution of billions of dollars of grants over the past 70 years and from US support for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This approach has maintained stability and fostered economic growth that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of pov­erty and facilitated the free move­ment of people, goods, planes and ocean-going vessels,” Thomas says. “We aren’t asking Nepal to join a club or sign up to an organization. What we are asking is that Nepal stick up for itself and for the rules-based order that protects smaller countries and allows everyone to thrive”

*

The idea behind the formation of the Nepal-India Joint Commis­sion in the 1980s was to period­ically review all bilateral issues and projects at the top political level. It was formed after repeated com­plaints from the Nepali side that India-funded projects dragged on for a long time. The bureaucracies of the two countries were expected to resolve long-pending issues based on the commission’s guidelines. “The commission was formed amid concerns in Nepal over India’s ten­dency to hold on to projects but not complete them on time,” says Bhek Bahadur Thapa, a veteran diplomat and Nepal’s former Ambassador to India. More than three decades have passed since the commission was formed in 1987, but only five meet­ings have so far been held—the first in 1987, and then in 1988, 2014, 2016 and the most recent one in 2019. There is a provision of organizing such meetings every two years alter­nately between Nepal and India, but that has not been happening.

The long-delayed fifth meeting of the commission, which took place this week in Kathmandu, reviewed a whole gamut of bilat­eral issues, including trade, transit, investments, defense and security, border management, power, water resources and agriculture. Yet the fifth meeting also ended without detailed discussions on pending bilateral issues. Even though the meetings were scheduled over two days, they were wrapped up in one evening.

“Both sides reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral relations with specific focus on the areas of con­nectivity and economic partner­ship; trade and transit; power and water resources sectors; culture, and education,” says a press release issued at the end of the meeting. The statement says that views were exchanged on the review of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and submission of the report of the Emi­nent Persons Group on Nepal-In­dia Relations (EPG-NIR). There was also discussion on inundation in border areas.

On Nepal’s request for additional air entry routes, the meeting con­cluded that discussions are already underway between the civil aviation authorities of the two countries, even though these discussions have thus far been fruitless. Nor could much progress be made on other pending issues.

Similarly, cross-border transport facilitation, education, cultural and youth exchanges, tourism, railways and infrastructure development are other vital issues the commission deals with. It also reviews sub-re­gional, regional and international issues of mutual interest.

Fits and starts

The third meeting of the commis­sion had taken place after a hiatus of 23 years when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014. It was seen as part of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s desire to elevate bilateral relations to a political level. No meeting had taken place after 1988, almost as if the two sides had forgotten the commission even existed.

The third meeting in July 2014 reactivated the commission and underscored its importance in furthering bilateral relations. The fourth meeting of the India-Nepal Joint Commission was held in New Delhi on 27 October 2016, but it yielded no substantial outcome. There was no meeting in 2018 due to the preparations for the Indian general elections. Finally, the fifth meeting of the commission took place this week.

Compared to the previous decades, progress was made on some big development projects during Modi’s first tenure. Energy banking, Janakpur-Jayanagar rail­way, an electronic cargo tracking system for Nepal-bound shipments, an Integrated Check Post, petro­leum pipelines, projects related to post-earthquake reconstruction are some areas that have seen progress.

The two countries also formed the Nepal-India Oversight Mechanism in 2016, with the goal of reviewing progress on bilateral economic and development projects. The meet­ings, six of which have already been held, are co-chaired by Nepal’s for­eign secretary and Indian Ambas­sador to Nepal, to facilitate smooth execution of projects within a spe­cific time frame. Officials say the mechanism has been instrumental in identifying and clearing bottle­necks in bilateral projects.

In his first tenure, Narendra Modi had instructed the Indian bureau­cracy to speed up bilateral projects and conduct periodic reviews. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs also carries out periodic reviews of bilateral projects in Nepal. Partic­ularly after 2014, successive Nepali prime ministers have been insist­ing on the completion of past proj­ects instead of signing new ones, thus putting pressure on the Indian side. The Indian government has also faced criticism at home for not doing enough to check the growing Chinese influence in Nepal. Many in India think their country needs to deliver on the promises it makes to its small neighbors.

Not one-way street

But the Indian side is of the view that Nepal is equally responsible for the delay in bilateral projects. India often complaints that Nepali author­ities are not serious about clearing hurdles in development projects, such as land acquisition. They also blame Nepal’s bureaucratic red-tape. Indian projects in the past (and even now to some extent) have been opposed by various Maoist groups, which have also contributed to the delay. According to former Nepali Ambassador to India, Deep Kumar Upadhyay, between 2014 and 2018 there was maximum effort to com­plete pending projects, to no avail.

Speaking at a recent program, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali said projects that have been in limbo for two decades or more should be dropped. The Pancheshwar Mul­tipurpose Project tops this list. It was conceived under the Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India in 1996.

Similarly, issues related to the annual flooding of various parts of southern Nepal due to the infra­structure on the Indian side remain unresolved. Although a joint task­force inspected the inundated areas, there has been no agreement on a way forward. Exporters of Nepali products to India face a myriad of problems on the border, and Nepal’s huge trade imbalance with its south­ern neighbor remains another major issue.

Former Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Sherstha stresses the need for regular meetings of the Nepal-India Joint Commission in order to set­tle bilateral issues amicably. “The main objective of the commission is to review bilateral issues and to identity priority areas,” says Shres­tha. Former foreign ministers and ambassadors with whom APEX spoke were of the view that although there have been positive talks at the political level, implementation has always been dismal. They think regular meetings are necessary but not sufficient; the two sides should also seriously think about the bot­tlenecks in implementation. Even the agreements reached during pre­vious commission meetings have been shelved.

For example, the third meeting held in Kathmandu in 2014 had reiterated the need for reviewing, adjusting and updating the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship to better reflect current realities. It had directed the foreign secretaries to make necessary rec­ommendations, but it was never executed. Instead a Nepal-India Emi­nent Persons’ Group was formed to recommend ways to review the treaty.

With Modi’s recent re-election as India’s prime minister and S Jais­hankar’s appointment as the foreign minister, it remains to be seen how bilateral projects and issues will move forward. But if the fifth Joint Commission meeting is any guide, we should keep our expectations in check