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Two political developments—a life sentence for lawmaker Resham Chaudhary and an 11-point agreement with secessionist Madhesi leader CK Raut—have widened the rift between the federal government and the Madhes-based parties. 

According to the leaders of the Madhes-based parties and Madhes experts APEX contacted, Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) and Federal Socialist Party Nepal (FSPN) see these government moves as ploys to discredit them in Madhes, while giving undue space to Raut, who does not have a strong organizational and political base there. Currently a part of the federal government, FSPN is not as vocal about it as RJPN. But FSPN Chairman Upendra Yadav, who is also Minister for Health, has said that Raut had effectively ‘surrendered’ before the state.

Sources say Raut’s portrayal as being on a par with the Madhes-based parties in federal and provincial parliaments is unrealistic. “PM Oli is projecting Raut as our rival political force, which is a gross miscalculation. Our major competitor in Madhes is either Nepal Communist Party led by Oli himself or Nepali Congress,” says RJPN Secretary Keshav Jha. “PM Oli cannot weaken us in Madhes and boost his party and Raut instead,” he adds.

RJPN and FSPN leaders as well as Madhes-watchers are of the view that regional parties should have been consulted before the agreement. Madhesi leaders also argue that if the government can seemingly strike an agreement with Raut after asking the judiciary to release him, it could have similarly withdrawn the case against lawmaker Resham Chaudhary. They say while Chaudhary’s case is a political one, Raut’s is treasonous and there can be no comparison between the two.

A long-time Madhes watcher says that the Madhes-based parties are unhappy with the government for not consulting them. “It would have been better if the Madhes-based parties were consulted because they are stakeholders in Madhesi politics. The deal has soured the relationship between the government and the Madhes-based parties, which does not bode well for the stability of Madhes,” he says, requesting anonymity.

Oli’s calculation

The Madhes-based parties had portrayed Oli as being anti-Madhes during and after the constitution-drafting process. But when Oli became prime minister with a two-third majority, they surprisingly supported him. Oli promised to amend the constitution on the basis of necessity. But nobody was under any illusion that he would actually do so, which was perhaps why FSPN led by Upendra Yadav joined the government without the amendment.

RJPN was pressing Oli to amend the constitution. Indeed, both Madhes-based parties were in favor of joining the Oli government. RJPN sought constitution amendment as a face-saver to join the government but Oli did not budge.

Oli had sensed that RJPN would withdraw its support to the government after the Kailali court issued its verdict on Chaudhary. At the same time, negotiations were underway with Raut. “As PM Oli has failed to deliver, he hyped up the Raut case to show that he has scored an important political gain. Now, the PM is into political marketing, claiming that he ended a secessionist movement,” says Bijaya Kanta Karna, a close follower of successive Madhes movements. Similarly, according to observers, signing a deal with Raut signals that Oli wants to expand NCP’s space in Madhes.

“Oli wants to increase his acceptability in Madhes as he knows his nationalist card won’t work again even in the hills in the next election cycle. To emerge as the largest party again, he needs to enhance his image in Madhes,” says Karna. So Oli’s first priority will be to bring Raut into NCP by making him a lawmaker, if not a minister. Even if that does not work, Oli wants to weaken the Madhes-based parties by giving more space and power to Raut. This, in the view of observers, could also weaken Nepali Congress in Madhes, a traditional NC vote bank.

A Madhes watcher says the Madhesbased parties are unhappy with the government for not consulting them

Raut’s reasons

It is unclear whether Raut will honor the 11-point agreement. He has told his cadres that there has been an agreement for a referendum and it should be celebrated as an achievement. Observers cite a couple of reasons which might have compelled Raut to sign the agreement. In 2012, he had returned to Nepal, giving up an attractive job in the US. His had high political ambitions. In the second Constituent Assembly (CA) election in 2013, the Madhes-based parties fared poorly and Raut sensed an opportunity.  

But in the succeeding years, he struggled to expand his space, even as the mainstream Madhesi parties recouped some of the ground they had lost in 2013. Now, the provincial government (in Province 2) is led by the Madhes-based parties. Raut was upbeat when security forces started to project his group as a major security threat. But he struggled to build his party, making him very frustrated in recent months, according to Madhes observers.

The government then arrested him, and he probably started feeling that he could be behind bars all his life. Meanwhile, his family started putting pressure on him to renounce extremism. Oli was offering him space and a respectable position if he joined peaceful politics. “In the past he was successful in attracting radical youths with his secessionist agenda, but now he has given up that agenda. As peaceful politics is already the forte of Madhesi parties, NC and NCP, it won’t be easy for Raut in Madhes,” says Karna.

Who’s backing Raut?

After Raut returned to Nepal in 2012 and launched the secessionist movement, there was a certain curiosity: who is backing him? Some pointed to foreign forces, but that was never established. A Madhesi observer says if Raut was backed by foreign forces, ‘he was unlikely to surrender’ before the government. Another senior Madhesi leader requesting anonymity says Raut had at one point sought India’s support. Instead, Indian security forces wanted to rein in his activities in Madhes.

“Raut was a card of some unseen forces who worked against the Madhes-based parties. Now, this has been exposed and Raut’s 11-point agreement with the government does not affect our politics in Madhes,” says Jitendra Sonal, a parliamentary party leader of RJPN from Province 2.

Leaders and Madhes experts say Raut cannot return to his earlier campaign, which would violate his agreement with the government, but there are multiple options before him. Raut could register his own party and work to build up his organization, targeting the elections after four years. And he could peacefully raise the issue of a referendum in Madhes. He could also join NCP if he gets an attractive position. Another, albeit less likely, possibility is that he would gradually distance himself from politics and return to his profession. “He could choose any of these options,” says Manis Suman, General Secretary of RJPN. 

What of RJPN and FSPN?

RJPN and FSPN have limited options. Observers say as there is no environment in Madhes for another popular movement, the only option left for them is to ‘wait and see’.

RJPN’s first priority, according to its leaders, is to maintain intra-party unity and strengthen organizational structures. They say they are not worried because RJPN controls the government in Province 2, as well as most of its local level bodies, which will come in handy in the next election cycle. As RJPN has already withdrawn its support to the government, the party would focus on enhancing its position in Madhes. In FSPN’s case, the party is likely to wait a while. “We have already started our struggle from the parliament and we are planning a street protest. We are holding discussions with all political forces that stand for the politics of identiy,” says Jha.  

At the local level, conflict between the cadres of RJPN and those of CK Raut could escalate. Raut’s supporters accuse the Madhes-based parties of failing to adequately raise important Madhesi issues and focusing solely on power and money. On the other hand, leaders of the Madhes-based parties used to accuse Raut of trying to split the country. Now, they accuse him of surrendering to KP Oli.

RJPN will continue to press the Oli government to amend the constitution. Though it seems unlikely, there have been talks about unity between RJPN and FSPN. Some leaders do not rule out the possibility of Oli reaching out to the Madhes-based parties either.  

A FSPN leader, who also requested anonymity, says the party will not immediately quit the government. “We will definitely quit when public frustration with the government boils over, but we are in no hurry. This government still has four years,” he said.

3 India and Madhes

 APEX Series

OLI GOVERNMENT AND INDIA

 1 Progress on pending issues

2 EPG report

3 India and Madhes

4 New Indian power regulation

5 Is India losing

 India imposed a nearly five-month-long border blockade following the promulgation of the new Nepali constitution on 20 September 2015. India was unhappy that it was not consulted and that Kathmandu was ignoring the demands of Madhes-based parties.

Three years on, two Madhes-based parties, namely Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJP-N) and Federal Socialist Party-Nepal (FSP-N), are demanding another amendment to the constitution. But India is no longer backing the agenda of the Madhes-based parties, at least not publicly. Observers point at a few reasons behind India’s silence. One, its focus now is on minimizing China’s influence in Nepal by taking Kathmandu into confidence.

Two, there is no unity among the Madhes-based parties and the absence of a towering figure capable of triggering and leading a popular movement in Madhes. During the local elections in 2017, there was a clear split among Madhes-based parties. Their differences remain; whereas FSPN Chairman Upendra Yadav is part of the Oli govern­ment, RJPN leaders are not. Three, there are insufficient numbers in parliament to pass a constitution amendment bill and the likelihood of another popular movement in Madhes is low.

However, Amresh Singh, a Nepali Congress lawmaker, has a different take. He says India imposed the blockade because of its concern over Nepal’s status as a Hindu state, not over the Madhesi issue.

“The Indians overreacted. The Madhes movement was going on at the time, so they jumped on the bandwagon. But after a few weeks, they realized that the ruling hill elites were displeased, so they lift­ed the blockade and started deal­ing with the Nepal government,” he says.

In a recent interview with APEX, Constantino Xavier, a fellow in For­eign Policy Studies at Brookings India and an experienced Nepal hand, had argued that the salience of the Madhes issue in Nepal-India relations has gone down. “You see general statements about inclusive­ness and diversity, but there are no prescriptive statements India used in 2015/2016 about what Nepal should be doing in terms of its con­stitutional and political arrange­ments,” he said.

But says a senior Nepali leader who worked on constitution-draft­ing, “After a rapprochement with Kathmandu, India dropped the Mad­hes agenda. But if differences with Kathmandu resurface, Delhi will not hesitate to bring up the agenda to put pressure on Kathmandu.”

 Is Madhes just a card for India?

  When Nepal promulgated a new constitution on 20 September 2015, India imposed a blockade to put pressure on Kathmandu to fulfill the demands of Madhes-based parties. Follow­ing the pressure, some of those demands were addressed through an amendment to the constitution.

Three years after the blockade, two Madhes-based parties, namely Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJP-N) and Federal Socialist Party-Nepal (FSP-N), are demanding another amendment to the constitution. But India is no longer backing their agenda, at least not publicly. There was a time when Nepal had to pres­ent a written roadmap on how it was going to address the demands of the Madhes-based parties, but that’s no longer the case today.

Observers point at a few rea­sons behind India’s silence on the demands of the Madhes-based par­ties. First, its focus now is on mini­mizing China’s influence in Nepal by taking Kathmandu into confidence. Mainly after the formation of a strong government led by the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) Chairman KP Sharma Oli, India invested its time and energy persuading Oli to check China’s influence.

Sometime after the blockade, foreign policy observers believe, it dawned on India that if it antago­nizes Kathmandu, China will make further inroads into Nepal. After that, India started playing down the Madhes agenda in an attempt to appease Kathmandu so as to reduce Chinese influence in Nepal.

Despite some rhetoric to the con­trary, Oli is not ready to amend the constitution. India does not want to make the Madhes issue a cause of friction with the Oli government. “India can neither give up the agenda of the Madhes-based parties nor speak strongly in favor of them,” says a Nepali diplomat who has been actively engaged in Nepal-India deal­ings in recent times, requesting ano­nymity, as he cannot speak publicly given his official position.

Come as one

The second reason behind India’s silence is the lack of unity among the Madhes-based parties and the absence of a towering figure capable of triggering and leading a popular movement in Madhes. During the local elections in 2017, there was a clear split among Madhes-based parties. Their differences remain; whereas FSPN Chairman Upendra Yadav is part of the Oli government, RJPN leaders are not. “India, for a long time, has been telling the Madhes-based parties to unite but since that’s not happening, India itself seems confused about their demands,” says the diplomat.

The third reason is insufficient numbers in parliament to pass a constitution amendment bill and the low likelihood of another popu­lar movement in Madhes. The NCP has a two-thirds major­ity in the parliament but Prime Minister Oli is not ready to amend the constitution—at least for now. Although his party Co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal appears to have a soft spot for the demands of the Madhes-based par­ties, he is not in a posi­tion to make important decisions by himself.

Yet another reason is that after the blockade, which fueled anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal, there were strong views within India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that India should not view Nepal through a Madhes prism. Some BJP leaders strongly advised Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj that India’s policy on Nepal take into con­sideration various factors and not just the Madhes. They were of the view that if India backs the Madhes-based parties, and thus helps derail the local polls, its com­mitment to democracy would be questioned.

However, Amresh Singh, a Nepali Congress lawmaker, has a differ­ent take. He says India imposed the blockade because of its concern over Nepal’s status as a Hindu state, not over the Madhesi issue. “The Indians overreacted. The Madhes movement was going on at the time, so they jumped on the bandwagon. But after a few weeks, they realized that the ruling hill elites were displeased, so they lifted the blockade and started dealing with the Nepal government and the ruling elites,” he says.

India imposed the blockade because of its concern over Nepal’s status as a Hindu state, not over the Madhesi issue

Amresh Singh, Nepali Congress lawmaker

Dropping Madhes

“The then Indian Ambassador to Nepal Ranjit Rae was tasked with appeasing the ruling elites. This pol­icy was initiated by the RSS [Rash­triya Swayamsevak Sangh]. By way of justification, India blamed the leaders of the Madhes-based parties, saying they were divided, corrupt and visionless.”

A senior leader who worked on constitution-drafting says, “After a rapprochement with Kath­mandu, India dropped the Madhes agenda. But if differences with Kath­mandu resurface, New Delhi will not hesitate to bring up the agenda to put pressure on Kathmandu,” says the leader.

There is a consensus across the political spectrum in Nepal that valid demands of the Madhes-based parties should be addressed to stem the rise of extremist forces in Madhes. To understand how India gradually changed its position on Madhes, it is necessary to analyze the Indian position and policy over the last decade.

India had played a mediating role during the Madhes movement in 2008. The then Indian Ambassador to Nepal Shiva Shankar Mukherjee had helped strike an agreement between then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and the Mad­hes-based parties. India’s role at that time was interpreted as that of an external guarantor. During the con­stitution-drafting period from 2009 to 2015, India was continuously backing the demands of the Mad­hes-based parties. Immediately after the constitution was promulgated in September 2015, India imposed a blockade on Nepal as a punishment for not addressing those demands. During the blockade, which lasted almost five months, India’s position was loud and clear: amend the con­stitution to address the demands of the Madhes-based parties.

After the blockade, the issue of constitution amendment featured prominently in every Nepali prime minister’s visit to Delhi. Due to dif­ferences over this topic, no joint press statement was issued during KP Oli’s visit to India in 2016. Oli insisted that India should welcome Nepal’s constitution and the issue of Madhes-based parties should not be incorporated in the joint statement. India disagreed.

Sparing Dahal’s blushes

India started softening its position after Pushpa Kamal Dahal, in alli­ance with the Nepali Congress, came to power in 2016. During Dahal’s visit to Delhi, the Madhes-based parties’ issue was presented in a general way in that it was the Nepal government’s duty to bring all sec­tions of society on board. This was in contrast to the past tradition of India issuing a prescriptive state­ment urging Nepal to specifically address the demands of the Mad­hes-based parties.

But even until the local elections in 2017, India was still pressing Dahal to go for polls only after addressing the demands of the Madhes-based parties. However, Dahal succeeded in convincing India that the demands cannot be addressed as they lacked enough parliamentary support. A week before the announcement of the local polls, Dahal sent his dep­uty Narayan Kaji Shrestha to Delhi with a message that the date of the first phase of the polls would be announced. Shrestha made a case in front of Indian leaders and offi­cials that there was no other option. Still India wasn’t fully convinced. Later when Sher Bahadur Deuba visited Delhi as a prime minister, he expressed a commitment to amend the constitution, which drew criti­cism in Nepal.

At the same time, the Mad­hes-based parties were also divided on whether to contest the local polls. (They did ultimately.) Indian Ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri reportedly urged the Madhes-based parties to drop their agenda of a con­stitution amendment and contest the elections. If India had insisted on amending the statute by addressing the Madhes-based parties’ demands, the local elections would not have been possible. In that case, Dahal would have had to step down, pav­ing Oli’s path to power—an outcome India wanted to avoid. The Mad­hes-based parties, however, felt betrayed by India when it did not back their agenda just before the local elections.

After the formation of the Oli-led government last year, the Indian side has refrained from talking about amending the constitution or fulfill­ing the Madhesi parties’ demands. The Madhes-based parties, however, are still asking for an amendment.

In a recent interview with APEX, Constantino Xavier, a fellow in For­eign Policy Studies at Brookings India and an experienced Nepal hand, had argued that the salience of the Madhes issue in Nepal-India relations has gone down. “You see general statements about inclusive­ness and diversity, but there are no prescriptive statements India used in 2015/2016 about what Nepal should be doing in terms of its con­stitutional and political arrange­ments,” he said.

Xavier had continued: “I think there is now a focus on delivering development assistance, imple­menting connectivity projects and diversifying outreach in Nepal beyond the usual groups of people who are friendly to India”.

2 EPG report

APEX Series

OLI GOVERNMENT AND INDIA

 1 Progress on pending issues

2 EPG report

3 India and Madhes

4 New Indian power regulation

5 Is India losing influence in Nepal?

The report prepared by the eight-member Eminent Per­sons’ Group on Nepal-India relation (EPG-NIR) around seven month ago is gathering dust. It is not clear when the report will be submitted to the prime ministers of the two countries. The long delay means members from both sides are losing hope that the recommendations of the report, which was prepared after extensive and taxing homework, would be implemented. In various bilateral talks and meetings, the Indian side has repeatedly cited the tight sched­ule of Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the reason for the delay, but not everyone is convinced.

An EPG member who spoke at length with APEX says that Modi’s tight schedule and the upcoming Indian elections are not the real rea­sons. According to him, the Indian side is dissatisfied with some por­tions of the report, mainly related to the regulation of the Nepal-India border by adopting high-level tech­nology and identity cards. “If both governments accept our report and implement its recommendations, the dynamics of the open border will change,” he says. India is report­edly not satisfied with some other provisions of the report as well. It is expressing displeasure over the leakage of the report to a ‘third country’ before its submission.

Observers say India’s reluctance to accept the report has highlighted a couple of issues. They argue it is not rational to expect the Indian government to form a position based on a report prepared by a group of experts. “If so, there was no need to form such a panel to suggest ways to redefine bilateral relations,” says a diplomat who is closely following EPG-related issues. “It is just a report prepared by a group of experts and it is up to the two governments to settle outstand­ing bilateral issues,” he says. He argues that the delay in accepting the report is a clear demonstration of India’s desire to keep the 1950 treaty unchanged and maintain the status quo on other issues.

The EPG’s eight members (four from each country) had reached a consensus while finalizing the report. Just before the report was finalized, some (but not all) Indian members had expressed a desire to make changes to some provisions and those changes were incorpo­rated in the final report. Besides other treaties and conventions, the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship is the main docu­ment that Nepal wants to amend.

Members from the two sides APEX approached for this story said they still await an appointment with Indian Prime Minister Modi to submit the report. “I do not see any reason behind the delay. Both countries are free to take or reject our suggestions,” says Surya Nath Upadhaya, an EPG member from the Nepali side. Soon after the EPG finalized its report, the Indian media had carried stories that said some high level Indian officials think the report’s recommendations should not be implemented, as doing so would end the special relationship between the two countries.

Disputes over 1950 treaty

The 1950 treaty has 10 articles, some of which are outdated. Article 2 states: “Two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.”

This provision is obso­lete as both countries are conducting their foreign policy independently. During the Doklam crisis between India and China in 2017, some Indian experts cited this arti­cle to argue that Nepal should support India. Nepal, however, took a neutral position on the India-China standoff that lasted 77 days. The Nepali side of the EPG has reportedly suggested scrapping this article.

Nepal also wants to amend articles 5, 6 and 7 of the 1950 treaty. Arti­cle 5 says: “The Govern­ment of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedure for giv­ing effect to this arrange­ment shall be worked out by the two Governments acting in consultation.” As per this article, Nepal is free to import arms and ammunitions that its security forces need. Another “secret” arms agreement was signed between India and Nepal in 1965, but was made public only after 1990.

Article 5 of this agree­ment states: “The arrangements envisaged above shall have no bear­ing on the independent foreign policy on either Government. The Government of Nepal shall be free to import from or through the territory of India arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal. The procedures for giving effect to this arrangement shall be worked out by the two Gov­ernments acting in consultation.”

Indian officials maintain that Nepal should consult with India when it imports arms from third countries. In 1989 when Nepal imported arms and ammunition from China, India objected to it, say­ing that it was a violation of the 1950 treaty, and even imposed a border blockade. Nepal wants to remove such provisions from the treaty to ensure that it can freely purchase arms from third countries.

However, Dinesh Prasain, whose PhD thesis (from Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi) deals with the 1950 treaty, has a different take. “Nowhere in the treaty is it explicitly mentioned that Nepal is not free to import arms from other countries. And Nepal has no obliga­tion to consult India in any way if the imported arms are not transported through the Indian territory,” Pra­sain says.

Article 6 and 7 of the 1950 treaty deal with how citizens of one coun­try are to be treated in another. Article 6 says: “Each Government undertakes, in token of the neigh­borly friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals of the other, in its territory, national treat­ment with regard to participation in industrial and economic devel­opment of such territory and to the grant of concessions and contracts relating to such development.” Arti­cle 7 says: “The Governments of India and Nepal agree to grant, on reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature.”

Given the difference in the size, population and economic condi­tions between the two countries, Nepal cannot provide national treat­ment to Indian citizens. The fate of the Nepali migrant workers in India, however, is open to debate. Accord­ing to the EPG, India has about one million Nepali migrant workers, who are working there without a work permit. If this provision is modified, they might need a permit.

Says Prasain, “The treaty does not grant ‘rights’ to the nationals of the other country, it just gives them ‘privileges’.” Moreover, even the privileges related to “residence, ownership of property, participa­tion in trade and commerce, move­ment”, as well as the unspecified “other privileges of a similar nature” which have never been clarified, that each country grants to the “nation­als” of the other country, are not guaranteed—they are to be granted on “a reciprocal basis”.

The reasons why India hasn’t accepted the EPG report are unclear, but it’s probably safe to say that it won’t do so before the upcoming Indian national elections.

The history

On 31 July 1950, the then Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher Junga Bahadur Rana and Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh, an Indian government repre­sentative, had signed the Treaty of Peace and Friend­ship. However, dissatisfac­tion erupted in Nepal soon over the ‘unequal’ nature of the treaty and how it disproportionately favored India. Since then, revising or even scrapping the treaty has been a major political agenda in Nepal. Mainly, var­ious communist outfits and royalist forces have exploited this agenda to bolster their ‘nationalist credentials’.

For example, then Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista in 1969 publicly spoke about the need to revise the treaty on the grounds that it was obsolete. After the resto­ration of multi-party democ­racy in 1990, the CPN (UML)-led government in 1994 also demanded the treaty’s abro­gation. It argued that the ‘special relationship’ with India must come to an end and there must be renego­tiations on the sharing of water resources, the recruit­ment of Nepali nationals into the Indian Army and so on. Similarly, in 1997, then For­eign Minister Kamal Thapa submitted a non-paper to Indian officials concerning the amendment of the treaty.

Political weapon

During Nepal’s 10-year-long insurgency, the Mao­ists vehemently demanded that the ‘unequal’ treaty, as well as other discriminatory accords between Nepal and India, be scrapped. Of late, during the national polls in 2017, amending the treaty was a major election plank of the leftist alliance, whose manifesto said: “The ten­dency to surrender to foreign forces will be discouraged. All unequal treaties and agreements signed with India including the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship will be reviewed and replaced on the basis of necessity and national interest. Diplomatic efforts will be applied to resolve border related prob­lems and the management of border points.”

Coincidently, the EPG completed its task at a time when KP Oli is leading a gov­ernment with a two-thirds majority. He has both the mandate and the time to take a decision on treaty revision.

Our five-part, five-week APEX Series ‘Women in politics’ has made it clear that although Nepal has come a long way on inclusion of women in state institutions since the 2006 change, a lot remains to be done. Proportionally, Nepal has more women in the national legislature than any other country in Asia. Yet that is not saying much in itself. Moreover, the political parties didn’t do it voluntarily. The Election Commission (EC) had to force them to ensure at least 33 percent representation of women in the legislature.

Constitutionally, all four of our national parties—the Nepal Communist Party, the Nepali Congress, the Federal Socialist Forum Nepal and the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal—are illegitimate in that they have failed to ensure the constitutionally-mandated minimum 33 percent representation of women in party structures. For instance, in the 441-member central committee of the ruling NCP, there are only 75 women (17 percent), and in the 84-member central working committee of the NC, there are 17 women (20.24 percent).

The picture is bleaker still in the executive. After the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, 10 cabinets have been formed and none had anywhere close to 33 percent representation of women. Chanda Chaudhary, an RJPN lawmaker, points at more disparities. “Political parties have given 33 percent of parliamentary seats to women because of pressure from the Election Commission, which rejected the lists they forwarded that didn’t ensure adequate representation of women. But in appointments to ambassadorial positions and constitutional bodies, the EC cannot impose its decision, so the parties are reluctant to provide due space to women.” It shows.

Political parties have confined women to secondary roles, such as deputies in local bodies, deputy speakers and state ministers. Top leaders seem to be under the impression that women cannot take up leadership or win elections. Even if our constitution has many progressive provisions, they do not mean much if they are being openly flouted to give continuity to the patriarchal status quo.

Otherwise, top political leaders are not ready to give due space to women in their own parties or in other state organs. This shows our parties are not committed to the principle of inclusion and only legal and constitutional mechanisms are driving them to accept some inclusion. Even the incumbent government, which is the first full-fledged government formed after the constitution’s adoption in 2015 and which has a two-thirds majority in the federal parliament, is not committed to the policy of inclusion in its letter and spirit.

Women’s representation in politics is gradually increasing, but there has not been a quantum leap forward in line with the huge political changes Nepal witnessed in the last one decade or so. Over the past four weeks, as a part of APEX Series, we analyzed women’s representation in our political parties, in the legislature, in the executive and in key political appointments. A closer look at our series of articles shows that the provision of 33 percent women’s representation is implemented only in those areas where legal and constitutional tools compel political parties to do so. Otherwise, top political leaders are not ready to give due space to women in their own parties or in other state organs. This shows our parties are not committed to the principle of inclusion and only legal and constitutional mechanisms are driving them to accept some inclusion.

Better deputies?

There is also a lack of a mechanism to monitor whether the government and political parties comply with the provision of ensuring adequate women’s representation in all state mechanisms. For instance, the Public Hearing Committee (PHC) of the House of Representatives (HoR) can compel the government to ensure that 33 percent of constitutional appointments go to women. The parliamentary committees are regarded as mini parliaments and they can reject the government’s list of recommendations that does not have 33 percent women. For example, the PHC cannot initiate a hearing if 33 percent women’s representation hasn’t been achieved. Women’s representation in key decision-making bodies remains disappointing. Women have generally been relegated to the posts of deputies in local bodies and state ministers in provincial governments.

Chitra Lekha Yadav, a former minister and NC leader, says that the constitutional requirement of 33 percent women’s representation should be fulfilled in all state organs, including in the cabinet. “Political parties have ensured 33 percent women’s representation in the parliament due to constitutional and legal obligations, but they haven’t done so in the cabinet. Top leaders should seriously think about women’s representation in the cabinet as well.”

She adds that women should be appointed to top positions and not just given deputy roles. “Top leaders should think about establishing a system as provided in the constitution. Women have been ensured 33 percent of seats in the parliament, but they are still facing various types of discrimination. Leaders should walk the talk about a prosperous Nepal and happy Nepalis by adopting an inclusive policy.”

APEX investigation also shows that women leaders and members of the civil society haven’t exerted enough pressure on the government and political parties to ensure 33 percent female representation in political appointments. The current scenario is unlikely to change unless women leaders from across the political spectrum come together to build pressure. Our reporting also shows that women with connections to top party leaders are being appointed to important posts, whereas women without such connections, but who are otherwise qualified, are denied such opportunities. Top leaders seem to be under the impression that women cannot take up leadership roles or win elections. And until they are convinced otherwise—or are sufficiently pressured to adopt inclusive policies—the situation is unlikely to change any time soon.

Late to the party

On May 17, 2018, leaders of the CPN-UML and the CPN (Maoist Center) jointly submitted an application to the Election Commission to register the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), formed after the merger of the two parties. The commission asked the new party to ensure that one-third of its central committee members are women. Otherwise, the EC took a firm stand initially, constitutional and legal provisions do not allow it to register a new party. Some commission officials suggested giving the NCP a month to meet that requirement. The party, however, was not serious about implementing constitutional and legal provisions. Instead, top party leaders started exerting pressure on the EC to complete the registration process at the earliest.

“They cited practical difficulties in running the party such as opening a bank account. The Election Commission couldn’t withstand the pressure and was compelled to register the party. It’s unlikely that the party will ensure 33 percent women’s representation before its general convention,” says a high-level commission official, requesting anonymity.

This means the NCP and other major parties are technically illegal. NCP co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal has confessed that the party is illegal as it fails to ensure women’s representation as required by the law. Speaking at a public forum recently, Dahal said, “We have assured the Election Commission that we would ensure 33 percent representation of women in our central committee. Currently, I feel that I am leading an illegal party.”

Major parties that brought the inclusion agenda to the political forefront now seem indifferent to the issue of women’s representation. They have failed to set an example for other parties on the country’s inclusive policy. “The provision of 33 percent women’s representation is clearly mentioned in the law. I think big parties have a bigger responsibility to abide by legal and constitutional obligations,” says Ila Sharma, an EC Commissioner.

Article 269 of the constitution deals with the topic of inclusion at the time of a political party’s registration. It states: “There must be a provision of such inclusive representation in its executive committees at various levels as may be reflecting the diversity of Nepal.” Clause 15 (4) of the Political Party Registration Act says: “A political party should have at least one-third women’s representation in all its committees.” But despite such provisions and the fact that women’s empowerment and inclusion is a hot issue, political parties only pay lip service to it.

It has been 12 years since the constitution made it mandatory for political parties and state mechanisms to ensure 33 percent women’s representation. Women constitute over 50 percent of Nepal’s population, but their representation in political parties remains dismal. APEX has examined women’s representation in four parties, namely the NCP, the Nepali Congress, the Rastriya Janata Party and the Federal Socialist Party, all of which are recognized as national parties in the federal parliament.

Not a single one

A glaring example of inadequate women representatives is the ruling party, the NCP. Its women leaders are continuously urging top party leaders to ensure 33 percent representation of women in the party’s structures. “The issue was raised in the party’s central committee and standing committee, but our demands haven’t been addressed. They should be fulfilled without delay,” says Nabina Lama, a lawmaker and leader of the NCP.

In the party’s nine-member Secretariat, there is not a single woman. In its 45-member standing committee, there are only three women (6.67 percent). And in its 441-member central committee, there are only 75 women (17 percent). The situation is similar in the party’s provincial committees as well, none of which have ensured 33 percent women’s representation. The total number of provincial committee members is 1,338, and only 271 (20.25 percent) of them are women.

Things aren’t different in the main opposition. In NC’s eight-member ‘office bearer’, the party’s highest decision-making level, there is only one woman (Treasurer Sita Devi Yadav). In the 84-member central working committee (CWC), there are just 17 women (20.24 per­cent).

Dila Sangraula, an NC CWC member, says although women’s representation in the party structure is at present below 33 percent, the new statute endorsed by the recently concluded Mahasamiti has made it mandatory. “In the upcoming general convention, the party cannot escape from ensuring 33 percent women’s representation in all party structures, from the grassroots level to the CWC,” she says. The new statute has a provision of one female in the party’s office bearer. Presently, the NC has, on average, 20 percent women’s representation in all its party structures.

Madhes-based parties, which have vociferously raised the issue of inclusion, have also failed to ensure the presence of enough women in their party structures. In Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN)’s 815-member central committee, only 129 women (15.8 percent) have been appointed.

The 268-member committee of the Federal Socialist Forum-Nepal, a coalition partner of the government, has only 28 women (10.44 percent). Leaders of these parties say they are currently in transition and will ensure 33 percent representation of women after the general convention.

 The reinstated parliament in 2006 had, for the first time, officially endorsed the provision of 33 percent women’s representation, a provision that was further cemented in the 2007 interim constitution. While the representation of women in the civil and security services has been ensured, the situation in the top political parties is disappointing.

Top leaders focus primarily on placating dissatisfied party members, but do not seem serious about implementing the agenda of inclusion and elevating women leaders. A few months ago, Prime Minister KP Oli publicly said that the issue of women’s representation was driven by non-governmental organizations.

Failing a duty

Women leaders believe that ensuring female representation and empowerment will help curb the growing violence against women. In the past 12 years, women leaders of major parties have made several efforts to ensure their representation in their party structures, but to no avail.

Women leaders lament that top party leaders portray them as weak and unable to perform their duties if elevated to top positions. To increase the presence of women in state mechanisms, the first step is increasing their representation in the political parties and providing them with leadership opportunities. The parties are failing on a major duty.

Historical evolution of women’s representation in political parties

Nepali Congress: The first central working committee (CWC) of the Nepali Congress elected in 1947 did not have a single woman. Neither did another CWC elected in 1950. In fact, all CWCs elected before 1960 lacked women representatives. The 31-member CWC elected in 1960 saw the representation of one woman. There is no official record of CWC formation and women’s representation during the Panchayat regime, as party activities were banned.

After the restoration of democracy in 1990, there was some progress in women’s representation in the party. The 18-member CWC elected by the eighth general convention in 1992 had three women representatives. The number remained unchanged for a few years. The convention held in 2001 elected only one woman in the 18-member CWC. In 2008, the number of women representatives in the CWC reached seven and in 2010 it increased to 17. Now, there are 17 women representatives in the 85-member CWC.

Communist parties: Before 1990, the Nepal Communist Party was the country’s mainstream communist party, although it suffered several splits. Records show that there were no women in the central committee (CC) of the NCP from the 1950s to the 1990s. After the restoration of democracy, the CPN-ML was the mainstream community force, which was later renamed the CPN-UML. In the first 17-member central committee of the CPN-ML in 1989, there was no woman.

The fifth general convention of the CPN-UML held in 1992 elected only one female representative in its 34-member CC. The sixth general convention in 1998 did not elect any woman as a CC member. Likewise, the seventh General Convention in 2003 elected four women in its 39-member CC, and the eighth general convention in 2014 elected 22 women in its 93-member CWC, which, though inadequate, is a huge progress.

Former Maoists: Data show that the Maoist party, which launched the 10-year-long insurgency, has not been serious about women’s representation in the party either. The central committee formed in 1994 did not have any women. In 2000, only four women were elected in the 51-member CC. In 2004, the number plummeted to nine. In 2006, only two women were elected in the 34-member CC. In 2006, in the 34-member CC, the number of women was only two, which remained unchanged till 2008.

In December 2008, the Maoists elected only 13 women in the 125-member CC. Then, in 2013, the party formed a 128-member CC but with only 23 women representatives. After that, the size of the Maoist CC varied substantially from time to time due to multiple splits, and there is no official record of the number of women representatives. (Historical data in the article from the pre-1990 period have been borrowed from journalist Dhurba Simkhada’s book ‘Mulukako Muhar’ published by Himal Kitab)

Common minimum program

With 33 percent women representatives in both the federal parliament and provincial assemblies, Nepal outranks other Asian countries when it comes to female representation in parliament. A close study of parliaments formed after Nepal’s first parliamentary elections in 1959 clearly shows that women’s representation is increasing, thanks to some strict constitutional and legal provisions. There has been improvement on this front despite the political leadership’s reluctance to provide due space to female lawmakers.

In 1959, Nepal elected its first bicameral parliament through a general election. Of the 109 members elected, only one was female. Dwarika Devi Thakurani was in fact Nepal’s first Member of Parliament. She later became a member of the BP Koirala-led cabinet in 1959, in what was Nepal’s first democratically elected government. After King Mahendra dissolved Nepal’s first parliament as well as the Koirala government and imposed a party-less regime in 1960, there was no democratically elected parliament during the three-decade-long Panchayat era. Instead there was the Rastriya Panchayat, a mixed bag of people appointed directly by the King and zonal representatives favored by the regime. The first Rastriya Panchayat formed in 1963 had three women. During the entire Panchayat regime, women’s representation was nominal.

After the restoration of democracy in 1990, women’s representation increased slightly, but was still very low. In the first parliament elected in 1991, there were six women MPs. The number reached seven in 1994 and 12 in 1999.

The historic changes of 2006 and the subsequent interim constitution of 2007 fixed the minimum number of women in the national parliament, compelling political parties to abide by it. In many cases, the parties tried to flout the constitutional requirement. But now the provision of 33 percent women’s representation in the parliament is firmly established.

Still, the parties have only fulfilled the minimum constitutional requirement and have not taken proactive measures to increase the number of women MPs. In the first Constituent Assembly (CA) in 2008, the number of women elected under the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system was 30, which represented just 12.5 percent of the total parliamentarians elected under the system. As many as 26 of these women lawmakers were affiliated to the then Maoist party. The constitutionally-mandated 33 percent women’s representation was fulfilled in the first CA through proportionate representation.

The percentage of women parliamentarians who won under the FPTP system came down to 4.17 in the second CA elections in 2013, which elected only 10 female candidates. Women’s total representation also fell to 30 percent, which was an open violation of the interim constitution. Despite pressure from the Election Commission, parties were reluctant to ensure 33 percent representation of women.

The number of women who win under the FPTP system is still very low. It is primarily because the party leadership thinks women candidates cannot win direct elections. But there is another side to the story; top women leaders of major parties prefer to be MPs under the Proportional Representation (PR) category, with almost guaranteed election, whereas contesting an election is always a risky bet. (Perhaps they are well aware of their slim chance of winning in what is still largely a patriarchal society.)

Provincial concerns

In the current House of Representative (HoR), of the 165 lawmakers elected under the FPTP category, only six are women. The political parties met the constitutional requirement by selecting more women in the PR category.

Of the 275 HoR members, 90 are women (32.7 percent). And of the 59 National Assembly (NA) members, 22 are women (37.3 percent). However, women are not in leadership positions. Both the speakers are male whereas the deputy speakers are female. (Shashikala Dahal is the deputy speaker of the NA and Shiva Maya Tumbahambe is the deputy speaker of the HoR.) In the provincial assemblies, all deputy speakers are women. This clearly shows women’s secondary role and position—from the center, down to the grassroots.

However, in a recent noteworthy achievement, in the second Constituent Assembly (CA), Onsari Gharti was elected the first female Speaker in Nepal’s parliamentary history. Gharti was a leader of the then CPN (Maoist Center). The second CA was transformed into a parliament after the constitution’s promulgation in September 2015.

There is also the provision of 33 percent women’s representation in the parliamentary committees, which are considered mini-parliaments. Of the 12 parliamentary committees under the HoR, women lawmakers lead four. Of the four committees under the NA, women lawmakers lead two.

Article 84(8) of the constitution clearly states: “Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part, at least one third of the total number of members elected from each political party representing in the Federal Parliament must be women. If women are not so elected as to constitute one third of the elected members of any political party… such political party must, in electing members… so elect that women members constitute at least one third of the total number of members elected to the Federal Parliament from the party.”

Women’s representation in the provincial assemblies is satisfactory, but not particularly encouraging in that the parties have just met the constitutional provision of 33 percent women’s representation but not gone beyond that. In the 93-member Provincial Assembly (PA) in Province 1, there are 31 women.

In the 107-member PA in Province 2, there are 35 women. In Province 3, there are 36 women in the 110-member PA. The 60-member PA in Province 4 has 20 women. The number of women in the 87-member PA in Province 5 is 29. There are 13 women in the 40-member PA in Province 6 and 17 women in the 53-member PA in Province 7.

A report of the global Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) says: “With 33.5 percent women parliamentarians in the two houses of the Federal Parliament, Nepal is well above the global average of 23.8 percent women parliamentarians.” The average for Asian countries is 19.8 percent. The report says Nepal is ranked 37th out of 193 countries, followed, among South Asian countries, by Afghanistan (55), Pakistan (93), Bangladesh (95), India (147), Bhutan (170), Maldives (178) and Sri Lanka (180).

Globally the number of women in parliaments seems to have stagnated at around 23 percent and women’s progress in politics has been painfully slow. According to the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, it will take 50 years to achieve 50-50 parity at this rate.

Nepali women lawmakers say their representation in the parliament has contributed to highlight the myriad issues women face. “Naturally, it would be easier for female lawmakers to highlight women’s issues, but they are yet to play an effective role expected of them. They are learning though,” says Sashi Kala Dahal, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly. She says women are heading some parliamentary committees effectively. “The role of women lawmakers will be more effective as they gain experience in parliamentary practice,” she says.

But Dahal wasn’t happy that deputy speakers of provincial assemblies are ranked below an undersecretary in the new precedence order in Provincial Assembly, and thinks that it needs to be corrected. With women’s increasing numbers, and hopefully more meaningful participation, in the national and provincial legislatures, we can expect them to formulate laws that address the problems faced by women, who constitute 51 percent of Nepal’s population. Other laws will also be more balanced.

Exclusionary executives

There has not been much improvement in female representation in the cabinet. An examination of all the cabinets formed after 2007 shows that women’s representation remains frustratingly low. After the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, 10 cabinets have been formed but none has 33 percent representation of women.

Even after the promulgation of the constitution in 2015, the number of women in the cabinet has not increased significantly. Women’s representation in key decision-making bodies remains disappointing. Women have generally been relegated to the posts of deputies in local bodies and state ministers in provincial governments.

In the federal cabinet led by the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) Chairman KP Sharma Oli, there are 22 ministers and three state ministers. Only three of the 22 ministers are women—Tham Maya Thapa (Minister for Women, Children and Senior Citizen), Bina Magar (Minister for Water) and Padma Kumari Aryal (Minister for Land Management, Cooperatives and Poverty). Of the three state ministers, one is female—Ram Kumari Chaudhary (State Minister for Agriculture and Livestock). This is a clear violation of the constitutional provision that requires 33 percent women’s representation in all state organs. Among the 22 ministers, Thapa, Magar and Aryal hold 14th, 21st and 22nd positions respectively in the cabinet. In principle, the council of ministers constitutes ministers, state ministers and deputy ministers, but the state and deputy ministers are barred from participating in cabinet meetings.

Constitutional and legal provisions stipulate that women should constitute 33 percent of the appointees to the three levels of government, but political parties tend to ignore these provisions in areas where the Election Commission (EC) cannot impose its decision. For example, the EC cannot dictate how the cabinet is formed.

In provincial governments too, women’s representation is disappointing. Of the seven provincial governments, Provinces 1 and 3 have no women, which show sheer negligence on the part of the political parties. In Province 2, there are two women who are state ministers, namely Dimpal Jha and Usha Yadav.

In Province 4, Nara Devi Pun is Minister for Social Development; in Province 5, Aarati Poudel is Minister for Land Management, Agriculture and Cooperative; in Province 6, Bimala KC is Minister for Land Management, Agriculture and Cooperative; and in Province 7, Binita Chaudhary is Minister for Land Reform, Agriculture and Cooperative and Maya Bhatta is Minister for Industry, Tourism, and Forest and Environment. That is it.

The local election held in 2017 after a two-decade hiatus proved historic in terms of ensuring 33 percent women’s representation. Currently, there are 753 local level units—six metropolis, 11 sub-metropolis, 276 municipalities and 460 rural municipalities. The local polls elected a total of 35,041 representatives, of whom around 14,000 were women. This means, for the first time in Nepal’s political history, there is 40 percent women’s representation in local governments.

The number of women at the local level increased significantly due to the legal provision imposed by the EC, which stipulated that 40 percent of all nominee seats be reserved for women candidates. This included the requirement that between the mayor and the deputy mayor and between the chair and the deputy chair of rural municipalities, political parties has to field at least one woman candidate.

The parties mostly picked a male candidate for the mayor’s post and a female candidate for the deputy mayor’s. That is why an overwhelming number of deputies in the local bodies are female and chiefs are male. At the ward level, the Local Level Electoral Act 2017 has reserved two seats in each of the nearly 7,000 ward committees for women, one of which has to be for a Dalit woman.

History of women in cabinet

Political awareness in the country grew after the overthrow of the Rana regime and the establishment of multiparty democracy in 1951. A cursory analysis of the national cabinets formed after 1951 shows that women’s representation is depressingly low; there were no women in several of these cabinets.

The 10-member cabinet formed after the establishment of democracy in 1951 and led by Mohan Shumsher Rana had no woman. In fact, no cabinet between 1951 and 1959 had any women. The 20-member cabinet formed on May 27, 1959 and led by the late Nepali Congress leader Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala had one woman member, Dwarika Devi Thakurani, making her the country’s first female minister. That cabinet was soon dissolved by King Mahendra, who then imposed a party-less Panchayat regime that lasted three decades.

The first cabinet led by King Mahendra himself had no woman. In fact, it wasn’t until 1972 that Nepal got another female minister. The cabinet led by Kirti Nidhi Bista in 1972 had one women minister—Kamal Shah—who served as the state minister for health. All cabinets formed between 1972 and 1990, including the interim government led by the late NC leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, had only one woman minister—save for the 1988 cabinet that had two women.

1990 to 2007

The first elected government led by the late NC leader Girija Prasad Koirala after the promulgation of a new constitution in 1990 had one woman minister, a number that remained unchanged when the cabinet was later reshuffled. The cabinets formed between 1991 and 1995 saw no representation of women. The cabinet formed under the NC leader Sher Bahadur Deuba in September 1995 had no woman, but when it was reshuffled later in the same year, one female minister was appointed.

In all cabinets formed after 1995, the representation of women was negligible; there was either none or one female cabinet member, with one exception in 1996, which saw three female ministers. All the cabinets from 2001 to 2006 had very low representation of women. In this period, the number of female ministers ranged from one to three.

The first cabinet formed after Janaandolan-2 led by the then NC President Girija Prasad Koirala in April 2006 had no female representation. When the cabinet was reshuffled the following month, two women ministers were inducted.

No improvement after 2007

Despite the constitutional provision of 33 percent women’s representation introduced after 2007, there has not been much improvement in female representation in the cabinet. An examination of all the cabinets formed after 2007 shows that women’s representation remains frustratingly low. After the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, 10 cabinets have been formed but none has 33 percent representation of women. The first cabinet led by the then NC President Girija Prasad Koirala after 2007 had only two women ministers.

After the first Constituent Assembly (CA) election in April 2008, the then Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal formed an eight-member cabinet, which was expanded to 20 members after a few weeks. The number of women ministers in that cabinet was four, a significant improvement from previous cabinets.

On May 25, 2009, the then CPN-UML leader Madhav Kumar Nepal replaced Dahal and formed a two-member cabinet, which was later expanded to nine members, including two women ministers. The cabinet was again expanded to 18, but there was no increase in the representation of women. On February 7, 2011, the then UML leader Jhala Nath Khanal replaced Madhav Kumar Nepal and initially formed a three-member cabinet with no female representation. That cabinet was later reshuffled and expanded to 27 ministers, including eight women. Khanal was succeeded by the then Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai, whose 36-member cabinet included 10 women ministers—a huge improvement.

That cabinet was expanded to 38 members and the number of women ministers reached 11. After the dissolution of the CA, the then Chief Justice Khila Raj Regmi-led government, formed in 2013, had 10 ministers, only one of whom was female. After the second CA election in November 2013, the then NC President Sushil Koirala became prime minister, whose 19-member cabinet had only three women ministers.

Even after the promulgation of the constitution in 2015, which ensured 33 percent women’s representation in all state organs, the number of women in the cabinet has not increased significantly. The government formed under the then CPN-UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli in October 2015 had only two women ministers. When the then Maoist Chairman Dahal replaced Oli, the number of female cabinet members dropped to one. The NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba, who succeeded Dahal in 2017, reshuffled his cabinet six times. In his 56-member ‘jumbo’ cabinet, there were very few women.

Despite some improvement, women’s representation in key decision-making bodies remains low. Women have generally been relegated to the posts of deputies in local bodies and state ministers in provincial governments. This shows that political parties are not serious about meaningful female participation. They should go beyond tokenism and appoint women to key positions in their party as well as in the government.

Commissions and omissions

Currently there are five commissioners (including the chief commissioner) at the Election Commission (EC), a constitutional body mandated to hold federal, provincial and local level elections. Of the five, Ila Sharma is the only female commissioner. It’s ironic that the commission, which is responsible for ensuring 33 percent representation of women in the national and provincial parliaments and in political parties, is itself un-inclusive. The Public Service Commission (PSC), another constitutional body mandated to select public servants on an inclusive basis, also suffers from inadequate female representation. Of its six members (including a chairperson), only one—Brinda Hada Bhattarai—is female. Both these key constitutional bodies, with the responsibility of implementing the nation’s policy of inclusion, are rather exclusionary.

Other bodies share the same fate. The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is another important constitutional body where the representation of women is poor. Sabitri Gurung is the only female commissioner at the CIAA. The situation at the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is also disappointing; of its six commissioners, Mohana Ansari is the only woman. No constitutional body in the country is headed by a woman.

There is no official record of political appointments of women, but observers say the low number of female appointees is an old problem. The government makes dozens of political appointments (besides those to the federal and provincial parliaments and to the cabinet), but very few appointees are women. This clearly shows the political parties’ disinclination to ensure the constitutionally-required representation of women in state organs.

The situation has remained unchanged even after the promulgation of a new constitution in 2015, the holding of three tiers of elections in 2017, and the formation of a government with a two-third majority last year. Now, there is a tendency of appointing a token number of women just to show commitment to the principle of inclusion.

In the third week of January this year, the government recommended the heads of five commissions—National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission, National Inclusion Commission, Madhesi Commission, Tharu Commission and Muslim Commission. None of the five recommended chiefs is a woman.

In letter, not spirit

These commissions were envisioned by the constitution to promote an inclusive polity, but the approach taken to make appointments to them is not inclusive. This is a clear violation of the constitution, whose article 283 says: “Appointments to offices of constitutional organs and bodies shall be made in accordance with the inclusive principle.”

When it comes to political appointments to other state apparatuses, women’s representation is nominal as well. The core idea behind having a certain number of female political appointees is to ensure adequate representation of women in important decision-making processes. Since women are severely underrepresented in political institutions, observers say due attention should be given to securing a minimum number of seats for women.

“There is a flawed understanding among our political leaders that women cannot take up leadership and carry out their responsibilities well,” says Manchala Jha, a member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). “If women are given an opportunity, they are fully capable of leading constitutional and other state bodies,” she adds. Besides Jha, the TRC has one other female member (Madhabi Bhatta).

The basic principle behind political appointments is recruiting experts in specific fields. However, women with close connections to political parties are being appointed and those without such connections are denied the same opportunities. In other words, political cadres without the necessary expertise are being appointed to important positions. Observers say the appointment of women with political access and connection does not fulfill the basic principle of inclusion, and that women from marginalized communities without political affiliations must get opportunities.

“Political appointments since the Panchayat era clearly demonstrate that women with better political connections are getting all the opportunities,” says Harihar Birahi, former President of the Federation of Nepalese Journalists. Birahi, who has been closely following the country’s political developments for several decades, says women close to the monarchy were appointed to government positions during the Panchayat period. “Right through the past five decades, capable women without good political connections have been passed over in favor of less deserving candidates with such connections,” says Birahi.

Old problem

There is no official record of the political appointments made during the Panchayat and the democratic periods. But very few women were politically appointed during the Panchayat era for a few reasons. First, the number of educated women during that period was very low and it was difficult to find the appropriate person. Second, few places were allocated for political appointments. Third, the concepts of inclusion and women’s empowerment were not firmly established and there was no pressure group to take up the issue of women’s representation.

Birahi says the Panchayat regime appointed very few women to government bodies. “Now the space for political appointments has expanded, and there has been some progress in women’s representation but still not up to a desirable level,” he says.

Although there are enough qualified women now and sufficient space for appointing them, political parties are seemingly hesitant to do so. Even in offices that meet the constitutional requirement of female representation, the roles and contributions of women are not always properly recognized. There are complaints that women’s opinions are not heeded while making important decisions. Often women also carry the extra burden of having to go beyond the call of duty to prove they are as qualified as their male counterparts.

Ambassadorship is another area where the government makes political appointments. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal has embassies in 30 countries, of which two—those in Oman and Japan—have women ambassadors who were politically appointed: Sarmila Parajuli Dhakal and Prativa Rana respectively. Rana, who is the mother-in-law of the Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, was appointed by the previous government. Besides Dhakal and Rana, Sewa Lamsal Adhikari is a woman ambassador (to Pakistan), but she’s a joint secretary at the MoFA, not a political appointee.

Lucky Sherpa, who was serving as the Nepali Ambassador to Australia, stepped down recently after being accused of human trafficking, although she has denied the charges. In 2012, Maya Kumar Sharma, who was serving as the Nepali Ambassador to Qatar, was recalled over her objectionable remarks against the Gulf nation.

Disturbing patterns

Among those most recently recommended for an ambassadorial position, the only woman is Anjan Shakya (to Israel). There is already criticism that Shakya was chosen directly under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s order: The two are distant relatives. The current pattern of ambassadorial appointments clearly goes against constitutional provisions. Article 282 of the constitution says, “The President may, on the basis of the principle of inclusion, appoint Nepalese ambassadors and special emissaries for any specific purposes.”

In contrast, powerful countries are appointing female ambassadors to Nepal. Hou Yanqi is the new Chinese Ambassador to Nepal. Other countries have also appointed female ambassadors to Nepal. Egypt, Bangladesh, Brazil, Sri Lanka and China have female ambassadors in Kathmandu, as does the European Union.

Besides constitutional bodies and ambassadorial positions, political appointments are made to public enterprises, which are under government control. But again, very few women have been appointed to these bodies. And the heads of state-owned Nepal Television, Radio Nepal, Rastriya Samachar Samiti and Gorkhapatra Corporation are all politically appointed males.

Political appointment is an overlooked issue in Nepal. Women leaders and members of the civil society haven’t exerted enough pressure on the government and political parties to ensure 33 percent female representation in political appointments. The current scenario is unlikely to change unless women leaders from across the political spectrum come together to build pressure. Similarly, the Public Service Commission should compel the government to ensure that at least a third of the political appointees are women.

(Based on APEX Series ‘Women in politics’)

1 Progress on pending issues

APEX Series

Oli government and India

1 Progress on pending issues

2 EPG report

3 India and Madhes

4 New Indian power regulation

5 Is India losing influence in Nepal?

During his maiden foreign trip to India in April 2018, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli insisted on implementing past agreements instead of signing new ones.

Unlike the past tradition of signing a long list of bilateral projects, the joint statement issued on April 8, 2018 mentioned only three new agreements: partnership in agriculture, expansion of rail linkages (Raxual-Kathmandu) and new connectivity between the two countries through inland waterways. During the visit, PM KP Oli and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi jointly inaugurated an integrated check-post and the Motihari-Amlekhgunj cross-border petroleum pipeline project, two vital pending bilateral issues.  

The two prime ministers ‘underlined the need for expeditious implementation of bilateral projects in Nepal, and to reinvigorate the existing bilateral mechanisms to promote cooperative agendas across diverse spheres.’ 

The sense of urgency in settling bilateral issues seen in the early days of the Oli government has gradually waned

One year has passed since Oli came to power. While there was a sense of urgency in settling bilateral issues in the early days of government formation, such urgency has gradually subsided. In the initial months, Indian government officials and experts were of the view that India should address the issues raised by Nepal without delay in order to stem China’s inroads in Nepal and appease the new Oli-led Nepali government.

Many in Nepal think India only holds on to development projects but is not serious about completing them on time. This has added to the climate of mistrust. Speaking at a program organized by the Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (AIDIA) this week, Indian Ambassador to Nepal Majeev Singh Puri said several factors contribute to delay in Indian development projects in Nepal. Puri was clearly hinting at the problems on the Nepali side.

Observers recommend a nuanced approach to apportioning blame. While some projects are delayed due to the conditions put forth by India, others are pushed back owing to bureaucratic issues in Nepal.

The Biratnagar bang

There was encouraging progress in resolving bilateral issues during the initial months of the Oli government. An unauthorized camp office of the Indian embassy in Biratnagar had been a contentious bilateral issue. Successive Nepali governments had requested the Indian side to close the office but to no avail. It was only after the talks between Oli and Modi that India agreed to close it. Many thought this was a significant achievement of the Oli government.

Progress was also made in the joint inspection of flood areas. Nepali territories on the border are vulnerable to inundation due to the physical infrastructures on the Indian side. A couple of years ago, the two sides had agreed on a joint inspection of inundated areas, but there was no progress. In an attempt to find a solution, a joint committee has inspected such areas and prepared a report. The two countries are likely to act on the basis of the report’s recommendations.

Soon after the Oli government was formed, India agreed to provide additional air routes to Nepal, which is yet another long-pending bilateral issue. The four routes that India had agreed to make bi-directional or two-way are Kathmandu-Biratnagar-Dhaka, Kathmandu-Janakapur-Kolkata and Kathmandu-Janakpur-Patna in the eastern part of Nepal and Kathmandu-Mahendranagar-Delhi in the western. But India has now backtracked from its earlier commitment citing security reasons. A senior Nepali government official told APEX that discussions with India are underway to find alternative routes and that there is a possibility of an agreement on Kapilvastu as an air entry point. 

There are many hurdles in exporting Nepali products to India. This has created a huge trade imbalance between the two countries. Nepal has been asking India to revise the trade treaty between them and provide more preferential treatment to Nepali products. There have also been some positive developments in clearing the export hurdles. For example, India has recently lifted restrictions on the import of ‘entirely Nepal-produced’ ginger.  

Still ‘no entry’

Similarly, India has, in principle, agreed to provide the same treatment to Nepali private vehicles entering India that vehicles bearing an Indian registration number get in Nepal. During a joint-secretary level meeting held in India in July last year, the Indian side expressed its readiness to provide hassle-free entry to Nepali vehicles in its territory. Nepal had been raising this issue in all bilateral meetings.

And in December, India paved the way for Nepal to export surplus electricity to third countries via Indian transmission lines. In a set of new guidelines, India’s power ministry included a provision under which two countries having a bilateral agreement with India can use the Indian central transmission utility for trading electricity. In 2016, India had introduced a regulation that had created obstacles to cross-border power trade.

Recent developments in energy banking could be dubbed another progress.

Oli and Modi jointly laid the foundation stone for the 900 megawatt Arun-3 hydropower project. (They did it remotely from Kathmandu.) Nepal and India also exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding on a preliminary engineering-cum-traffic survey of the broad gauge rail line between Raxaul and Kathmmandu.

After the formation of the Oli government, there was encouraging progress in some bilateral issues with India, but observers say Nepal’s decision to not attend a BIMSTEC military drill created an environment of mistrust between the two countries. So did a few other issues such as the Indian government’s reluctance to accept the Nepal-Indian Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) report. Past experiences suggest that economic cooperation between the two neighboring countries is smoother when there is mutual trust at the political level.

Still there are a number of unresolved bilateral issues. In the past one year, there has been virtually no progress on the Pancheshwor Multi-purpose project despite intensive attempts by the two governments. Of late, there have been reports suggesting that India has proposed a new way forward, but there is still lack of clarity on the issue.

New urgency

Another prickly bilateral issue over the past two years has been the provision of an exchange facility of the now-defunct high denomination Indian notes for Nepali citizens. Nepal has been urging India to exchange up to Rs 25,000 in old denominations that Nepali citizens are holding but India hasn’t obliged.

Meanwhile, the task up upgrading border pillars that started in 2014 is in limbo and the two countries are no closer to resolving the disputed territories of Susta and Kalapani than they were, say, a decade ago.

The Indian bureaucracy in recent years seems to have realized the importance of completing development projects in neighboring countries on time. Indian PM Narendra Modi has reportedly given instruction to Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and other officials to review such development projects periodically and clear any bottlenecks immediately.

Indian bureaucracy seems to have got the importance of completing projects in neighboring countries on time

Speaking to APEX last month, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali had claimed that there has been good progress in some matters of bilateral concern and that the Nepal government is making every effort to settle unresolved issues. “Both sides are working on settling longstanding bilateral issues and engagements at various levels are underway,” he said.

Nepal-India Oversight Mechanism, which was formed to identity the bottlenecks in bilateral projects and address them immediately, “is meeting on a regular basis to resolve problems in project implementation,” says Bharat Raj Poudel, the spokesperson at MoFA. The meeting co-chaired by the Indian Ambassador in Kathmandu and Nepal’s Foreign Secretary sits with various government agencies to discuss problems in development projects.

Issues making headway

• Energy banking
• Janakpur-Jayanagar railway
• An electronic cargo tracking system for Nepal-bound shipments
• Construction of an Integrated Check Post
• Construction of petroleum pipelines
• Two countries set to sign an MoU to purchase fertilizers from India under a G to G model
• India’s electricity guidelines
• Inland waterways

Issues not making headway  

• Postal roads  
• Exchange of demonetized Indian currency
• India’s consent to switch part of the $750 million Line of Credit (LoC) granted to rebuild earthquake-damaged buildings to other infrastructure projects
• Pancheshwor Multipurpose Project
• Nepali Police Academy
• Additional air routes to Nepal
• Border pillar construction and resolution of Susta and Kalapani 

Oli and Modi building a special kind of chemistry and rapport

By: Dr. Dattesh Prabhu Parulekar

First of all, the reason we should strengthen bilateral cooperation is because both India and Nepal have a young demography. Unlike the earlier generations, the youth today is not willing to wait a few decades for their destiny to change. They want quick change and tangible progress. There is a “now or never” kind of thing in Nepal-India relations. Politically, we have to work on maintaining stability in our relationship. We need to decouple our ties from specific political actors. The prime ministers of the two countries, irrespective of who holds the posts, should not determine the trajectory of bilateral relations.

Both Oli and Modi are determined to become development icons; they want to make development the fundamental pillar of their county and society. This is the right time for them to take ownership of the issue and make tangible progress. Some development projects are dragging on because of financial, technical or feasibility issues.

But Nepal and India are not like China, which is a one-party state. In our countries, there are local stakeholders and there is a democratic process. Not all decisions made by Oli and Modi can be implemented because of many local factors. The two countries have a decentralized federal system and reaching a consensus takes time, especially when it’s a bottoms-up process. 

There has certainly been some progress in bilateral relations after the formation of the Oli government in Nepal. Arun-3 is an apt example. It is a very ambitious project and a litmus test of both countries’ leadership. Again, although the two PM should not entirely direct bilateral relations, Oli and Modi are building a special kind of chemistry and rapport, which helps a lot.

The author is assistant professor of International Relations at Goa University

Our five-part, five-week APEX Series ‘Women in politics’ has made it clear that although Nepal has come a long way on inclu­sion of women in state institutions since the 2006 change, a lot remains to be done. Proportionally, Nepal has more women in the national legislature than any other country in Asia. Yet that is not saying much in itself. Moreover, the political parties didn’t do it voluntarily. The Election Commission had to force them to ensure at least 33 percent women representation in the legislature.

Constitutionally, all four of our national parties—the Nepal Commu­nist Party, the Nepali Congress, the Federal Socialist Forum Nepal and the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal—are illegitimate in that they have failed to ensure the constitutionally-man­dated minimum 33 percent repre­sentation of women in party struc­tures. For instance, in the 441-mem­ber central committee of the ruling NCP, there are only 75 women (17 percent), and in the 84-member cen­tral working committee of the NC, there are 17 women (20.24 percent).

The picture is bleaker still in the executive. After the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, 10 cabinets have been formed and none had anywhere close to 33 per­cent representation of women.

Chanda Chaudhary, an RJPN law­maker, points at more disparities. “Political parties have given 33 percent of parliamentary seats to women because of pressure from the Election Commission, which rejected the lists they forwarded. But in appointments to ambassa­dorial positions and constitutional bodies, the EC cannot impose its decision, so the parties are reluctant to provide due space to women.” It shows.

Political parties have confined women to secondary roles, such as deputies in local bodies, dep­uty speakers and state ministers. Top leaders seem to be under the impression that women cannot take up leadership or win elections. Even if our constitution has many progressive provisions, it does not mean much if they are being openly flouted to give continuity to the patriarchal status quo.

Not even a third of the sky

APEX Series

WOMEN IN POLITICS

1 In political parties

2 In the legislature

3 In the executive

4 In key appointments

5 Overall picture

Women’s representation in politics is gradually increasing, but there has not been a quantum leap forward in line with the huge political chang­es Nepal witnessed in the last one decade or so. Over the past four weeks, as a part of APEX Series, we analyzed women’s representation in our political parties, in the legislature, in the executive and in key polit­ical appointments. A closer look at our series of articles shows that the provision of 33 percent wom­en’s representation is implemented only in those areas where legal and constitutional tools compel political parties to do so.

Otherwise, top political leaders are not ready to give due space to women in their own parties or in other state organs. This shows our parties are not committed to the principle of inclusion and only legal and constitutional mechanisms are driving them to accept some inclu­sion. Even the incumbent govern­ment, which is the first full-fledged government formed after the consti­tution’s adoption in 2015 and which has a two-thirds majority in the fed­eral parliament, is not committed to the policy of inclusion in its letter and spirit.

After the last polls in 2017, the Election Commission (EC) was reluctant to publish the final results until the parties ensured 33 percent women’s representation through their Proportional Representation (PR) list. Failure to do so, the EC warned, would delay the publica­tion of results. So the parties sent lists to the EC that had 33 percent representation of women. But in areas where the EC cannot impose its decisions, women’s representa­tion is dismally low.

There is also a lack of a mech­anism to monitor whether the government and political par­ties comply with the provision of ensuring adequate women’s repre­sentation in all state mechanisms. For instance, the Public Hearing Committee (PHC) of the House of Representatives (HoR) can compel the government to ensure that 33 percent of constitutional appoint­ments go to women. The parlia­mentary committees are regarded as mini parliaments and they can reject the government’s list of rec­ommendations that does not have 33 percent women. For example, the PHC cannot initiate a hearing if 33 percent women’s representation hasn’t been achieved.

Late to the party

Very few political appointees are women. Key areas such as constitu­tional bodies, ambassadorial posi­tions and other public enterprises don’t have 33 percent women. There is a tendency of appointing a nomi­nal number of women just to give an impression that the appointments have been inclusive. There is no offi­cial record of political appointments of women, but observers say the low number of female appointees is an old problem. The government makes dozens of political appoint­ments (besides those to the federal and provincial parliaments and to the cabinet), but very few appoin­tees are women.

This clearly shows the political parties’ disinclination to ensure the constitutionally-required represen­tation of women in state organs. The situation has remained unchanged even after the promulgation of the constitution in 2015, the holding of three tiers of elections in 2017, and the formation of a government with a two-third majority last year. Now, there is a tendency of appointing a token number of women just to show commitment to the principle of inclusion.

No political party has allocated 33 percent of positions to women in their structures, whether at the center or at the local level

No political party has allocated 33 percent of positions to women in their structures, whether at the center or at the local level. Nepal has four national parties that got over three percent of the total votes cast in the last general elections. And all four—the Nepal Communist Party, the Nepali Congress, the Federal Socialist Forum Nepal and the Ras­triya Janata Party Nepal—are illegit­imate in that they haven’t ensured the constitutionally-mandated min­imum representation of women.

Women’s representation in these parties is well below the 33 percent threshold required by electoral laws. This is also against the spirit of the new constitution. NCP co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal recently admit­ted that his party was illegal for the same reason. No other top leader from the four big parties has been so forthcoming. But these parties are all the same: illegitimate. In the 441-member central committee of the ruling NCP, there are only 75 women (17 percent).

Likewise, in the 84-member cen­tral working committee of the NC, there are 17 women (20.24 percent). Madhes-based parties, which have strongly raised the issue of inclu­sion, have also failed to ensure enough female participation in their party structures. The 815-member central committee of the RJPN has only 129 women (15.8 percent) and the 268-member central committee of the FSFN, a coalition partner of the incumbent government, has only 28 women (10.44 percent).

Male cabinets

Women’s representation in the state’s executive bodies is also disappointing. Despite the constitutional provision of 33 per­cent women’s representation intro­duced after 2007, there has not been much improvement in female repre­sentation in the cabinet. An exam­ination of all the cabinets formed after 2007 shows that women’s rep­resentation in them remains frus­tratingly low. After the promulgation of the interim constitution in 2007, 10 cabinets have been formed but none has 33 percent representation of women.

Even after the promulgation of the constitution in 2015, the number of women in the cabinet has not increased significantly. Women’s representation in key decision-mak­ing bodies remains disappointing. Women have generally been rel­egated to the posts of deputies in local bodies and state ministers in provincial governments.

Chitra Lekha Yadav, a former min­ister and NC leader, says that the constitutional requirement of 33 percent women’s representation should be fulfilled in all state organs, including in the cabinet. “Political parties have ensured 33 percent women’s representation in the par­liament due to constitutional and legal obligations, but they haven’t done so in the cabinet. Top leaders should seriously think about wom­en’s representation in the cabinet as well.”

She adds that women should be appointed to top positions and not just given deputy roles. “Top leaders should think about establishing a system as provided in the constitu­tion. Women have been ensured 33 percent of seats in the parliament, but they are still facing various types of discrimination. Leaders should walk the talk about a prosperous Nepal and happy Nepalis by adopt­ing an inclusive policy.”

The situation is more encouraging when it comes to women’s represen­tation in legislative bodies, where the EC’s mandatory provisions have compelled the parties to ensure 33 percent women’s representation. As a result, Nepal outranks other Asian countries when it comes to female representation in the parliament. A close study of parliaments formed after Nepal’s first parliamentary elections in 1959 clearly shows that women’s representation is increas­ing, thanks to some strict constitu­tional and legal provisions. There has been improvement on this front despite the political leadership’s reluctance to provide due space to female lawmakers.

Not enough pressure

“Political parties have given 33 percent of parliamentary seats to women because of pressure from the EC, which rejected the lists for­warded by the parties that did not meet the constitutional require­ment. But in appointments to ambassadorial positions and con­stitutional bodies, the EC cannot impose its decision, so the parties are reluctant to provide due space to women,” says Chanda Chaudhary, an RJPN lawmaker. “Women’s repre­sentation in various party structures is depressing. Top leaders are not serious about addressing this prob­lem,” she adds.

APEX investigation also shows that women leaders and members of the civil society haven’t exerted enough pressure on the government and political parties to ensure 33 percent female representation in political appointments. The current scenario is unlikely to change unless women leaders from across the political spectrum come together to build pressure. Our reporting also shows that women with connections to top party leaders are being appointed to important posts, whereas women without such connections, but who are otherwise qualified, are denied such opportunities.

Political parties have generally confined women to secondary roles, such as deputies in local bodies, deputy speakers and state minis­ters. Top leaders seem to be under the impression that women cannot take up leadership roles or win elec­tions. And until they are convinced otherwise—or are sufficiently pres­sured to adopt inclusive policies—the situation is unlikely to change any time soon.

Bhaskar Koirala, the Director of Nepal Institute of International and Strategic Studies (NIIS), is an old China hand. He is a keen observer of the strategic competition among big powers in Nepal. Kamal Dev Bhattarai caught up with Koirala for his insights on Nepal’s foreign policy, the new rumpus over Venezuela and Nepal’s relations with China and the US.

How do you evaluate the Oli government’s foreign policy in the past one year?

The country is still in transition and even senior leaders are not sure which direction it is headed in. In this transitional phase, the leadership is weak, and there is a lack of clarity on the country’s foreign policy objectives. There are fundamental disagreements on what kind of foreign policy Nepal should pursue. So I do not know how you can claim success in the conduct of foreign policy. We can take the most recent example of Venezuela, and use it as a benchmark to determine the quality of foreign policy processes in Nepal. If you go back a bit and try to understand how this government has defined its relationship with China, India and the US, I see a lack of clarity.

Why do you think that is the case?

There is no creativity in the overall process. A lot of things could have been initiated in relationships with India, China and the US. But you do not see that happening. After one year, what is the result? Where is the government headed? How has the government defined its foreign policy? 

You referred to Venezuela. How has its handling by the ruling party and the government been?

Lately, the government seems embroiled in the Venezuela issue. Many were surprised by this; no one had expected happenings in that country to have reverberations in Nepal. It started with a press statement by a co-chairman of the ruling party. Some say it is an ideological issue and the communist party had to stand by it. But I think this is an example of negligence in the conduct of foreign policy. But let us not blow things up. There was similar negligence when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supposed to mention ‘condolences’ instead of ‘congratulations’ while sending a message to Indonesia after it was struck by a devastating cyclone. Venezuela’s case was one of similar negligence, no more. Nepal does not have a substantive relationship with Venezuela.

Do you espy China’s hand behind Dahal’s statement on Venezuela?

I think that’s totally ridiculous. I do not think China would dictate to another country what kind of foreign policy statement it should release. I certainly do not believe, unlike what some media outlets have suggested, that China somehow coaxed Nepal into taking this position.

It seems that the government’s position has created some friction in our relations with the US.

It has created a serious problem in bilateral relations with the US. How long its impact will last, I do not know but it seems to be a big issue. In a recently held diplomatic briefing of the government, the US Ambassador to Nepal was missing. The US has said that the investment summit that Nepal is going to organize in March is premature. Remember, the statement on Venezuela was signed by a co-chairman of the ruling party and on the party’s letter pad, and it was backed by the Foreign Ministry later. That is not how foreign policy issues should have been handled. Even small negligence can lead to a serious crisis.

Talking about the Americans, how important are Nepal-US ties?

The Nepal-US relations have been very important over the past 70 years. Recently, Minister for Foreign Affairs Pradeep Gyawali visited the United States. At a recent program in Vietnam, I met Alice Wells, the US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State, who gave examples of how the Indo-Pacific region is becoming more and more important for them. She said the $500 million grant to Nepal under the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a part of their overall Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The MCC does two things: road maintenance and construction of transmission lines. Roads are already there and the Americans help repair them. Nepal has huge potential in hydropower, so the US is helping Nepal stand on its own feet. So, you can look at it in those terms as well. And you do not have to see it as the US trying to contain China from here. The US is a big power. As a relatively small country in this region between two larger states, Nepal should have its own identity. Nepal should stand on its own feet and should be independent. 

I find the concept of the US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) interesting. Long before the earthquake, the US helped with the conservation of our temples through the AFCP. So, the US is trying to help Nepal to preserve its identity in this age of rapid globalization; maybe it thinks Nepal’s identity is being diluted. The US is helping us because it lost many aspects of its culture to modernization. They want to help us preserve our identity.

But there are views that China is concerned about Nepal cultivating closer ties with the US.

We are confining ourselves to a certain narrative. As someone who’s been interested in Chinese foreign policy for the last 15 years, I do not think China would be concerned if Nepal develops a closer relationship with the US and deepens its relationship with India, so long as these relations do not hurt its core interests. So long as its interests aren’t affected, China would be happy to see Nepal develop a multifaceted relationship with the United States. 

There was much talk about Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali’s visit to the US. How did you see it?

When the then Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Nepal 17 years ago, he did not specifically come here to meet our foreign minister and discuss bilateral issues or to talk about how Nepal had an important role in the US regional strategy. Powell had come here as a part of a world-wide tour after 9\11 to garner Nepal’s support on the war on terror. Gyawali’s recent visit is very important because such a visit took place after a gap of over 17 years. I do not know when the two countries’ foreign ministers had met before Powell’s visit.

What was the outcome of our foreign minister’s trip to the US?

Although Gyawali’s visit was a very important platform to cultivate relations with the United States, we were not able to capitalize on it. Maybe it was also the fault of the foreign ministry that didn’t know how to present the visit to the Nepali public, or to other international powers. It was not like Nepal had to sign on a dotted line that it was now subscribing to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I do not see why Nepal could not take part in discussions on the concept of Indo-Pacific. There could be, for instance, discussions on how Nepal can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.

We can move ahead in far more positive, constructive and creative ways rather than simply saying Nepal is neutral and implying that the Indo-Pacific Strategy is directed at China and Nepal cannot jeopardize the BRI.

The government lost an opportunity. The idea of Indo-Pacific is not contradictory to the Belt and Road Initiative. Even international media are presenting the two as mutually exclusive ideas. We can reconcile the two broad foreign policy concepts, one coming from China and another from the US.

How do you observe Nepal’s evolving relations with China?

It is headed in a positive direction. I frequently visit bordering areas such as Kerung and Hilsa. China is developing infrastructures along its border with Nepal. It shows how much importance China attaches to its relations with Nepal. We do not have the same level of infrastructure on the Nepali side. There is hardly any movement on our side. Bordering areas on our side do not have electricity. For example, police cum administrators are working without electricity in Hilsa, which is an important place. Hilsa is not connected with roads to the district headquarters. We can’t even get electricity from China, even though the locals want it desperately. There has not been any initiative to bring electricity from China to these areas. There is a lack of clarity. Pretty much the same could be said about our bilateral relations.

The BRI process in Nepal seems stuck. Then there is that talk of a debt trap.

Yes, obviously a country like Nepal, which is going through a transition and which is much weaker than China, India or the US, should be cautious. But this is just one narrative. We have to avoid the kind of entanglements seen in other countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Everyone is talking about a debt-trap. But one narrative cannot define Nepal’s relationship with China. There are other bilateral issues.  Around 7,000 Nepali students are studying in China. There are 65 weekly flights between Kathmandu and various Chinese cities. They are important for boosting our economic relationship. Tourism is another area that can enhance economic relations.

But there are some structural problems between the two countries. There have been discussions on railway connectivity and people are very excited. But there is no road connectivity. We have not talked to the Chinese about ensuring our agriculture products’ access in their market. Our government authorities have not sat down with their Chinese counterparts to discuss and settle this issue. This is a glaring weakness on the part of our government. There are many examples of this relationship moving forward but there are also counter-signs. Take the example of the ring road in Kathmandu. We should take it in a positive way because it is a significant piece of infrastructure. Rather than indulging conspiracy theories, we should be thankful to the Chinese government. We can plant trees and manage cycle lanes there on our own. Again, there are multiple narratives. We should try to understand those narratives.

How does Nepal manage the strategic competition between the US, India and China?

We talked about the railway from China, which is an extraordinary development. The Nepali leadership wants to show it to the public. See this is how our relations are progressing! But the Nepali leadership has not taken the initiative to take India into confidence. We have a 1,700 km-long open border with India. It is a historical fact, whether you like it or not. Our border with China, on the other hand, is closed. Trade relations between India and China are growing and there are frequent interactions between them. They also have serious disagreements on security matters. How you allay Indian concerns about this railway from China? Is it not the responsibility of our leadership?

We have to be sensitive while dealing with this delicate matter. In sum, we have to take India and China into confidence. That is the only way to move forward.

4 In key appointments 

APEX Series

WOMEN IN POLITICS

1 In political parties

2 In the legislature

3 In the executive

4 In key appointments

5 Overall picture 

Currently there are five com­missioners (including the chief commissioner) at the Election Commission (EC), a constitutional body mandated to hold federal, provincial and local level elec­tions. Of the five, Ila Sharma is the only female commissioner. It’s ironic that the commission, which is responsible for ensuring the rep­resentation of 33 percent women in the national and provincial par­liaments and in political parties, is itself un-inclusive. The Public Service Commission (PSC), another constitutional body mandated to select public servants on an inclusive basis, also suffers from inadequate female represen­tation. Of its six members (including a chairperson), only one—Brinda Hada Bhattarai—is female. Both these key constitutional bodies, with the responsibility of implementing the nation’s policy of inclusion, are rather exclusionary.

Other bodies share the same fate. The Commission for the Investiga­tion of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is another important constitu­tional body where the represen­tation of women is poor. Sabitri Gurung is the only female commis­sioner at the CIAA. The situation at the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) is also disap­pointing; of its six commissioners, Mohana Ansari is the only woman. No constitutional body in the coun­try is headed by a woman.

There is no official record of polit­ical appointments of women, but observers say the low number of female appointees is an old prob­lem. The government makes dozens of political appointments (besides those to the federal and provincial parliaments and to the cabinet), but very few appointees are women. This clearly shows the political par­ties’ disinclination to ensure the constitutionally-required represen­tation of women in state organs.

The situation has remained unchanged even after the promul­gation of a new constitution in 2015, the holding of three tiers of elections in 2017, and the formation of a gov­ernment with a two-third majority last year. Now, there is a tendency of appointing a token number of women just to show commitment to the principle of inclusion.

In the third week of January this year, the government recommended the heads of five commissions—National Natural Resources and Fis­cal Commission, National Inclusion Commission, Madhesi Commission, Tharu Commission and Muslim Commission. None of the five rec­ommended chiefs is a woman.

In letter, not spirit

These commissions were envi­sioned by the constitution to pro­mote an inclusive polity, but the approach taken to make appoint­ments to them is not inclusive. This is a clear violation of the con­stitution, whose article 283 says: “Appointments to offices of con­stitutional organs and bodies shall be made in accordance with the inclusive principle.”

When it comes to political appointments to other state appa­ratuses, women’s representation is nominal as well. The core idea behind having a certain number of female political appointees is to ensure adequate representation of women in important decision-mak­ing processes. Since women are severely underrepresented in political institutions, observers say due attention should be given to securing a minimum number of seats for women.

“There is a flawed understand­ing among our political leaders that women cannot take up lead­ership and carry out their respon­sibilities well,” says Manchala Jha, a member of the Truth and Rec­onciliation Commission (TRC). “If women are given an opportunity, they are fully capable of leading constitutional and other state bodies,” she adds. Besides Jha, the TRC has one other female member (Madhabi Bhatta).

The basic principle behind political appointments is recruit­ing experts in specific fields. How­ever, women with close connec­tions to political parties are being appointed and those without such connections are denied the same opportunities. In other words, polit­ical cadres without the necessary expertise are being appointed to important positions.

Observers say the appointment of women with political access and connection does not fulfill the basic principle of inclusion, and that women from marginalized commu­nities without political affiliations must get opportunities.

“Political appointments since the Panchayat era clearly demonstrate that women with better political con­nections are getting all the opportu­nities,” says Harihar Birahi, former President of the Federation of Nep­alese Journalists. Bihari, who has been closely following the country’s political developments for several decades, says women close to the monarchy were appointed to gov­ernment positions during the Pan­chayat period. “Right through the past five decades, capable women without good political connections have been passed over in favor of less deserving candidates with such connections,” says Birahi.

Old problem

There is no official record of the political appointments made during the Panchayat and the democratic periods. But very few women were politically appointed during the Pan­chayat era for a few reasons. First, the number of educated women during that period was very low and it was difficult to find the appropri­ate person. Second, few places were allocated for political appointments. Third, the concepts of inclusion and women’s empowerment were not firmly established and there was no pressure group to take up the issue of women’s representation.

Birahi says the Panchayat regime appointed very few women to gov­ernment bodies. “Now the space for political appointments has expanded, and there has been some progress in women’s representation but still not up to a desirable level,” he says.

Although there are enough qual­ified women now and sufficient space for appointing them, politi­cal parties are seemingly hesitant to do so. Even in offices that meet the constitutional requirement of female representation, the roles and contributions of women are not always properly recognized. There are complaints that women’s opin­ions are not heeded while making important decisions. Often women also carry the extra burden of hav­ing to go beyond the call of duty to prove they are as qualified as their male counterparts.

Ambassadorship is another area where the government makes political appointments. Accord­ing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal has embassies in 30 countries, of which two—those in Oman and Japan—have women ambassadors who were politically appointed: Sarmila Parajuli Dhakal and Prativa Rana respectively. Rana, who is the mother-in-law of the Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, was appointed by the previous government. Besides Dhakal and Rana, Sewa Lamsal Adhikari is a woman ambassador (to Pakistan), but she’s a joint secretary at the MoFA, not a political appointee.

Lucky Sherpa, who was serving as the Nepali Ambassador to Australia, stepped down a few days ago after being accused of human trafficking, although she has denied the charges. In 2012, Maya Kumar Sharma, who was serving as the Nepali Ambassa­dor to Qatar, was recalled over her objectionable remarks against the Gulf nation.

Disturbing patterns

Among those most recently rec­ommended for an ambassadorial position, the only woman is Anjan Shakya (to Israel). There is already criticism that Shakya was chosen directly under Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s order: The two are distant relatives.

The current pattern of ambas­sadorial appointments clearly goes against constitutional provi­sions. Article 282 of the constitu­tion says, “The President may, on the basis of the principle of inclu­sion, appoint Nepalese ambassa­dors and special emissaries for any specific purposes.”

In contrast, powerful countries are appointing female ambassadors to Nepal. Hou Yanqi is the new Chi­nese Ambassador to Nepal. Other countries have also appointed female ambassadors to Nepal. Egypt, Bangladesh, Brazil, Sri Lanka and China have female ambassadors in Kathmandu, as does the Euro­pean Union.

Besides constitutional bodies and ambassadorial positions, political appointments are made to public enterprises, which are under gov­ernment control. But again, very few women have been appointed to these bodies. And the heads of state-owned Nepal Television, Radio Nepal, Rastriya Samachar Samiti and Gorkhapatra Cooperation are all politically appointed males.

Political appointment is an over­looked issue in Nepal. Women leaders and members of the civil society haven’t exerted enough pressure on the government and political parties to ensure 33 per­cent female representation in polit­ical appointments. The current scenario is unlikely to change unless women leaders from across the political spectrum come together to build pressure. Similarly, the Public Service Commission should compel the government to ensure that at least a third of the political appoin­tees are women.