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The Chinese delegation under Foreign Minister Wang Yi was not pleased. It had come to Kathmandu to prepare the ground for President Xi Jinping’s much-discussed Nepal visit. But neither could it get the Nepali side to finalize the BRI projects Nepal wanted China to help with, nor was it assured about the ‘security preparations’ for Xi’s trip.  

Possible protests in Nepal by pro-Tibet activists or by the local Muslim community over China’s treatment of its Uighurs are a big headache for China. The Chinese delegation would not have been reassured by the small protest in front of the Chinese Embassy by a group of women, on whatever pretext, when it was in town. This is perhaps the first time that there has been a public protest in front of the Chinese Embassy during the visit of a high-level dignitary from China. The Chinese were left wondering: Even with its supposedly foolproof preparations, how could Nepal Police have failed to guard the embassy periphery?

According to high-level intelligence officials in Nepal, the Chinese side has to be fully assured that there would be no such faux pas before they give the final stamp of approval to Xi’s Nepal visit. But if he comes, it will be a momentous occasion: the first time a Chinese president will be in Nepal in 23 years, after Jiang Zemin’s 1996 trip. The exact date and duration of Xi’s trip is yet to be worked out. Probably he will come. If the Chinese are fully assured of security, he could even stay the night. If not, it would be an eight- or nine-hour visit.

In 2016, when Xi visited Bangladesh, there were speculations that he could visit Nepal too. Many reckon the visit was cancelled due to the sudden collapse of the UML-Maoist coalition government. “In 2016, powerful forces were successful in blocking Xi’s visit. But this time, he is almost sure to come,” says Tanka Karki, a former Nepali ambassador to China.  

The Chinese will push for the signing of at least one major BRI project to justify Xi’s trip. Besides that, the visit of the Chinese president could also set in motion a geopolitical tug-of-war. Its consequences could be felt far into the future.

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Xi’s route to Kathmandu

Barring a dramatic turn of events, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a state visit to Nepal next month. To lay the ground for the visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi completed a three-day trip to Kathmandu earlier this week. In recent years, high-level Chinese officials have been coming here with increasing frequency. But Xi will be the first Chinese President to come to Nepal in 23 years since Jiang Zemin’s trip in 1996.

Government officials say the Chinese foreign minister had three broad agendas—to take stock of the preparations for Xi’s security; to explore specific agendas during XI’s visit; and to create a conducive political environment for his visit. Wang held detailed discussions with Prime Minister KP Oli and President Bidya Devi Bhandari about Xi’s visit.

“Both sides underscored the importance of the exchange of high level visits on a regular basis in order to develop mutual trust and confidence, and to further strengthen bilateral relations,” reads the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of Wang’s visit. According to Nepali officials, the Chinese side will finalize the agenda and itinerary of Xi’s visit based on Wang’s inputs.  

During his recent Kathmandu trip, Wang seemed mainly concerned about the security dimension of President Xi’s Nepal visit. Former DIG of Nepal Police Hemanta Malla Thakuri believes there is no physical threat to foreign dignitaries in Nepal. But due to the recent unrest among the Uighur Muslim community in China, Thakuri adds, the Chinese may have felt some threat from this section in Nepal.

Then there is Tibet. “During any high-level visit from China, the main concern is possible protest by the Tibetan community in Nepal,” he says. “Even if there is a minor protest in which members of the Tibetan community can brandish Tibetan flags, the Chinese take it very seriously. So our security forces need to be on high alert.”

A senior intelligence officer with the National Investigation Department says the Chinese would finalize President Xi’s visit only after being completely assured. High-level security teams from China have been regularly visiting Nepal in the past few weeks. “Just to be double sure, Nepal Army will be deployed at the front row of the security arrangement,” says the NID official.

Settling for a pittance

During the Chinese foreign minister’s visit, the two countries signed three letters of exchanges: on a hospital recovery project in the district of Manang; on providing 5,000 emergency shelter tents; and on a volunteer Chinese teachers’ program. “It would have been better had these minor agreements not been signed during Wang’s visit, as the visit will be followed by Xi Jinping’s much-more consequential trip,” says a retired diplomat who has closely followed Nepal’s diplomatic history with China.

Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao did not visit Nepal during his two terms between 2003 and 2013, even though he was considered to have in-depth knowledge about Nepal and Tibet. During Hu’s tenure, Nepal was undergoing major political upheavals, such as the king’s direct rule, followed by the monarchy’s abolition, and the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly (CA) without delivering a constitution. Now that Nepal has a semblance of political stability, both sides see it as an appropriate time for the Chinese President to pay a visit.

In April this year, President Bhandari had extended an invitation to Xi during her visit to China. Xi had responded that he attached great importance to visiting Nepal, and that he would come here at a convenient time. During the visit, Bhandari and Xi had witnessed the signing of seven bilateral agreements, including the protocol to the Nepal-China Transit and Transport Agreement.

South Asian outlier

Xi is seen as the most powerful Chinese president after Mao Zedong. Last year, the Chinese Communist Party changed its statute, paving the way for Xi to lead country for longer than his recent predecessors. Given this context, a visit by Xi will be significant, and the Nepali side has long desired it. The Chinese side, however, has generally been noncommittal, citing lack of preparations.

In 2016, when Xi visited Bangladesh, there were speculations that he could visit Nepal too. Many politicians and diplomats reckon the visit was cancelled due to the sudden collapse of the CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Centre) coalition government. Some even argue that the government was toppled to forestall Xi’s visit. “In 2016, powerful forces were successful in blocking Xi’s visit. But this time, he is almost sure to come,” says Tanka Karki, a former Nepali ambassador to China.  

In his first five-year tenure, Xi visited several other South Asian countries but not Nepal. He visited Bangladesh in October 2016, in what was the first visit by a Chinese President to Bangladesh in 30 years. During the visit, Bangladesh and China signed 27 agreements worth billions of dollars. Similarly, Xi visited Sri Lanka in 2014, and Pakistan the following year. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives have already gotten loans from China to execute projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India and Bhutan are two South Asian countries that have not joined the BRI. Several South East Asian countries have also launched infrastructure projects under the BRI framework.

BRI push

Soon after becoming Chinese president in 2013, Xi announced the mega infrastructure project, the One Belt One Road (OBOR), which was later named the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Xi’s signature project, it is now a major component of China’s foreign policy. So the BRI will be a major agenda during Xi’s visit to Nepal. Although Nepal signed an MoU on the BRI in 2017, there has not been much progress in selecting and implementing projects under it. Officials say preparations are underway to finalize some projects under the BRI and to form high-level mechanisms to look into BRI-related issues. Xi’s visit is expected to expedite these processes.

His visit could also strengthen bilateral ties at the top political level. Of late, China has given high priority to cultivating relations with Nepali political parties. Rail and road connectivity and Chinese investment in Nepal, including in hydropower, are potential areas of bilateral cooperation. But a major concern of the Chinese side has always been Nepal’s sluggish implementation of bilateral agreements.

Sundarnath Bhattarai of the China Study Center believes Xi’s visit would boost Nepal’s standing in the region. “China is not just our neighbor, it is an emerging global power. Xi’s visit is significant and will have wider regional implications,” he says. “The signing of the protocol to the Nepal-China Transit and Transport Agreement and some progress on railway connectivity are major achievements. Regarding railway projects, we have to try harder to bring India on board,” he adds.

Stopover or direct?

The exact date of Xi’s visit has not been finalized, but Nepali officials are confident it will happen sometime in October. What remains uncertain though is whether Xi will stop over in Kathmandu after his informal summit with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Chennai, or whether he will fly to Kathmandu directly from Beijing. It is also possible that Xi could come to Kathmandu from Tibet, where he will be in October to mark the 60^th anniversary of the ‘democratic reform’ in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

Nepali officials have told their Chinese counterparts that a stopover visit after India would not send a positive signal, and it would be preferable if Xi came to Kathmandu via Tibet or directly from Beijing. While the nature and dates of the visit are unclear, preparations are in full swing to welcome Xi in Kathmandu. Usually, the Chinese side announces dates just before a visit. For instance, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s 2012 visit was kept under wraps until the last minute.  

On 17 September 2015, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) endorsed a new version of the constitution and set September 20 as the day for its promulgation. The very next day, India dispatched its then foreign secretary S. Jaishankar as a special envoy to convince Nepali leaders to delay the constitutional process. Soon after landing in Kathmandu, Jaishankar went to then CPN-UML Chair KP Oli’s residence in Balkot and urged him not to issue the stat­ute in a hurry. Jaishankar then held talks with then Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and senior CPN (Maoist Cen­ter) leaders. There was apparently a harsh exchange of words between Jaishankar and Nepali leaders over the constitution and the demands of Madhes-based parties. Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal report­edly told Jaishankar that he should have visited 15 days earlier to make India’s case. All leaders conveyed a clear message to Jaishankar: the constitution would be promulgated on the set date as the CA had already endorsed it.

A senior ruling NCP leader recalls, “Jaishankar was furious. He warned that the constitution’s acceptance by other countries would be mean­ingless if India did not endorse it.” Oli then sent Pradeep Gyawali to Delhi as his envoy to convince Indian leaders of the validity of the constitutional process. Gyawali was meeting senior Indian government officials, including Jaishankar, when the constitution was promulgated back home.

Much water under the bridge

Coincidentally, Jaishankar was recently in Kathmandu as the Indian Minister for External Affairs for the fifth meeting of the Nepal-India Joint Commission. Through him, Prime Minister Oli extended an invitation to his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi to be the chief guest at Nepal’s Constitution Day cele­brations on Ashoj 3 (September 20). It’s probably too late now for Modi to accept the invitation, but the invite has raised an obvious question: Why did Oli extend it to the prime minister of a country that has not officially welcomed Nepal’s constitution? On 20 Sep­tember 2015, India had only ‘noted’ the promulgation of a new consti­tution in Nepal. Immediately after, it imposed an almost five-month-long economic blockade, ostensibly in support of the protesting Mad­hes-based parties; the real reason behind India’s disapproval of Nepal’s constitution remains a matterof speculation.

India even launched an interna­tional lobbying campaign to per­suade other countries that Nepal’s constitution is not inclusive and needs amendment. Only after the first amendment, which partially fulfilled the demands of the Mad­hes-based parties, did India lift the blockade.

A lot of water has flown under the bridge in the past four years. Madhes-based parties initially boy­cotted the 2017 local elections held under the aegis of the new consti­tution, but eventually joined the electoral process. They took part in the federal and provincial elections and have formed the government in Province 2. Similarly, they have lent support to the Oli government, and a top Madhesi leader Upendra Yadav is now a deputy prime minister. In a way, Madhes-based parties have accepted the charter, though they have not given up their demand for an amendment. India, however, no longer speaks about constitu­tion amendment. Jaishankar did not mention it in his recent meetings with leaders of Madhes-based par­ties. But India’s position in favor of an ‘inclusive constitution’ remains unchanged.

Kashmir conundrum

Observers say if Modi were to attend the Constitution Day cele­brations on September 20, it would signaled India’s endorsement of Nepal’s constitution. But why did PM Oli invite his Indian counterpart knowing full well that Modi has a packed calendar in September? He is scheduled to address an Indian audience in Houston, Texas on Sep­tember 22 and the United Nations General Assembly on September 28. Or was Oli hinting at the kind of impromptu foreign visits of Modi like his 2015 trip to Pakistan or 2018 visit to the Maldives?

“If PM Modi wanted to, he could have come to Nepal for a few hours on September 20,” says a foreign ministry official request­ing anonymity. “But it is also our fault. How could we invite India’s prime minister without any preparation?”

But this official also believes that Modi could have come here had the Nepal government taken a clear position on Kashmir, as Jaishankar had apparently urged PM Oli to do during his recent Kathmandu visit. India wanted Nepal to clearly state that Kashmir is an internal matter of India. But Nepal was under pressure from Pakistan and China not to issue such a statement.

In a surprise statement on Sep­tember 4, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali said that amending the Indian constitution to change Jammu & Kashmir’s status “was entirely the domain of the Indian government… and so we have no comment on that decision.” Many analysts have interpreted this com­ment as an endorsement of India’s recent steps in Jammu & Kashmir. But is this enough to lure Modi to Nepal? They are unsure.

Oli’s surprise?

“If the government wants to cel­ebrate the Constitution Day as a national day by inviting foreign dig­nitaries, there has to be sufficient consultations and preparations,” says Vijaya Kanta Karna, a political analyst. “By inviting Modi, the gov­ernment seems to be angling for full Indian support for the constitution.”

Some Madhes-based parties and civil society groups observe this day as a ‘black day’, as dozens of Mad­hesis were killed during protests around the time of the constitution’s promulgation. This is why “Modi’s participation in the Constitution Day celebrations would have hurt the sentiments of the Madhesi peo­ple,” says a senior Madhesi leader requesting anonymity.

Madhes-based parties have been pressing the government to amend the constitution without delay. As soon as PM Oli returns from Singa­pore, where he is currently undergo­ing medical treatment, these parties are preparing to hold decisive talks on amendment. Leader of Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) Raj Kishor Yadav says, “Our talks with PM Oli will determine our next move.” Pub­licly, Oli has made it amply clear that he is not in favor of another amendment.

Yet a section of the Madhesi lead­ership believes that Oli has ‘softened’ of late. “Perhaps it is the awareness of his mortality, but I find him much more amenable on Madhesi issues these days,” says another top Mad­hesi leader. “Perhaps he could just spring a last-minute surprise on constitution-amendment as well.”

 “The two leaders discussed Nepal’s central role in a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, [and] global issues, including North Korea,” reads the statement issued after Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali’s bilateral talks with his American counterpart Michael R. Pompeo in December last year.

The statement had ignited intense debates in Nepal’s political and dip­lomatic circles. Several observers and politicians, including some from the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP), suspect that the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is a China contain­ment strategy. In this reading, the US is trying to draw Nepal into its security orbit to keep it from taking advantage of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). American officials, however, maintain that the IPS is not targeted against any country and is simply a document that gives direction to the American policy in this region. They stress that the IPS is not an alliance, let alone a military one, and that no country has to sign up to it.

Asked if the IPS is a counter strategy to the BRI, Paul Thomas, the Public Affairs Officer at the US Embassy in Kathmandu, replies: “No. The Indo-Pacific Strategy is a vision for this region and an articu­lation of US policy that has been con­sistent for decades, stretching back to the end of World War II.” Yet even Thomas acknowledges that in the US goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific “all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous, and are not domi­nated—economically or otherwise—by any one nation.” But IPS skeptics have no doubt that this ‘one nation’ is China.

Soon after Gyawali returned home, he was under pressure to clarify what Nepal’s ‘central role’ in the Indo-Pacific entailed. In the party’s standing committee meet­ing on December 22, Gyawali was grilled on the statement. He reportedly responded that although the US sought Nepal’s support, Nepal would not join any military alliance.

Such a response notwithstanding, several NCP leaders suspect that Gyawali made commitments during his US visit. Gyawali and Defense Minister Ishwar Pokhrel have repeat­edly said that Nepal would not join any military bloc. It’s mainly the former Maoist leaders—now part of the ruling NCP—who are critical of Nepal joining the IPS. Dev Prasad Gurung, for instance, has spoken critically about it in the parliament a number of times.

No plans or preparations

On June 1, the US Department of Defense made public its report on the IPS, which, among other claims, says America aims to enhance mili­tary partnership with Nepal.

The Indian Ocean Region is at the crossroads of global trade and com­merce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes.

“While the region offers unprec­edented opportunity, it is also con­fronting a myriad of security chal­lenges, including terrorism, trans­national crime, trafficking-in-per­sons, and illicit drugs. To combat these challenges, the United States seeks opportunities to broaden and strengthen partnerships with India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Ban­gladesh, and Nepal to respond to shared regional challenges,” the document says.

This shows the US considers Nepal a fairly important partner in its Indo-Pacific Strategy—despite Nepal government’s protestation to the contrary. In this context, how should Nepal deal with the IPS? Senior for­eign ministry officials do not seem to have a clear answer. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has not had a detailed discussion on it, nor has it added a separate IPS desk.

“It is an American strategy and currently there are no issues that demand a permanent mechanism and regular communication,” says a senior MoFA official requesting anonymity. “We are a country in the Indo-Pacific region, and we have no option but to support this strategy. From now on it appears the US will deal with us exclu­sively through the IPS. So there is no question of us not joining it,” he adds.

American officials have already hinted that all US support to Nepal will henceforth come under the IPS umbrella. US Deputy Assistant Sec­retary of State for South Asia David J Ranz, during his visit to Nepal a few months ago, said that the Millen­nium Challenge Corporation (MCC), through which the US has outlined a $500 million grant to Nepal, is very much part of the strategy. While the Nepal government has regis­tered a proposal in the parliament to endorse the MCC, officials maintain Nepal should not join any military bloc or alliance under the IPS.

The government thus far has pre­pared no plans on the IPS. Senior MoFA officials bemoan the lack of guidance on the matter. “We already had to handle the BRI and now there is the IPS. So we have to devise a plan on how to skillfully navigate these two frameworks so as to safeguard and further our national interests,” says a former diplomat requesting anonymity.

Political leaders and foreign policy analysts are of the view that Nepal needs a lot of homework to deal with the IPS and the BRI successfully. “Both have military and strategic components,” says Deepak Prakash Bhatta, a security expert and NCP lawmaker. “Nepal has a tendency of stepping back based on the reaction of one country to our engagement with another. We will get nowhere with such a flawed approach. We cannot be aloof and reactive,” Bhatta adds.

Upendra Gautam, General Secre­tary at the Kathmandu-based China Study Center, views the IPS as a mil­itary strategy rather than an economic one. “I went through the Indo Pacific Strategy Report unveiled by the US Department of Defense. The US Ambassador to Nepal said it is a ‘partnership’. But it was prepared and made public by the Pentagon. I read the document and found many issues related to Nepal Army. Peacekeeping has been mentioned as a fundamental issue of the IPS and there is a role of the Army in peacekeeping.”

Competing narratives

Not only Nepal, other South Asian countries also face a dilemma on the IPS. As the IPS is still in a for­mative stage, no country has come up with a definite position on it. The dominant view among small South Asian countries is that they should derive benefit from the eco­nomic and governance components of the IPS. India, however, has not yet spoken about this strategy or the participation of its small neigh­bors in it. But a few weeks back, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs created a separate division to look after issues pertaining to the IPS.

Again, despite America’s claims to the contrary, the IPS is generally perceived in Nepal as a counter-strat­egy to China’s BRI, which could be why the government is having dif­ficulty striking a balance between the two. In fact, it has not issued any statement on it. Ministers and government officials are of the view that big countries like the US can prepare their regional strategy but there is no need to comment on it officially.

But what do the Americans think? How can Nepal benefit from the IPS? According to Paul Thomas of the US Embassy in Kathmandu, “the US IPS is a policy, not a club. It is a policy based around the vision of ensuring this region is free and open for generations to come.”

Nepal has already benefited from this policy, he adds, including through US contribution of billions of dollars of grants over the past 70 years and from US support for a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This approach has maintained stability and fostered economic growth that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of pov­erty and facilitated the free move­ment of people, goods, planes and ocean-going vessels,” Thomas says. “We aren’t asking Nepal to join a club or sign up to an organization. What we are asking is that Nepal stick up for itself and for the rules-based order that protects smaller countries and allows everyone to thrive”

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The idea behind the formation of the Nepal-India Joint Commis­sion in the 1980s was to period­ically review all bilateral issues and projects at the top political level. It was formed after repeated com­plaints from the Nepali side that India-funded projects dragged on for a long time. The bureaucracies of the two countries were expected to resolve long-pending issues based on the commission’s guidelines. “The commission was formed amid concerns in Nepal over India’s ten­dency to hold on to projects but not complete them on time,” says Bhek Bahadur Thapa, a veteran diplomat and Nepal’s former Ambassador to India. More than three decades have passed since the commission was formed in 1987, but only five meet­ings have so far been held—the first in 1987, and then in 1988, 2014, 2016 and the most recent one in 2019. There is a provision of organizing such meetings every two years alter­nately between Nepal and India, but that has not been happening.

The long-delayed fifth meeting of the commission, which took place this week in Kathmandu, reviewed a whole gamut of bilat­eral issues, including trade, transit, investments, defense and security, border management, power, water resources and agriculture. Yet the fifth meeting also ended without detailed discussions on pending bilateral issues. Even though the meetings were scheduled over two days, they were wrapped up in one evening.

“Both sides reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral relations with specific focus on the areas of con­nectivity and economic partner­ship; trade and transit; power and water resources sectors; culture, and education,” says a press release issued at the end of the meeting. The statement says that views were exchanged on the review of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and submission of the report of the Emi­nent Persons Group on Nepal-In­dia Relations (EPG-NIR). There was also discussion on inundation in border areas.

On Nepal’s request for additional air entry routes, the meeting con­cluded that discussions are already underway between the civil aviation authorities of the two countries, even though these discussions have thus far been fruitless. Nor could much progress be made on other pending issues.

Similarly, cross-border transport facilitation, education, cultural and youth exchanges, tourism, railways and infrastructure development are other vital issues the commission deals with. It also reviews sub-re­gional, regional and international issues of mutual interest.

Fits and starts

The third meeting of the commis­sion had taken place after a hiatus of 23 years when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014. It was seen as part of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s desire to elevate bilateral relations to a political level. No meeting had taken place after 1988, almost as if the two sides had forgotten the commission even existed.

The third meeting in July 2014 reactivated the commission and underscored its importance in furthering bilateral relations. The fourth meeting of the India-Nepal Joint Commission was held in New Delhi on 27 October 2016, but it yielded no substantial outcome. There was no meeting in 2018 due to the preparations for the Indian general elections. Finally, the fifth meeting of the commission took place this week.

Compared to the previous decades, progress was made on some big development projects during Modi’s first tenure. Energy banking, Janakpur-Jayanagar rail­way, an electronic cargo tracking system for Nepal-bound shipments, an Integrated Check Post, petro­leum pipelines, projects related to post-earthquake reconstruction are some areas that have seen progress.

The two countries also formed the Nepal-India Oversight Mechanism in 2016, with the goal of reviewing progress on bilateral economic and development projects. The meet­ings, six of which have already been held, are co-chaired by Nepal’s for­eign secretary and Indian Ambas­sador to Nepal, to facilitate smooth execution of projects within a spe­cific time frame. Officials say the mechanism has been instrumental in identifying and clearing bottle­necks in bilateral projects.

In his first tenure, Narendra Modi had instructed the Indian bureau­cracy to speed up bilateral projects and conduct periodic reviews. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs also carries out periodic reviews of bilateral projects in Nepal. Partic­ularly after 2014, successive Nepali prime ministers have been insist­ing on the completion of past proj­ects instead of signing new ones, thus putting pressure on the Indian side. The Indian government has also faced criticism at home for not doing enough to check the growing Chinese influence in Nepal. Many in India think their country needs to deliver on the promises it makes to its small neighbors.

Not one-way street

But the Indian side is of the view that Nepal is equally responsible for the delay in bilateral projects. India often complaints that Nepali author­ities are not serious about clearing hurdles in development projects, such as land acquisition. They also blame Nepal’s bureaucratic red-tape. Indian projects in the past (and even now to some extent) have been opposed by various Maoist groups, which have also contributed to the delay. According to former Nepali Ambassador to India, Deep Kumar Upadhyay, between 2014 and 2018 there was maximum effort to com­plete pending projects, to no avail.

Speaking at a recent program, Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali said projects that have been in limbo for two decades or more should be dropped. The Pancheshwar Mul­tipurpose Project tops this list. It was conceived under the Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India in 1996.

Similarly, issues related to the annual flooding of various parts of southern Nepal due to the infra­structure on the Indian side remain unresolved. Although a joint task­force inspected the inundated areas, there has been no agreement on a way forward. Exporters of Nepali products to India face a myriad of problems on the border, and Nepal’s huge trade imbalance with its south­ern neighbor remains another major issue.

Former Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Sherstha stresses the need for regular meetings of the Nepal-India Joint Commission in order to set­tle bilateral issues amicably. “The main objective of the commission is to review bilateral issues and to identity priority areas,” says Shres­tha. Former foreign ministers and ambassadors with whom APEX spoke were of the view that although there have been positive talks at the political level, implementation has always been dismal. They think regular meetings are necessary but not sufficient; the two sides should also seriously think about the bot­tlenecks in implementation. Even the agreements reached during pre­vious commission meetings have been shelved.

For example, the third meeting held in Kathmandu in 2014 had reiterated the need for reviewing, adjusting and updating the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty of Peace and Friendship to better reflect current realities. It had directed the foreign secretaries to make necessary rec­ommendations, but it was never executed. Instead a Nepal-India Emi­nent Persons’ Group was formed to recommend ways to review the treaty.

With Modi’s recent re-election as India’s prime minister and S Jais­hankar’s appointment as the foreign minister, it remains to be seen how bilateral projects and issues will move forward. But if the fifth Joint Commission meeting is any guide, we should keep our expectations in check

After the disastrous 2017 parliamentary polls, Nepal’s Grand Old Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has been going through a deep leadership crisis. Soon after the election debacle, there were strong voices in the party in favor of an impromptu General Convention to elect new leadership. Youth leaders in particular are of the view that the current leadership can no longer run the party well, hence the need for new leadership to revitalize it.

After continuous inside pressure, a Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting this week decided to initiate the process of holding the convention within a year. The pressure came mainly from senior leaders Ram Chandra Poudel, Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala. Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba has been facing the heat for failing to transform the party’s structure into a federal setup and to play an effective role as the head of the main opposition party in the parliament.

As part of the preparations for the 14^th General Convention, the CWC has decided to alter the party’s organizational structures into interim structures appropriate for the federal setup. As per an agreement, a CWC meeting in the second week of December will prepare a specific timeframe for the convention. Similarly, the party is all set to start the process of renewing active membership.  

This means that the race for party presidency has well and truly begun. Congress leaders believe there will be new alignments in the lead-up to and during the convention. At the 13^th GC, there were three factions led by Deuba, Poudel and Sitaula, an arrangement which has continued till date. Senior leader Shekhar Koirala has not taken any side but is preparing to fight for party presidency himself.

Changing face

Youth leaders think that the current leadership—which not only means Deuba but also other senior leaders like Poudel, Sitaula and General Secretary Shashank Koirala—cannot effectively lead the party in the face of a strong Nepal Communist Party which has a near two-thirds majority in the House. “We have high respect and love for our incumbent leaders, but it’s clear that they cannot reform the party. The public will no longer accept them as the party’s face. A change is the need of the hour,” says Congress youth leader Gagan Thapa.

Many party leaders believe an ordinary leadership cannot take the party into the next set of elections, and that it needs charismatic leaders who can communicate with the people with a powerful message. While some think young leaders like Thapa can play that role, the old generation leaders are unlikely to accept his leadership. The NC, many believe, is therefore going through the worst leadership crisis in its seven-decade history.

According to a CWC member, completely displacing the incumbent leadership in a party like the Congress is not possible. Leaders and cadres have a hierarchical mentality; they think youth leaders should wait until the older generation retires. “The NC has leaders who have emerged from a long struggle, served jail terms and are totally dedicated to the party. They are not ready to hand over leadership to the new generation easily,” says Puranjan Acharya, a political analyst and a close observer of Congress politics.

Deuba seems to be in no mood to give up his claim to party leadership in the next GC though. He has publicly said that he would take rest only after elevating the party’s position in national politics. “The party lost the last elections badly while Deuba was its president. He does not want to retire with the tag of an incompetent party president,” said a leader close to Deuba.

Divided he wins

Despite his unpopularity among the youths and criticism by rival factions, Deuba maintains a strong hold on the party’s organizational base. So he is likely to emerge victorious in the next GC if multiple factions fight for presidency.

There is talk of an anti-Deuba alliance in the Congress, but it is unclear how or whether it will happen. Poudel, who claims to be senior to Deuba, complains he is always relegated to second position in the party. Poudel’s several attempts to become prime minister and party president have been unsuccessful. He was defeated by Deuba in the race for party presidency at the 13^th convention. Poudel’s faction is weaker but is in the limelight because of the presence of popular youth leaders such as Gagan Thapa and Pradeep Poudel. The senior leader has confided to his close aides that he wants to lead the party once and then retire. He wants all leaders in the anti-Deuba camp to support him in his bid for party presidency. 

Not everyone will oblige. Shekhar Koirala has been making preparations to stake his own claim on party presidency, although leaders from the Poudel faction, such as Prakash Man Singh, Ram Sharan Mahat and Arjun Nara Singh KC, argue that Shekhar is a junior leader in terms of his active party politics.

“That argument makes me sad. I accept that I am junior. But what is the status of the party that is now being led by seniors? I respect them. But the logic that juniors cannot fight for presidency is unacceptable,” Koirala told APEX. 

Though they have their differences, three members of the Koirala family—Shekhar, Shashank and Sujata—seem to have come together in the past couple of years. But it is still unclear whether Shashank will support Shekhar. Shashank has not yet given any clues about his plan; he has only spoken broadly about the need for a change in party leadership.

Which seems possible only if everyone decides to gang up against Deuba. Shekhar is trying to incentivize Gagan into supporting him by offering him the post of General Secretary. Shekhar claims that if Gagan and his young supporters back him, he would completely hand over party leadership to youth leaders at the 15^th convention. The Koirala family, because of BP’s legacy, still enjoys considerable support; despite limited leadership skills and lack of a clear agenda, Shashank Koirala was elected General Secretary at the 13^th GC by a wide margin.

Deuba believes it would be easy for him to win party presidency if there are multiple candidates. So he will try to prevent a possible gang-up against him, according to a senior party leader.

After the disastrous 2017 parlia­mentary polls, Nepal’s Grand Old Party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has been going through a deep leadership crisis. Soon after the election debacle, there were strong voices in the party in favor of an impromptu General Convention to elect new leadership. Youth leaders in particular are of the view that the current leadership can no longer run the party well, hence the need for new leadership to revitalize it. After continuous inside pressure, a Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting this week decided to initiate the process of holding the conven­tion within a year. The pressure came mainly from senior leaders Ram Chandra Poudel, Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala. Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba has been facing heat for failing to transform the party’s structure into a federal setup and to play an effec­tive role as the head of the main opposition party in the parliament.

As part of the preparations for the 14th General Convention, the CWC has decided to alter the par­ty’s organizational structures into interim structures appropriate for the federal setup. As per an agree­ment, a CWC meeting in the second week of December will prepare a specific timeframe for the conven­tion. Similarly, the party is all set to start the process of renewing active membership.

This means that the race for party presidency has truly begun. Congress leaders believe there will be new alignments in the lead-up to and during the convention. At the 13th GC, there were three factions led by Deuba, Poudel and Sitaula, a state of affairs that has continued till date. Senior leader Shekhar Koirala has not taken any side but is pre­paring to fight for party presidency himself.

Changing face

Youth leaders think that the cur­rent leadership—which not only means Deuba but also other senior leaders like Poudel, Sitaula and Gen­eral Secretary Shashank Koirala—cannot effectively lead the party in the face of a strong Nepal Com­munist Party which has a near two-thirds majority in the House. “We have high respect and love for our incumbent leaders, but it’s clear that they cannot reform the party. The public will no longer accept them as the party’s face. A change is the need of the hour,” says Congress youth leader Gagan Thapa.

Many party leaders believe an ordinary leadership cannot take the party into the next set of elections, and that it needs charismatic leaders who can communicate with the peo­ple with a powerful message. While some think young leaders like Thapa can play that role, the old generation leaders are unlikely to accept his leadership. The NC, many believe, is therefore going through the worst leadership crisis in its seven-decade history.

According to a CWC member, completely displacing the incum­bent leadership in a party like the Congress is not possible. Leaders and cadres have a hierarchical mentality; they think youth leaders should wait until the older gener­ation retires. “The NC has leaders who have emerged from a long struggle, served jail terms and are totally dedicated to the party. They are not ready to hand over leader­ship to the new generation easily,” says Puranjan Acharya, a political analyst and a close observer of Congress politics.

Deuba seems to be in no mood to give up his claim to party leader­ship in the next GC. He has publicly said that he would take rest only after elevating the party’s position in national politics. “The party lost the last elections badly while Deuba was its president. He does not want to retire with the tag of an incompe­tent party president,” says a leader close to Deuba.

Divided he wins

Despite his unpopularity among the youths and criticism by rival fac­tions, Deuba maintains a strong hold on the party’s organizational base. So he is likely to emerge victorious in the next GC if multiple factions fight for presidency.

There is talk of an anti-Deuba alliance in the Congress, but it is unclear how or whether it will hap­pen. Poudel, who claims to be senior to Deuba, complains he is always relegated to second position in the party. Poudel’s several attempts to become prime minister and party president have been unsuccessful. He was defeated by Deuba in the race for party presidency at the 13th convention. Poudel’s faction is weaker but is in the limelight because of the presence of pop­ular youth leaders such as Gagan Thapa and Pradeep Poudel. The senior leader has confided to his close aides that he wants to lead the party once and then retire. He wants all leaders in the anti-Deuba camp to support him in his bid for party presidency.

Not everyone will oblige. Shekhar Koirala has been making prepara­tions to stake his own claim on party presidency, although leaders from the Poudel faction, such as Prakash Man Singh, Ram Sharan Mahat and Arjun Nara Singh KC, argue that Shekhar is a junior leader in terms of his active party politics.

“That argument makes me sad. I accept that I am junior. But what is the status of the party that is now being led by seniors? I respect them. But the logic that juniors cannot fight for presidency is unacceptable,” Koirala told APEX. Though they have their differences, three mem­bers of the Koirala family—Shekhar, Shashank and Sujata—seem to have come together in the past couple of years. But it is still unclear whether Shashank will support Shekhar. Sha­shank has not yet given any clues about his plan; he has only spoken broadly about the need for a change in party leadership.

Which seems possible only if everyone decides to gang up against Deuba. Shekhar is trying to incentiv­ize Gagan to support him by offering him the post of General Secretary. Shekhar claims that if Gagan and his young supporters back him, he would completely hand over party leadership to youth leaders at the 15th convention. The Koirala family, because of BP’s legacy, still enjoys considerable support; despite lim­ited leadership skills and lack of a clear agenda, Shashank Koirala was elected General Secretary at the 13th GC by a wide margin.

Deuba believes it would be easy for him to win party presidency if there are multiple candidates. So he will try to prevent a possible gang-up against him, according to a senior party leader

During his visit to the US in 1963, Foreign Minister Tulsi Giri discussed the prospect of military assistance with American officials. The US agreed to give Nepal light weapons, military equipment and medical supplies. Agreement to this end was signed in 1964 and all support was provided in the form of aid.

The following year, the American military experts consisting of nine Signals Corps and eight Vehicles Maintenance Corps arrived in Nepal. In 1965-66, the US provided military assistance worth $1.8 million. In this period, the US also provided some support to the Tibetan rebels based in Khampa. Throughout the Cold War, the US continued its military assistance to Nepal.

Turning point

In the early 2000s, two major developments—the escalating Mao­ist conflict and the 9/11 terror­ist attacks—prompted the US to increase its military assistance to Nepal. The US Mission Nepal Security Cooperation Office offi­cially opened in June 2001 and a military attaché was appointed at its Kathmandu mission. Earlier, security cooperation between the US and Nepal was handled by the US Embassy in Delhi.

From 2001 to 2004, the US sup­ported the then Royal Nepal Army with M16 and M4 rifles, helmets, parachutes and load bearing equip­ment. It also helped the RNA with the creation of the Mahabir Battal­ion, which is now a regiment. In this period, the two countries also began Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCETs) with special operations.

Between 2005 and 2014, the US supported the RNA in its transition to the Nepal Army and assisted with the integration of the Maoist combatants. Additionally, the US helped train and equip the Nepali peacekeeping missions abroad. It was also the start of the US sup­port for disaster response, which is considered a major reason behind Nepal’s increased success in such operations.

American military cooperation and assistance to Nepal has grown further since 2015. Since that year, the US increased support to the Birendra Peacekeeping Operations Training Center (BPOTC) in Kavre district. After the earthquake in April 2015, a Disaster Response Station was opened at the Tribhuwan Inter­national Airport. Projects worth nearly $9 million were launched. During the earthquake, the US Army conducted various disaster response operations.

A blood bank at the Teaching Hos­pital in Maharajgunj came into oper­ation soon after the earthquake. In 2015, the first ever airport disaster response plan for TIA was launched, which was written by CAAN with the US military support.

The US military also completed the construction of the BPOTC headquarters and medical facility. According to information provided by the US Embassy in Kathmandu, the building was designed and con­structed by an entirely Nepali crew, and built to international safety and earthquake resistance standards.

In 2017, the US completed con­struction of the Hetauda Storage Warehouse for the storage of disas­ter response supplies. The same year it completed the Regional Crisis Management Center in Chhauni, Kathmandu.

For 2019-2020, the US has increased funding for training and equipment, the budget raised by nearly $65 million. It has supported disaster response in various prov­inces as well. In Gandaki Province, for example, it is building five new deep tube wells. In Province 7, it is constructing a blood bank. Simi­larly, it has supported the creation of the first regional airport disaster response plan at Pokhara Airport.

The US has also been offering an increasing array of courses, not only to Nepali security personnel but also to its civil servants.

In recent years, mainly after the promulgation of the constitution and China’s assertive inroads into Nepal, the US has enhanced military col­laboration with the small Himalayan country. The frequency of high-level visits has gone up too .