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Experts have urged Nepal to urgently shift toward equity-based investment and implement regulatory reforms, warning that ‘free capital’ inflows will begin to disappear after 2026, when the country graduates from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category.

“The era of free money ends,” said Calvin St. Juste, Special Envoy for Investment of the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, during a high-level roundtable meeting in Kathmandu on Sunday, reads a statement issued by Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (AIDIA).

The event, organized by the Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (AIDIA), brought together senior banking leaders, media representatives, and economic analysts to assess Nepal’s investment landscape, its credit rating trajectory, and opportunities arising from shifting global financial currents.

 “Grants fade, and loans cannot sustainably replace them. Equity can,” he added.

The Envoy encouraged Nepal not to fear its forthcoming graduation from LDC status, but instead view it as an inflection point.

He argued that Nepal should shift from loans to equity-based financing, particularly in sectors like hydropower where domestic capacity is strong but international capital remains essential.

“Political uncertainty is temporary,” he said, adding that challenging or not, this is the moment to bring investors in.

St. Kitts and Nevis ranked among Nepal’s top five foreign direct investment (FDI) sources in 2020-21 in the Nepal Rastra Bank’s report.

Addressing widespread misconceptions around ‘tax haven’ jurisdictions, speakers emphasized the importance of distinguishing competitive tax policy from illicit financial practices, according to the statement.

Addressing the persistent label of ‘tax haven,’ he urged Nepal to reframe the global narrative. “Tax competitiveness is not illegal,” Calvin said, adding that tax avoidance is legal; tax evasion is not. “Don’t be fearful of designing a system that allows your economy to survive.”

Calvin shared the experience of St. Kitts and Nevis, which endured bankruptcy in 2005 after decades of dependence on the sugar industry. The turning point, he explained, came when the country shifted from reliance on commodities and concessional aid toward attracting FDI and building investment-driven resilience.

Calvin, on the occasion, also highlighted the structural similarities between the two nations. “Nepal is landlocked, whereas St. Kitts is sea-locked,” he said, adding “In different ways, we are both small states whose destinies can be profoundly shaped by external forces.”

Referencing a recent Fitch report, that Nepal got BB- ratings, pointed to growing investor hesitation due to political unpredictability, he said Nepal should take the ratings advantage. “As investors, you cannot control politics, but you can control risk.”

He also urged Nepal to proactively address systemic vulnerabilities.

On the occasion, Ram Kumar Tiwari, CEO of Nepal SBI Bank informed that investors have begun pulling back due to current political uncertainty, the statement further reads.

Likewise, Ananda Jha, CEO of CARE Ratings Nepal Ltd highlighted Nepal’s own structural challenges, including conflicts across multiple regulators – Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), Securities Board of Nepal (SEBON) and Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC) – which often lead to fragmented or convenience-driven policy outcomes.

Despite a growing capital market and rising entrepreneurial activity, the country lacks meaningful international access, he said.

Apart from concerns around liquidity scarcity and investor skepticism, participants also pointed to rigid labor policies and a prevailing working culture misaligned with global productivity expectations.

While acknowledging the value of an eight-hour workday, they stressed that technology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) now enable output many times greater without extending hours.

High tax rates – corporate taxes of 20% to 25% and personal taxes up to 39% – are also flagged as deterrents to large-scale investment in Nepal. Participants also questioned the justification for high taxes without visible improvements in public services, underscoring the importance of customer-centric governance.

Sudyumna Prasad Upadhyaya, Sanima GIC CEO, during the discussion highlighted the insurance and reinsurance companies’ performance and profitability in the Caribbean including St Kitts and Nevis.

Nepal and India are holding a meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Petroleum and Gas Cooperation in New Delhi on Monday. 

Joint Secretary Shiva Ram Pokharel of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies will lead the Nepali delegation in the meeting, while a Joint Secretary from the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas will lead the Indian delegation.

The JWG was set up in 2017 to strengthen cooperation between the Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (IOCL) and to widen collaboration in the petroleum and gas sector. 

The meeting comes at a time when Nepal is seeking progress on multiple cross-border energy projects, including the handover of the second phase of the Motihari–Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline and new initiatives to expand bilateral petroleum infrastructure.

Ministry officials say Nepal will push for the formal handover of the second phase of Motihari–Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline, which was completed in October last year but has yet to be transferred to Nepal. 

The first phase of the pipeline, handed over in 2018, currently supplies diesel, petrol and kerosene to Amlekhgunj, from where fuel is distributed to major hubs including Kathmandu, Pokhara, Biratnagar and Bhairahawa. The pipeline now accounts for nearly 70% of Nepal’s nationwide fuel imports.

The meeting is also expected to review the status of several projects, including the proposed Siliguri–Charali pipeline, the Charali storage facility and the planned Amlekhgunj–Chitwan pipeline. The storage facility in Chitwan will be built with Nepali investment and Indian technical cooperation.

Officials say Nepal will also push for the Motihari-Sarlahi gas pipeline. It will also brief India on new domestic storage projects under development, including depots being built on NOC land in Rupandehi.

Nepal is additionally exploring the possibility of receiving aviation turbine fuel (ATF) through the cross-border pipeline, according to Indian media reports.

India is the sole supplier of petroleum products for Nepal. NOC currently imports diesel, petrol, kerosene, ATF and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from the India Oil Corporation (IOC).

Nepal’s political landscape has been shaped repeatedly by acts of betrayal, and today’s GenZ movement finds itself encircled by similar breaches of trust—both from state institutions and non-state forces. This pattern is not new. Twenty years after the 2006 Second People’s Movement, that abolished the monarchy and established a federal republic, Nepal witnessed another youth-led uprising in Sept 2025, commonly referred to as the “GenZ” movement. The protesters’ core demands centered on ending systemic corruption, addressing mass unemployment, lifting restrictions on social media, holding the state accountable and dismantling entrenched old power structures. While some voices within the movement called for constitutional amendments or a directly-elected prime minister, the demand for immediate elections was not the primary focus.

Nevertheless, in response President Ramchandra Paudel dissolved the House of Representatives, appointed former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister and announced fresh elections within six months. Many observers see this rapid dissolution and election announcement as the latest instance of the state deflecting, rather than addressing, popular demands for systemic change.

Whether this abrupt move constitutes a deliberate strategy to defuse and ultimately neutralize the GenZ youth rebellion remains a critical question that warrants serious national debate.

Whither constitutional legitimacy?

After the government collapsed and Parliament was dissolved, the nation was left without leadership. Holding fresh elections and seeking a new public mandate appeared to be the most legitimate and constitutional way forward. It would have ensured that the interim government remained only a temporary arrangement, functioning strictly within constitutional limits. However, this path was never pursued.

The President should have first explored the possibility of forming a new government from within the existing Parliament, safeguarding constitutional integrity and institutional dignity. The more democratic alternative would have been to respond to the aspirations of the youth, bring their concerns to the floor of Parliament, and open meaningful avenues for their representation and participation in state governance. Nepal has taken such steps before—it is not a distant chapter of history.

Yet, the interpretation of the symbolic burning of ‘parliament’ during the movement as an attack on the institution itself has now become a contentious matter, one that may shape political debates and institutional behaviour far into the future.

Some argue that calling for fresh elections in the midst of a power vacuum is merely an effort to preserve the existing power structure. Others claim that this step does not resolve constitutional deadlocks but stands in direct violation of the constitution. Meanwhile, even as the demand for parliamentary restoration remains under judicial review, the very parties advocating for it are preparing to contest elections scheduled for March 5 next year. This, in effect, suggests that they have dismissed the spirit of the GenZ movement.

For some, elections were presented as a way to absorb the movement’s energy—redirecting youthful activism from the streets into parliamentary politics. Yet this logic contradicts the core of the youth uprising, which never demanded immediate elections. The protests exerted intense pressure on those in power, but following the election declaration, criticism has grown that the President’s decision—taken in the belief that street anger could be channeled into ballot papers—constitutes a profound betrayal of the movement’s purpose. In response, a segment of the youth now questions whether another uprising is needed to secure the goals for which they first took to the streets.

A bid to signal stability

By announcing the election date, the President appears to be projecting a message—both domestically and internationally—that Nepal is moving from instability toward procedural normalcy. Despite the scheduled elections creating an impression of institutional restoration, the conditions for a fair and credible vote are still far from secure. If the elections were to be cancelled under such circumstances, the country could face another crisis, reminiscent of events like prison breakouts and the burning of government buildings during previous unrest.

A limited mandate

The interim administration has been granted only one primary task: to conduct elections. This narrow mandate risks entrenching the same old power structures riddled with corruption. In such an environment, the possibility of the GenZ movement returning to the streets remains high. The interim government itself has repeatedly clarified that its role is not to engineer systemic change, but merely to steer the country back to the constitutional path through elections.

Yet, elections within six months are no cure-all. The challenges ahead are immense. The youth-led uprising has demanded deeper structural reforms—reforms that are currently not being addressed. The President’s decision to withhold authority from the interim government to amend the constitution or initiate institutional restructuring stands in stark contradiction to the spirit of transition. This raises a real risk that elections may simply reopen the door for the old parties to regain power.

There is also constitutional ambiguity regarding the appointment of a prime minister from outside Parliament following its dissolution. Fears persist that those powers granted in the present could be misused in the future.

Trust, reform and inclusion

Nepal is navigating a turbulent period. Institutions are weakened, and public trust in the state is steadily eroding. In such a context, six months is a short window. Rushed elections may favor established political forces rather than fairness or reform. If grievances over unemployment, corruption, exclusion and limited opportunity remain unaddressed, dissatisfaction could resurface even more strongly.

Simply announcing elections and releasing attractive party manifestos cannot restore people’s faith in the existing order. Trust must be rebuilt through visible action. The interim government must prioritise transparency and accountability from day one. Public disclosure of assets—from ministers and top officials to senior policymakers—is essential to reinforce integrity in state leadership.

Sensitive corruption cases must be pursued without delay, and the law must be allowed to act decisively. Only then will citizens feel the beginning of change. Equally crucial is the meaningful inclusion of youth, experts, women, indigenous communities and civil society in candidate selection and electoral rule-making—because inclusive participation is the foundation of genuine democracy.

Before the election day arrives, Nepal needs a broad national dialogue on long-overdue reforms and on the review of vague or disputed constitutional provisions. Such deliberation can set the groundwork for stability, improve governance and gradually rebuild public confidence in the system.

The unprecedented youth-led protests of Sept 8–9—now popularly referred to as the GenZ movement—have fundamentally reshaped Nepal’s political landscape. What began as a decentralized, internet-driven outcry against a proposed social media ban swiftly grew into a mass uprising that targeted corruption, nepotism, impunity, and elite capture of the state. Although Nepal has witnessed people’s movements before, this was the first time that a digitally coordinated, leaderless, GenZ-dominated mobilization managed to topple a powerful government and force all major political parties into deep introspection.

In the two-day violence altogether 76 people were killed, leaving dozens injured. Yet the broader political consequences were even more far-reaching. The immediate effects of the protests was collapse of coalition government of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, installation of interim government led by former chief justice Sushila Karki, a legitimacy crisis across traditional parties, leadership struggles and generational tensions with each party, and a renewed debate about intra-party democracy and accountability.

The movement provided a space for second-rung leaders of the major parties to speak up against the monopoly of single leaders inside the party. But, top leaders of the major parties have shown very few or no indication of reflection and accept their past mistakes. 

The GenZ movement also showed that there was a deep frustration among the party rank and file against the leaders, as it has been revealed that even the cadres of NC, UML and Maoist were engaged in the arson and vandalisms of party leaders. It also showed the animosity among local level cadres of the major political parties because some cadres of NC were engaged in the vandalism of private residences of CPN-UML and vice versa. Similarly, cadres of Maoist and Rastriya Swatantra Party also attacked the NC and UML leaders.

Inside the Nepali Congress

The Nepali Congress—the oldest democratic party—found itself at the epicenter of public anger. The shocking assault on Party President Sher Bahadur Deuba and then–Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba at their residence was emblematic of the extent of the public’s fury. Their rescue by the Nepal Army late on Sept 9 evening  and subsequent hospitalization symbolized the spectacular collapse of the NC’s authority. For weeks after the protests, Deuba remained silent, undergoing treatment in Singapore, while the party drifted without direction. 

At a critical moment when President Ram Chandra Paudel was consulting parties to form the new government, NC leaders were conspicuously absent. As a result, the Karki-led interim government was formed without NC’s input, a political setback that exposed the party’s organizational paralysis. 

The first NC leader to publicly address the GenZ protestors was General Secretary Gagan Kumar Thapa, who released a video message recognizing the grievances of the youth. His move reenergized young cadres and strengthened calls for generational change.

Soon after, both general secretaries—Gagan Thapa and Bishwa Prakash Sharma—openly demanded that Deuba relinquish party leadership, asserting that the NC could not regain public trust without internal reform. But, Deuba and his supporters opposed Thapa’s demand of resignation stating that it is morally wrong to attack the party leadership at a difficult time, though there is a very few space of morality in the politics.

Under growing pressure, Deuba named Purna Bahadur Khadka as acting party president before leaving for medical treatment. This gesture, however, did little to calm the situation. Top leaders of the party after Deuba, such as Shanshak Koirala, Bimalendra Nidhi, Krishna Prasad Sitaula, Prakash Man Singh, Prakash Sharan Mahat, Gopal Man Shrestha and Bijaya Kumar Gachhadar, stood against Thapa.

As per NC’s statute, Deuba is no longer eligible to run for the presidency, which means a leadership transition is unavoidable. But the question is who will lead the transition—and when. In the wake of the protests, about 54 percent of general convention representatives signed a petition demanding a special general convention before the March 5 national elections. Their objective was clear: elect a new leadership that resonates with the GenZ wave. But the proposal of a special general convention faced fierce resistance from seven brothers. They argued that holding a convention based on outdated delegate lists would be unfair and politically unsound. Acting President Khadka and senior leader Shekhar Koirala played a neutral role but they were also against Thapa and Sharma. In a way, all top leaders are against the Thapa’s bid to become party president either from special general convention or regular one.

The conflict escalated when Thapa and Sharma, backed by younger leaders and grassroots cadres, threatened to unilaterally convene the convention. This raised the specter of a party split, sending shockwaves through the NC. The party’s indecision lasted nearly two months, during which critics accused the NC of failing to act as the responsible political actors.  Ultimately, the Central Working Committee decided to hold the convention in January, setting off a fierce internal leadership contest. Thapa has announced his candidacy, positioning himself as the face of generational change. The establishment faction is preparing to field Khadka as their candidate. Senior leader Koirala, who previously competed against Deuba, is also gearing up for the presidency.

The outcome remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: The GenZ movement has forced the NC to confront its internal contradictions and prepare for a transformation it long resisted. However, holding the party’s general convention in January is still challenging, as the dispute regarding the active membership still remains unsettled. The process of holding NC’s general convention is one of the democratic processes in South Asia and it is too technical as well which demands a great deal of time to accomplish all tasks. The ‘seven brothers’ are working to find a consensual candidate for the party president who can get the support of Deuba.

Inside the UML: Oli’s struggle to retain control

If the NC suffered from inertia, the CPN-UML suffered from arrogance. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli—widely criticized for undemocratic tendencies—became one of the vocal critiques of the youth movement. He had to be evacuated from Baluwatar by the Nepali Army (NA) only after tendering his resignation. Because NA reportedly told him they can rescue him only if he resigns.  For four days, he was held in an army barracks in Makawanpur with his phone confiscated—an extraordinary development for a sitting prime minister in a democratic state—he spent altogether 10 days in army barracks before being released. Once released, Oli launched a political offensive, accusing the Karki government of being “unconstitutional” and calling for the reinstatement of Parliament. 

The party has filed a writ at the Supreme Court demanding the revival of Parliament. But inside the UML, the mood had shifted dramatically. Senior leaders demanded Oli’s resignation from party leadership, arguing that he should take moral responsibility for the deaths of 19 youths. But Oli refused, stating that the GenZ movement was launched against his party and country and he is not responsible for what happened on Sept 8-9.  To avoid the pressure to step down, he declared he would seek a renewed mandate at the Dec 13–15 General Convention.

Even before the GenZ movement, Oli had amended the party statute to secure a third consecutive term as party chair. He also blocked former President Bidhya Devi Bhandari from rejoining the mother party, fearing she could challenge his dominance. His decision to revoke her membership caused deep resentment among party cadres and senior leaders. The GenZ movement only intensified the internal fractures. For the first time in years, a strong challenger has emerged: Ishwar Pokhrel, backed by former President Bhandari and a coalition of disillusioned senior leaders, has announced his candidacy.

Local-level conventions revealed that nearly 50 percent of organized members abstained from voting, signaling widespread frustration and voter fatigue. UML’s upcoming general convention is now seen as a defining moment: a battle between Oli’s authoritarian grip and a rising internal rebellion. Whether Pokhrel can unite the anti-Oli faction remains uncertain, but the party’s internal cohesion has already been severely damaged. Out of 18 office bearers of the party, more than seven have already openly supported the Pokharel. Among the public, UML’s image has been severely damaged due to the killings of 19 students on Sept 8 when Oli was the prime minister. Now, Ishwor Pokhrel is challenging Oli who has the strong backing of the former President Bhandari.

Inside the Maoist Center: Dahal’s cunning consolidation

The Maoist Center responded differently from the NC and UML. Chairperson Pushpa Kamal Dahal was the first major leader to react positively to the GenZ movement. His quick engagement in consultations for the new government allowed him to position himself as a pragmatic and flexible actor.  

To preempt internal criticism, Dahal dissolved the party’s Central Committee and announced the formation of a Convention Organizing Committee. This allowed him to reset the party structure and eliminate internal dissenting voices. Soon after the protests, senior Maoist leaders Janardhan Sharma and Narayan Kaji Shrestha pressed him to step down. But, Sharma was ultimately forced to leave the party after leaders and cadres who were close with Dahal intimidated him through social media and public forms.

Simultaneously, Dahal began a political outreach campaign, inviting former splinter groups and leaders from the CPN (Unified Socialist) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal. Dahal claims that 15 fringe communist groups have now joined his umbrella structure, the newly proclaimed Nepali Communist Party (NCP)—with Dahal as its convener. But, those parties which had joined the party have a minimum level of people’s support.  Whether this unity is ideological or merely symbolic is yet to be seen, but the move has strengthened Dahal’s control over the left space. 

Despite these consolidations, prominent leaders like Janardan Sharma and Sudan Kirati left the Maoist Centre to join former Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai’s new political formation. Their exit underscores the lingering dissatisfaction with Dahal’s long tenure and centralization of authority. Nevertheless, compared to other parties, the Maoists appear the least destabilized—mainly because Dahal has mastered the art of internal crisis management. Unlike NC and CPN-UML, Dahal seemed positive about the GenZ movement. He has also formed a GenZ organization within the party to demonstrate that he fully supports the agenda of the movement. He is attacking Oli for failing to improve himself even after the GenZ movement. Another important development is Pushpa Kamal Dahal has abandoned Maoism because he has agreed to change the name of the party.

Inside the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)

The RSP entered Nepali politics as a fresh alternative to traditional parties, appealing especially to young urban voters. In the 2022 election, it emerged as the fourth largest party in the 275-member House of Representative (HoR), in a surprising victory. But paradoxically, it was one of the parties worst affected by the GenZ movement. Many protesters accused the RSP leadership of opportunism and inconsistency. Similarly, it was found that scores of the party’s cadres at the local level were involved in the arson and vandalism. After the Sept 8 protests, the party’s lawmakers decided to resign en masse from the House of Representative. 

The party’s chair Rabi Lamichhane, who was released from jail during the protests, returned to custody after widespread public criticism. Senior leaders Sumana Shrestha, Santosh Pariyar, and others resigned from the party. RSP hurriedly announced a unification with the Bibeksheel Party, but the move was perceived more as damage control than a strategic coalition. The party’s internal credibility crisis raises questions about whether the RSP can retain the youth support it once enjoyed. At the same time, the party faces a leadership crisis as Lamichhane is in jail. There is a tussle between top leaders of the party.

Inside the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP): Limited impact

The monarchist RPP experienced less disruption compared to the mainstream parties. The party maintained that elections alone cannot solve Nepal’s systemic crisis and called for fundamental political restructuring. A positive outcome of the GenZ movement was that longtime rivals Kamal Thapa and Rajendra Lingden initiated discussions about party unification. Although many challenges remain, both leaders acknowledge that a fragmented right-wing space cannot capitalize on the shifting political mood. Despite uncertainties, the RPP has expressed readiness to participate in upcoming elections.

The dismantle of CPN (Unified Socialist)

The GenZ movement led to the dissolution of the CPN (Unified Socialist) party led by former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal who had formed the party in 2022, breaking up his ties with CPN-UML Chairperson Oli. A group of leaders led by Madhav Kumar Nepal decided to make party unification with CPN (Maoist Center) with an agreement of forming a new party Nepali Communist Party. However, scores of leaders refused to join Nepali Communist Party. Some leaders including Ram Kumari Jhakri decided to return to their mother party CPN-UML, while senior leaders of Ghana Shyam Bhushal joined hand CPN (Unified) led by veteran communist leader Chandra Dev Joshi.

The GenZ movement has forced Nepal’s political elites to confront realities they long ignored. 

Traditional parties can no longer rely on hierarchical, patronage-based politics. Leaders cannot remain in power indefinitely without facing internal revolts. Youth frustration has reached a breaking point—and will continue to shape political behavior. Political transparency and accountability are now unavoidable demands. Every major party—NC, UML, Maoist Centre, RSP, and RPP—has been compelled to undergo some degree of transformation.

Whether these changes lead to genuine democratic renewal or simply a reshuffling of old elites remains to be seen. But one truth is undeniable: Nepal’s GenZ has entered the political arena, and they are not leaving anytime soon. The GenZ movement has been beneficial for the youth leaders of the major political parties because now they are more vocal than in the past about the need for leadership change. The movement is also likely to force the traditional political parties to provide more space to the youths in the internal party organizations and in the elections. But, except inside the NC, the leadership change is unlikely in the major political parties.

After the GenZ movement, major political parties namely Nepali Congress, CPN-UML and CPN (Maoist Center) have not come together. In the past, during the time of crisis, there were traditions of three parties coming together but now they maintain a distance, at least publicly though they are engaged in informal talks. The animosity between Dahal and Oli remains in the political landscape. Dahal is publicly saying that the protest on September 8-9 happened due to the governance failure of Oli, while the latter has blamed Dahal that Maoist party was engaged in the vandalism and arson. Nepali Congress is also maintaining a distance with Oli on the political agenda. Oli tried to convince NC to stand in favor of restoration of Parliament but NC decided to participate in the elections.

New parties, new voters

The GenZ movement has triggered a surge in the registration of new political parties. After the GenZ movement, 25 new parties have been registered. According to the Election Commission, of the 37 applications submitted for party registration after the GenZ movement, 25 new parties had been registered as of this week. Similarly, the number of the political parties participating in the election is also going up. 

In 2022, only 84 political parties had participated in the election but this time more than 120 political parties have expressed their eagerness to participate in the elections. The total number of the political parties registered in the EC has already exceeded 143. Out of the 143 parties registered at the Election Commission, seven parties are led by women. The Election commission has said that the addition of more than 800,000 new voters is encouraging. Before the latest voter registration drive began, there were 18,168,000 voters, and for the upcoming elections, an additional 837,094 voters have now been registered.

Nepal has stressed on the need of glorious journey towards building prosperous society and sustaining development when the Least Developed Countries are transformed into the developing countries. 

Likewise, Nepal has laid emphasis on extending financial and integrated assistance to the LDCs. 

At the high-level discussion on Thursday on building a global partnership for the sustainable development of least developed countries, Foreign Secretary Amrit Bahadur Rai emphasized these issues as the chair of the LDC group. 

The meeting was organized in Doha by the Office of the United Nations High Representative for Least Developed, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States and the Qatar Fund. 

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the meeting, the Foreign Secretary met with Deodat Maharaj, Managing Director of the United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries, and conveyed Nepal's expectation of support from the bank to facilitate Nepal's journey from a least developed to a developing country. 

On that occasion, they also discussed the role of the bank and opportunities for cooperation. 

Black cardamom has emerged as Nepal’s second-largest export in the first four months of the current fiscal year 2025/26. According to the latest foreign trade data released by the Department of Customs, Nepal exported 1,823.90 tons of black cardamom worth Rs 3.97bn between mid-July and mid-November. 

In the same period of the previous fiscal year, total exports remained at 1,306.25 tons worth Rs 1.9bn. The spice was Nepal’s fourth-largest export in 2024/25 when shipments reached 4,301.04 tons valued at Rs 7.68bn.

Exports grew strongly in the first quarter alone. From mid-July to mid-October, Nepal exported 1,072.20 tons of black cardamom, up 36.8 percent from 783.75 tons a year earlier. Earnings during the period rose 33.3 percent to Rs 1.68bn, compared to Rs 1.26bn last year. 

Almost all of Nepal’s black cardamom goes to India. Exporters say the spice is processed, graded, packaged, and branded there before being re-exported to Pakistan, Gulf markets, and other destinations—often relabeled as “Made in India.” Once re-exported, black cardamom can sell for up to $28 per kilogram, far higher than what farmers received. Nepali farmers earn less than Rs 2,000 per kilogram from Indian buyers.

Nepal is the world’s largest producer of black cardamom, accounting for more than 55 percent of global production. Over 80 percent of the crop comes from five districts in eastern Nepal: Taplejung, Ilam, Sankhuwasabha, Panchthar, and Tehrathum.

However, since the country lacks basic processing and value-addition capacity, farmers are forced to export raw pods, losing out on the higher margins available through drying, grading, oil extraction, and branded retail products. Experts say processing and branding inside Nepal could raise earnings by 50 percent–100 percent.

The country exported 5,017 tons worth Rs 7.93bn in 2023/24, and hit an all-time earnings record of Rs 8.27bn in 2022/23. Revenue stood at Rs 4.77bn in 2021/22 and Rs 6.93bn in 2020/21. Annual earnings stayed above Rs 4bn from 2017/18 to 2019/20.

The government of Nepal has signed a loan agreement worth 34.59 billion Japanese yen (around Rs 31.76 billion) with the Government of Japan for the Koteshwor Intersection Improvement Project. 

The agreement was signed and exchanged today at the Ministry of Finance in the presence of Finance Minister Rameshwor Prasad Khanal.

The loan Nepal is receiving through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has a grace period of 10 years and a repayment period of 30 years. The annual interest rate for the loan is 0.2 percent. Under the project, an underpass and a flyover will be constructed along the Koteshwor–Jadibuti section. 

Once these major infrastructures are built, traffic congestion in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and along the BP Highway is expected to ease significantly. 

The project will be implemented by the Department of Roads under the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport.

Finance Secretary Dr Ghanashyam Upadhyay and Japan’s Ambassador to Nepal, Maeda Toru, signed the exchange notes related to the agreement, while Dhaniram Sharma, Chief of the International Economic Relations Division at the Ministry of Finance, and JICA Nepal’s Chief Representative, Matsuzaki Mizuki, signed the loan agreement on behalf of their respective sides.

On the occasion, Finance Minister Khanal pledged to use his tenure to further strengthen bilateral cooperation between Nepal and Japan, stating that the loan support from Japan is significant for improving the Kathmandu Valley's traffic system. 

The Japanese Ambassador said that once the project is completed, it will bring substantial improvements to traffic management in the Kathmandu Valley. 

He also highlighted the long-standing friendly relations between Nepal and Japan.

Senior officials from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport, the Department of Roads, the Embassy of Japan, and JICA Nepal were present at the ceremony.

Nepal are facing the hosts UAE today in the championship-decider match to be held under the ACC Men's U-19 ODI Premier Cup.

The title match is scheduled to start at 10:30 am local time today at the Karwan Ground in Ajman of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 

Nepal have defeated Malaysia by nine wickets while the UAE defeated Oman by eight wickets to secure a place in the final.

It may be noted that Nepal and the UAE have already qualified for the Asia Cup, as per the provision that the finalists will qualify directly for the Asia Cup.

Malaysia and Oman will play for third place today and the winner will be qualified for the Asia Cup. 

A total of 14 teams had participated in the competition. 

Organized by the Asian Cricket Council, the U-19 Asia Cup 2025 is being held in the UAE from December 12-21.

Nepal's contemporary political history shows that an unstable political system has been a constant. The country is at another crossroads following the Sept 8-9 protest of GenZers against chronic corruption, nepotism and political instability that overthrew the government of Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, leading to the dissolution of the Parliament through a presidential decree and the appointment of a retired Chief Justice, Sushila Karki, as PM, with the sole mandate of holding elections to the House of Representatives on March 5 next year. One of the most important questions that we face as a nation at this point in time is: What will happen if the government fails to conduct the polls on time? 

What’s more, the course that Nepal takes will have implications for regional stability too. 

A history of instability 

To understand the gravity of this moment, we must look at Nepal's troubled political history. Since the restoration of multiparty democracy in 1990, our country has witnessed more than two dozen prime ministers. Between 2008 and 2025 alone, Nepal saw 14 different governments. This carousel of leadership has created a political culture where power sharing out-dated policy implementation, and coalition building became more important than serving the people.   

In 1961, King Mahendra banned political parties and began the Panchayat system, which remained until 1990, when a popular movement compelled King Birendra to go for multiparty democracy with constitutional monarchy. With the start of the Maoist insurgency in 1996, Nepal entered a decade-long civil war that killed more than 17,000 people. After the people's movement of 2006, the monarchy got abolished (in 2008) and the Constitution promulgated seven years later turned Nepal into a federal secular democratic republic. 

Political instability continues to be Nepal’s defining feature in spite of these constitutional accomplishments. Frequent changes in administration have caused public confidence to plummet, slowed down development initiatives and fostered an atmosphere that allows nepotism and corruption to thrive unchecked. 

The GenZ awakening 

The September 2025 GenZ protests were not spontaneous, they were the eruption of long simmering frustration. The government banned 26 social media platforms on Sept 4 to silence dissent and what followed is public knowledge. 

Young Nepalis, representing over 60 percent of the population under age 30, poured into the streets with three clear demands: end corruption, eliminate nepotism, and reform the political system.

This movement stood out from earlier demonstrations due to its leaderless, digital-native nature. GenZ activists organized using social media sites like Facebook, Instagram and Discord, completely avoiding established political systems. While regular Nepalis faced depleting earnings and a youth unemployment rate of 20 percent, they revealed the extravagant lifestyles of politicians' offspring, known as “nepo kids,” who were vacationing in Europe and shopping for expensive brands.  

On Sept 8, police opened fire during the movements, killing 19 people, including a 12-year-old. The next day, angry demonstrators stormed and burnt the Supreme Court, Parliament and the homes of politicians. There were 72 fatalities in all. PM Oli resigned on Sept 9 and Sushila Karki succeeded him, becoming the country's first female PM, on Sept 12, leading an interim administration with the sole goal of holding free and fair elections on March 5 next year.  

A gray area  

The interim government exists in a constitutional gray area. Nepal’s 2015 Constitution does not explicitly provide for appointing a prime minister, who is not a sitting member of the parliament. The current arrangement emerged through negotiations involving President Ramchandra Paudel and Chief of the Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel with GenZ representatives—an unprecedented process that bypassed normal constitutional channels.

 Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives comprises 275 members: 165 elected through FPTP from single constituencies and 110 through proportional representation. The Election Commission has approved the election schedule, with political parties required to register between November 16-26, 2025, campaign period running from February 15 to March 2 next year and voting on March 5 (7 am-5 pm).

The interim government has formed a judicial commission to investigate the violence, appointed untainted candidates as ministers and pledged to serve a maximum six-month term. Prime Minister Karki promised diplomats that her government is “non-political” with a “single, non-negotiable mandate”—conducting elections on the stipulated date (March 5 next year).  

Neighborly influence 

The political stability of Nepal affects the entire region. For both the neighbours—China and India—Nepal’s stability is very important. 

India and Nepal have an open border, and India is home to the largest Nepali diaspora. An open border between two sovereign countries is taking a toll on the overall security of both the countries, thanks to a relatively unrestricted movement of people, transnational crimes and illegal trade.  

In order to protect its Tibetan border and further BRI projects, China sees Nepal as strategically significant. Beijing emphasized its commitment to “regional stability” by quickly recognizing the Karki-led government. However, Nepal’s inability to strengthen bilateral ties and repeated changes in administration have become a constant irritant for China.  

 Both the neighbors kept a close watch on the GenZ movement. China voiced hope that “dialogue will restore social order,” while the Indian ambassador was present at Karki’s swearing-in. Our history shows that any extended instability invites outside intervention, teaching us to move with extreme caution. 

Consequences of electoral delays   

If elections do not occur on March 5 next year, Nepal faces dire consequences across multiple dimensions. 

Political Crisis: The commitment of the interim government to holding elections on time is the only thing that gives it legitimacy. Any delay might spark violent protests again because it would be seen as treachery. The CPN (Maoist Center), Nepali Congress, and CPN-UML are the main major groups that already oppose the temporary arrangement; some call for the reinstatement of Parliament. Nepal might experience a constitutional crisis in the absence of elections, necessitating either military action or authoritarian governance.  

Economic collapse: Damages from the protests in September totalled $22.5bn, or over half of Nepal’s GDP. Growth estimates dropped below one percent, investor confidence hit rock bottom and cancellations decimated tourism throughout the holiday season. Prolonged uncertainty is too much for Nepal's economy, which already depends on remittances that account for more than 25 percent of GDP. Postponing elections will hinder reconstruction efforts, halt development initiatives and encourage more young people to go overseas.  

Social instability: GenZ called for the abolition of nepotism, direct executive elections and investigations into corruption scandals from 1990 to 2025. Postponing elections will not make these goals go away. Young people’s “radically different understandings of power, deference and legitimacy” from older generations came to light through the movement, revealing significant generational gaps. Continued isolation runs the risk of radicalization, which could reignite an armed insurgency or ethnic conflicts similar to the Maoist insurgency of 1996–2006.  

Regional instability: The crisis in Nepal is similar to recent upheavals in Bangladesh (2024) and Sri Lanka (2022), where youth movements and economic desperation overthrew governments. In addition to upsetting India-China relations and undermining trust in democratic institutions throughout the region, a failed transition in Nepal will destabilize South Asia.  

Will big parties cooperate? 

There is an existential challenge for established parties. Although they still have rural support and organizational strength, the GenZ movement has destroyed their credibility. How the new and the old parties fare remains to be seen.  

The CPN-UML has called for the restoration of the Parliament, while others insist elections proceed as scheduled. Some traditional leaders refuse to resign or make way for younger voices, clinging to power despite widespread discontent. Yet cooperation is essential, elections without major party participation would lack legitimacy.  

While tackling three pressing issues—restoring police infrastructure damaged during protests, removing legal barriers preventing young voters from voting and establishing a competent commission to investigate the violence—Prime Minister Karki must forge unity across the political spectrum. Current methods put thousands of young people at risk of losing their right to vote, while the pledge to grant Nepalis overseas the right to vote remains a pledge.    

The path forward 

More than just a democratic exercise, the March 2026 election will determine if Nepal can overcome the decades-long cycles of instability. The GenZ movement demanded fairness, clean government, and youth participation in decision-making; it was more than just resistance.  

Success requires political will from all stakeholders. Traditional parties must accept that "rank and power" alone cannot sustain legitimacy. They must embrace reforms, investigate corruption transparently and genuinely include marginalized voices. The interim government must restore law and order, rebuild destroyed institutions, and conduct elections that command legitimacy domestically and internationally.  

If elections fail to take place on time, Nepal faces a grim future: constitutional crisis, economic ruin, social upheaval and regional destabilization. But if we seize this moment, if political leaders rise above narrow interests and young citizens engage constructively, Nepal can finally establish stable, accountable governance.   

The choice is ours. A government born from a people’s movement cannot afford to fail. The world watches as Nepal stands at a crossroads: reconstruction or regression, democracy or chaos, hope or despair. Our response to this question “If the elections are not held in time, what will happen?” will define Nepal’s route for generations to come. So, let’s create a conducive environment for free and fair elections.

The schedule of the ICC T20 World Cup to be held in 2026 has been made public today. 

The International Cricket Council (ICC) announced the schedule by dividing 20 participating teams in four different groups. 

The ICC T20 World Cup is taking place from February 7 to March 8, 2026 in India and Sri Lanka.

As per the schedule, Nepal are put in Group 'C'. All games of Nepal will be played  in Mumbai, India.

There are West Indies, England, Bangladesh and Italy along with Nepal in Group 'C'. 

West Indies and England lifted the titles of the ICC T20 World Cup twice each.    

Nepal would play against England in their first game on February 8, 2026 in Mumbai. 

Likewise, the second game against Italy on February 8, third against West Indies on February 15 and the fourth against Bangladesh on February 17, according to Cricket Association of Nepal (CAN).

CAN had requested the ICC to arrange all games for Nepal in India. CAN Chairman Chatur Bahadur Chand said that the ICC accepted that request and the games for Nepal have been scheduled in India.

With this, Nepal are playing the ICC T20 World Cup for the third time after 2014 and 2024. 

What if the future of Nepal’s tourism lies not in building new trails, but in rediscovering how we welcome people?
For decades, the world has known Nepal for its bravery and beauty—the courage of its people and the majesty of its mountains.

Yet beneath those summits lies a quieter, equally powerful strength: hospitality. From the warm “Namaste” of a villager to the tea shared by a stranger on a trail, Nepal’s identity has always been rooted in kindness. But as tourism grows, one must ask—are we still carrying that spirit as high as our peaks?

Adventure and nature-based tourism are expanding faster than ever. The global adventure travel market is projected to exceed $1trn by 2030, while Nepal welcomed over 415,000 international visitors in the first four months of 2025, many seeking authentic, meaningful encounters. In this new era, the competition is no longer just about altitude or adrenaline. It’s about experience—and the soul of that experience lies in hospitality.

Hospitality, however, isn’t only about hotels or service standards. It’s about behavior—the way we treat those who cross our paths. Do we, as Nepalis, truly enjoy hosting people? Do we take pride in sharing our home, our food and our stories? Do we greet a visitor with warmth or with the weariness of routine? Both the professional side of hospitality and the personal one matter. One builds an economy; the other builds emotion. And when the two drift apart, so does the essence of travel.

To understand where that gap may be widening, I chose to look closely at the Everest region — specifically Phakding, the village that greets trekkers on their first night of the journey toward Everest Base Camp. For most travellers, it’s little more than a resting point; for me, it became a window into how first impressions are formed—and how they can shape the image of an entire country.
Phakding lies quietly beside the Dudhkoshi river, its suspension bridges swaying like ribbons against the mist.

At sunset, the air hums with footsteps and laughter—a blend of excitement and exhaustion. Over five nights, I watched the rhythm of arrivals and departures, the quick exchanges between guests, guides and lodge owners — moments small yet revealing.

One evening, I overheard a young Filipino and his British friend talking to their guide. “Is the hotel in Namche better than this one?” the Filipino asked, hopeful. The guide, clearly experienced in climbing but not in conversation, replied, “It’s in the middle of Namche… top ten.” The guests chuckled: “So, the tenth of the top ten then.” It was polite laughter, but tinged with disappointment—cramped rooms, uneven bathrooms, Wi-Fi and hot showers that cost extra. The guide smiled awkwardly, unsure whether to explain or empathize. In that silence, I realized how much storytelling matters—how the right words could have turned complaint into curiosity.

Nearby, a group of Chinese women debated the price of beer. “Can we go out and buy it elsewhere? It’s too expensive here!” they laughed. Their guide could only shrug. The Everest region’s economy is complex: rooms are cheap to attract trekkers, but the costs rise in food and amenities. Everything here—every plate, plank and bottle—is carried on the backs of animals and people.

Zopkyo, the sturdy cross between yak and cow, and khachhar, the hybrid of horse and donkey, carry supplies along steep stone paths. Their bells echo through forests and clouds. Each item that reaches Phakding bears the mark of effort and endurance. And yet, few travellers ever hear that story.

It struck me then: if every meal came with its story, the experience would change. Imagine a host announcing, “Tonight’s dinner is prepared by young cooks from this valley — using ingredients carried on the same animals you saw along the trail today.” Suddenly, the price of a meal becomes not a cost but a connection. That’s what true hospitality does—it turns transaction into meaning.
What I witnessed in Phakding isn’t a failure; it’s a reminder. A reminder that Nepal’s greatest advantage is not infrastructure or altitude, but empathy. We don’t need to outbuild others—we simply need to out-care them. If we can pair the professionalism of tourism with the heart of Nepali warmth, we can redefine what visitors remember when they leave.

Phakding, in that sense, is more than the first night of a trek. It’s a mirror—showing us what the world first sees of us. But it can also be a destination in itself: a riverside retreat, a place where travellers and Nepalis alike pause, reflect and reconnect with the rhythm of the mountains. Perhaps that is where our tourism story must begin again—not at the summit, but at the welcome.

As I rode up toward Rimijung monastery above Phakding, I passed the small wooden house where Bikas, my horse caretaker, lives. It was simple but serene—a clearing that felt like a slice of heaven on earth. Bikas, a young man in his early twenties, has chosen to stay in his village and rear horses for trekking. Watching him, I felt both hope and concern. Hope, because here was someone who had found purpose in his own landscape; concern, because so many of his contemporaries from equally beautiful corners of Nepal now live in cramped rented rooms in Kathmandu, far away from their roots.

Bikas represents the future of Nepali tourism—not in infrastructure, but in attitude. We need more young people like him, who love their hometowns and see value in preserving their culture. Only when young Nepalis fall in love with their own land and stories will they become the kind of hosts who can show visitors a Nepal that is authentic, responsible, and deeply human.

The day I reached Rimijung monastery, a grand Lhabab Düchen puja was taking place—celebrating Buddha’s descent from Heaven back to the human realm after teaching the Abhidhamma, or higher philosophy, to the gods and his mother, Queen Maya Devi. As I stood among the monks, I noticed walls filled with centuries-old scriptures—each page carrying the wisdom of generations. They reminded me of the stories our country and culture hold, yet often forget. These are the stories that can retell Nepal’s identity to the world—stories of compassion, coexistence and courage that people everywhere would want to listen to.

For generations, Nepal has been known for its altitude. For decades, the world has known Nepal for its bravery and beauty—the courage of its people and the majesty of its mountains—for the summits that pierce the sky and the courage of those who climb them. But perhaps our next great ascent lies not in meters or milestones, but in mindset. The climb ahead is inward—toward an attitude of self-love, one that rekindles pride in our own stories—Nepal’s stories that the world longs to hear.

True altitude will only mean something if it’s matched by gratitude. When a traveller from across the world chooses Nepal, it isn’t just tourism—it’s trust. They are choosing to become part of Nepal’s story. That should fill us with joy, not routine. Too often, we measure success in the number of arrivals rather than the depth of their experience. Our goal should not be to attract more visitors, but to raise the quality of how we receive them—to lift our hospitality behavior to match our natural beauty.

People like Bikas remind us what this new attitude can look like. A young man who stayed in his home village, raising horses along the Dudhkoshi, Bikas’s open-mindedness and contentment reveal a truth we’ve forgotten: happiness doesn’t have to be imported. It can be cultivated right where we are. If more young Nepalis embraced that mindset—to live with curiosity, pride and purpose in their own hometowns—Nepal’s tourism would no longer need to be “developed.”

It would already be thriving through love.
At Rimijung monastery, as monks chanted for Lhabab Düchen and the walls shimmered with ancient scripture, I was struck by another realization: we must rediscover curiosity about ourselves. Our stories—once whispered through valleys and carved into temples—are fading from our own memory. Yet these are the stories that can once again enchant the world, if only we learn to ask the right questions and tell them with conviction.

To every guide, host and agency shaping tomorrow’s Nepal, the climb is clear. Take pride in being Nepali. Learn from the world’s best storytellers, then become one for your own home. The true spirit of hospitality is not service—it’s storytelling with sincerity.

The world will always come to Nepal for its mountains. But it will return for its warmth. Our next great climb is not to the top of Everest — it is to the heart of who we are.

Nepal’s two-wheeler market is expanding rapidly, with imports rising sharply in the first four months of the current fiscal year despite growing global momentum toward electric mobility. 

According to the Department of Customs, Nepal imported 106,768 units of motorcycles and scooters, including both assembled and completely knocked down (CDK) units, during the first four months of the current fiscal year 2025/26. This marks a 25.68 percent increase, or an additional 21,800 units, compared to the same period last year.  In the first four months of 2024/25, the country had imported 84,890 units.

The latest import data shows that the domestic appetite for petrol-powered motorcycles and scooters remains strong, as concerns over affordability, quality, and infrastructure continue to deter consumers from switching to electric two-wheelers.

Automobile industry people say the surge reflects a rebound in economic activity as mobility improves and consumer confidence gradually returns. Two-wheelers remain one of Nepal’s most preferred personal mobility options, particularly in urban areas where public transport is not dependable.

A significant portion of this year’s imports, or 81 percent, were unassembled units. Nepal imported CDK units 86,339 in the four-month period. Nepal currently assembles more than a dozen motorcycle and scooter brands domestically. Selected models from popular brands like Royal Enfield, Bajaj, TVS, Yamaha, Hero, Honda and CFMoto, among others, are imported as CDK units and assembled locally. Local assembly has created jobs and helped reduce prices down to some extent.

During the period, Nepal imported 20,351 units of fully-built two-wheelers, according to the department. While electric vehicles (EVs) have gained traction in Nepal’s four-wheeler segment, the same momentum has not been seen in the two-wheeler market. Traders say consumers remain hesitant to transition to electric motorcycles and scooters due to factors like higher upfront costs, limited model choices, concerns over battery reliability, and a lack of widespread charging infrastructure.

Dealers also say electric two-wheelers are still expensive compared to their petrol counterparts which make them less appealing to middle-income buyers who dominate the two-wheeler market.

This year, unlike in the past, the Government of Nepal’s prudence was evident when the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM) issued heavy rainfall warnings. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA) issued a four-day travel advisory for October 3–6, which prohibited long-distance vehicle operations and limited travel in susceptible areas. Citizens were urged to refrain from avoidable travel with early warnings of landslides and swelling rivers in the provinces of Koshi, Bagmati, Gandaki and Lumbini. Even public holidays were issued for two days, prompting the residents to stay safely at home.

With swift evacuations and well-coordinated communication, these preventative measures helped prevent significant losses during the monsoon. A slight improvement in Nepal’s disaster management was visible this year, evident with better early warning systems, institutional coordination and a maturing public response mechanism. Yet, early preparedness and rapid post-disaster recovery can no longer remain the only answer: infrastructures built for a gentler historical climate remain worryingly defenseless to the “new normal” of intensifying future extremes.

The flood that rewrote the map

The September 2024 floods were a sobering lesson. A rare cyclonic circulation and mid-tropospheric westerly trough triggered 60 hours of continuous rainfall across central and eastern Nepal. According to the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, over 183 weather stations recorded more than 50 mm, while 25 broke 24-hour records, some exceeding 400 mm. The streams of the Bagmati, Koshi, and Narayani basins surpassed their historic highs, causing landslides, debris flows, and flash floods that affected 2.6m people, claimed 249 lives, and caused economic losses exceeding Rs 46bn, over one percent of GDP.

Among the worst hit was the Banepa–Bardibas (BP) Highway, a lifeline connecting Kathmandu with the eastern Tarai. Field assessments along the Roshi Khola corridor, from Bhakunde Besi to the Sunkoshi confluence, revealed widespread destruction, with dozens of landslides and slope failures damaging approximately 80 km of the highway, and 26 km were severely impacted. Collapsed retaining walls and eroded embankments were anything but sparse. In one particularly devastated stretch of the Kavrepalanchok district, the river eroded an 8-km segment of the roadway, rendering it impassable.

Our study found that the Roshi basin received an average of 267 mm of rainfall in 24 hours, equivalent to a once-in-773-year event, based on 60 years of rainfall records. The unprecedented precipitation turned the river into a force that the infrastructure was never built to face, with a discharge significantly higher than the design capacity.

A year later, the same story

The susceptibility was exposed again this year. Temporary repairs failed, embankments slumped and diversions were washed out. The BP Highway’s recurring damage reveals a systemic flaw: Nepal’s highways, particularly along river corridors, are no longer safe, acutely exposed to the whims of climate extremities.

Lessons from collapse

First, our engineering standards must evolve. The flood magnitudes adopted by the NRS 2070 assume a 50-year return period for first-class roads and a 100-year for bridges. While a 10 percent increase in design discharge is mandated to account for climate change, DOR’s Guidelines on Hydrologic and Hydraulic Analysis and River Training Works for Bridge Design no longer suffices in the face of rapidly shortening return periods.

There should be no delay in increasing the design return period to 100 and 200 years for major roads and bridges, respectively. Moving beyond reliance on historical data-based frequency analysis, all major road retrofitting, bridge reconstruction and new construction projects must be checked against the contemporary climate projections for the design period.

Second, planning must be risk-informed and data-driven. Integrating climate-informed vulnerability mapping to identify at-risk zones before the construction or repair is imperative. This helps to avoid the high-risk zones from the get-go and minimizes the likelihood of recurring future damage.

In flood-prone river corridors, vulnerability mapping determines where infrastructure elevation is necessary versus where an early warning system might suffice (reducing consequence through evacuation and traffic management). This systematic approach should be an indispensable first step before deploying costly engineering solutions.

And most importantly, resilience cannot rely on concrete alone. Structural adaptations like increased freeboard of bridges and strategic elevation of roadways should be complemented with nature-based and hybrid solutions, vegetative slope stabilization and bioengineering. In Nepal, steep slopes could benefit particularly from hybrid approaches such as vegetative bioengineering combined with check dams. Also, land-use planning, like establishing conservation buffer zones adjacent to floodplains to regulate development, prevents encroachments that heighten flood levels or exacerbate erosion.

Reaction to resilience

To break free from the disaster and repair loop, Nepal must embed “climate logic” into its development DNA. “Fund Resilience, Not Disasters,” the theme from the recent International Day for Disaster Risk Reduction, captures this urgency: invest now, or pay exponentially later.

Short-term restoration of strategically important corridors like the BP Highway must go concurrently with long-term resilience planning.  Roads should be realigned away from unstable river bends where possible, with major corridors upgraded for at least 100-year floods, and slope protection integrated with river training works such as spurs and check structures.

Design standards must evolve beyond the historical averages to incorporate the plausible future scenarios. Climate risk screening and cost-benefit justification for resilience measures should be mandatory for detailed project reports. Increasing hydrometeorological networks and interleaving vulnerability mapping into road asset management will help prioritize investment where it matters most.

While these reforms seem costly, prevention is the cheapest insurance. Global evidence shows that every dollar spent on resilience saves at least four are saved in recovery. For Nepal, with annual road repair costs already exceeding Rs 3 billion, the choice is obvious.

The road ahead

While decisive early action can be effective in minimizing risks, it cannot substitute for durable infrastructure. Preparedness can save lives, but only resilience saves livelihoods.

The BP Highway disaster is more than just a damaged road; it serves as a warning. The next storm is imminent. Safeguarding every trip, whether to school, the market, or home, requires investing in resilience now, not in repairs later.

(Rajan KC is a civil/geotechnical engineer working on disaster mitigation and resilient infrastructure.)

As global leaders gather at COP30 in Brazil to negotiate finance, adaptation, and loss and damage, Nepal’s 2025 monsoon season offers a stark reminder of why climate-vulnerable countries need stronger recognition and support. From slow-onset droughts in the plains to catastrophic glacial floods and colossal landslides in the mountains, Nepal’s experience illustrates how climate variability is already inflicting deep human, economic, and ecological losses—despite the country’s negligible contribution to global emissions. 

According to the German Watch’s Climate Risk Index 2025, Nepal averages nearly 250 deaths annually from climate-related disasters, with roughly 75,840 people directly affected each year. The economic cost of such events is also substantial, amounting to an estimated $221.3m—or 0.258 percent of the national GDP—underscoring the persistent human and financial toll of climate-induced hazards

Nepal’s 2025 monsoon opened with extended dry conditions across Southern plains; mainly Madhes Province, where rainfall from June to mid-July fell to less than one-third of normal levels during the critical paddy transplantation period. With worsening soil moisture and visible crop stress, the provincial government declared drought on July 24. Yet only weeks later, it brought severe downpours mainly across Madhes, inundating ripening paddy fields and low-lying settlements and causing damage worth billions of rupees. The abrupt shift from drought to heavy flood within the same season is emblematic of climate-driven rapid extremes now harming smallholder farmers who lack buffers to absorb repeated shocks.

The situation intensified even after the official monsoon withdrawal. Multiple post-monsoon rain systems—amplified by two unexpected but powerful cyclones on Oct 4-5 and again on Oct 30-31—brought extreme rainfall during Nepal’s peak harvest season, destroying crops of billions rupees worth, stored grain, and essential infrastructure. These late-season events have heightened national anxiety about Nepal’s changing monsoon behaviour and the possibility of more frequent cyclone-linked hazards in the future.

High-altitude regions faced even more severe climate-induced damage. Amid lingering fears from last year’s catastrophic Thame incident in the Khumbu region, Nepal faced another shock on 8 July when a transboundary glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF), originating in China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region, surged into Rasuwa District through Bhote Koshi river. It killed 10 people, left 19 missing, destroyed the Rasuwagadhi friendship bridge, damaged hydropower facilities, flattened the dry port, swept away cargo trucks, and disrupted cross-border trade. Losses were estimated at Rs 2.5bn, and insurance claims reached nearly Rs 1bn. For Nepal, this event underscored the country’s exposure to hazards that originate beyond its borders—a key issue Nepal continues to raise at COP30 within the global Loss and Damage framework.

Beyond infrastructure losses, climate-induced non-economic damages—psychosocial stress, displacement, health impacts, lost educational days, and erosion of cultural and natural heritage—remain largely unaddressed in national relief systems. These burdens fall disproportionately on women, elderly residents, low-income families, and indigenous communities, widening existing inequalities and undermining long-term resilience.

Despite these mounting challenges, Nepal is also making notable progress in reducing human casualties. The 2025 monsoon spanned 135 days—longer than average, with onset on May 29 and withdrawal on Oct 10—bringing near-normal rainfall yet resulting in significantly fewer deaths and injuries than in previous years. Disaster incidents fell by 32 percent, deaths by 70 percent, and affected households nearly halved. These gains reflect improved forecasting, stronger institutional coordination led by NDRRMA, and community-level preparedness also supported by the development partners at local level. 

Madhes Province demonstrated how accessible warning systems can directly reduce loss and damage. SMS alerts, radio updates, and volunteer networks enabled households to protect livestock, food stocks, and essential assets. While economic losses were considerable, no fatalities were recorded—underscoring the life-saving value of localized, people-centered early warning systems. Similarly, in the downstream areas of Karnali, flood early warning mechanisms proved crucial in minimizing both human and property losses. Development partners, under Climate Resilience Measures for Community (CRMC) projects, working with national authorities and local communities, strengthened both the hardware—such as flood and rainfall sensors—and the software components, including community awareness and emergency preparedness. Together, these interventions showed that timely information and local readiness remain Nepal’s strongest defense against escalating climate risks

Across municipalities, bamboo-based bio-dykes, riverbank reinforcement, sandbagging, and pre-positioned emergency supplies helped prevent larger-scale devastation. These low-cost, community-driven measures highlight the importance of social capital and local knowledge in resilience-building.

However, substantial vulnerabilities persist. Ilam recorded the highest fatalities (39). Rasuwa suffered catastrophic economic losses. Trekking corridors and high-altitude settlements still lack reliable communication networks, leaving residents and tourists without timely warnings. And the increasing frequency of post-monsoon cyclone-driven rain systems threatens the stability of Nepal’s agricultural calendar.

Why COP30 must acknowledge Nepal’s climate reality

Despite Nepal’s minimal emission yet timely National Determined Contribution (NDC) submission along with Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) stating its full commitment to carbon neutrality by 2045, the country continues to face severe climate-induced loss and damage. The new Loss & Damage Fund at COP30 is promising, but predictable, accessible finance is urgently needed to protect communities bearing the brunt of crises they did not create.

Key questions for COP30: Who is responsible for escalating losses? How can vulnerable nations access reliable funding for preparedness and recovery? How can non-economic losses—culture, health, education—be addressed?

Nepal’s experiences with glacial lake outburst floods, drought–flood cycles, and cyclone-linked extremes show that adaptation alone is insufficient. Policy priorities include community-based monitoring, risk-informed land-use planning with phased relocation, nature-based solutions, and integrating non-economic losses into planning.

The 2025 monsoon is a stark reminder: those least responsible for climate change are suffering the most. Ensuring Nepal’s concerns are acted upon is essential for a fair, resilient, and climate-just future.

Hundreds of GenZ youths filled the busiest streets of Nepal’s capital city—Maitighar and New Baneshwor on Sept 8. It was the burst of frustration with the government’s malpractice—corruption, lack of accountability and transparency, ban on social media resulting in encroachment of the freedom of speech and the rising “nepo-baby” trend on social media that showcased contrasting images of the lavish lifestyles of political leaders’ children comparing to the daily struggles of ordinary Nepalis who shed their skin and bones in foreign lands just to sustain their families. 

What began as a peaceful protest quickly turned violent after the police forces opened fire claiming 76 innocent lives. The aftermath of the massacre left the nation in shock. 

The following day, government and private properties were destroyed, set ablaze and ultimately forced the then Prime Minister KP Oli to step down. For a country already mired from political instability, it felt like watching a tower of Jenga collapse. 

Just a year before Nepal’s September revolution, a similar GenZ youths uprising, called the July Revolution took place in Bangladesh. Thousands of students and youth activists took to the streets, demanding an end to decades of “political corruption” and “authoritarian regime”. The movement grew rapidly throughout the country after violent clashes between protesters and security forces, leading to a nationwide wave of demonstrations that eventually forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country, marking a major turning point in Bangladesh’s political history. 

As a matter of fact, these two movements, led primarily by GenZ youths, marked a historic turning point for both nations shaping their modern political landscapes. Nepal saw the rise of its first woman Prime Minister, while Bangladesh’s long-serving female leader was forced into exile. The July Revolution in Bangladesh is now more than a year-old story, while Nepal’s September Revolution is still only two- or three-months in. Bangladesh is still struggling to rebuild its governance and restore public trust, and Nepal now stands at a similar crossroads. 

So, what kind of future lies for Nepal?

Constitutional crisis in Bangladesh 

In Bangladesh, following the resignation of Sheikh Hasina, Chief of Army Staff General Waker- uz-Zaman and President Mohammed Shahabuddin announced the formation of an interim government to stabilize the political situation. 

Invoking the emergency provision under Article 72(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Professor Muhammad Yunus, sworn in as the chief advisor to the Interim Government. However, the formation of the Interim Government led to a constitutional crisis. However, this triggered a constitutional crisis. 

Many critics argued that the appointment of a non-elected prime minister violated Article 56(1), which states that the prime minister must be a Member of Parliament. Several writs were filed, but the Supreme Court of Bangladesh quashed the writs, citing an Interim Government could be formed in accordance with Article 106 of the Constitution.  

Despite this, opposition groups have continued to resist the government adding on to the nation’s political instability. While Professor Yunus has promised national elections by July 2026, the fragile political environment and widespread distrust make that path challenging. 

Along with the political instability, Bangladesh has been facing challenges with a deteriorating law and order situation with increasing mob violence, violence against women and girls, and even religion-based clashes. Religious minorities, including Hindus and Ahmadiyyas, remain vulnerable as opportunistic groups exploit the power vacuum to spread hatred and violence. The new government’s struggle to control sectarianism shows how revolutions can awaken deep-rooted tensions that are hard to contain.

Politico-constitutional crisis in Nepal

In Nepal, following the resignation of KP Oli, led to a similar sequence of events like in Bangladesh. With the formation of a power vacuum, Army Chief Ashok Raj Sigdel and President Ram Chandra Paudel stepped in. 

After talks with the leading GenZ protest groups, former Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed as Nepal’s first woman Prime Minister under Article 61, which confers power on the President to protect the constitution. However, her appointment immediately became controversial as a section of lawyers and learned class argued that “none of the constitutional provision explicitly recognizes” Karki’s elevation to PM office.   

As of Sept 29, sixteen writs have been registered at the Supreme Court’s constitutional bench challenging the legality of her government.

State facilities burned and vandalized 

Adding to the crisis, Nepal’s law and order situation has deteriorated. Key government buildings, including the Supreme Court, Revenue offices in Kathmandu, Biratnagar and others, Morang District Court, Biratnagar High Court, Rajbiraj High Court, Saptari District Court, Kathmandu District Court and other courts, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Federal Parliament were burned down during the protests. Resultantly, the offices so damaged are yet to stand functional in full-fledged mode.  

The Supreme Court continued operating its benches from temporary tents.

Drop in security personnel morale 

The morale of security forces has also plummeted. Nearly 1,000 personnel from the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force have resigned following the protests. With the interim government planning elections on 5 March 2026 the weakened security apparatus poses a major threat. 

The criminal gangs, political opportunists, and even external actors could exploit the instability. For ordinary citizens, this means growing insecurity, political uncertainty, and potential lawlessness on the streets. 

Economic dimension 

In the aspect of economy, both Nepal and Bangladesh are facing economic challenges following their revolutions. In Bangladesh many industries have been shut down leading to massive job losses, with many industries still not in operation, banks have been reluctant to issue letters of credit, dealing a severe blow to international trade and business confidence. 

On a more positive note, the interim government has introduced several economic reforms aimed at recovering laundered money and attracting fresh investments. 

Nepal can take inspiration from these efforts and adopt similar strategies to stabilize its own struggling economy. Nepal, too, is suffering economically in the aftermath of the September Revolution. The repercussions have been evident in the sharp decline of the tourism industry, which is one of the country’s main sources of revenue. 

Furthermore, Nepal Rastra Bank Governor, has acknowledged that investor confidence has significantly weakened since the GenZ movement, creating additional pressure on the already fragile economic environment. The World Bank has also lowered Nepal’s economic growth forecast to 2.1 percent for 2025/26 from 5.2 percent which is an alarming rate.

If political instability continues Nepal could face severe consequences like a slowdown in foreign investment, rising unemployment, and many more.

Way forward

Given the political instability and the challenges, the future remains uncertain, but it will be interesting to see how it unfolds, hopefully in an optimistic light for both Nepal and Bangladesh. 

History offers examples of nations like Germany and Japan, which managed to rebuild themselves into major economic powers after experiencing total devastation and political overhauls. With perseverance, accountability, and reform, there is hope that both countries can follow a similar path toward recovery and progress.

Nepal should reconsider its long-standing practice of appointing ministers from sitting MPs. Such changes are not just desirable—they are inevitable—given the mounting evidence of political instability if the country is to preserve the integrity of its parliamentary system and respond to growing public discontent. The Constitution of Nepal also allows for the selection of ministers from among MPs, and requires those appointed from outside parliament to secure membership within six months.

Corruption, patronage politics and weak legislative scrutiny have also increased as the country grapples with an alarming increase in election spending. Once MPs become ministers, they become entangled in the executive branch, reducing their ability and willingness to hold the government accountable. Moreover, since political positions are viewed as investments rather than responsibilities, the lure of ministerial appointments encourages excessive spending on parliamentary election campaigns.

In light of these anomalies, it is time to rethink this constitutional arrangement. Barring members of the House of Representatives from assuming ministerial positions would create a clear separation of powers, reduce political conflicts of interest and discourage the monetization of elections. Appointing ministers from outside parliament based on expertise and merit is the need of the hour. Doing so can help strengthen governance and restore citizens’ trust in Nepal’s democratic institutions.

A vicious cycle

Nepal’s elections are so expensive that only those with the support of wealthy or powerful donors can compete effectively. According to reports, despite our low GDP and per capita income, Nepal’s elections are estimated to be 147 times more expensive than those in neighboring India. Candidates for the 2022 general election have been reported to have taken on large amounts of personal debt or relied on opaque funding sources.

This financial burden does not end with victory. Elected members of the House of Representatives, who are deeply in debt from campaigns funded by private donations, often view ministerial appointments as a way to make up for the shortfall. Ministerial positions come with significant perks—salaries, allowances, and influence over budgets and contracts—that can be used for personal gains. When donors, often businesses or contractors, expect policy favors or government tenders, the stage is set for institutionalized corruption.

Corruption would be reduced if members of the House of Representatives were barred from becoming ministers. The parliamentary role alone reduces the opportunities for recovering the financial investments made in elections. Instead, candidates can focus on policy and public service, potentially reducing overall election costs through greater transparency and public financing reforms advocated by experts.

Erosion of accountability

Corruption in Nepal is not just an aberration but a systemic scourge that permeates every level of government. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index gave Nepal a dismal score of 34 out of 100, ranking it 100th out of 180 countries globally.

Political scandals abound. Senior politicians have been implicated in scams such as the fake Bhutanese refugee scam. In 2025 alone, more than a dozen high-profile cases involving former prime ministers and ministers in corruption came to light. These cases were at the center of the GenZ protests earlier this year. They exposed decades of systemic decay.

Appointing members of the House of Representatives as ministers exacerbates this by blurring the lines between the legislature and the executive, weakening the separation of powers necessary for checks and balances. This leads to incomplete separation, legislative flip-flopping and democratic unaccountability.

Parliament’s oversight and monitoring role is weakened when MPs play a dual role as ministers. Who checks on this when members of the executive are also legislators? This creates fertile ground for corruption. Ministers can influence resource allocations, agreements and policies without strong parliamentary oversight.

The legislature could reclaim its role as a watchdog by reserving ministerial positions for technocrats or experts from outside parliament.

In Nepal, this could disrupt the “vicious cycle” where high election costs push politicians into ministerial positions for corrupt gains, as noted in the analysis of campaign finance.

A path forward

The recent youth protests that forced a change of government in less than 28 hours on charges of corruption signal a public mandate for systemic change.

The political upheaval reflects a powerful public demand for deep, structural reforms. This uprising has exposed a critical truth that Nepal’s democratic institutions can no longer function effectively under the old structures that reward money, favoritism and power-brokers in public service.

In this context, the proposal to bar members of the House of Representatives (HoR) from appointing ministers is not an attack on the parliamentary system but a step toward strengthening it. Such a reform would encourage political parties to elect parliamentarians who are truly committed to their legislative duties, while also enabling the formation of an executive.

Implementing this reform may ultimately require constitutional amendments to formalize the separation of legislative and executive responsibilities. Prioritizing non-parliamentarians in cabinet formation and making appointments based on merit could initiate positive change through political practice.

Nepal can no longer sustain a system where skyrocketing election costs and widespread corruption reinforce each other. By clearly separating membership in the House of Representatives from ministerial ambitions, the country must remove financial incentives that distort democratic competition. This can strengthen accountability and rebuild trust in public institutions. The Election Commission and the interim government must recognize the urgency of reform. They must act decisively for the nation’s democratic future. Otherwise, another wave of citizen-led opposition may begin.