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Minister for Foreign Affairs Narayan Prakash Saud is preparing to fly to Russia for discussions on the death of Nepali nationals engaged in the ongoing war against Ukraine, the status of those missing in action and the repatriation of the youths still engaged in the war alongside the Russians. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in consultation with Moscow to set the date for the visit. Minister Saud is doing spadework for talks with his Russian counterpart regarding the death, injury and status of those Nepali recruits, who have gone missing while fighting for the Russian army. 

There are no bilateral provisions on recruitment in the Russian forces, but reports suggest that Nepalis are serving alongside the Russians and fighters from a number of other countries lured by certain ‘incentives’. 

Moscow has not responded to Nepal’s repeated requests for information about the Nepalis in the Russian army, though the government has said that hundreds of Nepalis have been serving the Russians, more than 100 have gone missing and 11 Nepalis have died in the war so far.

According to Saud, 115 families of the Nepali youths, who have joined the Russian army, have submitted a request at the ministry calling for their early repatriation. We have asked Russia to repatriate the Nepalis serving its army and compensate the families of those killed in action, he said. 

Despite repeated requests from Nepal, no response has come from Russia, which recently passed a law allowing foreigners to join its army with a promise to provide them citizenship once they fulfill set criteria. 

A youth of Tikapur, Kailali died during a war between Russia and Ukraine.

Bharat Shah (36) of Durganagar, Tikapur Municipality-1, who joined the Russian army three months ago, is said to have died on November 26.

Rabin Thapa of Kanchapur, who is serving in the Russian army, confirmed the death of Shah.

Shah’s family, who had not been in touch with Shah for three weeks, knew about his death only on Saturday. 

Shah’s family member and Nepali Congress Kailali Constituency No 1 President Prakash Shah said that his last rites were performed by making an effigy of kush, holy grass, at Dalitpur Ghat of Karnali river on Sunday.

In the audio message, Thapa said that he and Shah were in the same barrack and they went to Russia from Dubai together.

“We went to Russia together. We were in the same barrack as a team,” Thap said, adding, “I could not save Shah, who was injured in the war, despite my best efforts. I am sorry. Perform all the rituals. I have all the documents of Bharat.”

Thapa said that he is going to war again and has no hope of life.

Shah, who had worked as traffic policeman in Nepal Police for seven years, had reached Russian by putting in his papers as a guard in Dubai.

Bharat, Rabin and Rajendra Rai of Pokhara had gone to Russia from Dubai.

Rai, who was injured after receiving five bullets in the war, said that told his family members that he sustained injuries during a war with the Ukrainian army at Bakhmut.

The Foreign Ministry and the Russian government, however, have not officially informed the family about the death of Shah.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a debate regarding Nepal's commitment to non-alignment policy. As the world watched, Nepal voted in the United Nations’ proposal that condemned Russia's aggression, while neighboring South Asian countries, including India, chose the path of abstention.

This divergence of stance stirred criticism from foreign policy experts and communist parties, who vehemently posited that Nepal's vote in the UN resolution represented a stark deviation from its enduring non-alignment doctrine. They contended that Nepal, like several regional counterparts, should have maintained a resolute neutral position.

In recent months, a fresh discourse has taken root among foreign policy luminaries and political leaders, probing the question of whether Nepal should relinquish its non-alignment policy in light of the ever-shifting regional and global power dynamics. Yet, some proponents of this shift offer their case without specifying what should supplant the non-alignment policy.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), born in the cauldron of the 1950s and 1960s, had at its heart the notion of eschewing alignment with either of the two prevailing blocs: the democratic realm led by the United States or the communist sphere headed by the Soviet Union. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the bipolar world transitioned into a unipolar landscape under US dominion. Currently, there are 120 members that follow the non-alignment policy. 

Nepal has enshrined it in its constitution of 2015. Article 51 of the constitution explicitly mandates Nepal to conduct an independent foreign policy based on the United Nations Charter, non-alignment, Panchasheel principles, international law, and world peace norms. It underscores the overarching imperative of safeguarding Nepal's sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and national interests.

Those advocating for abandoning the non-alignment policy often cite India as an example. They argue that India has embraced a multi-alignment doctrine in recent years. India's reduced emphasis on global non-alignment conferences is seen as a testament to this shift. Experts assert that India has deftly carved a path of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, all while preserving the core tenets of non-alignment.

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, India's steadfast neutrality and ongoing engagements with both Russia and the US have underscored the nuanced nature of its foreign policy. Professor of international relations, Khadka KC, contends that even India has not categorically severed ties with non-alignment, hinting that Nepal, in its own way, has been practicing a form of multi-alignment since the 1960s, all while upholding the principles of non-alignment.

It's argued that Nepal actively pursues economic benefits from major global powers, including Russia, and, since 1960, has remained untethered to military alliances. Experts assert that the current non-alignment doctrine does not preclude Nepal from engaging with any nation to further its national interests. However, the unique geography of Nepal necessitates a cautious avoidance of taking sides in global conflicts.

Beyond Nepal's borders, the Global South at large grapples with the intricacies of non-alignment and neutrality, particularly in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite fervent lobbying by the US and its allies, many Global South nations have refrained from endorsing US sanctions on Russia. The positions of these smaller nations have triggered consternation, as they effectively curtail the impact of the sanctions on Russia’s economy.

Professor KC staunchly advocates for Nepal's continued adherence to non-alignment, affirming that it's intrinsic to Nepal's foreign policy fabric. He emphasizes that geography and evolving regional and global power dynamics underscore the primacy of Nepal's non-alignment policy.  “Nepal can simultaneously reap economic benefits from major powers while remaining committed to non-alignment,” he says.
Former diplomat Dinesh Bhattarai insists that at the core of Nepal's non-alignment policy lies the art of making independent judgments without tilting toward any side, a principle perfectly aligned with Nepal's unique geographical constraints. He dismisses claims that non-alignment stifles development.

“I have heard the contention that non-alignment policy hinders our development. What I say is geography is an omnipotent factor, and taking sides offers no guaranteed path to rapid progress.” 

Mriendra Bahadur Karki, executive director at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, offers a nuanced perspective. “Nepal should reinvent non-alignment to involve active engagement in global affairs while sidestepping military alliances,” he says.  

Karki also defends Nepal's prudent decision to vote against Russia's invasion of Ukraine, portraying it as an embodiment of active non-alignment.

International relations analyst Gaurab Shumsher Thapa underscores that non-alignment does not entail turning a blind eye to regional or global events. “Instead, it beckons active engagement in world affairs without shackling Nepal to any military blocs.”  Given Nepal's intricate geopolitical milieu, Thapa asserts that the relevance of non-alignment will likely increase rather than dwindle in the country's future.

To date, Nepal remains an ardent advocate of the non-alignment policy. In a recent ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement Coordinating Bureau, Foreign Minister NP Saud reaffirmed Nepal's unwavering faith in the principle of the Non-Aligned Movement. He stressed the imperative of international cooperation within NAM, the strengthening of south-south collaboration, and the fortification of multilateralism with the United Nations at its nucleus, as a means to surmount contemporary global challenges.

Saud maintained: "As NAM members, we must address the root causes of persistent global problems, such as poverty, conflict, and violence. We must champion enduring peace through dialogue and respect for diversity while accelerating our economic development to attain the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development."

Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conversation with ApEx, contend that the ongoing debate on non-alignment falls short of mirroring the contemporary reality. In the face of external forces exerting pressure to enlist Nepal in their ranks, they say the most prudent course for Nepal would be to remain steadfast on its non-alignment commitment. 

They firmly assert that Nepal, in view of its unique position, cannot afford to antagonize any nation by picking sides. Critics of non-alignment, they argue, have yet to furnish a coherent alternative.

Nilanthi Samaranayake is a visiting expert at the US Institute of Peace and an adjunct fellow at the East-West Center in Washington. She has 25 years of experience in the nonprofit research sector. Most recently, she served as director of the strategy and policy analysis program at CNA, where she led a team conducting multidisciplinary research and analysis for civilian and military leaders. Before joining CNA, Samaranayake analyzed public opinion at the Pew Research Center and completed a fellowship at the National Bureau of Asian Research.

Her work focuses on regional security in the Indian Ocean, smaller South Asian countries, non-traditional security issues, and US alliances and partnerships. Kamal Dev Bhattarai  of ApEx spoke with her on China-US contestation and implications for the South Asian Countries like Nepal. The views expressed are solely hers and not of any organization that she is affiliated with.

How do you see the US-China contest in South Asia?

Smaller South Asian countries are increasingly expressing concerns about maintaining their sovereignty and independence amid strategic tensions between large powers. Nepal, for example, was caught in this situation as a smaller state during the debate over the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). What should be a straight-forward effort to help meet development needs can quickly become politicized due to the backdrop of strategic competition. This pattern was seen in Sri Lanka with the MCC as well, but with a different outcome. The US withdrew its $480m offer.

It has been more than one year since the Biden administration came up with an Indo-pacific strategy, how are South Asian countries responding to it?

To understand how Smaller South Asian countries are responding to the Indo-Pacific Strategy, I recommend reading a recent East-West Center series with experts from Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka directly commenting on their own country’s responses. I served as a guest editor for the series.

The United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies India as a major defense partner and discusses how the US will support India’s regional leadership. The strategy, however, does not mention any of the Smaller South Asian countries. This is an oversight that US officials may want to address in a future update because it represents a disconnect between US strategy and policy. In fact, a review of US policy in the region shows that Washington has clear interests and engagements with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives along multiple lines, such as economics, development, security, and democratic governance. It even has common interests with Bhutan despite their lack of formal diplomatic relations.

How do you see India’s engagement with South Asian countries in the backdrop of growing US-China competition?

Regarding US-China competition, India is a major actor on its own terms due to its border conflict with China, which has included fatalities. As a result, India has sought to strengthen its relationships with the Smaller South Asian countries as tensions with China have increased in the past few years and as China has developed more active ties with these countries. 

India has conceptual frameworks for organizing its regional engagements such as Neighbourhood First and SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) in the Indian Ocean. As the US and India are deepening their relationship, underscored by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US, we also see the US supporting India’s security concerns about China in the Smaller South Asian countries. For example, US officials reportedly met with Sri Lankan leaders after India expressed its objections to Sri Lanka permitting a Chinese ship to visit the controversial Hambantota port last summer.

How do you see the position of South Asian countries in the Russia-Ukraine War?

This is a good question because Russia remains an important actor for Smaller South Asian countries, despite all the attention given to China’s role in South Asia. In March 2022, the UN General Assembly resolution on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka abstained along with India and Pakistan. Bangladesh, in particular, has found itself caught up in the debate over sanctions as it tries to pursue a power plant project with Russia. 

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka tried to enforce the sanctions, but had to back down after Russia suspended passenger flights for four months and affected tourism earnings during the worst of the country’s economic crisis. However, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives have voted at the UN in Ukraine’s favor. This is a strong stance for smaller states to take.

What are your suggestions for a country like Nepal in the conduct of foreign policy in the shifting geopolitical environment?

Nepal is navigating major power rivalry in ways that are similar to other Smaller South Asian countries. Yet its relationship with India is unique in terms of trade, people-to-people ties, and military cooperation. Nepal has arguably the most considerations to make as it manages its foreign policy with large powers.

I think the challenge for Nepal and other Smaller South Asian countries will be to maintain their focus on meeting national-level economic development needs and hitting targets like graduating from least developed country (LDC) status, while minimizing partisan and personality-based infighting in domestic politics to the extent possible.