Nepali Congress could struggle to honor February convention dates

Even as the Covid-19 crisis rages on, badly hindering party activities, Nepali Congress, the main opposition, has expedited the process of holding its 14th General Convention on 19-22 February 2021 in Kathmandu. The party’s top decision-making body is to elect new leadership from center to grassroots.

To prepare, the party is holding its Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting. In fact, preparations for the convention had started back in February but had to be put off following the Covid outbreak in the country. Though the dates for lower-level party conventions have changed, the previously set date for the general convention remains intact. Yet it will be tough to hold the general convention on time.

First, the Nepali Congress is yet to complete the integration process of its grassroots-level cadres in line with the federal structures. In the federal restructuring, many village development committees have been reduced to wards and new electoral constituencies for provincial houses have been created. Adjustment of local leaders and cadres to this change has been difficult. Factional feuds have posed additional hurdle, as the party has to accommodate all factions.

According to NC Spokesperson Bishwa Prakash Sharma, adjustment of cadres remains incomplete in over two dozens districts. The party has instructed those district committees to complete the task within the next week. Originally, all these activities were to be completed by the third week of April.  

Renewal and updating of active membership is another uphill task that needs to be completed soon for the general convention to happen. Yet the party is yet to even send membership forms to all districts.

According to the new calendar, renewal and distribution of new active membership will be completed by December 15. This will be followed by village/town/ward level convention on December 21. The convention of 753 local governments happens on December 23, provincial-level electoral constituency convention on December 26, and district-level convention from December 28-31. After this comes provincial level convention on January 19, and last is the general convention on February 19-22. The party is undecided on how such a large number of cadres will gather in the middle of a raging pandemic.

Although NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba was hesitant, the party was compelled to come up with a fixed calendar due to relentless pressure from senior leaders like Ram Chandra Poudel and Krishna Prasad Situala. These leaders had been boycotting CWC meetings accusing the party president of delaying the general convention. Ever since the Congress was drubbed in 2017 parliamentary elections, Deuba has been under pressure to hold the convention as soon as possible so that party leadership can be handed over to someone else.

Besides Covid, constant floods and landsides will make party activities difficult in July and August. Similarly, in the winter that follows, mountainous districts will be covered in snow. Says a top NC leader requesting anonymity: “Party President Deuba agreed to hold general convention on time to deflect criticism that he is using the corona crisis as an excuse to extend his tenure.”

NC youth leader Madhu Acharya, who is thought of as close to senior leader Ram Chandra Poudel, says the party’s calendar is unscientific and it will be difficult to hold the general convention next February. “Due to floods and landslides, there can be no party-related activity in the next couple of months, and soon after that, there is Dashain and Tihar. Practically, it will be impossible to strictly adhere to the calendar,” Acharya says.

Yet the announcement of general convention dates signals that the process of electing new NC leadership has started, which is a vital message in the eyes of the party functionaries opposed to Deuba’s leadership. Party statute allows the CWC to extend its tenure by six months in case of an ‘abnormal situation’ in the country—and on current form the party is likely to take that option.

Incumbent President Deuba, 73, is looking to hang on, even after the 2017 electoral drubbing. Other party leaders wanted him to take responsibility and resign; but Deuba has refused to be scapegoated. At the upcoming general convention, his main challenge for party presidency could come from Dr Shekhar Koirala, who has been widely canvassing the country to drum up support. He believes he is the right scion of the Koirala family.  

Ram Chandra Poudel, 75, feels other senior leaders have long cheated him out of presidency, and even of the prime minister’s chair. He reckons it’s now or never. Prakash Man Singh, another senior leader from the Poudel camp, also wants to fight for presidency. But if Poudel enters the ring, Singh is likely to settle for vice-president.

Unstable Nepali polity

When democracy was restored to Nepal in 1990, the country was unprepared. The state had been thoroughly centralized under the Panchayat system, with everyone ultimately answerable to the monarch. Between the people and the place, there were only a handful of intermediary institutions, which too came under direct control of the monarchy. Political parties were banned, and so were independent courts and constitutional bodies. Thus post-1990 governments had to operate in a kind of vacuum. Without functioning democratic institutions to hold them to account, the political leaders who suddenly found themselves in power were free to do pretty much as they pleased. 

Lack of democratic culture became immediately clear as political parties started a mad scramble for power. Politicians were reluctant to sit in the opposition and miss out on the gravy train. Hence no sooner would a government be formed, the opposition was already plotting its downfall. Nor were big parties like Nepali Congress and CPN-UML united, and competing political leaders often conspired to bring down their own governments. One reason for this perpetual state of instability was the flawed legislation that allowed quick making and breaking of governments. This changed in 2015 with the drafting of a new constitution. 

But even though the legislation changed, the mindset of the class of politicians that has continuously ruled the country for the past 30 years didn’t. So despite the ruling Nepal Communist Party now having nearly two-thirds parliamentary majority, its government once again appears wobbly even as more than half its five-year mandate remains. “Democracy demands responsible, broad-minded and consultative political leadership,” says political analyst Krishna Pokhrel. “Yet we have hardly had leaders with these characters since the 1990 political change.”

One reason for this close-mindedness is the tendency of our top political leaderships to limit their horizons to a small coterie of leaders and advisors. They simply don’t trust others. Another political analyst Chandra Dev Bhatta avers that the current regime, like the earlier ones, is heavily occupied by power politics and not with people’s urgent agendas. Bhatta argues that ‘elite settlement’ of various democratic movements and convergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ classes to amass power, prestige and money create disillusionment among the masses and thus sow the seeds of instability. 

Then there is India, which became enmeshed in making and breaking many governments in Kathmandu. India wanted to maintain its stranglehold on Nepali polity and keep other foreign actors out. But in analyst Pokhrel’s words, “India’s interference persists, and yet the primary drivers of instability remains domestic—and it was no different in the past.” 

Sadly, the country’s current political leadership has done little to strengthen other democratic institutions or to make people believe it is working in their interest. It also seems minded to rely on external actors to protect its reign. 

 

Lack of intra-party democracy contributing to perpetual political instability

In 1991, following the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Nepali Congress (NC) formed a single-party majority government with a five-year mandate. But largely owing to intra-party rifts, the government led by Girija Prasad Koirala collapsed just two years after its formation, starting a phase of chronic instability that still characterizes the country.

Frequent government changes, never-ending horse-trading for power, and corruption have since become key features of national politics. Again, in 1999, the Nepali Congress secured a majority in parliamentary elections and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai became the prime minister. But he was forced out in under a year, largely due to machinations of Koirala. This ultimately culminated in King Gyanendra’s takeover of executive powers in 2005.

In the first Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in 2008, the mother Maoist Party that had waged the decade-long insurgency emerged as the largest party, with near majority seats in the CA. But the subsequent government of Pushpa Kamal Dahal collapsed after only nine months in office. He had to resign over his sacking of the army chief Rookmangud Katawal, allegedly at the instigation of Baburam Bhattarai who wanted to cut Dahal down to size.

Intra-party rifts have been common in different political parties. And most Nepali prime ministers of the past three decades have paid for their failure to manage the relation between their party and the government. “Democracy demands a responsible, broadminded and consultative political leadership,” says political analyst Krishna Pokhrel. “Yet we have hardly had any leaders with these characters since the 1990 political change.” He attributes Nepal's political instability to the tendency of leaders to confine themselves to small coteries instead of trying to take the whole party into confidence.

Different but same

The formation of KP Sharma Oli's two-thirds majority government in 2018, it was hoped, would finally herald an era of stability. Yet in the two and a half years since, there have been constant talks about rifts in the ruling Nepal Communist Party and egregious lack of coordination between the party and the government it led. “The party gave a free-hand to PM Oli. But Oli failed to maintain a cordial relation with the party,” says Pokhrel. The kind of close consultation and coordination that is needed between the party and the government on policy-related issues was missing. 

Another political analyst Chandra Dev Bhatta also speaks of his disappointment with the two-thirds majority government. “The much talked about stability is once again falling apart due mainly to internal wrangling in the NCP,” he says. The current regime, like the earlier ones, is also heavily occupied by power politics, he avers, at the expense of people’s agendas.

Bhatta argues that ‘elite settlement’ of various democratic movements and convergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ classes to amass power, prestige, and money has also contributed to political instability in Nepal.

In the post-1990 phase, the number of political parties mushroomed. In several cases, fringe parties with only a handful of seats in the parliament were able to act as kingmakers. There were other loopholes in the parliamentary system as well. The earlier constitution gave the prime minister full authority to dissolve the House and call for fresh elections. That is why one after another prime minister opted for mid-term elections whenever they faced a crisis of confidence in their own party. In the new constitution adopted in 2015, many such loopholes were closed. Under new provisions, the prime minister cannot call for mid-term elections so long as there is a possibility of government formation from the House floor. Similarly, a no-confidence motion against the prime minister cannot be introduced before two years of government formation. The split of political parties has been made difficult too.

Enemies without

Then there are the external factors. Though India often says stability in Nepal is in its interest, it has often belied its stated commitment. In the past, India was instrumental in making and breaking governments by playing with the contradictions within Nepal. In analyst Pokhrel’s words, “India’s interference remains, and yet the primary drivers of instability are domestic. It was no different in the past.”

Bhatta has similar views on external factors. He cites two primary reasons for their outsized importance in Nepal: the country’s sensitive geographical location and its poor economic condition. “Our leaders have been co-opted by outside powers and today we see the majority of the political class is pro-India, pro-China, pro-West but not necessarily pro-Nepal,” he adds. The role of external meddling is so ingrained in Nepali minds that there is a tendency to see outside hands in just about every political development.

Shyam Shrestha, an analyst of left politics, meanwhile, blames the tendency in communist parties of portraying rival factions as enemies.  “If you see the politics of the last three decades, there has been a tendency of betrayal and non-cooperation in our communist parties. Similarly, leaders don’t seem committed to honoring their agreements. For instance, the first Oli government collapsed in 2016 because of his reluctance to implement the deal with Prachanda. Conditions now are pretty much the same.”

All three political analysts APEX talked to concurred that political stability would continue to remain elusive so long as Nepali political parties failed to strengthen internal democracy.

India or China?

Carefully balancing the influence of its two giant neighbors has been Nepal’s guiding foreign policy principle since the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah. This has never been easy. The British India government or the Qing emperors, each wanted the small landlocked state to serve only its interests. This expectation remains more or less intact. As India-China ties take a nosedive, Nepal could once again find itself in the unenviable position of being asked to choose between its two equally indispensable neighbors.

This is not idle speculation. There have been similar expectations in the past. Officially, “Nepal is confident that both the neighboring countries will resolve, in the spirit of good neighborliness, their mutual differences through peaceful means in favor of bilateral, regional and world peace and stability.”

But that is not how folks in New Delhi or Beijing see it. “Nepal has to take a clear position on whether to stay neutral or take a side,” says Nihar R Nayak, a Delhi-based expert on Nepal-India ties. He says that as per the 1950 treaty, India could inform Nepal about its tensions with China and may seek its support.

Lin Minwang, Professor at Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, and deputy director of the university’s Institute of South Asia Studies, says “India’s violation of the territorial sovereignty of China and Nepal has given China and Nepal a common strategic interest on this issue.” Therefore, China and Nepal should support each other in this process, whether this support is “direct or indirect, public or private.”

Nepali geopolitical analyst Tika Dhakal differs. “Nepal has historically taken a neutral, non-aligned position between the two neighbors. One aspect of Nepal’s unique positioning in the South Asian region is its role as a buffer between India and China,” he says. “Continuation of this policy is important to ensure perpetual peace in Nepal as well as in the region.” Nonetheless, Dhakal too does not rule out added pressure on Nepal to take sides.

Another issue dividing public opinion in Nepal is the MCC compact, the American grant program. The compact is in limbo after the latest parliamentary session that ended June 2 failed to endorse it. China is against Nepal’s endorsement of the compact, as it sees it as a part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy that aims to contain its rise. As India-China tensions worsen, India may pursue its interests in Nepal in concert with the US, further complicating things for Kathmandu.

The Oli government has only itself to blame for its current pro-China image, at least outside the country. There was no need for Nepal to hail China’s aggression in Hong Kong, or for the ruling party leaders to take part in a ‘training session’ with the CCP leaders—not when India and China were on the brink of war. History suggests Nepal cannot afford to so heavily rely on one of its neighbors, almost to the exclusion of the other. If unnatural proximity to India is dangerous, so is the NCP’s current love affair with China. Astute heads will be needed to pull Nepal out of the geostrategic quagmire it finds itself in.