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Many argue that as Afghanistan is not even South Asia proper the recent spate of events there are unlikely to have any direct impact on Nepal, a fellow SAARC member state. Of course there is the question of the fate of around 10,000 Nepalis who are believed to be working in Afghanistan, both legally and illegally. Thankfully, their repatriation is in full swing. Other than that, there will be limited direct impact. But that does not mean events there will have no bearing on Nepal whatsoever.

“You must factor in the Nepal-India open border when we talk about recent events in Afghanistan,” says Pramod Jaiswal, Research Director at Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE). “Afghan refugees have various ways of reaching India, including on tourist visas. They could then easily come to Nepal. India won’t look kindly on such movements,” he argues. This is because India expects a spike in Taliban activities not only in India but in the whole of South Asia in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Kabul.

Indra Adhikari, another foreign policy analyst, points at a related risk. “Even in Nepal, we have had plenty of problems with extremist forces,” she says. “At least for some of them, the victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan would be a huge morale booster.”

Both Jaiswal and Adhikari offer cautionary advice to Nepal. Afghanistan is an old victim of great power rivalry, and if Nepal does not play its cards well, it too could be a victim of the growing geopolitical competition between the US, India and China in South Asia. Nepal is a stronger state than Afghanistan, which is riven by multiple geographical and sectarian divisions. Yet that should be no cause for complacency.

“Another important lesson from Afghanistan is that overreliance on outside forces inevitably backfires,” adds Adhikari. The previous Afghan government propped up by the Americans seemed divorced from the concerns of ordinary Afghans. Corruption rocketed. “Just look at how swiftly the inefficient and corrupt Afghan military collapsed to the Taliban attack.”

If the Nepali state wants to learn from Afghanistan, there is much to internalize. If it doesn’t, the country will eventually suffer. 

Often forgotten in hard-nosed debates on geopolitics is the fact that the countries under discussion are home to people just like us. Take Afghanistan, the country of 40 million that geopolitical analysts often refer to as the ‘graveyard of empires’. All the important international actors are in play in this traditional confluence of South Asia and Central Asia. We in Nepal think we are struggling to manage international geopolitical competition in our midst. But if our situation is that of struggle, in Afghanistan, things are hopeless. People there have little to look forward to.

The scenes of Afghans clinging to a military aircraft about to take off, in what was their last desperate ditch to leave the Taliban-controlled country, were heart-rending. One shudders to think of their state of mind. Yet there seems to be no shortage of commentators, including in Nepal, who are celebrating the Taliban’s ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan. As a rule of thumb, the farther on the left you go, the greater the number of sympathizers for Afghanistan’s new ‘liberators’.

In the past few days, I have had the misfortune of listening to countless Afghan women express their fears of living under the Taliban. These interviews broadcast over TV and radio had an overarching theme: whatever the mullahs might say, women are not safe in the new Afghanistan. They fear their jobs will be taken away, girls’ education will be discontinued, and they will be forced to accept their ‘second-class’ status under the sharia law. Even the limited achievements in gender equality that has been achieved in the past two decades would now evaporate into thin Hindu Kush air.

But it’s not only women who are afraid of the Taliban. Most of those trying to force their way into Kabul airport to leave were young men. The US is certainly to be blamed for a lot that has gone wrong in Afghanistan since its 2001 invasion. Did they need to invade the country to capture one terrorist, whom they could have easily ‘neutralized’ through precision airstrikes? If they were going to ruin the country, why didn’t they have any plans to rebuild it afterward? And why did they so callously assume that the Afghans would welcome an invading force with open arms? And, by the way, wasn’t it the US that first armed most of the men who now fight under the Taliban umbrella?

Yes, they were guilty on these and many other counts. But there was also a welcome side effect of the Taliban’s removal from power. Women could uncover their faces and attend schools and colleges. They were consulted in making modern Afghanistan. They had found a voice. Even as bombs continued to fall all around them, young Afghans, boys, and girls, now started imagining a life of freedom and gainful employment. How can the crushing of their aspirations and dreams be celebrated?

I have often been amused at this divide in Nepali intelligentsia, between the proponents of ‘freedom and democracy’ at any cost and the backers of unconditional ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’. For some, the Americans are evil imperialists whose sole intent is to conquer the world, and such was also their intent in Afghanistan. For others, no regime is worse than the one in Beijing, whose ‘debt trap’ diplomacy is no more than modern-day colonialism. For still others, the expansionist India is to be the most feared. There is no middle ground in this race-to-the-bottom debate.

Instead of everyone uniting to raise a collective voice in favor of better lives for common Afghans, they seem mostly busy holding their ideological forts. On the plus side, people around the world have gotten to hear and see from the Afghan streets. A geopolitical hotspot it certainly is. With 63 percent of its population under the age of 25, it is also a young and restless country teeming with possibilities.

It’s hard to view the progress of the Belt and Road Initiative happily since Nepal signed the agreement with China on 12 May 2017. Out of the limelight, the initiative has now been covered with snows of skepticism and the ice of pessimism in this Himalayan nation.

Part of the blame goes to Nepal’s rollercoaster politics: Will the Deuba-led coalition government continue to play it down like what KP Sharma Oli had done at the end of his premiership? There is too much cant from politicians, who are apt to take seesaw policy. Part goes to the knowledge gap between what’s written on the official paper and what’s happening on the ground. There are too many distorted stories in the media.

Close examination

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on BRI will expire in 2023 after being automatically renewed in May 2020 for another three years. Nine projects for potential funding under the BRI had been identified by Nepali side in January 2019 after Chinese side advised them to trim down the list from the earlier 35 projects to a single digit.

Among them, the Madan Bhandari Technical University may reach a dead end due to its strong partisan background; the Kerung-Kathmandu railway will live in a fool’s paradise for another 10 years or more, thanks to its complexity.

Except for these two wet blankets, according to government officials, some progress has been made in the Tamor hydroelectricity project (756MW), the Phukot Karnali Hydro Electric Project (426MW), and the Galchhi-Rasuwagadhi-Kerung 400kv transmission line.

On the Kimathanka-Hile road, track opening on most part of the 168km long road from Khandbari, headquarter of Sankhuwasabha district, to Kimathanka border point with China, has been completed. Only 14 kilometers are left to be worked upon. Construction has also started on the road from Dipayal to the Chinese border, without Chinese involvement, according to the Department of Road.

For the two remaining projects aimed at strengthening connectivity with China’s Tibet—upgrading of the Rasuwagadhi-Kathmandu road and Tokha-Bidur road—it is mainly the Covid-19 pandemic that is to be blamed as Chinese contractors can’t enter Nepal to start their jobs. 

Though the report card fails to satisfy, it tells the BRI hasn’t sunk into oblivion either.

Constructive lessons

It’s prejudiced to blindly criticize only politicians like former PM KP Sharma Oli as dishonest. Opportunism and lack of overall political will to implement projects under the BRI are other notable obstacles. The China-Nepal Friendship Industrial Park located in Jhapa district, Oli’s constituency, can be cited as a glaring example.

This writer was told before the foundation-laying ceremony of the park in February 2021 (a BRI project with full support from the local government of Tibet) that Oli hosted many cabinet meetings for what was going to be the country’s largest industrial park. With a jaundiced eye, one could ridicule Oli, as every miller draws water to his own mill.  

But a participant at the inauguration ceremony of the industrial park this February informed that no representatives from other political parties appeared on the stage, allowing Oli to take all the credit. After all, the project was to bring into Nepal around $100 million of Chinese investment in three years (Phase 1), creating around 100,000 jobs, according to the Investment Board of Nepal.

All projects under the BRI are joint ventures between Nepal and China, and both have the duty to see them through on schedule. But why are those projects being driven from pillar to post? In a narrow sense, China began at the wrong end.

There is no royal road to mega projects. BRI projects or national pride projects: which came first? What’s the performance of those 21 national pride projects of strategic importance for Nepal’s overall development? A fair assessment will make the matter clear.

According to a report presented by the National Development Action Committee in 2016, the year the two countries first agreed to board the same boat named BRI during Oli’s visit to Beijing, most of those vital projects were moving at a snail’s pace, with almost half failing to meet the target.

Their poor performance provided a cautionary tale for China, which might be the main reason none of these nine projects had been officially declared by both the parties as coming under the BRI. The Chinese side might have sensed uncertainty of these hit-or-miss projects in a slow-footed Nepal under huge geo-political pressure.

If Chinese professional technicians could be designated to work together with Nepali side, perhaps they would work out three to five feasible projects that could be completed in two or three years. But the former PM Oli seemed intent on doing everything at once.

As a Chinese saying goes, “A tower is composed of many grains of sand, and a river is formed by several streams.” China hopes principles of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits guide the Belt and Road cooperation. But unfortunately, this cooperation in Nepal seemed to be about establishing an exclusive bloc of UML or “Oli club.” The case of industrial park again being the perfect example.

People say he who pays the piper calls the tune, but instead of calling the shots, China let things drift, without any supervision. Thus its ambitions had been submerged by good intentions and passive observation.

New momentum

In a broader sense, however, the BRI has been a success in Nepal. Encouraged by the initiative, Chinese investors have thronged to Nepal. As a result, China has topped other countries in FDI commitments to Nepal for six successive years.

Pushed by the grand plan of Nepal-China Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, India has been strengthening connectivity with its northern neighbor, too, in a betrayal of its long-cherished dog-in-the-manger-policy.

To match China’s landmark infrastructure scheme, the G-7 nations led by the US unveiled, in June, Build Back Better World (B3W), to provide infrastructure to low- and middle-income countries. How it moves ahead is anybody’s guess.

Nevertheless, these initiatives and endeavors echo the deep wish of people for a decent and happy life. The pith and marrow of Belt and Road cooperation is putting development first, as a core agenda for people. Those countries where politicians are addicted to playing politics will miss the golden opportunities and further lag behind.

It is known to everyone that a perception of weakness and failure of the Oli-led government paved the way for the Deuba-led government, which is in its first few weeks. What is expected of the new government is initiative and courage to carry out the BRI to better serve the people.

As things stand, the cooperation is gaining new momentum with the mobilization of the private sector, a surefire measure of success.

The transit protocol is a case in point. A chief complaint on BRI is Nepal’s failure to utilize four Chinese seaports and three land ports for third-country trade after the related protocol came into effect on 1 February 2020. During the visit of President Bidya Devi Bhandari to China, the two countries had signed the Protocol on Implementing the Agreement on Transit and Transportation in Beijing on 29 April 2018.

An early breakthrough is expected. Nepal Mingda Group Company, a China-Nepal joint venture based in Kathmandu, is preparing for the export of the first consignment of frozen buffalo meat to Kazakhstan via China’s landport at Shigatse or by its seaport at Lianyungang.

Wu Xiaoda, the Chinese investor on this project, told this writer the agreement signed with Kazakhstan is worth $100 million, which means his company will export 30,000 tons of buffalo meat in 1,060 consignments via China in a year.

An old campaigner, Wu has been working in Nepal for more than 14 years and there are a few hundred Nepali workers under him.

“This deal would have been impossible without the support of the Ministry of Industry,” he shared, adding that the young generation officers from this ministry are positive and helpful, a stark contrast to the fitful enthusiasm of old-generation bureaucrats.

The author is former chief of Xinhua News Agency Kathmandu Bureau

The reactionary right is getting all-righteous again. Their central argument has been that federalism and secularism are ‘imported’ concepts imposed on Nepal. The argument’s genesis goes back to 2005 and the signing of the 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance in New Delhi. It was the basis of the subsequent second Jana Andolan, the restoration of the dissolved House, the two Constituent Assembly elections, and the 2015 constitution. India, it is alleged, dictated the agreement and much of the subsequent developments in Nepal.

Then, in 2007, when the interim constitution was being written, secularism was added to the charter at the behest of conniving, free-spending Europeans. Federalism, likewise, found a mention in it because of outside pressure. Neither federalism nor secularism was the demand of the street during the second Jana Andolan. And so, as Nepali people were not consulted on these all-important issues, we either need a referendum on them or these provisions should be declared null and void. 

But the question is, which part of the current political system is unique to Nepal? The idea of a constitution through an elected constituent assembly in Nepal was first proposed by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950. For various reasons, a constituent assembly could not be elected back then. Yet both the constitutions promulgated in the 1950s had heavy inputs from Indian constitutional experts.

The reason we have a parliamentary system is that India does so, and India does so because it inherited it from the British. Again, back in the 1950s, our monarch was seeking asylum in India even as our freedom fighters were waging a guerrilla war in Nepal, again from Indian soil. Just as in 2005, New Delhi in 1950 mediated talks between Nepali interlocutors: King Tribhuvan, Nepali political forces, chiefly Nepali Congress, and the Rana regime. If the 12-point understanding in 2005 had an Indian imprint, New Delhi virtually dictated the 1950 agreement that heralded democracy in Nepal.  

Democratic governance is universal, characterized by periodic elections, check and balance, separation of powers and fundamental rights. We also borrowed all the governing principles of modern nation-states from abroad. Perhaps this is a simplistic argument. But then it is even more simplistic (and misleading) to argue that there is something uniquely Nepali about the institution of monarchy or the country’s erstwhile identification with a single religion.

We embraced the idea of constituent assembly as we thought it would be the best way to frame a democratic constitution. Similarly, we adopted federalism as the earlier unitary state failed to bring meaningful change to the lives of common Nepalis. It is also disingenuous to argue that federalism has failed even as power and resources continue to be centralized in Singha Durbar.

Likewise, all progressive nation-states are secular. Those who argue Evangelical Christianity has spread like wildfire in federal Nepal should listen to parliamentary debates from back in the 1950s when successive governments were accused of promoting religious conversion. Even before that, we have written a history of the coercive conversion of indigenous communities who worshipped various natural deities into Hinduism. Calling Nepal a secular state is thus only honoring its heterogeneous ethnic and religious make-up.    

It was the popularly elected Constituent Assembly that abolished the monarchy. Its representatives framed the new charter, warts and all. But there was no mistake made in declaring Nepal a secular republic. Only a popular revolution of the kind we witnessed in 2006—an unlikely event—can change that.