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Newly appointed Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli is taking oath of office and secrecy today.

Prime Minister Oli is scheduled to take the oath of office and secrecy amidst a special ceremony at Sheetal Niwas at 11 am today.

Following the oath taking ceremony, Prime Minister Oli is likely to expand his Council of Ministers and administer the oath of office and secrecy to the newly appointed ministers.

President Paudel on Sunday late afternoon appointed UML Chair Oli as the new Prime Minister with the support of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, in accordance with Article 76(2) of the Constitution.

He had given until 5 pm on Sunday for two or more parties in the House of Representatives to stake their claim for the post of the Prime Minister.

On March 4, Pushpa Kamal Dahal of CPN (Maoist Center) broke alliance with the Nepali Congress (NC) to form a new governing coalition with the CPN-UML. At the time, many political analysts saw this as a significant step towards left unity and eventual unification of communist parties. While UML Chairperson KP Sharma Oli was not particularly enthusiastic, senior leaders from his party the Maoist Center were optimistic about the unification.

It was assumed that both Oli and Dahal had recognized that the split of the erstwhile Nepal Communist Party (NCP) was a mistake, and that the two parties—UML and Maoist Center—should unite again. However, a lack of trust between Oli and Dahal led to the breakup in their alliance this week. The partnership between the two communist parties lasted just four months. This distrust between Oli and Dahal dates back to 2021 when the then NCP dissolved, resulting in the revival of the Maoist party and a split in the UML, with Madhav Kumar Nepal forming a separate party, CPN (Unified Socialist), which continues to collaborate with Dahal. 

On Sunday, with support from the NC, UML leader Oli became the prime minister. This development has significantly reduced, if not entirely closed, the prospects of left unity in the near future. The NC and UML justify their alliance by citing the need to ensure political stability and address the country’s economic issues. This rationale mirrors the left unity in 2018, which had promised political stability and economic development, resonating well with the people and securing nearly two-thirds of the votes for the left parties. The new coalition faces numerous challenges. Firstly, it must maintain internal cohesion to effectively address the country's current problems. Secondly, it needs to revitalize the economy. Additionally, it must tackle issues of good governance and corruption. The coalition has also pledged to amend the constitution but has not provided details on how this complex task will be achieved.

A major challenge for the coalition will come from within their respective parties. Historically, a lack of communication and coordination between the government and the parties has led to government collapses. Therefore, the leadership of both NC and UML must not overlook party dynamics if they wish to maintain the coalition. Oli and Deuba must be particularly careful in managing internal government differences. There have been many past instances of disagreements between the prime minister and ministers from the coalition parties in the past. Policy and appointment disagreements have also strained relations between coalition partners. The new coalition will face similar challenges, and the key question is how Oli and Deuba will manage these differences.

Another challenge arises from internal party dissatisfaction. Leaders like Shekhar Koirala and Gagan Kumar Thapa within the NC are unhappy with the selection of ministers, a common issue since the 1950s. Oli and Deuba must address these internal concerns seriously, as suppressing dissatisfaction will hinder government effectiveness.  The coalition must also address the country’s economic issues. Immediate measures are needed to coordinate efforts between the Ministry of Finance and Nepal Rastra Bank. International financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank are willing to assist, and the government should seize this opportunity.

To prevent the youth exodus abroad, the government must create job opportunities. On the international front, there are challenges in creating a favorable environment for Nepal’s economic development. The recent Investment Summit showed international interest in investing in Nepal, and the new government should build on this momentum. This involves winning the trust of key development partners, including India, China, and the US. However, even before Oli's oath ceremony, some Indian media portrayed him as a 'pro-Chinese' leader, highlighting the complexities in foreign policy among coalition partners.

While there are no fundamental differences between the NC and UML in dealing with major powers, there are visible differences in their priorities and approaches. For example, the NC is hesitant about moving forward with China’s BRI, while UML leaders advocate progress. Although Dahal, Oli, and Deuba all oppose high-interest loans from China, UML leaders have criticized the lack of progress. Similar differences exist in dealing with other countries like the US, the UK, and development partners such as Korea and Australia. Effective foreign policy will require coalition partners to consult with each other.

Frequent changes in the coalition have led to public skepticism about the government’s stability. The coalition must convey a message of stability; otherwise, it will be ineffective. Investors are wary due to frequent coalition changes over the past year and a half. If the UML-NC coalition fails to deliver, there will be no remaining alternatives, as all government formation options have already been tried.

Oli: A sharp-witted and shrewd politician 

KP Sharma Oli, elected as Nepal’s prime minister for the third time, was born on 23 Feb 1952, in Terhathum district of eastern Nepal, as the eldest son of Mohan Prasad and Madhumaya Oli. In 1963, his family moved to Jhapa district, where Oli began his political career. He became a full-time political activist and joined the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1970. That same year, he was arrested under the Public Offense Act for his involvement in the cause of democracy and the establishment of a republican state.

On 22 May 1970, Oli went into hiding to lead the movement as a full-time leader. In 1972, he was nominated as the chief of the Jhapa Movement Organizing Committee. In 1973, he was arrested on various false charges, including subversive acts, and was imprisoned for 14 years, including four years of solitary confinement. During his imprisonment, the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) or CPN (ML) was formed on 26 Dec 1976, and Oli was regarded as a founding leader.

Released from jail in 1987, Oli was assigned responsibilities as a Central Committee member of the CPN (ML) and served as the in-charge of the Lumbini Zone until 1990. In 1990, he became the founding chair of the Democratic National Youth Federation, Nepal (DNYF), a youth wing of the party. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or CPN (UML) was founded on 6 Jan 1991, by merging two large communist groups, with Oli as a founding central leader.

In 1991, Oli was elected as a member of the House of Representatives from Jhapa-6 and was re-elected from Jhapa-2 in 1994. He served as the Minister for Home Affairs from 1994 to 1995 in the first popularly elected communist government under Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari. He held various party positions, including chief of the Central Department of International Affairs and chief of the Central Department of Publicity. From 1999 to 2002, he was the deputy leader of the main opposition party in Parliament.

Oli was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the interim government led by Nepali Congress’s Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala from April 2006 to March 2007. Although he lost the election for the Constituent Assembly in 2008, he continued to hold key party positions, including chief of the Central Department of Party School and chief of the Central Department of International Affairs.

In Nov 2013, Oli was elected as a member of the Constituent Assembly from Jhapa-7 and was elected leader of the parliamentary party in 2014. He became the chairman of the UML in July 2014. Oli first served as prime minister from 11 Oct 2015, to 24 July 2016, and again from 15 Feb 2018 to 13 July  2021.

Oli is known for his sharp wits and being a shrewd politician who is never the one to shy away from controversy. He is fond of reading the works of philosophy, political economy, literature, arts and culture. He has also been active in social works and loves to play various sports including table-tennis. 

CPN UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli has been appointed the Prime Minister.

President Ram Chandra Paudel appointed UML Chairman Oli as the Prime Minister in accordance with Article 76 (2) of Constitution, according to the President's Press Advisor, Kiran Pokhrel.

Oli was appointed the PM in the backing of the largest political party in The Parliament, Nepali Congress.

UML Chairman Oli and NC President Sher Bahadur Deuba had submitted the signatures of a majority of lawmakers proposing Oli as the new prime minister in the wake of President Paudel's call on staking a claim for PM after the outgoing PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal's failure to secure trust vote in the House of Representatives meeting on Friday.

The President had called to stake a claim for PM with the support of two or more political parties representing in the parliament, giving a deadline till today.

The oath-taking ceremony will be held at 11 am tomorrow.

Kwak Gil-sup, President of One Korea Center

Since May 28, North Korea has sent trash into South Korean airspace four times. While North Korea's abnormal behavior is not a recent occurrence, this provocation marks a new low in the history of leaflet distribution.

Neither passively enduring nor overreacting is the best response. If the government fails to unite domestic and international public opinion, it could lead to a loss of national dignity and pride, leaving us vulnerable to further provocations and tactics aimed at creating internal conflicts.

It's Not Trash "Balloons" but Trash "Terror"

Media reports have been referring to the incidents as "trash balloons" since they began. However, this term doesn't accurately capture the severity of the situation. "Trash terror" is a more precise and fitting description.

The large amount of trash has insulted and instilled fear in the South Korean public. In some areas, trash has damaged windshields and disrupted operations at Incheon International Airport. Although the damage was not severe this time, the potential for a major accident remains. In the worst-case scenario, we could imagine North Korea deploying biological or chemical weapons in such balloons, which is terrifying. Therefore, it is crucial to accurately name the issue from the start. It is not "trash balloons" but "inhuman trash terror."

Background of North Korea's choice of Trash Terror' provocation

North Korea claimed that its first trash terror at the end of May was in response to the leaflet distribution by the North Korean defector group Fighters for a Free North Korea on May 10. However, this is actually a calculated multi-purpose psychological warfare, also serving as a test of hybrid warfare applied to the Korean Peninsula, a tactic recently highlighted in the Israel-Hamas conflict.

I assume North Korea's recent trash terror has the following motives:

In the long term, it is an extension of the 'power-for-power' strategy pursued since the diplomatic disaster in Hanoi in February 2019; In the short term, it is a practical step towards Kim Jong-un's "two-Korea policy" declared at the end of the year.

More directly, it is part of the follow-up actions to the decisions made at the Politburo meeting chaired by Kim Jong-un on May 24.

Kim Jong-un orchestrated two significant events during the Politburo of the Workers' Party of Korea meeting in late May. First, he decided to hold the "10th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the WPK" in late June. This plenary meeting to be held just before the Supreme People's Assembly will formalize new borders in the constitution.

Second, after hearing reports on military issues from the General Staff Department, he issued related, undisclosed orders. The content of these orders can be inferred from the statement by North Korea's vice defense minister Kim Kang-il on May 25, which warned of strong responses to South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, civilian leaflet distributions, and South Korean Navy's Northern Limit Line (NLL) violations.

Since then, North Korea has engaged in various provocations, including launching a reconnaissance satellite, trash terror against South Korea, testing the 600mm super-large multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), GPS jamming in the West Sea, violating the military demarcation line, and reinstalling loudspeaker broadcasting along the demilitarized zone. These actions indicate calculated psychological warfare and simulated attack training. Additionally, the conditional suspension announced by Kim Kang-il on June 2 ("100-fold response if leaflets are distributed again") and Kim Yo-jong's retaliation warning on June 9 ("new response to leaflet distribution and loudspeaker broadcasts") are typical hit-and-run tactics aimed at blaming South Korea for heightened tensions, characterized by low-cost, high-efficiency fear-inducing strategies.

Based on current developments, North Korea is likely to continue provoking South Korea with aggressive rhetoric and various actions. These provocations aim to create internal debates about 'war or peace' and instill fear of conflict. By the late June Plenary Meeting and the July Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea is expected to finalize and announce new borders, marking a significant step in their "two-Korea Policy".

North Korea will likely exploit South Korea's political landscape, characterized by intense conflicts and opposition, as well as the anti-American struggle period (June 25 to July 27) and the South Korea-U.S. joint nuclear exercises in August. This includes launching reconnaissance satellites, testing strategic weapons, and possibly conducting a seventh nuclear test. These maneuvers aim to dominate the Korean Peninsula situation and set the stage for new negotiations after the U.S. presidential election and the Ukraine war.

Outlook and direction of response

Kim Jong-un has pushed an anti-nationalistic, anti-unification "two-Korea policy" this year, unlike his predecessors. Over the past five months, he likely weighed the pros and cons and decided the benefits outweighed the costs, erasing traces of national cooperation. The recent trash terror operation is part of this strategy. It's assumed North Korea anticipated South Korea's countermeasures, such as resuming psychological warfare.

The recent provocations, including trash terror, are part of North Korea's strategy to solidify its "two Korea policy." After unsettling South Korea internally from late May to early June, North Korea is expected to adjust its tactics before Vladimir Putin's visit and the late June Party Plenary Meeting. Following the constitutional amendment at the July Supreme People's Assembly (stipulating territorial regulations), North Korea will likely intensify its offensive across all domains.

The South Korea and international community should approach Kim Jong-un cautiously. To solve this abnormal behavior problem, regional and global organizations such as the United Nations and its members, particularly ASEAN, which is close to the Korean Peninsula, should have a strong voice to pressure and enforce the existing sanctions against North Korea. Embracing this challenge as an opportunity, the government should strive to bring about fundamental transformation in the North Korean regime. Now, the South Korean government took steps: suspending the September 19 Military Agreement, putting the military on high alert, and resuming loudspeaker broadcasts. These actions aim to manage the situation and advance North Korean liberalization.