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Judicial committees in Nepal, established under Article 217 of the 2015 Constitution, represent a pioneering effort to decentralize justice delivery. Their primary mandate is to resolve local disputes at the municipal and rural municipal levels, bridging the gap between formal legal systems and traditional community practices. Operationalized through the Local Government Operations Act (LGOA) of 2017, these committees handle cases ranging from property disputes and water-sharing conflicts to unpaid wages and domestic conflicts. With over 150,000 cases pending in Nepal’s formal courts, these committees play a vital role in alleviating judicial backlogs while ensuring access to justice for all.

Despite their promise, critics argue that these committees have focused heavily on supply-side mechanisms such as processes, structures and jurisdiction, while neglecting the demand side—ensuring justice delivery for marginalized and vulnerable groups. Supreme Court Justice Sapana Pradhan Malla emphasizes that these committees must adopt a victim-centered, gender-sensitive approach based on the fundamental principles of justice. Justice must not only be delivered but also felt and realized by those who seek it. This article examines the historical evolution, challenges, global insights and reformative potential of judicial committees in Nepal, offering a path forward to make justice accessible, inclusive, and impactful

Historical foundations and legal framework

Nepal’s justice system has long been rooted in community-based practices, guided by principles of restorative justice, legal pluralism and cultural norms. During the Kirant dynasty, Mundhum, a customary code, emphasized reconciliation and social harmony. The Lichhavi and Malla dynasties institutionalized systems such as Panchali and Pancha Samuha, which combined local norms with administrative governance. Under the Shah dynasty, Dibyopadesh codified justice, creating a hierarchical system that incorporated community-led dispute resolution.

In modern times, the Panchayat system, formalized through the Village Panchayat Act of 1961, marked a significant step toward decentralizing justice. These mechanisms aimed to resolve local disputes but often excluded marginalized groups, perpetuating elitist dominance. The Local Self-Governance Act of 1999 sought to further decentralize judicial powers, empowering village development committees (VDCs) to mediate disputes. However, political instability and a lack of resources limited their effectiveness.

The 2015 Constitution institutionalized judicial committees as part of Nepal’s federal restructuring. Their legal framework includes jurisdiction over 13 categories of disputes, including property boundaries, minor criminal offenses, and domestic issues. These committees are designed as quasi-judicial bodies, intended to provide alternative dispute resolution while supplementing formal courts. However, ambiguities over their role—whether they are courts or supplementary mechanisms—have led to inconsistent practices across municipalities. Elected representatives lead judicial committees, emphasizing their democratic accountability, but their lack of integration into the judicial hierarchy raises questions about procedural fairness and impartiality.

Supply-side focus, demand-side gaps

While judicial committees are theoretically well-positioned to deliver justice, their operational realities reveal significant gaps. One of the most pressing issues is the absence of mechanisms linking justice seekers to these committees. Marginalized groups, including women and the poor, often lack the knowledge or resources to access these committees. Paralegal committees, which previously served as vital bridges, have been largely dismantled. Their reinstatement could provide essential support, such as legal counseling, community mediation and transitional justice mechanisms, ensuring that vulnerable populations can navigate the justice system effectively.

Resource constraints further undermine the effectiveness of these committees. Many committees lack dedicated office spaces, hearing rooms, trained personnel and access to legal libraries. These deficiencies disproportionately affect rural municipalities, where logistical barriers exacerbate the challenges of delivering justice. Domestic violence cases in Rupani rural municipality highlight the limitations of these committees. The absence of trained mediators and psychosocial support hindered their ability to address sensitive disputes, leaving victims without meaningful resolutions. In contrast, Dhulikhel municipality demonstrates the potential of judicial committees when they integrate traditional norms with modern mediation techniques. By successfully mediating a water-sharing conflict, the committee underscored the importance of cultural sensitivity and contextual understanding in justice delivery.

Another criticism of these committees is their overemphasis on “positive/statutory law,” focusing on procedural adherence at the expense of substantive justice. Theoretical frameworks such as procedural justice emphasize fairness, impartiality and inclusivity as essential components of justice delivery. However, these principles are often sidelined in practice, with judicial committees prioritizing processes over outcomes. Justice must not only adhere to legal standards but also address the real-world needs and experiences of those seeking redress.

Effective local justice

Nepal’s judicial committees can benefit by studying international models that balance procedural rigor with community engagement. The Philippines’ Lupon Tagapamayapa operates at the barangay level, offering a community-driven mediation system that resolves disputes efficiently and cost-effectively. Its focus on accessibility and stakeholder participation highlights the importance of engaging local communities in justice delivery.

India’s Gram Nyayalayas integrate village-level dispute resolution with formal judicial oversight. These courts ensure procedural consistency while remaining accessible to rural populations. South Africa’s community courts, rooted in restorative justice principles, harmonize traditional practices with modern legal frameworks, making them particularly effective in addressing culturally sensitive issues.

Bihar’s community mediation programs provide a compelling example of inclusivity. Data show that diversity among mediators correlates directly with greater trust and effectiveness in dispute resolution. Nepal could adopt similar practices to ensure that judicial committees reflect the diversity of the communities they serve, enhancing their legitimacy and public trust.

These global models demonstrate the value of procedural clarity, inclusivity and community engagement in strengthening localized justice systems. Judicial committees must adapt these lessons to align their operations with both local contexts and international best practices.

Toward inclusive justice

To transform judicial committees into effective instruments of justice delivery, Nepal must address both structural and conceptual challenges. Reinstating paralegal committees is a crucial step toward bridging the gap between justice seekers and judicial committees. These committees can facilitate community outreach, provide paralegal support and empower marginalized populations to access justice mechanisms.

Expanding mobile legal clinics and mediation programs is another critical reform. Mobile clinics offering free legal counseling and transitional justice services can bring judicial committees closer to rural and disadvantaged communities, ensuring that justice is accessible to all. Public awareness campaigns and targeted interventions are equally important to educate communities about their rights and the functions of Judicial Committees.

Legislative amendments are necessary to clarify the role and jurisdiction of judicial committees, resolving ambiguities that hinder their operation. Training programs focusing on gender-sensitive dispute resolution, case management, mediation techniques and legal literacy must equip committee members with the skills needed to handle complex cases effectively. Judicial committees must also prioritize outcomes over processes, adopting a justice delivery approach that emphasizes fairness, impartiality and inclusivity.

Drawing on global best practices, Nepal can integrate lessons from the Philippines, India and South Africa to enhance the credibility and effectiveness of its judicial committees. By fostering community engagement, promoting diversity and ensuring procedural consistency, these committees can become transformative platforms for equity and empowerment.

Conclusion

Judicial committees in Nepal are a bold experiment in localized justice delivery, reflecting the country’s commitment to empowering communities and decentralizing governance. However, their potential remains largely unrealized due to operational inefficiencies, resource constraints, and a disconnect between theoretical frameworks and practical implementation. By addressing these challenges and adopting a justice delivery approach, Nepal can transform judicial committees into effective mechanisms that deliver meaningful outcomes for all.

The path forward requires reinstating paralegal committees, expanding mobile legal clinics and clarifying the role of judicial committees within the broader justice system. Inclusive practices, gender sensitivity and public engagement must be prioritized to ensure that justice is accessible and impactful. With thoughtful reforms and a commitment to equity, Nepal’s judicial committees can set a global benchmark for localized justice systems, bridging the gap between legal mandates and the lived realities of those they serve.

​​​​​The author is an advocate and development practitioner

Prime Minister KP Oli’s China visit has stirred the pot, with some experts terming it as a diplomatic maneuver aimed at counterbalancing India and fueling speculations that India was not too keen on extending an official invitation to him. Additionally, the two major ruling coalition parties, the CPN-UML and the NC, have differing interpretations of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as viewing it as grants versus aid. These differences, along with their political and ideological leanings toward either China or India, have sent out mixed signals regarding Nepal’s relationships with its neighbors.

Many Indian politicians, media outlets and think tanks view the BRI as China’s key foreign policy tool aimed at influencing the signatory countries' domestic and foreign policies. For instance, a recent heated debate in the Indian Parliament focused on the perceived shift of India’s neighbors toward China and India’s failure to build trust with them. India’s Member of Parliament Manish Tewari questioned the efficacy of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Neighborhood First’ policy even as Nepal and China signed on the BRI cooperation framework during Prime Minister Oli’s recent visit to China, triggering considerable debate in India’s nationalistic media.

India’s relationship with Bangladesh and other neighbours is on a rough patch. Bangladesh’s popular movement, which toppled the regime of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August this year, has created friction between the two countries, with Bangladesh asking India to extradite the former PM. Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal have tried to strengthen their relations with China often creating friction with India. In South Asia, critics also argue that the appeal of BRI funding and other assistance to India’s neighbours is less about China’s efforts to contain India, which accounts for almost 80 percent of the region’s economy, and more about these countries’ desire to counterbalance or challenge India’s Monroe Doctrine-style regional dominance.

Global politics also plays a significant role in South Asian geopolitics. Military conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war and trade tensions, such as the US chip embargo and reciprocal tariffs coming from the US and China, underscore the renewed great power competition involving the US, a rising China, and a revisionism ambition of Russia. India’s fast economic growth, coupled with rising global influence, is also reshaping alliances and the world’s political and economic orders. 

In this context, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) comprising India, Australia, Japan and the US seeks to counter China’s growing military and political influence in the Indo-Pacific. Recently, the global economic landscape is shifting in India’s favour, with 69 percent of companies, up from 55 percent in 2022, planning to leave China, and 39 percent favouring relocation to the Indian subcontinent, according to Fortune Magazine.

India’s reservation toward Nepal’s closeness with China through the BRI also emanates from the fact that in global power competition, superpowers and rising powers are likely to use military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and technological tools to influence other states and reshape the world order by leveraging foreign assistance in all forms—military, economic and development. For example, China has invested billions in African infrastructure projects and established a military base in Djibouti, with plans for another in Gabon. A key lesson for Nepal is to carefully assess each form of assistance or alliance, accepting or rejecting them based on national interests.

At the technical level, Nepal should be aware of risks and opportunities associated with BRI fundings under which China has provided an estimated $1.34trn to more than 20,000 projects based in 165 countries in the form of grants and loans. 

The top three recipients of BRI funding over the past two decades have been Russia, Venezuela and Pakistan. China has provided nearly $170bn in development loans to Russia for multi-sector projects, including industry, mining and construction, budgetary assistance to Venezuela for stabilizing the economy and funding of more than $67bn to Pakistan (almost 20 percent of its GDP) whose economy continues to struggle.

Chinese loans have been a major source of sovereign default risk in countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Zambia, prompting some to label it as China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. According to World Bank estimates, in 2022, one-third of debt service payments by the 74 poorest countries in the world were owed to China, with many borrowers unable to repay. This has led Beijing to reduce spending on infrastructure projects under the BRI and focus more on rescuing countries in financial distress to help them repay their loans. China is also increasingly focusing on smaller-scale strategic projects, such as green technologies, political party training and cultural exchanges.

The key question is not whether to accept BRI funding, but to assess whether proposed projects are financially and technically viable and offer a high rate of return. Fitch's credit rating recently highlighted Nepal’s strong debt affordability, with more than 40 percent of government debt being external and highly concessional. This suggests that accepting BRI loans is less challenging for Nepal than for countries like Sri Lanka or Pakistan. However, the projects must be transformative for Nepal’s development; otherwise, they risk becoming ‘white elephant’ projects.

China has recently been scaling back funding for large-scale projects, making it increasingly difficult to secure substantial grants. The challenge for Nepal now lies in its ability to develop projects with high rates of return and secure adequate fundings. Otherwise, submitting a list of projects without concrete funding agreements would amount to little more than a symbolic gesture aimed at counterbalancing India.

Most importantly, Nepal should prioritize what is beneficial for the nation while improving its communication of priorities. Nepal must clearly explain why development assistance from its neighbors, including BRI, is not only crucial for its own economic growth but also contributes to regional and global economic integration. This can be achieved by dispelling common myths, addressing information gaps and building trust with both India and China. Countries like Singapore and Mongolia have successfully crafted foreign policies that serve their national interests by earning the trust and confidence of rival powers. 

At the same time, Nepal should adopt a balanced approach, maintaining strong ties with both neighbors to secure financial support for infrastructure and development projects, without becoming overly reliant on large loans from either country. Such a strategy would encourage healthy competition between the two regional powers, enabling Nepal to negotiate more favorable terms for its development. As long as Nepal clearly communicates to both India and China that accepting BRI promotes Nepal’s stability, growth and prosperity, maintaining close economic ties with China may not be as sensitive an issue for India as often perceived.

Given a divided national political landscape, Nepal needs a consensus on how to handle foreign development assistance and decide which projects to accept or reject. While the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funding sparked political division, it also led to a more open debate. In contrast, discussions on the BRI have been less transparent, with limited public information, making the call for parliamentary debate and oversight both valid and reasonable.

Most importantly, a national consensus is crucial on the principles for accepting foreign assistance, including inclusion (with civil society participation), transparency (openness about projects and funding), parliamentary oversight (for broader legitimacy) and honest communication with donors on Nepal’s approach and position. While parliamentary approval for each foreign funded project may not be necessary, it is essential for larger projects like the BRI or the MCC Compact.

The author is a member of the board of directors at the Institute of Foreign Affairs,Nepal. Views are personal

Asia has been one of the world’s fastest-growing regions, and energy requirement is expected to increase by more than 50 percent until 2040, mainly driven by factors such as industrialization, urbanization and population growth. The general electricity generation dependency upon coal and thermal power in the region is 70 percent for India, over 80 percent for Bangladesh and 58 percent for Pakistan. Despite being a technologically advanced nation, 70 percent of Japan’s energy demand is fulfilled by fossil fuels whereas the numbers for South Korea and China are 80 percent and 60 percent, respectively. The Asian countries use about 0.5bn metric tons of coal annually, of which more than 1.5bn metric tons of CO2 are emitted from the power sector. This heavy reliance on fossil energy resources bears the social cost of extreme air pollution and greenhouse gas pollution. As industries like steel, cement, ammonia and others that release high levels of CO2 are expected to expand during the current decades, it is imperative to develop nontraditional energy sources in the region.

Green hydrogen is a clean, versatile energy carrier generated through water electrolysis using renewable electricity. In contrast to grey or blue hydrogen, which are derivatives of fossil fuels and their production emits greenhouse gases, green hydrogen is carbon-free. Its applications are manifold: from powering industry and transport to energy storage and a clean fuel source for power generation. For Asia whose energy mix is dominated by coal and natural gas, green hydrogen offers a pathway to decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors like steel, cement and heavy transport. It also aligns with the region’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to limit global warming.

The present energy scenario of Nepal shows a comfortable position with an installed hydropower potential of about 3,157 MW, while the total domestic demand is about 1,870 MW. Nepal’s estimated peak electricity demand looks much less at 10,500 MW by 2040 with an installed capacity of 40,000 MW. This excess renewable energy is a perfect opportunity for Nepal to focus on green hydrogen production since water electrolysis can be powered with surplus electricity. Green hydrogen can act as a carbon-neutral and exportable energy vector for meeting the energy transition needs of neighboring Asian countries. Since coal and thermal energy predominate in the countries within the region, exporting green hydrogen from Nepal could be helpful to countries like China, South Korea, Japan, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan to progress toward less carbon-intensive energy sources and, at the same time, spur regional cooperation and growth of the energy sector. 

India's rising demand for green hydrogen is a perfect opportunity for Nepal to become a major exporter of green hydrogen. Nepal, being a country abundant in hydroelectric power, could use the excess clean energy to generate green hydrogen to aid India in its decarbonization drive. Moreover, Nepal has the potential to export green hydrogen and its derivatives, such as ammonia, to India via pipelines, enabling further export to East Asian and South Asian markets. While green hydrogen may not currently be the most economically viable energy source, it stands out as one of the most environmentally-sustainable options, aligning with global decarbonization goals. Besides, the geographical location of Nepal, which is adjacent to India, and the ongoing prospects of energy exchange make the country an ideal supplier of green hydrogen. At the same time, this business may lead to the generation of thousands of employment opportunities in Nepal’s energy transportation and logistics sectors and contribute to diversification. Green hydrogen holds the promise of becoming the foundation of Nepal's new export economy in energy and, therefore, could become a long-term substitute for the two most volatile industries in Nepal—remittances and tourism.

A 2023 report by the World Bank estimated that if Nepal utilized 10 percent of its technically feasible hydropower for hydrogen production, it could produce 1.2m metric tons of green hydrogen annually, worth approximately $6bn at current market rates. Exporting hydrogen to India, Bangladesh and potentially China would create thousands of jobs throughout the supply chain of hydrogen production, storage, transport and logistics. For Nepal’s economy, which relies heavily on remittances and tourism, hydrogen could diversify revenue streams and reduce trade deficits.

The proximity of Nepal to the two significant energy consumers, India and China, places it at a logistical advantage in terms of green hydrogen exports. India’s National Hydrogen Energy Mission has targeted bringing down the price of green hydrogen to $1 per kilogram by 2030, creating massive demand for cheaper imports. And Nepal could be a key supplier. Also, hydrogen trade could be added to existing bilateral agreements such as the India-Nepal Power Trade Agreement (2014). Developing regional hydrogen corridors with shared infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage facilities, would reduce costs.

The government’s support is critical to making Nepal a green hydrogen hub. The Nepal Hydrogen Hub plan foresees the utilization of excess hydropower in the production of green hydrogen that can be utilized in Nepal’s economy in green cement and green steel industries, and the excess hydrogen can be exported as green ammonia or transported through pipelines to the Asian market. Setting up a green hydrogen plant for every hydropower project being developed in Nepal would be very costly. In response, the Nepal government should propose a plan to establish four strategic hydrogen hubs to centralize resources for cost efficiency based on the approximate area of hydropower stations. These hydrogen hubs, depending on their distances from either India or Bangladesh, could be used to export green hydrogen, hence providing Nepal with perfect regional markets. 

For that, the policymakers need to formulate a National Hydrogen Roadmap outlining the production target, export strategy and incentive for investment. Offering subsidies or tax breaks for producing green hydrogen and related infrastructures can attract domestic and foreign investments. Incentivizing public-private partnerships is critical for mobilizing large-scale capital and technical expertise. Green hydrogen aligns with Nepal’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to achieve net-zero emissions by 2045. Hydrogen can reduce air pollution, improve public health, and contribute to global climate goals by replacing fossil fuels. 

Developing robust export infrastructure, such as pipelines, storage systems and transportation networks, will ensure seamless movement to regional and international markets via shipments. This will not only strengthen the Nepali economy but also make it more self-reliant, rather than being dependent on remittances and taxes, which are unsustainable long-term economic solutions. Becoming a green hydrogen export hub will not only position Nepal as a leader in sustainable energy but also create massive employment opportunities and drive the development of green infrastructure to pave the way for long-term economic growth and environmental resilience. Besides, the export of green hydrogen will lower Nepal’s trade deficit by decreasing reliance on imports while creating new revenue streams. This transformation aligns with global efforts to decarbonize energy systems and presents Nepal with an opportunity to lead the region in renewable energy innovation and sustainability.

Over the past 30 days or so, various mechanisms of the Nepali and Indian military along with their team of aides remained active, vibrant and traveled back and forth pursuing a special mission. The spontaneous multilayered communication, coordination among various military and civilian components, and frequent arrangements of combined engagements marks another milestone in the Nepal-India defense relations. As a result of these meticulous efforts, military chiefs of Nepal and India have been conferred the honorary title of general of each other’s army in separate ceremonies. This has been an epoch of bolstering military-to-military relationships, which contributes significantly to Nepal-India relations as a whole. 

At this onset, this article seeks to explore the areas of defense cooperation between Nepal and India through the pursuit of a seven-decade-long practice of conferring the title of honorary general to each other’s army chiefs. Furthermore, it analyzes how this practice has reinforced Nepal’s strategic interests and also argues why it is imperative for longer defense cooperation between the two neighbors. 

Tracing the practice

The Indian Military Chief General Upendra Dwivedi was honored with the honorary rank of General of the Nepali Army on 21 Nov 2024 by Nepal’s President Ramchandra Poudel during an investiture ceremony held at the president’s office, Sheetal Niwas. 

A few weeks later, India’s President Droupadi Murmu conferred the honorary rank of General of the Indian Army to Nepal’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashok Raj Sigdel on 12 Dec 2024 amidst a special investiture ceremony held at the president’s office. General Sigdel is the 16th COAS of the Nepali Army to be conferred with such an honor. 

The practice of honoring each other’s Chief of Army Staff by conferring the honorary title of General between Nepal and India dates back to the 1950s. Given the world security situation of the early 1950s—the end of the Second World War and the inception of the Cold War—strong security ties and proper understanding among the regional states was vital. In such a pretext, Nepal and newly decolonized India developed an understanding of defense and security cooperation, which has evolved in multiple dimensions since then. Among myriad practices and provisions, conferring the honorary title of General remains one of the most effective and valued practices. 

The practice of conferring the title is not only a ceremony that takes place in a certain period but largely beyond that. It transcends through different dimensions of Nepal-India relations, viz defense cooperation, security affairs, diplomatic, social, cultural and spiritual aspects. It also reflects the historical legacy and comradeship the two armies shared throughout the years despite various episodes of turbulence in bilateral relations. 

In the context of the changing world order of the 1940s, India was on the verge of being independent from the British colony, whereas Nepal as an independent kingdom was beginning to open up to the world through an open and multilateral foreign policy. As a result of the foreign policy priorities and farsightedness of the time to establish close relations with neighboring countries and put Nepal on the world stage, the practice of conferring the title of honorary General on each other’s army chiefs between the two countries seems to have started. 

In 1950, General KM Kariappa, Chief of hArmy Staff of India, was awarded the Honorary General of the Nepal Army for the first time whereas Chief of the Army Staff General Surendra Bahadur Shah was the first from the Nepali side to be honored with the same honorary rank of General. Since then, 16 COAS of the Nepali Army and 20 Chiefs of the Indian Army have received the title.

Nepal and India are two independent neighboring countries that share borders in three directions. Although bilateral diplomatic relations formally began on 13 June 1946, the historical, religious, cultural and geographical proximity between the two countries goes back a long time. Thus, the honorary generalship also signifies this deep-rooted bilateral relationship. 

Why this matters

This unique military practice fosters abundant opportunities to both armies for defense and security cooperation, benefiting both nations. Besides that, it has ample positive impacts, which are shortly described below. 

First, this type of practice is an important exercise in military diplomacy. While some say that security and diplomacy are different and opposite issues, in modern diplomatic practice, security and diplomacy are complementary rather than opposite to each other, where the other cannot succeed in the absence of one. Therefore, each country perceives military force as a source of national power along with its geography, population, economic capacity, diplomacy and intelligence. This seven-decade-old practice has proved to be a milestone in deepening relations between the two countries through cordial defense relations. It is globally seen that the trust gained at the military level makes it easier to discuss, and cooperate at other layers of the state. For this reason, in the realm of international relations study, the democratic peace theory suggests that a country doesn’t feel insecure by the hundreds of nuclear warheads owned by friendly states unlike a single nuclear warhead owned by the adversary. 

Secondly, this unique practice is part of an ongoing effort to peacefully resolve mutual misunderstandings, disputes and problems that arise from time to time. There have been plenty of examples of continuous efforts for a concrete exit by the various mechanisms formed by the governments of the two countries through expert provisions and insights.

Third, the support of friendly military forces is essential during natural disasters and crises. The assistance rendered by friendly military forces during disasters that Nepal has faced at different times is unforgettable. After the devastating earthquake of 2015, 18 military teams from 34 friendly countries extended their invaluable assistance in the search, rescue and relief operations. Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, friendly military forces provided generous support to Nepali Army personnel and ordinary citizens. These are some of the instances of established relations and diplomatic dimensions at the military level. Surya Kiran, an exercise involving the Indian and Nepali armies, is also an example of a platform that prepares to combat such disasters jointly. 

Fourth, since the regional security challenges faced by these two countries with open borders can only be addressed through joint response, a practice of institutional trust and cooperation at the military leadership level is a must, which is reinforced by this practice of honorary generalship.  

Fifth, the implementation of Nepal’s foreign policy requires significant contributions from all state agencies, governmental and non-governmental, private and professional sectors. Since the visits of the military leadership are not limited to the equivalent level but also with personalities related to foreign, administrative and national security, it provides a way to augment the overall security situation and mutual relations. During the official visit to India, Nepal’s COAS met with India’s defense minister, and national security advisor, including other key defense portfolios. The Indian military chief had also met top political and defense authorities of Nepal during the context of the investiture ceremony. These are the crucial opportunities where defense priorities and concerns are expressed based on mutual understanding and trust.

Sixth, although conferring the title of honorary general is an established practice at the military level, it is also a matter related to the dignity of the nation and foreign relations. Established diplomacy at the military level provides support to the country’s overall diplomatic maneuverings mostly in times of state emergencies and crisis. 

Lastly, India has not only been the largest defense exporter for Nepal but also remains as a stable and reliable security partner in the region. As Nepal and India share open borders, both countries bear similar kinds of security threats, viz terrorism, cross-border crimes, money laundering and counterfeiting, communal violence and refugee crisis, along with human security threats such as unemployment, food crisis, environmental hazards and natural disasters, pandemic and health crisis. Thus, it is imperative to have smooth, vibrant and spontaneous cooperation between the spearhead security agencies of the two countries to deal with these common security threats. 

To sum up, a strong bond between the two armies may eradicate the possibility of a swerve in bilateral relations regarding various issues and areas that Nepal and India confront. Such a unique practice also paves the way for cordial and trustful relations between Nepal and India in the long term. Realizing this matter, the Nepali Army has perceived this practice as an "emblematic of the close ties" between the national armies of the two countries.

This practice not only consolidates an inveterate relationship between Nepal and India but also hones the trust between the two armies, which is essential for peaceful coexistence. All in all, this practice helps to amalgamate bilateral interests, creating a conducive environment to pursue the security equilibrium.

The author is a Major in the Nepali Army. The views are personal and do not reflect the Nepali Army’s official position