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The student movement against the 30 percent quota in government jobs for descendants of the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war veterans not only led to the loss of power for Sheikh Hasina, who had stayed in power for 15 consecutive years, but also forced her to flee the country. In an interview with the media, her son suggested that Hasina is unlikely to return to active politics.

Hasina is currently in New Delhi. For Hasina and New Delhi, this is not a new atmosphere, though. During her exile, Hasina had once lived in the Indian capital for six years. The streets of India and the cordial relationship with Indian power centers are not new to her.

India and Bangladesh enjoy the best bilateral relationship in the region—not just between governments, but also between heads of state. It was not long ago that a dispute along nearly 4,000 kilometers of the border area was resolved on the basis of this relationship. Even now, Indian media outlets report that citizens from both countries in border areas freely cross over and indulge in farm work daily. It is, therefore, natural for India to be concerned about and interested in the security sensitivity with Bangladesh. India is reportedly quite sensitive about the political change in Bangladesh. It may not be as easy for India to cooperate with the new government as it was with Hasina’s leadership.

If news reports are anything to go by, India is apprehensive that China might dominate regional geopolitics. Bangladesh has been facing economic difficulties recently. In July, during Hasina’s visit to China, Bangladesh had requested $5bn in loan assistance from China. However, no agreement was reached after China expressed willingness to provide only $1bn. This issue reportedly ended after the foreign ministry of Bangladesh stated that an agreement for $5bn was anticipated, but China only expressed intent to give $1bn.

According to Harsh Vardhan Shringla, India’s former foreign secretary, who also served as Indian envoy to Bangladesh, the economic situation of Bangladesh has weakened since Covid-19. The unemployment rate in Bangladesh has increased and people are finding it difficult to make ends meet. All this had been creating an atmosphere of anger among the younger generation. Amidst this came the government decision of providing a 30 percent reservation in government jobs. The youngsters took to the streets against the decision. This took a violent turn.

Some argue that regional politics infiltrated the protest. This is because the Supreme Court had already annulled the quota system, and the student movement had subsided. But within a few days, the movement suddenly got stronger and protesters started demanding Hasina’s resignation.

Shringla argues that the protests took a violent turn after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and extremists like Jamaat-e-Islami, who were waiting for an opportunity, entered the student movement.

The Sonadia Island seaport near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh is said to have strategic significance for India and China. Some argue that the interests of the two regional powerhouses were seen in the project to keep Bangladesh within their sphere of influence and ensure their regional dominance. 

Bangladesh’s relationship with India appears to be more political and strategic than economic, while with China, it is purely economic. Until 2023, China has invested more than $3bn in Bangladesh. China has helped Bangladesh build seven railway lines, 12 highways, 21 bridges and 31 power stations. However, international media outlets have been analyzing that Hasina’s China visit in July didn’t go as Bangladesh had hoped, from the economic perspective. But immediately after that, both India and Bangladesh had responded that Hasina’s state visit to India was quite successful. 

Both India and China have shown interest in the Teesta river project of Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Hassan Mahmud had made it clear that priority would be given to India’s proposal.

The downfall of pro-India forces in Bangladesh is also seen as a weakness of the Indian government in regional politics. In a discussion on the Indian online media outlet Lallantop, participants argued that the power shift in Bangladesh has weakened India’s influence in the region. They argue that the world powers are aware of the ups and downs in the relationship between Nepal and India since 2015 with exit of Pushpa Kamal Dahal and the rise of Oli, President Muizzu’s stance in the Maldives and India’s withdrawal of military personnel, the end of the Rajapaksa era in Sri Lanka, the end of democratic rule in Myanmar followed by the rise of military rule and China’s silence, the dominance of the Taliban in Afghanistan and China’s support for the Taliban, the relationship between Pakistan and India and the equidistance with the US and Russia that India has been trying to maintain after the Ukraine war. But they may not do anything to immediately provoke India because of the lucrative regional market and the trust in the government led by Narendra Modi.

Discussions have started in India about Hasina’s ouster, particularly regarding the future bilateral relationship. Shashi Tharoor, a leader of the Indian Congress and a member of the Lok Sabha, says: India needs to be alert about possible refugee infiltration from Bangladesh. 

He adds that India will not stand on the side of an unstable and unfriendly neighbor and that it stands and will stand with the citizens of Bangladesh. But India must remain vigilant about India’s security issues, Tharoor says.

India not only has a large investment in Bangladesh but it also provides economic assistance. It knows bad relations could impact India’s investments worth billions of rupees in Bangladesh. Another issue is how China’s relation will be with the new government in Bangladesh. This is because China is the second largest partner of Bangladesh after India. Bangladesh will have to listen to China as much as Hasina listened to India because bilateral relationships are determined by economic activities these days.    

Bangladesh’s regional relations could be different once the new government is formed. This is because Hasina had banned the main opposition party from contesting in the last two elections. After Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh’s President Mohammed Shahabuddin has ordered the release of former Prime Minister and BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia. If she leads the government, her policy might be different from Hasina’s. This is because India had remained silent when the western nations raised concerns about the legitimacy of the recent election and the decision to keep Zia in jail. This has created an anti-India atmosphere at the citizen level. At the same time, Bangladesh needs economic assistance. Analyses are also being made that Bangladesh will be forced to silently support that nation that announces economic assistance to it.

Zia became Bangladesh’s first female Prime Minister in 1991 after her husband’s assassination. She is a fierce critic of Hasina. She became Prime Minister for the second time from 2001 to 2006. But in Jan 2007, when elections could not be held due to political violence, the military intervened in Bangladesh and formed an interim government. The interim government sent Khaleda Zia and her two sons to jail on corruption charges. Hasina adopted an even tougher policy toward Zia and her family.

When Zia’s party BNP was in power, India used to be apprehensive about security issues. But Hasina used to address India’s security concerns. It remains to be seen whether the new government will follow India’s security concerns according to the needs of the power blocs or emphasize continuity. It is necessary for not only Bangladesh but also other nations in the region to be aware because when elephants fight it is the grass that suffers.

In over seven decades of the communist rule, new norms of Chinese society and policies have evolved. Founded in 1921, the Communist Party of China (CPC) in early days was influenced by Soviet models of ethnic policy, and thus emphasized the right to self-determination for minority groups. In a similar way to Nepali Maoists’ policy of attracting diverse ethnic groups to the ‘People’s War’, the CPC sought allies against the Kuomintang during the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949). 

After getting to power, the CPC created five autonomous regions Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia, granting the ethnic minorities a degree of self-governance. In addition, 29 autonomous prefectures were created, dedicated to different minorities. As the CPC’s grip became stable, especially during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), it began to promote Han Chinese cultural norms, sometimes suppressing ethnic minority languages, religions, and customs. 

With the rise of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, ethnic policies saw a shift. The CPC introduced more lenient policies, allowing the revival of ethnic cultures and traditions. Economic development programs targeted ethnic minority regions, aiming to reduce poverty and promote stability. 

If China, where over 91 percent of its population is Han, needs to address the ethnic issues to unite her 56 nationalities, a country like Nepal with 125 distinct ethnic groups and no one ethnic group as a majority, certainly needs to find common dreams to bind all of us together. 

In this context, I came across Xi Jinping’s speech “Heighten the Sense of National Identity and Improve the Party’s Work on Ethnic Affairs in the New Era”, included in his work ‘The Governance of China’ Volume IV.  

Xi emphasizes the Chinese approach to ethnic issues, strengthening law-based governance of ethnic affairs, and preventing and resolving major risks and hidden threats in ethnic affairs. He cites the policy of reform and opening up introduced in 1978, and reiterates the Chinese nation as one family and one single community and the shared identity brought forth by the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012.

Xi highlights national rejuvenation and common prosperity as common dreams. He proposes making it a major task for the new era to motivate all ethnic groups to build China into a modern socialist country. His recipe includes cultivating in all ethnic groups a growing sense of identity with the home country, the Chinese nation, and Chinese culture. He suggests upholding the equality of all ethnic groups.

In searching for a balance between ethnic autonomy and implementation of central policies, he emphasizes on supporting ethnic groups in their economic development and all-round improvement. In my opinion, this advice is transferable.

Xi upholds the management of the ethnic affairs in accordance with the law. Perhaps this can be a milestone in creating a society where all citizens are equal. On top of all these, Xi advocates safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and encouraging, through education and guidance, all ethnic groups to carry forward the patriotic tradition and consciously safeguard the unity of the country, national security and social stability.

He proposes improving ethnic works by balancing commonality and diversity and by accommodating ethnic and regional factors, with a view of increasing commonality. He says this is the only way to manage ethnic affairs properly and efficiently and deliver concrete results.

Xi rightly points to the need of properly understanding the relationship between commonality and diversity that exist among ethnic people, and calls for promoting commonalities while also accommodating differences. In line with Chanakya, Xi advises always putting the interests of the nation first, and says ethnic identity should be subordinate and subscribe to the sense of national identity. However, he also says while ensuring the overall interests of the Chinese nation, they must ensure the specific interests of each ethnic group. He considers both Han chauvinism and regional ethnic chauvinism detrimental to the building of the Chinese nation as one community.

He suggests “to properly understand the relationship between Chinese culture and cultures of individual ethnic groups. The fine cultures of the latter constitute an integral part of the former. Chinese culture is like the trunk of a tree, while individual ethnic cultures are branches and leaves; only when the roots are deep and the trunk is strong can the branches and leaves grow well.” In China’s case, by virtue of population, the Han culture is Chinese culture. However, in Nepal a vacuum is being created as the established common culture is being attacked as alien, foreign, chauvinist, dated, conservative, and divisive.

Xi says, reform and development should serve the goals of reinforcing the sense of national identity, safeguarding unity, opposing division, improving the wellbeing of the people, and gathering extensive support so as to make our nation a strong community. This view can be applicable in dealing with Nepali ethnic issues. Let’s strongly counter the divisive plots. 

China is pushing popularization of the standard spoken and written Chinese language, known as Putonghua or Mandarin, while at the same time protecting the spoken and written languages of all ethnic groups as well as their rights to study and use their own languages. Nepal should not overlook the role a standard Nepali language plays; we should give a top priority to fixing its hijje the spellings. Nepali hijje system has received intentional and unintentional blows, some in disguise of reforms, some as results of negligence, some as a mechanical copying from foreign languages.

Nepal needs to adopt special policies to support backward areas, based on local natural resources, development conditions, and comparative strengths. We need to focus on poverty alleviation in tandem with rural revitalization, to achieve more efficient and higher-quality development of agriculture and related industry, to build the countryside into a pleasant place to live and work, and to provide farmers with a prosperous and happy life.

The author is professor of pharmacy at Tribhuvan University

Over the last three weeks, I have been trying to follow as closely as possible the dramatic situation unfolding in Bangladesh.

As I write this, Sheikh Hasina is no more the Prime Minister of the South Asian country.

The violent protests were triggered by the decision of a High Court in Bangladesh to reinstate extremely generous public jobs quota for the descendants of the martyrs and veterans, who had fought the independence war against Pakistan.

Disenfranchised students, alienated from a system that is corrupted and rife with governance malpractices, protested to assert their rights at getting the jobs available.

Initially peaceful, the protests soon turned into a violent and bloody mayhem with the state machine showing total brutality.

Indeed, the state’s reaction was harsh, vicious, ruthless and cruel.

Law enforcement agents and members of the students’ wing of the Awami League, the thuggish BCL, showed no mercy, no containment.

As a consequence, extreme violence was unleashed. And then, finally, the regime fell.

Abu Sayed, an unarmed student standing with his arms stretched in defiance, was savagely shot dead.

Student leaders were taken away from their homes in the middle of the night and even those recovering in hospitals were forcibly removed from their beds despite the pleas from doctors and family members.

The result was hundreds of students killed and thousands jailed. The picture is complex due to the fact that Bangladesh could be defined as a semi-authoritarian regime governed by the same person, Prime Minister Hasina and her party, the Awami League, for 15 years.

Indeed, there have not been competitive elections since 2011 and the Awami League has become an overtly dominant party.

Geoffrey Macdonald, a Senior Advisor for the International Republican Institute and a Visiting Scholar with the US Peace Institute wrote, just a few months ago, an analysis on the current political situation in Bangladesh.

It was fittingly entitled “A Perilous Moment for Bangladesh’s Democracy” as the author describes the features of a polity that de facto could soon increasingly become close to resembling a single party system.

The opposition parties, especially the Bangladesh National Party and the Islamist Jaamat, have been at the receiving end of the government’s crackdowns over the last decade, and are now unable to operate freely, allegedly joined in the protests.

For the government, they were the main culprits, the cause for the violence that ushered in.

According to an official narrative that the former ruling party was spinning, they were even plotting to take over the official residence of PM Hasina.

In the end, the mass movement driven by students but filled by common people did the job.

Law enforcement officers also paid a high price as some of them even got killed and wounded.

The situation has been even more chaotic and difficult to understand with the government officially banning the internet for over 150 hours.

While it is hard to put all the pieces together, what is certain is that too many students paid with their lives and this should have never happened.

The internet ban is something I experienced firsthand. Over the last two weeks, I tried to access local news outlets from Bangladesh multiple times, to no avail. 

Then I contacted a promising academician from Dhaka, someone I had met in the course of an international conference. A brilliant scholar, he refused to comment on the developments, even anonymously.

He felt ashamed about what was unfolding in his country but it was too sensitive, too risky to comment.

His refusal was an indicator that it is indeed a dangerous time for democracy and liberties in the country.

At the end, last week, I got in touch with Jahed Salim, a senior reporter with Massranga Television, who was willing to share his views.

During our interaction, the situation was getting much better and no one was forecasting the fall of the Awami League.

“After the imposition of curfew, normalcy seems to be returning to the whole country, including the capital Dhaka. With the easing of curfew, offices, courts and business establishments have reopened. Till now we have not received any reports of disturbances in the whole country” he shared via email.

I asked Jahed if there would be some sort of accountability and justice for what happened.

“A judicial inquiry has been arranged into the early riots, especially the killings by the police on July 17. In this case, I think action will be taken according to the inquiry report. But the violence also took place with the brutal killing of members of law enforcement agencies. I feel that the government is very strict on this matter”.

Indeed, despite the limited freedom of expressions, newspapers like the Daily Star have been unequivocally adamant at demanding accountability.

Hasina, after further escalating the tensions by calling the students “traitors”, had exercised restraint, with a promise to deliver justice. She also paid a visit to some of the youths wounded in the violence.

It was all too late.

Yet, apparently many in Bangladesh harbor doubts on bringing to justice those who disproportionately used force, especially against unarmed students.

“The issue of BCL, the former ruling party youth organization, will probably be seen “politically”. I don't think anyone will be brought to justice,” Jahed had explained me.

The latest developments indicate that there will be accountability and the members of the BLC will pay a heavy price, but hopefully their punishment will follow the rule of law rather than the chaos and hatred of revenge.

The involvement of opposition parties in the protests is now almost an indisputable fact. They saw an opportunity and exploited it by causing destruction.

“Although it is called a students’ movement, the main opposition parties got involved. This has been observed in the past few movements. Since they cannot go on the streets due to the sternness of the government, they infiltrate various movements and try to achieve their interests,” Jahed explained.

“There was a real possibility that external forces comprising members of some of the opposition parties would carry out such brutality if given the opportunity. Because they have been conducting activities underground for a long time. However, the students’ movement had no idea that it would become like this. It is very painful.”

I asked him if there was any possibility that the protest focused on employment quotas, would turn into something with a far more broadened and radical agenda, the overthrow of the ruling party.

He had rejected that possibility but what happened is the opposite.

People in Bangladesh have started expressing a strong antipathy and dissatisfaction against PM Hasina and her party.

Those who dared to oppose the government in the past were at risk of facing serious consequences.

Let’s not forget that in January Nobel Laureate and Grameen Bank founder Professor Muhammad Yunus was convicted to a six-month jail term due to some bogus charges of money-laundering, tax evasion and corruption in some.

Now Prof Yunus is going to play a key role in the interim government.

In this case, my interlocutor proved wrong but many were thinking the same. Over the weekend, there was a turning point with people expressly demanding the PM’s resignation, something that was not seen as a possibility just a few days ago.

“It seems that the students will not go for any attempts at pulling down Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from power. However, those who are on the opposition that are trying to use the opportunity. They have already called on everyone to unite in a one-sided demand for the downfall of the government”.

Yet what happened in Bangladesh showed how protests can quickly turn into something much bigger.

In the case of Bangladesh, a peaceful mass movement by students turned into a bloody crackdown by the authorities and then it turned into a real revolution.

If, after the initial violence, there was a different reaction, a real remorse, the Awami League could have introspected and saved itself

In the last days before her fall, Sheikh Hasina tried to make amends with the students, inviting them to the palace but the lid was already open, years of ruthless governing could not be undone with a belated request of dialogue.

What is happening in Bangladesh is extremely concerning.

What unfolded in Bangladesh has been brutal and traumatic, a black chapter for the whole of South Asia.

This is unfortunate because democracy is way too important, not only for the young citizens of Bangladesh but also for all the citizens of South Asia.

Nepalis should take note of what is happening not that far from home.

They should re-assert their commitment to upholding one of their most precious, though sometimes often undervalued assets: Democracy and rule of law based on justice and fairness.

Now a new chapter is opening for Bangladesh and hopefully the high-stake confrontations among parties, nepotism and violence of the past will be undone and democracy now will have a real chance to flourish.

Views are personal

The predicament of Bhutanese political prisoners raises profound questions about human dignity and the international community’s role in safeguarding human rights.What could be the primary need of these political prisoners: Food, clothing, shelter, or their very identity? How might people feel when they have no home to claim in the entire world? How would they feel when, after spending years in prison as criminals in their own country, they find they have no family to connect with and no place to call home? How might they feel upon discovering they have lost their family members while in prison, leaving them with no one to call their own? 

This is the reality of political prisoners in Bhutan.

Bhutan has declared itself the happiest nation on Earth on the basis of its Gross National Happiness index (GNH). What an irony: On the one hand, it has forcibly removed and is still expelling its political prisoners, while on the other, it uses GNH as a soft power to obscure its country's violations of human rights. Bhutan's 1992 National Security Act (NSA), which replaced the 1957 statute, is used to hold a large number of political prisoners. The Chamgang jail, for example, is intended to house political prisoners in accordance with Bhutan’s 2009 Jail Act. The political detainees, however, have been found in Rabuna and there may be more, as the Bhutanese government does not disclose the number of political prisoners.

Bhutan’s nation-building efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s were dominated politically by the Buddhist ethnic majority, who enacted policies that disadvantaged the country’s largest minority, the Nepali-speaking Hindus. Accusing nonviolent political and anti-discrimination campaigners of violating national security laws, Bhutanese courts imposed lengthy sentences on them. Many of the defendants in these cases, which date back to when Bhutan changed from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy in 2008, are currently serving lengthy prison terms, some of which are life sentences. While some political prisoners have received amnesty, a large number are still behind bars and the number is unknown. Those who are freed confront enormous obstacles: They are driven into exile and are unable to reintegrate into their country; they have experienced physical and psychological anguish; they are also devoid of identity and possessions.
Among these political prisoners are Madhukar Magar, Ram Bahadur Rai and Man Bahadur Khaling Rai, who, after years in Bhutanese prisons, were released and entered Nepal via Mechipul after being left at the Indian border (Jaigaon). The Indian administration has facilitated Bhutan by transporting refugees to the eastern Nepal border. This situation aggravates the plight of these political prisoners, as Bhutan’s expulsion and denial of their citizenship contravenes Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “Everyone has the right to a nationality”.

Bhutan is subject to customary international human rights law, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is not a party to either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, political prisoners were and are still forcibly removed from their homes, subjected to cruel trials, and tortured. So, is this the problem with the UDHR's non-binding nature? Or perhaps they ought to have been granted the rights in accordance with CIL?

From an early age, we are taught that human rights are universal, inalienable, and equal, inherent by virtue of our humanity. So why are Bhutanese political prisoners denied these rights? Is there a flaw in our understanding of human rights, or are they merely a constructive narrative? Why can't universally acknowledged human rights protect Bhutanese political prisoners, and who is responsible for their protection (R2P)?

When a state fails to safeguard its citizens, the international community is obligated by paragraph 139 of the Responsibility to Protect(R2P) to interfere through diplomatic and other peaceful measures. The United Nations, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch have been exposing and denouncing Bhutan's abuses of human rights for years and the world is also aware of Bhutan's practice of forcibly transforming its Lhotsampa residents into illegal migrants and banishing them. Nepal has been housing hundreds of Bhutanese refugees for humanitarian reasons, as the nation is not a signatory to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Through the collaboration of UNHCR, IOM, and other agencies, over 100,000 refugees were resettled in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Europe. Roughly 7,000 refugees have remained in Nepal, notwithstanding the resettlement project.

The question of who will defend their rights  remains unanswered. According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the ICC only has jurisdiction over offenses committed after July 1, 2002. Bhutan is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the human rights abuses took place prior to the Court's current purview. Cases involving refugees, who have been living in exile for extended periods of time—such as the Bhutanese—would not qualify. Comparably, only a state party can file a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the ICJ lacks personal jurisdiction, is unable to provide legal counsel and is unable to represent persons in court. 

Over the years, support for the Bhutanese refugees from international organizations like the ICRC, UNHCR has diminished. Despite the transition to democracy, the government of Bhutan still does not recognize the refugees as citizens and refuses to repatriate them.  The pursuit of justice in a domestic setting is impossible due to Bhutan's legal framework and its continuous reluctances. The international community must do every bit to secure the rights of Bhutanese political prisoners, who remain among the most exploited and forgotten victims of human rights violations.