Nepal Policy 2.0
We have read more than enough of how and why the victory of the Left Alliance in the polls is a huge loss for India. Almost all who have been writing about it, and let’s be honest, there’s not much else to write about these days either, have mainly focused on how China will be an influential player in Nepali politics in the days ahead. But there’s hardly any piece suggesting India what it ought to do now—if it wants those seen “favorable” to its interests win the next elections—or telling it exactly where it went wrong on Nepal.
Let’s admit it, many perceive India as a power that wants to dictate terms in Nepal and China as a benevolent power that does not interfere. China thus enjoys enormous soft power. The Left Alliance’s victory has much to do with the thoughtless Indian embargo and KP Oli government’s brave resistance against blatant violation of Nepal’s rights as a landlocked country. New Delhi policymakers must understand that the bullying approach coupled with India’s efforts to micromanage Nepal must change. India clearly needs an image makeover and it is not difficult do; all it needs is Nepal Policy 2.0.
The South Block and old Nepal hands in India must accept that their coercive diplomacy vis-a-vis Nepal has not in any way been successful. The Indian approach so far has been: you follow our diktat or we blockade you, and if you still do not do what we say, then we foment a revolution/oust you and have our men take over the reins of government. Maybe this worked in the past, but it’s not going to work anymore as China has entered the scene and our leaders rightly view it as a power that can keep India in check.
The more coercive India gets, the more our leaders—of course, minus some obsolete ones who are yet to grasp the wishes of the majority—will be open to China’s active involvement in Nepal.
Similarly India needs to take seriously the accusation that it does not want Nepal to develop. Its delay in completing infrastructure projects; its companies’ dilly-dallying on starting vital projects even after years of getting necessary permits; and India keeping companies of other countries away from infrastructure projects, especially the ones deemed crucial for Nepal’s development—are the things that anger Nepalis. It’s about time India let go of the unfounded fear of a moderately developed Nepal as a threat to its interests.
India also needs to explain the mystery of border pillars between the two countries moving further along Nepali territory. It needs to initiate dialogue to resolve the long-standing dispute on Susta and Kalapani. Moreover, it has to understand that the arrogance of Indian security forces entering Nepal in uniform and carrying weapons to either awe the locals in border areas or to arrest criminals only add fuel to the fire.
What could be resolved diplomatically and by following the “unofficial” arrangements when it comes to arrest and extradition of criminals between the two countries, India does just the opposite. And we rightly view it as undermining our sovereignty. Controlling the activities of its state governments and border forces would give it less or no bad press and help in creating a new image in the not-so-long run.
Then there’s the issue with the peace and friendship treaty of 1950, which was forced upon the ailing Rana regime. Come on, it is 2018. Instead of taking us for a ride with futile EPG meetings, why can’t India show magnanimity and announce that the diplomats of the two countries will be working on replacing the treaty entirely in a year’s time?
For many Nepalis, India is an important neighbor, but it is at times difficult and insensitive. Now the onus is on India to change this widely held perception.
Illusion of stability
Despite so much skepticism and uncertainty, in 2017, what was almost-impossible suddenly became the rather easily possible. Nepal successfully held three tiers of elections: local, provincial and federal—a feat most Nepalis and anyone else who cared to watch were perplexed by. In a real sense, successfully conducting three elections in a year would have been a giant pat-on-your-back accomplishment for even the most developed of democracies. For this reason, in the eyes of history, 2017 will go down in the books as one that opened up a chapter that no one was confident was even written until we turned the page to find it was.
Perhaps what drove these elections more than anything else was an elusive promise of stability. The past two decades were defined by the contrary ‘political instability’, a buzzword internalized by most, often as an excuse for larger state incapacity, incompetency, rampant corruption and poor governance. Political instability was unanimously blamed for everything by everyone. As such the dream of a state of ‘political stability’ was one that, in our collective psyche, we considered a precondition to overcome all social, economic and political evils.
The announcement of the Left Alliance in the run up to elections, in tandem with their message of stability and prosperity, really thrust the public into a mindset that saw for the first time in a good long while, a glimmer of hope. You have two major political forces, i.e. the UML and Maoist Center, put aside their differences to ‘unite in favor of stability and prosperity’. Nothing could sound better for the ravaged and beat Nepali psyche. It seemed that all at once, Nepali politics had changed in an unprecedented way and wiggled in a tiny space for positive governance.
However, there are no clear signs that things are indeed changing. In fact, the forecast shows more of the same. For example, the Nepali Congress and its democratic alliance, who badly lost the elections, are still running the government. Instead of making way, stepping back and going through a process of introspection, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba is happily steadfast in passing one populist (under-researched and unbudgeted) decision after the next. Albeit a caretaker government, Deuba has so far done little to bring his reign to a close and continues to act as though he has just walked into office with a fresh and popular mandate.
Meanwhile, the victors in this election are spending the majority of their time squabbling over power sharing compromises instead of focusing on a real plan to deliver on their promised ‘prosperity’. So far, no concrete plans or agendas have been set on how ‘development’ would be achieved, how these promised railways and industries will be built and sustained and how the income of average Nepalis will be three-fold over 10 years, as promised in the election manifesto. The reality is so dire that two months after already having won on the promise of stability and prosperity, the leaders are now discussing drafting ‘plans for development’. One can only guess that most of us will have entered old age by the time the discussions are finalized, the plans drafted and approved and finally implemented!
Deep down there is an understanding that the promise of stability was just a coy to coax the public to relent in favor of the Left Alliance and that Leftist mergers are most often simple temporary opportunistic endeavors. As for the promise of prosperity, a cursory look at the UML and Maoist Center ‘plans’ or lack thereof speak volumes about the superficial and illusive nature of the idea of prosperity. Yet, the promise of both stability and prosperity will undoubtedly be best tested in the months to come, after which that tiny glimmer of hope which was seen through the year of elections will likely be little more than a memory.