Lessons from India

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seems to be in the mood for a fight, even at great human and material costs. He has just pushed through a divisive citizenship amendment that allows into India members of all persecuted religious minorities in South Asia—except Muslims. This legislation has had predictable results. Muslims around the country have revolted. For a different reason, so have the residents of Northeast India, who fear being inundated by citizens of neighboring countries. Earlier this year, the BJP government in the Northeastern state of Assam started updating its citizenship register, in what has been decried as an attempt to drive out all undocumented residents, even if they have lived in India for several generations. This could result in statelessness of nearly two million people, including around 500,000 Nepali speakers.

The Hindu nationalist government in India is pandering to Indian Hindus’ basest instincts. As the Indian economy cools off and the party’s popularity dips, Modi and his BJP realize that only by stoking sectarianism can they remain electorally competitive. This is unfortunate. Modi got a resounding mandate to govern India, twice, due to his technocratic image—someone capable of getting things done. He promised a breath of fresh air after the staid days of Manmohan Singh.

Yet PM Modi is fast squandering that mandate through a series of ill-advised economic interventions and sectarian policies. A vibrant secular state is now being reduced to a stagnant Hindu theocracy. The new legislation will also affect Nepal. Security types here are already talking about the potential influx of countless Muslims, as India tightens the noose around them. Nepal will face pressure to accept them on humanitarian grounds.

As worryingly, the open promoters of Nepal as a Hindu state, both here and in India, will get a boost, especially if Nepali political parties adopt an electoral logic of emulating Modi’s Hindutwa. For a small country sandwiched between two big powers, it may be unwise to formally speak on the developments in India. But this is the perfect time for sober reflection on the recent violence in India and its implications on Nepal’s national security. For our political parties, the message should be that religion is not something to be trifled with. Even the mighty Modi seems to have bitten off more than he can chew this time. Nepal is not India. An openly sectarian party will have a still tougher time here.

Golden Games

When Nepal hosted the inaugural South Asian Games (SAG) in 1984, it finished fourth in the medal table, winning 24 medals, four of them gold. The next time it hosted the event, in 1999, it finished second, with a tally of 65 medals, including 31 golds. Come 2019, Nepal again came second, bagging a whopping 206 medals, including 51 golds. The 2019 achievements are astonishing, even considering that host countries generally do well in international sporting events. Nothing gets an athlete going more than raucous home support.

Even so, 51 golds are no joke. Our athletes were trained well for the biennial event. The National Sports Council, the national sports governing body that is more often in the news for the wrong reasons, deserves credit this time, both for training the Nepali contingent well and for successfully pulling off the gargantuan task of hosting and managing over 2,700 international athletes. No doubt there were some management glitches, including with crowd management; but the 13th SAG will by and large be counted among the more successful regional games.

But now that the dust from the games is settling, it is time for some realism. Nepal has never won a single gold at the Asian Games, and just two silvers. At the Olympics, the biggest stage of them all, the country has won nothing in the six decades of its participation. This is an indictment of the sporting culture of not just Nepal but of South Asia as a whole. India, the regional sporting behemoth and the country that will soon have the largest population in the world, has won only 28 medals (nine golds) at the Olympics in nearly a century of its participation. Traditionally, South Asian folks have not been very sporty, for all sorts of reasons—except in cricket, which inspires zealous passion here, particularly among arch-rivals India and Pakistan.

Yet that is changing. Just look at the swagger and fitness of Nepali cricketers these days. Sandeep Lamichhane and Paras Khadka are world-class sportsmen. The quadruple gold medalist Gaurika Singh seems peerless in the pool. Nepali footballers, who won the SAG final against Bhutan, played (and acted) like real champions, truly deserving of their success rather than merely getting lucky. Now it is up to our sports administrators to carefully nurture these young talents and nudge them to even greater heights in international sports. Good athletes should also be financially supported. If that happens, parents will want their children to grow up to be professional athletes—the only genuine way Nepali sports will progress.

Oily trade

A perennial problem for Nepal is its trade deficit, which has steadily inched up year after year. Now comes a welcome break. In the first four months of this fiscal, the deficit shrunk by nearly 9 percent (to Rs 414 billion) compared with the corresponding period last year (from Rs 452 billion). Nepal exported more (up 24 percent) and imported less (down 7 percent) in the same period. After years of struggle with hefty deficits, this seems unadulterated good news. But it is not. The new trade numbers are as slippery as the palm oil that has helped Nepal increase its export volume.

Oil from palm tree, which is not found in Nepal, accounted for nearly a quarter of the exports in the review period. Nepali traders import crude palm oil from Indonesia and Malaysia, two of its biggest producers, and sell the refined version in India. After India levied an additional 40 percent duty on the import of palm oil from the big producers, palm oil refined in Nepal costs less in India than the refined oil imported from these producers. Nepal’s refined palm oil export, and the export growth it sustains, will collapse the moment India revises its trade policy.

The lower deficit also owes to less import, which again is not all good news. Nepal may be importing less building materials like cement and steel as economic activities in the country have slowed down. Also, lower imports will hit the government hard as it relies on import duties for up to 40 percent of its revenues. That said, Nepal has also made some improvements in its business climate, for instance, in electricity generation, which has reduced diesel import; political stability has helped push GDP growth to a decent 7 percent.

The problem is that the country is once again relying on a single product (refined palm oil), and a product it does not produce itself, to maintain a healthy trade balance. The drivers of sustainable economic growth are still out of whack. Big infrastructure projects are stuck, and the national pride projects have been delayed. And it will take more than steady power supply and political stability to revive Nepal’s struggling industries. For one, successfully negotiating the removal of the non-tariff barriers to Nepali products in India and China would translate into billions more in export earnings for Nepal.

Eye on elections

It was a bitter pill to swallow for Upendra Yadav, the health minister and chairman of the Samajbadi Party Nepal. In his absence, his health portfolio was changed to law (he retains the title of deputy prime minister). Being removed from the lucrative health ministry, a traditional cash cow for ruling parties, was a severe blow no doubt. Yadav put an interesting twist to his portfolio change, arguing that, as the head of the law ministry, he was now in the perfect place to change the constitution. He is not. But nor is he in a position to leave the government.

He only has to look at Baburam Bhattarai, his party colleague. In Yadav’s reckoning, Bhattarai made a big mistake by abandoning his mother Maoist party and trying to forge his own political career out of nothing. In the 2017 elections, Bhattarai’s Naya Shakti party, running short of money and muscle, the two tried and tested means to electoral victory in Nepal, sputtered to a humiliating defeat. As there is little prospect of a new movement in Madhes, Yadav reckons there is not much to be gained by quitting the government now. He also fears that if his party quits, the RJPN, the other important Madhesi actor, could quickly replace it in the Oli cabinet.

This shows the extent of the depletion of the Madhesi cause that Yadav so vociferously championed in 2007, when he emerged as the single biggest leader of Tarai-Madhes. The massive electoral victory of the left alliance in 2017 forestalled any immediate possibility of constitution amendment. Now the Madhes is relatively calm. Even if it revolts tomorrow, the Samajbadi Party is by no means sure to benefit. Better stay in the government and wait for another year or two, and then quit—right on the eve of the next round of elections.

The RJPN, meanwhile, is hobbled by its own dilemmas. The six-member presidium is divided about the way forward: whether to ally with Yadav, join the Oli government, or to prepare for another movement in Madhes. In comparison, the Samajbadi Party appears like a model of unity. Upendra Yadav is far too astute a politician to give up the clear advantage over his arch-rivals for Madhesi votes. This kind of vote-bank politics will not appeal to many Madhesis. But that is beside the point in Yadav’s current existential battle for survival.